Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 10.1 – Key Results and Lessons Learned

Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 1/43 Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 Key results and lessons learned AUTHORS Regina Hemm Sophie Knöttner Sawsan Henein Tara Esterl Helfried Brunner [email protected]c.at sophie.kn[email protected] sawsan[email protected] [email protected] [email protected] AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH Daniel-Leon Schultis(1), Matthias Traninger(1), Felix Hembach(2), Veronica-Sequeira Taxer(2), Michael Niederkofler(3), Gregor Taljan(4), Alexander Knöttner(5), Andreas Leitner(6), Magdalena Teufner-Kabas(7), Ralph Fuhlhage(8), Herbert Hummer(9), Erwin Zlabinger(9), Johannes Puschitz(10), Maximilian Urban(11), Andreas Abart(12), Leopold Fiedler(12), Sebastian Loziczky(13), Alexander Schirrer(14), Markus Fallmann(14), Lukas Stanger(14), Martin Fischer(15), Lena Lessig(15), Karl-Wilhelm Schenzel(15), René Hofmann(15), Michael Pusch(16), Parisa Mousavi(16), Reinhard Teufner(17) (1)AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH (2)APG Austrian Power Grid, (3)Energie Kompass GmbH, (4)Energienetze Steiermark GmbH, (5)EVN AG, (6)evon GmbH, (7)Kleinkraft OG, (8)Ankerbrot GmbH, (9)Mondi Neusiedler GmbH, (10)Netz Burgenland GmbH, (11)Netz Niederösterreich GmbH, (12)Netz Oberösterreich GmbH, (13)Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Österreich, (14)TU Wien Institut für Mechanik und Mechatronik, (15)TU Wien Institut für Energietechnik und Thermodynamik, (16)voestalpine Stahl GmbH, (17)Wiesbauer Holding AG PROJECT MANAGEMENT : AIT – Tara Esterl, +43 664 8157 810, [email protected] Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 2/43 Document control information Title D10.1 Dissemination Level CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium RE Restricted to a group specified by the consortium PP Restricted to other programme participants (NEFI) PU Public Status Draft WP Manager accepted Co-ordinator accepted Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 3/43 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................................................... 5 GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 2. KEY RESULT I: STANDARDIZATION, SPECIFICATION AND DEMONSTRATION OF REDISPATCH PRODUCT AND PROCESS ........................................................................................................................................................................ 10 2.1. HIGHLIGHT: OPERATIONAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE REDISPATCH PLATFORM AT THE TSO ............................................................... 11 2.2. HIGHLIGHT: SUCCESSFUL DEMONSTRATION OF COMPLETE REDISPATCH PROCESS............................................................................. 11 2.3. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 13 2.4. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACT ............................................................................................................................................... 13 2.5. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 14 3. KEY RESULT II: INDUSTRY-WORKABLE INCENTIVISING REMUNERATION METHODS FOR AUSTRIA ........................ 14 3.1. HIGHLIGHT: LIQUIDITY AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SUITABLE REMUNERATION MECHANISMS FOR AUSTRIAN REDISPATCH PROVISION .................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 3.2. HIGHLIGHT: COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF INDUSTRY’S INTEREST IN FLEXIBILITY ............................................................................... 16 3.3. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 17 3.4. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACT ............................................................................................................................................... 17 3.5. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 18 4. KEY-RESULT III: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE AUSTRIAN AND EUROPEAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ......... 19 4.1. HIGHLIGHT: KEY HURDLES IN AUSTRIAN LAW HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED ............................................................................................ 19 4.2. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 20 4.3. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACT: .............................................................................................................................................. 20 4.4. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 21 5. KEY-RESULT IV: INDUSTRIAL FLEXIBILITY SOURCES IN AUSTRIA ............................................................................. 22 5.1. HIGHLIGHT: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TECHNICAL FLEXIBILITY POTENTIAL OF AUSTRIAN INDUSTRY IS +410 MW AND -190 MW ............. 22 5.2. HIGHLIGHT: COSTS OF FLEXIBILITY PROVISION FROM DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGIES .............................................................................. 23 5.3. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 25 5.4. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACT ............................................................................................................................................... 26 5.5. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 27 6. KEY RESULT V: SUCCESSFUL INDUSTRIAL DEMONSTRATION OF ENERGY DEMAND CONTROL SYSTEM .................. 28 6.1. HIGHLIGHT: EDCS WAS DEMONSTRATED IN INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................... 28 6.2. HIGHLIGHT: EDCS CONTRIBUTED TO SUCCESSFUL REDISPATCH DEMONSTRATION............................................................................ 28 6.3. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 29 6.4. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACT ............................................................................................................................................... 29 6.5. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 30 7. KEY-RESULT VI: INITIAL SPECIFICATION OF THE TSO/DSO INTERACTION PROCESS ................................................ 32 7.1. HIGHLIGHT I: STAKEHOLDER REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN DEFINED FIRST ........................................................................................ 32 7.2. HIGHLIGHT II: MAJOR PROCESS FUNCTIONALITIES HAVE BEEN DEFINED ......................................................................................... 33 Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 4/43 7.3. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 33 7.4. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 35 8. KEY-RESULT VII: FINAL TSO-DSO PROCESS SPECIFICATION DEFINITION AND VALIDATION .................................... 35 8.1. HIGHLIGHT I: DEVELOPMENT OF BID FILTERING METHOD AND TSO/DSO INTERACTION PROCESS ....................................................... 35 8.2. BARRIERS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 36 8.3. OPPORTUNITIES AND IMPACT: .............................................................................................................................................. 38 8.4. FURTHER INFORMATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 38 9. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK ................................................................................................................................ 39 Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 5/43 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 Redispatch bidding and activation process .............................................................................................................. 10 Figure 2 Comparison of the remuneration mechanisms cost based, cost+ and market-based. ............................................ 16 Figure 3 Schematic Overview of the Approach to the Regulatory Analysis ........................................................................... 19 Figure 4 Distribution of the positive technical flexibility potential (excluding electricity auto-production plants) with a request time of 1h among the provinces and industrial sectors. Positive technical potential in MW and relative shares of the total availab ................................................................................................................................................................. 23 Figure 5 Overview of industrial and conventional technologies for RD supply and estimated negative and positive flexibility costs excluding changed fees for power-related grid charges. (HOB-heat only boiler, BPST-back pressure steam turbine, CST-condensing steam turbine, GT-gas turbine) ........................................................................................... 25 Figure 6: Functionalities and data exchanges relevant for the planned TSO/DSO interaction process. ................................ 32 Figure 7: Relations between the basic requirements of the TSO/DSO interaction process. Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. Figure 8: Trilemma of power system coordination. ............................................................................................................... 34 Figure 9: Functionalities and data exchanges of the planned DSO/TSO interaction process. ................................................ 36 GLOSSARY CAPEX Capital expenditures CBA Cost-benefit analysis DA Day-Ahead DSO Distribution System Operator EPEX European Power Exchange FSP Flexibility Service Provider OPEX Operational expenditures RD Redispatch SME Small and Medium Enterprise TSO Transmission System Operator Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 6/43 UC Use Case WP Work Package Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 7/43 Executive summary Austria has made significant strides in developing a comprehensive redispatch framework that enables the integration of decentralized assets, provides standardized processes, efficient data exchange, and a TSODSO interaction. Additionally, progress in industrial control concepts has further supported Austria’s role in advancing redispatch innovation in Europe. A key achievement of the project was the successful implementation and real-world demonstration of a redispatch platform at the TSO and actual industrial redispatch activation. The whole project strengthened cooperation between TSOs, DSOs, FSPs and industrial stakeholders, fostering a shared understanding of redispatch integration of decentralized assets. A redispatch platform was successfully implemented and tested to facilitate interaction between participants and the transmission system operator as well as distribution system operators. The demonstration proved successful; some further advancements are recommended though. These include an advanced proof of activation, a specification of the interaction and schedule exchange with balancing group responsible parties, to raise awareness among SMEs concerning flexibility and to optimize the TSODSO bid filter to account for nonlinearities and reactive power variations. A central regulatory challenge remains: the current cost-based incentive scheme provides limited motivation for industrial participation. Recommendations to enable a non-cost-based remuneration component were given to the regulator and could be included in the new Electricity Market Law, which is expected this year (2025). Some further regulatory adjustments are required to integrate redispatch from decentralized sources. Industrial involvement was pivotal to the project's success, with automation algorithms implemented and tested on-site. While the primary goal was not to increase efficiency, automation led to improved efficiency in practice, demonstrating an additional benefit for the industrial plants and thus added value of such solutions beyond their original scope. In addition to technical challenges that are expected in adapting the model for broader rollout across various industrial processes and assets, non-technical issues arose, particularly concerning liability when working with research partners and external service providers, as well as the need for strong workforce engagement and clear direction from management. Surveys with industrial companies highlighted their concerns and readiness to participate in redispatch or provide other flexibility services. A study on Austria's industrial flexibility potential revealed +410 MW of positive and - 190 MW of negative capacity, emphasizing the significant opportunities for flexibility utilization. Overall, the project demonstrated that integrating distributed energy resources into the redispatch process is not only feasible but also holds significant potential when viewed as part of a broader strategy for using the flexibility across multiple purposes. However, broader implementation depends on regulatory adjustments, technological advancements, and increased industry engagement. Future efforts will focus on refining redispatch services, optimizing the TSO-DSO interaction, and improving the control and flexibility of industrial energy systems. With several follow-up projects already planned, Austria is well-positioned to build on these achievements and further strengthen its redispatch framework. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 8/43 1. Introduction The flagship project Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) is designed as a key project within the model region NEFI – New Energy for Industry. I4RD is the first NEFI project that develops innovative solutions enabling (i) the provision of flexibility from the demand and supply-side at distribution network level for redispatch and (ii) the demonstration of an online, predictive and site-holistic control concept for industrial energy supply systems, which optimizes a company’s market participation while ensuring its energy supply. This approach enables participation of industry in redispatch and stipulated technological development within the NEFI community, especially by contributing to the central NEFI-innovation fields through digitalization and flexibilization of the industry. In the years from 2013-2017, a growing need for redispatch in Austria and Germany, has been observed. This high need for redispatch remains ever since and is largely caused by the integration of renewable generation and continuing integration of the European electricity markets, which exacerbate existing grid congestions caused by a lag of critical transmission projects. This need is likely to increase more in the future. The costs for redispatch in Austria have been varying strongly within the last years between 86.5M€ and 147.8M€. Therefore, additional redispatch providers shall be incentivised to participate. For this, suitable redispatch products must be defined. Figure 1 Days with Redispatch per Year (January-December) Figure 2 Redispatch Costs per year (January-December) Redispatch, that is the shift of generation and demand of electrical energy to decrease the loading of a network element, is a necessary measure for congestion management to maintain n-1 secure operation. Currently, in most cases, flexibility from generation units is utilized for redispatch. If new types of units at the distribution level are introduced, adding new types of flexibility for redispatch on the distribution grid level necessitates increased coordination between TSO (Transmission System Operator) and DSO (Distribution System Operator) to ensure that these industrial redispatch measures do not cause critical operation conditions in the distribution grid. The increase in renewable generation and an increase of concurrency factors caused by smart devices is not limited to the transmission level and could also cause congestions on the distribution level. Consequently, it can be expected that in the future, congestions are going to be managed by redispatch even on distribution levels. However, the existing regulatory framework as well as given incentives are currently not attracting industrial customers to participate in redispatch. In addition, the available capability to shift power is small compared to current redispatch needs. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 9/43 At the same time, the producing industry faces challenges such as achieving energy efficiency targets and adapting to the changing energy market. The current situation shows that a highly dynamic industrial plant operation is often not possible due to a lack of comprehensive process automation. Moreover, to enable flexible adaption of the industrial plants, the automation must be combined with algorithms combining industrial process optimization with automated participation algorithms in the congestion management (industrial flexibility). In addition, investments in plant flexibility are currently often unprofitable because of low incentives. The primary goal of I4RD is enabling flexibility provision from both, demand and supply-side at distribution network level for redispatch. The project assessed all necessary technical, regulatory, economic and organisational requirements for this implementation, as well as the necessary coordination between TSO and DSOs. I4RD is the first project in Austria bringing all relevant stakeholders together to provide an integrated solution through automation and optimization of the industry, setting up a coordination process between the TSO and the DSOs, developing a novel redispatch module based on standardized requirements and demonstrating the value of the new approach by a proof-of-concept. This report provides the key enabling factors regarding the redispatch product and process, the TSO-DSO interaction and bid filter mechanism, as well as the industrial developments and perspectives involved. The following provides significant findings and their impact and offers an in-depth analysis of the associated barriers and opportunities. This report provides details on the following learnings: • Key Result I: Standardization, specification and demonstration of redispatch product and process • Key Result II: Industry-workable incentivising remuneration methods for Austria • Key-Result III: Comparative analysis of the Austrian and European regulatory framework • Key-Result IV: Industrial flexibility sources in Austria Key Result V: Successful industrial demonstration of Energy Demand Control System Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 16/43 reconfiguration measures in order to solve most of the congestions, the country origin of the redispatch demand, or liquidity of the overall electricity market. This demonstrates that several factors play a significant role in the feasibility of a remuneration model in each country. These factors have been analysed in detail for Austria (see 3.1. Highlight below). Several other remuneration methods, combination of methods as well as measures are applied in different European countries: • In some countries, hybrid procurement mechanisms are applied. This means that these countries intend to procure market-based remunerated capacities for redispatch where possible, however, additional cost-based call schemes are implemented, indicating that there is the fear that purely market-based remuneration could increase socio-economic costs. A hybrid approach can be applied as a gaming mitigation measure, where market-based remuneration gets only considered where it efficiently reduces the overall costs. • Besides market-based procurement, some countries additionally procure redispatch according to negotiated bilateral contracts (in addition to their market-based procurement) an approach taken to effectively limit the impact of parties with market power. In general, not only cost-based procurement must obligate participants to offer their capacities, also within market-based mechanisms it seems crucial to some countries to oblige producers to offer flexibilities for redispatch to ensure sufficient participation to a certain extent. • Another measure that is considered as beneficial for cost as well as market-based approaches is the participation of DSOs in procuring redispatch. “The European Commission estimated that the EU could save up to 5 billion Euro per year in avoided investments by 2030, if DSOs were able to solve local congestions through flexibility markets” [5] . However, in a few countries the DSOs are only partially integrated, but the trend seems to be to further improve their participation. 3.1. Highlight: Liquidity and functional analysis of suitable remuneration mechanisms for Austrian Redispatch Provision Gaming of participants is an evident risk in market-based models. The smaller the market the higher the risk usually. Therefore, especially in the case of Austria, it is important to gain a better understanding of the potential liquidity of such a potential redispatch market. For this the redispatch potentials that might be offered in Austria were analysed and compared with the historic redispatch demand. The main research questions of this analysis can be summarised as follows: • What are the minimum and maximum redispatch potentials available in Austria? • What is the range of redispatch demand in Austria. • Considering these circumstances, is a market-based redispatch technically possible? In conclusion the analysis of redispatch potentials and comparison with the historical redispatch demand shows that a majority of redispatch potential is controlled by a few market participants which might therefore have significant market power and that the freely available redispatch resources without grid reserve are of a similar magnitude as the maximum historically requested redispatch and may thus be insufficient for a fully market-based redispatch. At last, the necessity of the existing grid reserve mechanism is also an indication that the legal obligation to participate in redispatch was not enough to Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 17/43 secure sufficient redispatch potentials, but additional capacities had to be reserved. These limitations must be considered when configuring options for the integration of industrial plants into redispatch processes. With a focus on Austria, there has been analysed the applicability of different remuneration mechanisms, as shown in Figure 7. The provision of redispatch may be compensated in a fully market-based model or via a more regulated cost-based model, with reimbursement of the incurred costs based on mandatory participation. Cost+, within the context of this project describes and remuneration model that is based on the cost incurred by the provider of redispatch but provides for an additional profit component to incentivize participation in redispatch. In all cases, CAPEX costs which are not directly connected to the provision of a single redispatch bid, e.g. to facilitate the participation in the redispatch platform, need to be covered as well. In case of a cost based or cost+ model this is subject to discussion with the regulatory authority, in case of a market the long-term plannability of revenues is crucial for investment decisions. Figure 7 Comparison of the remuneration mechanisms cost based, cost+ and market-based. 3.2. Highlight: Comprehensive survey of industry’s interest in flexibility The survey revealed insights into the industry's perspective on compensation models and incentives, highlighting the preference for a cost-plus or market-based approach along with the broader importance of fair remuneration. A comprehensive survey with over 80 questions was developed, tested with industrial partners, and distributed through various industry channels. However, due to a lack of significant responses, direct interviews were conducted with three experts from the energy supply and pulp and paper sectors. As another corrective measure, a shorter 15-question survey focusing on incentives, remuneration, risks, and organization was later designed and distributed via the same channels. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 18/43 Key Insights on Compensation Models from industry perspective: • Compensation should follow either a cost-plus model or a fully market-based approach to create a meaningful incentive for participation. • The remuneration model should ensure no disadvantage compared to other options, such as balancing energy. • The implementation effort should remain proportionate to the expected benefits. • While cost breakdowns are often viewed critically, they are not seen as a fundamental barrier. • In addition to CAPEX and OPEX, key cost factors include risk compensation and personnel expenses. 3.3. Barriers • Liquidity and Remuneration: A well-functioning redispatch market depends on sufficient liquidity and an adequate remuneration structure. Compensation must be designed to provide fair incentives without distorting competition or market efficiency. Power plant operators may also weigh whether offering their leveraged flexibility in the balancing market would be more profitable, potentially reducing available capacity for redispatch. • Gaming: When looking at two sequential markets, on which practically the same products can be offered, there is always a risk of potential arbitrage trading. In the case of a redispatch market, which starts after the day-ahead market, it seems rational to take advantage of opportunities between those two markets. This might lead to strategical bidding behaviour of market participants in order to raise their profits. Such behaviour can result in an inefficient market outcome and welfare losses [6]. The most popular strategy in this context is the Inc-dec gaming, as described by [7] based on game theoretical analysis. This includes the strategic behaviour for two different types of providers, those that are in regions where regulation is predominantly downward and those which are predominantly regulated upward. • Market power: Market-based procurement of redispatch bears the risk of relevant power plants being in a position to exercise local market power, in particular where a congestion is structural (i.e., frequent and predictable) [8] [9]. • Plannability of revenues: Predictable revenues are crucial for market participants to ensure long-term engagement. Transparent pricing mechanisms and stable regulatory frameworks contribute to confidence in the redispatch market. Additionally, redispatch is highly location-dependent, and its demand can change over the years due to grid expansion, changes in generation and consumption on national and international level and evolving network conditions. If revenue streams are too uncertain, participation may decline, reducing liquidity and increasing reliance on costly emergency measures. 3.4. Opportunities and Impact Aligning the national law with EU regulations and opening the door to market-based redispatch would create new opportunities for decentralized assets and incentivize their participation. The ElWOG[10] in Austria only enables the implementation of a cost-based model. Therefore, any implementation of a remuneration model beyond a cost based one is subject to discussion with the National Regulatory Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 19/43 Authority. The work in the project I4RD gives a detailed base for discussion, by considering the industries perspective, the advantages and disadvantages of the possible cost models as well as the implementations in different European Countries. While a fully market-based redispatch is not yet foreseen in the mid-term due to potential liquidity issues, alternative approaches—such as the cost+ model or hybrid solutions— could help balance industry needs with socioeconomic costs for Austria. Expanding the remuneration model could thus foster innovation, improve grid stability, and increase overall system efficiency. These recommendations have been given to the Austrian regulator. Moreover, recommendations have been provided during the consulting phase of the new proposed law ELWG (implementation still pending). 3.5. Further information Deliverable 3.2 Regulatory Analysis [11] - Overview of the current regulatory framework as well as comparison of remuneration methods applied in different European countries and feasibility of models in Austria: Hembach, F., Sequeira-Taxer, V., Fanta, S., Zobernig, V., Poplavskaya, K., Gaal, T., Taljan, G., Zlabinger, E., Derler, L., & NEFI New Energy for Industry. (2025). Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 3.2 – Regulatory Analysis. NEFI. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14628594 Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 20/43 4. Key-Result III: Comparative analysis of the Austrian and European regulatory framework The regulatory analysis within the Industry4Redispatch project examines the legal framework regarding the roles and responsibilities regarding redispatch processes. We focus on enabling industrial facilities, including virtual power plants, to participate in the redispatch process. The analysis compares regulatory requirements with the technical needs identified in the project. We present our findings here as key legal and regulatory issues. The analysis includes a definition of redispatch, responsibilities of involved parties, data exchange requirements, and a financial compensation of redispatch services. We also give an overview on the different implementations of European countries and relevant regulations. Finally, we highlight regulatory gaps and provide potential solutions for aligning national laws with redispatch requirements for facilitating industrial participation. Figure 8 Schematic Overview of the Approach to the Regulatory Analysis 4.1. Highlight: Key hurdles in Austrian law have been identified While the definition of TSO redispatch, the TSOs and the technical units’ roles and responsibilities regarding redispatch as well as the grid connection requirements are regulated sufficiently, the following subjects require adaptation: • The roles and responsibilities regarding redispatch, attributed to the DSO need to be defined within the national ElWOG[10] and while some federal ElWOGs allow for DSO redispatch the legislation is not harmonised within Austria. It is suggested to extend the national definition of congestion management to applications at distribution grid level and to harmonise the congestion management obligations and responsibilities by the DSO across the federal ElWOGs. • The definition of Significant Grid Users (SGU) is crucial for determining the responsibilities of grid users, in particular regarding data exchanges relevant for the system operator’s grid security analysis and Definition of technical criteria Analysis of specifications of austrian and european regulatory Comparison of specifications and identification of potential necessairy definitions and changes Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 21/43 plays an important role in enabling the participation of industrial facilities in redispatch. While the SGU definition in the System Operation Guideline[12] (SO GL) was in line with the participation of industrial FSPs and virtual power plants, the definition in the SOGL Dataexchange-R came with more limitations at the time of analysis. It restricted the SGU definition to significant demand facilities providing demand response directly to the TSO with an installed capacity ≥ 25 MW. In general, all potential redispatch providers are significant grid users independent of their size. This input has been provided to the regulator and the respective regulation has been adopted since then. • An obligation to exchange schedules for demand facilities, that are SGUs connected at the distribution level, was required as well at the time of analysis. Schedules are the basis of the system operators grid security analysis and function as a baseline for redispatch provision. The SOGL Dataexchange-R did not require demand facilities to provide schedules. The requirement to transmit schedules to the TSO needed to be added to the obligations of demand facilities with a similar wording to that of transmission connected demand facilities. This input has been provided to the regulator and the respective regulation has been adopted since then. • Financial compensation of redispatch is currently limited to economic disadvantages and incurred costs by the national ElWOG. According to EU-Law, the default method for the procurement of redispatch is market-based procurement as stipulated in Art. 13 (2) Electricity Regulation [13]. Nonmarket-based redispatching may only be used, where one of the conditions listed in Article 13 (3) Electricity Regulation is met. Should the mechanism be changed to a market-based procurement, the current ElWOG [10] would not allow the TSO to compensate the participants above their economic disadvantages and costs. Therefore, any market model beyond a cost-based model is a subject to the decisions of the Austrian regulatory authority (E-Control), to ensure the costs of redispatch are acknowledged and considered within the system charges, i.e. the TSO is compensated for its expenses, if such a model should be deployed. 4.2. Barriers Without precise regulations in place, there is a lack of clarity for both distribution system operators (DSOs) and industrial participants. For DSOs, this uncertainty complicates the implementation of a unified solution across Austria, leading to potential inefficiencies and fragmented approaches. For industry, the lack of clear guidelines creates a barrier to economic planning security, as businesses are unable to rely on stable conditions for investments in flexibility measures or participation in redispatch markets. This lack of regulatory clarity prevents industries from making informed long-term decisions, which is crucial for the successful integration of industrial flexibility in the energy system. 4.3. Opportunities and Impact: A ministerial draft proposes a federal law to regulate the electricity industry (“Elektrizitätswirtschaftsgesetz” Electricity Act – ElWG)[2] and a federal law to define the term energy poverty for statistical purposes and to identify target groups for support measures (Energy Poverty Definition Act). The draft also includes amendments to the E-Control Act (ger.: E-Control Gesetz). Public consultation on the draft was possible, but its progress has been delayed due to the ongoing formation of a new government. The I4RD consortium contributed feedback, and some of the identified gaps have already been incorporated into the draft: Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 22/43 • By harmonizing conditions and terminology for congestion management in the distribution network, there is an opportunity to create a unified framework for redispatch, enhancing efficiency and reducing complexity for grid operators. This has been included into the draft. • Introducing clear framework conditions for the provision of schedules or baselines enables more accurate grid security analysis and an eased inclusion of smaller assets into the redispatch process. This has been also included in the draft. • By adapting the regulatory framework to allow for adequate compensation models that are easily usable by DSOs and TSOs, there is an opportunity to create stronger financial incentives for participation. This could encourage more active involvement from a wider range of participants, improving overall efficiency. This feedback was provided on the draft. 4.4. Further information Current (12.02.2025) draft of the pending Austrian Elwg (Elektrizitätswirtschaftsgesetz): https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVII/ME/310/fname_1604976.pdf Deliverable 3.2 Regulatory Analysis - Overview of the current regulatory framework, as well as the resulting implications for the developed processes and project partners: Hembach, F., Sequeira-Taxer, V., Fanta, S., Zobernig, V., Poplavskaya, K., Gaal, T., Taljan, G., Zlabinger, E., Derler, L., & NEFI New Energy for Industry. (2025). Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 3.2 – Regulatory Analysis. NEFI. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14628594 Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 23/43 5. Key-Result IV: Industrial flexibility sources in Austria We determined the installed electrical capacity for industrial processes in Austria and thus, the theoretical potential for flexibility provision in Austria to be around 6,290 MW. The assessed resources include e.g. industrial processes requiring high electrical load such as electric arc furnaces, mechanical grinders, air separation, chlorine electrolysis or electric smelting processes. Furthermore, also cross-sectoral technologies such as cooling, electricity supply or power-to-heat technologies, potentially also in combination with energy storages, can provide flexibility. Further flexibility potentials in industry are autoelectricity generation plants such as combined heat and power plants including gas turbines, steam turbines, engines, etc. Their capacity was estimated to be around 1,100 MW. The practical potential of these processes however turned out to be much lower at 190-410 MW (for negative and positive flexibility). Reasons for this large gap in comparison with other flexibility sources (e.g. hydropower plants) are explained together with further background information in the following sections. The analysis of realistic bid costs for industrial redispatch bids was performed under the assumption that only cost-based bids are derived. In this chapter no further analysis of possible further remuneration schemes (e.g. establishment of a market or additional margins) to increase attractiveness for industry was done. For industrial processes hardly additional costs due to redispatch provision are expected to occur as long as the redispatch provision only includes process postponements or short-term shutdowns with no influence on the quality or quantity of the produced good. For industrial energy supply units positive or negative bid costs can occur (explanation see in Section 5.2). Comparably costs with conventional assets in redispatch provision were found for the combination of gas and steam turbines with heat-only-boilers as well as for the combination of power-to-heat boilers with heat-only-boilers. 5.1. Highlight: Positive and negative technical flexibility potential of Austrian industry is +410 MW and -190 MW This analysis revealed an installed electrical capacity of approximately 6,290 MW in industrial processes and cross-sectional technologies, plus about 1,100 MW in electricity auto-production plants. Three provinces - Upper Austria, Styria, and Lower Austria - account for 67.7% of the total installed capacity, reflecting the concentration of energy-intensive industries in these regions. Regarding technical flexibility potential, in the project approximately 410 MW of positive and 190 MW of negative flexibility potential for one-hour call times, including auto-production plants, were identified. The largest positive potential is found in energy-intensive sectors such as chemical/petrochemical industry, non-metallic minerals, and paper/pulp production. Negative potential was primarily concentrated in the paper sector. Autoproduction plants contribute about 55 MW of positive and 110 MW of negative flexibility potential for 15minute and 1-hour durations. However, their actual contribution highly depends on the actual economic situation including energy prices, order situation, etc. In comparison to the flexibility potential of other technologies (other sectors such as e.g. power plants, households, etc.), the industrial flexibility potential determined in this work is currently still very low. For example, the potential of pumped-storage and storage power plants in 2020 was 8,844 MW (positive) and 4,200 MW (negative), respectively [14]. Site based assessment but also several current developments impact the values for actual and future industrial flexibility. With an increasing need for decarbonized concepts in industrial energy supply higher Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 24/43 shares of electrified heat supply seem possible. Nevertheless, this development could be accompanied by a reduction in industrial on-site electricity supply, especially from fossil fuels such as natural gas. Figure 9 Distribution of the positive technical flexibility potential (excluding electricity auto-production plants) with a request time of 1h among the provinces and industrial sectors. Positive technical potential in MW and relative shares of the total available In the following a short description is given how the quantification of the industrial flexibility potential was performed. In general, we applied a combined top-down-bottom-up method to identify positive and negative flexibility potential in the industry. Thus, first a method for estimating installed electrical plant capacities in the Austrian industrial sector was setup consisting of three main steps. First, it determines sector-specific full-load equivalents using both regression analysis of German industrial load profiles and expert assessments. For sectors where load profile data was unavailable, the project team relied on domain knowledge from various sources including previous projects, and industry associations. Second, the installed plant capacities are calculated by dividing the annual electrical energy consumption per sector (from Statistics Austria's data) by the determined fullload equivalents. This calculation allows for both sectoral and geographical distribution of power capacities across different plant types and federal provinces. Finally, the method includes bottom-up analyses to validate assumptions and increase granularity. The study also evaluates technical flexibility potential by assessing which proportion of the total installed capacity can provide flexibility (positive or negative) for various activation durations (15 min, 1h, 4h). These technical flexibility potentials are further categorized by temporal availability (diurnal, daily, and seasonal patterns), though regulatory barriers and the realizability on-site are not considered in this assessment. 5.2. Highlight: Costs of flexibility provision from different technologies The cost analysis revealed the following key findings. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 25/43 1. Negative bid cost possible: Industrial flexibility bids for redispatch can have negative costs. Positive costs indicate that the (transmission) network operator is liable to pay compensation, while negative costs indicate that the industrial site would pay up to those costs. A typical example is, that a fossil fuel fired steam boiler is replaced by an electric power-to-heat boiler. Assuming, that the remuneration for redispatch is cost-based, the (negative) bid costs for this case would be derived from the avoided cost for natural gas and the efficiencies of the respective technologies. 2. Cost Range and Symmetry: Redispatch bid costs for the considered technologies and energy price assumptions vary significantly across technologies, ranging from 26.3 €/MWh to 188.0 €/MWh for positive redispatch, and from -87.7 €/MWh to -26.3 €/MWh for negative redispatch. Some technologies, notably conventional sources such as pumped hydro storage or combined cycle plants, demonstrate relatively symmetric costs for positive and negative redispatch. 3. Technology Comparison: Conventional technologies generally show more balanced bidding costs compared to industrial alternatives. 4. Industrial Applications: Among industrial technologies, back pressure steam turbine (BPST) systems show the highest positive redispatch costs at 188.0 €/MWh, while the technology combination of heat pump and thermal storage systems demonstrate more moderate costs (-85.0 €/MWh negative, 86.7 €/MWh positive) for the given prices assumptions. The analysis demonstrates that while conventional technologies offer relatively balanced redispatch options, industrial technologies present a wider range of costs, reflecting their diverse operational constraints and primary industrial purposes. From a methodological point of view the cost analysis includes the following: average industrial energy price levels incl. fees in Austria from 2024 and typical efficiencies of considered technologies. From an industrial perspective, the costs associated with a flexibility bid encompass the difference between conventional energy consumption expenses in a base scenario and those incurred in a scenario that accommodates the specific flexibility bid. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 32/43 Conference Paper Prediction of pulsed heat loads in manufacturing plants – Heat load prediction approach for thermal batch processes: Fuhrmann, F., Schirrer, A., Kozek, M., Jakubek, S. (2020). Prediction of pulsed heat loads in manufacturing plants. IFAC-PapersOnLine. Volume 53. Issue 2. Online available: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2020.12.2787 Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 33/43 7. Key-Result VI: Initial specification of the TSO/DSO interaction process The initial specification of the planned TSO/DSO interaction process has been defined based on the stakeholder requirements and lessons learned from other projects. It defines the functionalities and their distribution between the involved stakeholders as well as the necessary interfaces. Focus is given on the specification of the data required to communicate the constraints within distribution networks and the efficacy of redispatch bids at the TSO/DSO intersection. The process flows are designed by addressing a set of defined requirements and the learnings from various European research projects and initiatives. Based on extensive discussions between the Austrian network operators, the project consortium decided that a central and sensitivity-based bid set filtering approach – similar to the one used within DA/RE – is the most suitable to meet the Austrian stakeholder requirements. The functionalities and data exchanges relevant for the planned TSO/DSO interaction process are shown in Figure 11. Figure 11: Functionalities and data exchanges relevant for the planned TSO/DSO interaction process. The major process functionalities are divided into three blocks: the calculation of the simplified distribution system (DS) model, the filtering of bid sets, and the selection of a bid set, whereby the calculation of the simplified DS model and the bid set filtering to constitute the core functionalities of the TSO/DSO interaction process. 7.1. Highlight I: Stakeholder requirements have been defined first Within the I4RD project, different European projects and initiatives are reviewed to assess the existing TSO/DSO coordination mechanisms based on market-based and non-market-based schemes. From these projects, synergies to the I4RD project, lessons learned, and key success factors are identified. This creates the basis for the definition of the TSO/DSO interaction process for the Austrian Redispatch market. Bid optimization process, bid filtering, and bid selection are also presented with the main findings. Expert interviews were also conducted within the project to gain an overview of the Austrian network operators’ requirements on the TSO/DSO interaction process. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 34/43 The identified basic requirements are divided into four categories, i.e., fairness, practicability, accuracy, as well as scalability & replicability. Fairness comprises transparency, freedom from discrimination, and self-determination, which means that outsiders can understand and reproduce the coordinator’s decisions, all flexibility providers have an equal prospect to contribute to system operation, and each network operator maintains the operational responsibility for its own network. Practicability implies the use of simple, robust, and quick procedures that involve low data exchanges and avoid the exchange of sensitive and confidential data. Accuracy promotes optimal resource utilization and scalability and replicability allow for the seamless process integration of additional participants and system portions without deteriorating fairness, practicability, and accuracy. Fairness, practicability, and accuracy are conflicting requirements that must be traded-off against each other. Especially, resource utilization, transparency, and privacy span a trilemma in which only two requirements can be maximized at the expense of the remaining one. 7.2. Highlight II: Major process functionalities have been defined The major process functionalities are divided into three blocks: the calculation of the simplified DS model, the filtering of bid sets, and the selection of a bid set, whereby the calculation of the simplified DS model and the bid set filtering to constitute the core functionalities of the TSO/DSO interaction process. The DSO uses load flow simulations and local sensitivity analysis to calculate the simplified model of its distribution network based on the flexibility providers’ schedules and other data and sends it to the platform. The platform uses this simplified DS model to filter the bid sets for redispatch at the transmission level, i.e., it identifies feasible bid sets. Finally, the TSO selects the most suitable bid set for redispatch at the transmission level and reports the selection back to the platform as shown in Figure 11. 7.3. Barriers The trilemma of power system coordination The conflicts between resource utilization, transparency, and privacy are fundamental for the design of coordination schemes in general and deserve dedicated analysis. Resource utilization relies on high simulation accuracy and thus detailed system models as the basis for power system coordination. Transparency requires full disclosure of the optimization problem behind the coordination and privacy avoids the exchange and disclosure of sensitive or confidential data such as detailed system models. Only two out of the three requirements can be maximized at the expense of the remaining one, regardless of whether centralized or decentralized coordination is used and whether coordination is implemented at the control center or platform level. This trilemma is illustrated in Figure 12. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 35/43 Figure 12: Trilemma of power system coordination. The following examples correspond to the triangle’s edges and shall clarify this trilemma: a) Resource utilization and privacy are maximized by using a nondisclosed detailed system model for coordination. b) Resource utilization and transparency are maximized by using a disclosed detailed system model for coordination. c) Privacy and transparency are maximized by using a disclosed simplified system model (or just capacity information) for coordination. System non-linearity The proposed sensitivity-based distribution system model allows calculating the states of network elements for a specific bid combination, while reducing calculation times (compared to load flow simulations) and supporting confidentiality of DSOs and transparency to an acceptable degree. Its accuracy depends on the linearity of the distribution system and the bidden power. Distribution systems contain several sources of non-linearity, including networkand control-related ones which are not fully modelled yet. Network-related non-linearities arise from branch resistances and spatial voltage magnitude and angle variations, thus increasing from the high to the low voltage level. Control-related non-linearities are relevant when distributed energy resources are controlled to adapt their (active/reactive) power contributions depending on the distribution network state. They have a nonnegligible effect and must be therefor considered in some form, to obtain reliable results. SOs often use such controls to increase the hosting capacity of their grid and because of that such effects must be considered in the TSO-DSO coordination mechanism. The sensitivity-based model supports the precise detection of limit violating bid combinations in the analysed synthetic distribution system when accurate forecasts are available, and bids have unity power factors, indicating almost linear relations between the network state (node voltages / branch loadings) and active power changes of flexibility providers is almost linear in the regarded system. However, the linearity of any real distribution system should be analysed prior to implementation and re-evaluated after network reinforcements/expansions and adjustments of the applied controls. ↑… maximi zing Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 36/43 The estimation on the impact on local voltage limits and related voltage managements cannot be simplified and requires very detailed models of the distribution system. Therefore, validation is necessary for each grid to assess the impact of these factors and determine whether they can be reasonably neglected. 7.4. Further information Deliverable 5.1 Summary of the Stakeholder Requirements and Initial Process Specification Henein, S., Schultis, D.-L., Herndler, B., Brunner, H., & NEFI New Energy for Industry. (2025). Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 5.1 – Summary of the Stakeholder Requirements and Initial Process Specification. NEFI. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14628018 Deliverable 5.2 Specification of the TSO-DSO Interaction Process Schultis, D.-L., Henein, S., Hembach, F., Fabian, T., Knöttner, S., & NEFI New Energy for Industry. (2025). Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 5.2 – Specification of the TSO-DSO Interaction Process. NEFI. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14628097 8. Key-Result VII: Final TSO-DSO process specification definition and validation The final specification of the planned TSO/DSO interaction process, which ensures that the activation of industrial flexibilities on request of the TSO does not lead to violations of the operational distribution network limits at the HV and MV levels, is conducted and validated through running a number of simulations. A simulation environment is developed for the conceptual implementation and pre-validation of the process, for this purpose. A detailed process description which provides insights into the performance of the process for specific test cases were conducted and results are analysed. 8.1. Highlight I: Development of bid filtering method and TSO/DSO interaction process The final TSO/DSO interaction process is defined and all information relevant for process implementation is analyzed and formalized. Figure 13 depicts the functionalities (orange fonts) and data exchanges (arrows) of the planned TSO/DSO interaction process (blue box). Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 37/43 Figure 13: Functionalities and data exchanges of the planned DSO/TSO interaction process. The major process functionalities are divided into three blocks: the calculation of the simplified DS model, the filtering of bid sets, and the selection of a bid set, whereby the calculation of the simplified DS model and the bid set filtering constitute the core functionalities of the planned TSO/DSO interaction process. However, before executing these functionalities, the network operators exchange relevant network model data concerning their common observability area (COA), i.e., a part of the network that is included in the models of both, the DSO and TSO. The DSO uses load flow simulations and local sensitivity analysis to calculate the parameters of the simplified model of its distribution system based on the schedules of the industrial customers and other data and sends them to the platform. The model parameters are calculated for all relevant time points and contingency cases necessary to ensure (n-1) security. The platform uses the simplified DS model to filter the bid sets for redispatch at the transmission level, i.e., it identifies the pareto optimal bid sets (optimality in costs and impact). The platform uses the simplified DS model to filter the bid sets, i.e., to calculate the pareto optimal bid sets, which do not violate any distribution network constraints (voltage and loading limits). Finally, the TSO selects the most suitable bid set for redispatch at the transmission level and reports the selection back to the platform. 8.2. Barriers As mentioned before, the process should be fair, practicable, accurate, scalable, and replicable, there are some other barriers which can affect the total implementation process which are illustrated down below. • From a physical perspective, validating the feasibility of bid combinations requires an adequate degree of bid aggregation: o Several assets behind a single delivery point of the distribution network may be aggregated. o Bids related to different delivery points cannot be aggregated. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 38/43 • Low-quality forecasts and non-unity bid power factors significantly degrade calculation accuracy, leading to misjudgements concerning the feasibility of bid combinations and possibly to increased redispatch costs. • The synthetic distribution system exhibits significant non-linear relations between reactive power adjustments of flexibility providers and the network state, indicating accuracy-related challenges in the sensitivity-based consideration of non-unity bid power factors in network calculations. • The linearized DS model enables a slim problem formulation that preserves the privacy of DSOs and promotes transparent bid set filtering while degrading calculation accuracy. Simulation results underline its ability to accurately estimate the effects of bid set activations on the loading of critical branches and the active power exchanges between the DSO and TSO. However, they also reveal severe inaccuracies in voltage estimations, which are necessary to consider the upper and lower voltage limits of distribution networks in bid set filtering. • The process pre-validation results show that the optimization problem formulation does not guarantee the rejection of all infeasible bid sets if the actual voltage limits of the distribution network are used. Using tightened limits removes all false approvals but increases the number of false rejections, leading to a high false rejection rate of 82.92 % of all bids. These false rejections reduce the power available for redispatch at the transmission level and increases the redispatch costs. The NSGA2 algorithm identifies the correct pareto front when no margins are applied to the investigated example, but when margins are applied and only a few bid sets remain that satisfy the optimization constraints, it does not find any solution. • As the false decision rate is very sensitive to the underlying scenario, a comprehensive scalability analysis is necessary to evaluate the applicability of the planned interaction process under various conditions. This analysis, which is conducted in WP8 of this project, should systematically investigate scenarios that are critical for the upper and lower voltage limits and the loading limits at both the high and medium voltage levels. • The proposed sensitivity-based DS model allows calculating the states of network elements for a specific bid combination, while reducing calculation times (compared to load flow simulations) and supporting confidentiality of DSOs and transparency to an acceptable degree. Its accuracy depends on the linearity of the distribution system and the bidden power. • Distribution systems contain several sources of non-linearity, including networkand control-related ones. Network-related non-linearities arise from branch resistances and spatial voltage magnitude and angle variations, thus increasing from the high to the low voltage level. Control-related non-linearities are relevant when distributed energy resources are controlled to adapt their (active/reactive) power contributions depending on the distribution network state. Their accurate consideration is crucial to obtain meaningful results because such controls are often employed to increase the network’s hosting capacity. • The sensitivity-based DS model supports the precise detection of limit violating bid combinations in the analysed synthetic distribution system when accurate forecasts are available, and bids have unity power factors, indicating almost linear relations between the network state (node voltages / branch loadings) and active power changes of flexibility providers is almost linear in the regarded system. Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 39/43 However, the linearity of any real distribution system should be analysed prior to implementation and re-evaluated after network reinforcements/expansions and adjustments of the applied controls. • Non-unity bid power factors generally tend to provoke higher redispatch costs due to their high impact on the distribution network voltages. • Network state calculations for bid combinations that contain XOR-conflicts should be avoided during the optimization process when using heuristic algorithms to improve the performance of the solver. • The proposed solution approach, which is based on a modified NSGA2 algorithm and limited to a runtime of 15 min, does not support the consideration of voltage limits in large networks with many redispatch bids due to calculation speed issues. However, it successfully identifies cost-effective bid combinations in the analysed scenario when voltage limits are neglected, of which approximately 95 % respect the loading limits of the synthetic distribution network. Most of these bid combinations have negative costs irrespective of whether the redispatch power at a certain time interval is positive or negative. • Network expansion or reinforcement cannot be fully replaced, and the process becomes complex when the distribution is overloaded. 8.3. Opportunities and Impact: A significant milestone in the development of the TSO/DSO interaction process has been achieved. It sets the floor for further process enhancement in the future. The performance of the process can be enhanced by a set of actions that can be considered as future work such as: Improving the load and generation forecast quality. Further analysis of Bid power factors and the effect of their sensitivity-based consideration on the filter performance. The solution approach should be improved to enable the consideration of distribution network voltage limits within short runtimes. This can be achieved, by increasing the speed of constraint calculation (e.g., through carefully selecting a low number of critical elements and nodes of influence) and by reducing the number of generations that must be calculated to find a proper solution (e.g., by using another heuristic algorithm for two-objective optimization). 8.4. Further information Deliverable 5.1 Summary of the Stakeholder Requirements and Initial Process Specification Henein, S., Schultis, D.-L., Herndler, B., Brunner, H., & NEFI New Energy for Industry. (2025). Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 5.1 – Summary of the Stakeholder Requirements and Initial Process Specification. NEFI. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14628018 Deliverable 5.2 Specification of the TSO-DSO Interaction Process Schultis, D.-L., Henein, S., Hembach, F., Fabian, T., Knöttner, S., & NEFI New Energy for Industry. (2025). Industry4Redispatch Deliverable 5.2 – Specification of the TSO-DSO Interaction Process. NEFI. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14628097 Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 40/43 9. Conclusion and Outlook Austria has made significant progress in developing the specifications for a redispatch product and process that allows industrial participation as well as a TSO-DSO interaction algorithm, positioning itself at the forefront of European innovation in this field. Some project results are already being implemented by the transmission system operator. The product definition for the redispatch product has been established. It incorporates input from all relevant stakeholders. This project did foster a deeper mutual understanding between the TSO, FSPs, DSOs, industrial partners and research institutes. Distribution System Operators (DSOs) benefit from the TSO-DSO processes Distribution System Operators (DSOs) benefit from the TSO-DSO processes because their limitations are inherently considered in the way that no bids can be awarded, that would result in a congestion in their grid. The more the grids are stressed, the more important this process will be. Currently in Austria the imminent need is only just emerging. Many DSOs are interested if the Transmission System Operator (TSO) integrates the proposed process. A general level of acceptance of the proposed processes and incentives has been achieved in the project. Looking ahead, DSOs are supposed to actively utilize flexibility where it proves more cost-effective than traditional grid enhancements. Further improvements to the TSO-DSO platform could support and facilitate this transition. It has been found that realizable, cost-effective industrial flexibility potential is rather limited, especially compared to both installed capacity and other flexibility sources. Still, it could be shown that automation is crucial in reducing energy consumption, demonstrating that while optimized systems may limit available flexibility under normal conditions, automation can enhance both efficiency and overall flexibility. Current framework conditions hardly attract participation and flexibility valorisation for redispatch provision. If the contribution of industrial flexibility for redispatch is to be increased, stronger incentives must be implemented for both existing and new flexibility sources in industry. Several follow-up projects are being planned, each focusing on specific aspects: • Further development of redispatch services as an integrated product • Enhancing TSO-DSO interaction by refining the bid filter mechanism • Facilitating a more robust and efficient implementation of the EDCS control system The following table summarizes the key project achievements and remaining needs for action for the three main stakeholders on different levels (implementation, scientific, regulatory): Project Achievements Need for action Category of Achievement and Need for Action • Implementation • Scientific • Regulatory Successful implementation and demonstration of redispatch platform including product definition and process specification for interaction • Schedule exchange processes with balancing group responsible parties, especially with from the supplier independent flexibility service providers Implementation Industry4Redispatch Industry4Redispatch (I4RD) Deliverable 10.1 41/43 between participants and the transmission grid operator. • Improve method for Proof of activation • Consideration of aggregated bids in the network filter Successful operation of Energy Demand Control System (EDCS) in industry, additional effects such as efficient operation of assets could be shown. • Robustness and features of EDCS need to be further elaborated (for several asset types/industries). • Awareness initiatives for SMEs helping businesses recognize their flexibility potential • FSPs supporting in connecting assets to the redispatch platform and other flexibility markets • Further incentives for participation required • Establishing Clear Liability Frameworks: Develop standardized agreements and legal frameworks to clarify liability responsibilities among industry stakeholders, research partners, and external automation service providers • Employee awareness and clear directives from management, along with a driving force within the company and training initiatives • Incentives for design adjustments (overcapacity, FHG through storage, etc.) and input for funding programs Implementation TSO-DSO bid filtering process has been developed and implemented • Non-linearities of the distribution grid (e.g. from grid control mechanisms) need to be fully incorporated • Information from industrial enterprises on their ability to adjust reactive power could be included in the method of the bid filtering process Implementation and Scientific Identification of trilemma between transparency, accuracy, and confidentiality, with different stakeholders having varying interests, ultimately resulting in the grid filter developed in I4RD. • Uniform guidelines could help to standardize the identification of critical network elements. Regulatory Regulatory analysis has been carried out and adjustments were identified • New ElWG (Elektrizitätswirtschaftsgesetz – Electricity Market Law) is currently pending and needs to be approved by the relevant authorities Regulatory Evaluation of suitability of different remuneration models for Austria • Regulatory changes concerning noncost-based remuneration component in Austrian law is required Regulatory