CO-SUSTAIN: Context and stakeholders analysis for historic examples of political participation

Context and Stakeholders Analysis for Historic Examples of Political Participation Deliverable 1.2. Ref. Ares(2025)1347064 - 19/02/2025 Start date of the project 01/01/2024 Duration of the project 36 months Project’s website https://co-sustain.eu/ Deliverable n° & name D1.2 - Stakeholder analysis for historic examples Version 1 Work Package n° 1 Due date of the deliverable M10 – 10/31/2024 Beneficiary responsible Instytut Gospodarki Surowcami Mineralnymi i EnergiąPAN (IGSMiE) Main author(s) Wojciech Kowalik, Wit Hubert, Lidia Gawlik, Monika Pepłowska, Dominik Kryzia, Aleksandra Komorowska (IGSMiE PAN) Michael Braito, Michael Klingler, Jana Plöchl, Patrick Scherhaufer (BOKU) Nona Galvany,Federica Giardina, Priscila Rivera (ECOSERVEIS) Maare Käis, Matti Kojo (LUT) Marina Frolova (UGR) Lorenza Giorgetti, Davide Grasso (UNITO) Anneli Kährik, Dagmar Narrusson, Bianka Plüschke-Altof, Helina Tamm Plüschke-Altof, Aet Annist, Lilian Pungas (UT) Nature of the deliverable R Document, report (excluding the periodic and final reports) X DEM Demonstrator, pilot, prototype, plan designs DEC Websites, patents filing, press & media actions, videos, etc. DATA Data sets, microdata, etc. DMP Data management plan ETHICS Deliverables related to ethics issues SECURITY Deliverables related to security issues OTHER Software, technical diagrams, algorithms, models, etc. Dissemination level PU Public, fully open, e.g. web (Deliverables flagged as public will be automatically published in CORDIS project’s page) X SEN Sensitive, limited under the conditions of the Grant Agreement Quality procedure Date Version Reviewer Action 25/10/24 V1.0 Wojciech Kowalik (IGSMiE PAN) Wit Hubert (IGSMiE PAN) First version of the deliverable 29/10/24 V1.1 Lidia Gawlik (IGSMiE PAN) Internal review 4/11/24 V2.0 Wojciech Kowalik (IGSMiE PAN) Wit Hubert (IGSMiE PAN) Alessandro Sciullo (UNITO) Lidia Gawlik (IGSMiE PAN) Aleksandra Komorowska (IGSMiE PAN) Second version of deliverable 8/11/24 V2.1 Lidia Gawlik (IGSMiE PAN) Monika Pepłowska (IGSMiE PAN) Internal review 18/11/30 V2.2 Marina Frolova (UGR) Belen Pérez (UGR) Review 18/11/30 V3.0 Wojciech Kowalik (IGSMiE PAN) Wit Hubert (IGSMiE PAN) Alessandro Sciullo (UNITO) Lidia Gawlik (IGSMiE PAN) Aleksandra Komorowska (IGSMiE PAN) Final version of the deliverable TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. PROJECT ABSTRACT 9 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 3. ABBREVIATIONS 10 4. METHODOLOGY 14 4.1. Context Analysis 14 4.2. Stakeholder Analysis 15 4.3. References 20 5. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF INVOLVEMENT 21 5.1. OurPower Energy Cooperative (AT) 21 5.1.1. Context Analysis 23 5.1.2. Stakeholders Analysis 28 5.1.3. References 31 5.2. Energy Community in the Rural Municipality of Monachil (ES) 33 5.2.1. Context Analysis 33 5.2.1.1. Geographical and Territorial Characteristics 33 5.2.1.2. Demographic Trends, Migration, and Educational Attainment 34 5.2.1.3. Economic Structure and Employment 36 5.2.1.4. Political and Administrative Structure 38 5.2.1.5. Political Participation 39 5.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis 40 5.2.3. References 43 5.3. “Przylesie” Housing Community (PL) 44 5.3.1. Context Analysis 44 5.3.2. Stakeholder Analysis 48 5.3.3. References 51 5.4. Urban gardening communities in the city of Tartu (EE) 53 5.4.1. Context Analysis 53 5.4.1.1. Geographical and Territorial Characteristics 53 5.4.1.2. Population and residential dynamics 54 5.4.1.3. Socio-cultural issues 55 5.4.1.4. Power Regime and Governance 56 5.4.1.5. Public Participation and Community Activism 57 5.4.1.6. Ecological characteristics 58 5.4.1.7. Other Important Factors 59 5.4.2. Stakeholder Analysis 60 5.4.3. References 69 5.5. Solidarity Renewable Energy Community (REC) Naples Est (IT) 70 5.5.1. Context Analysis 70 5.5.1.1. Characteristics of the Territory 70 5.5.1.2. Population and Migration 72 5.5.1.3. Economy and Employment 73 5.5.1.4. Political and Administrative Structure 75 5.5.1.5. Political Participation 76 5.5.2. Stakeholder Analysis 77 5.5.3. References 82 6. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 84 6.1. Covid-19: Network of “Makers” (ES) 84 6.1.1. Context Analysis 84 6.1.1.1. The demarcation of the CM in terms of the MLP levels. 84 6.1.1.2. Key context variables and their relationship with the MLP levels as demarcated 87 6.1.2. Stakeholder Analysis 90 6.1.3. References 94 6.2. Local self-help movement in Kainuu region (FI) 97 6.2.1. Context Analysis 97 6.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis 101 6.2.3. References 105 6.3. Earthquake in L’Aquila in 2009 (IT) 107 6.3.1. Context Analysis 107 6.3.1.1. Characteristics of the Territory 107 6.3.1.2. Population and Migration 109 6.3.1.3. Economy and Employment 110 6.3.1.4. Political and Administrative Structure 111 6.3.1.5. Political participation 112 6.3.2. Stakeholder Analysis 113 6.3.3. References 120 6.4. Flood in Genoa in 2011 (IT) 122 6.4.1. Context Analysis 122 6.4.1.1. Characteristics of the territory 122 6.4.1.2. Population and migration 123 6.4.1.3. Economy and Employment 124 6.4.1.4. Political and Administrative structure 126 6.4.1.5. Political Participation 127 6.4.2. Stakeholder Analysis 129 6.4.3. References 137 7. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 140 7.1. Vienna Climate Team, participatory budgeting (AT) 140 7.1.1. Context Analysis 141 7.1.2. Stakeholder Analysis 145 7.1.3. References 150 7.2. Youth Climate Group, city of Granollers (ES) 152 7.2.1.Context Analysis 152 7.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis 157 7.2.3. References 160 7.3. Resource wise municipality (FI) 163 7.3.1. Context Analysis 163 7.3.2. Stakeholder Analysis 167 7.3.3. References 171 7.4. Clean Transport Zone in Krakow (PL) 174 7.4.1. Context Analysis 174 7.4.1.1. Power regime dynamic (political system, legal system, related to politicians) 175 7.4.1.2. Population structure and dynamics 175 7.4.1.3. Economy of the HE impact area 176 7.4.1.4. Socio-cultural dynamics 178 7.4.1.5. Socio-political dynamics 179 7.4.1.6. Socio-technical dynamics 179 7.4.1.7. Political and civic participation 180 7.4.1.8. Ecological characteristics 180 7.4.2. Stakeholder Analysis 181 7.4.3. References 185 7.5. Green zones for recreation and community spaces in Tartu County (EE) 188 7.5.1. Context Analysis 188 7.5.1.1. Raadi (Tartu municipality) - Geographical and Territorial Characteristics 188 7.5.1.2. Population and residential dynamics 189 7.5.1.3. Socio-cultural issues 189 7.5.1.4. Power Regime and Governance 190 7.5.1.5. Public Participation and Community Activism 190 7.5.1.6. Economic Situation and Employment 191 7.5.1.7. Ecological characteristics 192 7.5.1.8. Other Important Factors 192 7.5.1.9. Conclusions and Summary 193 7.5.2. Stakeholder Analysis 193 7.5.3. References 197 8. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF ACTIVISM 199 8.1. Anti-nuclear movement in Austria since 1972 (AT) 199 8.1.1. Context Analysis 199 8.1.1.1. Socio-political and economic pre-conditions. Austria’s Post-War Economic Growth and Energy Demand: The Case of Nuclear Power 199 8.1.1.2. Political Support for Nuclear Power 200 8.1.1.3. Social participation and emerging forms of civil disobedience 201 8.1.1.4. Socio-cultural characteristics 203 8.1.1.5. Socio-technical characteristics 205 8.1.2.Stakeholder Analysis 207 8.1.3. References 210 8.2. Energy poverty movements in Spain: Residents’ movement in the Northern District of Granada (ES) 212 8.2.1. Context Analysis 212 8.2.1.1. Geographical and Territorial Characteristics 213 8.2.1.2. Demographic Trends, Migration, and Educational Attainment 215 8.2.1.3. Economic Structure and Employment 217 8.2.1.4. Political and Administrative Structure 218 8.2.1.5. Political Participation 219 8.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis 221 8.2.3. References 225 8.3. Energy poverty movements in Spain: Energy Poverty Alliance (ES) 226 8.3.1. Context Analysis 226 8.3.2. Stakeholder Analysis 232 8.3.3. References 236 8.4. Pro Hanhikivi association (FI) 239 8.4.1. Context Analysis 239 8.4.2. Stakeholder Analysis 241 8.4.3. References 248 8.5. Organisation Krakow Smog Alert (PL) 250 8.5.1. Context Analysis 250 8.5.1.1. KSA relation to sustainable transformation/climate imperative 252 8.5.1.2. Socio-political characteristics 252 8.5.1.3. Demographic structure 253 8.5.1.4. Economic situation 253 8.5.1.5. Socio-cultural characteristics 253 8.5.1.6. Socio-technical characteristics 254 8.5.1.7. Social participation 254 8.5.1.8. Ecological characteristics 255 8.5.2. Stakeholder Analysis 255 8.5.3. References 263 9. CONCLUSION 266 9.1. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF INVOLVEMENT 266 9.2. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 268 9.3. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 269 9.4. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF ACTIVISM 270 1. PROJECT ABSTRACT In Western democracies, traditional institutional participation is on the decline while non-institutional participation has been increasing. Non-institutional participation for the climate transition often relies on a prefigurative approach, thus creating spaces to incubate alternative ideas and novel forms of political participation (niches). Empowering these forms of political participation to encourage niche innovations will provoke radical yet necessary changes in the socio-technical system for a climate transition. The CO-SUSTAIN project seeks to address this opportunity for a democratic climate transition by defining and testing new democratic pathways, enabling local policymakers to support various and novel forms of political participation and empowering citizens to act for a sustainable transition. To develop a better understanding of political participation linked to environmental, political, and societal imperatives, CO-SUSTAIN will study 18 historic examples (HEs) in 6 different European countries for each of the latent and manifest forms of political participation underlined by Ekman: involvement, civic engagement, formal political participation, and activism. It will use institutional ethnography and system mapping to understand the dynamics of the participation and its management, thus delivering best practices to stimulate and support political participation around these imperatives. These best practices will serve to define interventions for solution co-creation in 4 case studies, one for each form of political participation: involvement through Spanish energy communities, civic engagement through Food Solidarity in Turin (IT), manifest political participation through participatory processes promoted by the government in Northern Europe (EE, FI) and activism through the Lobau Bleibt social movement (AT). The outputs and outcomes of the deliberations will be assessed to draw conclusions for more democratic climate policymaking across Europe. 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The aim of the context and stakeholder analysis is to gather information and data that will allow to better understand the temporal, social, and spatial scope and circumstances in which Collective Action Initiatives (CAIs) emerged and evolved within the 18 historical case studies (HE) analyzed. These analyses are part of a broader research effort to answer the main research question: What are the most significant factors and related dynamics influencing the emergence and development of Collective Action Initiatives (CAIs) in the context of the climatic, political and/or social imperatives and what are their implications for democratic transitions towards sustainability? Context is understood as a complex system where various elements interact and provide the background for the processes analyzed within each HE. This approach implies the need to define the boundaries of the system under study (HE) and identify its key components using a Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) theoretical framework. Thus, context analysis incorporates the use of various methods and data sources to capture the fullest possible overview of the scale, dynamics and relationships between the different elements that constitute a niche in the socio-technical conditions that frame the regime and landscape in which a particular historical example occurred. Equally important for understanding the determinants and dynamics of the processes in each HE is the identification and definition of the role of individual and collective actors who, in some way, contributed to the emergence or evolution of the CAI. process proposed by Reed5, figure 4.1 visualizes this strategic position of SA in CO-SUSTAIN research implementation. Figure 4.1 - CO-SUSTAIN Stakeholder Analysis’s role in Historical Examples research process On these premises, the CO-SUSTAIN’s SA methodology develops along three main steps: (1) Identification, aimed at answering the question ‘who are the main actors involved?’; (2) description, aimed at answering the question ‘why and to what extent they are involved and how and to what extent they are able to affect or be affected by the initiative development?’; (3) categorization, based on the description and aimed at clustering the stakeholders in order to assess their relevance and proceed with the engagement. In the following, a few methodological details are provided for each step. Step 1) STAKEHOLDERS IDENTIFICATION This step aims at answering three main questions: 1a. Which actors have a direct influence on the activities of the initiative? 1b. Which actors can be positively/negatively affected by the initiative? 1c. Based on a and b, which role the actors play with respect to the development of the initiative? In order to facilitate the researchers in answering these questions and in order for the answers to be comparable among the HEs, we asked the researchers to adopt three typologies in the identification process. Typology 1 - Stakeholders’ categories ●Institutions: public administration, public agencies… ●Business & Industry: industries, SMEs, retailers, banks… 5Ibidem. ●Public services: mobility, health, education, welfare… ●Intermediate bodies: representative Associations, Trade unions… ●Research: universities, research institutes… ●Professionals: experts, consultants, practitioners… ●Citizens: the wide community more or less directly involved ●NGOs: associations, no profit bodies, third sectors ●Civil society organizations: formal and informal movements… ●Media: any type of information channel (no social media) ●Politicians: parties’ representatives Typology 2 - Spatial scale ●Local: municipal and county level (LAU and NUTS3). ●Regional: NUTS 1 and 2. ●National: country level (NUTS 0). ●Supranational: European Union, Europe, Global (UN, OECD…). Typology 3 – Role of SH in the process ●Promoter: actors that directly push the initiative, identify visions, objectives etc. ●Target Group: actors that are expected to directly support initiative development/actions implementation ●Beneficiary: actors that are directly affected from the initiative development/actions implementation ●Third party: any other actors indirectly involved in initiative development/actions implementation NOTE: Typologies 1 and 2 are proposed to answer questions 1a and 1b, TYpology 3 to answer question 1c Step 2) STAKEHOLDERS DESCRIPTION Once identified the stakeholders, the aim is for each of them to better qualify their role in relation to the initiative, i.e., to find an answer to the following questions 2a To what extent are they actually interested in the initiative? And why? 2b. How much are they concerned about the problem that triggered the initiative and favorable/opposing the initiative itself? 2c. How much power do they have to affect initiatives’ development? 2d. What resources can they activate (economic, financial, positional, knowledge…) for this power to be executed? 2e. Which kind of relation and how strong do they have with the initiative? In order to find answers to these questions, the following six features have been analyzed. 1. Resources: referred to the 5 types of leverages that the SHs can activate to affect the initiative: ●Normative: actor is able to affect/decide the policy or the rules for its implementation. ●Relational: actor is strongly linked with many of the main players in the domains affected. ●Positional: thanks to its position in the policy implementation chain. ●Economic: actor is able to provide/complement funds. ●Knowledge: actor has a deep knowledge about the topic. A stakeholder can, of course, count on more than one resource. 2. Influence, referred to an assessment of the extent to which actors are able to activate their resources to affect the process, since having a resource is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the resource to be actually used (e.g., having a perfect knowledge of a phenomenon does not make you a powerful actor if you are not required to feed the decision making process...). 3. Interest, referred to the analysis of the reasons why the stakeholders should be interested in the initiative and how much interest they have. 4. Attitude, referred to the interaction among the specific views and goals of the SHs and the views and goals of the initiatives that could trigger an opposing or favorable attitude. 5. Impact, related directly to the mechanisms that might produce an expected/unexpected positive/negative change on the SHs and to the magnitude of this change. 6. Relationship, that relates to the nature (neutral, conflictual, cooperative) and intensity (strong vs weak) of the interactions between the SHs and the initiative. Step 3) STAKEHOLDERS CATEGORIZATION Based on the results of the description at step 2, the magnitude of a subset of features is then assessed through the application of two quantitative evaluation on two scales: ●From 1 = min to 5 = max to evaluate the magnitude of attributes “Power” and “ Interest”. ●From -5 = strong negative to +5 =strong positive to evaluate the magnitude of attributes “Attitude” and “Impact”. NOTE: the value ‘0’ was not considered in the 2 scales for two main reasons: (1) as for the 1st scale because for an actor to be considered a stakeholder it is supposed to have a minimum power and interest in the process ; (2) as for the second, in order to avoid central tendency bias The scores were then combined to produce two typologies of stakeholders. Typology A – Stakeholders by Relevance Power and Interests scores have been combined to implement the Power X Interest Matrix, the most widely diffused approach in SA to assess the relevance of stakeholders in terms of their capability to affect the process As reported in the figure, in such a way the stakeholders have been assigned to the following four categories. Key Players (values from 3 to 5 for both Interest and Power): these are the most relevant actors to be considered, highly interested and powerful. Context Setters (values from 3 to 5 for Power, 1 and 2 for Interest): these are relevant actors to foster or hamper the process although they are not very interested. Subjects (values from 3 to 5 for interest, 1 and 2 for Power): these are the most affected actors, highly interested with little power to influence the process. Crowd (values below 3 for both Interest and Power): these are the ‘surrounding’ actors, with no interest neither power to affect the process. Typology B – Stakeholders by Impact A second typology was built on the combination of the Power and Impact scores, to categorize the stakeholders on the basis of the likelihood of affecting vs being affected by the initiative development. This second typology is a simplified version of the one proposed by Chevalier and Books6. Figure 4.3 - The Rainbow diagram : likelihood for SHs to affect/be affected the process In order to assign the stakeholders to different impact category, a simple ratio has been computed: R = Power Score / Impact Score Based on R, the SHs were assigned to the following three categories: ●Affected (R < 0,75), that means the actors are affected from the process in a way far greater than the power they have to affect the process. ●Affecting & Affected (0,75<=R<=1,25) that refers to actors that are able to affect the process more or less to the extent they are likely to be affected. 6Chevalier, J.M. and Buckles, D.J., 2008. SAS2: A Guide to Collaborative Inquiry and Social Engagement. Sage Publications. ●Affecting (R > 1,25), that refers to actors that are more able to affect the process than likely to be impacted. NOTE: given that the impact can be positive or negative (i.e. below or above 0 ) in computing R the absolute value is adopted while the actual values are reported in a dedicated table. 4.3. References Bryson, J.M., 1995. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Bryson, J.M., 2003. What To Do When Stakeholders Matter: A Guide to Stakeholder Identification and Analysis Techniques. Paper presented at LSE, 10 February. Chevalier, J.M. and Buckles, D.J., 2008. SAS2: A Guide to Collaborative Inquiry and Social Engagement. Sage Publications. Reed, M.S., Graves, A., Dandy, N., Posthumus, H., Hubacek, K., Morris, J., Prel,l C., Quinn, C.H. and Stringer, L.C., 2009. Who's in and why? A typology of stakeholder analysis methods for natural resource management. Journal of Environmental Management 90, 5, 1933-1949. 5. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF INVOLVEMENT 5.1. OurPower Energy Cooperative (AT) The energy cooperative OurPower was founded in 2018 by a group of 19 founding members, with the goal of fostering the transition to renewable energy and developing a new model for energy democracy and citizen power7. OurPower was the first Austrian company to adopt the legal form of European Cooperative Society (SCE, for Latin societas cooperativa Europaea). The co-founders combined expertise and previous experience with the green energy market with knowledge on stakeholder participation and the design of online platforms. The aim of the energy cooperative is to promote cooperation and relationships between energy producers and consumers, thus sharing risks and responsibilities related to the energy market and ensuring fair prices for both sides8. To this end, the cooperative envisaged the development of an online marketplace to connect producers and consumers of regionally produced electricity from renewable sources, including biomass, solar, hydroand wind power. The implementation of this digital marketplace received funding from the Vienna Business Agency amounting to €150,000 over 21 months9, from 2018 to 2020. In addition to this funding, the cooperative started out with a founding capital of around €70,000 which corresponds to roughly 700 company shares (à €100 each) purchased by the founders, and an additional 500 shares were agreed to be subscribed to by the founders or their companies in due time10. OurPower defined its funding milestones at €300,000 €600,000 and €900,000 respectively, the first of which was reached in 2019 and the second in 2021, while the third goal is still under progress11. In addition to financial support, the social networks and contacts of OurPower’s founding members constituted key resources that enabled the cooperative’s foundation. As a cooperative of electricity producers, OurPower needed strong partners from the practical field of renewable energy generation interested in selling their electricity through the marketplace. To this end, OurPower has been working closely with “Energiebezirk Freistadt”12, a non-profit organization in the Upper Austrian Region “Mühlviertel”. Energiebezirk Freistadt was founded by the municipalities of the Upper Austrian district Freistadt in 2005 and has since implemented many regional and local projects in the areas of renewable energy, sustainable mobility, climate protection and climate change mitigation. Another key practice partner is “Helios Sonnenstrom GmbH”13, a daughter company of Energiebezirk Freistadt founded in 2012 which has since accumulated over 10 years of experience and knowledge on the planning, financing, construction and operation of over 100 photovoltaic installations. In addition to this practical experience, OurPower is also building on their partners’ previous efforts in community building and citizen 13 See: https://www.helios-sonnenstrom.at/ 12 See: https://www.energiebezirk.at/ 11 See: https://www.ourpower.coop/page/mitglied-werden 10 Ibidem. 9OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mbH, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2018‘, ourpower.coop, Vienna, 2019, https://www.ourpower.coop/page/downloads, (accessed: 20.10.2024). 8Ibidem. 7OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mbH, ‘Satzung der OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mit beschränkter Haftung‘, ourpower.coop, Vienna, 2018, https://www.ourpower.coop/page/downloads, (accessed 20.10. 2024). participation14. Next to these strong local partners, international and EU-level connections also played an important role in bringing larger-scale discourses on energy democracy, independence from fossil energy sources and global energy markets, and “citizen power” to Austria and conceiving of OurPower as an Austrian lighthouse project for these ideas. OurPower’s first year of operations was marked – next to the development of a corporate identity and the recruitment of additional members and supporters – by the development of the online marketplace, which entered its pilot phase in mid-201915. Since April 2020, the marketplace has been fully functional, allowing energy producers to sell their electricity and consumers to choose a personalized mix of energy and specific production facilities16. Since then, OurPower has been steadily working on implementing improvements and additional features, such as a personalized electricity bill to foster visibility and relationships between its energy producers and consumers17. At the same time, the cooperative has been working on recruiting new members, producers and consumers and securing additional funding through these memberships (where each member must sign at least one company share, adding to the cooperative’s capital) as well as through its revenues. At the end of 2023, OurPower counted 833 cooperative members, 292 electricity producers, 1100 electricity customers and a cooperative capital of 843 000 euros18. OurPower’s development since its foundation was strongly affected by the multiple crises experienced globally in recent years. The onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020 meant that countless in-person events and workshops aimed at marketing OurPower and increasing its public awareness had to be canceled. A further effect of the global health crisis meant that public awareness shifted away from OurPower’s core topics of climate action and renewable energy transition, which made it more difficult to engage people in the cooperative’s activities. The team reacted to this by shifting most of their marketing efforts online and developing new digital formats of communicating with members and citizens and forming meaningful relationships in an online environment19. As an additional measure, OurPower expanded its scope of action to recruit funding through participation in several scientific research projects20, which proved to be quite successful and was continued in the following years21. Starting in the second half of 2021, the electricity exchange prices rose sharply, a development that was further exacerbated by the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in early 2022. While this situation presented 21 OurPower, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2020‘, 2021, op. cit. 20 OurPower, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2019‘, 2020, op. cit. 19 OurPower, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2020‘, 2021, op. cit. 18 OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mbH, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2023‘, ourpower.coop, Vienna, 2024, https://www.ourpower.coop/page/downloads, (accessed: 20.10.2024). 17 OTS, ‘OurPower startet die persönlichste Stromrechnung Europas‘, OTS.at, Vienna, 2021, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20210319_OTS0155/ourpower-startet-die-persoenlichste-stromrechnu ng-europas-bild, (accessed: 9.10.2024). 16 OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mbH, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2020‘, ourpower.coop, Vienna, 2021, https://www.ourpower.coop/page/downloads, (accessed: 20.10.2024). 15 Ibidem. 14 OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mbH, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2019‘, ourpower.coop, Vienna, 2020, https://www.ourpower.coop/page/downloads, (accessed: 20.10. 2024). challenges to OurPower’s goal of maintaining fair prices for both producers and consumers22 . It also created opportunities through increased public awareness for the energy system as many countries implemented measures to gain independence from Russian oil and gas. While OurPower is currently operating only in Austria, the initiative’s legal status as a European cooperative allows for future expansion to other EU countries, thereby furthering their goal of knowledge distribution and international cooperation. However, the different legal requirements for energy communities across EU countries currently pose a barrier to this expansion. 5.1.1. Context Analysis While some of OurPower’s activities, such as the co-creation and sharing of knowledge and practical experience regarding citizen participation in the renewable energy transition, extend beyond the national scale to encompass scientific and practice partners around Europe, the cooperative’s core business activities (i.e. the online marketplace) are currently focused on Austria. Austria is a central European country covering an area of just under 84,000 km2, characterized by its large share of alpine regions and its diverse landscape23. Due to its geographic location at the transition between two climate zones, Austria’s west experiences an oceanic climate with more frequent precipitation and westerlies, while the east is characterized by an increasingly dry continental climate with hot summers and cold winters24. As detailed in the annual report of the Austrian Federal Institute of Statistics (“Statistik Austria”), Austria’s resident population counted 9.1 million people at the beginning of 2023 and is expected to grow to over 10 million in the 2060s25. Austria's population is growing exclusively through immigration: Austria's total population growth within a decade (01.01.2013 to 01.01.2023: +652,912 people) was entirely due to the positive migration balance (+654,870), while the balance of births and deaths was negative overall during this period (-5,508 people)26. The largest municipality in the country is its capital city Vienna, with around 1.98 million inhabitants on January 1, 202327. Other large cities in descending order of inhabitants include the provincial capitals of Graz (298,000 inhabitants), Linz (210,000 inhabitants), Salzburg (157,000 inhabitants) and Innsbruck (131,000 inhabitants)28. Of the 9.1 million people living in Austria, roughly 1.32 million are children under the age of 15, around 6.01 million are aged 15 to 64 and 1.78 million are aged 65 or older29. Therefore, around two thirds (66.0%) of the population are of working age between 15 and 64, while 14.4% are children of pre-school or compulsory school age and 19.6% are older people of retirement age30. The older population aged 65 and over is growing in absolute numbers and relative share – even more so in the future, as the ‘baby boomer’ generation born in the late 1950s and early 1960s will reach retirement age in the 2020s – while the labor force is also aging31. 31 Ibidem. 30 Ibidem. 29 Ibidem. 28 Ibidem. 27 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem. 25 Ibidem. 24 Ibidem. 23 Statistik Austria, 2024. Österreich. Zahlen. Daten. Fakten., Vienna, Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich. 22 OurPower Energiegenossenschaft SCE mbH, ‘Geschäftsbericht 2022‘, ourpower.coop, Vienna, 2023, https://www.ourpower.coop/page/downloads, (accessed 20 October 2024). Regarding educational background, in 2022, 21.7% of the Austrian population aged 25 to 64 had a tertiary-level qualification (i.e. university level or equivalent), 64.9% a secondary-level qualification (including secondary and vocational schools as well as vocational training) and 13.4% a compulsory education qualification (9 years of compulsory education, from age 6-15)32. Over the past decades, the share of people with a tertiary qualification has been continuously increasing, while the proportion of those with at most a compulsory school-leaving certificate has been declining (for comparison, in 1971, 57.8% of 25 to 64-year-olds had a compulsory school-leaving qualification and 2.8% had a tertiary qualification)33. Secondary-level qualifications have also been on the rise. The gender-specific differences in educational attainment have narrowed in recent years. In 2020, 15.1% of women and 11.7% of men had at most completed compulsory education, and women have overtaken men with regard to tertiary qualification (23.9% of women compared to 19.5% of men)34. However, major gender differences remain with regard to vocational training: 38.3% of men, but only 25.3% of women have completed vocational training35. These differences can be attributed to long-standing gender-specific employment patterns, as women are particularly well represented at commercial, business and social vocational secondary schools, while traditionally male-specific vocational qualifications, such as in the skilled trades, are often acquired through vocational training36. Concerning the Austrian labor market, in 2022 just over half of the population in private households (4.44 out of 8.9 million people) were in employment37. At 3.9 million, almost nine out of ten people in employment (88%) are non-self-employed, while around 543,100 self-employed and contributing family members account for 12% of the workforce38. Of the people not in employment, 1.95 million were pensioners, 143,800 people were permanently unable to work, and 230,100 were not in gainful employment as they are housewives or - much less frequently - househusbands who devote themselves exclusively to maintaining the household39. 383,900 people aged 15 and over were in education, while 23,000 men were doing military or civilian service40. The employment rate among the working-age population (15 to 64 years) was at 74% in 2022, which is above the EU average (70%) and in tenth place among the 27 EU member states41. The highest rate (86%) could be observed among 25 to 54-year-olds, while the rate was lower (52%) among teenagers and young adults (15 to 24 years), who are often still in education42. Despite an upward trend, Austria's employment rate of 55-64 year-olds (56%) is still below the EU average (62%) in 202243. The proportion of working women aged 25 to 54 is 83%, which is already much closer to that of men (89%) than in previous years44. However, large gender differences remain with regard to part-time work: A significant proportion of the workforce – in 2022, 1.36 million or 31% – were 44 Ibidem. 43 Ibidem. 42 Ibidem. 41 Ibidem. 40 Ibidem. 39 Ibidem. 38 Ibidem. 37 Ibidem. 36 Ibidem. 35 Ibidem. 34 Ibidem. 33 Ibidem. 32 Ibidem. not in full-time employment45. Among these part-time employees, eight out of ten (78%) are women, and of all women in employment, 51% work part-time, while for men, this proportion is just under 13%46. At 4.8% in 2022, Austria’s unemployment rate (= proportion of unemployed people in the labor force) is at a medium height compared to other EU countries, with the EU average in 2022 being at 6,2%47. Austria's economic output increased by 4.8% in 2022, rising above the pre-crisis level of 2019 again after a historic decline of 6.6% in 2020 due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, and a plus of 4.3% in 202148. This puts Austria's economy in the front midfield internationally: Slightly lower growth was recorded both in the European Union as a whole (+3.4%) and in the eurozone (+3.4%)49. Austrian GDP rose by 10.4% at current prices to around €447.22 billion in 2022, while GDP per capita amounted to € 49,400 (+9.1%), or €44,097 adjusted for purchasing power (in purchasing power standards; PPS), compared to the EU27’s average GDP per capita in PPS of €35,434 (around 80.4 % of the Austrian value)50. Like most highly developed, modern economies, the Austrian economy today is dominated by the service sector: Almost 70% of gross value added is generated by the so-called “tertiary” sector, around 29 % by the “secondary” sector - the manufacturing sector - and only 1.5 % by agriculture and forestry (the “primary” sector)51. More than one in two men (58%) work in the service sector, and eight in ten women (84%), with the sector providing work for 70% of the workforce overall, while agriculture and forestry, which were historically very important, now only account for 4% of the workforce, and the manufacturing sector (industry and commerce) accounts for around 26% (38% of men work in this sector, but only 13 % of women)52. Looking at the individual branches of the economy, the manufacture of goods is the branch with the highest employment, followed by trade53. The service sector has grown significantly, especially in the past decade, and employs a particularly large number of women, especially in the health and social services sector and in trade54. By contrast, the manufacture of goods is a typically male domain, employing 23% of all employed men55. Regarding Austria’s climate impact, the country’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions amounted to 77.5 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO₂eq) in 2021, an increase of 4.9% or 3.6 million tons compared to 2020 and 1.9% below the 1990 level56. The main reason for the relatively low figure were the measures relating to COVID-19 (for comparison, in 2019 GHG emissions were higher at 80.0 million tons)57. With 8.8 tons of CO₂eq per capita, Austria is in the European midfield and slightly above the EU average of 7.9 tons of CO₂eq per capita58. The main sources of GHG emissions (including emissions 58 Ibidem. 57 Ibidem. 56 Ibidem. 55 Ibidem. 54 Ibidem. 53 Ibidem. 52 Ibidem. 51 Ibidem. 50 Ibidem. 49 Ibidem. 48 Ibidem. 47 Ibidem. 46 Ibidem. 45 Ibidem. Statistik Austria, 2024. Österreich. Zahlen. Daten. Fakten., Vienna, Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich. Directorate-General for Energy, 2019. (European Commission). Clean energy for all Europeans. data.europa.eu, Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2833/9937, (accessed: 9.10.2024). Internet sources: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/ren e wable-energy-directive_en https://www.energiebezirk.at/ https://www.helios-sonnenstrom.at/ https://www.ourpower.coop/page/mitglied-werden 5.2. Energy Community in the Rural Municipality of Monachil (ES) The process began in 2018 with the establishment of the Municipal Energy Office, spearheaded by the Monachil Town Council in collaboration with the local cooperative Cooperase. The aim was to promote energy savings, efficiency, and renewable self-consumption among local residents. A crucial turning point came in 2019 when a Royal Decree allowed for collective self-consumption, creating a favorable regulatory environment for local energy communities. In 2020, Cooperase and the local association Pasos applied for a grant from SOM Energía, which provided funding and spurred social participation, leading to the formal creation of the Monachil Energy Community in 2022. Today, the energy community has 55 members, split evenly between men and women aged 30 to 75, primarily of Spanish origin and with educational backgrounds ranging from vocational training to doctorates. This initiative stands out as a successful case of rural community engagement in the energy transition, overcoming challenges such as regulatory uncertainties, limited local resources, and initial low participation. Although still in its early stages, the Monachil Energy Community provides a model for similar initiatives by demonstrating the potential of local networks and participatory processes to establish collective renewable energy projects. Furthermore, the community plans to extend its benefits through "energy solidarity" by eventually sharing surplus renewable energy with vulnerable households in the municipality, thereby addressing issues of energy poverty and social inequality. The case of Monachil offers valuable insights into the barriers and drivers of participation in rural energy communities, emphasizing the importance of bottom-up initiatives and local government support in the broader context of Spain’s energy transition . 5.2.1. Context Analysis 5.2.1.1. Geographical and Territorial Characteristics Monachil is a Spanish municipality located in the southeast of the Iberian Peninsula, within the province of Granada, in the region of Andalusia. As of 2022, Andalusia remains the most populous region in Spain, with 8,500,187 inhabitants73. The province of Granada has a population of 921,987, of which 8,182 reside in Monachil, representing less than 1% of the province’s total population. Despite its small size, Monachil’s geographical location within the Sierra Nevada Mountain range is significant. The municipality’s terrain is predominantly mountainous, which greatly influences its climate74. Monachil experiences cooler temperatures than much of the surrounding province and higher levels of precipitation, often in the form of snow during the winter. This unique climate sets it apart from other areas in both the province and the broader region. 74 Rivas-Martínez S., Penas Á., del Río S., Díaz González T.E., and Rivas-Sáenz S., 2017. Bioclimatology of the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands. In: Loidi J (eds) Veg Iber Peninsula. Plant and vegetation, vol 12. Springer, Cham, pp 29–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54784-8_2 73 INE, 2024. Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Municipal Register Demography and population. https://www.ine.es (accessed: 20.6.2024). Andalusia spans 87,268 km², making it the largest autonomous region in Spain75. The region is divided into eight provinces and consists of 785 municipalities. Andalusia’s varied topography, climate, and hydrology play critical roles in shaping its socio-economic development. The Betic System, which includes prominent mountain ranges such as the Sierra Nevada, Sierra de los Filabres, and Sierra de Grazalema, dominates much of the region’s landscape. The Guadalquivir River basin, running through the region’s central areas, supports fertile agricultural land, while the Sierra Morena in the north acts as a natural barrier. The southern part of Andalusia is defined by its extensive coastline, which stretches 917 kilometers along the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This diverse landscape creates a wide range of climatic conditions, from the continental climate of its mountainous interior to the Mediterranean climate of its coastal areas. The province of Granada mirrors this regional diversity, spanning 12,647 km²s with 174 municipalities. It is part of the Betic System, with the Genil River flowing through a portion of the province. Granada’s terrain includes 79 kilometers of coastline, further contributing to its geographical variety. Monachil, located at an altitude of approximately 790 meters above sea level and covering 88.85 km²s, lies on the western slopes of the Sierra Nevada76. Its proximity to the mountains shapes its climate and landscape, providing it with a unique natural environment. As part of the urban agglomeration of Granada, Monachil has seen increasing integration into the economic and social fabric of the provincial capital. The urban agglomeration itself comprises 30 municipalities and has experienced significant urban expansion since the 1950s. The population of the urban agglomeration is now double that of the city of Granada. While Monachil has participated in this growth, it has maintained a more moderate pace of development, characterized by its primarily residential and tourist-oriented economy. Over the last decade, Monachil’s population has increased by 10%, largely driven by residents of Granada seeking quieter, less densely populated metropolitan areas. This trend is common in metropolitan regions, where rising housing costs in city centers push residents to search for more affordable options in nearby municipalities. Monachil has also been part of this urbanization process as a result of the search for quieter and more affordable areas outside the urban centers. From an MLP perspective, Monachil´s geographical characteristics and its proximity to Sierra Nevada represent part of the “landscape” level, which is defined by long-term, external trends that shape local activities. The geographical constraints and opportunities provided by the mountainous terrain significantly influence the local socio-technical regime, which is currently dominated by tourism and residential development. These landscape features have historically determined the economic and social structures of Monachil and continue to guide its future developments77. 5.2.1.2. Demographic Trends, Migration, and Educational Attainment Andalusia is the most populous region in Spain, but given its large territorial size, its population density is approximately 100 inhabitants per km², slightly above the national average. However, this population density varies locally: while the provincial average is quite low, at 72.9 inhabitants per km² in 2021 (in line 77 Rivas-Martínez et. al., 2017. op. cit 76 INE, 2024. op. cit. 75 IECA, 2024. Sistema de Información Multiterritorial de Andalucía. https://www.juntadeandalucia.es/institutodeestadisticaycartografia/dega/sistema-de-informacion-multiterritorial-d e-andalucia-sima with ongoing rural depopulation), the provincial capital exceeds 2,500 inhabitants per km². Monachil covers just 0.7% of the provincial surface area and its population represents 0.9% of the province’s total. These figures are explained by its location within the Sierra Nevada Natural Park. Since much of its land is steep and mountainous, making it uninhabitable, the municipality records a low average population density. In 2021, Monachil had a population density of 93 inhabitants per km²78. Population dynamics between 2011 and 2021 reflect two significant socio-economic factors: the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. While a slight increase in population was observed nationally and regionally, the overall population in the province of Granada decreased by 0.28%. However, Monachil experienced a 10% population growth, in line with the expansion of the metropolitan area, particularly impacting Barrio de Monachil. When analyzing the evolution of the population by major age groups between 2011 and 2021 in both Andalusia and the province of Granada, a clear trend emerges: there has been a relative decline in the number of children and the working-age population, resulting in an overall aging of the population. Monachil is no exception: the population aged over 64 years grew by 17.83%, a rate higher than that of the rest of the province, region, and country. However, despite this trend, the working-age population in Monachil still accounted for 69.33% of the total population in 2021. Additionally, in the same year, the average age of Monachil's population was 41.19 years, lower than the provincial and regional averages79. Indeed, Monachil’s population growth has significantly outpaced the overall trend in the province of Granada. While the province experienced a slight population decline of 0.28% between 2011 and 2021, Monachil saw a substantial 10% increase during the same period. This divergence can be attributed to the growth of the urban agglomeration of Granada due to the urbanization of the rural areas surrounding the provincial capital, as rising housing costs and the densification of the provincial capital have prompted many residents to seek more affordable and spacious living arrangements in surrounding areas like Monachil. The growth of the urban agglomeration of Granada has had a profound impact on Monachil, particularly in areas like Barrio de Monachil, which has increasingly become a residential hub for individuals commuting to the city for work or education. As a result, Monachil is no longer just a peripheral rural area but is now actively integrated into the urban agglomeration of Granada, benefiting from improved infrastructure and services, which have made it an attractive alternative for those looking to escape the urban density while still enjoying proximity to Granada’s amenities. Over the past decade, there has been significant growth in the foreign-born population, with rates exceeding 20% across all territories and reaching 75% in Monachil. Despite this increase, the percentage of foreign-born residents in Monachil stood at only 9.72% in 2021, compared to 10.51% in Andalusia and 15.30% nationally. In other words, Monachil is showing convergence with the provincial average regarding the presence of foreign residents. 79 Entrena, F., 2006. Difusión urbana y cambio social en los territorios rurales. Un estudio de casos en la provincia de Granada. Revista de estudios regionales, (77), 179-203. 78 INE, 2023. Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Annual Population Census. 2021 & 2011 Retrieved from https://www.ine.es Granada’s university tradition has had a key impact on Monachil’s level of human capital. In 2021, 36.08% of Monachil’s population over the age of 16 held higher education degrees, compared to the national average of 31.76%. Regionally, Andalusia lagged behind with just 26.83%, while in the province of Granada the figure reached 30.40%. These figures clearly demonstrate the positive externality of the university in its metropolitan area, continually advancing the human capital of its surrounding territory. The economic transformation of Monachil, particularly the shift from agriculture to tourism, can be understood as part of a regime shift. Tourism, especially the ski resort in Pradollano, represents the dominant socio-technical regime. This regime, however, is vulnerable to landscape-level pressures such as climate change, which threatens the viability of winter tourism. Efforts to diversify Monachil’s economy, particularly through niche innovations like active tourism and renewable energy projects, are crucial for increasing local economic resilience. The rise of year-round tourism initiatives and the development of the Monachil Energy Community represent niche innovations that challenge the existing tourism-dominated regime. These innovations align with broader landscape trends in climate change awareness, sustainability, and decentralized energy production. As these niche innovations mature, they have the potential to influence and transform the existing socio-technical regime, gradually shifting Monachil’s economic base toward more sustainable and resilient sectors. 5.2.1.3. Economic Structure and Employment The economy of Granada and its province reflects a diverse structure, closely resembling that of Spain overall, but with distinct characteristics shaped by its geographical and historical context. Since 2011, economic activity in the region has displayed varying trends, particularly between coastal and inland areas. The service sector, particularly tourism, has been the primary engine of employment growth across the region. Cities such as Seville, Córdoba, Granada, and Málaga have seen significant expansions in their tourism industries, driving job creation in hospitality and related services. Although the COVID-19 pandemic dealt a severe blow to this sector, it has shown a strong recovery in recent years. As Spain’s leading agricultural region, Andalusia has maintained stable levels of employment in agriculture despite challenges such as climate change and fluctuating market prices. Key products, including olive oil, wine, and a variety of crops, continue to be central to the region’s economic resilience. However, the industrial sector in Andalusia has seen a relative decline, with the exceptions of agro-industry, renewable energy, and certain clusters such as aerospace and naval industries. In the province of Granada, the economic structure is somewhat less diversified than the broader region, with a greater reliance on agriculture and agro-industry. Despite challenges like price volatility and the ongoing impact of drought, agriculture remains a crucial sector. Crops such as olives, almonds, and tropical fruits along the coast have shown considerable resilience, supporting the agro-industrial sector. Despite pressures from modernisation and automation, this sector continues to be a major employer, aided by international competitiveness and innovation. While tourism plays a prominent role in the provincial capital, the services sector in the wider province is more varied, with a focus on rural and cultural tourism. Employment in trade and personal services has also grown steadily. Monachil’s socio-economic landscape has evolved significantly over the past century, particularly with its increasing integration into the Granada metropolitan area. Historically, the municipality’s economy was rooted in agriculture, especially in the cultivation of olive trees and vegetable crops. Olive oil production once played a central role in Monachil’s economy, and while this tradition persists, it now occupies a smaller role. In recent decades, the service sector, particularly tourism, has become the main driver of economic activity. Monachil’s natural beauty and proximity to the Sierra Nevada have made it an attractive destination for rural tourism, drawing outdoor enthusiasts for activities such as hiking, birdwatching, and other nature-based tourism. Investments in local guesthouses, restaurants, and tourist services have further supported this shift. The ski resort in Pradollano remains the largest contributor to Monachil’s economy, generating significant employment and attracting large numbers of tourists during the winter months. However, this reliance on seasonal tourism has exposed the municipality’s vulnerability to fluctuations in employment and income at the close of the ski season. To mitigate these effects, Monachil has been promoting year-round tourism, particularly through active tourism initiatives, helping to stabilize the local economy and provide more consistent sources of income for residents and businesses. The economic transformation of Monachil, particularly the shift from agriculture to tourism, can be understood as part of a regime shift. Tourism, especially the ski resort in Pradollano, represents the dominant socio-technical regime. This regime, however, is vulnerable to landscape-level pressures such as climate change, which threatens the viability of winter tourism. Efforts to diversify Monachil’s economy, particularly through niche innovations like active tourism and renewable energy projects, are crucial for increasing local economic resilience. The rise of year-round tourism initiatives and the development of the Monachil Energy Community represent niche innovations that challenge the existing tourism-dominated regime. These innovations align with broader landscape trends in climate change awareness, sustainability, and decentralized energy production. As these niche innovations mature, they have the potential to influence and transform the existing socio-technical regime, gradually shifting Monachil’s economic base toward more sustainable and resilient sectors. In 2021, the percentage of the employment-to-population ratio at the national level was 46.48%. While the regional and provincial figures were lower, at around 43%, Monachil recorded a higher rate of 47.40%, surpassing the average in other areas. This situation coexists with an unemployment rate of 24.21%, higher than that of the province (23.52%), Andalusia (24.01%), and Spain (17.03%). This apparent contradiction is explained by the high labor force participation rate in Monachil, which reaches 62.54%. This means that a larger proportion of Monachil´s population is either employed or actively seeking work compared to other regions. Many of these individuals are employed in seasonal positions, particularly in the tourism sector, such as the Pradollano ski resort. During the off-season, when tourism demand drops sharply, local businesses may close temporarily or reduce staffing, leading to higher unemployment during this periods To address this issue, expanding Monachil’s tourism offerings to include more year-round activities is essential for reducing dependence on winter tourism and fostering greater economic resilience80. 80 INE, 2023. op. cit. The labor market situation is closely tied to the evolution of income levels, measured in terms of per capita income. In 2021, per capita income in Andalusia and the province of Granada stood at approximately €13,000. In Monachil, however, it was 13% higher, reaching €14,837 per person annually. This difference is largely due to Monachil’s role as a commuter town within the Granada metropolitan area, closely linked to the service-based activities in the capital. An additional perspective can be gained from analyzing poverty levels, particularly the percentage of the population with an income per consumption unit below €5,000. In this respect, Monachil’s figures are similar to those of the province and in line with regional averages. The primary source of economic vulnerability remains the municipality’s dependence on tourism, as many families’ incomes are tied to this sector, and the seasonality of tourism-related employment can create financial challenges81. 5.2.1.4. Political and Administrative Structure Spain is a parliamentary monarchy, established by the 1978 Constitution, which laid the foundation for a democratic system after forty years of Francoist dictatorship. The Constitution defines the political system based on the separation of powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative authority is vested in the Cortes Generales, comprising the Congress of Deputies and the Senate, while executive power is held by the Government. The judiciary operates independently, ensuring the administration of justice. All central institutions are based in Madrid, the nation’s capital. Spain’s territorial organization is divided into regions, provinces, and municipalities. The regions, known as autonomous communities, enjoy a high degree of self-governance. The regional government of Andalusia, headquartered in Seville, administers key decentralized public services such as education, healthcare, social services, and cultural affairs. At the provincial level, the government of Granada is structured around the Diputación Provincial, which coordinates and supports smaller municipalities. It plays a crucial role in facilitating the delivery of public services across the province and works in collaboration with the regional government to implement both regional and local policies. Monachil, like other municipalities in Granada with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, receives support and coordination from the Diputación Provincial de Granada. Locally, Monachil follows a political and administrative structure typical of Spanish municipalities. The Town Council acts as the legislative body responsible for approving the municipal budget, overseeing urban development, and enacting local ordinances. The council members, or councilors, are elected every four years in municipal elections, with the most recent held in 2023. The number of councilors is determined by the size of the population, and in Monachil, as a small municipality, the council consists of 12 representatives. The mayor holds executive power at the local level, managing the day-to-day administration of the municipality and executing the decisions made by the council. Monachil’s municipal government is currently led by the center-left Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). 81 Tax Agency, 2023. Statistics of Personal Income Tax declarers with disability by municipalities https://agenciatributaria.gob.es/Sede/en_gb/datosabiertos/catalogo/hacienda/Estadistica_de_los_declarantes_del _IRPF_por_municipios.shtml 5.2.1.5. Political Participation Between 2011 and 2023, political participation across various territorial levels followed consistent patterns depending on the type of election. In general elections, voter turnout remained around 70%, while participation in municipal elections was significantly lower, particularly in 2023. This decline in local election turnout may reflect a lack of interest or disengagement from local politics, or the perception that national elections are more impactful. Additionally, social movements, especially those advocating for the defense of public education and healthcare, played a role in mobilizing citizens, although this did not always result in higher electoral participation. In Monachil, the decline in voter turnout was particularly noticeable. In Andalusia, political participation fluctuated between 2011 and 2023, depending on the election. Turnout in general elections remained high and stable at around 69%, while participation in municipal elections was consistently lower, reaching just 61.36% in 2023. Within the province of Granada, political participation followed similar trends to those observed in Andalusia, but with variations depending on location. In rural areas, turnout tended to be lower, largely due to factors like youth migration to urban centers and an aging population. In smaller municipalities and rural zones, voter turnout in local and regional elections typically ranged between 50% and 60%, influenced by citizens’ connection to political processes and the socio-economic challenges they faced. In contrast, participation rates were generally higher in larger municipalities and areas closer to the provincial capital. This urban-rural divide is evident in Monachil, where turnout in general elections—both in 2011 and 2023—was around 68%, slightly below the regional and provincial averages. However, participation in local elections was significantly lower than in other territorial levels82. Voter turnout in Monachil´s municipal elections saw a notable decline between 2011 and 2023, falling from 61.12% to 56.63%. This drop may reflect a broader trend of disengagement from local politics, or the perception that municipal elections have less direct impact on daily life compared to general elections. Nevertheless, in the case of Monachil, its proximity to the provincial capital and its reliance on tourism may have helped sustain slightly higher voter participation compared to other rural areas.Local residents may perceive that municipal decisions have a more immediate influence on the management of tourism services and local infrastructure, which are crucial to the local economy. This sense of local control and impact may encourage greater voter engagement in municipal elections. Monachil’s political and administrative structure operates within the broader socio-technical regime of Spain’s decentralized governance. The municipality’s reliance on both local and provincial governments for infrastructure and public services reflects the current regime. However, the involvement of local associations like Cooperase and the Pasos association in the creation of the Monachil Energy Community signifies the rise of niche innovations within the political sphere. These participatory energy projects, supported by bottom-up initiatives and local government support, are reshaping the governance model towards more community-based, decentralized energy management. 82 Montiel, C., 2003. Tradición, renovación e innovación de los usos y aprovechamientos en las áreas rurales de montaña. Cuadernos Geográficos, (33), 7-26. This shift is reinforced by landscape-level developments in European and national energy policies, which provide incentives for renewable energy communities. Policies like Spain’s RD 244/2019 on collective self-consumption and the European Union’s Fit for 55 package create the regulatory framework that enables these niche innovations to flourish. The Monachil Energy Community, therefore, exemplifies how local actions can align with broader political and environmental trends, challenging the dominance of traditional centralized energy systems. 5.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis The categories of stakeholders (SHs) most represented in the Monachil energy community initiative are local government institutions under the Monachil Town Council (OME), civil society organizations such as Cooperase and PASOS Participación, and community-focused entities such as the Monachil River Energy Community (CERM). These stakeholders operate primarily at the local level, but have wider implications at provincial, regional and national levels, especially as part of the drive for energy community projects and energy autonomy, as they have led the way in these respects alongside other similar initiatives (Table 5.2a). In terms of impact, many of Monachil's stakeholders affect and are affected (Table 5.2b). For example, Cooperase, PASOS and Monachil Town Council through the OME play a dual role in influencing the direction of CERM while adapting to external constraints such as funding availability and regulatory frameworks. Some stakeholders, such as Endesa and the Ministry for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge, are primarily affecting entities, shaping policy and operational conditions, but are less directly influenced by the day-to-day activities of the community. Key actors in the Monachil energy community are local stakeholders, such as the Monachil Town Council, Cooperase, PASOS and the Rio Monachil Energy Community (CERM) itself, who provide essential resources, technical support and community involvement for the success of the project (Figure 5.2a). Context setters include regional bodies such as the Junta de Andalucía and national institutions such as the Ministry for Ecological Transition, which influence the policy landscape. Endesa, as an energy distributor, also plays an important role in enabling or delaying community access to the grid, which impacts the ability of the initiative to sustainably grow and grow. Table 5.2a – Stakeholders attributes Stakeholder Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1 Endesa Business & Industry Local-Regional-National third party Economic Neutral SH2 La Olla del Patio Civil society organizations Local beneficiary Relational Cooperative SH3 Local residents of Monachil Citizens Local beneficiary Relational Cooperative SH4 Junta de Andalucía Institutions Regional third party Normative, Positional Cooperative SH4 Ministry for ecological transition and demographic challenge Institutions National third party Normative Positional Cooperative SH6 Monachil City Council (OME) Institutions Local promoter Normative, Relational, Positional Cooperative SH7 Energy Poverty Advisory Hub (EPAH) Intermediate Bodies European target Relational Cooperative SH8 SOM Energía NGOs National promoter Relational Cooperative SH9 Cooperase NGOs Local promoter Relational Cooperative SH10 PASOS NGOs Local promoter Relational Cooperative SH11 Local Educational Institutions Public Services Local beneficiary Relational Cooperative SH12 University of Granada Research Local-International promoter Knowledge Neutral Notably, the Przylesie housing cooperative is significantly ahead of other communities in its pro-ecological efforts. This advanced position is largely due to the rare management structure of the cooperative. By considering Przylesie Housing Cooperative through the lens of MLP, one can gain a deeper understanding of the factors that shape the Przylesie HE and its context. Broader socio-economic context, which is the seaside character of Sopot (a fashionable resort) through its high average residential prices, is a determining factor in residents' investment decisions. These factors shape the conditions for the housing cooperative and provide a landscape for the actors acting in it. The legal framework which consists of both cooperative laws, building standards but also rules for the granting of loans and investment grants can be defined as the regime for this HE. The need to operate under such complex formal conditions requires, on the one hand, appropriate leadership (the Co-operative's long-standing Board) as well as a high acceptance of innovation by a large group of residents. This focus on the unique features and actions of the Przylesie housing cooperative represents the niche level, where innovation and experimentation can occur. The cooperative president's dual role as a cooperative leader and city council member creates a link between the regime and the local political landscape. 5.3.2. Stakeholder Analysis The Housing Cooperative ‘Przylesie’ in Sopot is developing thanks to the active participation of residents and cooperation with various stakeholders. Residents are key decision-makers, involved through consultation and referenda, facilitated by the cooperative's structure with elected boards. The table below (5.2) offers an insight into the landscape of all stakeholders of the Przylesie Housing Cooperative. The most important categories of stakeholders are citizens and institutions, operating mainly at the local level. This suggests a local context with significant involvement of residents and the decision-making bodies they legitimize (Supervisory Board and General Assembly). Analyzing the stakeholders of Przylesea HC according to their assessed importance, it can be seen (see Figure 5.3a) that the following three actors have the greatest importance: Provincial Environmental Fund, General Assembly of the Housing Cooperative. Table 5.3b, which analyzes the influence of stakeholders, shows that most stakeholders have a greater ability to influence the situation than to be influenced by it. This suggests that some stakeholders have a significant influence on the dynamics within the Przylesie HC. For example, the Provincial Environmental Fund, the General Assembly of the Housing Association and older residents (who obtained housing in the 1970s) are classified as having a lot of power and influence. Conversely, new residents are identified as significantly affected, indicating potential weaknesses or lack of influence within the HC. Groups such as the Gdansk District Heating Company and local media show a more balanced influence profile, suggesting that they both influence and are influenced by HC dynamics. The stakeholder analysis reveals a complex interplay of interests and influences within HC Przylesie. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for effective decision-making and navigating potential conflicts or collaborations, which should be the next step for the COSUSTAIN project. Table 5.3a - Stakeholders: list and main features Stakeholder Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1 Groups_of_Residents_(active on social media) Citizens Local beneficiary, target Relational conflictual SH2 New residents of HE - moved in during the last years Citizens Local beneficiary Relational cooperative SH3 Old HE residents - obtained flats in 1970s Citizens Local beneficiary Relational conflictual SH4 Locators_Defence_Council Civil society organizations Local beneficiary, target Relational conflictual SH5 Voivodeship_Fund_of_Environmental_Protection Institutions Regional promoter Normative, Relational, Positional, Economic, Knowledge cooperative SH6 Supervisory_Council_of_Housing Cooperative ‘Przylesie’, Institutions Local third party Normative, Positional cooperative SH7 General_Meeting_of_Social Housing Cooperative ‘Przylesie’, Institutions Local third party Normative, Positional, Economic cooperative SH8 Professional press (Co-operatives and Housing) Media National promoter Knowledge cooperative SH9 Local Media in Sopot and the Tri-City Media Regional target Relational, Knowledge neutral SH10 City_Council_Sopot Politicians Local third party Normative, Positional, Economic neutral SH11 Auditing Company Professionals Regional third party Knowledge cooperative SH12 Historic Monuments Conservator - Sopot Public services Local - Regional third party Positional cooperative SH13 Gdansk_Enterprise_Heat_Power Company Public services Regional third party Positional neutral Figure 5.3a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 5.3b – Stakeholders by impact Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected SH2.New residents of HE - moved in during the last years 1 3 Affected & Affecting SH13.Gdansk_Enterprise_Heat_Power Company 2 -2 SH9.Local Media in Sopot and the Tri-City 1 1 Affecting SH5.Voivodeship_Fund_of_Environmental_Protection 5 1 SH7.General_Meeting_of_Social Housing Cooperative ‘Przylesie’, 5 1 SH3.Old HE residents - obtained flats in 1970s 4 -2 SH1.Groups_of_Residents_(active on social media) 3 -2 SH6.Supervisory_Council_of_Housing Cooperative ‘Przylesie’, 3 1 Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact SH12.Historic Monuments Conservator - Sopot 2 1 SH10.City_Council_Sopot 2 1 SH8.Professional press (Co-operatives and Housing) 2 1 SH11.Auditing Company 2 1 SH4.Locators_Defence_Council 2 -1 5.3.3. References Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Powierzchnia i ludność w przekroju terytorialnym w 2024 roku. https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/ludnosc/powierzchnia-i-ludnosc-w-przekroju-terytorialny m-w-2024-roku,7,21.html (accessed: 7.10.2024). Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Rocznik statystyczny 2023. https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-statystyczny-rz eczypospolitej-polskiej-2023,2,23.html (accessed: 7.10.2024). Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Rocznik Statystyczny Leśnictwa 2023. https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-demograficzny -2023,3,17.html (accessed: 7.10.2024). Miasta w Polsce z najwyższymi cenami mieszkań(polskawliczbach.pl). https://www.polskawliczbach.pl/miasta_z_najwyzszymi_cenami_mieszkan (accessed: 7.10.2024). Ocena jakości powietrza - Bieżące dane pomiarowe - GIOŚ(gios.gov.pl) https://powietrze.gios.gov.pl/pjp/current (accessed: 7.10.2024). Raport SVS, 2019. https://gdansk.stat.gov.pl/vademecum/vademecum_pomorskie/portrety_miast/sopot.pdf (accessed: 7.10.2024). Sopot: atrakcje, wypoczynek, nocleg – przewodnik po kurorcie (wsopocie.eu) https://wsopocie.eu/#:~:text=Ponad%2060%25%20powierzchni%20Sopotu%20stanowi%C4%85%20tere ny%20zielone%20%E2%80%93,jako%C5%9B%C4%87%20powietrza%2C%20wyr%C3%B3%C5%BCniaj%C4 %85ca%20Sopot%20na%20tle%20innych%20miast. (accessed: 7.10.2024). Sopot (pomorskie) w liczbach. Przystępne dane statystyczne (polskawliczbach.pl) https://www.polskawliczbach.pl/Sopot (accessed: 7.10.2024). Trójmiasto. https://www.trojmiasto.pl/praca/Dwie-firmy-z-Trojmiasta-wsrod-Najlepszych-Pracodawcow-n95564.html (accessed: 7.10. 2024). Urząd Statystyczny w Gdańsku. Dane o województwie pomorskim. https://gdansk.stat.gov.pl/zakladka1/ (accessed: 7.10.2024). Związek Miast Polskich. (www.miasta.pl). https://www.miasta.pl/aktualnosci/miasta-w-ktorych-zyje-sie-najlepiej (accessed: 7.10.2024). 5.4. Urban gardening communities in the city of Tartu (EE) Urban gardening initiatives in Tartu are community-based examples of producing urban food - the activities being enabled by the land use regulations in the city. Although the city encompasses 10 such gardens altogether (as of 202496), this analysis focuses on the historic evolution of two examples of urban gardens aiming to produce, provide, and share local organic food (i.e. grown without synthetic herbicides and pesticides, with special attention to looking after soil): Tartu Organic Community Garden (called officially as Linnupargi Garden, but herewith we call it as Organic Garden, started in 2011) and Permaculture Community Garden (Emajõe Garden, started in 2016). The gardens are legally organized as NGOs with small annual membership fees, while a partnership with the local government has enabled them to have favorable conditions in accessing land for rent. Organic Garden is located in a gated area while Emajõe Garden is, by the contract of land lease, a public area. Communities were induced by enthusiastic individuals whose motivation was mainly driven by the idea to provide city residents the opportunity to grow food in order to support a healthy lifestyle as well as to contribute to community building among gardeners. Both initiatives are currently active. Emajõe Garden has around 30 members, whilst the Organic Garden has about 500 gardeners as of 2024. While the Organic Garden has mostly engaged local long-term residents, both Estonian and Russian-speaking as well as other language-groups, and has centered around food production for households’ own use with individual garden beds for gardeners to rent, the Emajõe Garden initiative has brought together more foreigners and is centered around community-building. An important aspect for both has also been the spread of information about ecological food production among members, and Emajõe Garden especially stresses the purpose of the garden on enriching the diversity of urban nature and introducing permaculture. The communities have brought together resident groups with different backgrounds in both cases, ethnically, socio-economically, age-wise but Organic Garden with its much larger group of gardeners bound primarily by access to the plots in the same, currently gated territory, has a markedly higher average age and is not functioning as much as a community as Emajõe Garden. Nevertheless, both operate as lifestyle laboratories: in addition to producing food and gardening activities, different educational and training activities are organized to support and advance ecological lifestyle as well as mindset and to support community building as well as social integration. Organic Garden is organizing annual meetings for all gardeners in the city of Tartu for sharing information and experiences. These historical examples will allow CO-SUSTAIN to study the success-factors and failures in community engagement in urban sustainable food production in association with related community development, but also the educational and awareness-raising activities around growing food in the city among the city dwellers and the authorities. 5.4.1. Context Analysis 5.4.1.1. Geographical and Territorial Characteristics Tartu is the second largest city in Estonia spanning over 154 km2. As a result of the territorial administrative reform of local governments in 2017, the territory of Tartu increased significantly, including now the agricultural lands beyond the border of the compact city (comprising 47.4 km2 agricultural land in 2024 in comparison to 0.4km2in 2017). Organic Garden has 8.3 ha land currently while Emajõe Garden is located in relatively small territory comprising 6500 m2. The spatial development 96 See: https://tartu.ee/et/tartu-linna-ja-kogukonnaaiad of the City of Tartu follows the master plan97 of the city (for 2040) indicating the strategic goals of spatial development on one hand and detailed zoning regulations on the other (indicating the different land use functions, e.g. for agricultural, green, recreational and other uses with urban gardens included as a separate planning category). While the historical city quarters and low-scale suburbs have traditionally provided opportunities to establish gardens and grow food for residents, the socialist-era mass housing construction in the form of multi-apartment buildings halted this tradition. However, through the Soviet era people often had access to plots of land in the so-called ‘dacha-settlements’, including the use of unconventional spaces, such as under power lines and in other urban wastelands. In essence, allotment gardens enabled people to produce their own food amidst the relative scarcity of variety in Soviet shops. Allowing this was partly in response to these scarcities; furthermore, the land was not owned by the people tilling it, hence not a challenge to the general socialist principles. These plots were usually organized as cooperatives and located in the suburbs or other areas near the towns and cities. They were especially popular and frequently used by people living in apartments. In the case of Emajõe Garden, the initiative started with establishing a guerrilla garden and jungle bar established on unused land near a railway station in central Tartu. The initiative has had to relocate three times during its lifetime due to land use changes. Since its beginnings, the Organic Garden initiative has had to move once, but after that, it has grown substantially, in terms of land use and the number of gardeners. Initially, the garden was organized as an allotment garden, gradually expanding its communal spaces. The reallocation has been due to the land issues - expansion of infrastructure and residential building areas. Instead, now, the gardeners have obtained so called wasteland near river Emajõgi which had been considered as unsuitable for a residential building site and other uses by the city government (interview with the main initiator of Organic Garden). 5.4.1.2. Population and residential dynamics According to the Population Register, Tartu had 98.300 inhabitants in 2024 (population density 631 ppl/km2). The population has been quite stable over the recent years. Overall, the population of Tartu is aging somewhat - in 2018, the most populous age groups were 30-34 and 25-29 year-olds, whereas in 2024, it was the 35-39 and 40-44 year-olds. Tartu is a university town with many students and the average educational level of the residents is higher than the country’s average. In Tartu, the share of population with tertiary education was 40% in 2018 and 44% in 2024 (cf 38% in Estonia as an average in 2024). Ethnically, in 2024, Tartu comprises 78% Estonians, 11% of Russians, and the rest combining Ukrainians (5%), Finns (1%), and other nationalities, a high proportion of those, the foreign students. The proportion of Estonians in the population of Tartu is higher compared to the Tallinn urban region and the North-East region of Estonia. Immigration - mostly steady in the country, with a slight increase in 2020 but a steep growth in 2022 due to the influx of Ukrainian war refugees. Emajõe Garden is somewhat overrepresented by international background students and younger and middle age groups while Organic Garden is representing the full profile of the residents of Tartu - 97 Tartu General Plan 2040. https://tartu.ee/et/uldplaneering2040#Tartu-linna-%C3%BCldplaneering (accessed: 10.10.2024). Estonians as well as long-term Russian-speaking groups and newly arrived migrants, younger age groups as well as older, and people with different socio-economic status - this is a true mix of different population groups living in Tartu (based on the interviews with the leaders of the gardening communities). In 2021, 84% of residents in Tartu lived in apartment buildings - therefore, community gardens have an important role to enable people who live in apartment buildings to grow their own food. 5.4.1.3. Socio-cultural issues Estonia has a traditionally strong agricultural background (it became an urbanized country only in the Soviet period after WWII), where farms and rural people have been independent food producers - but agricultural communities have historically been relatively highly educated, in comparison with many other regions of Eastern Europe, and very much part of the processes of nation-building and modernisation98. The long-term home grown food tradition is reflected in the rise of urban gardening embedded in the local culture, which is partly driven by people’s desire to cultivate their own food and reduce dependence on supermarkets99 100. Estonia is quietly moving towards a post-materialist value space typical of welfare societies, where people care about health, feel responsible for their actions, are politically active, tolerant of differences and aware of nature conservation issues101.Starting from the 1990s, the Estonian people have become happier, more trusting and more tolerant; they have attributed increasingly less value on work and more value on free time; achievement and success have become less important to them - these trends are consistent with Inglehart’s theory of post-materialistic value shift102.Based on the study, the most important values among Estonian people are nature, care, safety and solidarity, and in relation to work values, material benefits103. Despite Estonians having a culturally and historically established relationship with growing their own food and agriculture in general, the urban gardening phenomenon, as we understand it today, has gathered new momentum since the first community gardens were planned and established in Tartu in 2010 when Organic Garden was planned. Emajõe Garden has further been inspired by the West-European traditions of urban organic gardening through the individual experiences of the initiators of the garden (interview with the initiators of Emajõe Garden). Growing food for oneself has been valued in Estonia at different times for different reasons: during the Soviet era, food was grown because of food shortages, and as a result, dacha culture flourished; during the transition in the 1990s, low incomes led to the need to grow food; since the 2000s there is an 103 Ibidem. 102 Ibidem. 101 Ainsaar, M. and Strenze, T., 2019. Values as human capital and a source of societal development. Arenguseire Keskus. 100 Pungas, L., 2020. Caring dachas: Food self-provisioning in Eastern Europe through the lens of care. [In:] Food for degrowth (pp. 59-74). Routledge. 99 Pungas, L., 2019. Food self-provisioning as an answer to the metabolic rift: The case of ‘Dacha Resilience’in Estonia. Journal of Rural Studies, 68, 75-86. 98 Lillak, R., 2003. Eewsti põllumajanduse ajalugu.Tartu: Eesti Põllumajandusülikool. increasing concern regarding the safety and contamination of commercially produced food. Urban gardens' comeback since the 2010s had to happen with a certain distance from its Soviet time context, as such gardens tended to still be seen in a negative light. As a result, the new garden movement appears to have emerged from Western Europe and spread to Estonia. As it is highly likely many who are involved have memories or experiences from the earlier allotment gardening periods, the main actual difference between the gardens of then and now appears to be the foregrounding of environmentally conscious choices104. Furthermore, depending on the leading figures, functions of the gardens extend from simple production of food to the engagement of communities and community building. To some degree, the gardens have been used by foreigners to get involved in their new home country, and this has extended to integrating other foreign newcomers (students and professionals) to the host society. This has been particularly clearly the case in Emajõe Garden, but different ethnic groups have also found themselves working side by side in Organic Garden, even if sometimes, cultural and generational clashes have taken place. 5.4.1.4. Power Regime and Governance Changes in regime level 1990s and 2000s marked the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance practices in Estonia. In this new political context, land reform aimed to restore land ownership of pre-WW2 landowners. Nowadays, land in urban areas is mostly privately owned, while municipally owned land is a scarce resource and difficult decisions have to be made about how to use it - for example, whether it should be used for public recreation areas, green spaces, urban gardens, etc. In reality, private capital interests have been mainly driving the process of land development in cities, while the local government is responsible for providing the public infrastructure. The city of Tartu has been ruled by the Reform Party, which belongs to the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party Group. Tartu’s power regime has remained the same since 1998 and 26 years of government have brought stability, as the strategic development directions have been implemented in both urban and general planning. Within that practical context, in strategic development documents of Tartu - in the Development Strategy “Tartu 2035”105 and Tartu General Plan 2040106 environmental concerns and community engagement are central topics, envisioning the city to be climate-neutral by 2050, and including statements about empowering settlements and communities - while maintaining a strong place identity in the city107. The same document also highlights that Tartu is a multicultural city, where the integration of new immigrants into the community must be supported. In the new Tartu General Plan 2040, the locations of the urban gardens are determined. However, some of the gardens (including Organic Garden) are currently located in areas which are not specified under this category but fall into a broader category of municipal land where the garden has been assigned the status of intermediate use. 107 Development Strategy “Tartu 2035. op. cit. 106 Tartu General Plan 2040. op. cit. 105 Development Strategy “Tartu 2035. https://arengukava.tartu.ee/ (accessed: 10.10.2024). 104 Pungas, L., Plüschke-Altof, B., Müüripeal, A. and Sooväli-Sepping, H., 2022. Same, same but different? The ‘right’kind of gardening and the negotiation of neoliberal urban governance in the post-socialist city. [In:] Whose Green City? Contested Urban Green Spaces and Environmental Justice in Northern Europe (pp. 125-144). Cham: Springer International Publishing. In 2017-2018, there were extensive debates and conflicts between the regime and the niche over the inclusion of urban gardens as a separate planning category in the zoning regulations of the city of Tartu, and the partial destruction of dacha gardens (also referred to as the "Chinatown War"). As a result of the discussions, the city granted the use of a new site to Organic Garden and regulated its status and operation. The new land use contract between the city and Emajõe Garden stipulated that the garden area could not be enclosed by a fence. The two initiatives worked together to influence the city administration through a citizens' initiative. Organic Garden has achieved long-term agreements with the City of Tartu, with up to 5-years long rental contracts. The conditions for land use (e.g taxation) have remained sources of conflict areas between the communities and the city. Furthermore, from the point of view of at least some of the gardeners, nothing seems secure with the garden - “one can never know when the next parking lot development plan would override the gardeners’ desire to continue tilling their plots” (interview with the leader of one of the gardens). For both Emajõe Garden and Organic Garden, their initiators have, however, been quite successful in advancing their cooperation with the municipality (i.e. negotiations about the land, receiving operating support grants, overall supportive attitude by the local government). Cooperation between the regime and the niche has been affected by other events. Firstly, in April 2018, an international conference was held in Tartu in cooperation with the Estonian Association of Landscape Architects and the Transitional Cities Movement 'Living Tartu', focusing on food-urbanism, in which representatives of both gardens and the municipality were involved. Secondly, in 2018, Tartu Municipality took part in the international CRISCO project (Crossroad of the Region – fostering involvement of all citizens in local life to Improve Social Cohesion) and included the Emajõe Garden initiative in the project, with the aim of demonstrating how citizens' initiatives and the municipality work together. On the broader regime level, “the Estonian Agriculture and Fisheries Development Plan 2030” currently functions as the agricultural bioeconomy strategy in Estonia. Notably, none of the strategic documents mention practices, such as Food Self-Provisioning (or home-gardening, self-produced or self-grown food, or else). This, along with the absence of strategic vision on urban gardening on national level, has left any kind of implementation of urban gardening initiatives to the local municipality level. 5.4.1.5. Public Participation and Community Activism Regime level changes towards more inclusive governance in the context of urban gardens are signaled by 2 trends in Tartu. Tartu City Government encourages citizens to actively participate in the strategic planning and master planning process, and the annual participatory budgeting practice allows citizens to propose and vote on smaller initiatives (two of which are selected each year from the local budget for implementation). According to research, nearly 80% of residents in Tartu consider community activities important, but in 2023, only 30% of residents participated in those (Development Strategy “Tartu 2035”). Public participation is analyzed in the document "Civic Space Report 2024. Estonia", which emphasizes that the Rulebook of Good Legislative Practice and the Regulation of Legislative Practice require that stakeholders affected by legislative changes must be involved in the legislative process. Usually, this means that draft laws are sent to interest groups for feedback, and in rare cases the content of the draft SH12 Garden leadership NGOs Local-Regional promoter Knowledge, relational, normative, positional (one steady (continuity), one rotating, management skills, ecological knowledge, networks) cooperative SH13 Repair basement activists NGOs Local-Regional promoter Normative, positional (spatial/organizational symbiosis, shared values) cooperative SH14 Founders of CAI NGOs Local-Regional promoter Normative, Relational, Knowledge, Positional (Experience with community gardening abroad, strategic thinking, adaptability to changes, sustainable gardening skills esp. food forests and permaculture, not anymore actively involved) cooperative SH15 Boatbuilding Workshop next-door Professionals Local third party Relational, Normative (Common values, neighborly help, visibility) cooperative SH16 Estonian Landscape Architectural Ass. Professionals Regional-national third party Relational, economic (Platform for local projects & funding, visibility) cooperative SH17 Tartu Nature House Professionals Local-Regional third party Normative, Relational, Economic (Visibility, small funding, linking gardens with education institutions) 0 SH18 Planners CoT Public services Local third party Positional, Economic (Decision power on land uses (incl. rental contracts, enlargement of garden areas, land taxes, financial support), different phases of conflict and support) neutral SH19 Cooperation for Integration CoT Public services Local->National third party Normative; Economic (Collaboration, garden as integration point for international students, but also for Ukrainian refugees) cooperative SH20 R&D projects Research Regional-(inter)natio nal third party Relational; Knowledge (Helping to develop, self-reflect, link with different stakeholders) cooperative Figure 5.4a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 5.4b – Stakeholders by impact Tartu Eco Garden Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected & Affecting SH12.Garden leadership 4 5 SH3.Emajõe gardeners 4 5 SH13.Repair basement activists 4 4 SH5.Tartu urban garden community 3 4 SH14.Founders of CAI 3 3 SH6.Other sustainability networks 2 3 SH7.Edible city movement EE 2 3 SH4.Neighbors 2 3 SH19.Cooperation for Integration CoT 1 2 SH15.Boatbuilding Workshop next-door 1 2 SH8.Educational institutions CoT 1 2 SH9.Growing Food as Survival Art project 1 2 SH2.Place-renters for events 1 2 SH16.Estonian Landscape Architectural Association 1 2 SH17.Tartu Nature House 1 2 SH20.R&D projects 1 1 SH10.PR (CoT, South Estonia, EE) 1 1 SH11.Media (Tartu PM, Loodus, Sirp) 1 1 Mostly Affecting SH18.Planners CoT 4 2 SH1.Developers / Land owners 3 1 Tartu Emajõe Garden Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Mostly Affected SH2.Eco gardeners 2 5 SH18.Curated Biodiversity network 1 3 Affected & Affecting SH14.Founder 5 5 SH15.Participation-oriented co-leadership 4 5 SH16.Wider garden management 3 5 SH19.Planners CoT 3 3 SH6.Edible city movement EE 2 4 SH4.Tartu urban garden community 2 3 SH8.Politcians CoT 2 2 SH21.Early-stage supporter (Eco Center) 2 2 SH22.Co-founder (UT) 2 2 SH3.Neighbors 2 2 SH17.Disappointed former garden activists 1 2 SH20.EMÜ Eco Centre 1 2 SH9.Educational institutions CoT 1 2 SH23.R&D projects 1 2 SH10."Growing Food as survival art" project 1 2 SH5.Other sustainability networks 1 2 SH7.Garden produce buyers 1 2 SH12.Estonian Rural Network 1 2 SH11.PR (CoT, South Estonia, EE) 1 1 SH13.Media (Tartu PM, Loodus, Sirp) 1 1 Mostly Affecting SH1.Developers / Land owners 2 1 The stakeholder analysis differentiates between key players, context setters and crowd of the two gardening initiatives in Tartu (additional information can be found in the Excel table, Matrix and explanatory document). We have taken a rather broad understanding of “power” and “impact”, starting from the question of what the individual stakeholders contribute to the existence and persistence of the garden. While e.g. the gardeners or the produce buyers and place renters could alternatively also be considered as “subjects”, we considered them as essential to the gardens, as by their membership, purchasing, and renting decisions they contribute to the (non)duration of the garden. The key players are located in (1) the garden itself (founders, gardening leadership and management, close partners i.e. the repair basement) (2) the city government of Tartu (incl the planning, environmental and city economy departments with partly supportive, partly conflictual relationships, politicians) (3) the urban gardening network in Tartu and Estonia (the Eco and Emajõe gardeners, other community gardens in Tartu, the wider Edible City movement), and among those who also have a stake in land use – meaning (4) the neighbors of the garden and potential developers in the neighboring land plots. For Tartu Eco Garden, also (5) early-stage external supporters are crucial. Among the context setters are (1) initiatives and organizations who further a common cause with the garden (e.g. sustainability-oriented networks, the “Foods as Art of Survival” project, Tartu’s Nature House, the Eco Centre of the Estonian University for Life Sciences, and the “Curated Biodiversity” network) (2) a loose collaboration network (incl. R&D projects with Universities, collaborations with educational institutions and on the field of integration with the city of Tartu, and strategic partnerships with the Estonian Association of Landscape Architecture and the Estonian Rural Network), as well as (3) specific immediate context setters for each garden (garden produce buyers and (critical) former garden members in Eco Garden, and the neighboring boat-building workshop and place-renters for events in Emajõe Garden) The crowd is mainly connected to the (1) media landscape portraying affairs in the gardens. Another important topic is PR (of the city of Tartu, Estonia and tourist platforms), which helps (2) place marketing and the promotion of sustainability objectives and/or the portrayal of a sustainable image, which is especially embraced by the city of Tartu who is discursively very invested in green city developments. For the Estonian case, it is important to mention that the number of people involved in gardening initiatives in particular and sustainability initiatives in general is rather small (as Estonia as a country is rather small, population size ca 1.3 Million). Hence, despite being organized in different initiatives / organizations, there is often an overlap of central people. Deriving from that, some people can potentially create a bigger impact, when supporting the CAI in all their different roles / platforms that they can provide. Moreover, there are often loose networks among these people which are not necessarily formalized. The stakeholder analyses were written mainly with the current situation of stakeholders in mind. The attitude towards the CAI might have changed over time, especially for the City of Tartu, yet this change has not been linear but rather in different phases of support and conflict. While the stakeholder analyses include the current names of organizations, the collaborations usually go beyond the lifetime of these organizations, as often the same people have been over time involved in different organizations, hence the circle of people usually stayed but the organizational landscape has often changed over time. 5.4.3. References Ainsaar, M. and Strenze, T., 2019. Values as human capital and a source of societal development. Arenguseire Keskus. Development Strategy “Tartu 2035. https://arengukava.tartu.ee/ (accessed: 10.10.2024). EIB, 2023. The EIB Climate Survey: Government action, personal choices and the green transition. European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/en/publications/20230098-eib-climate-survey-europe (accessed: 10.10.2024). European Green Deal: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en (accessed: 10.10.2024). Lillak, R., 2003. Eewsti põllumajanduse ajalugu.Tartu: Eesti Põllumajandusülikool. Pungas, L., 2019. Food self-provisioning as an answer to the metabolic rift: The case of ‘Dacha Resilience’in Estonia. Journal of Rural Studies, 68, 75-86. Pungas, L., 2020. Caring dachas: Food self-provisioning in Eastern Europe through the lens of care. [In:] Food for degrowth (pp. 59-74). Routledge. Pungas, L., Plüschke-Altof, B., Müüripeal, A. and Sooväli-Sepping, H., 2022. Same, same but different? The ‘right’ kind of gardening and the negotiation of neoliberal urban governance in the post-socialist city. [In:] Whose Green City? Contested Urban Green Spaces and Environmental Justice in Northern Europe (pp. 125-144). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Tartu Energy 2030. Tartu City Energy and Climate Action Plan, Tartu 2021. https://tartu.ee/sites/default/files/uploads/Linnavarad/SECAP/TartuEnergy2030.pdf (accessed: 10.10.2024). Tartu General Plan 2040. https://tartu.ee/et/uldplaneering2040#Tartu-linna-%C3%BCldplaneering (accessed 10.10.2024). Tartu ROHEring. https://rohering.tartu.ee/ (accessed: 10.10.2024). Turu--uuringute AS, 2022. Eesti elanike keskkonnateadlikkuse uuring, 2022. https://kliimaministeerium.ee/sites/default/files/documents/2022-11/2022%20Keskkonnateadlikkuse%2 0uuring.pdf (accessed: 10.10.2024). Internet sources: https://tartu.ee/et/tartu-linna-ja-kogukonnaaiad (accessed 10.10.2024). 5.5. Solidarity Renewable Energy Community (REC) Naples Est (IT) The Solidarity REC Naples EST was founded in 2021 in San Giovanni a Teduccio, a neighborhood of the metropolitan area of Naples characterized by a high level of social and economic vulnerability. The establishment of REC was the result of the joint effort of Legambiente, the biggest environmental movement in Italy, a private enterprise 3E and two foundations: an ethical financial one that funded the projects (South Foundation) and an ecclesiastical one that catalyzed the participation of citizens (Famiglia di Maria). The engagement in the REC building process of local households lasted from 2018 to 2020. Over the last years, there has been a diversification of activities and the number of people benefitting from REC has increased. In 2023, REC counted 40 households experiencing conditions of high deprivation and energy poverty. Over 100 people are benefitting from REC both directly in terms of reduction of the energy bill and indirectly by a huge increase in their energy literacy which enables a shift in energy use and consumption. The initiative aims to increase social inclusion in a socio-economically vulnerable area. It supports low-income households in both directly addressing their energy needs, as well as receiving additional income through government incentives for the self-consumed energy and the sale of energy to the grid. This example will enable CO-SUSTAIN to understand how to include and empower socioeconomically vulnerable and geographically marginalized groups in the energy transition. 5.5.1. Context Analysis 5.5.1.1. Characteristics of the Territory Naples is located in the southern part of the peninsula. It is the capital of the Campania and the most populous municipality in the region (909,941 residents), the third in Italy after Milan and Rome, and one of Europe's most densely populated cities. The municipality is classified as a coastal hill with an average elevation of 17 meters above sea level. The geology of the entire area is related to the movements of tectonic plates between the Mesozoic and Miocene eras, which shaped the southern Apennine chain115. As regards the regional morphological characteristics, the territory covers an area of 13,670.95 km² and is divided into 550 municipalities. Its geographical conformation offers significant landscape variety and high biodiversity. The region includes large structural depressions like the Campanian Plain and the Sele Plain, currently alluvial plains. The countryside is also characterized by important volcanic centers, such as Mount Vesuvius and the Phlegraean Fields in the Naples area. The region is particularly susceptible to hydrogeological instability, related to various types of landslides and flood risks. Specifically, the municipality of Naples is listed among the Italian seismic localities with a seismicity grade of 2, classified as a medium seismic zone116. Going more in depth into the regional energy assets, energy production and consumption represent environmental determinants, as they are an anthropogenic factor that exerts pressure on air quality and the climate. The energy production of the Campania region aligns with the goals of national energy planning, which aimed to achieve specific targets related to renewable energy consumption. In 2021, 116 Dipartimento della Protezione civile, classificazione sismica aggiornata, settembre 2024. https://rischi.protezionecivile.gov.it/it/sismico/attivita/classificazione-sismica/ 115 Città metropolitana di Napoli (2021) Napoli. regional energy consumption amounted to 16,486.4 GWh, and the production deficit in Campania was -37.7% (-6,941.8 GWh) compared to an energy demand of 18,396.8 GWh. As of 2020, according to the monitoring defined by DM 15/03/12, the gross final energy consumption in the Campania Region (amounting to 5,916 Ktoe) was covered by 19.8% from renewable energy sources. Renewable energy in Campania includes photovoltaic, wind, hydroelectric, and bioenergy, with a total of 49,719 plants and total energy production of 6,007 GWh, where the largest contribution comes from photovoltaic sources, with 1,090 GWh (with 48,922 plants)117. Specifically, as of December 31, 2021, the gross efficient power (MW) of electricity production plants in the province of Naples was 392.6118. In terms of energy system efficiency, the Region has recently introduced incentives for the creation of energy communities. The Solidarity REC Naples EST119 was born in 2021 in the eastern part of Naples city. The Naples East area includes the neighborhoods of Ponticelli, Barra, Poggioreale, and San Giovanni a Teduccio. With more than 200,000 inhabitants, it was the largest industrial zone in the city. Naples East has deep commercial and economic roots in history, but it was during the 19th century that the area transformed into a giant industrial manufacturing hub, benefiting from its strategic city-to-sea location. After an initial boom, the first signs of crisis were recorded during the unification of Italy and continued into the 20th century. Under the fascist regime, chaotic and disordered urbanization led to the annexation of Ponticelli, Barra, and San Giovanni a Teduccio120. In the post-World War II period, the area increasingly took on the characteristics of a peripheral territory outside the city center, a feature that still distinguishes the neighborhood today. Currently, Naples East reflects a process of evident decay, seen in the decommissioning of many industrial plants and the presence of vacant urban spaces. The balance between population, mobility, and employment activities has slowly deteriorated, leading to marginal and degraded settlements inhabited mainly by the most vulnerable social class. In 1980, large industries declined due to extensive housing developments (popular districts), high unemployment, low education rates, and the pervasive control of the territory by the Camorra. This coincides with the Irpinia earthquake (1980) and the ensuing emergency, considered one of the most devastating seismic events in recent Italian history (magnitude 6.9 on the Richter scale). The disaster laid the groundwork for the rampant urban development of public housing in the eastern outskirts of Naples through the Extraordinary Residential Building Program (P.S.E.R.), which built upon the "Plan for the Peripheries" approved just a few months before the earthquake121. Throughout the 1980s a deregulation approach undermined the credibility of urban planning making industrialization decline and use of prefabrication coincident with poor construction quality. The most controversial example is represented by Taverna del 121 Attademo, A., Bassolino, C., Orfeo, L. and Veronese, 2021. La costruzione della periferia: Napoli 1945-1986. CLEAN edizioni. 120 IPSAR, 2023-2024. Ippolito Cavalcanti, Napoli San Giovanni a Teduccio e il Bronx: un’indagine conoscitiva sullo stato di attuazione degli interventi di riqualificazione territoriale. 119 Celentano R, Gadagno L, Palescandolo M, Scognamiglio S, Sposito S., 2010. Piccole imprese e tessuto socio-economico di Napoli Est. Palmentieri S. (2016) Innovazione e ridisegno degli spazi urbani: dai “vuoti” ai poli di sviluppo. L’Area Est di Napoli (a cura di) De Falco S. Innovazione, competitività e sviluppo nei territori dell’Unione Europea. Collana Europa Parole. 118 Gestore dei Servizi Energetici S.p.A (GSE); Arpa Campania RSA data. 117 Data from Regione Campania, 2022. Caratteristiche socio eocnomico terriotriali in Proposta di Aggiornamento del Piano Regionale per la Gestione dei Rifiuti Speciali della Regione Campania. Ferro, where the Tunnel structure, with the embedding of networks and technological systems in the concrete pour, (referencing the "Vele" of Scampia-Naples) is one of the symbols of the decay in the peripheral area of San Giovanni a Teduccio, which has recently gained media attention for becoming the backdrop of the large mural dedicated to Maradona by the Neapolitan artist Jorit122. In the 2000s, the area remained compromised by the presence of popular buildings, asbestos, and polluting industrial plants, such as refineries, which continue to threaten the health conditions of the local population. In the last few years, new funding has initiated significant urban regeneration work that is still ongoing. From the point of view of MLP about the CAI development, the niche corresponds to the Solidarity REC which was born thanks to the collaboration of four major players in the region: Legambiente, Fondazione Famiglie di Maria, Fondazione con il Sud, Impresa 3E. The creation of the CAI followed the regime regulatory developments (European and Italian), which led to the formalization of Renewable Energy Communities in the country123 124. At the local level, the regime also includes the technical offices of Naples Municipality, particularly regarding the bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining technical environmental permits for the installation of photovoltaic panels on the roof of Fondazione Famiglie di Maria. The request was passed to the Campania regional offices, which took responsibility for initiating the procedure. From this moment on, CAI’s developments followed the integration of European directives within national norms, the most recent are: the CER Decree (January 2024) and the Final transposition and implementation of Legislative Decree 199/2021 (April 2024), which introduces plants with a maximum capacity of 1 MW connected to the same primary transformation substation. In 2024, the Solidarity REC is active and aims at regenerating the social tissue of the district, through social work, environmental education, and training concerning energy produced and consumed by the local families involved in the project. These objectives are consistent with landscape developments, such as the global growth of ecological awareness, the energy transition process alongside climate change, and the drastic rise in temperatures (increased CO₂ levels due to the exploitation of fossil fuels). The Russian invasion of Ukraine as well as economic incentives for photovoltaics and the development of the green market have been key elements in supporting the adoption of new energy practices. The industrial decline and the infiltration of organized crime in Eastern Naples have further complicated the social landscape of the area, making urban and social regeneration more urgent. 5.5.1.2. Population and Migration Campania is the third most populous region in Italy and the second in population density. Population density varies locally, reaching a peak in the city of Naples (7,909 per km²). The metropolitan city of Naples (classified as such in 2015) hosts 53% of the region's population. The population structure in Campania is aging, with a significant increase in the over-65 population. In about 20 years, the average 124 Leone, MF., Amirante, R. and Sferratore, A., 2023. Comunità energetiche rinnovabili come architetture pubbliche e infrastrutture socio-ecologiche. Techne, 26, 173-183.. 123 De Vidovich, L, Tricarico, L and Zulianello, M., 2023. Modelli organizzativi per le comunità energetiche. Riflessioni dalla ricerca ‘Community Energy Map’, Impresa Sociale, 1, 122-137. 122 Ibidem. age of the population has risen by over 5 points, from 37.7 to 43.3 years, with a steady decline in birth rates. The population dynamics in Naples mirror the same regressive trend. In 2019, according to ISTAT data, the population consisted of 47.9% men, 52.1% women, 17% minors, and 5.5% people aged 80 and over. The age group between 55-59 years is the most populous, exceeding 70,000 people. In 2022, the province of Naples recorded the lowest natural balance (-6,284) and internal migration balance (-15,434), contrasted by a high foreign migration balance (+6,172)125. This demographic decline seems to have begun in the 1980s, with a gradual process of population aging, a ratio of over-65s (152.6) to under-15s (100). In the same years, migratory flows from non-EU countries, mainly from the Philippines, Cape Verde, Sri Lanka, sub-Saharan Africa, and South America, intensified. In the 2000s, there was an influx of Chinese and Ukrainian communities, especially linked to the war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine126. In 2019, there were 57,298 foreign residents in Naples municipality, with 51.2% being women and 48.8% men. In 2021, the metropolitan city of Naples had about 53,440 foreign residents, 91% of whom came from non-European countries127. The municipality hosts almost half of the non-EU population residing in the metropolitan city but with an incidence of only 5.6% of the resident population. Given the presence of an informal housing market with low housing standards, the presence of these communities is concentrated in the historic center's neighborhoods by about 60%. Since 1200, Naples has been home to the historic University of Federico II, established by the edict of the King of Sicily. This contributed to urban demographic growth and its prestige as a capital city. The Neapolitan university tradition places the city at the forefront of student resistance, particularly during the fascist era and the Gentile reform of schools (1923). In subsequent years, the university expanded, including new degree programs, structural parts, and student numbers, transforming into a mega-university. Naples historically is also home to the Orientale University, dating back to the 1700s and now specializing in linguistic-literary and historical-artistic teachings related to the East and Africa, without neglecting the cultures of Mediterranean countries, Europe, and the Americas. The incidence of adults with a diploma/degree increased from 1991 (32.3% - 49.4%) to 2011 by about 17 percentage points. In 2019, people with tertiary education (including PhDs) accounted for 14.6% of the population, of which men constituted 45.5% and women 54.5%. The phenomenon of commuting for study involves about 169,549 people, with 97.1% within the municipality of Naples. 5.5.1.3. Economy and Employment According to data as of December 31, 2020, the entrepreneurial system of the Campania region reflects a diversification typical of the national production system, but with significant specificities. The 127 Ibidem. 126 Città metropolitana di Napoli, 2021. Città metropolitana di Napoli, (2016-2018) Contesto esterno, Analisi del contesto demografico e socio-economico della Città Metropolitana di Napoli. ISTAT censimenti permanenti, popolazione e abitazioni, capoluoghi delle città metropolitane. Napoli. 125 Osservatorio della città di Napoli, 2021. Comune di Napoli. In 2021, the East Naples Energy (and Solidarity) Community (REC-S) was established through a partnership between key local stakeholders: Legambiente, Fondazione Famiglie di Maria, Fondazione con il Sud, and the company 3E. The local community, not particularly sensitive to energy-environmental issues, directly benefits from the social action and day-to-day support provided by the Famiglie di Maria Foundation, active since the 1800s. The project has two primary objectives: (a) a technical-operational goal, aimed at promoting renewable energy production and consumption for a sustainable transition, and (b) a socio-cultural goal, focusing on environmental education and active citizenship. Landscape The landscape is hypothetically tied to the rise of ecological awareness, which grew significantly in the second half of the 20th century, although early expressions of it appeared in the first half with the initial European experiments in renewable energy communities. By the late 20th century, industrial decline, especially in Eastern Naples, compounded with the absence of a concrete industrial conversion plan, led to the infiltration of organized crime. Events such as the 1980 Irpinia earthquake and the ensuing wild urbanization further worsened the ecological, economic, and social conditions of the region's residents. Notably, following the Irpinia earthquake (1980), which displaced large masses of the population to the peripheral areas of the city, the construction of temporary housing blocks became permanent facilities and affected the entire eastern area of Naples. In the 2000s the port and easter cost areas became of increasing national strategic interest that hosts major oil players like Q8 and Darsena Petroli. The industrial decline, the infiltration of organized crime, and the damage to the environment produced by big oil companies have further complicated the social landscape of the area, making urban, social and environment regeneration more urgent. Alongside these developments, there was growing recognition that climate change and rising global temperatures are primarily anthropogenic, spurring efforts to regulate alternative energy production methods aimed at economic and environmental sustainability. Additional driving forces include the growth of a green market and incentives introduced in the 2000s that encouraged the adoption of photovoltaics in Italy. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have also influenced the green transition and the development of RECs, promoting shared ownership models that enable end-consumers to participate in energy production collectively. Regime The regime is hypothetically identified with regulatory developments at global, European, and Italian levels that facilitated the formalization of REC. Locally, the regime includes entities such as the Municipality of Naples and the Campania region. The East Naples REC-S faced significant challenges with the local municipality’s technical offices, which delayed the installation of photovoltaic panels due to landscape restrictions. This impasse led to the involvement of regional offices to initiate the necessary procedures. At the global level, milestones such as the 1992 UN Earth Summit, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the 2015 Paris Agreement (COP21), and Agenda 2030 have shaped international guidelines. At the European level, important legislative steps include the 2018/1999/EU regulation on Energy Union governance, the 2019 Green Deal, and the 2019/944/EU regulation on the internal electricity market, which emphasized the role of citizens as active consumers. Italian regulations, such as the Milleproroghe Decree (2019) and the CER Decree (2024), have also played key roles in the development of energy communities. Niche At the niche level, the REC-S has fully evolved in compliance with the last implementation of Legislative Decree 199/2021. During the REC(S)’ implementation, administrative difficulties arose from the technical offices of the Municipality of Naples. The municipality required regional-level environmental authorization for the installation of the photovoltaic system, and therefore the GSE faced challenges in responding to the request for recognition of the energy community. The local government seemed to have hindered the project, accusing the Foundation of alleged building violations due to landscape constraints and fueling a conflictual situation with the municipal offices. The request was then forwarded to the regional offices, which took on the responsibility of initiating the procedure (according to point A6 of the Presidential Decree 31/2017 on simplified authorization regarding landscape, the installation of photovoltaic panels without landscape authorization is possible on flat roofs and not sloped roofs, as is the case with the building housing the Famiglia di Maria Foundation). By broadening the research field to include other stakeholders present in the area, such as the San Giovanni a Teduccio Civic Committee, the former Taverna del Ferro Committee, and the Libera/Maestri di Strada association, a latent conflict emerges between the Famiglia di Maria Foundation, which holds leadership in the REC(S), and other civic and associative entities active in the area. The latter does not recognize the social innovation brought by the energy community in the neighborhood and views the initiative led by the Famiglie di Maria Foundation unfavorably, considering its close ties with local and national political politicians and institutions and the involvement of only a few families in the project. Global actors, like Q8 and Darsena petrol players, instead, have been a stake in the initiative. They are engaged in the petrol business and natural gas deposits in the port area of East Naples. However, the project represents a valid experiment to understand how to include and empower socioeconomically vulnerable and geographically marginalized groups in the energy transition, and, according to stakeholders interviewed, it represents a precedent to realize subsequent energy and solidarity community projects in the neighborhood. Interaction between levels The analysis investigates the stakeholders involved and how the three levels (landscape, regime, and niche) interact with each other. Global developments and regulatory changes (landscape and regime) have opened a "window of opportunity" for the niche, represented by REC-S in Eastern Naples, to emerge and evolve. Understanding this intertwining is consistent with identifying the stakeholders involved and understanding how energy transitions and social regeneration can unfold in complex environments like San Giovanni a Teduccio. 5.5.3. References Attademo, A., Bassolino, C., Orfeo, L. and Veronese, 2021. La costruzione della periferia: Napoli 1945-1986. CLEAN edizioni. Celentano, R., Gadagno, L., Palescandolo, M., Scognamiglio, S. and Sposito, S., 2010. Piccole imprese e tessuto socio-economico di Napoli Est Città metropolitana di Napoli, 2021. Napoli. Città metropolitana di Napoli, 2016-2018. Contesto esterno, Analisi del contesto demografico e socio-economicodella Città Metropolitana di Napoli. Cozzolino, A., 2022. Napoli 1982, contro la camorra esplode l’ultimo movimento giovanile di massa. Strisciarossa. De Vidovich, L., Tricarico, L. and Zulianello, M., 2023. Modelli organizzativi per le comunità energetiche. Riflessioni dalla ricerca ‘Community Energy Map’, Impresa Sociale, 1, 122-137. Dipartimento della Protezione civile, 2024. Classificazione sismica aggiornata, settembre 2024 https://rischi.protezionecivile.gov.it/it/sismico/attivita/classificazione-sismica/ Leone, M.F., Amirante, R. and Sferratore, A., 2023. Comunità energetiche rinnovabili come architetture pubbliche e infrastrutture socio-ecologiche. Techne, 26, 173-183. Frascani, P., 1995. La città e la congiuntura. L’economia napoletana nella prima metà del Novecento. Meridiana,22/23, 223–247. IPSAR Ippolito Cavalcanti, Napoli San Giovanni a Teduccio e il Bronx: un’indagine conoscitiva sullo stato di attuazione degli interventi di riqualificazione territoriale. ISTAT, 2022. censimenti permanenti, popolazione e abitazioni, capoluoghi delle città metropolitane. Napoli. ISTAT il ruolo di napoli e del mezzogiorno, nello sviluppo economico sociale dell’Italia e dell’europa 2017. ISTAT regione campania. ISTAT, 2019. report la partecipazione politica in Italia. Le Nove-studi e ricerche (2013) Casa della cultura delle differenze, donne protagoniste a Napoli, un contributo alla ricostruzione del movimento delle donne dagli anni settanta ad oggi. Dines, N., 1999. Centri sociali: occupazioni autogestite a Napoli negli anni novanta, Quaderni di Sociologia, 21, 90-111. Osservatorio della città di Napoli (2021) Comune di Napoli. Palmentieri, S., 2016. Innovazione e ridisegno degli spazi urbani: dai “vuoti” ai poli di sviluppo. L’Area Est di Napoli (a cura di) De Falco S. Innovazione, competitività e sviluppo nei territori dell’Unione Europea. Collana Europa Parole. Pedìo, T., 1980. Agitazione e scioperi operai a Napoli nella primavera del 1848. Archivio Storico Italiano, 138(4 (506)), 577–596. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26259465 . Regione Campania, 2022. caratteristiche socio economico territoriali in Proposta di Aggiornamento del Piano Regionale per la Gestione dei Rifiuti Speciali della Regione Campania. Santino, U., 2000. Movimenti sociali e movimento antimafia, Città d’Utopia n. 29, pp 11-21. 6. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 6.1. Covid-19: Network of “Makers” (ES) The Network of “Makers” started spontaneously at the very start of Covid-19 when respirators were scarce in the hospitals. A network of IT-savvy individuals came together to develop and "print" respirators using 3D printers, and they continued until the shortage of respirators ended. Participants were scattered along the Spanish territory and organized themselves through smartphone communication apps (like Telegram), and they went in and out depending on availability. Without any specific or obvious leadership, it organized a quick and effective reaction to a public health emergency using the technological resources available and the knowledge of the participants, and it delivered its outcomes only as a result of effective (online) cooperation between the participants. This example enables CO-SUSTAIN to learn how quickly and effectively civil society can respond to a public emergency, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, by assembling and organizing people with a particular expertise. Although it was outside of their production, a number of industries that started manufacturing respirators during the pandemic may have found use for the ideas. 6.1.1. Context Analysis On March 12, 2020, the Spanish government declared a State of alarm due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The collapsing healthcare system and shortages of medical equipment made this situation critical. In this context, inspired by the Italian Maker community, the coronavirus maker network (CM from now on) emerged in Spain during the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis: a small group of Spanish makers who quickly organized, creating a Telegram group (@CM) to coordinate efforts at the national level to produce protective equipment. This group's growth was remarkable. Starting with a few and growing to 17,000 participants140, it mobilized thousands of volunteers across Spain and exemplified an innovative community pursuing the collective good in a global sanitary emergency. 6.1.1.1. The demarcation of the CM in terms of the MLP levels. The CM aligns with the MLP theory across three layers: the niche level, which primarily focused on the municipality of Barcelona and extended to its metropolitan area for specific data collection; the regime level in Catalonia and Spain; and the landscape level across Europe and globally. Barcelona's niche level significance stems from its strategic ICTs sector, driving investments, job creation, and competitiveness. In 2017, digital and industry 4.0 sectors in Barcelona and its metropolitan area accounted for 400,000 jobs141. The city ranks 2nd in Europe and 9th globally for internet searches related to investments, tourism, and talent, and 13th globally in technological maturity for social cohesion and sustainable development Networked Society City Index 2016. This foundation ensured the availability of highly skilled professionals and technological equipment during the pandemic. 141Barcelona Matròpolis (19.01.2024). Barcelona en datos: Industria 4.0. In Ciudad Global Dossier. https://www.barcelona.cat/metropolis/es/contenidos/barcelona-en-datos-industria-40. 140Arroyo, L., Sanchez-Asin, J. J., Valls-Pasola, J. and Hormiga, E., 2021. The CM network. Understanding the success of an innovation community facing COVID-19 in Spain. In: Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability during the Coronavirus Crisis: International Case Studies, edited by Sörensson, A., Tesfaye, B., Lundström, A., Grigore, G., Stancu, A, pp. 15-36. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Catalonia and Spain have been clustered within the regime level acting as intermediaries between local initiatives and broader, global dynamics, due to the specific legal procedures and regulations. Catalonia, with its autonomous legal structure and regulatory environment, provides a unique insight into regional governance, hosting 23% of Spain's tech and digital companies (with 90% located in Barcelona). In 2017, Catalonia ranked 4th in Europe for the highest number of people employed in high and medium-high technology manufacturing sectors142. On the other hand, Spain, encompassing the national legal and regulatory framework, investing on R&D and innovation projects and giving support to young entrepreneurs and technological-based companies, helps to understand how national policies and regulations facilitate or hinder innovation and community-driven responses at multiple scales. In this preliminary phase, the landscape level, framed within the CAI is considered peripherally and briefly outlined, focusing on key factors influencing the initiative across all MLP levels, with further exploration planned on its democratic transition outcomes. The Covid-19 pandemic, with its far-reaching impact, served as a critical juncture between the MLP levels, acting as a critical landscape pressure. As a catalyst, it disrupted indeed, daily life, economic stability, and healthcare systems worldwide, causing major changes across the regime and niche levels. The initial severe impact of Covid-19, led to a robust and centralized government response through the declaration of the state of alarm. This measure resulted in one of the strictest lockdowns in Europe and the consequent restrictions on movements; the quarantines and the closure of industrial facilities and retail premises. Preceding the pandemic, the capitalist system, and the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) can be factors that laid the ground for the so-called information society143, as one in which the creation, distribution, and manipulation of information is central to economic and cultural activities, driven by the pervasive influence of ICTs. The pre-existing makers’ network facilitated the rapid CAI during the health crisis144. Initially informal, the network's organizational structure varied across Spanish territories but soon reorganized into municipal and regional subgroups, adopting structured governance145. The CM exemplifies the principles of an information society146, as they quickly formed in response to the crisis, using existing and advanced technological skills and a collaborative spirit. Using platforms like Telegram, they efficiently coordinated efforts to share, design, prototype, and produce the essential medical equipment. Through 3D printing, open-source designs they were able to fill critical gaps, demonstrating how niche innovations could transition into mainstream systemic trends, influencing regimes and supporting the central state. Furthermore, the collaborative nature of the CM proves that information societies can foster new forms of social organizations and collective action, enhance community resilience and responsiveness in times of crisis, moved by the willingness to provide mutual support and to foster common good. This framework acknowledges the unique nature of the Makers’ initiative as a global movement without geographical boundaries. As for the availability of economic capital, the CM network didn’t receive any grant or direct funding. Existing equipment and infrastructure in Barcelona, though underused due to the economic slowdown 146 Martin, 2017. op. cit. 145 Arroyo et al., 2021. op. cit. 144Conde Melguizo, R., 2020. Makers y crisis sanitaria en España. Dataset. Figshare. [https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.12482678.v1] (accessed: 15.10.2024). 143 Martin, W.J., 2017. The global information society. London: Routledge. 142 Barcelona Metròpolis, 2024. op. cit. and lockdown, were considered "sunk costs". Companies and social entities donated resources and equipment, supporting community projects through employee involvement147. Organizations like the Ashoka Foundation at the national level and universities like the Autonomous University of Barcelona gathered donations to create initiatives. The "Makers of Vallès against COVID-19" by UAB Patronage established a solidarity fund to produce protective equipment for hospitals and nursing homes, covering equipment and transportation costs with donations. Open-source designs by makers were adopted by companies to produce personal protective equipment, increasing market availability148. From the human capital perspective, the CM comprised diverse profiles with both professional and moral attributes. Professionally, members were highly specialized, passionate about technology and innovation, adaptable, and entrepreneurial. Morally, they were driven by a sense of collective responsibility, altruism, and a desire for social change. The community included individuals who contributed with their knowledge and competences (e.g., doctors, engineers, digital strategists) and those who offered time, supplies, and equipment. From a technological standpoint, the availability of open-source design and 3D printers was a critical enabler for the quick prototyping and production of the needed equipment. As for the social imperative, the strong culture of solidarity in Spain149 provided the ground support for the network mobilization. Among the political factors, the state of alarm in Spain150 marked the beginning of force majeure measures aimed at containing the spread of the virus meanwhile, allowing the Spanish government to limit certain freedoms in favor of the crisis. This specific aspect might help understanding the willingness of civil society to act in support of the public authorities, due to their unpreparedness to handle the crisis, boosting the creation and action of CM. The state of alarm, initially set for 15 days, was extended until June 21, 2020. While crucial in reducing Covid-19 transmission, these measures had significant social and economic impacts, such as company shutdowns and increased unemployment. Employment measures like ERE and ERTE151 expanded though the pool of volunteers contributing their time and skills. As for possible ecological considerations, the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted the global healthcare supply chain, leading to export bans from major PPE-producing countries like China and international shortages. The lockdown measures caused a significant decrease in transport flows, especially air transport, resulting in a temporary decline in CO₂ emissions. Reducing goods transport by fostering local production can decrease emissions and lower the carbon footprint152, whilst local production also boosts local 152 Clarke, D., Flachenecker, F., Guidetti, E. and Pionnier, P., 2022. CO2 Emissions from air transport: A near-real-time global database for policy analysis. OECD Statistics Working Papers, No. 2022/04, OECD Publishing Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/ecc9f16b-en. 151Measures taken by companies to temporarily suspend or reduce the contracts of their workers. The reasons for initiating such a regulation can be economic, technical, organizational, productive, or due to force majeure, like during the Covid-19 pandemic. 150Enacted by the Royal Decree 463/2020 on March 14, 2020. 149 Rey-García, M. and Royo, S., 2022. Strengthening Civil Society in Spain: A Post-COVID-19 Agenda. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. 148 Arroyo et al., 2021. op. cit. 147 Forné, L. and Castro, M., 2021. La Hidra Cooperativa. Cómo generar marcos de colaboración con tramas comunitarias desde la Administración Pública2. Resumen de la Investigación. Bherria Topaketa 2021. https://bherria.eus/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Presentacio%CC%81n-investigaciones-La-Hidra.pdf (accessed: 13.11.2024). economies, creates jobs, and improves the security of essential goods and food153. The pandemic highlighted the vulnerability of global supply chains, emphasizing the need for local production to enhance autonomy, self-sufficiency, and resilience. However, the emission decrease was due to the economic slowdown, not systemic change, as emissions rebounded when economies recovered. The CM network can be explored from an ecological perspective to examine how local production capacities might adapt and respond compared to centralized global supply chains, reducing dependencies on international markets, and promoting decarbonization with decentralized solutions154. Additionally, the CM network could illustrate a more sustainable supply chain model, fostering resilience against global shocks and reducing long-distance transportation while promoting faster, community-driven responses to supply demands155. 6.1.1.2. Key context variables and their relationship with the MLP levels as demarcated Demographic structure: According to the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE, 2020a), Spain recorded a negative natural population growth rate for a decade, with more deaths than births, resulting in population decline and demographic aging. Especially during the COVID-19 crisis, the mortality rate increased to 17,7%156. Today, Spain's birth rate is declining at 24%, compared to the data recorded ten years before and the mortality rate has decreased to 5,8% since 2022157. In any case, only 8.6% of the population is between 0 and 14 years old, while 20% are over 65, with an average life expectancy of 83.08 years, a pattern typical of countries with low birth and mortality rates158. This demographic structure aligns with the patterns typically observed in countries with similar conditions, featuring low birth and mortality rates alongside a minimal natural population growth. Consequently, Spain can be defined as an aged society with a marked aging trend159. As for the economic structure, Spain has been showing a moderate productivity growth with a GDP of €1,119.01 billion, with Catalonia accounting €212.611 billion (19%) and Barcelona €160.180 billion. Catalonia and Barcelona’s GDP per capita were €27,505 and €28,133, respectively (INE, 2020c). Unemployment peaked in Q4 2020, reaching 1.88 million inactive individuals160. 160 INE, 2024. op. cit. 159 Ibidem. 158 INE, 2020b. Pirámide de la población empadronada en España. Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE. https://www.ine.es/covid/piramides.htm#_ccaaTab (accessed 4.11.2024). 157 INE, 2024. Ocio y relaciones sociales. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). https://www.ine.es/jaxi/Datos.htm?path=/t00/ICV/dim5/l0/&file=52501.px#_tabs-tabla (accessed: 1`0.11.2024). 156 INE, 2020a. Resultados definitivos Resultados Nacionales Población residente por fecha, sexo, grupo de edad y nacionalidad. Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE. https://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=56936 (accessed: 15.11.2024). 155 Sarkis, J. 2020. Supply chain sustainability: learning from the COVID-19 pandemic. International Journal of Operations & Production Management 41,(1), 63-73. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOPM-08-2020-0568/full/html. 154 Sigala, I.F., Sirenko, M., Comes, T., and Kovács, G., 2022. Mitigating personal protective equipment (PPE) supply chain disruptions in pandemics – a system dynamics approach. International Journal of Operations & Production Management 42, (13), 128-154. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOPM-09-2021-0608/full/html (accessed: 13.11.2024). 153 Liu Z., Ciais, P., Deng, Z., Lei, R., Davis, S. J., Feng, S., et. al., 2020. Near-real-time monitoring of global CO2 emissions reveals the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nature Communications, 11, 517. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-18922-7. In 2020, the Council of Ministers agreed to allocate 173.5 million euros to support measures for the industrial sector to promote its digital transformation and new business models. A first package of measures was equipped with 75 million euros, of which 50 million euros were directed towards industrial R&D and innovation projects in the manufacturing industry, and the remaining 25 million euros were allocated as loans to the financial support program for the Connected Industry 4.0. A second block offered participatory loans, valued at 98.5 million euros, to SMEs, young entrepreneurs, and technology-based companies161. The 2021 labor reform market162 boosted private-sector job creation and reduced temporary employment. In this context, Barcelona has emerged as a digital innovation hub in Europe, hosting major global events such as the Mobile World Congress and The Health Revolution Congress, the largest European summit in digital health, attended by leading corporations. Additionally, the city council has launched various initiatives to promote digital rights and the use of AI for the common good. The Spanish National Health System (SNS) is based on the principles of universality, free access, equity, and fairness, guaranteeing health coverage and access to medical facilities to all the residents in Spain. As a result of COVID-19 crisis, the Spanish government approved a quite significant investment plan to enhance the healthcare system, correct the existent inequalities among different regions within the healthcare infrastructure and to upgrade the old hospital equipment with advanced high-tech medical devices: the INVEAT Plan. The analysis of the 2020 European Health Survey reveals some interesting data: ●Spaniards have a strong preference for public health insurance, with over 33,700 thousand individuals covered exclusively by public healthcare. Mixed coverage, combining public and private insurance, is also significant, especially among younger demographics163. ●As for the hospitalization rate, 8% of the total surveyed population was hospitalized, with rates increasing with age. The major pick was mainly in the 35-44 years old range, followed by the 65-74 age range. An interesting figure is that men were slightly more hospitalized in the oldest age range, while the highest figure of women hospitalized can be seen in the 35-44 age range164. ●11% of approximately 40,000 surveyed individuals, experienced delays, or inaccessibility to healthcare facilities due to waiting lists. In general, women reported more issues than men, particularly in the 45-54 age range165. 165 INE, 2020e. Encuesta Europea de Salud 2020. Asistencia sanitaria: Cifras absolutas HOSPITALIZACIONES. Hospitalización en los últimos 12 meses según sexo y grupo de edad. Población de 15 y más años. Instituto Nacional 164 INE, 2020d. Encuesta Europea de Salud 2020. Asistencia sanitaria: Cifras absolutas COBERTURA SANITARIA. Modalidad de la cobertura sanitaria (Exclusiva) según sexo y grupo de edad. Población de 15 y más años. Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE. https://www.ine.es/jaxi/Datos.htm?path=/t15/p420/a2019/p02/l0/&file=06001.px (accessed: 27.10.2024). 163 INE, 2020c. Contabilidad Regional de España. Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE. https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736167628&menu=ultiDatos&idp =1254735576581 (accessed: 4.11.2024). 162 Enacted by Royal Decree Law 32/2021, 28 december. 161 La Moncloa, 2020. El Gobierno aprueba el Fondo COVID-19 de 16.000 millones de euros para las comunidades autónomas. Consejo de Ministros. 16.06.2020. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/resumenes/Paginas/2020/160620-cministros.aspx (accessed: 5.11.2024). The Ministry of Health identified elderly, individuals with cardiovascular diseases and high blood pressure, diabetes, chronic disease, cancer, immunosuppression, and pregnant women as most vulnerable to severe COVID-19, especially in nursing homes, which had high transmission and mortality rates. The INE official statistics166 indicate a higher count of Covid-19 fatalities, both at the national and regional level, among age groups starting from 75 years old, primarily women and a significant percentage of COVID-19 cases occurred in lower-income groups, highlighting social disparities and healthcare barriers167 168. Prior to the pandemic, Spain’s political landscape was fragmented, as evidenced by the 2019 general elections169. This division deepened during the pandemic, affecting public trust in the government. The preliminary results from the CIS survey in 2020, revealed that 45.8% of Spaniards viewed the government's pandemic response negatively, while healthcare, NGOs, and the armed forces improved their image. Less than half of the population approved of the government's management efforts, and 53% found the economic measures insufficient to tackle the financial repercussions of the pandemic. This insight would explain the low trust in government in Spain, that according to the Edelman Trust Barometer170 is around 36%. Similarly, trust in the media and business sectors is also low at 38% and 49%, respectively. As an opposite trend, NGOs receive a moderately neutral level of trust at 53%. As a comparison, for the year 2020, the OECD171 reported figure of 38.2% trust in government is aligned with those reported in 2021 by the Edelman Trust Barometer172 specifically focused on the consequences brought by the pandemic, whereas trust towards the government was still the lowest (34%), towards businesses was higher at 52%, making them the most trusted institutions at that time, closely followed by NGOs at 51%. 172 Edelman Trust Barometer, 2021. La bancarrota de la información. https://www.edelman.com.es/sites/g/files/aatuss396/files/2021-05/TRUST_SPAIN_2021.%20PRESENTACION.pdf (accessed: 6.6.2024). 171 OECD, 2024. How's Life? Well-Being. OECD Social and Welfare Statistics (database). https://doi.org/10.1787/b8a8569d-en (accessed: 5.5.2024). 170 Edelman Trust Barometer, 2023. Informe España. https://www.edelman.com.es/sites/g/files/aatuss396/files/2023-03/TrustBarometer%20Spain_2023.pdf (accessed: 8.11.2024). 169The first round of elections was on April 28, 2019, and after several months of unsuccessful negotiations and another failed attempt to invest Pedro Sánchez in July, a second round of elections was celebrated on November 10, 2020, with the PSOE as winner party that with Unidas Podemos formed the first coalition government of Spain 168 Ministry of Health, 2021. Ministerio de Sanidad. 2021. ‘INFORMACIÓN CIENTÍFICA-TÉCNICA. COVID-19 en distintos entornos y grupos de personas. Centro de Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias’. 25 March. https://www.sanidad.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/ccayes/alertasActual/nCov/documentos/Documento_GRU POS_PERSONAS.pdf (accessed: 15.10.2024). 167 Barcelona Public Health Agency, 2022. Agencia de Salut Pública de Barcelona. 2022. Evolució de la infecció per coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) a Barcelona. Consorci Sanitari de Barcelona (CSB), 11 april. https://aspb.shinyapps.io/COVID19_BCN/#Evoluci%C3%B3_di%C3%A0ria_dels_casos_acumulats (accessed: 5.11.2024). 166 INE, 2022b. Defunciones según la Causa de Muerte Resultados por Comunidad autónoma de residencia. Defunciones por causas (lista reducida) por sexo y grupos de edad. Instituto Nacional de Estadística – INE. https://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=10803#_tabs-grafico (accessed: 15.10.2024). de Estadística – INE. https://www.ine.es/jaxi/Datos.htm?path=/t15/p420/a2019/p02/l0/&file=03001.px (accessed: 10.10.2024). La Moncloa, 2020. El Gobierno aprueba el Fondo COVID-19 de 16.000 millones de euros para las comunidades autónomas. Consejo de Ministros. 16.06.2020. https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/consejodeministros/resumenes/Paginas/2020/160620-cministros.aspx (accessed: 5.11.2024). Liu Z., Ciais, P., Deng, Z., Lei, R., Davis, S. J., Feng, S., et. al., 2020). Near-real-time monitoring of global CO2 emissions reveals the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nature Communications, 11, 517). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-18922-7. Martin, W.J., 2017. The global information society. London: Routledge. Ministry of Health, 2021. Ministerio de Sanidad. 2021. ‘INFORMACIÓN CIENTÍFICA-TÉCNICA. COVID-19 en distintos entornos y grupos de personas. Centro de Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias’. 25 March. https://www.sanidad.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/ccayes/alertasActual/nCov/documentos/Docum ento_GRUPOS_PERSONAS.pdf (accessed: 15.10.2024). OECD, 2024. How's Life? Well-Being. OECD Social and Welfare Statistics (database). https://doi.org/10.1787/b8a8569d-en (accessed: 05.5.2024). Rey-García, M. and Royo, S., 2022. Strengthening Civil Society in Spain: A Post-COVID-19 Agenda. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Sarkis, J. 2020. Supply chain sustainability: learning from the COVID-19 pandemic. International Journal of Operations & Production Management 41, (1), 63-73. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOPM-08-2020-0568/full/html. Sigala, I.F., Sirenko, M., Comes, T., and Kovács, G., 2022. Mitigating personal protective equipment (PPE) supply chain disruptions in pandemics – a system dynamics approach. International Journal of Operations & Production Management 42, (13), 128-154. https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJOPM-09-2021-0608/full/html (accessed: 13.11.2024). Internet sources: www.xarxanet.org https://voluntaris.cat/ 6.2. Local self-help movement in Kainuu region (FI) In the winter of 2017-2018, the Finnish Kainuu region experienced widespread power outages due to heavy snow on trees (crown snow). As a result of crown snow many trees fell on power lines, leaving approximately 11 000 households in Eastern Finland (North Karelia and Kainuu) without electricity for several days. The blackouts also affected businesses, agriculture, and public service providers in the regions. The local self-help activism mobilized right after and improved the area’s preparedness for similar situations. According to the survey by SPEK (Laurikainen, anon.), neighborly help and support were important and trust grew, especially in the immediate community, but the preparedness of the electricity company and the municipal authorities was seen as inadequate. This example thus enables CO-SUSTAIN to learn how past crises are instrumental to increase the risk resilience and preparedness of the affected territory. 6.2.1. Context Analysis Large-scale power cuts due to challenging natural circumstances were not an unprecedented situation in Finland. However, what makes the power cuts in Kainuu stand out from the other large scale power cuts, was that they were caused by heavy snow. There had been smaller power cuts in Kainuu throughout December 2017, but the situation escalated on December 29th, when thousands of homes were without electricity. The situation worsened on December 30th, and the whole region of Kainuu was given an emergency warning. The power cuts happened during the Finnish Christmas holiday season, which contributed to the initially slow reaction from the officials responsible for this situation. Therefore, the resilience and self-help of the locals during the power cuts became important. The niche level in this historical example are the rural areas of Kainuu, especially in the municipalities of Hyrynsalmi and Suomussalmi, where the residents mobilized to help each other during the power cuts. The self-help movement pointed out the need for the crucial stakeholders to improve preparedness and infrastructure for similar occurrences. At the regime level, the power cuts contributed to a cultural shift for improved preparedness for power cuts and similar failures of infrastructure. For example, a preparedness forum of Kainuu was established in 2019. The Forum consists of security authorities, municipalities, the business sector and the third sector in Kainuu. The activities of the cross-sectoral forum enable the implementation of common contingency planning processes. As a result of the power cuts, the electricity companies, Kajave and Loiste, were obligated to conduct a report on the events of the power cuts. At the landscape level, all electricity companies in Finland have been mandated to report the grid development plan biannually and preparedness and development plan every three years. Kainuu is a 22 687,86 km² region of approximately 70 149 residents in the North-Central part of Finland. It consists of eight municipalities which govern themselves through municipal council and government. The region itself is governed by the regional council of Kainuu. Kainuu is the second most sparsely populated region in Finland and 80% of its area is forest180 181 182. The population density in Kainuu is 182 Mattila et al., 2023 - Mattila, H., Purkarthofer, E. and Humer A., 2023. Governing ’places that don’t matter’: agonistic spatial planning practices in Finnish peripheral regions, Territory, Politics and Governance, 11, 4, 813–832. 181 RC Kainuu, 2023. Regional Council of Kainuu, Tilastot (Statistics), 2023. https://kainuunliitto.fi/tietopalvelut/tilastot/ (accessed 23.2.2024). 180 RC Kainuu, 2024. Regional Council of Kainuu, Väestö ja muuttoliike (Population and migration), 2024. https://kainuunliitto.fi/tietopalvelut/tilastot/vaesto-ja-muuttoliike/ (accessed 10.6.2024). approximately 3 people per km², whereas the Finnish average is 18 people per km² 183. The region has only two cities: Kajaani and Kuhmo. Kajaani is the biggest of the two with 36 500 residents and it is also the provincial center of the Kainuu region. The rest of the municipalities are small and sparsely populated, with 2000 to 10 000 residents. These characteristics are reflected in the infrastructure as well. Distances are long and cars are the most important way of transport. The city of Kajaani is connected to the national railway network, but the smaller towns and municipalities are reachable by car or local buses. Kainuu shares a 406-kilometer-long border with Russia. The border region consists of sparsely populated wilderness, with long distances between villages and houses184. The border control monitors the border area and forest periphery surrounding it. In addition to the border control, one of the Finnish Army’s brigades is in Kainuu. The proximity of these institutions proved to be important during the power cuts. In addition to being sparsely populated, the region has been consistently losing residents over the past decades185. Reasons for this include the lack of universities or other higher education institutions (excl. Kajaani University of Applied Sciences), which have caused younger people to move to bigger cities in Finland186. This development is visible in the region’s demographics: the median age for an inhabitant of Kainuu is 47,9 whereas the corresponding number for the entire country is 43,8187. Due to the migration away from Kainuu towards other regions in Finland, the municipalities of Kainuu have been struggling to maintain their statutory responsibilities, such as providing healthcare for its residents188. Approximately 26,5% of all residents in Kainuu were elderly during the time of the power cuts189. In addition, there are more men than women living in the area and the gender division is most visible in the age groups of 20-24190. The demographics of Kainuu have been influenced by developments on the landscape and regime level. The main influences have been the severe recession Finland experienced in the early 90s, joining the EU in 1995 and the regional policies adopted as a result. In the early 90s, bursting of the financial bubble in Finland caused the worst recession in Finnish history and households and municipalities’ economies were affected until the early 2000s191. Before the recession, Finland had focused on keeping the entire country populated by supporting its remote and rural regions. However, priorities shifted after the recession, as more and more people were moving from rural areas to bigger cities in Southern Finland, which had more jobs available. The EU membership in 1995 on the other hand, initially provided positive impacts 191 Kiander, J. and Vartia, P., 2011. Lessons from the crisis in Finland and Sweden in the 1990s.Empirica, vol. 38(1), pages 53-69. DOI: 10.1007/s10663-010-9145-0. 190 RC Kainuu, 2024a. op. cit. 189 StatFin, 2024a - Statistics Finland. Väestö alueen, pääasiallisen toiminnan, koulutusasteen, sukupuolen, iän ja vuoden mukaan, 1987-2022. https://pxdata.stat.fi/PxWeb/pxweb/fi/StatFin/StatFin__tyokay/statfin_tyokay_pxt_115d.px/table/tableViewLayout 1(accessed: 26.2.2024). 188 Mattila, et al., 2023. op. cit. 187 RC Kainuu, 2024. op. cit. 186 Mattila, et al., 2023. op. cit. 185 RC Kainuu, 2024. op. cit. 184 RAJA, 2024. The Finnish Border Guard, 2024. Kainuu Border Guard District. https://raja.fi/en/kainuu-border-guard-district (accessed: 26.09.2024). 183 Kuntaliitto, 2022. Kuntaliitto, Kuntien pinta-alat ja asukastiheydet, 2022. https://www.kuntaliitto.fi/kuntaliitto/tietotuotteet-ja-palvelut/kaupunkien-ja-kuntien-lukumaarat-ja-vaestotiedot/k untien-pinta-alat-ja-asukastiheydet (accessed: 26.9.2024). for Kainuu in the form of funding, but the Southern expansion of the EU moved Kainuu to the category of developed regions, thus leading to the end of EU funding to the region192. In 2017 and nowadays, the private sector is the biggest employer in Kainuu. The private sector is followed by municipalities as the second largest employer193. The biggest employers in the region include administration, construction, industry, agriculture, mining and forestry194. Currently in 2024, 10,5% of the residents of Kainuu are unemployed. However, there are vast differences between different municipalities in Kainuu. In Puolanka for instance, unemployment is up to 22,8%, whereas in Kajaani the unemployment percentage is only 6%195. Currently the GDP of the region is 36 134 euros per resident196. In comparison, the national average is 45 285 €per resident197. 10,8% of the population are unemployed198. The national average at the time was 7,6%199. Kainuu is one of the snowiest regions in Finland during winter. Winter usually starts at the end of October and permanent snow arrives usually in the beginning of November. The amount of snow is at its peak in March, usually between 70-80 centimeters high. During Spring, the snow melts away in the end of April or in the beginning of May200. During the power cuts, the temperatures were warmer than average during snowfall, which resulted in the snow getting stuck on trees and causing power cuts. Kainuu is a mostly Finnish-speaking region. During the time of the power cuts, 97,3% of the population spoke Finnish as their first language201. The percentage of people who speak a foreign language as their first language has remained at 2-3% over the past 10 years, except for 2023, when the percentage rose to 5% of the Kainuu population202. The Kainuu region consists of eight municipalities. In Finland, municipalities are governed by the municipal council and government. The municipal council is elected through elections every four years. The candidates can be members of political parties or independent candidates. The members of the municipal council then elect the municipal government among themselves. For the historical example analysis, the municipalities of Hyrynsalmi and Suomussalmi were chosen as they were most affected by the power cuts. The municipalities are governed by the municipal council and municipal government. The municipal council is elected every four years, and the council chooses the members of the municipal 202 Ibidem. 201StatFin, 2024c. Statistics Finland, Immigrants and integration. 2024. https://pxdata.stat.fi/PxWeb/pxweb/fi/Maahanmuuttajat_ja_kotoutuminen/Maahanmuuttajat_ja_kotoutuminen__ Maahanmuuttajat_ja_kotoutuminen/maakoto_pxt_11vu.px/table/tableViewLayout1/ (accessed: 10.6.2024). 200 Climate guide, Kainuu – typical continental climate (Kainuu – tyypillistä mannerilmastoa), 2022. https://www.ilmasto-opas.fi/artikkelit/kainuu-tyypillista-mannerilmastoa (accessed: 10.06.2024). 199 StatFin, 2023. Statistics Finland, Employment weakened and unemployment grew in November 2023 from one year ago. 2023. https://stat.fi/julkaisu/cl89xplrstmes0avyn7w0nmwz (accessed 10.6.2024). 198 RC Kainuu, 2023. op. cit. 197 Ibidem. 196 StatFin, 2024b. Statistics Finland, National economy, 2024. https://stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_kansantalous.html (accessed: 10.6.2024). 195 Ibidem. 194 Ibidem. 193 Kainuun litto ,2024. Kainuun liitto, Employment, workforce and jobs (Työllisyys, työvoima ja työpaikat), 2024. https://kainuunliitto.fi/tietopalvelut/tilastot/tyollisyys-tyovoima-ja-tyopaikat/ (accessed: 26.9.2024). 192 Mattila, et al., 2023. op. cit. government amongst the council. The number of the council members depends on the size of the municipality. In Suomussalmi the council has 31 seats and Hyrynsalmi council has 21 seats203 204. Hyrynsalmi is population-wise a very small municipality as it has only 2 063 inhabitants. However, the municipality covers a large area: 1 521,37 km². Politically, the Agrarian-Leftist Centre party has been consistently the biggest party in the municipal elections, and they currently take up 13 seats (out of 21 seats) in the council. The difference is notable to the second largest party the Social Democratic Party, who only have four seats in the council. The Left Alliance and the Finns Party have two seats each in the council205. The voter turnout was 47,3%. The median age for the council member is currently 55 and in 2017 it was 54. 62% of the elected council members were male and 38% female206. Similar to Hyrynsalmi, Suomussalmi is geographically a large municipality (5 857,59 km²), but only has approximately 7 172 residents. Suomussalmi’s municipal council has a similar structure to Hyrynsalmi: the Centre Party is the largest party with 14 seats (out of 31 seats), followed by the Left Alliance with eight seats. The Finns Party have five seats and the National Coalition Party has four seats207. 58% of the elected council members are men and 42% women. The median age for the council members is like Hyrynsalmi, 54 years. Voter turnout was 48,8%208. The results were similar during 2017209. Therefore, during the time of the power cuts the Centre Party was the main political party in both municipalities. Significant factor in this historical example is the power system in Finland. It consists of power plants, the main grid, high-voltage distribution networks, other distribution networks, and electricity consumers. Households are connected to distribution networks, while industry, commerce, services and other demand facilities (such as agriculture) connect either to the main grid or distribution networks, depending on the case210. In Finland, distribution networks are operated by electricity network companies. There are just under 80 companies in total. A household can put its electricity supplier out to tender, but the electricity user is tied to the electricity network company in whose jurisdiction the place of use is located. In Kainuu, Loiste Oy is responsible for the distribution network. The electricity service network company Kajave has a total of about 13 800 km of electricity network in Kainuu and North Ostrobothnia. In Finland, electricity network companies have a legal obligation to develop distribution networks. The companies are regulated by the Energy Authority, to which they submit their development plans every two years. 210 Fingrid, 2024. Electricity system of Finland. 2024. https://www.fingrid.fi/en/grid/development/electricity-system-of-finland/ (accessed: 30.9.2024). 209 Ibidem. 208 Ibidem. 207 Ibidem. 206 Ibidem. 205 Ibidem. 204 Suomussalmi, 2021. Yle, Kuntavaalit tulospalvelu: Suomussalmi (Municipal elections result service: (Suomussalmi), 2021. https://vaalit.yle.fi/kv2021/fi/regions/12/municipalities/777/ (accessed: 10.6.2024). 203 Hyrysalmi, 2021. Yle, Kuntavaalit tulospalvelu. Hyrynsalmi. (Municipal elections result service: Hyrynsalmi), 2021. https://vaalit.yle.fi/kv2021/fi/regions/12/municipalities/105/ (accessed: 10.6.2024). 6.2.2. Stakeholder Analysis Among the stakeholders associated with the initiative, representatives of several categories can be noted. These include three representatives from business and industry related to the provision of electricity. An equal number of representatives of public administration units were identified. Other categories include the media, citizens, NGOs and civil society organizations (Table 6.2a). Even though the focus of this historical example is on the actions of the local residents of Kainuu during the power cuts, stakeholders from other categories played an important role during the events. The tables above elaborate the characteristics of the stakeholders. Figure 6.2a explains the stakeholders by relevance as a Power-Interest matrix. Table 6.2b explains the impact that the stakeholders had in this historical example. The most represented categories of stakeholders in our analysis are public services and business and industry. However, other categories, such as media outlets, civil society organizations, and NGOs were represented as well. Most of the stakeholders had an impact on more than one spatial scale: regional, local-regional and regional-national levels. Therefore, even though the focus is on the local level, the events are connected to several spatial scales, as many of the stakeholders operate on different levels (Table 6.2a). The majority of the stakeholders were affecting instead of being affected. Table 6.2a - Stakeholders: list and main features Stakeholder name Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1.Loiste Ltd Business & Industry Regional third party Knowledge, economic neutral SH2.Kajave Ltd. Business & Industry Regional third party Knowledge, economic neutral SH3.Fingrid Business & Industry National third party Positional, normative, economic, knowledge neutral SH4.Local Inhabitants Citizens Local promoter Knowledge cooperative SH5.Volunteer fire brigade Civil society organization Local third party Knowledge, positional cooperative SH6.National Defense Forces Institutions Local-Regional-Nation al third party Normative, Relational, Economic, Knowledge neutral SH7.National broadcaster Yle Media National third party Positional neutral SH8.Kainuun sanomat Media Local - Regional third party Positional neutral SH9.The Finnish Red Cross NGOs Local-Regional-Nation al promoter Positional, knowledge cooperative SH10.Kajaani Rescue department Public services Local-Regional-Nation al beneficiary Normative, Relational, Economic, Knowledge neutral SH11.Municipality Suomussalmi Public services Local - Regional beneficiary/target Positional, knowledge, economic cooperative SH12.Municipality of Hyrynsalmi Public services Local - Regional beneficiary/target Positional, knowledge, economic cooperative Figure 6.2a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 6.2b – Stakeholders by impact Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected SH11.Municipality Suomussalmi 3 3 SH4.Local Inhabitants 2 5 SH9.The Finnish Red Cross 2 3 SH3.Fingrid 1 2 SH8.Kainuun sanomat 1 2 Affected & Affecting SH10.Kajaani Rescue department 5 5 SH1.Loiste Ltd 3 4 SH2.Kajave Ltd. 3 4 SH12.Municipality of Hyrynsalmi 3 3 SH6.National Defense Forces 2 2 Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact SH7.National broadcaster Yle 1 1 SH5.Volunteer fire brigade 1 1 The residents of Kainuu are the focus of the stakeholder analysis. They had an active role through supporting each other throughout the power cuts. The main actions included sharing food, water and shelter and providing contact information to the rescue department and electric companies. This self-help movement was not official, but rather a product of resilience and willingness to help other community members. The willingness to help reached the stakeholders on the regional and landscape level as well, as many locals wanted to help out the rescue department and electric companies with dealing with the damages of the power cuts. In fact, there was too much help than necessary and some of the stakeholders on the regional and national level had to turn down help from the locals. In the events of the power cuts, the stakeholders on the regional level played a key role. The most influential of these stakeholders was the Kainuu rescue department. The main rescue department of the region is located in the city of Kajaani, but there are other smaller rescue departments located throughout the region. After the first couple of days of the power cuts, the rescue department took over on January 4th, 2018. As the rescue department was the only stakeholder with the authority to request help from the national defense forces, they immediately requested help in the form of providing vehicles that are designed for the extremely snowy and challenging conditions. The rescue department also took the responsibility of communications to prevent misinformation and mixed information to the residents of Kainuu. Until then, other stakeholders, such as the municipalities and NGOs had posted their own instructions, which had caused confusion among citizens. Therefore, giving the communications responsibility to the rescue department clarified the instruction to the citizens and to other stakeholders. The main task of the rescue department was to help citizens that were in danger due to the power cuts and to help with the fixing of the power lines. Members of the volunteer fire brigades were also participating in this work. In addition to these tasks, the rescue department established a task force to manage everyday operations during the power cuts. The task force had members from the rescue department, electricity companies and municipal officers. This helped the flow of communication between different stakeholders. The power company Loiste and the electricity network company Kajave which is owned by Loiste also had a strong role during the power cuts. They had the main responsibility to fix the power cuts, as they had the trained personnel that could fix them. The power cuts were caused by heavy snow, which got stuck on power lines and tree branches and even resulted in trees falling on the power lines. Kajave and Loiste collaborated with the rescue department to fix the power lines. Local citizens proved to be helpful in this task, as they could provide the locations where the biggest damages were. Although not directly involved in the events of the Kainu power cuts, afterwards Fingrid asked Loiste and Kajave for thorough assessments of the events of the power cuts and what can be done in the future to prevent such events from happening. In addition, similar obligations were extended for all electricity companies in Finland as well. The municipality personnel, especially the municipality leaders and high-ranking officials were important stakeholders as well. They would communicate the instructions by the rescue department to the locals and also provide places to stay and bathe if necessary. The rescue department had the responsibility for communications and other stakeholders, especially municipalities, would refer to the rescue department’s instructions through the municipality’s website and their Facebook pages. The main NGO helping the locals was the Finnish Red Cross, which had its local departments in the municipalities in Kainuu. The local departments, such as the one in Hyrynsalmi, mobilized quickly to help the locals. They would go from door to door and offer water, power banks and blankets and estimated whether the citizens required further assistance. The media outlets, especially Yle, reported the turn of events nationally. The local newspapers, mainly Kainuun Sanomat, spread instructions on how to survive without electricity and who to contact in case of emergency. 6.2.3. References Climate guide, Kainuu – typical continental climate (Kainuu – tyypillistä mannerilmastoa), 2022. https://www.ilmasto-opas.fi/artikkelit/kainuu-tyypillista-mannerilmastoa (accessed: 10.06.2024). Fingrid, 2024. Electricity system of Finland. 2024. https://www.fingrid.fi/en/grid/development/electricity-system-of-finland/ (accessed: 30.9.2024). Hyrysalmi, 2021. Yle, Kuntavaalit tulospalvelu. Hyrynsalmi. (Municipal elections result service: Hyrynsalmi), 2021. https://vaalit.yle.fi/kv2021/fi/regions/12/municipalities/105/ (accessed: 10.6.2024). Kainuun liitto, 2024. Kainuun liitto, Employment, workforce and jobs (Työllisyys, työvoima ja työpaikat), 2024. https://kainuunliitto.fi/tietopalvelut/tilastot/tyollisyys-tyovoima-ja-tyopaikat/ (accessed: 26.9.2024). Kiander, J. and Vartia, P., 2011. Lessons from the crisis in Finland and Sweden in the 1990s.Empirica, vol. 38(1), pages 53-69. DOI: 10.1007/s10663-010-9145-0. Kuntalitto, 2022. Kuntaliitto, Kuntien pinta-alat ja asukastiheydet, 2022. https://www.kuntaliitto.fi/kuntaliitto/tietotuotteet-ja-palvelut/kaupunkien-ja-kuntien-lukumaarat-ja-vaes totiedot/kuntien-pinta-alat-ja-asukastiheydet (accessed: 26.09.2024). Martila et al., 2023 - Mattila, H., Purkarthofer, E. and Humer A., 2023. Governing ’places that don’t matter’: agonistic spatial planning practices in Finnish peripheral regions, Territory, Politics and Governance, 11, 4, 813–832. In recent years, political life in L’Aquila and the surrounding areas has been heavily influenced by the aftermath of the 2009 earthquake. The national government has also played a crucial role in providing funding and oversight for the reconstruction process. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the central government established the Commissioner delegate for the reconstruction in Abruzzo, Giovanni Chiodi - president of the region (2009-2014). In 2009, the local political context was marked by the presence of the fourth Silvio Berlusconi (2008-2011) government, which remained popular despite the global and national economic crisis. Scandals related to the management of the 2009 earthquake emergency and subsequent legal issues involving the Prime Minister were not public knowledge yet. During this period, the regional political scene was dominated by the center-right coalition, while L'Aquila was governed by Mayor Massimo Cialente, a member of the Democratic Party (PD), from 2007 to 2012. Cialente was re-elected for a second term (2012-2017) and then was succeeded by Pierluigi Biondi, a member of the Fratelli d’Italia party (FdI), who is currently serving his second term until 2026. 6.3.1.5. Political participation L'Aquila does not have a particular tradition of civic activism. Some of the most well-known events traced back to the 1970s. The first is about the riots of L'Aquila, popular uprisings that occurred between February 26 and 28, 1971. The mobilizations began following the decision of the Regional Council of Abruzzo to establish the majority of regional departments (seven out of ten) in Pescara, while still retaining the title of capital region for L'Aquila. At that time, the city lacked significant industrial or commercial activity and the risk was to deprive it of even 70% of the regional offices. Students, workers, employees, and ordinary citizens organized to resist the regime. The second regards the 1973 workers' struggles, composed of 80% of women from the Sit-Siemens factory, who denounced the industrial sector, the housing crisis and the integration of the female farmers into the working class. In 1975 the city's master plan was introduced and included the urbanization of the historic center as well as of the municipal territory. The development of new social housing and peripheral neighborhoods was at the end the result of unchecked urbanization. The majority of buildings destroyed in the earthquake had been constructed in the 1980s when urbanization accelerated significantly compared to the 1960s227. In particular, significant urban interventions date back to the late 19th century, with the formation of the nation-state and the desire to revitalize the city's administrative and cultural role. It is important to note that the L’Aquila municipality (and the city itself) contains a wide variety of building types and conditions (masonry buildings, stone buildings, brick or concrete block buildings, with floors and roofs made of reinforced concrete, along with 227 Ciccozzi, E. and Olori, D., 2016. L’Aquila città in frantumi. La ricostruzione come acceleratore delle dinamiche socio-spaziali in sociologia urbana. STAMPA, pp. 13-33. very recent villas or condominiums in reinforced concrete). These varied conditions have generally made it very complex to estimate macroseismic intensity228. On April 6, 2009, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck the Abruzzo region's capital, L’Aquila, and 56 other municipalities. The historic center of L’Aquila was evacuated and declared a red zone by ordinance no.73 on April 8, 2009, by Mayor Massimo Cialente (PD), and about three months after the earthquake, only 40% of buildings in L’Aquila were deemed habitable229. By the end of April, the population that did not find alternative housing was split, with one-third in hotels on the Abruzzo coast and another third in tent camps. New citizen committees emerged in response to the emergency, self-organizing protests and campaigns to actively participate in the reconstruction. The “Popolo delle carriole” is one of these, and it was created by around 6,000 people who, equipped with wheelbarrows, ventured beyond the red zone to collect the debris from their city. From that moment on, a year after the earthquake, the Aquilan community organized several mobilizations between L’Aquila and Rome to seek support for social and economic reconstruction, also developing a popular initiative law for “The Reconstruction of L’Aquila and the Safety of the National Territory.” The conflict raises various issues: the lack of seismic prevention (e.g., failure to implement anti-seismic regulations in many buildings), delays in reconstruction work, and the establishment of a logic of commissarial management and derogation contracts post-earthquake, which have reduced the spaces for democracy and participation. Regarding formal participation, voter turnout in municipal elections has been declining since the post-earthquake period. In 2012, turnout was 77%, in 2017 it dropped to 67%, and in 2022 it further decreased to 64%. In the most recent regional elections of 2024, only 47% of voters went to the polls. 6.3.2. Stakeholder Analysis Given the spontaneous and strongly bottom-up nature of the Earthquake in L’aquila case study, half of the Stakeholder’s share the responsibility of being promoters of the initiative(table 6.3a). Among the promoters, the role is equally distributed between Civil Society Organizations and NGOs. The relationship of the promoters with the initiative are of course cooperative with the exception of Casa delle Donne (neutral) while a relevant number of the others show potential conflictual relationships: institutions, politicians and, surprisingly, private citizens. Except for the Supranational level, the stakeholders represent all the territorial levels. As for the relevance (figure 6.3a), only two key players are detected, characterized by more interest in affecting the process than power to actually affect it. More crowded are the group of the context setters, where all the institutions are reported, and the group of the subjects which includes some of the promoters. Finally, as for the impact, it has been not possible to identify SHs that are likely to affect and be affected by the process and the SHs are equally distributed between the group of the Affected (with both the key players included) and Affecting actors, the latter composed of the institutions at any territorial level. 229 Calandra, L.M., 2011. op. cit. 228 Galli, P. and Camassi, R., 2009. Rapporto sugli effetti del terremoto aquilano del 6 aprile 2009. Rapporto tecnico QUEST, DPC-INGV, Roma, 12 pp. Table 6.3a - Stakeholders: list and main features Stakeholder name Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1. Inhabitants Citizens Local beneficiary Relational; Knowledge conflictual SH2. 3.32/CaseMatte Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH3. Collettivo 99 Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational; Knowledge cooperative SH4. Comitato Famiglie delle vittime del terremoto Civil society organizations Local-Regional-Nation al promoter Relational; Knowledge cooperative SH5. Comune de L'Aquila Institutions Local target Normative; Economic;Positional neutral SH6. Civil Protection Department Institutions Local-Regional-Nation al target Normative;Economic conflictual SH7. Regione de L'Aquila Institutions Regional beneficiary/target Normative;Economic;Positional neutral SH8. BSA NGOs Local-Regional-Nation al promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH9. E.V.A./Misa NGOs Local promoter Relational; Knowledge cooperative SH10. Casa delle Donne NGOs Local-Regional-Nation al promoter Relational; Knowledge neutral SH11. Prime Minister Politicians National target Normative;Economic;Positional conflictual SH12. GSSI Research Local third party Relational;Knowledge;Economic neutral Figure 6.3a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 6.3b – Stakeholders by impact Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected SH2. 3.32/CaseMatte 3 5 SH4. Comitato Famiglie delle vittime del terremoto 3 5 SH3. Collettivo 99 2 4 SH9. E.V.A./Misa 2 3 SH8. BSA 1 2 SH10. Casa delle Donne 1 2 Affecting SH6. Civil Protection Department 5 3 SH5. Comune de L'Aquila 5 2 SH11. Prime Minister 5 1 Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact SH7. Regione de L'Aquila 4 -1 SH12. GSSI 2 -1 SH1. Inhabitants 2 -1 On the night of April 6, 2009, the tremor at 3:32 AM occurred within a seismic swarm that began on March 30, previously not assessed as a risk variable by the Major Risks Commission. This position seems to imply a logic of prevention and management of technical-political risks that excludes the relationship with the territory and the communities inhabiting it in favor of an objectification of the catastrophe (Art. 11 of the Decree-Law April 28, 2009, No. 39 converted into Law June 24, 2009, No. 77. The National Plan for Seismic Prevention was created precisely after the earthquake of April 6, 2009). The post-earthquake emergency phase was characterized by an immediate intervention from Civil Protection (D.P.C.) through a process of verticalization of the power230 which consequently led to the outsourcing of reconstruction works to private companies (Filiera Fintenza, Reluis, Cineas) and the derogation of fundamental rights and certain procedures. In particular, the legal instrument of the ordinance has the power to derogate in matters of public contracts, labor law, site safety, environmental directives, property, expropriation procedures, and municipal planning231 232. To address the housing emergency, the government proposed the construction of temporary and long-term settlements M.A.P (Temporary Housing Modules) C.A.S.E (Sustainable Eco-Compatible Anti-Seismic Complexes) in peripheral areas far from the historic center, which would uproot various family units and fragment the city’s social fabric. The C.A.S.E. project (Sustainable Eco-Compatible Anti-Seismic Complexes) was applied for the first and last time in L'Aquila in the form of 4,449 apartments distributed across 185 three-story buildings, made of various prefabricated materials (wood, concrete, iron, drywall) on a reinforced concrete base. The project cost over 800 million euros (approximately 180,000 euros per housing unit) and was intended to accommodate 14,000 displaced residents from the city. The MAP units, on the other hand, hosted around 7,000 people from nearby towns for 250 million euros233 234. The grassroots activation in L'Aquila responded by creating committee 3.32, a collective reality coordinating various emerging committees and associative activities, Including E.V.A, Collettivo99, 234 European Court of Auditors (2013). Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund response to the 2009 Abruzzo earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 233 Imperiale, A.J. and Vanclay, F., 2021. The mechanism of disaster capitalism and the failure to build community resilience: learning from the 2009 earthquake in L’ Aquila, Italy. Disasters Vol. 45(3) pp. 555-576. 232 Arcuri, A., 2019. Il governo delle emergenze: i rapporti tra decreti-legge e ordinanze di protezione civile dal terremoto de L’Aquila al crollo del ponte Morandi, in Osservatorio sulle fonti, n. 2/2019. 231 Bono, I., 2009. Oltre la «mala Protezione civile»: l’emergenza come stile di governo. Meridiana, 65/66, 185–205. 230 Forino, G., 2012. Riflessioni geografiche sul disaster management all'Aquila. Semestrale di Studi e Ricerche di Geografia. 1. 85-97. Comitato delle Famiglie delle Vittime del Terremoto, La Casa delle Donne, Brigate di Solidarietà Attiva (BSA), and others. The resilience process was activated through spontaneous mechanisms of mutual assistance, solidarity, and self-organization to promote direct participation in opposition to vertical management of the emergency and reconstruction that excluded the community. The objectives were a) to recreate a meeting place for the regeneration of the city’s social fabric and b) to participate in the reconstruction process as a community. The first collective mobilization was the campaign "100% Reconstruction, Transparency, and Participation," followed by protests in 2009-2012 against the Berlusconi government, the G8 in L'Aquila, the shock economy, and top-down reconstruction, and the red zone of the historic center (the "wheelbarrow movement," where 6,000 residents of L'Aquila broke down the fences of the red zone and began clearing the debris of the buildings in the historic center). In the same year, CaseMatte was born as an operational center of 3.32 within the former abandoned psychiatric hospital of Collemaggio. CaseMatte expanded the proposal for self-organization, becoming a place of aggregation, counter-information, and cultural production with a view toward participatory and social reconstruction of the city. Landscape We hypothesize that the MLP background could be defined by three macro-categories: environmental, financial, and cultural phenomena. The first category is defined by the geomorphological characteristics of the Aquilani territory and its seismic history. Specifically, the diagram references the 1915 Avezzano earthquake (the first earthquake in the Aquilani province in the new century, with approximately 30,000 victims), the L’Aquila earthquake on April 6, 2009, the 2016 Central Italy earthquake, and the 2017 earthquake between the provinces of L’Aquila and Rieti. It is important to note that the L’Aquila area is classified as a second-level seismic zone235 on a scale of four levels, where zone 1 represents a high risk of strong earthquakes. The second category includes the industrial decline of the 1970s, which was followed by the rise of the third sector and the 2008 financial crisis, occurring during a period of stagnation for the Aquilani municipality since the early 2000s. In 2007, Naomi Klein's book "The Shock Doctrine" discussed how neoliberal policies of privatization, market deregulation, and public spending cuts also operate in vulnerable and disaster contexts to generate profit (disaster capitalism)236. The third category refers to the cultural elements characterizing Italy during the twenty years between 1990 and 2010. In the 1990s privatization and market deregulation infiltrated democratic state institutions, leading to the "Mani Pulite" investigations between the political world and the business, industrial, and financial sectors (this is reflected within the regime level). In 1994, the Second Republic began with the first government of Silvio Berlusconi, who would be in his fourth term during the April 6, 236 Imperiale, A.J. and Vanclay, F., 2021. op. cit 235 OPCM 3519/2006 - Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. Testo dell'Ordinanza PCM 3519 del 28 aprile 2006 dalla G.U. n.108 del 11/05/06 "Criteri generali per l'individuazione delle zone sismiche e per la formazione e l'aggiornamento degli elenchi delle medesime zone. http://zonesismiche.mi.ingv.it/pcm3519.html 2009, earthquake. In the same year, the Italian Civil Protection Department defined its emergency management plan (1992) known as the "Augustus Method237". This method involves a set of systemic "simple and flexible" guidelines (recalling the tradition of Emperor Augustus) necessary for responding to disasters but limited by the identification of the disaster as the cause, the emergency as the consequence, and the community as the victim of the disaster. Regime The regime is identified by two conflicting elements: a) global regulatory frameworks related to risk and disaster reduction (UNDRO 1982; INDR 1984; UNISDR 2005; 2015238), and b) the state of exception declared in response to the post-earthquake emergency in 2009. In this historical example, the regime operates through command-and-control actions (Augustus method) exerted by the Civil Protection Department239. Particularly, the power to issue ordinances (Article 5 of Law 225/1992), introduced the red zone in the historic urban center and operated in derogation of existing regulations, especially concerning contracts and construction, as well as limiting the rights to mobility, expression, and information to the people living in camps240. In 2009, 105 ordinances were issued, averaging one every three days. Niche The niche is hypothetically defined here as the self-organized L’Aquila community responding to the post-2009 earthquake emergency, aiming to participate in the city's reconstruction. Informally, 3e32 was the first self-organized committee to take on coordinating following the mismanagement of the emergency in a state of exception Although L’Aquila did not have a particularly active political life, there are several similarities between the "L’Aquila riots of 1973" and the "Popolo delle Carriole" of 2010. The activism of the Aquilana community in the post-earthquake period from 2009 to 2011 represents a moment of intense social and political mobilization, marked by a series of actions aimed at opposing the emergency management and reconstruction efforts, which were seen as inadequate and influenced by economic and political interests. This fervor translated into protest demonstrations, occupations of public spaces, and the formation of civic committees, such as 3e32, which played a central role in coordinating the various facets of citizen resistance241. 241 Comitato 3e32, Nati alle 3e32. L’Aquila: cronache del dopo-terremoto, Round Robin Edizioni, 2019. 240 DICOMAC No. 15277/2009 - Comitato 3e32, Nati alle 3e32. L’Aquila: cronache del dopo-terremoto, Round Robin Edizioni, 2019;Imperiale AJ, F Vanclay (2019) Command-and-control, emergency powers, and the failure to observe United Nations disaster management principles following the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36, 101099. 239 Alexander, D., 2010. op. cit. 238 Imperiale, A.J. and Vanclay, F., 2019. op, cit. 237 Alexander, D. E., 2010. The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy on Disaster Response. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 2, (4), 325–342. For example, the demonstrations in Rome and L'Aquila in June 2009 saw the convergence of numerous groups and associations opposing the centralized and opaque management of the reconstruction. The "Yes we camp!" campaign, organized in conjunction with the G8 summit in July 2009, was a symbolic example of how the Aquilani community sought to promote a participatory reconstruction model based on principles of mutualism and grassroots management. Among the most symbolic actions was the "Popolo delle Carriole" (Wheelbarrow People) in February 2010, where thousands of citizens broke through the red zone, a symbol of exclusion and militarization of the historic center, to reclaim their city symbolically. On March 21, 2010, a draft law of popular initiative was created through participatory tables led by the 3.32 coordination with the subsequent collection of 50,000 signatures. The objectives of the proposed law were a) transparency regarding reconstruction funds and b) a national post-disaster intervention plan. With Law 134/2012 (commonly referred to as the Barca Law), all delegations for government action in the L'Aquila earthquake were entrusted to Fabrizio Barca, then Minister in the Monti government, which incorporated some requests within the popular legislative initiative. Barca committed to speeding up reconstruction timelines and facilitating a quick return to ordinary management of the post-emergency period, which ended on August 31, 2012. The same law established Special Offices for Reconstruction, one responsible for the city of L'Aquila (USRA) and one for the other municipalities in the crater (Special Office for the Reconstruction of the Municipalities of the Crater - USRC). Following this law was the "Really Safe" campaign, developed nationally with multi-stakeholder tables in fragile territories and already affected by disasters, elaborating broader recommendations than those included and partially incorporated within the Barca law. These recommendations are now included in the Framework Bill, a single law on disasters currently under discussion in Parliament. Furthermore, in 2018, with Legislative Decree No. 1 of January 2, 2018, the Civil Protection Code was revised, ensuring the participation of citizens, whether individuals or associations, in the process of developing civil protection planning. These are considered victories and regimes ‘fractures from the self-organized realities that emerged in the post-earthquake phase. As of 2024, 3.32 Case/Matte no longer coordinates the popular activation that began in 2009 and remained active until 2012. In particular, the transition from a left-wing majority administration (Massimo Cialente, Democratic Party 2012-2017) to a right-wing majority (Pierluigi Biondi, Brothers of Italy 2017-2027) seems to have removed the apparent attempt at dialogue, participation, and co-design with the citizenship. More broadly, generational changes, emerging distrust, and subsequent marginalization have initiated an ongoing transformation process of the niche still in effect today. Interaction between levels The conclusion of the first phase of preliminary research suggests that the clear division of the MLP levels expands through the dynamics that connect them reciprocally. This process is particularly evident through the opening of the window of opportunity where hypothetically the earthquake of April 6, 2009, fractured the regime which declared the emergency state and to which the self-organized groups of the community responded. It could be argued that the window of opportunity might also be a chance for the regime itself to freely operate through a state of exceptionality outside of the status quo. 6.3.3. References Alexander D., 2010. The L’Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy on Disaster Response. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 2(4), 2010, 325-342. Ambrosetti, E. and Petrillo, E.R., 2016. Environmental disasters, migration and displacement. Insights and developments from L’Aquila's case. Environmental Science & Policy Vol.56, pp. 80-88. Arcuri, A., 2019. Il governo delle emergenze: i rapporti tra decreti-legge e ordinanze di protezione civile dal terremoto de L’Aquila al crollo del ponte Morandi, in Osservatorio sulle fonti, n. 2/2019. Bono, I., 2009. Oltre la «mala Protezione civile»: l’emergenza come stile di governo. Meridiana, 65/66, 185–205. Calandra, L.M., 2011. Per una geografia sociale dell’Aquila post-sisma: comunicazione visuale e nuove forme di democrazia. Comunicazione al IV Convegno italo-francese di Geografia Sociale (Roma, 30 marzo/1 aprile). Ciccozzi, E. and Olori, D., 2016. L’Aquila città in frantumi. La ricostruzione come acceleratore delle dinamiche socio-spaziali in sociologia urbana. STAMPA, pp. 13-33. Centro regionale di studi e ricerche economico-sociali, Economia e società in Abruzzo (CRESA), 2010. Elaboration on Istat data. Comitato 3e32, Nati alle 3e32. L’Aquila: cronache del dopo-terremoto, Round Robin Edizioni, 2019. European Court of Auditors, 2013. Special Report No 24/2012 – The European Union Solidarity Fund response to the 2009 Abruzzo earthquake: the relevance and cost of operations. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Forino, G., 2012. Riflessioni geografiche sul disaster management all'Aquila. Semestrale di Studi e Ricerche di Geografia. 1. 85-97. Galli, P. and Camassi, R., 2009. Rapporto sugli effetti del terremoto aquilano del 6 aprile 2009. Rapporto tecnico QUEST, DPC-INGV, Roma, 12 pp. Imperiale AJ, and Vanclay F., 2019. Command-and-control, emergency powers, and the failure to observe United Nations disaster management principles following the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 36, 101099. Imperiale, A.J. and Vanclay, F., 2020. Top-down reconstruction and the failure to “build back better” resilient communities after a disaster: lessons from the 2009 L’Aquila Italy earthquake. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal 29 (4), 541-555. Imperiale A.J. and Vanclay F., 2021. The mechanism of disaster capitalism and the failure to build community resilience: learning from the 2009 earthquake in L’ Aquila, Italy. Disasters Vol. 45(3) pp. 555-576. ISTAT, 2021. ISTAT regione Abruzzo, 2020. Miccoli, S., Reynaud, C., Ambrosetti, E., and Licari, F., 2023. The impact of the L'Aquila earthquake on demographic changes. Population, Space and Place, 29. Pesaresi, C., 2012. I comuni del cratere sismico, prima e dopo il terremoto del 2009. Considerazioni sui movimenti demografici in atto. Semestrale di Studi e Ricerche di Geografia Roma - XXIV, Fascicolo 1, gennaio-giugno. Regione Abruzzo, Provincia dell’Aquila, 2013. Relazione geologica. Regione Abruzzo, report informativo, 2009. Dinamiche socio-economiche della regione Abruzzo e delle sue province. Regione Abruzzo, 2024. Classificazione sismica comuni abruzzesi. Reitano, M. and Centra, M., 2009. Effetti economici del sisma: l'occpuazione nell'area dell'Aquila in Meridiana: rivista di storia e scienze sociali. N. 65-66. Rosone, S., 2011, Il Clima della Conca Aquilana, Analisi fenomenologica in relazione alle principali configurazioni sinottiche. Meteo Aquilano, Previsioni e Monitoraggio meteorologico dell’Aquila e Provincia. The repression of the subversive movements that arose from this clash between the late 1970s and the 1980s completely changed the scenario of civic and political participation in Genoa. Rapid was the decline of student and workers’; organizations of socialist and communist inspiration. Catholic aggregations, which had always been present, remained in the area, while student and workers’ organizations played a marginal role and changed. Trade union organizations retreated into specific bargaining, trying to avoid resorting to strikes, and abandoned references to broader forms of social transformation. Student realities linked up with groups of young people from outside the world of higher education in various neighborhoods, occupying disused buildings and building centers for social aggregation animated by reference to the traditions and struggles carried out in Italy and elsewhere in the name of communism, anarchism, decolonisation, women’s liberation, and respect for human rights. Progressive Catholic associations as well as social centers and post-communist groups came together in 2001 in the Genoa Social Forum, the assembly of opposition and criticism of the G8 planned in the city in June of that year. The mass participation in the protests, also from outside Genoa and from foreign countries, largely caught the local realities off guard, which were often directed by groups from outside the city. The devastation left by the serious violence of July 2001 thus did not lead to greater civic and political activation on the ground, but rather to a wounded memory and a sense of humiliation and defeat on the part of a generation of activists from different backgrounds. The latter felt that they had seen the city go through a phenomenon that largely transcended it, and from which the city suffered, without having been able to play a major role in directing and organizing events. In the following years, however, politically motivated building occupations in the city increased from three in 2001 to five in 2011. As far as more general civic activation is concerned, one of the most significant episodes in the postwar history of Genoa is precisely the popular participation in the activities to clean up the damage caused by the flood of 1970, along the lines of the (in that case national) mobilization for Florence in similar circumstances in 1966. The city of Genoa, like all Italian cities, has a capillary network of parishes and social activities collateral to Church action throughout the territory. The parishes and the youth and residents’ groups that form within them are often active in voluntary work. On the aggregative level, an entirely different reality, but in turn important for the city, are both the sports associations and the supporters groups of the two main local football teams, Genoa and Sampdoria, which also have thousands of adherents and were also protagonists in the mobilisations against the G8 in 2001. Various groups linked to anarchist and post-communist politics animate, together with individuals from the ecological culture, territorial activations such as the No Gronda Committee, the movement against the Terzo Valico and the No Skymetro Committee. In terms of formal political participation, the inhabitants of the municipality of Genoa have shown over the years less participation in elections, e.g. for the European Parliament. In 2009, 59% of those eligible to vote were over 18 years old, which is lower than in the North and nationally, a decrease of 9.4% compared to the 2004 elections and as much as 24.8% compared to the 1979 elections. Until 2011, local political representation was older than the national average; in 2012, however, the average age of municipal councilors became 50.4 years, significantly reducing the gap with the rest of the country. The presence of women in the municipal council followed a rather irregular trend until 2011, remaining almost always below the national value. In 2012, however, it recorded a value of 20.7%, catching up with the figures for the rest of the country. Turnout in local elections fell steadily from 94% in 1976 to 55.5% in 2012, to 48.4% in 2017. While national general elections saw a drop of almost five points in turnout in 2017, but remained attended by 70% of eligible voters, regional elections saw a drop from 69.9% in 2005 to 53.7% in 2020 (in 1975, turnout was 92.3%). 6.4.2. Stakeholder Analysis As in the case study of the Earthquake in L’aquila (see 6.3) also in the Genoa case study the strong self-organizing nature of the initiative determines a weird distribution of the SHs with the majority being promoters of the initiative (11 out of 18, table 6.4). Again, as in the L’Aquila case, the group of promoters is mostly composed of NGOs and Civil Society Organizations with the Citizens and Institutions (at both Local and national level) being the main target of the process. With a few exceptions the SHs group is composed of Local actors counting on primarily Relational resources. The relationships among the stakeholders are, not surprisingly, cooperative or neutral with the only exception of the conflictual relationship detected in the case of the Genoa municipality. As for the relevance (figure 6.4a), not any key player can actually be detected, meaning that although being promoted by a large number of local associations not any of them seems to have enough power and/or enough interest to actually play a major role in affecting the process. The promoters are in fact mostly distributed among the Subjects and the Crowd while all the Institutions are included in the group of the Context Setters. Lastly, when it comes to the relation with the impact a few remarks might deserve to be reported. First, the category of the Affecting and Affected include only SHs that do not seem to have enough power to affect the process nor are expected to be highly impacted. All the institutions are not surprisingly included in the group of the Affecting stakeholder with the National Civil Protection Department being a particularly powerful actor (also positively affected) followed by the Municipality which seems instead to be slightly negatively affected. Among the SHs included in the group of the primarily affected actors is the rest of the promoters (both from NGOs and Civil Society Organizations) and the local residents. Table 6.4a - Stakeholders: list and main features Stakeholder name Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1. Municipio Val Bisagno Citizens Local target Normative; Relational;Economic neutral SH2. Inhabitants, volunteers Citizens Local beneficiary Relational;Knowledge neutral SH3. Centro documentazione Archivio Libertario Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH4. Comitato Piazza Adriatico Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH5. Autaut Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH6. Pinelli Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH7. Buridda Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH8. No sky metro Civil society organizations Local promoter Relational; Knowledge cooperative SH9. Municipio Media Val Bisagno Institutions Local target Normative; Relational; Economic neutral SH10. Comune di Genova Institutions Local target Normative; Economic conflictual SH11. Chiesa di S.Margherita Institutions Local target Economic;Relational;Knowledg e neutral SH12. Civil Protection Department Institutions National target Normative;Positional;Knowled ge neutral SH13. Circolo La Bianchini PRC Intermediate bodies Local-Regional-National promoter Knowledge;Relational;Position al cooperative SH14. Associazione Amici Ponte Carrega NGOs Local promoter Relational;Positional;Knowledg e cooperative SH15. Scout Agesci NGOs Local promoter Relational;Knowledge neutral SH16. San Benedetto Don Gallo NGOs Local promoter Relational;Knowledge neutral SH17. 15 Arci NGOs Local-Regional-National promoter Relational; Knowledge cooperative SH18. Università di Genova Research Local third party Relational;Knowledge; Economic neutral Figure 6.4a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 6.4b – Stakeholders by impact Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected SH14. Associazione Amici Ponte Carrega 2 5 SH3. Centro documentazione Archivio Libertario 2 5 SH4. Comitato Piazza Adriatico 2 5 SH17. 15 Arci 2 4 SH2. Inhabitants, volunteers 2 3 Affected & Affecting SH5. Autaut 1 1 SH6. Pinelli 1 1 SH7. Buridda 1 1 Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact SH15. Scout Agesci 1 1 SH11. Chiesa di S.Margherita 1 1 Affecting SH12. Civil Protection Department 5 2 SH10. Comune di Genova 4 -1 SH18. Università di Genova 3 1 SH1. Municipio Val Bisagno 3 -1 SH9. Municipio Media Val Bisagno 3 -1 SH13. Circolo La Bianchini PRC 2 1 SH16. San Benedetto Don Gallo 2 1 SH8. No sky metro 2 1 The floods in Genoa in 2011 and 2014 saw the spontaneous activation of various formal and informal groups of citizens, associations, and local institutions throughout the emergency. Self-organization and solidarity in the aftermath of the 2011 flood were also activated in the 2014 flood, only to dissolve shortly after. The November 4, 2011, event was characterized by intense precipitation over restricted areas, with about 500 mm of rain falling on the city in just a few hours. There were 6 victims from the flooding of the Bisagno River and the Rio Fereggiano. Following the tragedy, then-mayor Marta Vincenzi (PD) was condemned for a distorted reconstruction of the coordination events in collaboration with civil protection. The levels of the rivers were not properly monitored, schools were not closed, and civil protection arrived late at the emergency site. In the event of October 9, 2014, very intense rains of about 395 mm were recorded in just a few hours, resulting in floods mainly from the Bisagno River and the Rio Fereggiano, causing one death and flooding large areas of the city, particularly between the lower and mid-Val Bisagno. In this second event, no condemnation was issued for Mayor Doria (PD) and former regional civil protection councilor Raffaella Paita, who was accused of failing to issue the emergency alert in time. In 2015, following the two dramatic flooding events, work began on the spillways for the Rio Fereggiano, which were later completed in 2019 with the approval of a decree from the Renzi government. The spillway for the Bisagno River, instead, was initiated in 2017 under a second ministerial decree from the Gentiloni government and it is today under construction due to a mafia interdiction on the consortium Research From this preliminary phase, it emerges that the civic engagement process has self-organized based on territorial proximity and the existing collaborations among some of the stakeholders involved, such as lay and religious associations (Arci; San Benedetto Don Gallo, Amici di Ponte Carrega Association; Agesci Scout), religious institutions (Church of S.Margherita), Committees (Piazza Adriatico Committee) political and social informal spaces (Centro documentazione Archivio Libertario, Buridda, Pinelli, AutAut), political party circles (Circolo La Bianchini PRC), and municipalities (Val Bisagno, Media Val Bisagno municipalities), who have engaged with the broader mobilization generated by residents, property owners, families, and affinity groups. These actors facilitated coordination and the division of tasks among volunteers in the post-emergency phase before the intervention of civil protection. The latter had a containing effect on the self-organized process, but was controversial in its implementation depending on testimonies and locations, viewed by some stakeholders as a measure of discipline and rationalization, and by others as one of containment and control. Between 2011 and 2014, and subsequently after 2014, a popular network did not consolidate, but collective initiatives among some stakeholders emerged in response to subsequent emergencies, such as the collapse of the Morandi Bridge (2018) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2019). Furthermore, some of the demands and values contained in the self-organization process after the floods (solidarity, sustainability, participation) seem to have converged today into various committees against the logic of land exploitation and unrestrained urbanization, such as the committee "No-Skymetro for a Sustainable Val Bisagno," opposing the construction of the elevated subway extension based on the "banks" of the Bisagno River. The process of popular activation, reciprocally in 2011 and 2014, took on different forms and continuity based on the history and culture of the local territory affected by the flood in the city. A specific case identified is that of the Molassana area (Genoa) and Piazza Adriatico, a neighborhood with a significant working-class history where unrestrained urbanization of social housing began in the 1960s below the level of the Bisagno river. Molassana was an autonomous municipality until 1926 when it was incorporated into the municipality of Genoa. The central area of Molassana includes a lower part along the riverbank, with predominantly working-class neighborhoods, and an upper hilly part that constitutes the oldest core of the town. Piazza Adriatico was particularly affected by the flood in 2011 when the water reached a height of 4 meters. In 2024, Arci, the Piazza Adriatico Committee, the Documentation Center of the Libertarian Archive, and the Friends of Ponte Carrega Association collaborated for the common goal of regenerating the social fabric of the neighborhood that existed until the second half of the 20th century, not without disagreements and internal conflicts. In particular, the Friends of Ponte Carrega Association was established in 2012 to strengthen the community and inform citizens about urban and commercial development operations centered on the neighborhood. The idea matured during the days of the 2011 flood when driven by a spirit of collaboration and solidarity, the founders of the Friends of Ponte Carrega Association rediscovered a lively and pulsating community in the neighborhood. They found themselves embarking on a common path that brought together people with different stories and traditions to create an association aimed at building community. The association, therefore, seeks to promote another "model of life and development" defined as "human-scaled" to take care of the territory in dialogue with the community that inhabits and experiences it. From this, a series of informative conferences succeeded to inform people about the hydrogeological instability of the territory, and new collaborations began with different actors such as WWF, Legambiente, the University of Genoa, and others. In 2012, the recovery operation for Ponte Carrega commenced as part of a contentious demolition project aimed at building a roadway bridge to serve the commercial centers being developed. Thanks also to the pressure from the association, in 2015, the city council unanimously passed a motion with 28 votes in favor, proposed by Francesco De Benedictis (Fratelli d’Italia party), to preserve the 18th-century Ponte Carrega and prevent its demolition. The historical case of the floods that hit Genoa between 2011 and 2014 lends itself well to a reading framed in a multi-level perspective, but it must be considered that the social activation from below and the formation of socio-political innovation niches had a very limited impact on the regime between 2013 and 2015, seeing even this impact fade in the following years. As of today, the political authorities and electoral dynamics in Genoa and Liguria are moving in the opposite direction to that urged by the most advanced activations in the immediate post-flood period. In accordance with the categorisation in use in the interpretation of socio-technical transitions, readapted to the more or less radical transitions in the geopolitical sphere, we identify the following elements of analysis, at the current state of research. Landscape Genoa's socio-political landscape is characterized, in the years immediately preceding and following the floods of 2011248 249 and 2014250 251, by the cultural pre-eminence of secular and center-left forces (in particular the Democratic Party) and by the issue of the city's industrial decline inherited from the latter part of the 20th century, to which the major events that the city hosted (the Colombiadi in 1992, the G8 in 2001) had only partly responded, failing to keep pace with Turin as consumption pole in the north. Even the tourist industry, prominent in the Levante and Ponente regions of Liguria, is less developed, in relative terms, in Genoa. The main resisting legacy of Genoa's industrial phase is the chaotic urbanism resulting from the immigration of workers, first from the eastern Italian regions affected by the Second World War, then from the south. The urbanization of a mountainous territory close to the sea and subject to sudden heavy rainfalls252 253 crossed by two large streams and hundreds of rivulets, meant that much 253 Acquaotta, F., Faccini, F., Fratianni, S., Paliaga, G., Sacchini, A. and Vilímek, V., 2019. Increased flash flooding in Genoa Metropolitan Area: a combination of climate changes and soil consumption?. Meteorology and Atmospheric Physics,131, 1099-1110. 252 Acquaotta, F., Faccini, F., Fratianni, S., Paliaga, G. and Sacchini, A., 2018. Rainfall intensity in the Genoa Metropolitan Area: secular variations and consequences. Weather,73(11), 356-362. 251 Faccini, F., Luino, F., Paliaga, G., Sacchini, A., Turconi, L., and de Jong, C., 2018. Role of rainfall intensity and urban sprawl in the 2014 flash flood in Genoa City, Bisagno catchment (Liguria, Italy). Applied Geography,98, 224-241. 250 Faccini et al. 2015a - Faccini, F., Luino, F., Sacchini, A. and Turconi, L., 2015a. Flash flood events and urban development in Genoa (Italy): Lost in translation. In Engineering Geology for Society and Territory-Volume 5: Urban Geology, Sustainable Planning and Landscape Exploitation (pp. 797-801). Springer International Publishing. 249 Fiori, E., Comellas, A., Molini, L., Rebora, N., Siccardi, F., Gochis, D. J., ... and Parodi, A., 2014. Analysis and hindcast simulations of an extreme rainfall event in the Mediterranean area: The Genoa 2011 case. Atmospheric Research,138, 13-29. 248 Pirlone, F., 2012, Rischi naturali e sostenibilità territoriale. L’esperienza dell’alluvione di Genova. of Genoa's orography was obstructed254255. This was compounded by urban planning that did not take into account the danger of hydrogeological instability to which the city is exposed, with large portions of the territory built below river level and buildings constructed in the stream beds themselves256. Regime Although in 2008 the Civil Protection Department had approved an intervention to secure the Ferreggiano river, between the Quezzi and Marassi districts, the PD-led local administration and the center-left and center-right 2008-2011 governments had not taken action on the matter until the 2011 flood. The latter led to the investigation against the mayor Marta Vincenzi (PD) and her conviction, and to the victory of a left-wing civic list in the subsequent elections. In 2014, when the second flood hit the city in conditions that had not significantly changed in terms of socio-technical innovations, the new mayor Marco Doria showed a similar inability to act. His administration remained indifferent to pressure from below for alternative solutions to the spillway as a technical solution to torrential flooding. The technicians in his administration decided to hold a fruitful dialogue with pieces of the Italian academic world (town planning, geognostics, architecture) through the mediation of committees that had sprung up in the area, but without this having any real impact on the administration's choices. The 2017 and 2022 elections, however, would by then have led to a victory for the center-right, which bases its vision of urban development on even more invasive works such as the new cable car, the Gronda highway project and the sky-metro. Niches In addition to families, residents and individuals, in 2011257 and 2014258 several organized groups took action to relieve homes and businesses from the pressure of the water, mud and debris accumulated during the floods, which had claimed a total of 6 lives. These included Catholic organizations such as Agesci (scout movement), which acted in close contact with the civil protection department of the government, or parishes such as the one in Marassi, which collected considerable sums for the affected businesses in the district in cooperation with the Carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza (military and police forces). Then there were sport and para-sporting groups, such as the organized fans of the two 258 Zamarian, M., 2022. Noi per Genova. The coordination of volunteers in the Genoa flood of 2014/Noi per Genova. Il coordinamento dei volontari durante l’alluvione di Genova del 2014. 257 Rizza, C. and Pereira, Â.G., 2014. Building a resilient community through social network: Ethical considerations about the 2011 Genoa floods. In ISCRAM, May. 256 Castelnovi, M. (2015). Fiume Doppio e Pugnalatore: considerazioni storico-geografiche sulle alluvioni a Genova. Collana" Dalla mappa al GIS"(Labgeo Caraci editore, 2016-), 35-50. 255 Faccini, F., Paliaga, G., Piana, P., Sacchini, A., & Watkins, C. (2016). The Bisagno stream catchment (Genoa, Italy) and its major floods: Geomorphic and land use variations in the last three centuries. Geomorphology,273, 14-27. 254 Faccini et al. 2015b - Faccini, F., Luino, F., Paliaga, G., Sacchini, A. and Turconi, L., 2015b. Yet another disaster flood of the Bisagno stream in Genoa (Liguria, Italy): October the 9th-10th 2014 event. Rendiconti Online Della Società Geologica Italiana,35, 128-131. rival city teams, Genoa and Sampdoria, who did not hesitate to collaborate on the occasion. Finally, a series of small groups linked to anti-capitalist left-wing ideologies, such as the Communist Refoundation Party and the Active Solidarity Brigades, the social centers (Buridda, Aut-Aut, Pinelli, and others), and informal collectives such as Vivere in collina in the Quezzi district. However, the activation that appears, as a result of the research, to be the most original (and to have expressed the greatest potential and impact in the direction of a concrete proposal for socio-technical innovation) is the Molassana committee ‘Amici di Ponte Carrega’. After the flood of 2011, the committee was built around a limited number of citizens in the neighborhood. They have, however, managed to independently study the possible causes of Genoa's hydrogeological disruption, to share alternative projects with urban experts, and to organize conferences and debates involving some of the technical staff of Genoa's administration. Only some of the committee's proposals were then taken up by the municipality, sometimes because they were pushed by the right-wing opposition against the left-wing mayor. On the whole, the committee, which still exists today, considers that the socio-political and socio-technical regime, as far as land management is concerned, has not been impacted by the more innovative ideas proposed: uncovering of rivers, widening of river beds, upland lamination, reforestation, restriction of major impact urban interventions, even underground such as spillways (the only solution instead adopted by the municipality). Interaction between levels After the floods of 2011 and 2014, in Genoa there is a debate on the solutions (not) to be adopted, and on a minimal approach to interventions or a rethinking of the overall logic of urbanization259 260. The latter should include upstream interventions with a reforestation and lamination around the terraces, and the renunciation of the construction of further highways along the mountain slopes. Downstream, the uncovering of streams, their securing, the demolition of buildings too close to water flows and the renunciation of projects built along watercourses (such as the sky-meter). On the function, usefulness and urban or hydro-geological significance of the spillways on the Ferreggiano (built) and Bisagno (planned) the positions are further divided. Bibliographic and documentary research, together with interviews with 22 individuals involved in local institutions or social activism, have shown how the niche has arisen in certain groups of citizens who come from an overall logic or a local memory linked to the Marxist or libertarian left261 that had established itself in Genoa in the 20th century (and in particular to the history of the PCI or minor communist formations of the 1970s). Although the various committees that emerged from this cultural sphere showed very different levels of activation and analytical elaboration, some of them, such as the Amici di Ponte Carrega or Vivere in 261 Leiss, A., 2011. GENOVA, OLTRE L’ALLUVIONE. Critica marxista: analisi e contributi per ripensare la sinistra, (5), 17-22. 260 Bonati, S., 2022. Contested flood risk reduction: An analysis of environmental and social claims in the city of Genoa. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction,67, 102637. 259 Bracco, F., Modafferi, C., and Ferraris, L., 2017. Piove, governo ladro. Emozioni e cognizione nell'analisi dei rischi a seguito di un evento alluvionale. Sistemi intelligenti,29(2), 351-370. the transport sector by switching to electric vehicles and by changing mobility behavior, expanding public transport and infrastructure for cycling and walking; (3) reduce heat consumption in buildings and convert to district heating and use of ambient heat plus heat pumps wherever possible. In addition, Vienna also promotes the decarbonization of city-related or city-owned infrastructure293: The decarbonization of electricity and district heating generation is fostered through the expansion of renewable energies in Vienna and Austria. Green gas will be utilized in future for combined heat and power plants or other high-energy uses, but not for heating and hot water, while nuclear energy is still not seen as part of the solution. Over the course of the next few years, these ambitious goals will need to be translated into concrete steps and measures to be implemented in the city of Vienna. While the climate roadmap and other key policy documents (e.g. the Viennese “Smart City Strategy”) outline many concrete steps and actions to be taken, their successful implementation will require the involvement of Vienna’s citizens to ensure inclusive and sustained change. The Vienna Climate Team thus addresses two important challenges Vienna is facing. First, top-down implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures without adequate inclusion of citizens often lacks the necessary speed and ambition, as political representatives fear citizens’ resistance to such measures. Ensuring citizens’ ongoing participation in the design and implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures can greatly speed up the process, improve the quality of decisions and empower people to become active democratic citizens. Second, while the city has implemented participatory processes before, the majority of these processes has been limited to different forms of information and consultation294 rather than transferring actual decision-making power to citizens. Additionally, an increasing number of Viennese residents who are of voting age are not allowed to participate in national, regional or local elections: In 2023, of a total of 1,982,097 inhabitants, 560,550 (33.4%) did not have the right to elect their representatives, resulting in a considerable democratic deficit which is especially pronounced among younger people, in the age-group of 25-44295. VCT’s participatory budgeting process, which allows all of Vienna’s inhabitants to participate indiscriminately and specifically aims to involve underrepresented groups, therefore represents an important countermeasure to this increasing lack of representation and democratic participation. From an MLP perspective, the development of VCT as a niche innovation involved and was strongly influenced by many regime level actors and events, which is unsurprising given that the CAI constitutes an example of formal political participation and is therefore strongly linked to the political regime level. The idea for VCT was conceived and developed within the framework of an EU innovation program (EIT Climate-KIC’s ‘Deep Demonstrations’ program), which, while funded and institutionalized at the (EU) regime level, is specifically designed to foster niche innovations. During the early stages of the project, the exploration and development of the participatory budgeting idea in the Viennese context fell mainly to niche actors specializing in the fields of citizen participation and climate action, such as (non-profit) consultancies and local actors in Vienna who had previous experience with and expertise in these fields. However, for the idea to become more concrete, enter conceptual development and finally receive funding for implementation, the support of key regime actors from the Vienna municipal government and the city administration was essential. On the landscape level, this support was facilitated by the 295 MA, 2023a. op. cit. 294 cf.: Arnstein, S.R., 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of planners, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 216–224. 293 Ibidem. global “Fridays for Future” movement gaining momentum during 2019, which resulted in societal pressure on policy makers to take meaningful actions against the climate crisis. In the same vein, landscape level trends towards increased citizen participation in policy making and democratic innovation contributed to the appeal of the VCT project idea. During the process design stage, the niche actors worked closely together with regime actors such as administrative staff and department heads, identifying challenges to the implementation of VCT’s innovative concept within the framework of Vienna’s existing political, legal and administrative structures and jointly developing solutions. Ultimately, the collaboration between niche and regime actors was incorporated into the process design itself, as citizens’ ideas are assessed by experts and administrative staff from the city of Vienna and are then co-developed together with VCT’s participants to ensure their practical feasibility and effectiveness, while the final decision-making power remains, again, with niche actors (i.e. with the respective district’s citizens, via the Citizens’ Jury drawn by lot). 7.1.2. Stakeholder Analysis Table 7.1a provides a deeper breakdown of the stakeholders for the Vienna Climate Team initiative. The stakeholder categories that are best represented include Professionals and Institutions, showing how well-developed the involvement of specific professions and government bodies is in taking the initiative forward. A majority of these work at the local level, illustrating how the initiative is firmly anchored within the Vienna context. However, the stakeholder involvement at the supranational, namely EU, level-such as "EIT Climate-KIC" and "Democratic Society"-holds great potential for wider outcomes and interlinkages with European climate action networks. The Power-Interest matrix in Figure 7.1a gives the stakeholders' influence and levels of engagement. Being key players, Ideator 1 (climate angle) and Ideator 2 (participation angle) have high power and interest. These could be persons or groups specializing in climate action and participative processes, respectively. With their active participation and influence, they are identified to be in the driver's seat of the process. On the other hand, context setters such as the Department for energy planning (MA 20) may have low interest despite possessing a high power and thus should be strategically challenged for assurance of support and comprehension of the goals. Table 7.1b names stakeholders according to their influence on the initiative. What can be striking to note is that a big batch of the stakeholders are "Affected & Affecting." By this, it shows that so many of those stakeholders, such as "District councils" and "Participating citizens," are not just passively affected by the outcomes of the initiative. Instead, they are active contributors to its course and, at the same time, influenced by the developments of the course. This also evidences the collaborative and participatory dimensions of the Vienna Climate Team initiative, wherein stakeholders actively take part in shaping its track while at the same time being influenced by its output. Table 7.1a - Stakeholders: list and main features Stakeholder name Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1. Participating citizens Citizens Local beneficiary Knowledge cooperative SH2. Department for energy planning (MA 20) Institutions Local target Normative;Positional; neutral SH3. District councils Institutions Local beneficiary, target Positional; neutral SH4. EIT Climate-KIC Intermediate bodies Supranational (EU) promoter Normative;Relational;Positional;Eco nomic;Knowledge cooperative SH5. Lokale Agenda 21 NGOs Local target Knowledge neutral SH6. City councilor for climate, environment, democracy and personnel Politicians Local promoter Relational;Positional cooperative SH7. Political parties (city level) Politicians Local third party Positional;Economic cooperative SH8. Ideator 1 (climate angle) Professionals Local promoter Normative;Positional;Knowledge cooperative SH9. Ideator 2 (participation angle) Professionals Local promoter Normative;Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH10. Head of MA 20 Professionals Local target Positional; cooperative SH11. Democratic Society Professionals Supranational (EU) target Normative;Relational;Knowledge cooperative SH12. Dark Matter Labs Professionals Supranational (global) target Normative;Knowledge cooperative SH13. Klimapuzzle Professionals Global/local adaptation target Knowledge cooperative SH14. Administrative staff (city level) Professionals Local beneficiary/target Positional;Knowledge neutral SH15. Agencies for participation and communication Professionals Local-national target Normative;Knowledge cooperative SH16. Steering group Professionals Local third party Normative;Positional; neutral SH17. Board of experts Professionals - third party Positional;Knowledge cooperative SH18. Brainbows Professionals Local target Knowledge cooperative SH19. Expert for law and budget Professionals Local target Knowledge cooperative SH20. GB* urban renewal city area management Public services Local target Knowledge neutral Figure 7.1a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 7.1b – Stakeholders by impact Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected SH2. Department for energy planning (MA 20) 2 3 SH12. Dark Matter Labs 2 3 SH4. EIT Climate-KIC 2 3 SH13. Klimapuzzle 1 2 SH14. Administrative staff (city level) 2 3 SH20. GB* urban renewal city area management 1 2 SH5. Lokale Agenda 21 1 2 SH1. Participating citizens 3 5 Affected & Affecting SH8. Ideator 1 (climate angle) 5 5 SH9. Ideator 2 (participation angle) 5 5 SH10. Head of MA 20 4 4 Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact SH6. City councilor for climate, environment, democracy and personnel 4 5 SH3. District councils 3 3 SH11. Democratic Society 3 4 SH15. Agencies for participation and communication 3 3 SH18. Brainbows 1 1 SH7. Political parties (city level) 1 1 Affecting SH16. Steering group 3 2 SH17. Board of experts 2 1 SH19. Expert for law and budget 3 2 The key players of the VCT project can be tentatively sorted into two categories, namely, (1) (mainly) niche actors who had significant influence on the form and content of the project during ideation and conceptualization, and (2) (mainly) regime actors who were in key political or administrative positions at the time of project development to ensure the political and administrative support as well as funding of the project. Within the first group, the most significant actors are ideator 1 and ideator 2, who conceived of the idea for a participatory budgeting process in Vienna within the frame of EIT Climate-KIC’s “Deep Demonstrations” program. The idea development and early conceptual work were carried out with strong support from the international non-profit organization Democratic Society, who had a significant influence in the early phase of the project. As for the second group, invaluable political support came from Vienna’s city councilor for climate, environment, democracy and personnel, who was newly appointed after the 2020 city elections and brought the project idea into the new city government. In addition, the head of the department for energy planning (MA 20), where the “Deep Demonstrations” project was located, provided strong institutional support for the project idea, after an initial phase of skepticism due to being relatively new to the subject of citizen participation. During the second phase of developing an implementation plan for the project, additional key actors included the agencies for participation and communication who were tasked with co-designing the participatory budgeting process and provided invaluable expertise and experience. With regard to the major challenge of bridging the gap between the (rather innovative) niche idea and its implementation within the existing regime, an important role fell to the steering group comprised of the city administration’s department heads, who pointed out potential hurdles in the implementation of the project, as well as to the legal expert who supported the development of solutions to many of these challenges. Additional high-influence stakeholders include many of the experts and professionals involved in the development of the implementation plan and the design of the participatory budgeting process. EIT Climate-KIC provided the funding, while the consultancy Dark Matter Labs contributed important expertise, as did the board of experts, GB* and Lokale Agenda 21, the latter two providing practical experience with participatory processes in Vienna. The political parties of Vienna’s city government, though not actively involved in the design phase of the project, provided political support for VCT and granted funding, while the department for energy planning constituted the project’s institutional base. Members of the administrative staff, on the other hand, acted as important bridge-builders between the niche and regime level, as well as contributing key insights to the project development and process design. Stakeholders who were less powerful to influence the development and design of the process, but are rather strongly influenced by it, include the participating district councils and citizens. Of the two, the district councils had more power and opportunity to influence the process design, but citizens can also be characterized as having a certain amount of power, as they can choose whether or not to participate in the project and contribute their ideas. 7.1.3. References Arnstein, S.R., 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of planners, vol. 35, no. 4, p. 216–224. Bartocci, L., Grossi, G., Mauro, S,G, et al., 2023. The journey of participatory budgeting: a systematic literature review and future research directions. International Review of Administrative Sciences, vol. 89, no. 3, p. 758. Daminger, A., Huber, P. and Piribauer, P., 2024. Bericht zur Wiener Wirtschaft - Konjunktur und Arbeitsmarkt 2023, Wien, Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Democratic Society, 2022. Wiener Klimateam - Concept Development, https://www.demsoc.org/projects/vienna-climate-team-wiener-klimateam-vienna-participatory-budgeton-climate-action, (accessed 6.10.2024). Krutzler, D. and Rachbauer, S., 2023. 34 Bürger-Klimaschutzprojekte werden in Wien nun umgesetzt. DER STANDARD, 18 December. MA, 2022. Magistratsabteilung 20 – Energieplanung der Stadt Wien, Wiener Klimafahrplan, Vienna, Magistrat der Stadt Wien. MA 2023a. Magistratsabteilung 17 - Integration und Diversität, Integrationsmonitor 2023, Vienna, Magistrat der Stadt Wien. MA, 2023b. Magistratsabteilung 23. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien 2023. Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Statistik. Vienna, Magistrat der Stadt Wien. OTS, 2024. Nach erfolgreicher Pilotphase startet das Wiener Klimateam 2024 in drei neuen Bezirken. OTS.at, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20240510_OTS0034/nach-erfolgreicher-pilotphase-startet-d as-wiener-klimateam-2024-in-drei-neuen-bezirken, (accessed 6.10.2024). Presseservice der Stadt Wien, 2022. Archivmeldung: Stadt Wien startet „Wiener Klimateam“‘, Wien, Rathauskorrespondenz. https://presse.wien.gv.at/presse/2022/01/16/stadt-wien-startet-wiener-klimateam, (accessed 14.10.2024). Rachbauer, S., 2024. Das Wiener Klimateam wandelt sich. DER STANDARD, 10 May. Internet sources: https://klimateam.wien.gv.at/ https://klimateam.wien.gv.at/klimateam-2022 https://klimateam.wien.gv.at/projektablauf https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/685349/umfrage/bevoelkerung-von-wien-nach-alter/ https://www.demsoc.org/projects/vienna-climate-team-wiener-klimateam-vienna-participatory-budgeton-climate-action 7.2. Youth Climate Group, city of Granollers (ES) The EYES initiative, an Erasmus + project co-funded by the European Union, started in 2019 and lasted for 2 years. It was implemented in different cities in Italy, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, and Spain. The pilot in Spain was the municipality of Granollers. The project was conceived as an opportunity to bring youth and local public administration closer in the field of energy and climate change. The purpose of the project was to empower young generations, especially those between 18 and 29 years of age, to have an active role in the local decision-making regarding climate change. In other words, it attempted to create generational justice in the environmental field. Apart from targeting younger generations, which are the ones that will be suffering the direct consequences of climate emergency, EYES had a focus on vulnerable communities. When the aim is to apply measures to fight climate change, especially on the local level, it is important to have an inclusive mindset and make decisions that will leave no one behind. However, the participation of youth in today’s decision-making is not that obvious, either because they cannot vote or because they are not aware of the mechanisms for citizen participation296. The EYES project wanted to mitigate this by providing specific training and skills to youngsters, so they were able to take a stand on the policies being enforced in their territories. The whole project was organized with a top-bottom approach, led by the city council. On one side, there was an Advisory Board (AB) group, made of experts, who taught young participants to gain skills and knowledge on local participation processes, soft skills, Sustainable Energy and Climate Action Plans (SECAP) objectives, climate action, among others. On the other side, the young volunteers who received the training were grouped in Youth Intervention Teams (YIT). With the gained knowledge and the guidance received, the YIT managed to write and present policy recommendations to the mayor. On 31 January 2021, the project finished. It did not have a continuity itself, but it did imply several outcomes like the project Climatubers. It is important to mention the COVID-19 context that Spain was living at that time, which limited many outcomes of the project, for instance, to facilitate the participation of youth involved in the project in a European youth event, which could not be possible due to the pandemic. 7.2.1.Context Analysis The niche level and the focus for the historical example of Co-Sustain is the case of Granollers, the Spanish city chosen to implement the project. Its objective was to implicate youth (16-29) in local climate issues, promoting the development of certain skills and knowledge through a training program led by a group of experts called Advisory Board (AB). The youth groups were called Youth Intervention Teams (YIT) and were made of 10-15 people, including vulnerable profiles and/or people from different cultural backgrounds297. Although in Granollers there is an initiative called Roots Forum (Fòrum Arrel in Catalan), which started in 2018 and focuses on environmental and local climate action for youngsters aged 12 to 16, it was the first time that the city experienced a youth collective action like the one of EYES, involving individuals between 16 and 29 years of age. Although it was a top-down approach, youth saw the opportunity to get informed on the topic and channel their motivation to mitigate climate change at the local level. Following the input received during the interview with SH7, expert with knowledge on 297 Granollers City Council, EYES Project, 2019. https://wp.granollers.cat/eyes/. 296 ANEA, 2020. Ecoserveis and other partners, Deliverable O4.1: Guidelines for Municipalities to Use Youth Participation for Improving Local Policies and Enhance Youth Engagement in Climate Action, EYES Project. environment in Granollers, EYES was born with the objective to introduce the SECAP (Sustainable Energy and Climate Adaptation Plan)298 to younger generations, as the City Council realized they were the ones less informed on the topic but, at the same time, the ones that will be living first-hand the consequences of climate change in the city. As SH7 stated during the interview, as youngsters received more information, their motivation to be part of the change increased exponentially, directly being translated into an eagerness to do as many actions as possible. Most of this desire to undertake action for the future is motivated by the fact that climate change is a specifically catastrophic matter for youngsters. This is due to its multiple negative consequences, for instance, in the human and social field (conflicts, migrations, degradation of quality life), catastrophes due to extreme weather events, scarcity of resources, etc. Therefore, “recent studies have shown how climate change and extreme weather events have negatively affected the physical and mental health conditions of young people, including children”299. This is how youngsters started talking about ecoanxiety, a term that can be defined as the intrinsic relationship between the ecological crisis and the anxiety it created, especially to those who are informed and up to date on the matter. The regime layer in the EYES initiative is Catalonia. There is some context regarding youth movements in Catalonia that should be considered. A great example is the Children and Teenagers’ Council that Catalonia has since 1997. It shows the Catalan tradition and willingness to involve the voice of the youngest ones in the civic agenda. It is an initiative instigated by municipalities, where children can choose the other children who will represent them in the Council to defend their interests300. Regarding movements, there were specific landmarks in Catalan history, particularly from 2008 to 2015, that encouraged youth engagement in movements and protests, all of which were also part of the broader Spanish context. Examples include student protests, the feminist movement, and the okupa movement, although only the first type of protest will be mentioned here. The Bologna Plan in 2009 triggered significant student protests against the new education framework that the plan was proposing, which aimed to create a new structure for higher education adapted to the labor market needs, reducing the contents of university degrees301. Another relevant movement in Catalonia led by youth was the Indignados 15M protests that emerged in 2011. Although these protests were not directly related to climate issues, they highlight the robust social fabric in Catalonia, particularly among youth and students advocating for their rights. Whether addressing educational concerns or climate issues, as seen with the EYES project, Catalan youth have shown a strong commitment to activism. The landscape layer in EYES is the Spanish scenario but also the European one, due to the relevance that considering the European framework has in our initiative. Therefore, both geographical spaces will be 301 Garcia, C., 2017. Anàlisi del moviment estudiantil a Catalunya (2011-2016). https://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/108552/1/TFG-SOC-Garcia-Carla-febrer17.pdf . 300 CNIAC, 2024. Consells locals d'infància amb representació al CNIAC. Consell Nacional dels Infants i els Adolescents de Catalunya (CNIAC). https://pdia.blog.gencat.cat/consells-locals-infancia/. 299 Han, H., and Ahn, S., 2020. Youth Mobilization to Stop Global Climate Change: Narratives and Impact, MDPI, p.2, https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/10/4127. 298 It was approved in 2016. The plan can be accessed through the following link https://cloud.granollers.cat/index.php/s/BRZZkcIuzaS6l2v. Table 8.5a – Stakeholders: list and main features Stakeholder name Category Spatial Scale Role Resources Relationship SH1. Krakow Smog Alert NGOs Local promoter Relational cooperative SH2. Polish Smog Alert NGOs Local-Regional-Nat ional promoter Relational cooperative SH3. ClientEarth Poland NGOs National - Supranational promoter Relational, Knowledge cooperative SH4. Polish Green Network NGOs Local-Regional-Nat ional promoter Relational, Knowledge cooperative SH5. Business against smog Business & Industry Local promoter Positional, Relational cooperative SH6. Inspectorate of Environmental Protection Public services Local-Regional-Nat ional target Positional, Normative conflictual SH7. National/Regional Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management Public services Local-Regional-Nat ional target Positional neutral SH8. World Bank Institutions Supranational (EU, Global) third party Economic, Positional, Knowledge, Relational cooperative SH9. Scientists from Jagiellonian University Medical College Research Local-Regional-Nat ional third party Knowledge cooperative SH10. Scientists from AGH University of Science and Technology Research Local-Regional-Nat ional third party Knowledge cooperative SH11. Supreme Administrative Court Institutions National third party Normative neutral SH12. City Council of Cracow Public services Local target Normative, Positional, Relational, Economic cooperative SH13. Mayor of Krakow Politicians Local target Normative, Relational, Positional cooperative SH14. Lesser Poland Regional Assembly Politicians Regional target Normative, Positional, Relational, Economic cooperative SH15. Małopolska Provincial Office Politicians Regional target Normative, Positional, Relational, Economic neutral SH16. Ministry of Development Institutions National target Normative, Positional, Relational, Economic cooperative SH17. Ministry of Energy Institutions National target Normative, Positional, Relational, Economic conflictual SH18. Airly Business & Regional-Nationalbeneficiary Knowledge cooperative Industry Supranational SH19. Hackathons Civil society organizations Local promoter Knowledge cooperative SH20. Frank Bolt Foundation NGOs Local-Regional-Nat ional promoter Knowledge cooperative SH21. Citizens supporting initiative Citizens Local beneficiary/target Relational cooperative SH22. Citizens against initiative Citizens Local beneficiary/target Relational conflictual SH23. Lesser Poland Guild of Stove Fitter and Related Professions Intermediate bodies Regional target Positional, Relational conflictual SH24. Polish Economic Chamber of Coal Dealers Intermediate bodies Local-Regional-Nat ional beneficiary Positional, Relational conflictual SH25. Local media (krowoderska.pl, gazeta wyborcza) Media Local beneficiary/target Relational cooperative SH26. Foreign media Media Supranational (EU, Global) third party Relational neutral SH27. SMOGLAB Media National third party Relational cooperative SH28. Influencers/Social media celebrities Media Local-Regional-Nat ional third party Relational cooperative Figure 8.5a – Stakeholders by relevance: the Power-Interest matrix Table 8.5b – Stakeholders by impact Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact Affected SH5. Business against smog 3 4 SH18. Airly 3 5 SH22. Citizens against initiative 2 5 SH24. Polish Economic Chamber of Coal Dealers 2 5 Affected & Affecting SH4. Polish Green Network 2 2 SH9. Scientists from Jagiellonian University Medical College 3 3 SH10. Scientists from AGH University of Science and Technology 3 3 SH11. Supreme Administrative Court 1 1 SH19. Hackathons 1 1 SH23. Lesser Poland Guild of Stove Fitter and Related Professions 4 5 SH2. Polish Smog Alert 5 5 SH7. National/Regional Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management 4 4 Impact Category Stakeholder Power Impact SH21. Citizens supporting initiative 5 5 SH27. SMOGLAB 5 5 SH1. Krakow Smog Alert 5 5 Affecting SH16. Ministry of Development 5 3 SH17. Ministry of Energy 5 4 SH20. Frank Bolt Foundation 5 4 SH3. ClientEarth Poland 4 2 The Krakow Smog Alert is a social movement established in December 2012 in response to the alarming poor air quality in Krakow. Smog has been a phenomenon associated with the city for years, creating a negative counterbalance to its historic beauty and heritage. Smog in Krakow is a historical phenomenon; its presence in the city dates back to the 19th century, a time of technological and economic development. Until the 1990s development of industry (heat and power plants and steelworks in Krakow) was considered a major source of air pollution. After the steelworks were closed, household emissions (boilers) and traffic emissions are considered to be the main reasons for air quality degradation607. For years, residents remarked about poor air quality but could not see the consequences of inhaling it. Ecological organizations have been active in Kraków since the 1980s608(Polish Green Network), but it is only at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century that the topic of smog appears more and more often in the local public debate. This was influenced by two events that in 2012 mobilized residents to fight for clean air: (1) the announcement of 20 years of research at the Jagiellonian University on the negative impact of air pollution in Krakow on pregnancy and children development, and (2) the founding of the ‘Krakow Smog Alert’ Facebook profile by 3 people (Ewa Lutomska, Andrzej Guła, Anna Dworakowska), which published daily information on the state of air in Krakow. This made residents much more aware of the scale of pollution and its impact on their health. Numerous petitions, manifestations, and actions of urban activists were the initial forms of local political activities. Social activism and grassroots efforts have resulted in many social innovations and changes in social and cultural practices. The issue of combating air pollution has brought together different social groups and has led to activities and projects, such as hackathons, civic initiatives to create and place air quality sensors in city spaces, and a number of educational programmes and social campaigns. As a consequence of these activities and social pressures, a law has been introduced in Krakow which bans the burning of coal, wood and other solid fuels in boilers, cookers and fireplaces in the Krakow area from 1 September 2019. Now the citizens are fighting for a similar ban on solid fuels burning in surrounding communes. At the same time, taking the success of Krakow Smog Alert as an example, smog 608 Delorme, A., 2007. Dlaczego autentycznie społeczny ruch ekologiczny powstałw Krakowie. Państwo i Społeczeństwo 7, (4), 33-42. 607 Jeleński T., Dendys, M., Radziszewska-Zielina, E. and Fedorczak-Cisak M., 2021. Inclusion of Renewable Energy Sources in Municipal Environmental Policy: The Case Study of Kraków, Poland. Energies 14, (24), 8573. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14248573. alerts have been set up in dozens of other cities in Poland, and local government authorities there have begun to introduce anti-smog regulations following the example of Krakow. The civic initiative focused on the fight to improve air quality in Krakow began in 2012 when a Facebook profile called Krakow Smog Alert (KSA) was set up by three individuals. Initially, the profile published daily information on the air quality in the city. In the autumn of 2012, KSA used the social network for the first time to invite residents to participate in a protest march. At the time, around 300 people gathered to express their concern about the air quality in the city. Other organizations, public persons, city activists and artists associated with Krakow, as well as academics, joined in organizing the marches and publicizing the air quality issue. A community formed spontaneously around the Facebook profile, which began to amplify public discontent and put pressure on local authorities. A year later, in December 2013, the association was formally registered under the name Krakow Smog Alert. At the same time, a large-scale social campaign was initiated in the media and through outdoor advertising, which was financed from the bottom up by the community. Activists lobbying started for a change in regulations on permitted energy carriers (exclusion of solid fuels), as well as for the introduction of financial support programmes for the replacement of heating sources with ecological ones and subsidies for thermal modernisation of buildings. Due to the activities of the KSA, supporting organizations and citizens, from 2019 coal and wood can no longer be burned in the city, and the organization paved the way for all anti-smog resolutions in Poland (more than 50 other local smog alerts have been created since then). The members of such organizations are mainly residents of cities and towns where air pollution standards are exceeded, but they also involve social organizations, urban movements, scientists, artists, and some politicians. From the merger of the local smog alerts (Kraków, Lower Silesia and Podhale), the Polish Smog Alert (PSA) was established in 2015, bringing together civic movements concerned about poor air quality in Poland. The regime level consists of several levels corresponding to successive units of public administration. These are the local authorities represented by the city mayor and city council, the Marshal's Office and the Małopolska Regional Assembly. The Collective Action Initiative (CAI) landscape can be defined at the national level, with key stakeholders being the central government and its regional structure: the Małopolska Voivodeship Office. The legal framework and socio-cultural and economic conditions of the case study are also a part of the CAI landscape on the national scale: high dependence of the national economy on coal, the extraction of which is an important sector of the Polish economy. The dynamics of CAI activities were determined primarily by the different positions towards KSA's demands at different levels of administration, which resulted directly from the political struggle between political parties. Initially, local authorities were reluctant to introduce such radical solutions to improve air quality, despite clear evidence, including scientific findings, about their negative impact on human health. Activists were accused of being politically motivated (wanting to build political capital on the smog issues), acting to the detriment of Krakow's image (as a popular tourist destination) or lacking social sensitivity (banning solid fuels as a major factor in energy poverty for vulnerable groups). Relatively quickly, the municipal authorities of Krakow sided with the activists and submitted a petition to the provincial assembly to adopt a resolution banning the use of solid fuels in the city. At the same time, the city introduced protective programmes for energy-poor and low-income people in the form of subsidies for heating bills and a system of subsidies for replacing coal-fired furnaces with other heat sources. The latter was regressive, i.e. the subsidy was lower each year to mobilize residents to quickly decide to replace their heating sources. In the initial period, it was up to 100% of the investment costs. The initiators of CAI emphasize that the success of the project and the successful exertion of pressure on the municipal authorities was due to the huge mobilization of people, who were provided with reliable knowledge of the problem and possible solutions. This made politicians more willing to make unpopular decisions. Indeed, the resolution adopted by the Provincial Assembly at Krakow's request was immediately challenged by various groups whose interests had been violated. In addition to some residents, producers and sellers of coal and firewood, manufacturers of solid-fuel cookers and boilers, or associations of cooker and fireplace makers also agitated against the resolution. The anti-smog Resolution of the Provincial Assembly was adopted at the end of 2013, and already in February 2014, it was challenged before the Provincial Administrative Court, which annulled the introduced anti-smog regulations. This ruling was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) in August 2015609. The case at this stage became so high-profile that the central authorities had to address it. Public pressure meant that the government coalition in power at the time still managed to pass an amendment to the environmental protection law before the end of the legislature responding to all the SAC's objections. As a result, at the end of 2016, the councilors of the Małopolska Regional Assembly were able to adopt a second anti-smog resolution for Krakow, i.e. a total ban on burning coal and wood from 1 September 2019610. According to the KSA activists themselves, over several years of fighting for clean air, politicians have undergone a huge metamorphosis in their thinking about smog and decided, despite the political risks, to take such difficult decisions at a rapid pace. Achieving these changes required, in addition to marches and protests, also the support of scientists as well as works involving writing and submitting petitions, visits to Warsaw (the capital of Poland) to meet with representatives of the central authorities, and many social campaigns in which public figures were often involved. The most recent result of KSA's activities was the passing of an anti-smog resolution by the Małopolska Voivodeship Assembly, according to which the operation of classless solid fuel boilers was banned throughout the Małopolskie Voivodeship. Originally, the resolution was to come into force at the beginning of 2023, but due to the energy crisis caused by Russia's attack on Ukraine, the Sejmik finally postponed the deadline to April 2024611. This decision was 611 Spiller, J., 2022. Małopolska uchwała antysmogowa wejdzie w życie później niżzakładano, https://www.teraz-srodowisko.pl/aktualnosci/malopolska-uchwala-antysmogowa-kwiecien-2024-12430.html (accessed: 07.09.2024). 610 CIRE, 2016. Kraków. Uchwała antysmogowa zaskarżona, https://www.cire.pl/artykuly/serwis-informacyjny-cire-24/111455-krakow-uchwala-antysmogowa-zaskarzona (accessed: 07.09.2024). 609 Teraz Środowisko, 2015. Czy Kraków będzie stronąprzed NSA w sprawie tzw. "uchwały antysmogowej"? https://www.teraz-srodowisko.pl/aktualnosci/Krakow-NSA-uchwala-antysmogowa-643.html (accessed: 23.09.2024). appealed to the Voivode, and activists from the KSA were also joined by the city of Krakow in the role of allies fighting for air quality612. A long-term effort by KSA members, activists, residents and local authorities has led to the introduction of a ban on burning coal and wood. The year 2023 was the first year in the history of measurements in which there were no annual exceedances of the level of particulate matter and the permissible number of smog days at any of the measurement stations in Krakow (KAS 2024). Social activism and grassroots efforts have resulted in numerous social innovations and changes in social and cultural practices. The issue of combating air pollution has brought together different social groups and has led to activities and projects, such as hackathons, civic initiatives to create and place air quality sensors in city spaces, educational programs and social campaigns, and even a few start-ups. The case of Krakow is shown to this day as a unique example of how grassroots activities and civic participation can influence local regulations and local authorities. Despite meeting current air quality standards, smog episodes still occur in Krakow and the health risk is still significant. The levels recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO) have also still not been achieved613. 8.5.3. References ABSL, 2017. Sektor nowoczesnych usług biznesowych w Polsce 2017. https://g3.gazetaprawna.pl/p/_wspolne/pliki/2981000/2981561-raport-absl-2017.pdf (accessed: 05.10.2024). Blecharczyk, W. and Kandefer, M., 2021. Rola Krakowskiego Holdingu Komunalnego SA w zakresie gospodarki odpadowej Miasta Krakowa. Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Informatyki w Krakowie (17), 9-24. Bokwa, A., 2017. Smog jako element mezoklimatu Krakowa. [in:] M. Drewniak and M. Mika (eds.), Człowiek i jego działania. Spojrzenie geografa. Krakow: Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrzennej Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego w Krakowie, 61-69. CIRE, 2016. Kraków. Uchwała antysmogowa zaskarżona, https://www.cire.pl/artykuly/serwis-informacyjny-cire-24/111455-krakow-uchwala-antysmogowa-zaskarz ona (accessed: 07.09.2024). CNUCED, 2012. 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Civic engagement extends beyond individual participation to include volunteering and supporting causes that benefit the community, empowering citizens and strengthening social cohesion. Formal political engagement includes organized efforts such as voting in elections or aspiring for political positions , or engaging in policymaking processes to influence government decisions. Activism however, is a more complex form of participation which encompasses advocacy that involves direct confrontation, mass protests or campaigns that challenge established norms and structures. These categories reflect varying levels or “depths” of involvement with democracy and community life, highlighting the spectrum of participation dynamics. Initially developed to describe interpersonal interactions and their emotional dimensions in different contexts, this typology provides a useful framework for analyzing community engagement and political discourse. Within the CO-SUSTAIN project, however, the typology has been adapted to focus on the dominant characteristics of organizations so as to be able to identify their diversity on the transformative path. It is worth emphasizing that the categories of Ekman and Amna typology were implemented at the conception stage of the project making them a valuable tool for the initial organization of the research material gathered throughout the contextual analysis. 9.1. HISTORIC EXAMPLES OF INVOLVEMENT The excerpt below deals with involvement as a specific form of public participation. This type of involvement represents a passive form of participation with low levels of commitment and activity. The main activities which are included in this type of involvement are receiving information and voicing one's opinion, although not necessarily participating in any decision-making processes or other actions. Here, in order to understand the importance of these initiatives, it is important to look at the practices and decisions made by their members or supporters. The Chapter five draws on case studies of five European initiatives to illustrate involvement in practice: ●OurPower Energy Cooperative (AT): This cooperative promotes energy democracy and citizen power through an online marketplace connecting renewable energy producers and consumers. Although OurPower encourages citizen participation in the renewable energy transition, individuals primarily engage by buying or selling electricity, a relatively passive form of involvement. ●Energy Community in the Rural Municipality of Monachil (ES): This community aims to promote energy savings, efficiency, and renewable self-consumption among residents. While the community encourages participation, members primarily engage through membership. Although 614 Ekman, J. and Amnå, E., 2012. Political participation and civic engagement: Towards a new typology. Human Affairs 22. Doi: 10.2478/s13374-012-0024-1.