Evaluating and Strengthening Flight Safety Culture through Flight Crew Motivation

Copyright © ISRG Publishers. All rights Reserved. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17569082 138 ISRG PUBLISHERS Abbreviated Key Title: ISRG J Arts Humanit Soc Sci ISSN: 2583-7672 (Online) Journal homepage: https://isrgpublishers.com/isrgjahss Volume– III Issue -VI (November - December) 2025 Frequency: Bimonthly Evaluating and Strengthening Flight Safety Culture through Flight Crew Motivation Salmorbekova Rita Bobuevna1 *, Zhanibek Erasyl2 1 Doctor of Sociological Sciences, ProfessorDepartments of Natural Sciences, Kyrgyz Aviation Institute named after. I.Abdraimova, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Aviation and Aeronautics of the Russian Federation. Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, st. Lushchikhina, 60, 720027 2 Captain of Mi-8MTV Helicopter, Deputy Head of Flight Complex, Air Company JSC ―Burundaiavia‖, Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, st Baiterekova 55, 050038 | Received: 31.10.2025 | Accepted: 04.11.2025 | Published: 10.11.2025 *Corresponding author: Salmorbekova Rita Bobuevna Doctor of Sociological Sciences, ProfessorDepartments of Natural Sciences, Kyrgyz Aviation Institute named after. I.Abdraimova, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Aviation and Aeronautics of the Russian Federation. Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, st. Lushchikhina, 60, 720027 Abstract The article examines the interrelation between flight crew motivation and flight safety culture as key structural elements of the aviation system. Drawing on theoretical frameworks by A. Maslow, F. Herzberg, E. Deci and R. Ryan, J. Reason, P. Hudson, and S. Dekker, as well as ICAO and EASA standards, the study explores how human factors influence the effectiveness of Safety Management Systems (SMS). Using the case of civil aviation in the Kyrgyz Republic, the research identifies major demotivating factors such as low remuneration, pilot fatigue, shortage of simulator training, high attrition of personnel, and the absence of a Just Culture. The article proposes measures to enhance motivation and safety culture, including the implementation of a fair reporting and accountability system, improvement of socio-economic support for flight personnel, and greater involvement of pilots in safety management processes. The findings emphasize that a sustainable reduction of aviation risks is achievable only through a comprehensive integration of motivational mechanisms and safety culture principles aligned with international standards. Keywords: flight crew motivation; flight safety culture; human factors; Just Culture; Safety Management System (SMS); civil aviation; ICAO Copyright © ISRG Publishers. All rights Reserved. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17569082 139 Introduction Flight safety is a key indicator of the resilience of a nation’s aviation system. According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), up to 80% of aviation accidents are directly caused by human factors, with flight crew motivation being the most critical component [6]. Even with an aircraft in sound technical condition and modern navigation tools available, it is the pilot’s psychological state, level of discipline, degree of fatigue, and attitude toward established procedures that largely determine the outcome of a flight. For almost two decades, Kyrgyzstan has remained on the list of states whose airlines are banned from flying into European Union airspace. Despite the country successfully passing an ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) audit in 2024 with 85.7% compliance of critical elements, the European Commission kept all Kyrgyz airlines on the EU Air Safety List, pointing to persistent issues in human factor management and the development of safety culture [1]. Assessment of flight crew motivation is an important tool for analyzing the state of a flight safety culture. Modern approaches suggest a comprehensive study of both internal motivation factors (professional identity, sense of responsibility, job satisfaction) and external factors (compensation system, social benefits, career opportunities, organizational culture). The most common assessment methods are questionnaires, interviews, psychodiagnostic tests, and analysis of behavioral indicators within the Safety Management System (SMS). The results of such studies make it possible to determine the level of crew involvement in safety assurance processes, gauge the degree of trust in management, evaluate the effectiveness of internal communication, and measure risk perception. International practice has successfully applied models by Hofstede (1980), Reason (1997), and Hudson (2001) [20], adapted to assess the ―maturity‖ of safety culture. In these models, staff motivation is considered a key determinant in the transition from a reactive to a proactive type of organizational behavior. Improving flight crew motivation and managing the human factor require a holistic approach that includes organizational, educational, and operational measures. First, it is necessary to cultivate a safety culture in which motivation is viewed not only in terms of material reward but also as recognition, engagement, professional identity, and trust in leadership. Such a culture should encourage reporting without punishment, open discussion of mistakes, and staff initiative—this corresponds to ICAO’s recommendations on integrating human factors and building safe environments [17]. Second, the development and implementation of training and evaluation systems focused on human performance are important. These include programs on fatigue management, stress management, communication, decision-making, and teamwork, which directly echo the provisions of the Manual on Human Performance (Doc 10151) [18]. Third, the organization should provide a supportive environment in which following procedures and prioritizing safety are not perceived as an imposed obligation but as part of the pilot’s professional identity. Measures should include transparent rewards for safe behavior, regular feedback, and involving crews in incident analysis and the development of improvements. Human factor assessment tools—such as analyses of motivation and engagement—are becoming key elements of the safety management system [16]. Finally, for the conditions of Kyrgyzstan, it is important to adapt international standards (e.g., ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual) to national realities: taking into account local motivational characteristics, linguistic and socio-cultural contexts, and building a system of continuous improvement through data analysis, strengthened safety oversight, and pilot involvement in safety processes. Challenges in Kyrgyz Civil Aviation Safety Culture In the context of safety culture, a pilot’s motivation is reflected in their willingness to conscientiously follow rules and operate safely even when not under direct supervision. Pilot motivation determines whether they will strictly adhere to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or seek ―shortcuts‖; whether they will report an error (through a safety report such as an ASR) or hide it out of fear of punishment; whether they engage earnestly in Crew Resource Management (CRM) trainings or treat them as a formality; and whether they regard safety as a core value or as mere bureaucratic compliance. If a pilot is demotivated, they perform only the bare minimum, avoid initiative, and overlook early signs of threats. This leads to ―latent errors‖ (hidden failures) that form the basis of aviation incidents. Motivation can be intrinsic—stemming from personal responsibility and professional pride—or extrinsic, arising from salary, working conditions, and scheduling; an effective safety culture requires both forms of motivation. However, the current state of civil aviation in the Kyrgyz Republic is characterized by several persistent systemic problems that directly impact the level of flight crew motivation and the overall safety culture. These challenges include: Low remuneration of pilots in local airlines: The low level of pay in regional carriers (such as AviaTraffic Company, TezJet Airlines, etc.) leads to reduced motivation and professional engagement. The lack of competitive salaries compared to foreign markets drives an exodus of qualified personnel—primarily aircraft captains and instructors—to aviation organizations in the UAE, Turkey, and Russia. According to ICAO and IATA data, this process is typical for countries with limited resource bases and negatively affects the sustainability of the national training system for aviation personnel [15]. Pilot emigration and loss of experienced instructors: The emigration of pilots and instructors results in a shortage of seasoned mentors in domestic airlines and training centers. This reduces the quality of training for young pilots and weakens the internal system of professional knowledge transfer. The lack of continuity of experience in the aviation community leads to a gap in professional standards, which contradicts the concept of Continuous Professional Development (CPD) recommended by ICAO [16]. Prevalence of a “punitive culture”: The persistence of a punitive culture remains one of the key barriers to developing a Just Culture based on trust and open communication. Under the fear of disciplinary measures, employees prefer not to report violations or potential safety threats, which hinders the identification and prevention of incidents. As the European Union Aviation Safety Agency has noted, implementing Just Culture principles is a Copyright © ISRG Publishers. All rights Reserved. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17569082 140 necessary element of an effective Safety Management System (SMS) [10]. Lack of modern simulators and training centers: The shortage of up-to-date flight simulators and crew training facilities in the country significantly limits opportunities for practical training and certification of flight crews to international standards. As a result, pilots are forced to undergo training abroad, which incurs substantial financial costs and weakens the national aviation infrastructure. Formalistic implementation of the Safety Management System: A merely formal implementation of SMS without the active participation of pilots and engineering-technical staff diminishes its effectiveness. Often, SMS is perceived as an administrative obligation rather than as a tool for continuous risk analysis and improvement of organizational culture. This contradicts the basic tenets of the ICAO Safety Management Manual (Doc 9859), which emphasize the need for involvement of all levels of personnel in the safety management process [16]. Theoretical Foundations of Motivation and Flight Safety Culture: Key Concepts, Operationalization, and Assessment Methods Motivational Theories Relevant to Flight Crew Abraham Maslow – Hierarchy of Needs: People are motivated by a hierarchy of needs, satisfying basic needs (physiological, safety) first, then social needs, esteem, and self-actualization. Operationalization for pilots: Evaluate the pilot’s sense of job security, adequacy of pay, recognition in the team, and opportunities for professional growth. Example metric: Survey questions like ―Am I satisfied with my financial security at this job?‖ and ―Do I feel recognized by my colleagues?‖, rated on a 1–5 scale. [5] Frederick Herzberg – Two-Factor Theory of Motivation: Distinguishes ―hygiene‖ factors (e.g., pay, work conditions) and motivators (challenges, achievements). Absence of adequate hygiene factors causes dissatisfaction; their presence yields a neutral state, while motivators lead to positive satisfaction. In aviation: hygiene factors include salary, work schedule, living conditions; motivators include performing challenging missions, crew recognition, and career advancement. Example metric: Survey questions such as ―How satisfied are you with your pay and working conditions?‖ and ―How motivating is it for you to carry out challenging flights?‖, rated on a 1–7 scale. [4] Victor Vroom – Expectancy Theory: A pilot’s decision to act is influenced by expectancy (belief that effort leads to performance), instrumentality (belief that performance leads to outcomes), and valence (value of the outcomes). This theory is used in aviation to explain pilots’ career choices and behavioral decisions. [3] John Adams (Equity Theory) & Locke and Latham (GoalSetting Theory): These process theories focus on perceived fairness and goal commitment. Adams’ theory posits that pilots compare their input–output ratio to others’, affecting motivation and retention, especially among junior pilots. Locke and Latham’s theory emphasizes that specific and challenging goals can improve performance. [22] Edward Deci & Richard Ryan – Self-Determination Theory (SDT): Intrinsic motivation is strengthened when the basic needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness are fulfilled. For pilots: autonomy means involvement in decision-making; competence is maintained through regular training and certification; relatedness is the sense of being part of a team and having organizational support. Example metric: An adapted SDT questionnaire with items like ―I feel I can influence how I do my work,‖ ―I feel competent in my duties,‖ and ―I feel like a valued part of my crew/organization,‖ typically measured with agreement scales. [13] Aviation Safety Culture Models and Concepts James Reason – “Swiss Cheese” Model: Describes how latent and active failures align to cause accidents, forming the foundation for Just Culture and causal analysis of incidents. Reason’s framework underpins many safety investigations by highlighting the layers of defense and how human errors penetrate those layers. [26] Patrick Hudson – Safety Culture Maturity Ladder: Outlines stages of organizational safety culture development: pathological → reactive → bureaucratic → proactive → generative. In proactive/generative cultures, safety is fully integrated into everyday behavior. In aviation context: one can assess which stage an airline is at by pilot feedback—for example, whether ―we only react to incidents‖ versus ―we actively seek out and mitigate risks.‖ Example metric: Surveys or interviews asking ―How often are potential risks discussed in your organization?‖ or ―How often do pilots participate in developing procedures?‖ with responses mapped to a 1–4 maturity scale. [20] Douglas Wiegmann et al. – Integrative Safety Culture/Climate Model: Provides a synthesis of safety culture indicators such as organizational commitment, management involvement, empowerment of employees, reward systems, and quality of reporting systems. In an airline: this translates to evaluating pilot perceptions of management’s attitude toward safety and the overall safety atmosphere (supportive vs. punitive). Example metric: A safety culture survey (e.g., Safety Culture Indicator Scale – SCISMS) including items like ―Management actively participates in safety discussions,‖ ―There is openness about reporting safety violations,‖ and ―I do not fear negative consequences if I report an issue‖. [27] Robert Helmreich & Ashleigh Merritt – Cultural Influences on CRM: Their work on Crew Resource Management (CRM) emphasizes organizational strategies for error management and how national and organizational culture impact crew behavior and attitudes toward safety. This underscores the need to tailor CRM training to cultural contexts and to promote an organizational culture that supports team communication and error reporting. [19] Sidney Dekker – Just Culture: Focuses on creating an organizational environment where employees feel safe to report errors and near-misses without undue fear of punishment, balancing accountability with learning. Dekker provides practical frameworks for investigations and organizational learning that encourage reporting and transparent analysis of mistakes. [14] Dov Zohar – Safety Climate: Introduced the concept of safety climate as the shared perceptions among employees regarding the priority of safety in their organization. Subsequent research and meta-analyses have confirmed that a positive safety climate is a significant determinant of safe behavior among personnel. [28] Copyright © ISRG Publishers. All rights Reserved. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17569082 141 F. W. Guldenmund – Safety Culture vs. Climate: Offers a theoretical review distinguishing between ―safety culture‖ (deeply ingrained values and norms) and ―safety climate‖ (surface-level perceptions at a given time), and discusses methodological foundations for measuring these constructs. This work guides how researchers design safety culture assessments and interpret their results. [21] Table: Key theoretical concepts of motivation and safety culture, with their operationalization for flight crews and example metrics. № Theory & Concept Key Points Operationalization for Flight Crew Example Metrics / Questionnaire Items 1 A. Maslow – Hierarchy of Needs Motivation progresses from basic needs (physiological, safety) to higher needs (social, esteem, self-actualization). Satisfying lower-level needs enables focus on higher-level ones. Assess pilots’ sense of job security and safety, adequacy of salary, feeling of recognition in the team, and opportunities for professional growth. e.g., ―I am confident in the stability of my job position,‖ ―My pay is sufficient for my needs,‖ ―I feel recognized by my peers,‖ ―I have opportunities to grow‖ – rated 1–5. 2 F. Herzberg – Two-Factor Theory ―Hygiene‖ factors (e.g., pay, work conditions) must be acceptable to prevent dissatisfaction, but only ―motivators‖ (e.g., achievement, recognition) truly drive satisfaction. Absence of hygiene causes dissatisfaction; presence of hygiene yields neutrality; presence of motivators increases satisfaction. For pilots, hygiene factors include salary, work schedule, housing conditions; motivators include undertaking challenging flights, receiving crew recognition, and prospects for career advancement. e.g., ―How satisfied are you with your salary and work conditions?‖ (hygiene), ―How motivating do you find flying challenging missions or routes?‖ (motivator) – rated 1–7. 3 E. Deci & R. Ryan – SelfDetermination Theory (SDT) Intrinsic motivation is enhanced by fulfilling needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. When these needs are met, individuals are more internally driven. In a flight crew context: ensure pilots have some autonomy (involvement in decisionmaking), maintain competence (regular training and evaluation), and foster relatedness (team cohesion and support). e.g., ―I have a say in decisions that affect my work,‖ ―I feel fully proficient and well-trained for my duties,‖ ―I feel like a valued member of my crew‖ – using an adapted SDT survey. 4 D. Wiegmann – Safety Culture/Clima te Safety culture encompasses enduring values, beliefs, and behavior patterns related to safety, whereas safety climate reflects current perceptions of safety priorities. Key indicators include management commitment, open communication, and reward systems for safety. Gauge pilot perceptions of the organization’s safety attitude: Do they feel management truly prioritizes safety? Is the atmosphere supportive or punitive regarding error reporting? e.g., Items from a safety culture questionnaire: ―Management visibly participates in safety meetings,‖ ―Employees are encouraged to report safety concerns without fear,‖ ―I worry about being penalized if I report a mistake‖ – rated on agreement scales. 5 P. Hudson – Safety Culture Maturity Ladder Organizations evolve through stages of safety culture: Pathological (don’t care about safety), Reactive (safety is addressed after accidents), Bureaucratic (safety rules in place but mindless compliance), Proactive (actively looking for problems), Generative (safety is fully integrated and a core value). Higher maturity levels correspond to proactive risk management and learning. Determine the current cultural stage of an airline. Pilots can be asked to characterize their company’s approach: e.g., do they mainly react to incidents or proactively seek out and mitigate risks? e.g., Survey or interview prompts: ―Our company only fixes safety issues after they cause incidents‖ vs. ―Our company continually anticipates and prevents safety risks.‖ Responses indicate a stage on the ladder (1=Pathological up to 5=Generative). 6 S. Dekker – Just Culture A Just Culture is one where individuals are not punished for honest mistakes or reporting errors, as long as they are not willful violations. It emphasizes learning and accountability over blame, creating trust so that people report safety issues. Evaluate how secure pilots feel about reporting their own or others’ errors and whether the reporting process is perceived as fair and transparent. e.g., ―I do not fear unfair consequences if I report an error or safety violation,‖ ―When I report a safety issue, I receive useful feedback from the company‖ – rated 1–5. Copyright © ISRG Publishers. All rights Reserved. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17569082 142 Methods of Evaluating Flight Crew Motivation and Safety Culture Evaluation of flight crew motivation and safety culture in civil aviation relies on a combination of behavioral, psychological, and organizational indicators. ICAO standards emphasize that a safety culture can be considered mature only when it can be objectively measured [16]. In the context of Kyrgyz aviation, the most applicable methods include anonymous pilot surveys, analysis of incident reporting systems, interviews with aircraft commanders, and direct observation of adherence to standard operating procedures during flights or simulations [1]. Surveys and questionnaires provide insights into levels of professional satisfaction, trust in management, and willingness to report errors. For example, according to internal airline surveys in Kyrgyzstan, only about 38–40% of pilots believe that management genuinely supports open reporting, whereas more than 50% are convinced that reporting an error will lead to disciplinary action [8]. This indicates a weak implementation of Just Culture principles, which directly contributes to reduced motivation and the concealment of errors. A second tool is the analysis of reports in the Air Safety Report/Routine Safety Report (ASR/RSR) system. A low number of voluntarily submitted safety reports often does not signify an absence of errors, but rather a reluctance among crews to document violations due to fear of punishment. In some Kyrgyz aviation organizations, the rate of voluntary safety reporting is below 0.2 reports per 100 flights, whereas the international norm is on the order of 1–3 reports per 100 flights [7]. Additional methods include conducting interviews with flight crew members and observing crew behavior during simulator training sessions. During CRM training exercises, for instance, evaluators assess communication skills, task distribution within the crew, and the ability to follow SOPs under stress. If pilots exhibit passivity or avoid discussing their mistakes in these settings, it signals a low level of intrinsic motivation and professional engagement. Thus, by combining survey data, reporting system analysis, and observational findings, investigators can form an objective overall picture of pilot motivation and the true state of the flight safety culture. Practical Recommendations for Improvement Enhancing the flight safety culture in Kyrgyz civil aviation is possible only through a systematic strengthening of flight crew motivation and the elimination of factors that foster formality and the concealment of problems. In line with ICAO and EASA recommendations, the key directions for improvement are ensuring fair treatment of crews, creating conditions for voluntary error reporting, and fostering professional responsibility as an internal motivational norm [16]. The following practical steps are recommended:  Implement Just Culture principles: Unintentional errors should not result in automatic disciplinary action but rather be treated as opportunities for learning. The absence of a Just Culture is one reason over 60% of pilots in Kyrgyzstan prefer not to report deviations from norms [8]. Introducing regulations or corporate policies that protect employees who submit safety reports is a necessary condition for increasing trust in the safety system.  Strengthen socio-economic motivation: Research indicates that over 45% of Kyrgyz pilots have considered leaving the national airlines due to low pay and excessive workload [6]. Improving base salaries, providing bonuses for reliability and incident-free operation, offering medical insurance, and supporting pilots’ families are fundamental measures—without these, it is impossible to maintain high levels of intrinsic motivation.  Foster professional development and engagement: This involves regular simulator sessions, mandatory CRM training, and actively involving pilots in incident debriefings and safety threat discussions. In organizations where pilots participate in reviewing errors without fear of punishment, higher levels of engagement and discipline are observed. International experience shows that the presence of a modern training center and required Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) exercises can reduce the number of human factor–related errors by an estimated 30–40% [10].  Improve fatigue risk management (FRMS): Crew fatigue remains one of the major hidden threats to safety. Implementing programs to monitor and manage rest periods, enforce flight time limitations, and track pilots’ sleep and well-being can reduce the risk of errors during critical flight phases such as approaches, interactions with air traffic control, and adverse weather operations. In summary, strengthening pilot motivation must combine material incentives, fair treatment, opportunities for professional growth, and active participation in the safety management system. Only under these conditions will the safety culture be perceived not as a mere formality, but as an integral part of each pilot’s professional responsibility. Conclusion Flight crew motivation is a key determinant of flight safety culture, one that drives the effectiveness of the entire risk management system. The level of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation influences not only the degree of procedural compliance but also the extent of pilot involvement in the processes of analyzing, preventing, and minimizing aviation incidents. An analysis of the state of civil aviation in the Kyrgyz Republic revealed that despite the formal establishment of a Safety Management System (SMS), its actual effectiveness is undermined by insufficient personnel motivation and weak integration of Just Culture principles. The most prominent demotivating factors identified were low levels of remuneration, professional fatigue, limited opportunities for simulator training, skilled personnel outflow, and a lack of trust between pilots and management. Consequently, a reactive behavior pattern has formed in which crew members avoid reporting aviation events for fear of sanctions or reputational consequences. Thus, sustainable improvement of the flight safety culture is possible only by shifting from the formal compliance with ICAO requirements to the development of a truly motivational environment in which pilots recognize their personal responsibility for safety and feel the support of their organization. Achieving this Copyright © ISRG Publishers. All rights Reserved. DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17569082 143 goal necessitates the simultaneous implementation of three interrelated components:  A fair system of professional relations and reporting, built on trust and transparent decision-making;  Social and economic support for flight crews, including competitive pay and effective fatigue prevention programs;  Continuous professional development and the engagement of pilots in safety management at all organizational levels. 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