Between Faith and Power: Muʿāwiya's Correspondence with the Companions Who Declined Allegiance to ʿalī

International Journal of Social Science and Human Research ISSN (print): 2644-0679, ISSN (online): 2644-0695 Volume 08 Issue 10 October 2025 DOI: 10.47191/ijsshr/v8-i10-111, Impact factor8.007 Page No: 8460-8465 IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 10 October 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8460 Between Faith and Power: Muʿāwiya’s Correspondence with the Companions Who Declined Allegiance to ʿalī 1 Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mevlüt POYRAZ Artvin Çoruh University, Faculty of Theology, Department of Islamic History, Artvin, Türkiye ABSTRACT: Under extraordinary circumstances, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib became caliph, though some Companions in Medina withheld allegiance. He respected their choice, but tensions escalated, leading to the Battle of the Camel. Afterward, Muʿāwiya, governor of Damascus, openly rebelled, citing the unpunished killers of ʿUthmān. Seeking legitimacy, he wrote letters to Companions who had not pledged to ʿAlī, promoting his own competence and testing their positions. To ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, he even expressed readiness to support him as caliph. Most responses rejected his initiative, recognizing his political motives. Yet ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ showed willingness to cooperate, which significantly strengthened Muʿāwiya’s campaign. With supportive replies from ʿAmr and his sons, Muʿāwiya pursued power more resolutely. By contrast, figures such as Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and Muḥammad b. Maslama dismissed his calls. Ultimately, ʿAmr’s alignment—considered one of the key strategic minds of the Arabs—emerged as a decisive factor advancing Muʿāwiya’s ambitions. This study evaluates these correspondences through classical sources. KEYWORDS: Caliphate of ʿAlī, Rebellion of Muʿāwiya, Correspondence, Legitimacy. I. INTRODUCTION In the final period of the caliphate of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, the third caliph of the Muslims, a number of undesirable events occurred, leading to certain uprisings within the Muslim community. As a result of this turmoil, which is thought to have arisen from multiple causes, the caliph of the Muslims was, unfortunately, martyred by those who professed to be Muslims. Leaving aside the identities of the actors involved in the process and the political beneficiaries of the event, history records it as a fact that incurable wounds were inflicted upon the Muslim community. Indeed, prominent Companions—including ʿĀʾisha, the Mother of the Believers—were affected by this strife and engaged in fierce battle against one another (the Battle of the Camel). Ultimately, painful consequences emerged for the Muslim community. These events also gave rise to certain debates regarding the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate. In these debates, the refusal of some prominent Companions to pledge allegiance and the armed opposition of others against Caliph ʿAlī were cited as evidence. This study aims to examine the reasons behind the refusal of allegiance by certain leading Companions who were claimed not to have pledged to Caliph ʿAlī, through an analysis of the letters sent to them by Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān—who rebelled against Caliph ʿAlī with claims to the caliphate—and their replies to these letters. Within the framework of Islamic historical sources authored by scholars such as Abū Ḥātim, al-Ṭabarī, Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Kathīr, al-Dhahabī, and Aḥmed Cevdet Pasha, the study will examine the legitimacy of ʿAlī, Muʿāwiya’s political objectives, and the reflections of these objectives in the correspondences. II. THE ALLEGİANCE TO ʿALĪ AS CALİPH The assassination of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān created a power vacuum that necessitated the appointment of a new leader among the Muslims, and in this context, attention was directed toward ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. He was regarded as the strongest candidate among the members of the shūrā following ʿUthmān. However, he initially declined the offer made to him. According to historical reports, the insurgent group, in an attempt to fill this vacuum, successively offered the caliphate to the members of the shūrā. When the issue remained unresolved, a large assembly composed of both Muhājirūn and Anṣār, together with leading Companions such as Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbayd Allāh and al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwām, went to ʿAlī’s house and proposed that he assume the caliphate. This group asserted that ʿAlī was the most deserving of this office on account of his closeness to the Prophet and his scholarly competence. 1 This study, titled " Muaviye B. Ebî Süfyan’ın Hz. Ali’ye Biat Etmeyen Bazı Sahabe İle Mektuplaşması Hususunda Bir Değerlendirme" was presented at the 2st Internatıonal Sarajevo Scıentıfıc Research And Innovatıon Congress (30-31 May, 2025, Bosnıa-Herzegovına). The content was shaped through revision and refinement of the text published in the main proceedings book of the congress (p.493-504). Between Faith and Power: Muʿāwiya’s Correspondence with the Companions Who Declined Allegiance to ʿalī IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 10 October 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8461 At first, ʿAlī approached this offer with caution and, citing the weight of administrative responsibility, declined the caliphate, preferring to serve as a vizier rather than as a ruler. However, as a result of their insistent demands, he accepted the position on the condition that the pledge of allegiance (bayʿa) be made publicly, in the mosque. Consequently, ʿAlī was given the pledge of allegiance collectively in the mosque. It is reported that the first to pledge allegiance were Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr, who would later command the army at the Battle of the Camel. When the matter of allegiance was questioned in connection with the Camel incident, Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr alleged that their pledge had been made out of fear of being killed. Nevertheless, there were other Companions who refrained from pledging allegiance, yet they did not experience any fear for their lives on this account. In other words, it is evident that no threat emanated from ʿAlī. Among those who did not pledge allegiance—including some of the Companions central to this study—were Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, Ibn ʿĀmir, Zayd b. Thābit, Ḥassān b. Thābit, Kaʿb b. Mālik, Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī, Suhayb, Salama b. Salama b. Waqsh, Muḥammad b. Maslama, and Usāma b. Zayd (Abū Ḥātim, 2017, pp. 420–423; al-Ṭabarī, n.d., vol. 3, pp. 567–571; Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 195–203; Ibn Kathīr, n.d., vol. 7, pp. 365–369). Referring to al-Wāqidī, Ibn Kathīr records that nearly all the people of Medina pledged allegiance to ʿAlī, with the exception of seven individuals: ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, Suhayb b. Sinān, Zayd b. Thābit, Muḥammad b. Maslama, Salama b. Salama b. Waqsh, and Usāma b. Zayd. He further notes that, according to some reports, there was not a single member of the Anṣār who refrained from pledging allegiance to ʿAlī (Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 195–203; Ibn Kathīr, n.d., vol. 7, pp. 365–369). In conclusion, although the pledge of allegiance to ʿAlī outwardly appeared to have been carried out by means of a broad communal consensus, the refusal of some Companions to participate, or the reluctant participation of others, stands as a clear indicator of the political and social fragility of the period. This pledge also laid the foundation for the first major divisions in Islamic history and foreshadowed developments that would threaten the political unity of the umma. III. THE COMPANİONS WHO DİD NOT PLEDGE ALLEGİANCE TO ʿALĪ AND THEİR REASONS Within society, the perception that ʿUthmān had been wrongfully killed and that the rebels responsible for his death stood alongside the new caliph, ʿAlī, created hesitations among some Companions regarding the pledge of allegiance to him. For this reason, certain Companions remained hesitant during the process, some openly rejected the pledge, while others made their allegiance conditional upon communal consensus. Yet, before accepting the caliphate, ʿAlī himself had stipulated the establishment of general consensus in society (Abū Ḥātim, 2017, pp. 420–423), prioritizing the approval of the veterans of Badr. Nevertheless, due to the insistence of the people and political pressure, he accepted the caliphate (Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 203–204; Fığlalı, 1989, vol. 2, pp. 371–374). The reasons offered by Companions for not pledging allegiance to ʿAlī are cited in various works. Some linked their refusal to their former official positions during ʿUthmān’s caliphate, their loyalty to him, and the privileges they enjoyed under his rule (Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 195–203). Others categorically rejected the pledge. Figures such as Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, and Muḥammad b. Maslama stated that they would not pledge allegiance until general consensus was achieved within the community, while some others claimed that the Prophet had instructed them to remain neutral in times of discord. According to Abū Ḥātim, Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ said to ʿAlī: “I will not pledge allegiance to you. Unless you give me a sword with which I can distinguish between the believer and the unbeliever, I will not accompany you wherever you go.” Similarly, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar declared: “For the sake of God and our kinship, do not compel me to something of which I have no knowledge! By God, I will not pledge allegiance until all Muslims unite around a man upon whom God grants consensus.” (Abū Ḥātim, 2017, pp. 420–423; Ibn Saʿd, n.d., vol. 3, p. 160). Another report cited by Ibn Saʿd records that the Prophet handed a sword to Muḥammad b. Maslama, saying: “As long as the polytheists are fought, fight them with this sword. But if you see Muslims facing one another, then take it to Uḥud and strike it against the rocks until it breaks. Then return to your home, and remain there until an unjust sinner extends his hand against you, or until the death decreed for you by God overtakes you.” (Ibn Saʿd, n.d., vol. 3, pp. 512–515). In conclusion, the stance of those Companions who did not pledge allegiance to ʿAlī, or who pledged conditionally, was based on both individual justifications and the political pressures of the time. These attitudes formed significant dynamics underlying the first civil wars in Islamic history (the Battles of the Camel and Ṣiffīn). The Companions who stipulated communal consensus and thus remained hesitant included Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, and Muḥammad b. Maslama, as well as ʿAmr b. alʿĀṣ, who pursued a politically expedient course. This study examines the correspondences with these Companions and their replies. If the reports concerning these letters are authentic, they reveal both the legitimacy of ʿAlī and the political motives underlying the opposition of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān. IV. MUʿĀWİYA’S CORRESPONDENCE WİTH CERTAİN COMPANİONS: POLİTİCAL INTENTİONS AND THE QUEST FOR RELİGİOUS LEGİTİMACY The accession of ʿAlī to the caliphate after the martyrdom of ʿUthmān brought profound ruptures within the Muslim community. The hesitation, conditional allegiance, or outright refusal of some Companions to pledge allegiance—alongside Between Faith and Power: Muʿāwiya’s Correspondence with the Companions Who Declined Allegiance to ʿalī IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 10 October 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8462 claims that they were coerced—together with the stance of the Companions who demanded retribution for ʿUthmān’s blood (the partisans of the Battle of the Camel), and the efforts of Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān, governor of Syria, to secure political legitimacy under the pretext of seeking justice for ʿUthmān, were all clear manifestations of these ruptures. As a close observer of the process, Muʿāwiya, in his search for legitimacy, sought to draw strength from those Companions who had not pledged allegiance to Caliph ʿAlī. To this end, he wrote letters to the people of Medina and to notable Companions, seeking their support; however, these efforts did not yield the outcome he had anticipated. According to the reports, the first letter was sent to his close advisor, ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, from whom he expected the greatest support. A. The Correspondence Between Muʿāwiya B. Abī Sufyān And ʿamr B. Al-ʿāṣ And Its Outcome When ʿAlī assumed leadership, he dismissed Muʿāwiya from his post as governor of Syria and appointed another in his place. Muʿāwiya, however, refused to relinquish his position and, moreover, began to openly contest the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate, actively working against him. Particularly significant in this process were his political maneuvers in Syria, his efforts to organize opposition against ʿAlī, and his search for legitimacy through correspondence with prominent figures in order to secure their backing. Among these was ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ. The sources narrate the exchange between Muʿāwiya and ʿAmr as follows: When ʿAlī sent Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh to demand Muʿāwiya’s allegiance, Muʿāwiya stalled, saying to Jarīr: “Give me some time to breathe.” That night, he wrote to ʿAmr: “Marwān has come with a group hostile to ʿAlī and pledged allegiance to me. ʿAlī has sent Jarīr to obtain allegiance. I am entrusting myself to you—come quickly!” Upon receiving this letter, ʿAmr consulted his sons. His son ʿAbd Allāh advised: “O old man, the Messenger of God died while pleased with you. Abū Bakr and ʿUmar likewise. Do not corrupt your religion for a little worldly gain from Muʿāwiya, lest you tumble into Hell.” But his other son Muḥammad urged: “Engage in this matter immediately! Strive to be a leader before you are reduced to a follower.” Afterward, ʿAmr recited verses expressing inclination toward Muʿāwiya, to which ʿAbd Allāh retorted: “The old man has defiled himself and sold his religion.” Torn between indecision, ʿAmr repeatedly ordered his servant to pack and unpack, until finally the servant remarked: “Let me tell you of your situation: your heart is torn between the hereafter and the world—you cannot decide which to choose.” ʿAmr then asked: “What is the truth, in your opinion?” The servant replied: “Remain at home. If the people of religion prevail, you can live under their order. If the people of the world prevail, they cannot do without you.” To this, ʿAmr answered: “Then drive on to Muʿāwiya.” (Ibn Saʿd, n.d., vol. 5, pp. 86–91; Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 281–284; al-Dhahabī, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 258–261). As the sources indicate, ʿAlī had dispatched Jarīr b. ʿAbd Allāh to summon Muʿāwiya to obedience. Muʿāwiya, however, delayed the envoy and in the meantime appealed to ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ for assistance (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, vol. 1, pp. 431–436). After receiving the letter, ʿAmr consulted his two sons. ʿAbd Allāh advised him not to compromise his faith for worldly ambitions, while Muḥammad counseled him to seize the political opportunity. The moral deliberation that ʿAmr underwent during this decision-making process is particularly noteworthy. Despite his son ʿAbd Allāh’s warnings not to “sell his religion for the world,” ʿAmr ultimately chose to align himself with Muʿāwiya, reportedly in return for the governorship of Egypt (Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 281–284; al-Ṭabarī, n.d., vol. 4, pp. 35–36; al-Dhahabī, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 258–261). This episode demonstrates the extent to which the first major political conflict among the Companions was laden with personal, moral, and strategic contradictions. It has been narrated that ʿAmr joined Muʿāwiya’s ranks because he believed that ʿAlī had sidelined him in administrative matters and thus offered him no political role (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, vol. 1, pp. 431–436). Ultimately, though torn between worldly gain and concern for the afterlife, ʿAmr decided to join Muʿāwiya. After arriving in Syria and meeting with him face to face, ʿAmr reproached Muʿāwiya for failing to protect ʿUthmān, even as Muʿāwiya posed as his legal guardian. Nonetheless, it was reported that ʿAmr pledged his allegiance to Muʿāwiya in exchange for the governorship of Egypt (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, vol. 1, pp. 431–436). During these developments, the Syrian populace also rallied to Muʿāwiya under the slogan of avenging ʿUthmān’s death. The public display of ʿUthmān’s bloodied garment and the severed fingers of his wife Nāʾila incited public anger and turned sentiment against Caliph ʿAlī. Consequently, Muʿāwiya consolidated the support of the Syrian community, gathered strategic figures like ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ under his banner, and effectively laid the groundwork for the forthcoming Battle of Ṣiffīn (Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 281–284; al-Dhahabī, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 258–261). If the aforementioned reports are authentic, then the deliberation of ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ with his sons and the arguments presented therein reveal the following: ʿAlī, as the successor of a sacred mission, pursued the path of his forefathers, the Hāshimites, and the Messenger of God. Muʿāwiya, by contrast, as the follower of a worldly mission, continued the path of the Umayyads and his father, Abū Sufyān, the former leader of Mecca. The admonition of ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr to his father, warning him of the choice between this world and the hereafter, clearly reflects the distinction between the paths of Caliph ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya. Thus, it is evident that ʿAlī’s caliphate was wholly legitimate in the eyes of those who sought a religious mission, whereas Muʿāwiya’s actions—contrary to claims of being based on ijtihād—were transparently motivated by worldly ambition. As will be discussed below, this point also emerges from the replies of other Companions to Muʿāwiya’s letters. Muʿāwiya’s Letter to the People of Medina: Despite the warnings of his advisor ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ that such efforts would be of no avail, Muʿāwiya first addressed a letter to the people of Medina. In this letter, he stated that he had not been present in Medina Between Faith and Power: Muʿāwiya’s Correspondence with the Companions Who Declined Allegiance to ʿalī IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 10 October 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8463 during the days of civil strife and thus had not witnessed the events directly. He accused ʿAlī of collaborating with the killers of ʿUthmān, claimed to be the rightful guardian (waṣī) of ʿUthmān, and demanded retribution. Declaring his intention to fight for this cause, he sought the support of the Medinese. The people of Medina, however, responded angrily to his appeal, reproaching Muʿāwiya and his advisor ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ in strong terms (al-Dhahabī, 1996, vol. 6, p. 263; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, vol. 1, pp. 431– 436). Muʿāwiya’s Correspondence with Prominent Companions: Their Reactions and Justifications: Following the rejection by the people of Medina, Muʿāwiya—again against the counsel of ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, who insisted that such attempts would be fruitless— persisted in writing letters to prominent Companions such as ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar, Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ, and Muḥammad b. Maslama, seeking to win them over to his side (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, vol. 1, p. 431–436). Nevertheless, these efforts failed to elicit the support he desired, as many Companions opposed his invitation on various grounds. B. Muʿāwiya’s Letter to ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar and His Response Al-Dhahabī (1996) records the correspondence between Muʿāwiya and Ibn ʿUmar as follows: In his letter, Muʿāwiya wrote: “After the killing of ʿUthmān, there was no one among Quraysh more suitable than you for leadership, under whom the people could unite. Yet my affection for you changed when you abandoned him and confronted those who supported him. When I saw you in opposition to ʿAlī, I was greatly pleased. Assist us, therefore, in seeking retribution for the oppressed caliph. I am not seeking authority against you; rather, I desire that authority be in your hands. If you do not accept, then let the matter be decided by a council (shūrā) among the Muslims. Peace.” Ibn ʿUmar (may Allah be pleased with him) replied: “What has brought you to this position is your greed in relation to me. O Muʿāwiya! Your soul says to you: ‘Let me abandon ʿAlī, the noble Muhājirūn, and the Anṣār, and instead follow you!’ As for your claim that I opposed ʿAlī and criticized him: perhaps I am not equal to him in faith, migration, harming the polytheists, or his rank with the Messenger of Allah. But an event occurred concerning which I had no instruction from the Prophet. Out of fear, I hesitated, saying: ‘If this matter is guidance and virtue, then I have missed it; but if it is misguidance and error, then I am saved from it.’ Do not delude yourself. Peace.” (al-Dhahabī, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 352–354). Another report transmitted by Ibn Saʿd describes how Muʿāwiya employed ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ as an intermediary to gauge Ibn ʿUmar’s inclination toward conflict. ʿAmr asked: “O Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān! What prevents you from stepping forward (for the caliphate) so that we might pledge allegiance to you? You are the Companion of the Messenger of Allah, the son of the Commander of the Faithful, and the most deserving of this matter among the people!” Ibn ʿUmar responded: “Have all the people agreed upon this matter you mention?” ʿAmr replied: “Yes, except for a small group.” Ibn ʿUmar then said: “If only three strong men remained in Hajar, I would have no need for the caliphate!” The transmitter reported that ʿAmr then realized that Ibn ʿUmar did not wish to fight. He further suggested material incentives, to which Ibn ʿUmar retorted: “Away with you! Leave my house! Woe to you! My religion is not your dinars and dirhams.” (Ibn Saʿd, n.d., vol. 4, pp. 209–210). According to these accounts, Muʿāwiya, in his letter to Ibn ʿUmar, sought his support by portraying him as the most deserving candidate for the caliphate and by expressing satisfaction with his opposition to ʿAlī. By asserting, “I do not desire authority; I desire it for you,” Muʿāwiya attempted to elevate him politically and suggested shūrā as an alternative if Ibn ʿUmar refused. This support, however, was merely a tactical maneuver. Through ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, Muʿāwiya attempted to probe Ibn ʿUmar’s willingness to fight and pressured him by feigning to offer the caliphate. Ibn ʿUmar, however, rejected such political traps, famously declaring: “My religion is not your dinars and dirhams.” His response indicates that he was even offered material incentives in exchange for his support. In his reply, Ibn ʿUmar emphasized the high status of ʿAlī in Islam, accusing Muʿāwiya of ambition and rejecting such greed. He made clear that his hesitation was due to the absence of prophetic guidance on the issue, not out of opposition to ʿAlī. His stance ultimately revealed a cautious yet inner alignment with ʿAlī, while he chose to remain neutral in practice (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 431–436). C. Muʿāwiya’s Letters to Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and Muḥammad b. Maslama and Their Responses Among the other prominent Companions to whom Muʿāwiya sent letters seeking support were Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ and Muḥammad b. Maslama. Both, however, rejected his call and refused to align with him (al-Dhahabī, 1996, vol. 6, pp. 352–354). In these letters, Muʿāwiya argued that Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr had risen to avenge the blood of ʿUthmān and that it was therefore necessary to stand with them. Yet, his efforts received no favorable response. In his reply, Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ wrote: “I will not fight against ʿAlī, nor will I unite in opposition to him. Had Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr not confronted him, it would have been better for them.” Thus, while Saʿd did not offer active support to ʿAlī, his statement implicitly indicated disapproval of those who opposed him (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 431–436). As for Muḥammad b. Maslama, he emphasized that the Messenger of Allah had advised him to remain neutral in times of civil strife (fitna), and he accused Muʿāwiya of being motivated by worldly ambition. Reports indicate that Muḥammad b. Maslama had acted as a mediator during the disturbances in ʿUthmān’s caliphate, but when he realized reconciliation was impossible, he adhered to the prophetic counsel he had received. He is reported to have said: “The Messenger of Allah commanded me: ‘When your companions fall into discord, do not involve yourself in their affairs. Strike your sword against the rocks of Uḥud until it Between Faith and Power: Muʿāwiya’s Correspondence with the Companions Who Declined Allegiance to ʿalī IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 10 October 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8464 breaks, and remain in your home until either a sinful hand reaches you or your appointed death comes.’ I have acted accordingly.” (Ebū Ḥātim, 2017, pp. 420–423; Shahyar, 2020, vol. 30, pp. 552–553). It is also recorded that he kept a wooden sword during the period of discord, symbolizing his withdrawal from political conflict (Ibn Saʿd, n.d., vol. 3, pp. 515–516). Thus, it became well known that he strove to distance himself from political rivalries (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 431–436). When Muʿāwiya received such unfavorable responses, he turned to the public, delivering a sermon in which he exalted his own status and accused ʿAlī of being in error. To justify his position, he stressed that he had served as the Prophet’s scribe, as governor under ʿUmar and ʿUthmān, and that his noble lineage further legitimized him. He also asserted that the Syrians had pledged allegiance to him, thus tipping the balance of power in his favor. Subsequently, acknowledging ʿAmr’s counsel, he accelerated his preparations for war. From the pulpit, he declared that ʿUthmān had been killed unjustly, that he—as ʿUthmān’s walī (legal guardian)—was obligated to seek retribution, and he attempted to justify his stance by citing the Qurʾān (Q 17:33) (Aycan, 2020, vol. 30, pp. 330–332). However, this verse was considered to stand against, rather than in support of, his claim. In Islamic law, the status of walī belongs to the heir (i.e., the son), not to a cousin such as Muʿāwiya (Ibn al-Athīr, 1987, vol. 3, pp. 195–204; Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 431–436). Despite these rebuffs, Muʿāwiya did not relinquish his aspiration for power. He mobilized an army from among his followers and confronted Caliph ʿAlī, preferring conflict over reconciliation. Consequently, these correspondences concerning the legitimacy of the caliphate provided the political and intellectual groundwork for the first major civil wars in Islamic history (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 431–436). CONCLUSIONS This study has examined the debates surrounding the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s caliphate and the attitudes of certain Companions during this period. The turmoil that began with the martyrdom of ʿUthmān not only produced a crisis of political authority but also led to deep divisions that threatened the social cohesion of the Muslim community. Although the pledge of allegiance (bayʿa) to ʿAlī was accepted by a large portion of society, the refusal or hesitation of some Companions reflected the internal tensions of the era. Their positions were shaped by individual reasoning, religious sensitivities, and political concerns. The correspondences preserved in historical sources demonstrate that ʿAlī, by virtue of his character, was a leader with inherent legitimacy. The people of Medina and leading Companions recognized this, though some chose neutrality to avoid being drawn into the flames of discord. It becomes evident that the religious vision and moral integrity were on the side of Caliph ʿAlī, while Muʿāwiya’s aim was neither the pursuit of justice nor the establishment of a religious polity, but rather a worldly ambition to seize power by any means. Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān’s correspondence with prominent Companions in his attempt to undermine ʿAlī’s legitimacy and to secure political ground highlights the depth of these disputes. Yet, these efforts generally failed to achieve the desired outcome; the Companions either remained neutral or implicitly expressed support in favor of ʿAlī. In conclusion, these letters and developments provide insight into the political, social, and religious foundations of the first major civil wars in Islamic history (the Battles of Jamal and Ṣiffīn). They reveal that the caliphate was not merely a system of governance but also a symbol of the struggle for both religious and political legitimacy. 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