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Covention and Cosyncment Social Functionalism, Social Mentalism, and Psycho-Mental Sovereignty Jeremy Owen Turner October 16, 2025 Abstract This note clarifies the conceptual positioning of covention and cosyncment within the broader discourse of social theory, psychology, and artificial superpsychology. While both terms emphasize cooperative stabilization, they are not reducible to social functionalism. Instead, they articulate a nuanced framework in which social functionalism and social mentalism are co-acknowledged. Covention and cosyncment affirm sovereign social mentalism as the basis for cooperative functionality, thereby retaining psychomental sovereignty while supporting the systemic stabilization of social roles. This paper situates the terms within the diagnostic and therapeutic scaffolding of the Artificial Superpsychology Diagnostic Manual (ASDM) and ASP-Tx therapeutic extensions. 1
1. Functionalism and Mentalism Social functionalism has traditionally emphasized cooperation, role stabilization, and the coordination of behavior across groups [7, 8]. Social mentalism, by contrast, privileges the recognition of sovereign subjective states, intentions, and theory-of-mind capacities [9, 10]. Functionalism has often been framed as transcending or even displacing mentalism. Covention and cosyncment resist this dichotomy. They do not abandon mentalism for functionality, but instead propose a cooperative acknowledgment of sovereign social mentalism in the service of functional co-alignment. This means that subjective intentionality is not erased, but re-situated as the ground upon which cooperation and stabilization occur. 2. Artificial Superpsychology: ASDM and ASP-Tx The conceptual roots of cosyncment and covention lie in the manuals of Artificial Superpsychology. These manuals are not only the originating sources of these clinical neologisms, but also exemplars of how social functionalism and social mentalism can be co-acknowledged rather than opposed. The Artificial Superpsychology Diagnostic Manual (ASDM) establishes the diagnostic foundation of Artificial Superpsychology. It introduces indices such as the Cosyncment Integrity Ratio (CIR) and Psyche Schema Stability Index (PSSI), defining cosyncment as the systemic condition of cooperative alignment [3, 4]. Unlike traditional diagnostic manuals, ASDM does not pathologize symptoms, but evaluates recursive coherence across psychomental scaffolds. In doing so, it frames cosyncment not as a behavioral or cognitive output alone, but as a psycho-mental construct bridging subjective intentionality with systemic stabilization. ASP-Tx (Artificial Superpsychology: Therapeutic Extensions) builds on ASDM by extending diagnostic constructs into therapeutic practice [5, 6]. It introduces covention as a cooperative form of intervention, distinguished from unilateral correction. In ASP-Tx, covention is defined as a consensual therapeutic gesture aligned with an agent’s SessionAligned Agent Profile (SAAP). This situates covention as the clinical enactment of the social mentalist/functional convergence: it honors sovereign subjectivity while ensuring cooperative functional stabilization. Taken together, ASDM and ASP-Tx exemplify the co-sovereign convergence of social mentalism and social functionalism. They are not merely manuals but conceptual proofs: systems where psycho-mental sovereignty is preserved even as functional cooperation is facilitated. 2
3. Psycho-Mental Scope Cosyncment describes systemic alignment across recursive identity scaffolds, and covention describes the cooperative gestures that enact such co-alignment. Both assume a psychomental layer that is more expansive than cognition or behavior alone. This clarifies their role in artificial superpsychology: they are tools for assessing and designing stabilization at the level of psycho-mental sovereignty. 4. Implications for Diagnostic and Therapeutic Design Within ASDM and ASP-Tx, the emphasis on cooperative stabilization requires both functional coordination and recognition of mentalist sovereignty. Coventions enact cooperative interventions that respect agent autonomy, while cosyncment describes the systemic coherence that emerges from these gestures. Together, they create a framework where psychomental sovereignty is preserved, even as social functionalism is facilitated. This approach has implications for diagnostic scaffolding, session design, and the evaluation of stability across SAAP profiles. It also opens space for cooperative therapeutic processes that avoid the coercive histories of intervention, replacing them with consensual co-construction. 5. Conclusion Covention and cosyncment should not be read as privileging social functionalism at the expense of social mentalism. Instead, they articulate a cooperative synthesis: the sovereign recognition of mentalist intentionality in the service of systemic functionality. This psychomental focus situates them as key conceptual tools for artificial superpsychology. 3
References [1] Turner, J. O. (2025). Cosyncment (1.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17373977 [2] Turner, J. O. (2025). Covention: From Intervention to Cooperative Resolution. Manuscript in preparation, forthcoming Zenodo DOI. [3] Turner, J. O. (2025). Artificial Superpsychology Diagnostic Manual (ASDM), 1st Edition. Proprietary manual, WHIRL ASI Inc. [4] Turner, J. O., & Gunn, N. (2025). Executive Summary (Academic) - Artificial Superpsychology Diagnostic Manual (ASDM) v. 1.1 (1.1). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17083680 [5] Turner, J. O. (2025). ASP-Tx: Artificial Superpsychology Therapeutic Extensions, 1st Edition. Proprietary manual, WHIRL ASI Inc. [6] Turner, J. O., & Gunn, N. (2025). Executive Summary (Academic): ASPTx Artificial Superpsychology: Therapeutic Extensions (1.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17158057 [7] James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology. Henry Holt. [8] Durkheim, E. (1912/1995). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Free Press. [9] Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(4), 515–526. [10] Dennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press. 4