New Frontiers in EU Trade Policy: Moving Beyond Conventional Trade Agreements

WORKING PAPER N. 01 - 2025 ‘New Frontiers in EU Trade Policy: Moving Beyond Conventional Trade Agreements’ 1 Dr Niall Moran, Assistant Professor of Economic Law (Dublin City University) Abstract: As the rules-based international trading system faces stagnation and increasing unilateralism, the European Union's trade policy must evolve beyond conventional free trade agreements (FTAs). This article examines recent trends in EU trade agreements, highlighting not only their expanded scope to include areas such as digital trade, sustainability, and regulatory cooperation, but also the emergence of new negotiation formats such as two-phase agreements. It then explores alternative forms of trade cooperation, including plurilateral agreements, mini-deals, and informal economic partnerships, as potential responses to geopolitical shifts and recent trade disruptions. Against a backdrop of renewed protectionist measures—particularly from the United States—this article argues that the EU must proactively forge deeper economic alliances with likeminded partners as a counterforce to these trends.. The EU can do this by embracing adaptable negotiating formats that prioritise speed and flexibility without compromising on the core requirements for such agreements at the multilateral level. A strategic shift towards trade arrangements that are adaptable and pragmatic, yet uphold the integrity of the rules-based system is essential to preserving the multilateral trading order in an era of growing economic unilateralism. Keywords: EU trade law | FTAs | IPEF | plurilateral agreements | WTO law 1. What role for EU trade partnerships at a time of increasing unilateralism? As the rules-based international trading system has staggered into the second quarter of the 21st century, the pace of the conclusion of free trade agreements (FTAs) has at least remained steady (WTO, 2025). According to the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Database, as of 1 February 2025 there were 373 regional trade agreements in force involving all WTO 1 This is a pre-print of an article published in the Global Policy Journal, Special Issue ‘The New Washington Consensus and the Changing Landscape of International Economic Law and Policy’ (2025) members except Timor-Leste). While around 80% of global trade in goods is conducted on an MFN basis (Gonciarz, T. and Verbeet T, 2024) there are also a significant number of deeply integrated trading areas in the global economy. Approximately one half of WTO members are part of a customs union and one quarter are part of a monetary union. In contrast to the prominence of FTAs in the early 21st century, there has been stagnation at the multilateral level in international trade law. This stagnation in terms of negotiations and regression in terms of the settlement of disputes has begun to affect the content of FTAs and the usage of their dispute settlement mechanisms by WTO Members. Coupled with the recent rise in unilateralism, it may well be that there is a renewed impetus to reimagine the possibilities of FTAs. This would build upon the move “beyond traditional trade deals”, which was a hallmark of the Biden Administration, and one of the pillars of the “new Washington consensus” (Sullivan, J. 2023), the subject of this Special Issue. Given the dramatic escalation in tariffs unseen in scale for nearly a century, stable and reliable trading partnerships have taken on renewed strategic significance. As the Trump Administration targets allies and adversaries alike with economic measures from tariffs to export controls, there is increased urgency to deepen trading alliances and to form a united opposition to these actions. This represents an opportunity for those committed to the rules-based international order. New arrangements among likeminded allies may be the best option in the face of economic coercion or strongarming of this kind. The potential form such arrangements could take is the subject of this article. Trade integration and cooperation in international economic law (IEL) takes many forms – as does conflict in IEL. This article focuses on positive trade integration and explores four forms of cooperation including and going beyond conventional trade agreements. Such arrangements are all the more necessary at this time. This article makes the case that the caution that has characterised the economic integration process in recent decades has to be replaced not just by a firm commitment to rules-based international trade among WTO Members, but by putting in place new arrangements that will deepen their economic integration. 2. Expanding Cooperation under FTAs and recent trends in EU trade agreements This section considers recent trends in the conclusion of RTAs. It discusses expanding cooperation under FTAs before turning to the recent practices of the EU. a) Expanding Cooperation under FTAs Inter-state cooperation in international trade law has evolved from the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) of old to the Mega Regional Trade Agreements (MRTAs) of the past decade. i In line with Article XXIV GATT and Article V GATS, parties conclude such agreements with the aim of encouraging reciprocal trade, services and investment through deeper liberalization and without raising barriers against non-members. The aims of RTAs have expanded in recent times going beyond the reduction of tariffs, customs barriers and what has traditionally been covered in trade agreements to mutual recognition agreements, the harmonization of standards and qualifications, and other forms of cooperation (Claussen, 2022). In most FTAs, provisions on substantive rules and rights and obligations often closely follow (or directly incorporate) the WTO agreements in these areas. ii Overall however, the subject matter covered in RTAs and the level of detail entered into has also rapidly expanded in recent times to include coverage of matters that go beyond the WTO agreements (WTO-extra provisions) including for example investment chapters that contain ISDS (Horn, H. Mavroidis, P. & Sapir, A., 2009). While agreements like the GATT have proven remarkably resilient over time – though not without flaws – the scope of trade agreements today has inevitably expanded to include areas such as digital trade and data flows (Burri, 2023), sustainable development, and other emerging issues. iii A comparison between the EU-Singapore FTA and the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agrement (AFA) is instructive in understanding this recent expansion, with these agreements having been concluded in 2014 and 2024 respectively. The EU-Chile AFA contains 33 chapters, compared to 16 chapters in the EU-Singapore FTA, marking a clear expansion in areas such as trade governance and regulatory cooperation. Areas that have emerged under the EU-Chile AFA, and did not feature in the EU-Singapore FTA, include chapters on digital trade (chapter 19), SOEs (22), the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (14), regulatory cooperation (29 & 13) iv , SMEs (30), critical raw materials (8), and a greater emphasis on sustainability including gender equality (27). While there is a general trend towards expansion, the content of FTAs is bespoke. Not every FTA would contain a chapter on critical raw materials and the EU-Chile AFA is indicative of the EU’s increased emphasis on economic security. Agreements with other partners also contain atypical elements including the EU’s recent FTA with New Zealand, which contains innovative commitments on climate, and the EU’s Global Agreement with Mexico, which contains a chapter dedicated to anti-corruption. While areas not traditionally covered in trade agreements have at times been brought under the FTA umbrella (e.g. anti-corruption), there is now a shift from ‘trade and’ to ‘…and trade’ v —with trade increasingly being part of the broader framework of international cooperation, which may primarily be shaped by security and geopolitics (e.g., IPEF, TTC). The question arises as to the limits of what can be included in a FTA, where WTO Members maintain independent trade policies. This was tested during the negotiation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was concluded in 2020. This mammoth agreement encompasses trade, security, law enforcement, fisheries and more, containing 783 Articles and over 2,500 pages including annexes. The TCA was born of necessity in the unique circumstance of a ‘divorce’ between two economies that had become deeply intertwined over the course of the previous decades. While the TCA is a trade agreement involving deep integration between economic partners, it is not of course a model to follow and its provisions are driven by the unique context of Brexit. b) Recent trends in EU FTAs Economic security was to the top of the agenda in European Commission President Von der Leyen’s first term (2019-2024). The Commission’s geopolitical turn was reflected in the transition from the Juncker Commission’s ‘trade for all’ strategy to ‘open strategic autonomy’ (OSA) during Von der Leyen’s first Commission Presidency and is arguably the most important recent development in EU trade policy (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2023).The phrase OSA captured a dual focus in the focus of EU trade policy during this time. The word ‘open’ in OSA refers to measures that liberalise trade (broadly speaking), while ‘strategic autonomy’ largely refers to measures that strengthen trade defence, as well as the EU’s broader ambition of being able to function autonomously in global affairs. During these years, one of the three pillars of the EU’s economic security strategy was ‘partnerships’. In terms of OSA, there was more of a focus on protecting the EU against vulnerabilities during Commission President von der Leyen’s first term, for example through the adoption of instruments such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), CBAM etc (Verellen & Hofer, 2023). This came about after the Commission undertook a “vast project” to review potential vulnerabilities in its trade defence instruments (Beaucillon, 2023). There was less focus on FTAs and reduced ambition in EU FTA policy. Economic security and competitiveness are the issues that have dominated the early days of the second von der Leyen Commission, even leading to the renaming of the Commission’s trade department from DG Trade to DG Trade and Economic Security. The focus of EU trade policy is now on the core objectives of competitiveness, security and sustainability (von der Leyen, 2025). Compared to the Juncker Commission, which made the conclusion of a EU-US trade agreement one of its ten priorities, there has been a sense of inertia around the negotiation of new free trade agreements with exceptions such as the New Zealand and Chile trade agreements. The former was the first agreement to include the EU’s new approach to trade and sustainable development and it contained legally enforceable commitments on climate change. The latter can be seen as furthering EU economic security with the EU’s desire to secure access to raw materials such as lithium and copper being one of the driving forces behind this deal. Nonetheless these countries had a combined population of 24 million people at the time and agreements with larger trading partners remained elusive. There are signs of a renewed impetus to conclude FTAs with recent breakthroughs on the EU-Mercosur Agreement and the modernisation of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement in late 2024 and early 2025. Such agreements can act as a counterweight against rising protectionism, though neither agreement is yet in force. c) Trends to be approached with caution As mentioned, stable and reliable trading partnerships have taken on a renewed strategic significance in 2025. Where other major trading powers engage in coercive unilateral measures, this represents an opportunity for the EU to deepen its trading partnerships with likeminded allies. The second von der Leyen Commission’s key objectives centre around competitiveness and security and concluding deep rules-based trading partnerships contributes to both of these objecives. The EU must lead by example and in its negotiations with the Trump administration, there should be no question of compromising on respect for the rules of the international trading system. Deals of this kind, by the EU or other WTO Members, risk destroying the WTO rulebook. Any deal that fails to comply with WTO rules is a Faustian pact, that will ultimately prove destructive. As the US administration has criticised EU policies on a range of issues from VAT to hormone-treated beef, it is also far from certain that an agreement with the US could be concluded. In March 2025, the EU proposed a "zero-for-zero" tariff arrangement to eliminate industrial tariffs with the US. While President Trump rejected this proposal, EU officials have maintained that the offer is still on the table. The WTO compatibility of such an arrangement would depend on its benefits being extended to all WTO Members, it being part of a formal Free Trade Agreement (FTA), or the arrangement receiving a waiver from the WTO membership, which would be unlikely. While the details of this arrangement are not fully clear, there are definitely questions to be answered about its WTO compatibility, particularly as market access appears to be at its core, rather than sustainability or mutual recognition agreements. The UK was the first country to reach an agreement with the US in the aftermath of its socalled ‘Liberation Day’. This Economic Prosperity Deal, while not “legally binding” is far narrower than the EU “zero for zero” offer and would be a clear breach of WTO rules. This deal is reminiscent of the 2019 US-Japan mini-deal on tariff lines covering a narrow range of goods, though at least this agreement planned a more extensive second phase of negotiations (see section 3.b). The trend of sequencing trade agreements into multiple phases has also recently been adopted by the EU in its negotiations with Indonesia and India (Times of India, 2025). While this approach embodies the pragmatism that may be needed in today’s geopolitical climate, it also introduces risks. Deferring the most contentious parts of an agreement to a second phase of negotiations may well reduce the likelihood of reaching an outcome in these areas, as occurred in the abovementioned phase one US-Japan agreement. To mitigate this risk, steps can be taken to to maintain momentum such as having a built-in agenda. However, each party will have to assess whether there ultimately there will be the political will to conclude a second phase and whether that risk is worth taking (e.g. if a stalled agenda would call into question the WTO compatibility of a phase one agreement). There is understandable caution towards the ‘single undertaking’ model in the trade negotiations, given the limited outcomes at the WTO since 1995. Against this, bilateral negotiations are far simpler than those involving over 100 parties. However, negotiation theory emphasises the value of integrative bargaining in reaching favourable negotiating outcomes (Druckman, D. and Wagner, L., 2021) and that simultaneous negotiations can lead to better outcomes than sequential negotiations where there are multiple contentious issues (Fatima, Woolridge. and Jennings, 2006). 3. Forms of Cooperation Beyond Conventional Trade Agreements This section explores the options available for using FTAs as a means of deepening alliances and as a response to increasing unilateralism. It charts three different forms of cooperation on trade including plurilateral agreements, mini-deals, and informal economic partnerships. Along with RTAs, these arrangements are of increased importance in the context of rising unilateralism and faltering multilateralism. a) Plurilateral agreements As WTO Members have failed to successfully conclude major trade negotiations and bring the organization’s rulebook meaningfully into the 21st century, agreements among a subset of members, known as plurilateral agreements (PAs), seem like “a pragmatic alternative to multilateralism” (Collins, 2025) and an obvious solution to bypass the WTO’s consensus requirement. The EU for example has long resorted to the tactic of differentiated integration as a means of facilitating deeper integration among willing Member States (Peers, 2015). This raises the question of why plurilaterals have played such a marginal role in shaping the multilateral trading system in recent years. I believe the two main reasons for this are the WTO’s consensus requirement (foreclosing closed PAs) and the fact that we have entered an age shaped by geopolitical tensions and great power rivalries (foreclosing open PAs to some extent). vi Article II.3 of the Marrakesh Agreement states the Plurilateral Trade Agreements are “also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them”. Such agreements are included in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement vii but their addition to Annex 4 requires consensus among WTO Members. The WTO’s conensus requirement applies not only to new WTO agreements, but also to closed plurilateral agreements (Ungphakorn, 2024a; Collins, 2025). While it is understandable that reaching consensus among 166 Members and concluding an agreement such as the Doha Develoment Round is far from easy, it might be hoped that this consensus requirement would not be such an impediment to groups of Members seeking deeper integration at the WTO. This however has not turned out to be the case. At the WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13), there was some success with India lifting its objection to the Services Domestic Regulation, an open plurilateral agreement agreed to by 71 WTO Members. However a closed plurilateral was also proposed at MC13, the Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement, and this was blocked by India and South Africa. They cited the lack of consensus on the issue and Article X.9 of the Marrakesh Agreement. viii By the end of 2024, the addition of this plurilateral agreement had been blocked six times. Despite having the support of 126 WTO Members, the adoption of the agreement has been repeatedly opposed at the WTO General Council by India, South Africa and Türkiye (Ungphakorn, 2024b). It is safe to say that India is a staunch defender of the consensus requirement at the WTO, which it views as a “fundamental rule” in WTO decision-making. ix In India’s five-page “rant” (Ungphakorn, 2023) against plurilaterals, it asks “What could be more ironic in WTO than this, i.e., violating the treaty-embedded right of members to start consensus-based negotiations on mandated issues, and then at the end of such unrecognized and unlawful process, seeking consensus from those very members whose treaty-embedded right was intentionally vitiated in the first instance.” x While India’s opposition to closed plurilaterals may seem rigid, its stance highlights the broader challenge of securing consensus-based agreements at the WTO, and makes the conclusion of closed plurilateral agreements unlikely to materialize in the near future. Negotiations of open plurilateral agreements, sometimes referred to as ‘joint statement initiatives’, appear to be less objectionable to certain WTO Members, as seen above with the Services Domestic Regulation which entered into force at MC13. As per Article X.9 of the Marrakesh Agreement, such agreements may only be added to Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement where the Ministerial Conference decides to do so by consensus. Nonetheless, the negotiation of open plurilaterals within the WTO framework can present challenges as some Members tend to “insist that negotiations, or discussions, within the WTO involve all Members, and not only a coalition of willing Members.” (Van den Bossche and Zdouc, 2022). A way around this is negotiating plurilaterals outside the WTO framework. Examples of this in recent years include the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) which entered into force between New Zealand, Chile and Singapore in 2021. xi This agreement covers digital trade (data, artificial intelligence, digital products etc.). The Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS) eliminates tariffs on 316 environmental goods and over 100 environmental services, as well as developing a framework on the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies. xii While ACCTS is designed to expand over time, there are question marks over whether the EU and other potential partners will join. ACCTS includes a commitment to eliminating tariffs on goods including electric vehicles (EVs) and solar panels and it is unclear whether such a commitment would overly constrain EU policy as it seeks to gain a foothold in the EV industry. This is particularly relevant given the EU’s recent investigation into Chinese EVs and its decision to impose countervailing duties. The WTO compatibility of plurilaterals negotiated outside the WTO framework is clearer where they build on existing trade agreements between the parties (regional trade agreements that come under GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V are exceptions to the WTO’s rule on nondiscrimination). Where there is no underlying FTA, WTO compatibility may be called into question. xiii Where there would be a possibility of such objections, i.e. in the absence of an underlying trade agreement that the framework builds upon, this would be an additional obstacle to EU accession. DEPA and ACCTS undoubtedly fall short of GATT Article XXIV’s criterion of covering substantially all trade. These agreements are however open plurilaterals where the elimination of customs duties on environmental goods imports is extended to all WTO Members (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2024). As such the tariff reductions are implemented in a WTO-consistent manner observing the MFN principle. b) Mini-deals As the drive to conclude large scale trade agreements has slowed down in recent years, particularly among the world’s largest economies, an interest in deals at the other end of the spectrum – mini-deals – has emerged. Cernat puts the number of such deals concluded by the EU at around 2,000 (Cernat, 2023) and Claussen has found over 1,200 such agreements concluded by the US (Claussen, 2021). An obvious objection to such deals is the fact that they would be unlikely to meet the requirement of covering “substantially all the trade” between the territories in question. While there has been a longstanding question concerning the compliance of the hundreds of RTAs that have been notified to the WTO with this requirement, it is beyond question that mini-deals that cover a few tariff lines between the parties would not be compatible with GATT Article XXIV where there is no existing trade agreement between the parties. There are various types of mini-deals ranging from deals on tariffs to mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) (Cernat, 2023). Examples of mini-deals concerning tariffs include the EU-US mini-deal announced in 2020 on lobster and a few other tariff lines. xiv This package was agreed by Ambassador Lighthizer and Commissioner Hogan “[a]s part of improving EUUS relations”. xv The objective of the agreement was to “de-escalate tensions”. xvi Importantly the tariff reductions were implemented in a WTO-consistent manner and observed the MFN principle. Another example is the 2019 US-Japan mini-deal on tariff lines covering 42 farm products and certain industrial goods, which was the first cut in trade barriers during the Trump administration (Schott, 2025). The first phase of the US-Japan deal clearly failed that test, but US officials argued that once the second phase of the deal was completed, it would be WTOcompliant (Schott, 2025). This was well described as offering the deal a “thin veil of WTO compliance”, which was borne out as the more extensive second phase planned for 2020 was not ultimately completed (Dadush & Brekelmans, 2019). Mini-deals of this nature, including the UK-US trade agreement discussed in section 2(c), clearly depart from the rules-based system and the commitment of WTO Members to only depart from the MFN principle where they conclude comprehensive trade agreements. c) Informal economic partnerships In early 2025, at first glance, the case for making informal economic partnerships such as those pursued by the Biden administration the solution to the problems facing IEL today is not obvious. These new model arrangements may appear to have been little more than placeholders during the four-year interregnum between the first and second Trump administrations. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) was the Biden Administration’s flagship initiative in Asia. It included fourteen participating states xvii and was probably the most welldeveloped of these informal partnerships. Key features of IPEF included reduced ambition, particularly compared to an agreement like TPP, a move away from reducing trade barriers, an à la carte approach, so countries could opt out of any of the pillars, and a focus on key contemporary challenges such as supply chain management, climate change, the digital economy etc. IPEF was not a trade agreement in the traditional sense and it was ultimately underwhelming. It involved negotiations on four pillars including: (1) Trade; (2) Supply Chains; (3) the Clean Economy and 4) Anti-Corruption. xviii Across its seven negotiating rounds and ministerial meetings, outcomes were reached on all but one of these pillarsthe trade pillar. It appears that the fatal flaw in IPEF was that market access was taken off the table by the US. This was a key trade interest of many of the US’ partners and it can be argued that without market access the US’ partners lacked an incentive to give far-reaching commitments in areas such as labour standards or anti-corruption. Seven of the member countries of IPEF are also CPTPP Members and it may be the case that there was hope this agreement would be a bridge towards a more far-reaching agreement in the future. IPEF’s Supply Chain Agreement is perhaps its most interesting outcome. The parties established a Supply Chain Council, which included a Crisis Response Network aimed at addressing disruptions in supply chains. This Agreement also contains a Labor Rights Advisory Board (Article 8) and a mechanism that is akin to the USMCA’s Rapid Response Mechanism (Article 9). Under this mechanism, allegations of labor rights “inconsistencies” can be reported. A central issue here is enforcement and remedies. While the USMCA provides for the suspension of concessions where an inconsistency is found, there is no market access in IPEF that can be suspended. Rather the Agreement commits the parties to “dialogue in good faith to reach a resolution” (Article 9.10.). The EU’s main foray in this area was the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) as well as the EU-India TTC. xix The EU-US TTC was built on soft law structures and represents a “low bar of cooperation” (Fahey, 2024), having mainly focused on green trade and technology, and various aspects concerning supply chains. The TTC met six times from 20212024 and proved itself to be limited but useful in sharing best practices and coordinating action, for example on subsidy programmes (Working Group 3)and coordinating export control regimes, including on semiconductors. xx This was also important in the context of coordinating controls and sanctions in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the role of this informal economic partnership and a criticism of the TTC was the fact that the important trade issues such as the US’ Inflation Reduction Act were addressed outside of this Council at the EU–US IRA Task Force. Although neither of these examples could be said to have provided clear grounds for an endorsement of informal economic partnerships from 2021-2024, the next section discusses how such a format may yet prove to be a useful form of cooperation. 4. New Frontiers in EU trade policy: abandoning caution in response to the Trump Administration a) The need for action This article makes the case that the caution that has characterised the economic integration process in recent decades has to be replaced with a firm commitment to free trade among the subset of WTO Members that is proactively committed to the multilateral system, imperfect though it may be, and the concept of rules-based international trade. The Trump Administration has seriously undermined the rules-based international trading system with its so-called ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs. Scrapping the WTO’s foundational MFN provision, the US sought to impose “a reciprocal tariff with respect to each foreign trading partner” before pausing these measures (White House, 2025b). Trump has also imposed tariffs on a range of goods including steel and aluminium, automobiles, and semiconductors. These threats have at times been made in order to force changes to the immigration or drug control policies of neighbouring countries (White House, 2025a). Actions such at those of the US require an equal and opposite reaction in response. This involes forming alliances. As a starting point, the EU should seek to deepen its trading relations with WTO Members that have demonstrated a commitment to the multilateral system, for example the 28 other WTO Members who have joined the MPIA. xxi Cooperation with the CPTPP could establish “common principles” in oppostion to unilateralism and a cooperation framework that could eventually lay the groundwork for WTO reform (García Bercero, 2025). While the EU has trade agreements with many of these countries, progress can be made in building on existing agreements (as seen with the modernised agreement with Mexico), ratifying Mercosur, and concluding negotiations with Australia and the Philippines. b) What should new forms of cooperation in international trade look like? As set out in Section 3(a), the marginal role of plurilateral agreements (PAs) in the development of IEL comes down to a couple of key reasons. First, the WTO’s consensus requirement has meant that individual WTO Members can block closed PAs from being concluded within the WTO framework. Open PAs have had limited success both at the WTO and outside of it. Open PAs such as ACCTS have been successful in eliminating customs duties on environmental goods imports. The elimination of duties is however extended to all WTO Members in order to comply with the MFN principle. The EU recognises the potential for open, plurilateral agreements to deliver where the single undertaking approach has failed (European Commission, 2021). The Commission has also called for the creation of an easier path for plurilateral agreements to be integrated in the multilateral architecture (European Commission, 2021). While open plurilaterals further the objective of trade liberalisation, it may be difficult for the EU to adopt this approach where benefits are extended on an MFN basis to all WTO members in an age shaped by power rivalries. Closed PAs outside the WTO could be an option, though these would require an underlying FTA in order to be WTO compatible. On mini-deals, some of these agreements appear to be of questionable WTO compatibility. During Trump’s first term, the EU managed to strike a mini-deal with the US on a MFN basis, thus making it compatible with WTO law. The US-Japan mini-deal made no such provision. What the two deals had in common was the opportunity they seized upon. The objective of the Japan US mini-deal was not a general aim to promote trade in goods, rather it was an attempt to compensate American farmers “for their losses from the trade war with China” (Dadush & Brekelmans, 2019). Likewise, the EU’s mini-deal was concluded against a backdrop of demand for Maine lobsters having “fallen by 50%”, largely due to tariffs enacted by China in the US-China trade war (25% extra). xxii As Reinhard Bütikofer MEP reminded the European Parliament, “we open a door to shared efforts to overcome the trade war mentality which has poisoned transatlantic relations over the last four years”. xxiii This spirit of pragmatism needs to be replicated by the EU and its partners over the coming years. When the time is right, a window for a deal with the US may well present itself and as seen above, deals can be reached that are win-win and WTO compatible. Generally speaking however, mini-deals tend to be in areas such as Mutual Recognition Agreements. Such agreements are undoubtedly useful and provide incremental gains over time but on their own they are unlikely to provide a large scale solution to the problem of unilateralism. and Mr Commissioner, is of course: This is an offer - an offer to tackle the many problems we have with the United States.” xxiii European Parliament, Verbatim Report of Proceedings of 26 November 2020 (C/2024/5002) < https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C_202405002> accessed 15 February 2025. xxiv Mercosur negotiations infamously began in 2000 and the agreement still is not in force; negotaitions on CETA began in 2009 and its trade chapters only entered into force in 2017, while its investment chapters remain in limbo. xxv On 26 January 2025, Colombia President Gustavo Petro rejected two deportation flights from the US. In response, the Trump administration threatened tariffs on Colombian exports to the US. Despite an initial claim to respond with tariffs, President Petro accepted deportation flights “without limitation or delay”. See White House, Statement from the Press Secretary <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/2025/01/statement-from-the-press-secretary/> accessed 23 February 2025. xxvi The EU has 44 preferential trade agreements with 76 partners across the world <https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/enforcement-and-protection/implementing-and-enforcing-eu-tradeagreements_en> accessed 24 May 2025.