Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans: Serbia's Strategic Hedging

287 DOI: 10.33067/SE.1.2025.15 Article published under the license: CC BY-NC 4.0. Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Nikolaos Tzifakis* Eleni Vasdoka** Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans: Serbia’s Strategic Hedging Abstract Great-power interest in the Western Balkans has risen over the last few years, and while the West, China, and Russia have been competing for infl uence, Western Balkan leaders have encouraged the greater engagement of external actors in the region. This article contributes to the study of the gatekeeping role of Western Balkan leaders by examining Serbia’s foreign policy towards great powers since Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (hereinafter; the SNS) rose to power. The article argues that Serbia has adopted the strategy of hedging not only towards the European Union (EU) and the United States, but also towards Russia and China, sending ambiguous and contradictory signals on its alignment preferences. In doing so, the incumbent regime has sought to increase its domestic legitimacy and generate benefi ts for its patronage and clientelistic networks. The article assesses that Serbia’s strategy has been successful, as it has been perceived as credible and has involved only relatively moderate costs for the great powers. Still, the tenability of Serbia’s hedging in the long term is doubtful in a structural setting marked by the increased fi erceness of the competition between the great powers. Therefore, to comprehend the infl uence of the great powers on the Western Balkans, we should take into consideration both the structural environment and the preferences and actions of the countries in the region. Keywords: Serbia, Strategic Hedging, Western Balkans, China, Russia * Nikolaos Tzifakis – University of the Peloponnese, Greece, e-mail: [email protected], ORCID ID: 0000-0003-4653-6882. ** Eleni Vasdoka – University of the Peloponnese, Greece, e-mail: [email protected], ORCID ID: 0009-0004-5638-5875. The following article refl ects the geopolitical situation as at 31 December 2024. 288 Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2025 Introduction Over the past few years, Western decision-makers and experts have consistently highlighted the growing geopolitical competition in the Western Balkans (Bieber, Tzifakis, 2020). Signifi cant attention has been directed towards the actual and potential detrimental infl uence of external actors, such as Russia and China, on efforts to promote democracy, resolve confl icts, and achieve sustainable development in the region. The Russian military aggression against Ukraine has aggravated these concerns, giving rise to an additional fear that Moscow could try to open a second front in Europe. Although these anxieties are well-founded, they frequently rest on the neglect of the agency of the countries in the region. More specifi cally, they have often downplayed the fact that Western Balkan leaders have enabled increased engagement of external actors in the region. Acting as gatekeepers, regional leaders have eagerly sought the growth of ties between their countries and certain external actors. This article contributes to the study of the gatekeeping role of Western Balkan leaders by examining Serbia’s foreign policy towards great powers since Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) rose to power in 2012. The article argues that Serbia has adopted the strategy of hedging not only towards the EU and the United States, but also to Russia and China, sending ambiguous and contradictory messages on its alignment preferences. There is certainly nothing unusual in Serbia’s strategic choice; several small and medium powers in the Asia-Pacifi c long ago followed the same strategy towards China and the United States. Nevertheless, in Serbia’s case, the motives behind the choice of strategic hedging are rather unusual. While most countries perceive hedging as an insurance policy in uncertain times against security risks, Vučić has consistently employed that strategy to consolidate his hold on power. In other words, strategic hedging has increasingly been at the service of a transactional foreign policy towards the great powers, aiming at helping the incumbent regime increase its domestic legitimacy and secure benefi ts for its patronage and clientelistic networks. This article observes that Serbia has operationalised its hedging strategy through discourses and practices that consistently generate ambiguity regarding the country’s alignment preferences. This strategy has been successful, as it has been perceived as credible and has involved relatively moderate costs for the great powers. However, the longterm sustainability of Serbia’s strategic approach remains uncertain in a structural environment increasingly defi ned by intensifi ed competition among the great powers. 289 N. Tzifakis, E. Vasdoka, Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans… The article is structured into fi ve sections. The fi rst section provides a literature review, exploring the concepts of gatekeeping and strategic hedging. The second section examines the motivations behind Serbia’s strategic choice and delves into the ruling regime’s transactional approach to foreign policy. The third section analyses how Serbia has implemented its hedging strategy in practice. The fourth section evaluates the outcomes of Serbia’s strategy, while the fi nal section concludes with a summary of the article’s fi ndings. Gatekeepers and Strategic Hedging The infl uence exerted by the great powers over small and mediumsized powers is often analysed through a structural lens. Asymmetries in capabilities, geographical proximity, and geopolitical interests are typically identifi ed as the primary explanatory factors for great-power infl uence over the policies of lesser powers. For example, Levitsky and Way’s seminal work (Levitsky, Way, 2010, pp. 38–45) on the West’s external promotion of democratisation in third countries highlights two key dimensions: the ties and fl ows (linkages) between the West and those countries; and the latter’s vulnerability to external pressure (leverage). Notably, the expansion of linkages, understood as transmitters of infl uence, is found to be correlated with two structural factors, namely, geographical proximity and historical ties (Levitsky, Way, 2010, p. 44). The preferences of lesser powers (being the target of international infl uence attempts) in developing linkages with certain great powers have been overlooked. As a result, while Levitsky and Way convincingly explain the leverage great powers exert in different regions worldwide, they do not account fully for “intra-regional” differences in external infl uence over target countries (Tolstrup, 2013, p. 717). However, the ruling political elites of small and medium powers are not passive recipients of great-power initiatives. They play a crucial gatekeeping role in upgrading or downgrading their country’s relations with specifi c great powers through various ways, such as concluding or discontinuing agreements, participating in or leaving initiatives, and opening or closing their country to external linkages in domains such as the economy and the media landscape (Tolstrup, 2013, pp. 720–725). Acting as gatekeepers, the ruling political elites of small and medium powers can stimulate or restrict the formation of linkages between their countries and a given great power. Therefore, to fully comprehend the infl uence of great powers over third countries, one should take into consideration both the structural environment and the agential preferences and actions. 290 Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2025 If small and medium powers advance national preferences in their relations with great powers, which strategies do they usually follow? The term “hedging” emerged in the nineties in the international relations literature to analytically explicate the foreign policy behaviour of lesser powers towards the great powers, especially when the latter do not present a direct security threat to the former. In other words, hedging has been increasingly used to describe state strategies standing between outright balancing and bandwagoning (Kuik, 2021, p. 301). Owing to its wide and loose conceptualisation, the term has been alternatively depicted as “nearly ubiquitous”, “unclear”, “highly contentious”, “vague”, or even denoting a “residual category next to balancing and bandwagoning” (Ciorciari, Haacke, 2019, p. 368; Kuik, 2021, p. 301; Jones, Jenne, 2022, pp. 205–206). For many scholars, hedging entails a mix of engagement and containment elements (Goh, 2005, pp. 2–3; Korolev, 2019, p. 420; Koga, 2018, pp. 641–642; Ciorciari, Haacke, 2019, p. 367; Haacke, 2019, pp. 378– 379). Others presented hedging as something of an insurance policy to mitigate several risks in uncertain conditions. While small and medium powers are compelled to choose between the strategies of balancing and bandwagoning towards major powers posing security threats, they may resort to hedging when they do not know which security risks may turn into existential threats (Roy, 2005, pp. 312–323; Kuik, 2008, p. 164; Kuik, 2021, pp. 302–309; Korolev, 2019, p. 422; Haacke, 2019, pp. 392– 393; and Koga, 2018, p. 638). As a result, hedging has been alternatively described as a strategy of leaving all options open, “buying time”, or, more descriptively, a “just-in-case” strategic approach intending to minimise risks and maximise benefi ts (Koga, 2018, p. 637; Kuik, 2021, p. 309; Jones, Jenne, 2022, p. 208). According to Kuik (2021, p. 302), hedging is characterised by three key attributes: (a) the avoidance of taking sides or becoming entrenched in rigid alignments; (b) efforts to implement opposing or contradictory measures in order to counterbalance multiple risks; and (c) a tendency to diversify and develop fallback positions. Although the literature focuses on the lesser powers and their concern to preserve autonomy and advance national preferences, scholarly discussion is heavily infl uenced by structural realism. The starting points of many analyses are the international system’s polarity and the fi erceness of the competition between the great powers (e.g., Goh, 2005; Tessman, 2012; and Korolev, 2019). As a result, the understanding of hedgers’ foreign policy is limited by the emphasis placed on the structural constraints to those countries’ strategic choices. In other words, the agency of small and medium powers is frequently underestimated in the strategic- 291 N. Tzifakis, E. Vasdoka, Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans… hedging literature. Moreover, it is usually assumed that foreign policy is predominantly guided by a drive to attenuate security risks and contain security threats (e.g., Roy, 2005; Haacke, 2019). With some exceptions, the relevant scholarship downplays the salience of non-security-related factors (such as economic interests) and the role of domestic-level considerations. Nevertheless, as Kuik (2021, p. 310) explained, the governments of lesser powers may adopt strategic hedging to pursue various objectives, such as ensuring a regime’s survival, preserving political stability, and promoting economic growth. Building on Kuik’s approach, the article analyses Serbia’s strategic hedging towards the great powers, which has been increasingly motivated by the incumbent regime’s aspiration to gain international legitimacy and consolidate its hold on power. Furthermore, the article shows how the interplay of the structural environment and Serbia’s preferences and actions determine the effects of its strategy. The Motives in Serbia’s Strategic Thinking In 2009, Boris Tadić, Serbia’s then-President, announced that his country had adopted a new foreign policy doctrine premised on what he termed as “four pillars of diplomacy” (B92, 2009). While Serbia’s primary goal was EU accession, it would, in parallel, seek to establish “strategic partnerships” with three of the great powers, namely, the United States, Russia, and China. To explain Serbia’s strategic engagement with the United States, Tadić cited America’s “unequivocal domination” in the international system. As regards Russia, the Serbian President made mention of the historical ties between the two countries, along with Moscow’s support for Belgrade’s position over the Kosovo question along with Russia’s ability to determine energy prices. Lastly, concerning China, Tadić remarked that it would become a “future world economic leader” and underscored the need to attract Chinese investments (B92, 2009). Although not mentioned on that occasion, Serbia also appreciated China’s opposition to recognising Kosovo’s independence. If one were to take Tadić’s “four pillars” doctrine at face value, they could be misled into thinking that Serbia had adopted an engagement strategy with all of the great powers. Nevertheless, the confrontation between Russia and the West and the rising economic competition between the West and China left no room for such an idealistic strategic choice. In a competitive systemic context, the growth of Serbia’s ties with any great power would inevitably annoy others. In addition, whichever position Serbia adopted on major international issues (e.g., Russia’s military invasions of Ukraine), it would unavoidably result in a balancing 292 Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2025 or containing of some great-power interests. Therefore, in practice, the four pillars doctrine operationalised a hedging strategy. Indeed, with Tadić being aware of the diffi culty in engaging simultaneously with all the great powers in a competitive international setting, he felt the need to highlight that Serbia’s strategic partnership with Russia and China would not obstruct its EU membership (B92, 2009). However, Serbian decisionmakers subsequently used the essence of the four pillars doctrine to remark that if the country’s EU accession did not advance, Serbia would explore alternative paths from the rest of its strategic partners (Teokarevic, 2011, p. 74). Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy was reminiscent of Tito’s successful non-alignment policy. As a result, despite its vague articulation and poor design (Novaković et al., 2013, p. 18), the four pillars doctrine was endorsed by the country’s entire political system (Vuksanovic, 2021, p. 6). Indeed, the SNS, the largest party in the country (and a member of all governing coalitions) since 2012, has brought Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy to another level. SNS-led governments have deepened Serbia’s ties with these great powers and sought to establish strategic partnerships with additional countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Crucially, Serbia’s foreign policy drivers have evolved since the SNS rose to power. On top of the previously-stated objectives (e.g., diplomatic support on the Kosovo question, the attraction of foreign investments, and affordable energy prices), the incumbent regime has advanced a transactional foreign-policy agenda to support its efforts to consolidate its grip on power. As Bashirov and Yilmaz (2020, pp. 166–168) explained, a transactional approach to foreign policy is a personalist strategy driven by domestic considerations. This approach typically involves a preference for bilateral agreements over multilateral arrangements, as well as a focus on short-term gains and issue-specifi c deals rather than long-term strategic commitments and normative goals. Although Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia’s President and SNS leader, has consistently argued that his country’s primary objective was EU membership, his governance has featured a lack of meaningful efforts to implement EU-prescribed reforms. Indeed, Vučić has been mainly interested in the progress of Serbia’s EU membership talks as evidence of the EU’s endorsement of his rule. If the EU bestowed the SNS-led regime with external legitimacy and implicitly condoned its illiberal policies (and granted substantial pre-accession assistance), Vučić could be emboldened domestically to accrue more power and weaken any checks and balances on his governance. In exchange, the Serbian President has committed to the EU and the United States to help prevent the eruption of crises in the 293 N. Tzifakis, E. Vasdoka, Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans… region (i.e., in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and has refrained from fully aligning with Russia or China. The EU-Serbia “transactional agenda” has, as at the time of writing, recently been expanded with the inclusion of lithium mining (Bieber, 2024). As for Serbia-U.S. relations, Vučić attempted in May 2024 to gain the support of Donald Trump (who was leading in the U.S. Presidential election race) by leasing the site of the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence building (that was bombed by NATO during the Kosovo war) to a company owned by his son-in-law Jared Kushner for the development of a hotel (Hajdari, 2024b). The incumbent regime’s transactional approach to foreign policy is also manifested in bilateral relations with the Chinese and Russian authorities. Those countries’ investments and projects have not only been benefi cial in creating new employment opportunities; the informal and opaque terms of Serbia’s deals with China and Russia (in deviation from established rules of transparency and accountability) have generated much-sought benefi ts for the regime to consolidate its patronage and clientelistic networks (Soyaltin-Colella, 2023). In exchange, Serbia has offered a favourable business environment for launching activities where the questions of a project’s economic feasibility and/or environmental impact may be sidelined. Moreover, Serbia’s strategic partnerships with these great powers (entailing regular meetings at the level of political leadership) have boosted Vučić’s domestic profi le as a statesman with international appeal and infl uence. In return, the SNS-led government and the regime-friendly media have cultivated a positive image of these two powers and have acted as amplifi ers for the propagation of the Kremlin’s and Beijing’s propaganda in the Western Balkans. Above all, as previously noted, Serbia’s relationships with Russia and China have enabled Belgrade to secure concessions and rewards from the West. In this context, Serbia’s ties with Beijing have emerged as a more acceptable alternative to its relations with Moscow, particularly since Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine. Strategic Hedging in Practice Belgrade’s strategic hedging contains an implicit bargain with all of the great powers engaged in the Western Balkans. This bargain is not built on threats such as Serbia fully siding with China or Russia. It instead relies on the three tactics identifi ed by Kuik (2021, p. 302): (a) the avoidance of taking sides or making rigid alignment commitments; (b) the advancement of opposite or contradicting policies; and (c) a tendency to diversify and cultivate fallback positions. 294 Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2025 Evading Taking Sides or Entering Into Rigid Alliances Serbia has conveyed the ambiguity of its alignment preferences through both discourses and practices. In terms of discourse, while Vučić has expressed support for Serbia’s EU accession, he has done so somewhat unenthusiastically, framing it as a strategic decision aimed at generating economic benefi ts for the country and its citizens (Russell-Omaljev, 2016, p. 223). Vučić’s cautious endorsement of Serbia’s European integration signals that such support should not be taken for granted. For instance, the Serbian President has frequently expressed the people’s (and his own) disillusionment and bitter indifference caused by the length of the EU accession process (Bratanic, Kuzmanovic, 2021). More broadly, Vučić has often rebuked the West for its alleged hypocrisy and double standards on a range of issues, from the normalisation of the BelgradePristina relations to the Russian-Ukrainian war (Semenov, 2022, p. 269; Mayr, 2019). According to a study of the Serbian President’s Addresses to the Nation about the Russian-Ukrainian war, 37 out of 58 mentions of the West by Vučić were negative (with only one being positive) (Němec, Zorić, 2024, p. 12). On the other hand, 12 out of 15 references by Vučić to Russia were neutral (only one was negative) (Němec, Zorić, 2024, p. 12). Indeed, the Serbian President’s remarks on Russia have commonly featured expressions of appreciation (e.g., of Moscow’s support against the universal recognition of Kosovo’s independence) and cordiality, with portrayals of the Russian people as “brothers” and “traditional friends” (Taylor, 2022). Likewise, the Serbian President has regularly used warm language whenever mentioning China. For instance, in May 2024, when Vučić welcomed Xi Jinping in Belgrade, he described the Sino-Serbian relations as a friendship of “steel”, which “no one will be able to break”, and he referred to Xi as an “ironclad” friend (Cvetkovic, Heil, 2024). The Serbian President also told his Chinese counterpart that “the reverence and love” the latter encountered “in our Serbia will not be found anywhere else” (Hajdari, 2024a). Therefore, Vučić used warmer language whenever he commented on Serbia’s ties with Russia and China, in contrast to whenever he referred to the country’s relations with the EU (and the West). In this way, he has downplayed the salience of Serbia’s EU accession perspective and obscured his alignment preferences. Advancing Opposite or Contradicting Policies Belgrade’s tactics of advancing opposite policies are best observed at the level of its practices. Serbia has attempted to strengthen ties with Russia and China while progressing along its EU accession path 295 N. Tzifakis, E. Vasdoka, Great Powers and Gatekeepers in the Western Balkans… and strengthening its relations with the United States. Interestingly enough, Russia’s military aggressions on Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 did not interrupt Belgrade’s strategic hedging towards either of those great powers. Vučić did not bow to the EU’s pressure to align Serbia’s foreign policy with the Union’s joint decisions and actions and impose sanctions against Russia. Indeed, Belgrade has signed new agreements establishing additional ties with Moscow. Serbia, for example, took part in the Slavic Brotherhood, the yearly-organised joint military exercises of Russian and Belarusian armed forces, every year from 2015 to 2019 and again in 2021. In addition, the Serbian and Russian authorities have always been in regular diplomatic contact. It is worth mentioning that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries agreed (and twice renewed) “Consultation Plans” for 2019–2020, 2021–2022, and 2023–2024 (Serbian Government 2019; Serbian Embassy in Moscow 2020; RFE/RL, 2022b). In the fi eld of economic relations, Belgrade and Moscow have reached a series of agreements on energy, trade, and the modernisation of Serbia’s railway (Spasić, 2022; Reid, 2021). Notwithstanding the escalating economic competition between the West and China, Belgrade also sought to develop close ties with Beijing. The main drivers of the Sino-Serbian partnership have been economic projects and investments. Landmark deals included Chinese investments in the mining industry (as regards steel and copper) and the opening of a tyre factory by Linglong (Prelec, 2021; Jevtić, 2024). In October 2023, while the EU openly argued about the need to de-risk its economy from China, Belgrade moved in the opposite direction and signed a free trade agreement with Beijing, covering 90% of the goods traded between the two countries (Starcevic, 2023). In addition, SinoSerbian cooperation has extended to the military and security sectors. Indeed, in 2019, Serbia became the fi rst country in Europe to acquire the Chinese-manufactured FK-3 surface-to-air missile system (Vuksanovic, 2022). The Serbian authorities also partnered with Huawei to implement a “Safe City” surveillance project in Belgrade (Bjeloš, 2021), and the two countries started conducting joint police patrols in three Serbian cities (Reuters, 2019). Crucially, Belgrade has also come closer to Beijing on the diplomatic front. In particular, Serbia has consistently not aligned with EU joint decisions and actions on China on a range of issues such as human rights violations, developments in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and tensions in the South China Sea (Novaković, 2020, pp. 23–24; Novaković, Plavšić, 2023a, p. 4; Novaković, Plavšić, 2023b, p. 3). In May 2024, Serbia became the fi rst European country to sign an agreement with China on building a “Community with a Shared Future”, which is a step further 302 Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs, 1/2025 Serbia operationalised strategic hedging through discourses and practices, which have invariably aspired to generate ambiguity about its alignment preferences. Considering that it is not a member of any formal alliance such as NATO or the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Belgrade has striven not to take any side in the West-Russia confrontation nor the economic competition between the West and China. As a result, it has frequently pursued opposite courses of action, sending contradictory messages to those powers about its views and positions. Moreover, Belgrade has diversifi ed ties with external actors to receive concessions from several sides and cultivated fallback positions to minimise the risk of sanctions at the hands of any great power. Serbia’s strategic hedging has been successful; the incumbent regime has not been seriously criticised for the country’s dramatic democratic backsliding during the last decade and, despite the stagnation in implementing reforms, Serbia has steadily advanced in its EU accession path and has received unprecedented political support from the United States. Moreover, Belgrade’s inconsistent approach to the Russian military aggression on Ukraine has been cost-free so far. Neither the West nor Russia have pressured Belgrade to pick a side in the confl ict out of fear of sending the country into its opponent’s arms. In addition, Serbia has not been forced to make concessions in the confl ict with Kosovo. Above all, the West has implicitly tolerated Vučić’s non-transparent business deals with his Chinese and Russian counterparts that have generated benefi ts for the regime’s patronage and clientelistic networks. The success of Serbia’s strategy is attributed to two reasons: (i) it has been perceived as credible; and (ii) it has entailed only moderate costs for the great powers. To conclude, this article has demonstrated that, by acting as a gatekeeper, Serbia’s incumbent regime has played a crucial role in developing the country’s ties with the great powers. While the systemic great-power competition has precluded Serbia from adopting a strategy of outright engagement with external actors (as originally proclaimed), it has not forced the country to resort to hedging, nor has the structure determined how Serbia should operationalise its selected strategy. On the other hand, the more fi erce the confrontation between great powers becomes, the more diffi cult it will be for Serbia to maintain its present strategy of evading taking any sides. Owing to rising pressure from great powers, the tenability of strategic hedging may reach its limits at a certain point. 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