A South American Perspective on Antarctic Geopolitics

311© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 S. V. Scott et al. (eds.), Geopolitical Change and the Antarctic Treaty System, Springer Polar Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-9808-7_18 Chapter 18 A South American Perspective onAntarctic Geopolitics DanielaPortellaSampaio Abstract Despite its broad significance for Earth systems, Antarctica has always had more limited political relevance. This limitation is most explicit in relation to the profile of its main actors: the Global North has been a predominant participant in the history of the continent’s regime. A South American perspective offers a counterpoint to this narrative: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay engage directly in decision-making and provide an alternative to an “unreachable” or “exclusive” Antarctic. Likewise, Colombia and Venezuela demonstrate how new actors are pursuing stronger involvement through regional cooperative ties. Mindful of their diverse Antarctic histories, this chapter discusses South American engagement in Antarctica by focusing on how South American geopolitical thought entitles actors from the global periphery to engage in a once-exclusive region. I first introduce the main assumptions of South America’s geopolitical thought, then briefly recount the individual historical journeys of these South American actors in Antarctica. I demonstrate how South America has organised itself regionally through the creation of institutions, such as RAPAL, and cooperative initiatives between national programmes. I conclude with the potential influence of nonregional actors—such as China and the United States—on the future South American geopolitical imaginary of Antarctica. Keywords South America · Geopolitics · Regional integration · Antarctica · Regionalism · Imaginaries D. P. Sampaio (*) Alfred-Wegener-Institut, Helmholtz-Zentrum für Polarund Meeresforschung, Bremerhaven, Germany e-mail: [email protected] 312 18.1 Introduction The “exclusive” character of Antarctic governance has been a point of critique regarding its regime for decades (Chaturvedi 2012, 2013; Mancilla 2019; Triggs 1987). Even preceding the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, the “Antarctic question” pointed to the absence of extensive international society participation, questioning the limited number of actors directly involved in the region. Critics, such as India in 1956, or Malaysia in 1983,1 have encouraged the possibility of the United Nations having direct involvement as an avenue to enlarge participation and promote a more postcolonial engagement in the region. Even non-state actors have advocated for defining the continent as a “common heritage of humankind” (Joyner 1998). Although their motivation was the protection of Antarctica’s environment, non-state actors have also pressured the international community to designate the whole continent as a world park (Parsons 1987). Indeed, from the 12 original signatories in 1961,2 the Antarctic Treaty regime has expanded its membership, with 57 parties in 2024. Notwithstanding this noticeable growth, the regime still has an overwhelming presence of parties from the so-called “Global North” (Hemmings 2022). Popularised during the end of the Cold War period amid discussions of globalisation, the terms “Global North” and “Global South” referred initially to the distinction between developed and developing economies, with the latter being recognised as formerly colonised nations on the path to modernisation (Dirlik 2007). In Antarctica, the predominance of the Global North dates from its discovery, a consequence of economic expansion due to the sealing and whaling industries in the nineteenth century (Howkins 2016). In addition, Antarctica’s first political disputes arose from European nationalist endeavours in the early twentieth century (Hemmings etal. 2015). The predominant role of Global North nations in Antarctica was not limited to their human presence on the continent; it has persisted throughout the years and still accounts for the majority of Antarctic actors. According to the list of Global South countries from the UN’s Finance Center for South-South Cooperation, there are only 18 Global South acceding states; of these, only nine are Consultative Parties3 (i.e., with decision-making powers). This representation falls far below the Global South’s general relevance worldwide measured by population (85%) or even economic output (40%) (Véron 2023). Although scholars have already pointed to the marginalised role of the Global South in Antarctica (Flamm and Verbitsky 2022; Verbitsky 2014), how their few representatives engage in the region has yet to be explored. 1 Malaysia dropped its pledge and acceded to the Treaty in 2011 (Saul and Stephens 2015). 2 Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty 2023a). 3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, India, Peru, South Africa, and Uruguay (Finance Center for South-South Cooperation 2023). D. P. Sampaio 313 In terms of the representativity of Global South nations, South America is the region with by far the highest levels of participation and the longest presence in Antarctica. Argentina and Chile are original signatories, with their presence in the region dating from the beginning of the twentieth century. On the other hand, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay joined the Antarctic Treaty System in the late 1970s and early 1980s, providing a different trajectory for South American engagement. Therefore, exploring the differences, similarities, and encounters of these two tales is revealing of how the Global South has been present in the region. 18.2 South American Presence inAntarctica: Identitarian andGeopolitical/Geoeconomic Imaginaries The origins of geopolitical thinking in the late nineteenth century sought to understand the interplay between territory, geography, and politics in a region (Nolte and Wehner 2015). In this classical perspective, the state is a geographical organism, an entity in search of its continuous existence, becoming the main actor for politics and its subsequent analysis (Toledo 2020). If the discipline focused on the positioning of the state in the international system in order to understand its interactions, the state also quickly developed its own national geopolitical thinking based on its perceptions of itself and of its surroundings. Naturally, the discipline has evolved. In the 1980s, critical geopolitics questioned the state-centrism and the physical determinism of its classical counterpart, focusing instead on the role of discourse in shaping political practices (Agnew 2013). Despite the emergence of a more critical view, different national geopolitical thoughts have continuously influenced states’ preferences for a specific national and/or international order, and thereby their decisions regarding foreign and domestic policies. Therefore, understanding the “sociotechnical imaginaries” that shape such policies and preferences is central to any geopolitical analysis. Sociotechnical imaginaries refer to “collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures (or of resistance against undesirable ones) animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology” (Jasanoff 2015, p.19). Sociotechnical imaginaries shape different geopolitical thoughts, as different worldviews elucidate how a state behaves with regard to its domestic, regional, and global realms. In the Antarctic context, if the first disputes originated from geopolitical tensions in Europe in the early twentieth century—when nationalism fuelled rivalry imaginaries, even at the fringes of the world—contemporary geopolitical developments at regional and global levels will also directly impact Antarctic politics, as we now live in a far more integrated world. However, the question that remains is the extent to which different imaginaries can combine or antagonise, and what consequences these dynamics can bring to the governance of a region. 18 A South American Perspective onAntarctic Geopolitics 314 18.2.1 An Identitarian Imaginary Argentina traces its presence on the continent from the continued occupation of the observatory at Laurie Island since 1904, whereas Chile granted whaling and fishing concessions from 1902 to 1914 (Auburn 1982). This South American presence resulted in formal sovereignty claims over parts of the Antarctic territory in the 1940s. In 1940, Chile released a presidential decree defining the boundaries of the Chilean Antarctic Territory (Decreto Supremo 1747). Argentina, on the other hand, undertook the Primero de Mayo expedition in 1942, which placed plaques on islands on the north of the Antarctic Peninsula, and delimited the boundaries of Argentine territory. In 1943, Argentina formally stated its claims through a diplomatic memorandum to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires (Headland 2020). Argentina and Chile then became original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty, and actively participated in the negotiation of the agreement (Cardone and Fontana 2019). These states’ ongoing involvement in Antarctica did not subside when the Antarctic Treaty came into force in 1961. While the Treaty’s Article IV does not formally recognise any sovereignty claim in the region, both nations kept up intense operational activity through their privileged geographical proximity to the Antarctic Peninsula, and through their several research facilities on the continent. As human activity in Antarctica increased, Ushuaia, in Argentina, became the main hub for maritime tourism in the region; Punta Arenas, in Chile, became a gateway for various national Antarctic programmes operating on the Antarctic Peninsula (Elzinga 2013). Chile and Argentina also maintained an active decision-making role through a continuous engagement in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) (Portella Sampaio 2017). In addition, the headquarters of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat is located in Buenos Aires. Due to their status as claimants, these two nations established a very different bond with Antarctica, compared with other South American states. Whereas Antarctica is integral to Argentine and Chilean social identity (claiming the region is constitutive of their territory and history), the engagement of Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay is, rather, geopolitical and strategic (Barton 1997). The involvement of these four countries with Antarctic matters was sporadic before the establishment of the Antarctic regime, and their accession to the Treaty was far more recent.4 These later signatories have had a far reduced physical presence (with only Brazil and Uruguay operating year-round research stations); institutionally, their participation in ATCMs has been less engaged. This reduced presence is also reflected in the Antarctic scholarship on the history of their individual engagements. The few studies on the role of Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay in Antarctica share a geopolitical framing, in which the presence of these states is justified on the basis of strategic and economic concerns. Therefore, Latin American geopolitical thinking becomes pivotal for understanding how these other South American nations have engaged in the region. 4 All latecomers have acceded to the Treaty since the late 1970s: Brazil in 1975; Uruguay in 1980; Peru in 1981; and Ecuador in 1987. D. P. Sampaio 315 18.2.2 A Geopolitical/Geoeconomic Imaginary Brazil was the first non-original signatory in South America to accede to the Treaty. Although its accession was in 1975, Antarctica permeated the nation’s imaginary long beforehand. In 1956, two scholars from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics published “A Questão da Antártica”, which advocated for a Brazilian territorial claim in the region. Inspired by Pascal Poirier’s sector theory for the Arctic, Theresinha de Castro and Carlos Delgado de Carvalho proposed the “frontage theory”, which projected the meridians from the South American continent over the Antarctic region, defining potential territorial claims for South American nations (Castro 1976). At that moment, the history of South America’s engagement in Antarctica merged with the history of Latin America’s geopolitical thinking itself. Castro and Carvalho were exponents of the Brazilian Geopolitical School, which was deeply influenced by the German geopolitical tradition from the early twentieth century (Child 1979; Hepple 2004; Toledo 2020). The formation of nation-states— recently independent from Iberian colonisation—inherited several challenges from the colonial period, such as boundary and resource disputes. The writings of Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922) and Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904)—who founded the political geography discipline and coined the term “geopolitics”—deeply impacted Latin American military groups and academies, as these groups were in power for significant periods in these states’ recent past (Hepple 2004; Nolte and Wehner 2015). By forging the classic geopolitics perspective, Ratzel sought to understand global processes through the dynamic relation between states, nations, and geography, whereas Kjellén focused on the central role of the state, conflating the role of geography with state politics. For Kjellén, geopolitics referred to the states’ “geographic consciousness” (Puntigliano 2011; Toledo 2020). This idea, in which the state is an organic entity whose existence depends on a living space (Lebensraum), was directly adopted by Everardo Backheuser, a pioneer of the Brazilian Geopolitical School. He stated the need for Brazil to occupy and develop its frontiers in order to consolidate its territorial borders, establishing that the nation’s main concerns should be the unification of national space, industrialisation, and state-led development (Child 1979). Mario Travassos, a contemporary of Backheuser in the 1930s, also focused on the importance of Brazil’s empowerment through an intensification of its territorial occupation. He focused on the country’s east-west axis, which encompassed the Amazon basin and the Bolivian heartland (with the cities of Cochabamba, Sucre, and Santa Cruz), to counterbalance the Argentine influence of the River Plate basin (Child 1979; Hepple 2004). This territorial logic thrived in the country’s military circles. In the 1950s, General Golbery do Couto e Silva proposed not only a strong control of national territories, but also a peaceful continental projection to enhance Brazil’s international influence. Likewise, other geopoliticians, such as Carlos Delgado de Carvalho and Therezinha de Castro, focused on Brazil’s role in the South Atlantic, which included Antarctica. This is the defining point at which Brazil’s geopolitical thinking intermingles with its engagement in Antarctica, influencing other South American states. 18 A South American Perspective onAntarctic Geopolitics 316 In 1957, the Escola Superior de Guerra (High School of War) advised the government not to recognise any sovereignty claim in the region and to resist any form of internationalisation (Andrade etal. 2018). Brazil was not invited to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty, but the question to accede or not to the agreement remained. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry has always advanced an internationalist position regarding the Antarctic. In 1971, João Frank da Costa argued that the country’s position should include accession to the Treaty and the pursuit of a Consultative status in order to be part of its decision-making. In 1975, the Foreign Ministry justified Brazil’s accession on the basis of “strategic and national security issues”, and the possibility of commercially benefiting from Antarctica’s resources (Andrade etal. 2018). In 1982, Brazil became a Consultative Party. The influence of classic geopolitics was not confined to Brazil, as Argentina and Chile also developed their own geopolitical traditions. The Argentine Institute of Strategic Studies and International Relations (INSAR), under the direction of General Juan E.Guglialmelli, has produced geopolitical analysis reflecting on the threat of perceived expansionism by Brazil in the continent, its relationship with the United States, and especially on Argentina’s leading role in the South Atlantic (Child 1979; Puntigliano 2011). In this case, the repossession of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands and the preservation of its Antarctic sovereignty claims were viewed as pivotal to the survival of the Argentinean state. Likewise, in Chile, General Augusto Pinochet was a professor at the Chilean War Academy, andhis years as head of state strengthened the influence of Chilean geopolitical thinking on its foreign policy. Publications such as the Revista Geográfica de Chile showed that the protection of the territory after the Pacific War (1879–1883), its leading role in the South Pacific (through the control of the Strait of Magellan and Cape Horn), and the protection of its sovereignty claims in Antarctica were pivotal for the security of the Chilean state (Child 1979). Classic geopolitical thinking also influenced foreign policy in Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, minus the external projection element observed in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Ecuador’s geopolitical outputs in the 1960s had security and strategic considerations due to disputes with Peru over Amazonian territory (Barton 1997); whereas Peru was concerned with development and socioeconomic issues. In the case of Uruguay, publications of the time show that the country’s “geographical consciousness” was a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil (Child 1979). Regarding Antarctica, the influence of Brazil’s imaginary on Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay is even more noticeable. In 1967, Ecuador’s National Assembly announced the country’s sovereignty rights, inspired by the limits proposed by Castro and Carvalho’s frontage theory, leading to a formal protest from Chile (Zumárraga 1999). Even when Ecuador acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 1987, the National Assembly reified the Ecuadorians’ sovereignty claims (although, by adhering to the Treaty, Ecuador had to abide by Article IV) (Headland 2020). But this perception quickly changed in subsequent years. After organising its first Antarctic expedition, Ecuador applied for Consultative status at the 15th ATCM (1990), but was rejected due to insufficient demonstration of scientific activity (Zumárraga 1999). Later that year, Ecuador inaugurated its seasonal scientific D. P. Sampaio 317 research during its second expedition and was granted Consultative status, along with the Netherlands, in a Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Peru and Uruguay have a less convoluted history. Uruguay established the Instituto Antártico Uruguayo (Uruguayan Antarctic Institute) in 1968; in 1970, the first national convention on Antarctic matters discussed how Uruguay could engage in Antarctic activities (Uruguyan Antarctic Institute 2023). In subsequent years, the Ministry of National Defence incorporated the Uruguayan Antarctic Institute (1975), and more resources became available to foster scientific research. In 1980, Uruguay acceded to the Treaty and accelerated its engagement in Antarctica, establishing a research station during its first Antarctic expedition in 1984 and becoming a Consultative Party in 1985. In Peru, military officers’ trips to Antarctica were followed by accession to the Treaty in 1981 (Sanchez and Tielemans 2015). Peru organised its first expedition in 1988, establishing its seasonal research station. This activity enabled the country to acquire Consultative status in 1989. Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador followed the path paved by Brazil’s internationalist approach. Brazil justified its engagement in Antarctica on the basis of strategic and national security concerns (geopolitical), and the potential commercial gains from Antarctic resources (geoeconomic) (Andrade etal. 2018). Nevertheless, Brazil also acknowledged the primacy of international cooperation and acknowledged the Antarctic Treaty as its legitimate forum. Uruguay, Peru, and Ecuador followed suit. Therefore, one can ascribe this striking difference between South American original signatories and latecomers to the contrast between an identitarian and a geopolitical/geoeconomic framing of Antarctica. And here lies the key feature of this Global South representation: although these South American nations present a very distinct understanding of Antarctica’s place in their state social identity, their sociotechnical imaginaries of Antarctica are convergent, which is reflected in their cooperative patterns and in the institutional apparatus they have created together. I do not claim that South American Antarctic actors have the same imaginaries of the Antarctic; rather, they have convergent ones. Convergent sociotechnical imaginaries mean that two different, performed visions of a desirable future for the same object can co-exist. Antarctica could remain integral to Argentina’s and Chile’s national identity, whilst remaining strategic to Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. These two imaginaries do not contradict each other. In fact, these South American nation-states believe they have many practices and interests in common. 18.2.3 Reflecting Regional Integration: TheInstitutional Novelty ofRAPAL The convergence between identitarian and geopolitical/geoeconomic sociotechnical imaginaries is clearer when one observes the formation of a South American Antarctic identity. In 1987, the directors of the Antarctic institutes of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay identified common concerns with regard to their scientific and 18 A South American Perspective onAntarctic Geopolitics 318 operational activities in the region. After their first meeting in Buenos Aires, they convened subsequent meetings in Santiago (1988) and Montevideo (1989). In 1990, they institutionalised this initiative as a forum, creating the Reunión de Administradores de Programas Antárticos Latinoamericanos (RAPAL), which also incorporated Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru as full members.5 Since then, RAPAL has proposed the promotion of scientific, technical, logistic, and environmental cooperation among Latin American national Antarctic programmes, as well as their collaboration on educational, cultural, and communication matters. As a forum dedicated to the exchange of views, RAPAL has also sought to strengthen the presence of their members and their common interests in the region, coordinating a common position for the group at the Council of Managers of Antarctic National Programs (COMNAP). RAPAL was the first exclusively regional organisation initiative in Antarctica. Although the European Committee for Ocean and Polar Sciences (ECOPS) was established in 1989—almost concomitantly to RAPAL—their mandates were quite distinct, with ECOPS focusing on identifying the biggest challenges to ocean and polar sciences, whereas RAPAL initially focused on coordinating the operation of South American national programmes with regard to their logistic, scientific, and environmental efforts. Both institutions have evolved, influencing the creation of other regional initiatives such as the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences in 2004,but RAPAL has presented a much more stable institutional evolution in comparison to its European counterpart. In response to a co-funding offer from the European Commission in 1995, ECOPS became the European Marine and Polar Science Board (EMaPS). EMaPS was initially subordinated to the European Science Foundation and focused on the coordination of specific marine and polar activities and initiatives. In 1999, EMaPS was split into the European Polar Board (EPB) and the European Marine Board (EMB) (European Marine Board 2023). In 2015, the EPB became independent of the European Science Foundation (European Polar Board 2023), and its membership has changed from national programmes to research organisations. With numerous members and a strong foundation in scientific research, the EPB has become a pivotal regional organisation for European activity in Antarctica. On the other hand, RAPAL has a strong focus on the coordination of operational activities, and has therefore maintained national programmes as the only form of membership. Institutionally, the EPB and RAPAL have very different departure points: science and operations, respectively. Nevertheless, both institutions have expanded the scope of their activities. In support of its scientific endeavours, the inclusion of logistic coordination and infrastructure collaboration was a natural step in the EPB’s institutional evolution. Likewise, RAPAL’s mandate came to include all activities related to members’ national programmes, encompassing mutual support on their scientific, environmental, and educational activities. In addition, RAPAL has always sought the identification of common concerns for the national programmes of its 5 Colombia and Venezuela have been assigned the role of observers (RAPAL 2023). D. P. Sampaio 319 members, and this, combined with its institutional stability and permanent membership, has differentiated this Latin American forum by enabling an incipient formation of a South American Antarctic identity. In its terms of reference, RAPAL identifies points for collaboration among South American national Antarctic programmes, as well as their common interests in the region. The final reports of its annual meetings include several references to the “neighbouring” position of South American parties to Antarctica, as well as the need to “ecologically protect the American territories dependent and ecologically associated with Antarctica” (RAPAL 1994).6 Therefore, RAPAL institutionalises an ongoing process of regionalisation among South American Antarctic actors. 18.3 Cognitive Regions, Regionalism, andtheGeopolitics ofRegional Integration According to Adler (1997), communities can be socially constructed as “cognitive regions”, where people imagine that borders will actually delimit their shared understandings and common identities of security and economic well-being. Although regions have a territorial dimension, intersubjective understanding, values, and norms constitute members’ interests and practices, transcending and transcendthe limits of a nation-state (Adler 1997, p.254). The formation of cognitive regions requires collective identification processes, which are based on the blurring of the differentiation between Self-Other (to the point of its transcendence), where the Self expands to include the Other (Wendt 1999, p.229). A collective identification process which transcends the nation-state and enables the formation of a cognitive region is exemplified by the South American experience. Although organised in diverse territorial states, South America shares a common past of Iberian colonisation and the pursuit of increased political and economic autonomy (Barton 1997). In addition to geography and history, language also plays an important role in this collective identification process. Sharing knowledge or intersubjective understandings is ultimately a linguistic phenomenon (Kratochwil 2006) and, undoubtedly, a shared common language, in Spanish (with its closeness to Portuguese), presents a strong inclusive aspect for the formation of a regional community (Anderson 2006). As with every process of imaginary formation, there is also resistance to undesirable futures. In South America, the history of its geopolitical thought accounts for the various clashes between its Indigenous, national, and regional collective identification processes. 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