The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025)

International Journal of Social Science and Human Research ISSN (print): 2644-0679, ISSN (online): 2644-0695 Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 DOI: 10.47191/ijsshr/v8-i11-02, Impact factor8.007 Page No: 8498-8515 IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8498 The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) Mohammad Rabbani Communication and Society Research Centre (CECS), University of Minho, Braga, Portugal PhD in Public Policy/Political Science ABSTRACT: This article, grounded in the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, explores the evolution of symbolic struggles between the supporters and opponents of the official discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran from 2000 to 2025. Drawing on the author’s field observations, media archives, and qualitative data, it identifies three historical phases in this ongoing discursive conflict. First phase (2009–2017): during and after the Green Movement, opponents engaged in a struggle over significations by reinterpreting official symbols without rejecting their signifiers. These acts aimed to destabilize the semantic authority of the state while preserving its symbolic language. Second phase (2017–2022): the struggle shifted toward the signifiers themselves, culminating in the “Women, Life, Liberty” movement. Opposition forces created new symbols and alternative rituals, and summoned mythological symbols. The female body emerged as a site of resistance, while mythic and national imagery articulated a new nationalist discourse in opposition to the ummah-oriented official discourse. Third phase (2022–present): the positions of the supporters and opponents of the Islamic Republic have been reversed. Marks a return to the struggle over significations, in which the ruling power seeks to reappropriate national symbols and redefine their meanings to justify the legitimacy of its own, employing national myths and symbols once monopolized by its opponents to redefine the boundary between insiders and others. The article concludes that contemporary Iran’s socio-political arena has become a field of symbolic and semantic confrontation, where both sides compete to redefine the nation’s collective identity and legitimacy. KEYWORDS: Discourse, Signifier, Signification, Symbol, Symbolic Struggle, Legitimacy, Hegemony, Social movements 1. INTRODUCTION The transformations in the struggle over symbolic power between opponents and supporters of the official discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the past four decades—particularly from the spring of 2009 to the summer of 2025—are impoetant, because by mapping the components and dimensions of this struggle, we can gain a deeper understanding of contemporary Iranian political culture and more accurately trace the shifting dynamics of power, especially in the construction of social power. On this basis, I provide a chronological narrative of these changes and transformations, according to my own lived experience, sociological observations, and the data and documentary sources I have collected, and I seek to answer the following questions: through which symbols did supporters and opponents of the official discourse engage in meaning-making between 2000 and 2025, and which transformations have the opponents passed in establishing the foundations of an alternative symbolic order in opposition to the symbolic power of the official discourse? 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This study is grounded in a critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework, which considers language structures and symbols as sites of power and struggle. As Laclau suggests, competing social or political forces or discourses struggle for hegemonic position. In this framework, symbols act as “floating signifiers”—their meanings are never fixed but constantly reshaped and reappropriated through ongoing contestation. When a particular discourse succeeds in redefining these symbols, it can become a source of identification for a large number of people, attract their loyalty, mobilize their dispersed social power, and become the hegemonic discourse, and this means the discourse ultimately establishes itself as the dominant and legitimate source of power (Laclau, 1996). The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8499 This is why it is particularly important to frame the cultural and social roots of “symbolic conflicts”. In this regard, I have derived the configuration of the concept of “symbolic conflicts” from the works of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu considers symbolic power to be a “specific form of power” that operates through social recognition and the institutionalization of meanings, rather than through coercion. Symbolic power depends on acceptability, which is effective when individuals consider it legitimate or “natural” (Bourdieu, 1991). Bourdieu shows how school, language, art, or even food can be the scene of symbolic domination or the scene of its challenge by the resistant subject (Bourdieu, 1984). Within Bourdieu's configuration of the concept of symbolic conflict, Stuart Hall shows how representation and media imagery play a role in political-cultural conflicts (Hall, 1997). In this respect, He and others such as Therborn, Sarah Ahmed, and Anthony Cohen offer concepts such as "resistance through the symbol" and "struggle over meaning" to explain the arena of challenging the symbolic dominance of the ruling power, to show this arena is so broad that everything from public space to bodies can be part of the symbolic battlefield (Ahmed, 2004; Cohen, 1985; Hall, 1997; Therborn, 1980). 3. METHODOLOGY A large part of the data that the researcher refers in this article is the result of his travels and self observations of street conflicts, social or political campaigns, and the daily cultural life of Iranians over the past four decades, especially from the winter of 2000 to the end of summer 2005 in the cities of Tehran, Qom, Kashan, Natanz, Khorsouq, Isfahan, Shiraz, Kazerun, Kerman, Mashhad, Gorgan, Sari, Chalus, Nowshahr, Ramsar, Tabriz, Zanjan, Hamedan, Kermanshah, Khorramabad, Ahvaz, Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Kish, Qeshm, Chabahar, Zahedan, Iranshahr, Khash, Nikshahr, and some villages in Baluchistan in Qasr-e-Ghand County. These observations have been collected in the form of notes, travel reports, photographs, films, or audio files. In addition, to verify and develop the estimates derived from the observations, the researcher has referred to news, media analysis, archival videos, and images, as well as content on social networks. The researcher has analyzed all of these data and observations within the framework of the qualitative method of critical discourse analysis. Within this approach, he seeks to construct his own interpretive narrative of the events and the historical changes. It should be acknowledged that another scholar or observer might assess and recount the sequence and magnitude of these events differently. 4. LITERATURE REVIEW In recent years, the concepts of (symbolic power) and (symbolic struggles) have been used in the analysis of social movements. From the color revolutions in the republics that gained independence from the former Soviet Union to the "Black Lives Matter" movement in the United States, from the "Green" movement in Iran to the "Women, Life, Liberty" 1 movement, all have characteristics that encourage researchers to study them under the concept of (symbolic power) and (symbolic struggles). These studies have addressed topics such as the genealogy of symbols, the body as an arena of conflict, and the role of digital spaces and media, some of which we mention here: • Color Revolutions—such as the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005)—serve as prominent examples of mass mobilizations that strategically employed symbols and colors to articulate dissent. Numerous studies of these revolutionary movements show how colors functioned as symbolic resources for constructing collective identity and facilitating large-scale mobilization (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Tarrow, 2011; Torbakov, 2005) • In an article entitled “The Colour Revolutions in the Rearview Mirror: Closer Than They Appear,” published in Canadian Slavonic Papers in March 2011, Way (2011) analyzes the role of symbols and colors in these movements, underscoring how such symbolic elements functioned as tools of political and social protest. • The “Black Lives Matter” movement, which emerged in 2013 in response to police violence against African Americans in the United States, made use of powerful symbols such as the raised fist to express solidarity and resistance. This symbol, with its roots in earlier civil rights struggles, was reinterpreted within BLM as an emblem of subaltern power and their solidarity in political contestation. An article entitled “The Raised Fist: A History of the Symbol,” published by the People’s History Museum, traces the historical trajectories and diverse meanings of this symbol and examines its role in various movements, including BLM (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). 4.1. Changing the Meaning and Reappropriation of Symbols by Social Forces 1 In Persian language, the word “Azadi” carries both meanings of freedom and liberty. Most politicians, social activists, and journalists during this movement translated its slogan as “Woman, Life, Freedom.” However, this translation is inaccurate because the protesters in this movement are striving to establish the social and political rights of Iranian citizens. Therefore, the correct translation, in this context, is “Woman, Life, Liberty.” According to general usage, freedom refers to the personal state of being free from restraint, while liberty denotes the social or political rights guaranteed by law (Oxford English Dictionary, 2025). The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8500 Within this field of research, a number of studies have explored instances in which protest or opposition groups have reappropriated symbols originally associated with dominant or rival discourses, transforming their meanings in ways that are inverse or even antithetical to their initial connotations. This process—commonly referred to as symbolic reappropriation or symbolic inversion— is widely recognized in social and cultural studies as a significant mechanism in discursive and identical struggles (Hall, 1997; Hebdige, 1979; Turner, 1987). Several notable examples of this phenomenon in social movements are outlined below: • During the Gezi Park protests of 2013, then-Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referred to demonstrators as çapulcu—a derogatory term meaning “looters” or “thugs.” Protesters, however, reappropriated the term, transforming it into a symbol of resistance and collective pride. They emblazoned the word on T-shirts, incorporated it into songs, and even introduced the neologism chapulling into English, redefining it as a synonym for the “struggle for democracy” (Gürcan & Peker, 2015; Yörük & Yüksel, 2014). • In another example from the United States, American football player Colin Kaepernick knelt during the national anthem to protest police brutality against African Americans. Although initially perceived as disrespect toward the flag and the political order of the United States, this gesture gradually evolved into a powerful symbol of peaceful protest and the broader demand for racial justice. Through this process of symbolic reappropriation, national emblems such as the flag and anthem were transformed into sites of discursive contestation over justice and equality (Coombs & Cassilo, 2017; Kaufman, 2018; Bonilla & Tillery, 2020). In all of these cases, protest groups either employed symbols of the dominant discourse or reappropriated symbols originally associated with the dominant discourse, transforming their meanings in ways that were inverse or antithetical to their initial connotations. This process enabled them to redefine their collective identity, strengthen internal cohesion, and communicate their message to society more effectively, ultimately challenging the symbolic power of the official discourse and compelling changes in the political power structure. However, the trajectory of symbolic struggle in Iran, while initially resembling these cases, has subsequently followed a distinct path. 5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 5.1. History of Symbolic conflicts in Iran after the Islamic Revolution The social life of Iranians in the years after the Islamic Revolution, and especially after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, was never devoid of symbolism. Throughout all these years, both supporters and opponents of the Islamic Republic carried signs and symbols in their daily lives that allowed them to identify like-minded individuals or convey symbolic messages to society and others. For example, men supporting the government, who were generally Shiites and believers in the ruling religious system, wore simple shirts in dark or neutral colors. They left the tails of their shirts over their trousers so that the prominences of their bodies were less visible. They had beards and mustaches, wore agate rings on their fingers, and constantly held rosaries in their hands. Women in this group also traditionally appeared in the public arena wearing black chador that covered their entire bodies and even part of their faces. In contrast, women who did not believe in or opposed the official discourse of the government, after the Islamic hijab became mandatory in the early years after the Islamic Revolution, began to wear long coats or manteau, generally in dark colors, and a kind of wimple, headdress, or scarf. If they had the opportunity, they would apply a little makeup to their faces, and men in this group, based on the choices that the market gave them, tried to wear shirts with bright colors. They would tuck the ends of their shirts into their trousers, and if they had the opportunity, especially at celebrations and weddings, they would wear ties. They shaved their beards, and some of them wore gold or silver rings or necklaces (Rahgozar & Moridi, 2016). The official discourse opponents' men were wearing in this style, while shaving their beards and wearing gold or silver jewelry is forbidden for men according to the Sharia in the Shiite religion. In this way, women and men who did not believe in the official discourse were distinguished from supporters of the official discourse and were able to recognize themselves and the others. After the end of the exceptional state of war and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini as a charismatic leader, and with the beginning of the leadership era of Ayatollah Khamenei, who came to power through a bureaucratic process, and simultaneously with the beginning of the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani, there were gradual social openings that to some extent in the lifestyle and clothing of Iranians, some diversity in appearance and style of clothing emerged, especially among Iranian women who did not support the official discourse. However, never during this period was this difference in the appearance and clothing of women and men who did not support the official discourse intended to challenge or undermine the ruling symbolic power. In fact, in a way, these two styles of clothing and lifestyles, one of which relied on the full support of the ruling political and military power, and the other had created a cautious and even secretive aspect for itself behind the walls of houses, were simply two different life worlds that did not share a common symbolic aspect. During this period, numerous protest movements occurred. From the first street protests (1992) in the Tollab neighborhood of Mashhad (IRNA, 2018), the Qazvin protests in (August 1994) over issues such as national divisions (Ettelaat Online, 2024), the marches and unrest in Islamshahr in (April 1995) that originated from livelihood and economic issues (Al Arabiya Farsi, 2021), to protest gatherings with political goals such as those in (December 1998) to protest the serial killings (BBC Persian, 2016), in (July The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8501 1999) to protest the suppression of the press (Hawzah News, 2019), in (November 2002) to protest the apostasy and execution sentence of Hashem Aghajari (ISNA, 2004), and even in campaigns such as "one million signaturesthe" (BBC Persian, 2007) that was a women's movement's egalitarian campaign in (June 2006), all of them shared one common characteristic: none directly contested the symbolic power embedded in the official discourse. They pursued demands, but they did not seek to construct symbolic power against the symbolic power of the official discourse. In such circumstances, as I have observed, the first symbolic confrontation occurred around the winter of 2000. It is not clear whether its root was a plan by opponents of the Islamic Republic or whether it was simply a coincidence in fashion design. In several major cities, particularly Tehran, some modern young women began using the chafiyyah 2 as a headscarf. Since the years following the Islamic Revolution—and especially during the Iran–Iraq War—volunteer Basij members and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps soldiers had worn the chafiyyah as a headband or draped around their necks. In this context, the chafiyyah became a powerful symbol associated with jihad, martyrdom, and, more broadly, loyalty and devotion to the official discourse of the Islamic Republic. Consequently, the use of the chafiyyah as a headscarf by young women who did not follow the lifestyle approved by the government was considered an insult to the official discourse and even a conspiracy by the enemies of the Islamic Republic to alienate Iranian youth. On the other hand, Ayatollah Khamenei was a non-charismatic leader who, in the absence of the exceptional conditions of revolution and war that naturally had a mobilizing effect, had to create a symbolic system to form a network of his loyalists, shape the emotional and behavioral construction of his followers, and redefine the boundary between "self" and "other" as enemies. Just a few months after the modernist girls began using the chafiyyah, during his speech in the Tehran mosque in May 2000, he recalled the "chafiyyah" as a symbol of jihad and martyrdom. He added it to his official attire, opened a battle line in the conflict between opponents and supporters of the official discourse of the Islamic Republic, and officially set the stage for the symbolic conflict (Etemad Online, 2024). However, since no other case of this kind has observed before the formation of the “Green" movement” in the spring of 2009, it seems that opponents of the official discourse probably did not recognized the significance of confronting the ruling symbolic power at the socio-political level before the formation of the “Green" movement” and did not perceive a strong need to generate meaningmaking symbols aimed at contesting the government’s symbolic power. Consequently, until the beginning of the presidential election campaigns in the spring of 2009, they practically did not use specific symbols even when advancing their social, economic, and political demands through street protests or demand campaigns. 5.2. The “Green” Movement; the Beginning of Struggle over Significations During the 2009 presidential election, for the first time, the Ministry of Interior announced that it would assign a color to the campaign headquarters of each presidential candidate, so that they would draw lots with balls of these colors to determine the order in which the candidates’ advertising programs would be broadcast on the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio and Television (IRNA, 2009). This idea led to the campaign headquarters using these colors symbolically in the design of their advertising elements and posters. Red was introduced for Ahmadinejad’s campaign headquarters, blue for Mohsen Rezaei’s campaign headquarters, yellow for Mehdi Karroubi’s campaign headquarters, and green for Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign headquarters. However, this green color, which was initially used as a symbol of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign, quickly became a symbol of the government’s opponents after the start of the protests against the election results. This color, which was historically associated with religious concepts, became a symbol of resistance, hope, and transformation in this protest movement (Milani, 2010). The confrontation of the color green in the "Green Movement" turned into a confrontation of two definitions of the color green. Supporters of the government introduced themselves as the supporters of (Alavi Green), and called the supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign and the “Green Movement” as the supporters of (Umayyad Green). By pointing out that Muawiyah, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, lived in a green palace as a symbol of aristocracy and corruption, the supporters of the official discourse represented that the supporters of the "Green Movement" were in fact supporters of an aristocratic and corrupt type of Islam and did not believe in the principles of "true Islam". They considered themselves true followers of the first Shiite Imam, Ali, and his descendants, and believed that their path was the path of true Islam. Although they also respected the color green, they actually considered this color to be a genuine green color when it evoked support for the method and character of the first Shiite Imam and his family, as well as complete obedience and subservience to his successor, the leader of the Islamic Republic (Javan Online, 2009). If symbolic reappropriation can be understood as a process through which opposition or critical groups appropriate symbols that previously had a specific meaning in the dominant discourse and, by redefining them as “floating signifiers,” place them in the service of their own goals (Laclau, 1996; Glynos & Howarth, 2007; Hall, 1997), then my observations suggest that—alongside the contest over the color green noted above—verbal and even physical clashes also emerged around the symbolic reappropriation of 2 The chafiyyah (keffiyeh) is a large scarf worn by Arabs, especially Palestinian Arabs, as a headscarf. Years of war in the Palestinian territories and the oppression of its people have made the chafiyyah more visible in the media and recognized as a symbol of struggle and resistance against the dominance of imperialism. The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8502 the official flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran. These confrontations were visible in both slogans and street practices up until the end of 2010, when street clashes subsided. Protesters, through their chants, urged Mir Hossein Mousavi to reclaim the Iranian flag 3 , which they believed had been appropriated by a government lacking genuine popular legitimacy. Conversely, supporters of the official discourse asserted themselves as the rightful custodians of the official flag, framing it as the sacred inheritance of the thousands of martyrs who had perished during the struggle for the 1979 Revolution and the subsequent Iran–Iraq War. This symbolic confrontation over the re-appropriation and re-signification of symbols was also evident during the funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri, who had become one of the emblematic figures of the “Green Movement.” At the ceremony, I observed how, while a representative of the mourners attempted to deliver a eulogy in his honor, government supporters sought to drown out the speaker by mounting large loudspeakers on the back of a pickup truck and broadcasting Quranic recitations at high volume. In response, some mourners, invoking a slogan 4 that symbolically recalled an event from the Battle of Siffin 5 , stormed the pickup truck and forced the loudspeakers into silence. I also observed protesters participating in official marches—such as the government-sponsored march on the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution and the Quds Day march, held annually on the last Friday of Ramadan—which are traditionally monopolized by supporters of the official discourse. In these instances, protesters symbolically attempted to reclaim the public arena and the streets from the government’s supporters, presenting themselves as the true heirs of the values and ideals of the 1979 Revolution while framing the government as the actor that had deviated from these founding principles. Such practices can be understood as paradigmatic instances of symbolic actions aimed at reclaiming public space and time on occasions that are themselves highly charged with symbolic meaning (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Lefebvre, 1991; Butler, 1997; Tilly, 2004). On the other side of this conflict, the owners and supporters of the official discourse have also been trying to construct symbols in their own semiotic system during the years 2009 and 2010 and in the events following the decline of the "Green" movement until now. Among these symbolic practices, one notable example is the color and type of gemstone embedded in the rings worn by the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran on different occasions. These choices appear to function as semiotic signs through which he communicates political preferences, disapproval, or broader ideological messages to both his supporters and society. During the protests against the results of the 2009 elections, Ayatollah Khamenei, who considered the protesters to be seditionists, alien agents, and enemies, wore a ring with Khataei jasper, which according to Shiite religious beliefs is used to confront Satan and the enemies of God (BBC Persian, 2015). In the following years, just at the same time as the presidential elections were held and Hassan Rouhani was elected in 2013 and Masoud Pezeshkian was elected as president in 2014, the color of Ayatollah Khamenei's ring was exactly the same color as the election campaign of these two people. The former became president with a very fragile majority (Dehghan, 2013), and the latter, as Masoud Pezeshkian himself said, became president "with the support of the Leader of the Islamic Republic" (Pezeshkian, as cited in Euronews, 2024). If the repertoire of symbolic actions performed by both the opponents and supportes of the official discourse during the “Green movement" can be conceptualized as a conflict over the semantic re-appropriation of symbols (Bourdieu, 1991), then this struggle essentially revolved around attempts by each side to determine the meaning of shared symbols and to align them with their own understandings of the self, the other, and the surrounding world. During this protest movement—which can be regarded as the first symbolic confrontation between opponents and supporters of the official discourse of the Islamic Republic after the end of the state of exception marked by the Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War— the opponents sought to challenge the signifieds within the same semantic system of the official discourse while leaving the signifiers intact. For instance, as I observed, they chanted “Allahu Akbar” from their rooftops at night in response to the call to prayer broadcast from mosques under government control, insisting that the true meaning of the words of the call resided in their own way of life rather than in that of the government’s supporters. In another case, while affirming their respect for the foundational philosophy behind the creation of the Basij as a volunteer paramilitary force affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they distinguished in their slogans between the “true Basij” and the forces that violently suppressed the protests under the same name 6 . Meanwhile, supporters of the "Green Movement" tried very hard to express respect and loyalty to the principles of the official discourse and to avoid insulting or challenging them. For example, in incidents such as tearing and burning the portrait of Ayatollah 3 The protesters' slogan was: "Mousavi! Mousavi! Take back my Iranian flag!" 4 "This is the Quran that is on the spearhead." 5 During the Battle of Siffin, when the defeat of the Syrian army (Muawiya’s forces) was imminent, Amr ibn al-As suggested to Muawiya that in order to halt the war and create doubt among Ali’s troops—the first Imam of the Shiites—they should raise the Qur’an on the tips of their spears and call out: “Let us return to the judgment of God.” This act caused confusion among a portion of Ali’s army, within which there were some simple-minded individuals, leading to hesitation, silence, and ultimately, the defeat of Ali and his followers in that battle (Tabari, 1973/1352, Vol. 5, p. 1823). 6 “The true Basij were Hemmat and Bakeri.” In this slogan, the chanters refer to two commanders of the Basij forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, stating that these two were the true models of a Basiji because they defended their homeland against Iraq’s invasion and sacrificed their lives for the Iranian people but never suppressed them. The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8503 Khomeini 7 or pulling down and burning the flag of the Islamic Republic, supporters of the "Green Movement" condemned and excluded these types of actions and their perpetrators (RFE/RL, 2009). It should be emphasized that the opponents of the official discourse were not confined to the supporters of the “Green Movement.” A variety of other political groups and factions, both inside and outside Iran, were simultaneously active in opposing the Islamic Republic. Nevertheless, the narrative presented in this article focuses primarily on the most significant and influential socio-political current at each historical juncture. 5.3. Struggle over Signifiers Based on the evidence presented above, it may be argued that during the “Green Movement,” the central strategy of a symbolic confrontation between opponents and supporters of the official discourse was a struggle over meanings and signification. However, following the decline of the “Green Movement” and the understanding of the limitations of this strategy, the collective mentality of the opponents appears to have gradually shifted toward adopting an alternative strategy in the ongoing symbolic struggle. In the following years—particularly during the protests of January 2018, August 2018, and November 2019, as well as the unrest from winter 2020 8 to summer 2022—opponents of the official discourse moved toward a reformulation of symbolic struggle. They increasingly sought direct confrontation, simultaneously targeting both the signifiers and signifieds of the official discourse. This shift ultimately reconfigured the discursive battleground in the emergence of the “Women, Life, Liberty” movement. 9 In this regard, opponents of the official discourse fundamentally reshaped the discursive battleground by evoking the collective unconscious and reactivating national myths and symbols rooted in both historical memory and everyday life-worlds. The culmination of this approach is evident in the slogans and symbolic repertoires of the “Women, Life, Liberty” movement. The following examples illustrate these transformations: 5.3.1. Emblem and Icons During the street protests since January 2018 up to now, opponents of the government have repeatedly burned icons of the leaders of the Islamic Republic and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in across various regions of Iran. There have also been numerous photos of the raising and replacement of the “historical national emblem of Iran", featuring the lion and sun, with the official flag of the Islamic Republic, both in public and in cyberspace. The symbolic confrontation between the two sides of the battle over the lion and sun symbol emblem intensified in subsequent years. A striking example is found in the case of Majid Reza Rahnavard; a protester arrested and later executed whose hand—tattooed with the lion and sun emblem—appeared visibly broken and injured in widely published photographs (VOA Farsi, 2022). Moreover, in the continuation of the protests and in the following years, the raising of the so-called “Kaviani flag” alongside the lion and sun emblem further reinforced the mythological dimension of flag-raising practices. The invocation of the “Kaviani flag” constitutes a symbolic reference to the legendary uprising of Kaveh the Blacksmith as narrated in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh (Daryaee, 2009). 5.3.2. Attacks on religious centers and turban-removal In the January 2018 protests and subsequent protests, opponents of the government attacked some mosques, Husseiniyyas, and religious schools. (HRANA, 2019; BBC Persian, 2019; DW, 2018) There have been no reports of attacks on Sunni religious centers or other religions. This approach suggests a kind of symbolic anger towards Shiite religious centers as the official origin of the Islamic Republic. This trend spread in the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement. In addition, in several cases, images of attacks on Shiite clerics and the removal of their turbans were published, which is called the “turban-removal movement” (Al Arabiya Persian, 7 What I witnessed during the commemoration of Student Day (December 7, 2009) in front of the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Tehran was that a group of unidentified individuals tore up a photo of Ayatollah Khomeini. This act was later followed by the release of videos showing the burning of his picture and, in some cases, the burning of the flag of the Islamic Republic in other locations. 8 After the Ukrainian International Airlines Flight PS752, departing from Tehran to Kyiv, was hit by missiles fired by the air defense system of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on January 8, 2020, all 176 passengers on board were killed. Despite extensive evidence indicating that the plane had been struck by IRGC missiles, the Islamic Republic of Iran denied the missile attack for three days. However, following the disclosure of documents as well as international pressure, the government ultimately accepted responsibility on January 11, 2020. The majority of the Iranian passengers on this flight were young people who intended to leave Iran to pursue education and migration opportunities abroad. 9 The Mahsa Movement, or the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement, was a protest movement that began in late summer 2022 following the suspicious death of a young woman named Mahsa Amini. She had been arrested by the morality police for allegedly violating the mandatory hijab regulations and died under suspicious circumstances while in custody. Her death sparked a widespread wave of protests against the violation of citizens’ rights, particularly those of women. Although the initial focus of these protests was opposition to the laws enforcing compulsory hijab for women, they quickly evolved into a revolutionary movement with national and even international dimensions, and its street manifestations continued extensively for nearly five months. (Amnesty International, 2022) The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8504 2022, November 3). The turban is a part of the official Shiite clerical dress that they wear like a hat, and the attack on it can be interpreted and considered a narrative of a symbolic attack on the signifiers of the semantic system of the dominant discourse. 5.3.3. The Female Body During the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement, the female body emerged as both a medium and a subject of resistance, a stage for alternative rituals, a locus of social drama, and a symbolic battleground. By publicly removing or burning their hijabs, women opposing the official discourse transformed it into a powerful symbol of resistance against bodily coercion, a claim for bodily autonomy, and a broader demand for civil rights (Najmabadi, 2023; BBC Persian, 2023). 5.3.4. Construction of alternative rites The evocation of mythological symbols situated outside the symbolic power of the official discourse, while being an attempt to construct a narrative of resistance and link contemporary struggles to deeper historical and identity-based roots, on the other hand, constitutes an act of generating alternative rituals in opposition to the official discourse and the standardized ceremonies. Victor Turner, in presenting the concept of social drama, demonstrates that societies, when confronted with social or discursive conflicts and crises, enter a stage of "symbolic transition" by creating rites of passage. In this process, new cultural structures and forms emerge that serve to redefine the social order. To this end, opponents of the dominant discourse go through three stages: (a) Rupture and confrontation, which manifests itself in street conflicts and symbolic battles. (b) Construction of alternative rites or rites of passage. (c) Reconstruction and consolidation of the new discourse and permanent split from the defeated discourse (Turner, 1969, 1974). In the course of Iranian protest movements in recent years, at least three intertwined sets of these alternative rituals can be observed: 5.3.4.1. “Siyâvash mourning” or “Siyâvashân,” and the ritual of “gisoo-boran (cutting of hairs)” Perhaps the first signs of the emergence of alternative rituals can be traced to the aftermath of the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight PS752. The aircraft was struck by two missiles launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Air Force, resulting in the death of all passengers on board. The incident was kept secret from public view and denied for three days. Although the commander of the IRGC Air Force eventually officially took responsibility for the mistake and apologized, the three-day coverup and denial of the news brought many angry and grieving people to the streets. During these collective mourning practices, the myth of Siyâvash received particular resonance, especially given that many of the victims were young and educated Iranians who had left the country under adverse political and social conditions (Khezel et al., 2020). The similarities between the mythological story of Siavash and the young people killed in this flight led to the evocation of the rituals of the "Siyâvash mourning” or "Siyâvashân,” and a mythological reinterpretation of his story. 10 The ritual of gisoo-boran (hair cutting) in the "Woman, Life, Liberty" movement can be considered as a continuation of this mythological evocation as an alternative ritual. Recalling Ferdowsi's narrative of what Farangis did during the Siyâvash mourning (Ferdowsi, 2006), women removed their compulsory hijabs and cut their hair in an act of protest. Through these rituals, Iranian women who removed their hijabs, set fires, and cut their hair in the streets, emerged from a position of obedience and passivity and became symbol-making activists who made the female body the stage for the creation of a social drama to provide models for resistance and foundations for a new and alternative discourse by constructing new rituals. 5.3.4.2. Innovation in mourning practices Another turning point in the symbolic battle and the creation of alternative rituals can be seen in the mourning ritual for the dead who opposed the government. Videos of the dead from the protests of the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement and even those killed in previous protests, all of which showed beautiful young people dancing and rejoicing, were compiled in 1401 and released many times after that. At the same time, Ali Akbar Raefipour, one of the influential supporters of the official discourse, who proposed the theory of a “conspiracy against the government”, confirmed that the targeting of beautiful young people was intentional: “I said if you are beautiful, do not participate [in the protests]... [the enemies of the government] say he/she was killed, what a young he/she was: a symbol of beauty, and modernity” (Raefipour, 1:50:05 2022) 10 “Siyâvash mourning” or “Siyâvashân,” is one of the ancient and symbolic Iranian rituals that originates from the myth of Siavash, a prominent character in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh. This ritual, which combines elements of mourning, purification, and rebirth, has been practiced in various regions of Iran—particularly in Khorasan, Sistan, Baluchestan, and even among Zoroastrians—in diverse forms and under different names. Siavash is a virtuous and innocent prince who becomes the victim of court conspiracies and his father's (Kay Kavus) injustice. To prove his innocence, he passes through fire and demonstrates his purity. Grieved and disheartened, he is then compelled to migrate from Iran to Turan, where he marries a woman named Farangis but is eventually wrongfully killed. Farangis and all the women who heard of his death cut their hair in mourning. Siavash thus becomes a symbol of purity against corruption and an innocent victim of tyrannical rulers. (Bahar, 2002; Sattari, 2003; Mirfetros, 2012) The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8505 In this way, an epic image of mourning for the deceased opponents was represented and narrated. In this narrative, beautiful and freedom-loving youth, full of music, dance, and passion for life, are represented and depicted as encountering a cruel massacre. This narrative is, in fact, a retelling and evocation of the mythological story of Zahhak from Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh (Ferdowsi, 2006). During those days, and in mourning for the deceased opponents, many published videos in which they retold the story of Zahhak for themselves, their children, or the audience (YouTube, 2022a). Many artists created works inspired by this mythological story and represented this confrontation (Bagheri, 2022). In such an atmosphere, instead of holding traditional and religious mourning ceremonies, reciting the Quran and praying over the bodies of the deceased, their families symbolically played music, sang, and danced over their graves (Wintour, 2022). And even one of the protesters, Majid Reza Rahnavard, minutes before his execution, asked people in front of the official television camera not to hold religious ceremonies, not to pray, and not to read the Quran in his mourning, but to rejoice at his grave and play happy music (Aparat, 2022). Also, in some cases, contrary to traditional funeral ceremonies within the framework of patriarchal relations of official discourse, where men carry the coffin on their shoulders and women follow them, it was women who carried the coffin and refused to recite Islamic adhkar during the funeral ceremony. The two latest examples of this can be seen in the funeral of Shiva Arastouee, a very well-known Iranian poet and writer, attended by women in May 2025, and Naser Taghvaee, one of the most famous cinema directors, in October 2025. In the first, contrary to the patriarchal tradition of the official discourse, women carried the coffin, and in the second, contrary to the religious and traditional rules of the official discourse, all those present wore white clothes instead of black. Instead of reciting the Quran and Islamic adhkar during the funeral, music was played, and the mourners clapped and danced to the rhythm of the instruments as they accompanied Nasser Taqvaei's body. (Radio Zamaneh, 2025; BBC Persian, 2025) 5.3.4.3. Transformation of Mourning and Religious Celebrations Beyond innovations in funeral practices, alternative appropriations can also be observed in the performance of traditional mourning rituals and religious celebrations. Over the past decade, the government has invested public funds to institutionalize Shiite rituals in the public sphere by setting up mukeb (street stations) on occasions such as the mourning of the third Shiite Imam, Eid al-Ghadir, and other religious commemorations. These state-sponsored sites typically feature ritual music and the distribution of free food and drinks to passersby. However, what I observed is that many participants—especially young people whose clothing styles clearly distinguished them from government supporters—frequented these stations not out of religious devotion but to access free food, socialize, and reclaim the surrounding public space. By disregarding the ritual protocols and traditional attire associated with such occasions, they symbolically stripped these ceremonies of their intended sacrality, reducing them to sites of consumption and leisure. Moreover, because these ceremonies historically permitted a degree of openness and inclusivity, opponents of the official discourse were able to occupy the public arena of these events with minimal confrontation. In doing so, they not only appropriated the rituals’ spatial and temporal dimensions but also hollowed out their official meanings by creating a secular ritual marketplace, designing clothing, accessories, and thematic makeup for both men and women to participate in these occasions, and transform these rites into opportunities for alternative cultural expression rather than strictly religious ceremonies. 5.3.5. The God of Rainbow A discourse that has been emerging in opposition to the official one, although secular, is not atheistic. During the protest movements of recent years, particularly the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement, the floating signifier “God” was redefined and contested. Opponents of the official discourse have sought to imagine a God different from the God of the official discourse, who, in their opinion, is bloody and violent. By articulating notions such as the “God of Iran” or the “God of Rainbow,” they point to a God of peace who embraces and loves all, regardless of gender, religion, or ethnicity. Stressing the relationship of this God with Iran represents a symbolic counterformulation against the God of the Ummah-centered discourse. The articulation of such a God, in effect, represents the projection of the ideals and aspirations of the opponents of the official discourse—those who long for a life of peace and tolerance, and who demand that the state prioritize the needs of its citizens. During the street protests of the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement, the killing of a ten-year-old boy named Kian Pirfalak became one of the turning points in the narrative articulation of such a god. The release of videos of his tragic death and then his speech introducing the boat he built, beginning with “In the name of the God of the rainbow,” constructed an image of a mythic God in the emerging discourse (YouTube, 2022b). Since then, those who mention the “God of the rainbow” in their speeches or social media posts are, in fact, signifying symbolic affiliation with this new discourse and identifying themselves against the “other” (Asr Iran, 2022). 5.3.6. Three-day strikes During the "Women, Life, Liberty" movement, a call for nationwide three-day strikes on December 3, 4, and 5, 2022, on the eve of National Student Day, was circulated in cyberspace. The posters of this call were welcomed by diverse social groups—including merchants, taxi drivers, shop owners and academicsand became the most extensive wave of strikes since those of the 1979 The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8506 revolution. The posters were invoking a mythological narrative from Tazkirat al-Awliya, about the hanging of Hossein Mansur Halladj 11 and the notion of enduring pain and suffering on the path of true love. 5.3.7. Mythological Animals One of the most prominent symbolic aspects of the protest movements of recent years, particularly the "Woman, Life, Liberty" movement, is the symbolic evocation of mythological animals from ancient Iranian literature and beliefs, or the retelling of mythological narratives of the birth and death of animals. The most prominent examples of this symbolic evocation and narrative retelling include: 5.3.7.1. Phoenix For the first time in February 2022, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami’s Instagram page published a painting by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard, leaders of the “Green” movement who are under house arrest. The painting depicts a dense volume of red paint in a black frame with a flaming bird burning in the center (Kalani, 2022) In Iranian mythology, this bird is the Phoenix. The Phoenix is a mythical bird that is known in many cultures, including Iran, Greece, and ancient Egypt, as a symbol of death and rebirth, rebirth from ashes, hope, and resistance to destruction (Kavousi, 2015). A few days after the release of the image of the phoenix, the former Queen of Iran, Farah Pahlavi, said in a message to Iranian society on February 10, 2022: “Iran will rise from its ashes like a phoenix once again.” (VOA Persian, 2022) After that, and during the “Woman, Life, Liberty” movement, artists, poets, graphic designers, and cyberspace users turned to representing the concepts of resistance, suffering, hope, and rebirth, and the phoenix was the central symbol in the works of these artists. Hashtags referring to the phoenix were also used to symbolically refer to the situation in Iran and the hopeful future of protest movements opposing the official government discourse. In addition, many visual artworks showed the phoenix in the form of women rising from the flames (Iranian Women of Graphic Design, 2022). 5.3.7.2. Simorgh In October 2020, a text titled “The Third Feather” attributed to the contemporary poet, Houshang Ebtehaj, was published on social media. This text received such public attention that Houshang Ebtehaj’s son issued a public statement denying the attribution to his recently deceased father (ISNA, 2020). This text is about the Simorgh feathers in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh. The anonymous author cites evidence from several mythological stories in Shahnameh and claims that the Simorgh gave three feathers to Zal and his son Rostam so that, in times of danger or confusion, they could burn them and summon the Simorgh to provide a way to solve problems with the power of wisdom and be a source of salvation. The author recalls that by burning the feathers that the Simorgh had given to Zal, he appears twice and shows the way to salvation, but despite other critical moments that occur for the mythical heroes of Shahnameh, the third feather is never used. The author then asks the question: What happened to the third feather, and where is it? And he himself answers that Ferdowsi entrusted the third feather of the Simorgh in the history of Iran with a mysterious and symbolic statement so that at the moment of confusion and helplessness of the Iranian nation, it would be set on fire and the power of the Simorgh's wisdom would be summoned to show the Iranians a way out (ISNA, 2020). The point here is that it does not matter to what extent this story corresponds to the reality of the Shahnameh. What is important is how this story is understood in the intersubjective social space and why it is welcomed. Republishing this text, especially during the years when many Iranians are dissatisfied with the government's performance and consider it illegitimate, and on the other hand, they are severely suppressed after each nationwide protest and are practically helpless in finding a way out of helplessness and confusion, actually means a collective desire to invoke the Simorgh as a mythological wisdom symbolically. 5.3.7.3. Pirouz On May 1, 2022, three Asiatic leopard cubs were born. The mother of these three leopard cubs was named "Iran". She gave birth to the three cubs by field cesarean section, but two of the cubs died soon after, and hopes for the survival of "Pirouz", the only remaining cub of Iran's three children, were dashed (DW, 2022a). "Pirouz" went through many challenges after his birth, and at the same time, as the "Woman, Life, Liberty" movement began, news of his health also gained attention. "Pirouz," as the only surviving child of "Iran," became a metaphor for the fragility of hope. It was as if "Pirouz" was symbolically considered a representative of the young generation of the land of Iran, whose survival or the possibility of extinction evoked the survival of hope or the failure of Iranian youth (Arman Emrouz, 2023). Therefore, "Pirouz" became a mythical animal in the eyes of the public. News of his health was followed daily. And his wish for health and survival even made it into the song "Baraye," performed by Shervin Hajipour, and was repeated and heard millions of times (GRAMMY, 2023). But finally, "Pirouz" died on February 28, 2023, at the Tehran Veterinary Hospital. The cause of his death was announced to be the injection of the wrong drug (Rouydad24, 2023), which brought anger and 11 Then once again they took Hossein away to crucify him… It is related that a dervish among them asked him, “What is love?” He replied, “You will see today, you will see tomorrow, and you will see the day after tomorrow.” That day they killed him, the next day they burned him, and on the third day they scattered his ashes to the wind—meaning, this is love. (ʿAttār, 1905, part 71) The Evolution of Symbolic Struggles Between Supporters and Opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Official Discourse (January 2000–October 2025) IJSSHR, Volume 08 Issue 11 November 2025 www.ijsshr.in Page 8513 44) Farhangi, S. (2013). 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