The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia Since February 2022

THE POLITICAL DIVERSITY OF THE NEW MIGRATION FROM RUSSIA SINCE FEBRUARY 2022 Félix Krawatzek and Gwendolyn Sasse ZOiS REPORT No. 4 / 2024 · September 2024 ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 2 Content 02 ___ Summary 04 ___ Introduction 05 ___ Methodological considerations 08 ___ Migrant profiles across the sample 09 ___ Spotlights on hubs of Russian migration 09 ______ Armenia: A welcoming context 11 ______ Georgia: A de-mobilising socio-political context 12 ______ Turkey: A hub for wealthy and politically diverse migrants 13 ______ Kazakhstan: A somewhat familiar environment 15 ______ Kyrgyzstan: A base for transnational Russians 16 ______ Blame attribution for the war across all respondents 17 ___ Conclusion 20 ___ Imprint Summary While estimates vary, Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted approximately 800,000 to 900,000 Russian citizens to leave their country. Two distinct waves of migration from Russia have been identified: the first in the spring and summer of 2022, the second after the announcement of a partial mobilisation in September 2022. A significant number of Russian migrants have since returned to Russia, and it is estimated that 650,000 remain abroad. This report focuses on five of the most important destination countries for new Russian migration: Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. We conducted face-to-face interviews with around 4,300 Russian citizens across the five countries in the summer of 2023. The aim was to get a clearer sense of their political attitudes and determine whether different countries were popular with particular categories of migrants. For each of the five countries, we can demonstrate a correlation between the migrants’ socio-demographic profile and their political views, in particular their position on Russia’s war against Ukraine. These are our main findings: ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 3 – Migrants who left Russia since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 represent a highly heterogeneous group within and across the host countries. They differ strongly in their views on Russian politics and Russia’s war against Ukraine and in their political behaviour and social values. Given this diversity, it seems unlikely that the migrants will unite around a new overarching idea of Russians abroad. A shared sense of identity may, however, emerge linked to specific locations and experiences. – Different countries seem to attract specific socio-economic segments, with marked differences in the migrants’ age, level of education, employment sector, and previous place of residence in Russia. Our samples in Armenia and Georgia pick up a younger, highly educated, urban segment with a large number of employees from the IT sector. The samples in Kyrgyzstan and Turkey are much more diverse, and the sample in Kazakhstan includes migrants with lower levels of education and a large share of people working in the construction and trade sectors. – Across the five countries, the new Russian migrants cannot be thought of as an opposition-in-exile in the making. Armenia and Georgia emerge as the countries in our sample where a significant share of Russian migrants reports oppositional views and previous experience of political mobilisation in Russia. However, the societal and political context in Georgia, where Russians are viewed with suspicion, limits their scope for local or transnational political action. For the time being, this atmosphere seems to be having a demobilising effect. By contrast, Armenia currently appears to be a more conducive setting for political actions directed at Russia. – Sizeable shares of the migrant population in Turkey and Kazakhstan are broadly aligned with the political ideas propagated by the Kremlin, whereas the data from Kyrgyzstan suggest significant diversity and the potential for criticism of Russian politics. – Russian migrants are a key target of the Kremlin’s propaganda and many are still immersed in the Russian media environment. Under these circumstances it would be wise to invest more in alternative Russian-language media and support efforts to forge connections between migrants in different countries. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 4 Introduction Wars have been one of the main drivers of mass migration throughout human history.1 Russia’s war against Ukraine has led to millions of people leaving their homes — in Ukraine and Russia. Even though the numbers are hard to pin down, the total number of Russians who left their home country since February 2022 was estimated to be over 800,000 in July 2023.2 The number of Russians who remain abroad is probably lower at this point and estimated to be somewhere in the region of 650,000.3 It is a group that remains in motion: some have already moved on from their initial host country, while others have not made up their minds about how long they will stay in the receiving societies, where conditions are sometimes challenging. OutRush data from the summer of 2022 suggested that around 15 per cent of those who fled Russia after February 2022 had already returned before the partial mobilisation was announced in September 2022.4 Even for a country the size of Russia, with a working population of around 73 million, the loss of these citizens leaves a significant dent in the labour market. All the more so since educated, young urbanites account for a disproportionately high share of the migrants. They further diminish an active population that was already shrinking due to the war mobilisation. The Russian unemployment rate has reached record low levels, falling to below 3 per cent in early 2024.5 With men in particular missing from the economy, the professional profiles of men and women have significantly changed over the last two years.6 In the first months after the start of the invasion, the share of young, educated, urban and opposition-minded individuals who left the country, among them journalists, academics, and activists, was particularly high.7 There is a tendency to see this ‘group’ as a potential opposition-in-exile.8 However, there is also evidence of migrants, including Russian migrants in Western societies, who partially integrate while maintaining close links to the home country or even expressing pro-Kremlin attitudes while abroad.9 In many 1 The authors are grateful for the research assistance provided by Varvara Ilyina, Macha Gharbi and Alice Lackner. We would also like to acknowledge the comments provided by Tsypylma Darieva, Emil Kamalov and Dmitry Rudenkin, which helped to improve the report significantly. 2 This number is based on a comparative assessment by RE:RUSSIA in July 2023: ‘Escape from War: New Data Puts the Number of Russians Who Have Left at More than 800,000 People’, 28 July 2023, https://re-russia.net/en/review/347/. 3 ‘Russia’s 650,000 Wartime Emigres’, 19 July 2024, https://en.thebell.io/russias-650-000-wartimeemigres/. 4 ‘Six Months in Exile: A New Life of Russian Emigrants’, 20 May 2023, https://osf.io/preprints/ socarxiv/epn2c. The number is heavily disputed and politicised, including in the Russian state narrative. Dmitry Trenin recently claimed that two thirds of Russians have returned: ‘A massive transformation is taking place in Russia, and the West is blind to it’, 13 May 2024, https://www. rt.com/russia/597346-massive-transformation-is-taking-place-in-russia/. 5 ‘Russia Unemployment Rate’, 2024, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/unemploymentrate#:~:text=Unemployment%20Rate%20in%20Russia%20decreased,percent%20in%20 March%20of%202024. 6 ‘Russia has Too Few Workers’, 24 March 2024, https://en.thebell.io/russia-has-too-few-workers/. 7 Kamalov et al., ‘Russia’s 2022 Anti-war Exodus: The Attitudes and Expectations of Russian Migrants’, 6 September 2022, https://www.ponarseurasia.org/russias-2022-anti-war-exodusthe-attitudes-and-expectations-of-russian-migrants/. 8 Kirill Shamiev and Ksenia Luchenko, ‘Life in Exile: A New Approach to Russian Democrats in Europe’, 14 March 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/life-in-exile-a-new-approach-to-russiandemocrats-in-europe/. 9 Tatiana Golova and Liliia Sablina, ‘The Pro-war Mobilisation of Germany’s Russian-speaking Communities’, ZOiS Spotlight 20/2023, https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/the-pro-war-mobilisation-of-germanys-russian-speaking-communities. Even for a country the size of Russia, the loss of these citizens leaves a significant dent in the labour market. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 5 host societies, the new Russian migrants are but the latest of several waves of migration. This can facilitate integration, but it can also lead to segregation or tensions within the growing and increasingly complex migrant communities. The new Russian migrants find themselves in a highly politicised setting: some of them are engaged in anti-Russian or anti-war activism,10 others are openly pro-Kremlin, and many are choosing to be silent. The Russian state sees them through the lens of ‘Russkii mir’ as both an ally or channel for propaganda and disinformation campaigns, but also as further brain drain and outright traitors. Any ‘offloading’ of political opposition is, of course, a welcome side effect. Western governments regard them as a source of information on the increasingly closed-off Russian state and society, but also as a conduit for Russian disinformation and hence a domestic security risk. Host governments and societies in Central Asia or the Baltic states tend to view the Russian migrants with suspicion, in particular in connection with their own established Russian or Russian-speaking populations. In the receiving societies examined here, the unexpected inflow of economically powerful newcomers has had a significant impact on the local economy, prompting soaring inflation, particularly in the housing market but also in the price of basic commodities. Coupled with long-held animosity towards Russia, especially in Georgian society, this makes a smooth integration of the new Russian migrants unlikely in their host societies. In the absence of detailed data on the socio-demographic profile and political attitudes of the new Russian migrants, it is impossible to assess the implications of this migration wave. To our knowledge, our cross-country faceto-face survey of recent Russian migrants in five countries is the only one of its kind to date. Our ZOiS survey was fielded in the summer of 2023 among about 4,300 respondents across the five most important reception countries for new migration from Russia: nearly 1,000 respondents in Armenia, Georgia, and Turkey, respectively, and upwards of 600 respondents each in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. For comparison, the group also includes a share of representatives of the older Russian communities in the host countries. Methodological considerations Surveying migrants is always challenging, as they are usually not recorded in one register that can be used as a socio-demographic baseline for sampling. The main recruitment paths for migrants therefore concentrate on particular settings where they gather or try to reach them via social media. Both inevitably introduce biases to be aware of when contextualising the data. Such methodological challenges are amplified in the context of war, repression and very recent migration. It is thus important to be transparent about unavoidable methodological shortcomings, to interpret the data responsibly and to consider and communicate potential distortions in the data. 10 Tsypylma Darieva, Tatiana Golova and Daria Skibo, ‘Russian Migrants in Georgia and Germany: Activism in the Context of Russia’s War against Ukraine’, ZOiS Report 3/2023, https://www. zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-report/russian-migrants-in-georgia-and-germany-activismin-the-context-of-russias-war-against-ukraine. Some migrants are engaged in anti-war activism, others are openly pro-Kremlin, and many are choosing to be silent. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 6 Despite the methodological challenges, migrants — and especially large numbers of migrants — are a critical window onto developments in receiving and sending societies. It is with this conviction that we generated our survey data between June and August 2023. In order to use the data where it is strongest, this report puts an emphasis on constellations of factors in order to identify, for instance, the ‘typical’ profile of a respondent who opposed or supported the war11 or who was politically active in the host country. Less emphasis is placed on the total distribution, for instance, of support or opposition to the war in Ukraine. Throughout the text we will refer to broader trends in the data but only rarely to precise percentages so as not to prematurely suggest clear-cut individual results.12 Two methodological challenges are particularly virulent in this research: First, a random and representative recruitment of respondents is impossible in the absence of reliable socio-demographic information about the settlement patterns of this recent group of migrants, both within and across their host countries. All samples therefore have to rely on a combination of non-probability convenience and chain-referral sampling methods. Migrant samples thus include respondents who were convenient to reach, for instance because they were at physical locations typically frequented by Russian migrants or used social media channels aimed at Russian migrants. We also recruited based on recommendations from other respondents (snowballing). This means that not every individual from the overall migrant population had an equal chance of being selected into the sample. This ZOiS Report relies on face-to-face surveys, which provide a potentially more diverse sample than those exclusively based on online recruitment. The precise sampling method ultimately had to be adapted to the different country settings. This means that, strictly speaking, direct comparisons between the data across the five countries are not possible. Armenia, Georgia and Turkey are, however, more comparable. For example, the street intercept sampling, where potential respondents are approached on the street and interviewed on the spot, worked best in those countries. It proved, however, more difficult in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and in these cases a twostep chain referral sample had to be added to reach a decent sample size. In the two-stage referral, each interviewee was asked to provide contacts for another interviewee (first step) who was then contacted to provide us with a potential interviewee contact (second step). Our data reflect the migration history between Russia and the countries examined in this report, including varying shares of Russian citizens who settled in those countries before 2022. In our analysis we differentiate between ‘new’ and ‘old’ migrants and report any substantive differences between them. Second, in the uncertain context of war and migration, survey respondents may be more hesitant to take part or answer openly when asked about their 11 The official Russian term ‘special military operation’ was used in the surveys in order to avoid sending political signals to the respondents. 12 See also the discussion on this topic in Félix Krawatzek, George Soroka and Isabelle DeSisto, ‘Russians in the South Caucasus and the War in Ukraine’, ZOiS Report 2/2023, https://www. zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-report/russians-in-the-south-caucasus-political-attitudesand-the-war-in-ukraine. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 7 intentions, perceptions or social and political attitudes. Survey research always grapples with social desirability biases, i. e. the psychological mechanism that may skew respondents’ answers towards what they think the interviewer expects or wants to hear. In repressive or uncertain settings, this type of bias or reluctance to answer may increase. There are further reasons for caution: in a situation where Russian security agents have infiltrated Russian communities abroad and some local authorities are seen to cooperate with Russian authorities, respondents may be afraid of putting themselves or family members or friends in danger.13 The surveys were fielded in cities with a high concentration of Russians, including all five capitals as well as provincial hubs. MAP 1 In Armenia we expanded the fieldwork to Gyumri and Vanadzor; in Georgia to Batumi, Kutaisi, Rustavi, Mtskheta, Zugdidi and Gori; in Turkey to Antalya, Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin; in Kazakhstan to Astana, Aktobe, Karaganda, Pavlodar, Oral, Kostanay and Petropavl; and in Kyrgyzstan to Osh, Karakol and Cholpon-Ata. Under challenging circumstances for research, we adopted a methodologically sound approach to obtain face-to-face survey data and draw up a baseline for trends in different host countries. We contextualise our data with reference to other available data and country-specific reports. Crossvalidation with other existing work is particularly important. We therefore 13 At the end of each interview, the interviewers were asked to judge how comfortable a respondent felt when taking the survey. In both Georgia and Armenia respondents felt mostly or absolutely comfortable, while in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey around one respondent in ten reported feeling a little uncomfortable. MAP 1 Numbers of respondents in each of the five surveyed countries Source: Adapted from OpenStreetMap ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 8 compare some of our findings with other survey projects, in particular the survey projects realised by the OutRush project.14 Migrant profiles across the sample The demographic profile of the respondents recruited in each of the five countries shows both similarities and differences. TABLE 1 Across all five countries, the migrants in the sample are much younger than the average Russian, particularly so in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, where the migrants had an average age of 32 compared to the Russian average of 39 years. Male respondents predominate in our samples in Armenia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, whereas women are slightly overrepresented in Kazakhstan and Turkey, also among those who already left before 2022. The gender discrepancy suggests that the military mobilisation in Russia was a stronger 14 Outrush.io is a research initiative based at the European University Institute that has generated over 10,000 responses since February 2022 through online social media recruitment, see https://outrush.io/eng#results. For analysis of the early emigration in 2022, see also Exodus 22, a project supported by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation: https://exodus22team.wordpress. com/2023/03/07/pressrelease-eng/. See also Vladimir Inozemtsev, ‘The Exodus of the Century: A New Wave of Russian Emigration’, July 2023, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/ files/ifri_inozemstev_exodus_july_2023.pdf and Dmitry Gudkov et al., ‘The New Russian Diaspora: Europe’s Challenge and Opportunity’, June 2024, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/ atoms/files/ifri_gudkov_inozemtsev_nekrasov_new_russian_diaspora_2024.pdf. TABLE 1 Socio-demographic characteristics of the samples compared to the overall Russian population Source: Data on the 2010 Census of the Russian Federation: http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2011/0491/perep01.php, https://gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm. ARMENIA GEORGIA TURKEY KAZAKHSTAN KYRGYZSTAN RUSSIA (2010 census data) Number of respondents 1,030 998 1,004 697 608 Average age 32 36 35 36 32 39 Share of males 56 % 56 % 37 % 42 % 62 % 46 % Settlement size City with population > 1 million 83 % 88 % 73 % 65 % 73 % 20 % City of 500k to 1 million inhabitants 5 % 5 % 15 % 20 % 14 % 11 % City of 250k to 500k inhabitants 6 % 4 % 5 % 7 % 6 % 9 % City of 100k to 250k inhabitants 3 % 2 % 5 % 4 % 4 % 10 % Settlement with a population < 100k 3 % 1 % 2 % 4 % 4 % 51 % Place of residence Moscow 46 % 58 % 33 % 23 % 41 % 8 % St. Petersburg 21 % 20 % 13 % 18 % 16 % 3 % Those who self-identify with the titular nationality 19 % 6 % 0 % 11 % 17 % Share of pre-2022 Russian migrants in the sample 10 % 8 % 19 % 17 % 7 % ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 9 motivation to leave for migrants in some of the countries covered. Respondents are also significantly more likely to come from an urban context than the average person in Russia. This trend is particularly pronounced in Armenia and Georgia, where the highest shares of people come from a city with more than one million inhabitants. This is also the most common background of our respondents in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey, although in those countries a large share also comes from cities with a population of between 500,000 and 1 million. In all of the countries examined, around one third of respondents mentioned that they had children and nearly half were married. A closer examination of the socio-economic profiles of respondents across the five countries reveals that in Armenia and Georgia, there is a particularly high share of younger Russians, many of whom work in the IT sector and come from Moscow and St. Petersburg. The share of those who have completed higher education is high in both countries, particularly when compared to Russian migrants in Kazakhstan. Indeed, the Russian migrants in our sample in Kazakhstan mainly come from larger provincial cities, have lower levels of education on average and tend to work primarily in the construction and trade sectors. In Kyrgyzstan, the socio-economic profile of Russian migrants is diverse, with a very high share working in the IT sector. Respondents in Kyrgyzstan are also among the youngest on average in our sample. In Turkey, we find the most variation not only in terms of the migrants’ ages, but also their employment sectors and reported reasons for emigration. The Turkish sample also had the highest share of respondents who were in full-time education at the time of the interview. Spotlights on hubs of Russian migration Armenia: A welcoming context According to official estimates, there are a little over 100,000 Russians in Armenia.15 On average, the respondents in our sample are highly educated, were in full-time employment before leaving Russia, and in many cases lived in Moscow and St. Petersburg before emigrating. The largest share of respondents work in the IT sector (over 40 per cent), followed by individuals working in the arts and entertainment industry (about 15 per cent). Armenia continues to be a country that is easy to access, since Russians can enter it without an international passport and once registered they can extend their stay beyond the 180 visa-free days in the country. When asked about their protest experience back in Russia before 2022, respondents in Armenia are highly likely to indicate that they have prior 15 It should be noted that these numbers are uncertain. The number of more than 100,000 migrants was cited by the Armenian Minister for Economic Affairs Vahan Kerobyan in March 2023: https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/characters/2023/03/16/966716-rossiya-i-armeniya-otkazalis-ot-raschetov-v-dollarah-i-evro. Other sources arrive at markedly lower numbers (upwards of 60,000), see ‘Among Citizens of Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus Living in Armenia’, July 2023, https://armenia.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-08/Foreign_ASSESSMENT_25%20August.pdf and ‘Statistical Yearbook of Armenia’, 2023, https://armstat.am/file/doc/99541178.pdf. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 16 Based on the survey data, Russians in Kyrgyzstan appear to be a politicised group, with a majority reporting protest experience in Russia and claiming to have followed developments in the war against Ukraine, at least initially. It is, however, unlikely that their political interest will find an outlet in a media landscape where Kyrgyz media are heavily targeted by Russian propaganda and Russian media also enjoy a reputational advantage over Western media.34 When it comes to a sense of responsibility for Russia’s political future, respondents are, however, divided: more than one third of them say they have never had such a sense of responsibility, while slightly less than one third claim that they do. One in five indicate that they used to feel responsible, but no longer do so. A similar share of respondents reports waning interest in political developments, especially the war in Ukraine. Russian migrants in Kyrgyzstan are extremely diverse in terms of their political views. About half of the respondents blame Russia for the war, about 20 per cent the US and about 15 per cent Ukraine, with 15 per cent not responding to the question at all, possibly due to fear or uncertainty. Gender appears to be a factor in the question of who is to blame for the outbreak of the war: twenty per cent more male respondents blame Russia Blame attribution for the war across all respondents If we approach the data differently and look at the overall sample of new and old Russian migrants across the five countries, we get a stronger sense of the correlation between certain socio-demographic characteristics and political attitudes. We also gain a clearer understanding of the differences between the countries and the extent to which this might be related to the composition of each sample. The question of which country or actor is to blame for the outbreak of the war in Ukraine reveals where respondents stand politically. Across all countries, older respondents, particularly those aged 50 and over, are less likely to put the blame on Russia. The same is true of those who left Russia before February 2022. Indeed, these older Russian communities tend to be less critical of Russian politics in general. Across all five samples male respondents are more likely to blame Russia, as are those respondents who are employed in the IT sector. In particular respondents in Kazakhstan tend to put the blame on Ukraine, with one in four choosing this response option. By contrast, less than 10 per cent of respondents in Turkey and Kyrgyzstan blame Ukraine, while the number of respondents who share this opinion in Armenia and Georgia is negligible. Age does not help when it comes to understanding who blames Ukraine. However, gender is again a significant factor here, with female respondents being more likely to attribute blame to Ukraine. Respondents who left Russia before February 2022 are also more likely to hold Ukraine responsible for the outbreak of the war. IT-sector employees are, however, less likely to put the blame on Ukraine. 34 ‘Narratives and Perceptions of Russian Propaganda in Kyrgyzstan’, July 2023, https://iwpr.net/ global-voices/print-publications/russian-propaganda-kyrgyzstan/english. Older respondents, particularly those aged 50 and over, are less likely to put the blame on Russia. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 17 Western institutions and countries are blamed in particular by respondents in Kazakhstan (roughly one third) and Turkey (about half). In Kyrgyzstan, about one in five respondents blame either the USA or NATO, while in Armenia or Georgia only one out of 10 respondents do so. The tendency to hold Western countries (in particular the US) and institutions (NATO or EU) responsible for the war is highest among those aged 35 and older. Interestingly, this is also the age group that is most likely to follow the news about the war, although many who have stopped following those developments are likely to blame the West. Conclusion Our original face-to-face survey data from five important destination countries add up to a clearer picture of the predispositions, networks and behaviour of Russian migrants on a country-by-country basis. Overall, our data reveal a significant degree of diversity among the Russian migrants within and across the countries we surveyed.35 Compared to the reference population in Russia, the new Russian migrants stand out in terms of their socio-economic characteristics, most strikingly their predominantly urban background but also higher levels of education. Our research clearly shows that the new Russian migrants are best not thought of as one group, and certainly not as one big liberal exodus. Rather, it is a set of individuals that might become increasingly apolitical — largely depending on conditions in the respective host country — or might already support or come to support the Kremlin’s position. If a sense of group belonging develops in the future, it is most likely to be context-specific and possibly in response to perceived hostility in the host country. Our data provide timely insights into migration dynamics that are also potentially relevant for future socio-political developments in the receiving societies and to some extent in Russia. The focus in this report lies on the constellations of socio-demographic factors that explain specific attitudes or behaviour with a view to identifying underlying typical profiles. Given the two different sampling techniques employed, we are not directly comparing the data from the five countries. Moreover, we focus on the key trends our data show rather than the actual values in percentages as the most honest way to present and discuss the results. In a politically sensitive context, the extent to which biases (e.g. sampling biases, non-responses, social desirability biases) affect the numbers is harder to judge, and we believe it is important to communicate these issues transparently. Despite these caveats, we remain confident that our data capture trends in each of the surveyed countries. 35 The extent of this diversity diverges from the findings of OutRush, which in the summer 2023 wave of their online survey (wave three) found a high degree of homogeneity in the backgrounds of Russian migrants across countries. Methodological differences are likely to play a role in explaining some of these differences. See ‘A Year and a Half in Exile: Progress and Obstacles in the Integration of Russian Migrants’, February 2024, https://outrush.io/memo_january_2024. The new Russian migrants are best not thought of as one group, and certainly not as one big liberal exodus. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 18 In each of the countries analysed we tend to find typical profiles of migrants that differ significantly. – In Kyrgyzstan, those who left Russia report being highly connected to other Russians and they have a sense of political responsibility for Russia’s political future. However, Russian citizens are also divided in their degree of politicisation and the Kyrgyz context might not encourage them to find a political voice. – In Kazakhstan, meanwhile, respondents’ levels of political interest and engagement are generally rather low and their views are most closely aligned with the official Russian state narratives. This group seems deeply integrated into the Russian media landscape. – Turkey has attracted a very diverse set of migrants both in terms of age and employment sector. Russians in Turkey are very divided in their views on the war against Ukraine and continue to maintain a dense transnational network with people back in Russia. – In Georgia, the political and social context has had a demobilising effect on Russian citizens so far. While many in our sample bring previous experience of political mobilisation, the Georgian context currently makes it difficult to put this into practice. It is too early to tell whether mobilisation on the basis of perceived discrimination by the host society is possible. – Lastly, the respondents in Armenia remain the most politically active after migration; this is also the youngest group in the sample. Our data show that the context of this migration does not per se politicise migrants and that those who do arrive with oppositional views find themselves in country-specific settings that can make political mobilisation difficult. Thus, our data guard against simple assumptions about a liberal exodus and map the difficult context conditions for external measures to support political opposition outside of Russia or maintain connections between the migrants and Russia. The Russian state is actively reaching out to its compatriots, and many of the migrants we surveyed continue to be exposed to a Russian media environment that stifles any impulse they might have to mobilise against the Kremlin. Against this background, Western governments could make more efforts to support alternative Russian-language media and community building among Russian migrants in different countries. Yet, as this report shows, these efforts may only bear fruit in some of the five host countries we examine. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 19 Source: © MMONTAGEE, own work PHOTO 1 Anti-war protest by Russian migrants in Yerevan, April 2022 Imprint Authors Félix Krawatzek and Gwendolyn Sasse Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Félix Krawatzek and Gwendolyn Sasse: ‘The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022’, ZOiS Report 4 / 2024, (https://en.zoisberlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/3-Publikationen/ ZOiS_Reports/2024/ZOiS_ Report_4_2024.pdf) ISSN 2627-7233 Editing Anne Boden Graphics Iaroslav Boretskii Layout Yuko Stier Cover image The Russian bookshop and cultural venue Poltory Komnaty (Room and a Half) in Istanbul with a graffito of Joseph Brodsky. © Félix Krawatzek This report is licensed under a CC BY-NC 4.0 license. ZOiS Report 4 / 2024 The Political Diversity of the New Migration from Russia since February 2022 21