EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA

Copyright © Author(s) 2025. All Rights Reserved. Published by GLOBAL PUBLICATION HOUSE. | Int. Journal of Business Management Page 48 of 67 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA By: ESSANG EFFIONG EKPO M.SC STUDENT DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING, AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY DR. UWAKMFONABASI SIMEON, (PhD) DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING, AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY IMOH KINGSLEY IKPE, (PhD) DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC, AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY EMMANUEL OKON EMENYI, (PhD) DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING, AKWA IBOM STATE UNIVERSITY Abstract Despite the substantial remuneration packages offered to executives, many firms continue to experience weak share price performance, volatile earnings, and declining investor confidence. This misalignment suggests that compensation structures may not be effectively designed to incentivize executives to maximize shareholder returns. In view of this, this study examined the effect of executive directors’ compensation on share price performance of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. The study adopted an ex-post facto research design and utilized a panel data of sixty (60) pooled observations gathered from six (6) listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria over ten (10)-year period (2015-2024) and employed a panel multiple regression technique to analyze the data via E-views 10.0 statistical package. The study findings revealed among others that bonus payment has significant positive effect (Coeff. = 4.0789{0.0375}) on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria,. Conclusively, the results provide empirical evidence that executive directors' compensation have a significant impact on share price performance, highlighting the need for corporate boards and regulators to carefully consider the design and structure of executive compensation packages. The recommendations made included that corporate boards should consider aligning bonus payments with specific performance metrics to ensure that executive directors are incentivized to drive shareholder value. Keywords: EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE How to cite: EKPO, E., SIMEON, U., IKPE, I., & EMENYI, E. (2025). EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA. GPH-International Journal of Business Management, 8(10), 48-67. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17550682 e-ISSN 3027-0537 p-ISSN 3027-0375 10.5281/ZENODO.17550682 VOLUME 08 ISSUE 10 OCTOBER - 2025 ARTICLE ID: #2151 EKPO, E., SIMEON, U., IKPE, I., & EMENYI, E. (2025). EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA. GPH-International Journal of Business Management, 8(10), 48-67. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17550682 © 2025 GLOBAL PUBLICATION HOUSE | International Journal of Business Management 1.1 INTRODUCTION Executive compensation packages have been viewed as important in mitigating the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders in corporations (Ibrahim & Atmaji, 2023). It has been widely recognized that compensation packages could potentially play an important role in motivating top manager. This interest stems from the critical role that executive remuneration plays in aligning management objectives with shareholder interests. In Nigeria, the conglomerate sector has experienced notable fluctuations in share prices, prompting stakeholders to scrutinize the effectiveness of existing compensation structures in promoting optimal corporate performance (Cho et al., 2024). Understanding how various components of executive pay influence share price dynamics is essential for enhancing corporate governance and ensuring sustainable growth within this sector. As highlighted by Edochie et al. (2022), examining the impact of CEO compensation on firm performance is crucial for determining the efficacy of remuneration policies in achieving desired corporate outcomes. Executive compensation typically comprises various elements designed to incentivize performance and retain top talent. Bonus payments represent variable, performance-related compensation awarded to executive directors in addition to their basic salary. They are typically linked to the company’s short-term financial performance, such as profits, revenue growth, or achievement of specific key performance indicators (KPIs) (Emokpae, 2023). Bonuses can be structured as annual cash payments or deferred pay-outs, depending on the governance framework (Fletcher & Hart, 2022). Benefits-in-kind (BIK) are non-cash perks provided to executive directors as part of their total compensation package. These benefits may include company cars, health insurance, housing allowances, club memberships, retirement contributions, or other lifestyle-related advantages (Hundal et al., 2025). Sharebased payments involve granting executive directors equity instruments such as stock options, restricted stock, or performance shares. Instead of cash, directors receive compensation in the form of shares or rights to acquire shares at a future date, often tied to company performance (Campbell & Foster, 2022). Long-term incentive plans are structured programs that reward executive directors for achieving strategic objectives over a multi-year horizon, typically three to five years. They may include a mix of performance-based shares, cash bonuses, or other deferred rewards. Performance is often measured using metrics such as return on equity, total shareholder return, or long-term growth targets (Handayani & Fadjarenie, 2023). The base salary forms the fixed component of an executive director’s compensation package. It provides financial stability and security, regardless of company performance. Salaries are usually determined based on industry benchmarks, the size of the company, the director’s responsibilities, and their level of experience (Khatib et al., 2023). In the context of Nigeria's listed conglomerate firms, share price performance has been subject to various internal and external pressures. Economic factors, such as currency volatility and regulatory changes, have posed challenges to maintaining stable share valuations (Cho et al., 2024). Effective executive compensation structures that promote prudent decision-making and long-term stability are crucial in navigating these complexities. Research indicates that certain components of executive compensation, such as salary emoluments, bonuses, and stock-based compensation, can negatively impact financial performance metrics like return on equity, highlighting the need for well-structured remuneration packages. The linkage between executive directors' compensation and share price performance in Nigeria's conglomerate firms is multifaceted. Appropriately structured compensation packages can incentivize executives to implement strategies that enhance profitability and Page No. 49 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA Volume 8 Issue No 10 (2025) Access: https://gphjournal.org/index.php/bm market valuation (Fletcher & Hart, 2022). Conversely, misaligned remuneration may lead to short-termism or risk-averse behaviors detrimental to shareholder wealth. Therefore, a comprehensive examination of how various compensation components, such as bonuses, benefits in kind, share-based incentives, long-term incentive plan and salary affect share price performance is essential. Objectives of the study The main objective of this study was to examine the effect of executive directors’ compensation on the share price performance of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. The specific objectives of this study were to: 1. access the effect of bonus payments on the earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. 2. ascertain the effect of benefits-in-kind on the earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. 3. determine the effect of share-based payments on the earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. 4. to examine the effect of long-term incentive plans on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria 5. access the effect of salary of executive directors on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 2.1 Conceptual Framework 2.1.2 Executive directors’ compensation Executive directors’ compensation refers to the financial and non-financial rewards provided to executive directors in exchange for their leadership, strategic decision-making, and overall contribution to the firm’s performance (Hundal et al., 2025). Compensation packages typically include elements such as base salary, bonuses, stock options, long-term incentives, and other benefits. These packages are designed to align the interests of executive directors with those of shareholders, ensuring that executives are motivated to drive corporate success and long-term value creation. According to Smith and Johnson (2020), executive compensation is a critical component of corporate governance, as it influences managerial behavior, risk-taking, and strategic priorities. Effective compensation structures are essential for attracting and retaining top talent while promoting accountability and performance-driven leadership. The design of executive compensation packages often reflects the firm’s strategic objectives, financial health, and industry standards. 2.1.3 Proxies for executive director’s compensation 2.1.3.1 Bonus payments Bonus payments are a critical component of executive and employee compensation packages, designed to reward performance, motivate employees, and align individual goals with organizational objectives (Handayani & Fadjarenie, 2023). These payments are typically tied to specific performance metrics, such as revenue growth, profitability, or the achievement of strategic targets. According to Pathak et al. (2025), bonus payments serve as a powerful tool for enhancing productivity and fostering a performance-driven culture within organizations. EKPO, E., SIMEON, U., IKPE, I., & EMENYI, E. (2025). EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA. GPH-International Journal of Business Management, 8(10), 48-67. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17550682 © 2025 GLOBAL PUBLICATION HOUSE | International Journal of Business Management 2.1.3.2 Benefits-in-Kind Benefits-in-kind (BIK) refer to non-cash compensations provided to employees as part of their overall remuneration package (Fletcher & Hart, 2022). These benefits can include company cars, health insurance, housing allowances, gym memberships, and other perks that enhance employees' quality of life and job satisfaction. According to Roberts and Taylor (2020), benefits-in-kind play a significant role in attracting and retaining talent, particularly in competitive labor markets where organizations seek to differentiate themselves. While cash compensation remains a primary motivator, benefits-in-kind offer additional value by addressing employees' personal and lifestyle needs, thereby fostering loyalty and engagement. 2.1.3.3 Share-based payments Share-based payments, also known as equity compensation, refer to the practice of granting employees’ shares, stock options, or other equity instruments as part of their remuneration (Cho et al., 2024). This form of compensation aligns the interests of employees with those of shareholders by linking rewards to the firm’s long-term performance and stock price appreciation. According to Ohidoa and Kolade (2024), share-based payments are widely used in both public and private companies to attract, retain, and motivate talent, particularly in industries where competition for skilled professionals is intense. By offering employees a stake in the company’s success, firms can foster a sense of ownership and commitment, driving productivity and innovation. 2.1.3.3 Salary of executive directors’ (ED) The salary of an executive director refers to the fixed (regular) cash payment awarded to the executive as compensation for fulfilling their role, exclusive of variable rewards (like bonuses, stock options) or non-monetary benefits (healthcare and housing) (Chen & Wang, 2021). According to Adegbite and Ojo (2022) salary of executive director is said to be the mix of financial and nonfinancial awards received by an executive from his or her employing firm as payment for the services rendered. ED salaries are usually set on an annual basis. Moreover, it is a stylized fact that firm’s size is associated with base salary (Clark & Walker, 2020). 2.1.9 Share price performance Share price performance is a fundamental measure of a company's financial health and market valuation, often serving as a key determinant of executive and employee compensation, particularly in publicly traded firms (Fletcher & Hart, 2022). Many organizations incorporate share price performance into their incentive structures to align the interests of executives and employees with those of shareholders. According to Roberts and Phillips (2021), share price-based incentives, such as stock options and performance shares, can be powerful tools for motivating executives to focus on long-term value creation. 2.1.9.1 Earnings per share Earnings Per Share (EPS) is a fundamental financial metric that measures a company’s profitability on a per-share basis, providing insights into its ability to generate earnings for shareholders. It is calculated by dividing net income by the number of outstanding shares and is widely used by investors, analysts, and stakeholders to evaluate a firm’s financial performance. According to Harper and Quinn (2021), EPS is a critical indicator of a company’s financial health and is often used to assess management’s effectiveness in driving profitability. Page No. 51 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA Volume 8 Issue No 10 (2025) Access: https://gphjournal.org/index.php/bm 2.1.10 Executive directors’ compensation and share price performance Executive directors’ compensation is designed to align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. When well-structured and performance-based, compensation can enhance shareholder value. However, excessive or misaligned pay packages may have the opposite effect. According to Miller and Thompson (2021), firms must adhere to accounting standards such as IFRS 2 and ASC 718, which govern the recognition and measurement of share-based payments. Additionally, fluctuations in stock prices can lead to volatility in compensation costs, affecting the firm’s financial statements and investor perceptions (Fletcher & Hart, 2022). METHODOLOGY 3.1 Research design This study adopted ex-post facto research design. This design was suitable because the data for the analysis had already existed, leaving no room for the researcher to manipulate the variables under study. 3.2 Population of the study The population of this study made up of all the six (6) conglomerate firms which are Chellarams PLC, Custodian Investment PLC, John Holt PLC, SCOA Nig. PLC, Transnational Corporation PLC, and UACN PLC that are listed on the floor of the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) for the period between 2015 and 2024. 3.3 Model specification To achieve the stated objectives of the study, as well as testing the study hypotheses, the researcher adapted and modified the model of Ali and Ahmed (2021) and modified thus; EPSit = β0 + β1BPit + β2BIKit + β3SBPit + β4LIPit + β5SALit + µit. Where; EPSit = Earnings Per Share BPit = Bonus payments BIKit = Benefits-in-kind LIP = Long-term incentive plan SAL = Salary SBPit = Share-based payments β0 = Intercept or regression constant β1 – β3 = Regression coefficients to be estimated for firm i in period t µ = Stochastic error term. 3.4 Method of data analysis The study adopted panel least squares regression in analyzing the data via Eviews 10.0. The data conformed to the standardized regression assumptions, that is, linearity, homoscedasticity, normality and independence of data. 3.5 Decision rule The decision based on 5% level of significance. Accept null hypothesis (Ho) if probability value (i.e. P-value or Sig.) is greater than or equals to (≥) stated 5% level of significance (α); otherwise, reject and accept alternate hypothesis (H1), if p-value or sig. calculated is less than 5% level of significance. EKPO, E., SIMEON, U., IKPE, I., & EMENYI, E. (2025). EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA. GPH-International Journal of Business Management, 8(10), 48-67. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17550682 © 2025 GLOBAL PUBLICATION HOUSE | International Journal of Business Management DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS Descriptive statistics This was conducted to understand the behaviour of the data using various statistics including mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The result for the descriptive statistics analysis is as presented in Table 4.2 below; Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics results EPS BP BIK SBP LIP SAL Mean 19.93600 7.644979 0.416667 30.94884 1.491667 14.16517 Median 22.38500 1.477666 0.000000 0.000000 1.500000 13.53994 Maximum 340.0000 41.60000 1.000000 244.1689 2.250000 16.65031 Minimum -528.0000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 12.64433 Std. Dev. 158.5131 10.00788 0.497167 58.16892 0.514548 1.209312 Skewness -1.634700 1.407939 0.338062 2.007295 0.327374 0.727783 Kurtosis 7.095970 4.381501 1.114286 6.456060 1.412529 1.916130 Jarque-Bera 68.66487 24.59427 10.03265 70.15323 7.371898 8.233620 Probability 0.000000 0.000005 0.006629 0.000000 0.025073 0.016296 Sum 1196.160 458.6988 25.00000 1856.930 89.50000 849.9105 Sum Sq. Dev. 1482458. 5909.305 14.58333 199633.8 15.62083 86.28373 Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 Source: Researcher’s computation using E-views 10.0 (2025) Table 4.2 shows that earnings per share, bonus payments, benefits-in-kind, sharebased payments, long-term incentive plan and salary of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria have mean scores of approximately 19.93, 7.644, 0.4166, 30.948, 1.491 and 14.165 respectively. This indicates the central or average values for these variables from 2015 to 2024. The median values obtained for earnings per share, bonus payments; benefits-in-kind, share-based payments, long-term incentive plan and salary of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria were approximately 22.38, 1.477, 0, 0, 1.5 and 13.54 respectively. These constitutes the middle values for the distributions of these variables under the period covered in this study (2015-2024). In terms of the level of variability and dispersion in the distribution of these variables, the standard deviations obtained for the variablesearnings per share, bonus payments; benefits-in-kind, share-based payments and long-term incentive plan and salary of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria were 158.51, 10.01, 0.497, 58.168, 0.514 and 1.209 respectively. This indicates varying levels of variability in the distribution with earnings per share indicating high variations in the distributions. Similarly, the skewness values obtained for these variables were -1.634, 1.407, 0.34, 2.01, 0.32 and 0.727 respectively. This quantifies the asymmetry of the distributions. 4.2.2 Model evaluation The suitability of the data was assessed by conducting series of regression assumption tests. These tests include normality test, multicollinearity test and heteroscedasticity test. Page No. 53 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA Volume 8 Issue No 10 (2025) Access: https://gphjournal.org/index.php/bm 4.2.2.1 Normality test 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 -500 -400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 300 Series: Standardized Residuals Sample 2015 2024 Observations 60 Mean -1.98e-14 Median 6.221731 Maximum 300.1214 Minimum -528.7625 Std. Dev. 137.3266 Skewness -1.593788 Kurtosis 7.544526 Jarque-Bera 77.03338 Probability 0.000000 Fig. 4.1 Jarque-Bera Normality test results Source: E-views 10.0 Output (2025) A significant Jarque-Bera test result implies that the data do not follow a normal distribution. On the other hand, a non-significant result indicates that there is insufficient evidence to reject the assumption of normality. If the p-value associated with the Jarque-Bera test is below a predetermined significance level (p<0.05), then we accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the data do follow a normal distribution. With a p-value of 0.0000, there is sufficient evidence to reject the assumption of normality. 4.2.2.2 Multicollinearity test In examining the association among the variables, the study employed the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient (correlation matrix), and the results are presented below. Table 4.3 Spearman’s rank correlation matrix EPS BP BIK SBP LIP SAL EPS 1.000000 0.194708 0.000976 0.414060 0.543876 0.307744 BP 0.194708 1.000000 0.299591 0.153443 0.181543 0.779332 BIK 0.000976 0.299591 1.000000 0.153710 -0.191297 0.338428 SBP 0.414060 0.153443 0.153710 1.000000 0.090774 0.151364 LIP 0.543876 0.181543 -0.191297 0.090774 1.000000 0.173391 SAL 0.307744 0.779332 0.338428 0.151364 0.173391 1.000000 Source: E-views 10.0 Output (2025) The correlation analysis showed that all independent variables have coefficients lesser than 0.80 respectively confirming absence of multicollinearity issues. 4.2.2.3 Heteroscedasticity test Table 4.4 Cross-section dependence/ Heteroscedasticity test Test Statistic d.f. Prob. Breusch-Pagan LM 23.80924 15 0.0684 Pesaran scaled LM 0.512895 0.6080 Pesaran CD 1.448819 0.1474 Source: E-views 10.0 Output (2025) The statistics and probability value associated with the Breusch-Pagan LM test otherwise known as the Breusch-Pagan Godfrey test help determine whether there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the regression model. A low p-value (p<0.05) suggests evidence against the null hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis which indicates the presence of EKPO, E., SIMEON, U., IKPE, I., & EMENYI, E. (2025). EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA. GPH-International Journal of Business Management, 8(10), 48-67. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17550682 © 2025 GLOBAL PUBLICATION HOUSE | International Journal of Business Management heteroscedasticity in the regression model. With a p-value of 0.0684, there is sufficient evidence accept the null hypothesis, thus, conclude that the predictor variables in regression model were homoscedastic. 4.3 Test of hypotheses Each of the hypotheses in this study was tested based on the result obtained from the panel multiple regression analysis. The result that relates to these hypotheses is summarized in table 4.5 below; Table 4.5 Panel multiple regression result Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. C -84.78786 431.8725 -3.196326 0.0051 BP 4.078901 4.215292 2.967644 0.0375 BIK -40.98942 43.24147 -0.947919 0.3474 SBP 0.570618 0.366175 2.598321 0.0250 LIP 95.52829 41.70793 2.890411 0.0259 SAL -4.908987 33.00441 -0.148737 0.8823 R-squared 0.249451 Mean dependent var 19.93600 Adjusted R-squared 0.179956 S.D. dependent var 158.5131 S.E. of regression 143.5436 Akaike info criterion 12.86579 Sum squared resid 1112657. Schwarz criterion 13.07523 Log likelihood -379.9738 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.94772 F-statistic 3.589474 Durbin-Watson stat 1.517099 Prob(F-statistic) 0.007103 Source: Researcher’s computation using E-views 10.0 (2025) The multiple regression line is as written below: EPS = -84.74786+4.078901BP-40.98942BIK+0.570618SBP +95.52829LIP -4.908987SAL+ μ The regression line indicates that executive directors' compensation components have varying effects on share price performance, proxied by earnings per share (EPS). Specifically, a unit increase in bonus payments (BP) leads to a 4.08 increase in EPS, while a unit increase in long-term incentive plans (LIP) leads to a 95.53 increase in EPS. Conversely, a unit increase in benefits-in-kind (BIK) leads to a 40.99 decrease in EPS, and a unit increase in executive director salary (SAL) leads to a 4.91 decrease in EPS. Share-based payments (SBP) have a relatively small positive effect, with a unit increase leading to a 0.57 increase in EPS. These findings suggest that the structure of executive directors' compensation packages can have significant implications for share price performance. 4.3.1 Hypothesis one Ho: Bonus payment has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. H1: Bonus payment has significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. In order to test whether the variations in earnings per share explained by the independent variable-Bonus payment is significant. The T-test was carried out at .05 significance level and Tcal = 2.9676, compared with Ttab of 2.5706, given at T0.05,6. So far, the Page No. 55 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA Volume 8 Issue No 10 (2025) Access: https://gphjournal.org/index.php/bm Tcal is greater than Ttab. Hence, the null hypothesis which states that Bonus payment has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria fails to hold, thus rejected, and the alternative hypothesis accepted. The null hypothesis is further rejected given that at T05,6, its probability value (p = 0.0375) is less than 0.05. 4.3.2 Hypothesis two Ho: Benefits-in-kind has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. H1: Benefits-in-kind has significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. Regarding Benefits in kind, the T-test was carried out at .05 significance level and Tcal = 0.9479, compared with Ttab of 2.5706, given at T0.05,6. So far, the Tcal is less than Ttab. Hence, the null hypothesis which states that Benefits-in-kind has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria holds, thus accepted, and the alternative hypothesis rejected. The null hypothesis is further accepted given that at T05,6, its probability value (p = 0.3474) is greater than 0.05. 4.3.3 Hypothesis three Ho: Share based payment has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. H1: Share based payment has significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. Regarding share-based payment, the T-test was carried out at .05 significance level and Tcal = 2.5983, compared with Ttab of 2.5706, given at T0.05,6. So far, the Tcal is greater than Ttab. Hence, the null hypothesis which states that Share based payment has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria fails to hold, thus rejected, and the alternative hypothesis accepted. The null hypothesis is further rejected given that at T05,6, its probability value (p = 0.0250) is less than 0.05. 4.3.4 Hypothesis four Ho: Long-term incentive plans have no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. H1: Long-term incentive plans have significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. Regarding long-term incentive plans, the T-test was carried out at .05 significance level and Tcal = 2.8904, compared with Ttab of 2.5706, given at T0.05,6. So far, the Tcal is greater than Ttab. Hence, the null hypothesis which states that long-term incentive plans have no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria fails to hold, thus rejected, and the alternative hypothesis accepted. The null hypothesis is further rejected given that at T05,6, its probability value (p = 0.0259) is less than 0.05. 4.3.5 Hypothesis five Ho: Executive directors’ salary has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. H1: Executive directors’ salary has significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria. Regarding Executive directors’ salary, the T-test was carried out at .05 significance level and Tcal = 0.1487, compared with Ttab of 2.5706, given at T0.05,6. So far, the Tcal is less than Ttab. Hence, the null hypothesis which states that Executive directors’ salary has no significant effect on earnings per share of listed conglomerate firms in Nigeria holds, thus EKPO, E., SIMEON, U., IKPE, I., & EMENYI, E. (2025). EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE FIRMS IN NIGERIA. 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