Understanding Boredom in Ortega y Gasset's Moral Philosophy

Article Copyright: © 2025 Álvaro Artaza Prieto. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license for use and distribution (CC BY 4.0). Received 14 April 2025; Accepted 23 October 2025. Journal of Boredom Studies (ISSN 2990-2525) Issue 3, 2025, pp. 1–15 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17426112 https://www.boredomsociety.com/jbs Understanding Boredom in Ortega y Gasset’s Moral Philosophy ÁLVARO ARTAZA PRIETO Independent Scholar, Spain [email protected] https://orcid.org/0009-0004-1664-5353 How to cite this paper: Artaza Prieto, Á. (2025). Understanding Boredom in Ortega y Gasset’s Moral Philosophy. Journal of Boredom Studies, 3. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17426112 Abstract: The aim of this article is to contribute to the field of boredom studies from a perspective that has not yet been systematically explored: the gaze of Ortega y Gasset. On the one hand, it seeks to acknowledge the influence of Ortega y Gasset’s thought within the context of Spanish philosophy; on the other, it aims to engage with the growing field of Boredom Studies, which has become increasingly established with greater clarity regarding its direction and purpose. This study focuses on Ortega y Gasset moral philosophy, based on the thesis that the core concepts that structure it—life, vocation, project, and absorption—offer valuable insights into understanding the phenomenon of boredom. Ortega y Gasset’s work has been, and continues to be, extensively studied, in line with one of his fundamental ideas: that reality cannot be reduced to a single perspective, and any attempt to comprehend it requires a multiplicity of viewpoints. To this end, the present work also seeks to contribute to the study and understanding of Ortega’s philosophy, with particular emphasis on his ethics of vocation. Keywords: boredom, existential boredom, definition of boredom, Spanish philosophy, vocation. Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 2 1. Introduction: The Philosophy of Vital Reason in José Ortega y Gasset This article seeks to contribute to the growing field of boredom studies by engaging with the work of José Ortega y Gasset, one of the most influential figures in 20th-century Spanish philosophy. By first contextualizing Ortega’s work within the intellectual traditions of the Spanish-speaking world, this paper aims to offer a systematic interpretation of how his moral philosophy—especially his ethics of vocation—and core conceptual frameworks provide fertile ground for a deeper understanding of boredom as a philosophical and existential phenomenon. Ortega’s thought remains subject to ongoing critical engagement. In Spain, the Fundación Ortega-Marañón continues to preserve and promote his legacy. The present analysis adopts an explicitly orteguian lens, grounded in his perspectivist metaphysics—namely, the conviction that no single viewpoint can exhaust the complexity of reality. Instead, multiple perspectives must be integrated to approximate a fuller understanding of human experience. Ortega called this approach perspectivismo, or perspectivism. This theoretical stance positions Ortega’s philosophy as particularly relevant to contemporary debates within boredom studies, which likewise resist reductive or monodimensional accounts of subjective experience. This study thus operates on two interrelated levels: first, as a contribution to the interpretation and reception of Ortega’s philosophical project; second, as an intervention in boredom studies, a field that has recently gained prominence across philosophical, psychological, and cultural domains. By bringing these discourses into dialogue, the article aims to reveal how Ortega’s philosophy can enhance current understandings of affective disengagement, existential discomfort, and the search for meaning—dimensions central to the contemporary analysis of boredom. Accordingly, the structure of this article begins with an examination of the key concepts in Ortega’s moral philosophy in the first two sections. From the third section onward, the focus shifts to the question of boredom in Ortega’s thought and its relationship to other notions such as entertainment, temporal perception, and agency. Ortega y Gasset was arguably the first Spanish philosopher to achieve significant intellectual influence beyond the Iberian Peninsula. Although deeply concerned with Spain’s sociopolitical conditions—its crises, transformations, and future—his works attained transnational resonance. His texts were translated into multiple languages, including French and English, and read widely in countries such as Argentina, Mexico, Germany, France, and the United States. In Ortega’s vision, Spain could participate in global philosophical discourse, and he was committed to giving Spanish thought its true importance. An intellectually restless figure, Ortega aimed to lead a new generation of thinkers during the first half of the twentieth century. His engagements were not confined to the academy; he also entered the political arena. Yet, like Plato before him, he would eventually conclude that philosophy and politics are not always compatible pursuits. Nevertheless, this ambivalent relationship with public life further informs his reflections on individual vocation, historical responsibility, and the conditions of modern existence—all of which intersect, directly or indirectly, with the contemporary experience of boredom. One of the principal teachings of Ortega’s thought is that each era must confront its own challenges, something the philosopher expressed as the need of being “up to the task or challenge Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 3 of our time” (Ortega y Gasset, 2023, p. 213). The concept of circunstancia (circumstance), and the idea that if we do not save ourselves through it, there is no salvation possible, align with this perspective. The purpose of this study is connected to these teachings. Boredom, like the circumstance and so many other things that fall within it, must be understood by integrating multiple perspectives. We begin with the premise that it is impossible to comprehend boredom, as an existential phenomenon, without understanding that what we call life, or existence, is something fundamentally affected by boredom itself. For Ortega, life is more than a philosophical category; it is the starting point of his philosophy and of everything—it is ‘radical reality’. In his course What is philosophy? (2023) we find the first and one of the clearest displays of the theory of life as radical reality. This course, given at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Central University of Madrid (now the Complutense University), presents a mature Ortega’s idea, firmly grounded in his philosophical ideas. Life, Ortega (2023, p. 221) asserts, is “that which we do and which happens to us” and of which we are conscious. To live is to be aware of oneself, to be conscious of the relationships we establish with the world and with others. This world, composed of others and the objects we encounter, is what Ortega calls circunstancia (circumstance). Circumstance is everything we coexist with, all that we are not and yet accompanies us. Ortega’s notion of life not only includes this relational dimension but also a temporal one. To live is always to plan what we will do next—tomorrow or in the coming years. For this reason, Ortega tells us that life is also ‘futurition’; by this, Ortega meant that the subject’s perception of time, their present and their past, only acquires true meaning in relation to the future. For Ortega, life is oriented toward the future. However, all these plans are always possibilities, never absolute certainties. Thus, to live is also to choose among a range of possibilities that present themselves at every moment. Each choice requires constant validation, for we can always decide to flee, abandon everything, change the station, and tune into another plane of existence. A few years earlier, in The Revolt of the Masses Ortega had already stated that “our life, at every instant and before anything else, is consciousness of what is possible for us. If at every moment we had before us only a single possibility, it would make no sense to call it such” (Ortega y Gasset, 2022, p. 36). Therefore, “to live is to constantly decide what we are going to be” (Ortega y Gasset, 2023, p. 229). Among these characterizations of life, Ortega introduces an element that will later allow us to understand his contribution to the study of existential boredom: choice. From these characterizations, we see that life is not an isolated and autonomous entity but is conditioned by an engagement with something beyond ourselves: circunstancia, which shapes and limits us—something we do not choose, like our name or the very fact of having been born. The notion of circumstance encompasses a multiplicity of concepts, realities, and effects, which explains why it has transcended the realm of philosophy. Ortega’s famous statement, “I am myself and my circumstance, and if I do not save it, I do not save myself” (2004a, p. 760), has ensured that circumstance remains a valuable analytical tool in philosophy, applied today to the field of boredom studies (Elpidorou, 2023). Our next stop is In Search of Goethe from Within (published 1932), where Ortega offers a profound reflection on human life, its existential tensions, and culture. This essay connects key Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 4 concepts such as choice, vocation, and the authenticity of existence. Let us proceed step by step. Ortega begins his reflection with a powerful and somber image of human life: “Every life is, more or less, a ruin among whose debris we must discover what the person ought to have been” (2006, p. 128). This statement expresses the sense that, in many cases, the life we live is a distorted version of the life we could have lived. Indeed, we all “feel our real life as an essential deformation, greater or lesser, of our possible life” (Ortega y Gasset, 2006, p. 129). At some point, we have all experienced that abyss between the life we lead and the one we would have liked to lead—or would still like to lead. But for Ortega, whether we like it or not, human life is praxis; otherwise, it would not be life at all—it is “‘an action’ that begins with doing” (Ortega y Gasset, 2006, p. 131). In this sense, it is not enough to think about life; it must be lived and enacted in the continuous ‘now’ that defines existence. Our thoughts, ideals, and life projects must, sooner or later, confront reality. It is in this process, where decision-making and the search for options take place, that the meaning of our lives is shaped. At this point, Ortega reminds us of life’s relationship with time, clarifying that not only “the human being has a futuristic constitution” but also involves a connection with the past (2022, p. 132). The past serves as an aid in the task of giving meaning to our lives: “without the past, the future is an abyss, a horizon of problems that induces vertigo” (Ortega y Gasset, 2006, p. 131). This becomes particularly evident when we consider the shelter provided by any tradition or way of doing things inherited from our ancestors. From our grandmothers’ cooking recipes to sayings or proverbs that preserve both linguistic customs and certain ways of perceiving and understanding the world. Ortega correctly observes that for life to be healthy and vigorous, it must strike a balance between what has been done and what remains to be done—between past and future. For our philosopher, both dimensions are necessary, and neither should dominate the other. In this work, Ortega adopts a tragic tone when he continues by stating that everyone’s life is a ‘drama’, confronted with the things that make up reality and condition the decisions we make. This drama—this struggle to live an authentic life—is closely linked to the notion of vocation, which we will explore later. In relation to this dramatic and tragic dimension of life Ortega identifies an element that allows us to understand boredom. For the Madrid-born thinker, satisfaction alone is not a sufficient criterion to identify an authentic life. It is possible to live an authentic life and yet experience unpleasant, dissatisfying, or demotivating moments without necessarily being bored. If we accept that that boredom is a phenomenon that appears when we are not fulfilling what we understand as an authentic life (a full life that satisfies our need for meaning), we can see how Ortega’s view reinforces what Finkielsztein (2024) has already stated when it comes to one of the essential elements of boredom: a lack of interest simply does not provoke reactions, but it is not necessarily linked to boredom. Following Ortega, we can conclude that we must be prepared for such moments, accepting that the path is not always easy. While Ortega does not provide a concrete solution at this point, his perspective is clear: a meaningful life may include unsatisfying or repetitive moments but is not necessarily boring. Moreover, I argue that while boredom is not and cannot be desirable, dissatisfaction is a moment we must accept and be prepared to live with. Here it is worth recalling the distinction proposed by Viktor Frankl between dissatisfaction and boredom. For Frankl (2000), boredom is a state linked to existential emptiness and, therefore, to a lack of meaning. By contrast, suffering Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 5 or dissatisfaction may arise in other areas of life and can be meaningful in themselves; although suffering must be avoidable whenever possible (Frankl, 2000). As Frankl asserts, if life has a purpose, then there must also be purpose in suffering and in dying. This kind of suffering is an inescapable part of human existence, whereas boredom, by contrast, can—and should—be avoided. 1.1. Choice and Absorption For Ortega, there are only two moments in existence that prevent us from choosing: birth, as we are thrown into life without being asked, and death, the closing moment that ends our existence in the world. Aside from these two moments, Ortega sees life as choice. While animals exist in a state of restlessness (Ortega calls this state alteración), driven by their instincts and unable to refrain from actions such as satisfying hunger or reproduction, human beings are free; they can, and must, choose their next step and distinguished by absorption (ensimismamiento), which we should understand as the capacity to reflect in solitude on the projects that we want to guide our lives. To be self-absorbed (ensimismarse) is therefore both an ability and a condition that allows us to develop a personal and unique reflection, which can then be translated into action. Without this capacity, we become subject to mechanisms that do not belong to us—family, society, and their dictates—because what truly matters is listening to one’s own judgment. To achieve this, one must spend time alone with oneself. One might think, quite rightly, that this is nothing new. Indeed, the retreat of the self has always been a requirement of philosophy. The prototype of the wise man, the thinker embodied by Thales—who, according to the well-known anecdote, fell into a well while contemplating the stars—has become a leitmotif in the history of philosophy. This is not new. However, Ortega adds two requirements to this philosophical necessity of solitude. First, solitude is not an exclusive attribute of the thinker. In reality, everyone must have moments alone with themselves. Otherwise, we will never be able to reflect on the life we would like to live. The danger of not reserving time for solitude is that we betray ourselves, allowing others to dictate our destiny. In this sense, Ortega democratizes the philosophical imperative of solitude and personal reflection, presenting it as a non-transferable task that each individual must undertake. Second, and more importantly, we find the concept of vocation. Vocation represents the guiding force that determines what we must choose. If solitude is the moment in which we retreat to reflect, vocation is the inner voice that enables us to identify our destiny. Thanks to vocation, we can live an authentic life. It serves as a criterion with a dual function. Positively, it acts as a compass, pointing us toward where we should go. Negatively, it allows us to recognize whether we are living an authentic life or, conversely, a false one (i.e. one dictated by the projects imposed on us by others). That life is a work that constantly demands our attention (quehacer) means that, in some way, we must plan it, filling it with projects. Ortega distinguishes between two types of life projects. Some are given to us, imposed from the outside. This is the case during childhood when our parents or guardians decide which tasks and obligations concern us. Then comes adulthood, when the second type appears: the projects we choose for ourselves. Choice is an activity that we can engage in either with or without knowledge (e.g., I can be aware of the consequences of my Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 6 actions, know what I want to do, and then choose accordingly; or I can simply choose to do something with my life because it appeals to me). When we choose with full awareness (i.e. when we understand our choices and can explain them not to others but primarily to ourselves) then, according to Ortega, we move closer to an authentic life. In this journey, vocation is the essential element, the compass that allows us to recognize when we are happily choosing and when we are not. The danger arises when we consciously decide that we do not want to choose our own course of action, delegating that responsibility to others. When we live according to the projects of others, we live an inauthentic life. Ortega is not alone in these ideas. More recently, Viktor Frankl has argued that the will to meaning is the basic and primary motivation of human life. In line with the notion of authentic life, Frankl maintains that the meaning of life is unique and specific to each person; it is not something that can be defined in abstract terms. In his words: ‘Life’ does not mean something vague, but something very real and concrete, just as life’s tasks are also very real and concrete. They form man’s destiny, which is different and unique for each individual. No man and no destiny can be compared with any other man or any other destiny (Frankl, 2000, p. 85). Ortega’s call to live an authentic life and to pursue one’s most genuine vocation aligns closely with Frankl’s call for the search for meaning. Moreover, there is a nuance in Ortega’s thought that we previously noted, which also appears in Frankl: the distinction between suffering—or a certain dissatisfaction—which can be tolerable or even meaningful in the pursuit of purpose, and boredom, which Frankl sees as a symptom of a lack of meaning and thus something not to be tolerated. 2. Two Principles of Ortega y Gasset’s Moral Philosophy: Illusion and Authentic Life Ortega y Gasset’s moral philosophy began to take shape at a time when, according to the author, Spain and Europe were immersed in a deep crisis, which he called ‘the crisis of the West’. From his critique of this moment and his attempt to understand the situation, a solution emerges: the ethics of vocation. This proposal starts to take form in the 1920s, when we see Ortega adopting a more academic and introspective approach, viewing personal vocation as an individual and private task, detached from direct political involvement and its disappointments. It was during these years that he founded Revista de Occidente (first published 1923) and later, in 1948, the Instituto de Humanidades alongside Julián Marías. After analyzing the problem, Ortega proposed a solution grounded in a practical approach: moral philosophy. Having been highly critical of the idealist philosophical tradition, particularly Kant’s excessive moral rigorism, Ortega sought to offer a philosophy that could inspire and move people to pursue their life projects. Far from embracing relativism, Ortega firmly maintained that it is necessary to have a guiding criterion, a compass to navigate the uncertainty of existence. This is where the notion of vocation comes into play as the first key element of his proposal. Living and discovering one’s vocation are closely related phenomena, though not identical. We do not need to put our lives on hold to think about what vocation should guide Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 7 them, in the way that Descartes made a pilgrimage to the Sanctuary of the Virgin of Loreto after experiencing his three famous dreams that led to his Discourse on Method. It is not about this. As discussed in the previous section, living consists of dealing with the things of the world and responding to the tasks that characterize all existence. Clearly, the first relationship between living and discovering one’s vocation lies in the fact that if we do not live, there is no possibility of discovering anything. Secondly, Ortega introduces the idea that because we live (i.e. because we interact with the world and with others) we can come to recognize our vocation. Simply put, one cannot find one’s vocation from the couch. To live is to encounter things, to realize what we like and dislike, what harms or benefits us, what satisfies us, and what repels us. It is through these interactions with things that vocation begins to take shape. Vocation is understood through action, on one hand, and through its relationship with theory, on the other; just as we discussed in relation to absorption (ensimismamiento). However, Ortega does not limit himself to presenting an abstract moral framework in which vocation merely hovers over our lives as a vague guiding principle. Instead, his ethics of vocation is anchored in two very specific principles: illusion and authentic life. The purpose of ethics, according to Ortega, must be to inspire enthusiasm in the ethical subject. We must understand this ethical subject, according to Kant’s view, as a rational agent who acts autonomously according to moral laws derived from reason, treating humanity—both in oneself and others—as an end in itself. After strongly criticizing Kantian rigorism and its ethical universalism, Ortega argues that what truly matters in ethics is that it should once again generate illusion, in order to encourage people to make the ethical subject act rather than merely think. A certain degree of illusion, of the desire to intervene in the world, is necessary. In this sense, boredom already appears as a lurking shadow, leading to a loss of meaning and to blind faith in outdated ideals that no longer serve an individual’s life project. If, for Kant, duty is the central element of morality, for Ortega, it is illusion—that which moves us to act “while keeping the uncertain and problematic nature of the endeavor under control, by giving the self the impression that the possible can become real” (Lasaga Medina, 2006, p. 182). The second principle, authentic life, is realized when we follow the vocation that guides us. At the core of Ortega’s proposal lies a demand for happiness and fulfillment (Lasaga Medina, 2006). The principle of authentic life relates to what so many other thinkers have summarized as the human need to find meaning in life, broadly speaking. All this can be better understood with an example. In his analysis of the figure of Don Quixote, Ortega finds in the old hidalgo the representation of pure effort, devoid of ideals, of direction. According to this interpretation, Don Quixote would be a ‘critique of pure effort’, a hero who had everything but ideas in the strict sense of the term. Ideas serve to orient significant life projects. In this analysis we find the link that Ortega makes between the capacity to give meaning to life linked to ideas, which shape projects, and the critique of effort for effort’s sake, to will without direction. That is why, at bottom, “Don Quixote was a striving […] a man of heart” (Ortega y Gasset, 2004b, p. 664). Of all the elements of Ortega’s ethics, he only fulfills that of illusion, that of enthusiasm, but he has no ideas, no projects that lead him anywhere. As Ortega reminds us, in the second half of the Cervantes’ novel, the famous nobleman ends in a Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 8 state of melancholy, feeling uneasiness. Although Ortega is not yet talking about boredom these reflections let us understand the true meaning of ideals and authentic life for Ortega. In this sense, Don Quixote experiences a crisis of meaning about his own exploits, about the goal of all his efforts. At a more concrete level, we can say that human beings tend to avoid participating in activities they perceive as meaningless when an alternative is available. The moment we recognize that something lacks significance, we choose to abandon or avoid it, as long as circumstances allow it (Finkielsztein, 2024). To put it in Ortega’s words, if our actions do not contribute to the fulfillment of an authentic life, we tend to avoid or omit them. It is based on these two principles—and the reflections they inspire—that some have characterized Ortega’s proposal as an “ethics of happiness through vocation”, distinguishing it from moral universalism (Díaz Álvarez and de Salas, 2013, p. 264). This adds an essential nuance to Finkielsztein’s (2024) proposal, which links boredom to a lack of meaning. Meaning, in turn, is directly related to the feeling of control and agency over what one is doing. In other words, boredom emerges when we no longer perceive ourselves as active agents in our own projects, but rather as passive participants in imposed or meaningless activities. Nevertheless, other scholars have pointed out that boredom is linked to both a lack of challenge and a lack of meaning. What truly characterizes boredom, then, is the perception that the situation lacks a significant purpose—what, following Ortega, we might refer to as the absence of an authentic life. When these two elements converge—perceived lack of challenge and lack of purpose—boredom emerges. It can thus be understood as an affective state with a strong self-regulatory component that, far from being passive, actively pushes us to seek meaning and challenge in what we do—unlike emotions such as anger, frustration, or sadness (Van Tilburg and Igou, 2012). Pekrun (2006) has also proposed a control-value theory of achievement emotions from which to understand how boredom works in relation to the value, rather than the meaning, we give to our activities. 3. Boredom in Ortega y Gasset’s Philosophy As mentioned in the introduction, Ortega y Gasset did not develop a theory of boredom, nor did he engage, as others have (Finkielsztein, 2024; Ros Velasco, 2022, 2026; Svendsen, 2005), in outlining a systematic classification of the phenomenon and its characteristics. Alongside this, we encounter the additional difficulty posed by the vast production of Ortega’s work. Nevertheless, the edition of his Complete Works and, more specifically, the Index compiled by Domingo Hernández Sánchez, make this task easier as this index compiles every reference to boredom (Ortega y Gasset, 2004a). The objective here is to systematically gather those that are relevant and contribute some distinctive features to the reflection over the phenomenon. In all citations, we refer to the printed editions published by Taurus. To make the reading and comprehension of this phenomenon more engaging, we shall begin by establishing a starting point. Artaza Prieto Journal of Boredom Studies 3 (2025) 9 Let us briefly recall Ros Velasco’s thesis (2022, 2026), according to which, in the history of Western thought, the type of boredom addressed by philosophy and, in general, the humanities, is deep or existential boredom. My thesis is that Ortega is no exception, as he predominantly refers to profound boredom, with only scarce mentions of situational boredom. As for the other types—individual-dependent and chronic boredom and situation-dependent and chronic boredom (as distinguished by Ros Velasco, 2022, 2026)—they do not appear at all. From his literary critiques to his more profound analyses of modern sensibility, boredom appears as a symptom of cultural, social, and aesthetic transformations. In his early writings, Ortega speaks of boredom and weariness as synonyms. In The “Summer Sonata” by Ramón del Valle-Inclán (published 1904), Ortega (2004a) criticizes the inhumanity of the author’s characters due to their lack of feelings such as passion, fatigue, or weariness, pointing out that the work avoids portraying any deep emotion. In New Poetry, Old Poetry (published 1906) weariness is described as an existential experience, a void that “drips drop by drop into the entrails”, confronting us with the nothingness of existence (Ortega y Gasset, 2004a, p. 162). While both weariness, or apathy, and boredom are related through the absence of interest, the former entails a general disinterest in everything, whereas boredom refers to a lack of interest in the specific experience being lived (Finkielsztein, 2024). From literature to politics, passing through art and everyday life, boredom in Ortega is not merely a fleeting emotion but a symptom of profound change. In its various forms —weariness, disdain, spleen—it reveals both the fatigue of an era and the search for new horizons. In the second half of the 1920s, this vision remains intact: The man who is inherently weary of himself is a categorical type of humanity. That weariness is the very core of his being, and everything else he does, he does out of the necessity to escape from himself, compelled by that exhaustion (Ortega y Gasset, 2005, p. 307). One can distinguish between two types of demands: bodily demands, such as the need for food, rest, and hygiene, and spiritual demands, which relate to the realization of each individual’s existence. Here, Ortega situates the need to avoid dying of boredom. To respond to these demands, humanity has created culture, which “is nothing more than the repertoire of devices through which man responds to the demands of his existence. And within culture, ideas occupy a central place” (Ortega y Gasset, 2006, p. 359). A few years later, he returns to the figure of Goethe in the article “Goethe, el libertador”, published in the German newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung in March 1932. What is striking here is the novelty of finding that boredom can also be understood as a punishment directed at those who refuse to assume the responsibility of endowing their lives with meaning: “Boredom is a punishment upon those who attempt to evade this fundamental condition of life” (Ortega y Gasset, 2006, p. 143). Whoever desires nothing, whoever chooses nothing, becomes trapped in emptiness and inaction, condemned to the monotony of merely passing the time. One may distinguish between two types of demands: physical ones, such as the need for food, rest, and hygiene; and spiritual ones, which concern the realization of each individual’s existence. Here Ortega places the necessity of not dying of boredom. To respond to such demands, humanity has created culture, which “is nothing other than the repertoire of devices through which man