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Minority Youth and their perceptions of borders and the EU

Engl, Alice; Mitterhofer, Johanna; Nicolson, Marcus; Klatt, Martin; Opilowska, Elzbieta; Balogh, Péter; Böhm, Hynek; Gadimova-Akbulut, Nazrin; Nedelcheva, Petranka

Abstract

Abstract This report examines how young adults from national minority communities in European border regions perceive borders, Europe, and the European Union (EU), drawing on research conducted within the B-SHAPES project. Through semi-structured interviews and zine-making workshops with participants aged 18–31 across five case studies—South Tyrol (Italy–Austria), Zaolzie/Těšín Silesia (Poland–Czechia), North and South Schleswig (Denmark–Germany), Southern Slovakia (Hungary–Slovakia), and Western Thrace (Greece–Bulgaria–Türkiye)—the study provides bottom-up insights into everyday experiences of borders and European integration. The findings reveal a marked divergence between minority media narratives, which often portray borders in politicized or securitized terms, and the more pragmatic, functional views expressed by young people. For most participants, borders are experienced as open, ordinary, and opportunity-enhancing, shaped by Schengen mobility and cross-border routines, though cultural and linguistic differences remain salient symbolic boundaries. Episodic disruptions, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, exposed the fragility of this openness and reinforced young people’s reliance on mobility. Perceptions of Europe and the EU were similarly pragmatic: youth valued concrete benefits—free movement, educational mobility, and regional funding—more than symbolic identification, contributing to a form of banal Europeanism. While some viewed the EU as a guarantor of minority protection, skepticism persisted regarding its consistency and effectiveness. Strong regional and minority identities often superseded national or European ones. Overall, the study shows that minority youth normalize European integration in daily life yet articulate limited emotional attachment to the EU, underscoring both the resilience and vulnerability of Europe’s borderlands and the importance of integrating youth perspectives into future European policy and narratives.

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Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are, however, those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Execuve Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granng authority can be held responsible for them. Deliverable 4.2: Report “Minority Youth and Their Percepons of Borders and the EU” Project acronym B - SHAPES Project name Borders shaping percepons of European sociees Grant agreement no 101095186 Work Package WP4 Document name Minority Youth and their percepons of borders and the EU Lead Partner Eurac Research D.4.2, V1 2 Document Informaon Work Package Number 4 Responsible Task Leader Eurac Research Authors Alice Engl (Eurac Research) , Johanna Mierhofer (Eurac Research), Marcus Nicolson (Eurac Research), Péter Balogh (ELTE), Marn Kla (SDU), Elżbieta Opiłowska (UWr), Hynek Böhm (TUL), Nazrin Gadimova-Akbulut (independent) , Petranka Nedelcheva (HISTORYMUS), Anna Tüdős (independent) Project Coordinator Marn Kla (SDU) Sensivity Public Deliverable type Report Date of submission 29 September 202 5 History of Revisions Version, date Summary of changes made V.0 , 15.09.2025 Dra f or comments to B - Shapes Consorum V.1 , 29.09.2025 Report finalized on the basis of partners ’ comments D.4.2, V1 3 Execuve Summary ......................................................................................................................... 4 1. Introducon ................................................................................................................................ 6 2. Conceptual Background and Study Raonale ............................................................................. 6 3. Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 9 4. Case study contexts ................................................................................................................... 12 4.1 South Tyrol in the Italian-Austrian borderland ................................................................... 12 4.2 Zaolzie /Těšínské Slezsko in the Polish-Czech borderland................................................... 13 4.3 North and South Schleswig in the Danish-German borderland ......................................... 14 4.4 Southern Slovakia in the Hungarian-Slovak borderland ..................................................... 15 4.5 Western Thrace in the Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borderland .............................................. 16 5. Case Study Reports ................................................................................................................... 18 5.1 Italian-Austrian Borderland ................................................................................................. 18 5.2 Polish-Czech Borderland ..................................................................................................... 25 5.3 Danish-German Borderland ................................................................................................ 32 5.4 Slovak-Hungarian Borderland ............................................................................................. 42 5.5 Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borderland ................................................................................... 50 6. Discussion .................................................................................................................................. 58 7. Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................................. 61 8. References ................................................................................................................................. 63 9. Annex: Translaons of the Execuve Summary ........................................................................ 68 D.4.2, V1 4 Execuve Summary Please see Annex 1 for translaons in the following languages: Czech, Danish, German, Hungarian, Italian, Polish.1 The B-SHAPES project focuses on how people perceive Europe, paying close aenon to how border narraves and processes of re-bordering can influence these percepons. This report specifically explores how young people from naonal minority communies in European border regions perceive borders, Europe, and the European Union (EU). It draws on five case studies—South Tyrol (Italy–Austria), Zaolzie/Těšín Silesia (Poland–Czechia), North and South Schleswig (Denmark–Germany), Southern Slovakia (Hungary–Slovakia), and Western Thrace (Greece–Bulgaria–Türkiye)—to provide boom-up insights into everyday experiences of borders and European integraon. The study, conducted in 2024-2025, focused on young adults aged 18–31, using a combinaon of semistructured interviews and zine-making workshops. These approaches enabled parcipants to express their narraves both visually and verbally, generang perspecves that move beyond the elite-level and media discourses. By comparing youth accounts with minority media narraves (Engl et al., 2024) the study highlights both convergences and disconnecons between public and personal understandings of Europe. The analysis reveals a notable gap between minority media narraves and young people’s percepons. While media outlets oen frame borders and Europe in policized or securized terms, young people tend to adopt pragmac, funconal perspecves. This divergence underscores that youth voices are oen underrepresented in public narraves, despite their importance for the future of European integraon. Findings show that for most study parcipants, borders are experienced as open and largely invisible, a result of Schengen mobility and normalizaon of cross-border pracces. Borders are frequently understood as opportunies rather than barriers, associated with educaon, work, shopping, leisure, and family es. However, they remain symbolically significant: many young people frame cultural and linguisc divides, rather than state borders, as the “real” froners in their lives. Historical legacies and family memories also connue to shape how borders are imagined, even where physical border controls have disappeared. Moments of disrupon, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, exposed the fragility of this sense of openness. Recent re-bordering events have highlighted how strongly minority youth rely on mobility, reinforcing the value they place on Schengen but also reminding them of the potenal precarity of European integraon. Comparisons with securized external borders, such as Greek-Turkish border, further underscored the contrast between everyday openness and the reality of exclusion elsewhere. Percepons of Europe and the EU were generally pragmac. Parcipants emphasized the tangible benefits of EU membership, especially free movement, Erasmus, Interrail, and EU regional funding, rather than symbolic idenficaon with Europe. The EU was oen taken for granted as a background condion of daily 1 Translaons were machine-translated and checked by the respecve project partners. D.4.2, V1 5 life, producing a form of “banal Europeanism”. While some young people valued the EU as a guarantor of minority rights and a source of funding, others regarded it as distant, inefficient, or inconsistent in its protecon of minories. The posive percepons of the EU’s role in two of the cases (South Tyrol and North and South Schleswig) were strongly shaped by earlier minority rights selements that were established independently of the EU. While these arrangements originated from naonal or bilateral agreements and broader Council of Europe frameworks, the research parcipants in these border areas associated them with the EU, seeing it as a guarantor of diversity and minority protecon. Regional and minority idenes emerged as parcularly strong. Many parcipants idenfied foremost with their borderland or naonal minority community (eg. South Tyrolean, Zaolziak, Schleswigian, Hungarian in Slovakia (felvidéki)), rather than with broader naonal or European categories. These localized idenes oen offered a way to transcend naonal divisions while affirming cultural disncveness. Overall, the report shows that minority youth in border regions normalize European integraon through their everyday pracces but do not necessarily arculate strong emoonal aachment to the EU. Their views reflect a pragmac embrace of mobility and opportunity, tempered by skepcism about instuonal commitment to minority rights. These findings highlight both the achievements and vulnerabilies of European integraon in mes of crisis, while underlining the importance of listening to young people’s voices in shaping inclusive visions of Europe’s future. D.4.2, V1 6 1. Introducon Authors: Alice Engl, Marcus Nicolson, Johanna Mierhofer The objecve of this report is to invesgate the percepons of young naonal minority borderlanders (aged 18-31) in relaon to borders and Europe, as well as the narraves associated with these concepts. Specifically, we focus on naonal minority and borderland case study sites in Czechia, Denmark, Greece, Germany, Italy, and Slovakia. In each of these sites, we have used semi-structured interviews and parcipatory arts-based methods to explore the key research quesons of the study: How do young naonal minories perceive borders? How do young people perceive Europe and the European Union? These quesons reflect the B-SHAPES project’s overarching aim to understand beer how percepons of borders and European integraon are shaped from below, in borderland regions, especially considering ongoing re-bordering trends and sociopolical crises. The report is structured as follows: we first set out our jusficaon for the study and present a summary of the exisng research on the atudes of young members of naonal minories towards borders and Europe. We then explain our methodology, outlining our use of semi-structured interviews as well as the parcipatory creave arts research method, zine-making. In this secon, we also outline the framework used for data analysis. Next, we provide the contextual background for each case study, drawing on historical and socio-economic data, and present the results and empirical data from the five case study sites. Each case study provides valuable insights into how young people in minority borderland communies perceive borders, experience bordering pracces in daily life, and engage with the ideas of Europe and the EU. We then contrast the findings with the results from our earlier media analysis of minority media to explore convergences and tensions between public and individual narraves (Engl et al. 2024). The subsequent discussion idenfies and compares key themac paerns that emerge from the data gathered across the case studies. In the conclusion secon, we summarise the main findings, present our concluding remarks of the report and outline the key contribuons that the study makes to knowledge, suggesng possible lines for future inquiry in this area. 2. Conceptual Background and Study Raonale Authors: Alice Engl, Marcus Nicolson, Johanna Mierhofer This report explores how young adults from naonal minority communies in European border regions perceive borders, how they relate to the idea of Europe, and how their views are shaped by both everyday experiences and narraves operang at different levels of inference. It forms part of a broader invesgaon into how borders connue to shape European sociees. The B-SHAPES project focuses on how people perceive Europe, paying close aenon to how border narraves and processes of re-bordering can influence these percepons (Opiłowska et al., 2023; Sarmiento-Mirwaldt et al., 2025). While the EU envisions itself as a space without internal borders, recent events such as the 2015 so-called ‘migraon crisis’ and the COVID-19 pandemic have triggered the D.4.2, V1 7 reintroducon of border controls. These developments have revealed the fragility of the European idea of open borders and confirmed the ongoing power of borders to divide, shape idenes, and impact people’s everyday lives (Medeiros et al., 2020; Wassenberg, 2020). In this context, border regions become key spaces both where European integraon is experienced most directly and where tensions between unity and division are most visible. This report focuses on naonal minority communies living in five selected border regions: the Germanspeaking community in South Tyrol, the German and Danish minories in the German-Danish border region, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the Polish minority in Czechia, and the Turkish minority in northeastern Greece (Thrace). These regions are historically marked by shiing borders and overlapping cultural influences. For naonal minories, borders are not just geopolical lines but are entangled, experienced, and connuously negoated in everyday crossings and social interacons. In focus of this report are the perspecves of young adults from these minority groups. Through a series of interviews and workshops, we engaged with young people to explore how they think and feel about borders, how they perceive the European Union, and how their views reflect or differ from the narraves they encounter in the local media that serve their (minority) communies. These methods allowed us to examine how personal experiences, family histories, and the local context each contribute to shaping young people's understanding of borders, European integraon, identy, and belonging. We also invesgate the possible role of key deand re-bordering events, including the so-called ‘migraon crisis’ of 2015 and the COVID-19 pandemic, in shaping percepons of borders and the European project in minority regions. This work contributes to the broader goals of the B-SHAPES project by offering a boom-up understanding of borders in contemporary Europe. Young people’s polical percepons in border regions may be influenced by historical border legacies, and, at the same me, these individuals have the potenal to act as agents shaping how Europe is imagined and built. Throughout this report, we argue that young borderlander voices are essenal to understanding the challenges and possibilies facing European cohesion today. In placing naonal minority voices at the forefront of discussions around borders, this report aims to invesgate how borders shape percepons of Europe in everyday life. It highlights the diversity of experiences and understandings that exist within minority communies and calls aenon to the importance of studying the percepons of under-researched actors and communies, such as minories living in borderlands. The report also considers the context and culture in which the research parcipants are embedded. Each border region included in this study has a disnct history of shiing borders, minority experiences, and cross-border relaons, which shape the everyday realies and idenes of its inhabitants. These local contexts influence how young people understand borders. The central aim of this report is to idenfy common themes that run across these borderland minority communies and the young people who live in them. At the same me, we seek to highlight how these themes might be arculated differently depending on local histories and border dynamics. Finally, we compare the public narraves idenfied in daily minority newspapers with the personal narraves gathered through interviews and workshops with D.4.2, V1 8 young adults. This comparison reveals how public discourses in minority media are interpreted, challenged, and somemes reimagined by the young people living in these regions. Historical experience, polical expectaons, and instuonal dynamics shape naonal minories’ percepons of Europe and the EU. A dominant view in the literature frames the EU as a condional supporter of minority rights. This percepon stems from the Copenhagen Criteria, which imposed minority protecon standards on candidate countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s and 2000s (Malloy, 2022). However, this condionality applied only to applicants, not to exisng member states, creang a double standard between older members like France or Greece and new member states. The EU is thus seen as inconsistent, promong minority rights when polically useful but neglecng them once accession is complete (Constann, 2017; Nagy & Vizi, 2022). The lack of enforcement tools and declining priorizaon of autochthonous minories has led to growing disillusionment (Masse & Schakel, 2021, 427). Alongside this, the EU is also perceived as an enabler of connecvity, parcularly through de-bordering policies such as Schengen, the Single Market, and cohesion funding. These instruments have helped minories, especially in border regions, to maintain cross-border cultural and economic es and pursue transnaonal cooperaon (Engl, 2020; 2022; Hoch, 2022). However, integraon does not always foster mutual trust. Some communies feel le out of Europeanisaon processes, and increased mobility can even trigger resentment (Decoville & Durand, 2019). Moreover, EU efforts to build a common European identy may undermine regional disncveness, leading minories to view the EU as a cultural homogenizer (Kiraly, 2022). During so-termed crisis moments like the increased migraon in 2015-2016 or the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been pressure to align with naonal or European idenes at the expense of local ones (Tarvet & Kla, 2023). The EU is also seen as an instuonal resource and as a plaorm offering legal tools, funding, and polical visibility for minority advocacy. Iniaves such as the European Parliament’s InterGroup on minority rights and the Minority SafePack have been used by minority actors to advance their claims (Nagy & Vizi, 2022; Waterbury, 2021). However, symbolic setbacks, such as the EU’s rejecon of the SafePack despite strong public support, reinforce the percepon of the EU as distant and unresponsive (Crepaz, 2014) and have led to dissasfacon with the EU’s perceived lack of acve support (Sco 2020, 665; see also Tárnok, 2022). The gap between instuonal access and praccal influence has been said to have eroded trust in the EU as a reliable actor for minority concerns (Smith et al., 2019). Finally, minority and regionalist enthusiasm for European integraon that has been idenfied by scholars is parally waning. The EU’s reluctance to engage in internal territorial disputes or clarify kin-state relaons has led to frustraon and a rise in Euroscepcism among groups previously seen as pro-European (Masse & Schakel, 2021; Waterbury, 2008). The securizaon of minories, where they are framed as security threats, further strains interethnic relaons and can deepen distrust between minories and their home states (Bourne, 2003; Liebich, 2019). While some minority instuons connue to pursue sub-state diplomacy and peacebuilding through EU channels (Kla, 2018; McCall & Itçaina, 2017), the broader trend suggests that the EU’s capacity to act as a stable guarantor of minority protecon is perceived as increasingly uncertain. A review of the exisng literature on naonal minories and their relaonship with the EU reveals a clear predominance of top-down analycal frameworks. Much of the research tends to focus on the role of D.4.2, V1 9 European instuons, legal instruments, polical elites, and policies in shaping the experiences and rights of minority groups. Studies oen examine how EU enlargement criteria, cohesion funds, and various polical plaorms support or neglect minority issues. In parallel, another dominant approach concentrates on minority representaon. It examines how minority interests are arculated and mobilized through formal polical actors such as ethnic pares, NGOs, advocacy networks, and transnaonal alliances. Scholars have invesgated how these representave structures engage with the European polical system, make use of EU channels, or parcipate in campaigns like the Minority SafePack iniave. These perspecves, while crucial, sll operate within elite or organizaonal domains, largely viewing minories from their intermediaries rather than the communies themselves. What remains underexplored in the literature is the boom-up dimension of how minority individuals, especially those outside instuonal or polical leadership roles, understand, experience, and narrate Europe in their everyday lives. In parcular, minority voices themselves are oen absent from the analycal frameworks that dominate the field. This results in a paradox; while naonal minories are frequently discussed, their voices are rarely heard in scholarship. The B-SHAPES project adds this boom-up perspecve by invesgang the micro-level perspecves of young adults from minority communies living in border regions. Indeed, border research tradionally centers on adult perspecves, thereby neglecng how borders shape—and are shaped by—younger populaons. Yet, children and young people are not passive parcipants in bordering processes; they impact borders and borderlands through their own acvity and agency (Venken et al., 2021). With regards to the study of percepons of Europe, compared to older generaons, young people across the EU tend to hold more favourable atudes towards the European Union (e.g. Lauterbach and De Vries, 2020; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010). Around three in five respondents are generally in favour of the EU (Eurobarometer, 2024). Youth percepons of the EU vary notably across Europe, shaped by naonal contexts and regional priories. While young people from Denmark, Czechia and Italy had slightly more posive views on Europe than the EU average, young Slovaks, Germans, Poles and Hungarians were below average. By foregrounding their personal narraves, the B-SHAPES project seeks to enrich our understanding of how the EU, and the European integraon process are perceived not by elites or intermediaries, but by those living at the margins of the state. By incorporang voices that have oen been overlooked, the BShapes project aims to move beyond convenonal top-down narraves and contribute to a more inclusive and nuanced account of how Europe is lived and imagined by its diverse populaons. 3. Methodology Authors: Marcus Nicolson, Alice Engl, Anna Tüdős The methodology employed in this study combines qualitave approaches that include creave arts research, specifically zine-making, alongside semi-structured interviews with young adults aged 18-31 from naonal minority communies. D.4.2, V1 16 ups and downs (experiencing low points around 1993–1998 and 2006–2011, respecvely) but have improved overall in recent years. This is largely thanks to the general post-1998 democrasaon of Slovakia and the cauous but ongoing official bilingualisaon process at least on the municipal level. At the same me, Hungary’s now long-incumbent government has priorised kinstate policy since 2010, when the country’s cizenship law has been modified to allow a simplified naturalisaon process largely for ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries. As a response, Slovakia immediately banned dual cizenship for its cizens. A few Slovakia Hungarians have reportedly sll obtained Hungarian passports, which first led to considerable tensions between the two states but was later downplayed by former Slovak President Čaputová (Pósa Homoly, 2019). Since 2023, Slovakia and Hungary are led by similarly minded governments which however has so far had few concrete impacts on the former’s Hungarian minority. In the context of the EU, the two countries’ incumbent governments count as black sheep due to their frequent objecons to mainstream Union policies and norms. Yet not just the two countries but also Slovakia’s Hungarian minority are divided polically, with the laer’s main polical force (a party called Hungarian Alliance) being represented neither in the European nor in the Slovak Parliament but just on the local and regional levels. At the same me, since both countries joined the EU (2004), and the Schengen Area (2007), cross-border mobility has intensified, with many bridges having been (re)built – with considerable EU support – along the rivers Danube and Ipel’ which constute a long secon of the joint border. Accordingly, the openness of internal Schengen borders is hugely appreciated by Slovakia Hungarians, but less so their experience of the EU’s inacon regarding autochthonous minority rights. 4.5 Western Thrace in the Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borderland Authors: Marn Kla, Petranka Nedelcheva This case study focuses on the area inhabited by the Muslim Turkish-speaking minority centered around the cies of Xanthi and Komoni in Greece. The region belonged to the Ooman Empire unl the First Balkan War (1912), when it came under Bulgarian rule. Aer World War I, it was ceded to Greece. The Muslim populaon of Thrace was exempted from the populaon exchange regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This treaty sll remains the only legal basis of minority protecon for the Muslim/Turkish minority (the treaty only refers to Muslims), Greece has neither rafied the Council of Europe’s Framework Convenon for the Protecon of Naonal Minories, nor the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Greece does not allow NGOs or associaons named “Turkish”, leading to the peculiar situaon that the minority’s main associaon, the European Federaon of Western Thrace Turks, is registered in Germany. Currently, Muslims living in Western Thrace are the only group in Greece with a religious minority status dang back to the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which regulated the populaon exchange between Greece and the young Turkish Republic. Greece does not accept their status as naonal Turkish minority. Greece has signed but not rafied the Council of Europe’s Framework Convenon for the Protecon of Naonal Minories and has not signed the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. According to the official data of Greece, Western Thrace Turks are esmated at 49,000 comprising half of the total Muslim populaon of the region of 98,000. Unofficial data though suggests a higher number of the Turkish D.4.2, V1 17 populaon between 130,000 and 150,000 according to the socio-cultural organizaons in Western Thrace (FUEN, nd.). The border between Greece and Bulgaria was fenced and militarized during the Cold War, interrupng the local populaons’ contacts and rural herding habits. Greek-Turkish relaons have been difficult since 1923, not least because of the trauma of the populaon exchange. The Cyprus crisis of 1975 and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (only recognized by Türkiye) in 1983 have furthermore complicated the relaonship and the situaon of the Turkish minority in Greece (as well as the Greek minority in Istanbul). Greece joined the EC in 1981, Bulgaria in 2004. Türkiye has candidate status, but membership negoaons have been stalled. Bulgaria became a full member of Schengen in 2025 (aer the field research conducted by B-SHAPES). The border to Türkiye is thus an EU external border. There has been an Interreg program BG-TR-GR, but it appears to be inacve. Migratory pressures have resulted in a militarizaon/fencing of the border to Türkiye. D.4.2, V1 18 5. Case Study Reports 5.1 Italian-Austrian Borderland Authors: Alice Engl, Johanna Mierhofer, Marcus Nicolson The 17 young South Tyrolians who parcipated in our interviews and zine-making workshops, aged 18-31, were all members of the German-speaking minority, and born and raised within 10 km of the AustrioItalian border. Some of the parcipants were socially or polically acve in their community: three were involved in local polics, three were part of the same local feminist group. Nine had aended university, most of them abroad, and were now employed. Eight parcipants were currently aending the final class of the local high school. In short, all of them had grown up in a Europe characterized by open borders, with a Schengen border in their close vicinity that had only been closed once during their lifeme, in the COVID-19-pandemic. They all had direct experiences of the freedom this offered, travelling extensively and spending, or planning to spend, periods of study as Erasmus students in other European countries. At the same me, they all had relaves who had experienced and remembered the border controls of preSchengen mes, and great-grandparents who had lived through the effects of shiing borders aer WW1. These direct and indirect personal experiences of bordering processes shaped the ways in which the young research parcipants presented their narraves on borders and on Europe, as will be presented in the next secons. Narraves on the border The young minority borderlanders experience the state border as physically open and somewhat “invisible” in their everyday lives. Nonetheless, the border remains symbolically powerful and connues to influence their pracces. When discussing borders, language emerges as a more tangible divider than the state border, reinforcing cultural boundaries that persist beyond lines on the map. The invisible state border Most research parcipants described the state border as invisible. They perceive the border as simply exisng without strong polical or emoonal weight. This percepon reflects a de-policized and praccal understanding of the border, where it funcons more as a formality than a barrier. This percepon points to a post-Schengen mindset, in which the presence of the border is acknowledged, but it no longer imposes significant constraints or obstacles. The parcipants in the zine-making workshops generally approached the topic of borders conceptually or symbolically, rather than as a lived, local experience, represenng borders metaphorically using images of fences, walls, or barbed wire, and choosing images of securized borders far. This was described as far from the lived reality of the open border between Austria and Italy. In their day-to-day lives, parcipants only ever noced the existence of the border through banal instances such as changing traffic signs or phone signals upon crossing into Austria: D.4.2, V1 19 It doesn't actually exist. Unless we have a global pandemic, it's effecvely not there. … Only when you're on the phone, the conversaon stops for a moment, that's the only thing. (ST_1) However, the invisibility of the border cannot be equated with a percepon of the borderland as borderless. Very few interviewees regularly crossed the border and if they did, it was most oen for a quick shopping trip. Interesngly, interviewees described that their cross-border movements and relaonships had decreased over the years: with the increase of both petrol and food prices, there were few incenves to cross the border anymore. A degree of detachment from the people and places across the border characterised the interviewees’ narraons. Indeed, the linguisc and cultural proximity of Eastern Tyrol to South Tyrol rarely emerged as strong social or emoonal incenves to cross the border. While there were some reflecons on identy — especially around South Tyrolean identy and a sense of belonging that transcends or is complicated by borders — there was a notable absence of personal relaonships or meaningful connecons that cross the border. The Austro-Italian border, while barely perceived by the interviewees, thus connues to demarcate people’s spaces of everyday acon and interacon. Very few of the research parcipants menoned direct personal memories or experiences related to the nearby state border. When such memories were present, they typically revolved around leisure acvies such as shopping trips across the border or hiking in the mountains, rather than interpersonal or cultural connecons (see image 1). A few years ago, we used to go to the border to fill up with petrol and diesel, because it was significantly cheaper. Since the coronavirus, that's no longer the case. We also like to go shopping in Sillian, because there are various grocery stores there that are not available in the immediate vicinity… Otherwise, we don't go to Austria that oen, maybe to go up a mountain, but otherwise there are no specific reasons. (ST_5) I think you can sll feel a border there, because the coexistence between South Tyrol and East Tyrol is not really cross-regional, and although you would have the opportunity, you don't [cross/interact]. (ST_2) D.4.2, V1 20 Image 1: Zine image showing everyday cross-border acvies, including hiking and skiing, with the words ‘No Border’ to show how the local border remains open in these mountain areas Some parcipants made references to family memories involving the border, parcularly in the context of past border crossings or smuggling. In these instances, the idea of the border is preserved more through familial memory than direct personal experience. The frequent use of historical images in the zines may further indicate that borders are primarily associated with the past and not directly related to contemporary experience (see image 2). Image 2: Zine images made using black and white photos to signify historical closed borders, including border stones, barbed wire, and checkpoint offices Several parcipants also menoned internaonal travel, but even these reflecons tended to focus on the mechanics of border crossings rather than emoonal or relaonal aspects. Only a few parcipants associated borders with humanitarian or migraon-related narraves, possibly reflecng the extent to which open borders are normalized and taken for granted by young people in this region. Image 3: Image displaying the text ‘No Border Crossing without Control’ Overall, the findings suggest that while the border is a recognizable and somemes symbolic theme for young people in South Tyrol rooted in local history and family memory, it does not evoke strong personal or emoonal associaons. For most, the local border “simply is there”. D.4.2, V1 21 Border as a site of opportunity A number of interviewees viewed the border not as a liming or restricng factor, but rather as a place of opportunity: The border can always be crossed, and that in itself is understood as the embodiment of freedom. But also, more concretely, the border allows South Tyrolians to differenate themselves against what is on the other side of the border, with benefits for the local economy, parcularly the tourist industry, but also in terms of identy, as the following quote shows: I think of a border as a place of opportunity, because it seems to me that we are more likely to encounter opportunies than to be restricted, especially with the barrier-free crossing between the border of Austria and Italy. [...] For me, that is just a feeling of freedom, when I can just go wherever I want, because I don't think about it, okay, now I could get to Austria. I just go and that is already a place of possibilies. (ST_5) Borders and minority identy: The percepon of the language border as the “real” border When reflecng on the meaning and significance of borders, parcipants frequently referred to language borders. For many, the “real” border was not the state border nearby, but the internal regional border, which also marks a linguisc separaon between the predominantly German-speaking province of South Tyrol and the Italian-speaking region Veneto: When I think of the [Austrian] border, I would say that the culture and language are prey much the same. [...] But when I think of Belluno [in Veneto], it's totally different. The culture is very different there; the tradions are different, the language is different, and that's where I really noce the real border. (ST_3) While many interviewees idenfied as Italian cizens, some highlighted the recurring instances of othering, even alienaon, when meeng people belonging to the (Italian-speaking) naonal minority, parcularly in the context of encounters with, or as, tourists, when their imperfect Italian was commented on or even cricised. I was on holiday in Calabria two years ago and we were in a hotel. Then we went into the recepon, and the receponist asked us if we were from Germany. It's difficult for them to communicate down there. With us, they have the advantage that they can speak German with us. (ST_1) I was once in the south of Italy, at an Italian championship. Then I asked them if they didn't know where that (South Tyrol) was. Then they really scolded me for not knowing Italian when I'm already Italian. But the fact that we speak German here was half the end of the world for them. So, they didn't really know it anymore. So that was weird. (ST_6) The interviews reveal a sense of a disncve collecve South Tyrolean identy. Influenced by Italian and Austrian/Tyrolean culture, it does not fully align with either of these naonal narraves. Indeed, there is a sense of detachment from dominant naonal narraves, reflecng a desire to preserve and assert a unique South Tyrolean identy, which for many interviewees translated into a sense of being “in between” – embracing elements of both cultures while maintaining a disnct regional character. This fosters a sense D.4.2, V1 22 of local pride and reinforces a feeling of belonging to a self-defined community different from both the Italian and the Austrian ones. We are a border area and identy... I don't feel that I really belong to the Italian border area or the Austrian border area. I just am. When someone asks me where I come from, which was oen the case when I was abroad, I said Italy at first. At some point I said I was from Austria, because it was easier for people to understand, because nobody really knew what South Tyrol was. And at some point, I formed an identy within myself. We come from such a unique place. I am a South Tyrolean. We are the ones in the north of Italy. A small minority. And we are proud to be this minority. (ST_6) Narraves on Europe Parcipant narraves on Europe were also more nuanced than we had first hypothesized. Born mostly aer the Schengen Agreement became effecve at the local-state border, the young parcipants’ first associaon with Europe was free movement across borders. Indeed, the main themes related to Europe idenfied in the parcipants' narraves include free movement and the resulng opportunies, as well as the role of the European Union for minories. Europe as an opportunity Research parcipants tended to have a posive view of the European Union, highlighng the opportunies the EU provides parcularly in terms of free movement within the Schengen area, related to travelling and EU iniaves such as the Erasmus program, as well as economic opportunies. Image 4: Zine image showing the European Union flag which was elaborated on in discussion and during the interviews. Various interviewees juxtaposed the free movement of European cizens with the restricons placed on Third Country Naonals and at Europe’s external borders, emphasizing the selecve nature of a borderless Europe, and related it to their own experience of closed borders during the pandemic: D.4.2, V1 23 You realise in such situaons that the EU project, although it started with a great idea of opening up across borders, each country sll works for itself. (ST_1) Despite the generally very positive outlook on Europe, interviewees also noted the limitations of the EU, its inefficiency and its distance from the everyday life of EU citizens. Various interviewees maintained that there could be more European influence and less borders as the following quote shows: Personally, I think the EU is a great project, but we don't give the EU enough chances because everyone is afraid of getting too little or the others getting too much. (ST_2) Europe as a protector of minorities A core theme that emerged in mulple interviews was the EU’s role in protecng naonal minories from potenal threats from the central state: Well, I think that for us, the EU is primarily an addional protecon, to keep Italy from coming up with very, very stupid ideas, to put it that way. Simply because Italy is then once again interwoven into this construct of states, and that of course makes it much more difficult to say that ‘I'm now going to do something that may not be good and beneficial.’ And luckily, I think we currently have a mood throughout Europe that is rather humane and perhaps also minority friendly. (ST_1) The relaonship of minories with the EU was also defined in economic or financial terms, with one interviewee highlighng how minories may benefit financially from the EU: The advantages definitely outweigh the disadvantages for South Tyrol and also what we minories can make of it. I have seen that we, because we are a minority, always get funding for certain projects, for bridge building, road construcon, forestry, etc. We gladly accept everything, we always want to look ahead, keep going, keep going. And yes, when we receive something through our status, I always say yes, I'm happy to accept it! (ST_6) Europe in the Background Many parcipants were born in the late 1990s or early 2000s, and hence their view on Europe has not been shaped by any major integraon narraves related to borders and de-bordering, such as the abolion of border controls through the Schengen Agreement or the introducon of the euro as a common currency. While they recognize Europe as an important framework, they view it as something normal that has always been there in their lives. I just think that I am having a hard me with these quesons because the EU is so logical for us, because we were simply born into the EU, our generaon, that it is not really thought about. Okay, we live in the EU. What is the EU good for? What if it didn't exist? What was it like before? We don't know. We were just born into it, and it simply existed from the beginning. We learned in school about what the EU is and why it should be good or bad for us. And that has always just been the case, so I don't think young people think much about what the EU does for them. Because it has always just been there for as long as they can remember. (ST_6) D.4.2, V1 24 Other research parcipants argued that many of their contemporaries were unaware of the many advantages and opportunies brought by the EU, which may contribute to a certain degree of Euroscepcism they observed among young colleagues and classmates: The younger generations don't really know what [border controls] mean [...] I think we only appreciate many things when they are restricted. We have been given the great gift of open borders, and we don't really appreciate it... (ST_2) Comparison of individual young adults’ narraves with public narraves in local media In this secon we contrast the results gathered in our research interviews and workshop with those from the findings from the minority newspaper analysis conducted in the first phase of the project (Engl et al. 2024). A comparison of the media narraves analyzed in South Tyrol and the narraves of young members of minories reveal that borders are generally perceived as a less emove issue by young people than in minority media. The young parcipants displayed a more pragmac and depolicized stance that diverges from the more dramazed or ideologically charged portrayals in Dolomiten newspaper. Furthermore, it appears that borders have less relevance in young people’s everyday lives than in the media we studied earlier, suggesng a disconnect between tradional media narraves and young people’s lived experience. Rather than viewing borders as sites of division, or rigid structures of exclusion, our research parcipants tend to frame them as fluid opportunies—resources for mobility, personal growth, or leisure. This interpretaon is reinforced by their reacons to "crisis moments", such as the COVID-19 pandemic and ‘migraon crisis’. While minority media put a strong emphasis on these, research parcipants rarely perceived these as crises. The absence of strong emoonal or polical responses to such events could indicate a form of distancing from macro-level narraves that feel removed from personal relevance. References to these “crises” are rarely brought up in discussions, underscoring the limited impact such media frames have on the everyday consciousness of young people. The local border featured heavily in media narraves but appeared to be less relevant to young South Tyrolians, who crossed it infrequently and associated it primarily with parcular moments of leisure, such as mountain hikes. This ulitarian and recreaonal view suggests that local borders are stripped of their historic-polical weight in the eyes of the youth, becoming instead markers of lifestyle or nature rather than identy or conflict. Their reflecons on borders included, instead, abstract and general reflecons of borders. This abstracon may signal a conceptual rather than experienal relaonship with the idea of the border. Borders are intellectually acknowledged but rarely felt in tangible ways. Significantly, while naonal borders featured heavily in their narraves, the intra-state linguisc border between South Tyrol and nearby Veneto, and between the German-speaking minority and the naonal majority, constuted another central theme. This focus on internal cultural and linguisc boundaries over geopolical borders points to the persistent salience of identy polics at the regional level, even in an otherwise globalized or border-transcending youth culture. The idea of a cross-border Tyrolean imagined community or identy, central to media narraves on borders, is largely absent from interviewees’ narraves. Border-crossing as a daily and local act is not D.4.2, V1 25 significantly present. Instead, there is a greater relevance of crossing other (European) borders for purposes such as traveling, studying, and working. This shi indicates a reorientaon of spaal imaginaries from the local to the European scale, reflecng a mobility-based identy in which Europe, not the region, becomes the dominant frame of reference. Finally, regarding narraves of Europe, the media and the narraves of young people are similar: in both cases, the European Union is framed in rather posive terms, parcularly regarding free movement, while remaining a somewhat distant enty. The EU is seen as an instuon that cares about, and for, minories rather than a community or a common identy. Even in mes of crises, such as during the pandemic rebordering, the EU’s role in managing the crisis was not crically addressed. This convergence suggests that while the EU is viewed as generally beneficial, it also fails to inspire a strong sense of emoonal belonging. For these young people who grew up in, and with, a Europe with open Schengen borders, the EU was largely taken for granted rather than an issue that merits conscious reflecon, poinng to a ‘banal Europeanism’. The normalizaon of European integraon among youth may reflect the success of the Schengen project in embedding itself in daily rounes, but it also raises quesons about the depth of European identy and the potenal fragility of support in mes of instuonal or polical strain. 5.2 Polish-Czech Borderland Authors: Elżbieta Opiłowska, Hynek Böhm In the zine-making workshop and interviews, 22 young members of the Polish minority in the Czech Republic, aged 18 to 20, parcipated. The gender was balanced, consisng of 12 female and 10 male research parcipants. They were all students, primarily aending Polish minority schools in the region. While all had completed or were compleng their secondary educaon, their levels of engagement in Polish minority organisaons varied. Some were acve in cultural or folklore groups, while others did not parcipate in formal minority structures. The zine-making workshop took place in Polish language, on 25th June 2024 at the Pedagogical Centre for Polish Naonal Educaon (Centrum Pedagogiczne dla Polskiego Szkolnictwa Narodowościowego) in Český Těšín. The interviews were conducted in two rounds, in December 2024 and February 2025, in various informal sengs, ensuring a comfortable environment for discussion. They were conducted in the Silesian dialect, which reflects the parcipants' strong regional identity and bilingual background. Participant experiences with personal mobility were predominantly shaped by the open-border environment of the Schengen area. Many crossed the Polish-Czech border on a regular basis for shopping, leisure, or visiting family members. Unlike previous generations, they did not perceive the border as a significant obstacle but rather as a normal part of everyday life. In terms of self-identification, all participants were from the region and expressed a strong regional identity and identification with Zaolzie—the historical region they inhabit—rather than strictly as Polish D.4.2, V1 32 The open borders in the Schengen area are part of their identity, as was directly expressed by the interviewees. Against this background, in the media narratives, interviews, and the zine-making workshop, the border is perceived as a bridge, a connecting space, rather than a source of division. Moreover, the very local focus of Głos could be compared to the strong regional identity of our interviewees, which supersedes a strict Polish or Czech national affiliation. They feel a sense of belonging to the Zaozie region, of which they are proud, which is also manifested in speaking the local dialect and belonging to folklore groups. The use of dialect allows them to escape the bi-national, Czech-Polish categorization and to express the third identity rooted in regional history and heritage. Even if they referred to the history of the division of the border region, it was not seen as an obstacle for the borderlanders living here. Regarding identified narratives of Europe, the media and vernacular narratives of minority youth are also similar. In general, references to Europe were made mainly in relation to the Schengen area. Europe is seen as a practical framework for mobility but not necessarily as an identity. A Europe with open Schengen borders is taken for granted. As in Głos, Europe is in the shadows here, offering opportunities but not defining the identity of our interviewees. However, they perceived the achievements of European integration - the ability to travel without restrictions - as a value worth defending. As in the case of the media analysis, the re-bordering associated with COVID-19, rather than a 'migration crisis', was a lived experience of young minority members that had shaken their certainty about open borders as a matter of course. They expressed concerns about the future of open borders, reflecting a growing awareness of political debates within the EU. In conclusion, it can be argued that young minority members have internalized an expression of everyday, banal Europeanism in the Czech-Polish borderland. Their strong regional identity is rooted in the crossborder region, allowing them to avoid national categorization. For them, Europe is not an ideology but an everyday social practice. 5.3 Danish-German Borderland Author: Marn Kla The data collected here stem from a zine workshop, a discussion about “Europe”, and six interviews. The zine-making workshop was held on 19 August 2024 with a group of high school students (grade 12) from Deutsches Gymnasium Nordschleswig (the German language high school of the German minority in Denmark) at the Jugendbildungsstäe Knivsberg, an educaonal boarding school-like retreat in North Schleswig operated by the German minority’s youth organizaon (Deutscher Jugendverband Nordschleswig). This seng ensured confidenality as well as familiarity, as the parcipants had been there before at other events and knew the facility well. In effect, some of the German minority high school students resided in Germany, commung to school, and some had only recently migrated to Denmark from Germany. This diversity reflects the situaon at D.4.2, V1 33 the German minority high school, which, according to an assessment of its principal, is aended by ca. one third of students from core minority families, one third of students from local Danish families and Germans who have migrated to the region from Germany, and one third of students commung from Germany, who oen have aended a Danish minority school before. Interesngly enough, one of the interviewed Danish minority members consequently talked about the Danish-German minority (det dansktyske mindretal) (DKDE_1). Zines were produced along a headline the students had drawn previously out of ten different headlines from the media analysis (D4.1) of the two minority language newspapers in the region (Der Nordschleswiger and Flensborg Avis) selected to reflect the different codes used in the media analysis. Zines were produced for all ten headlines. Almost all students were producve and creave in producing a zine. Only one student had difficules with the task and produced an incomplete zine. A few others commented that they would have preferred to produce a free zine – without a chosen/drawn headline from the media analysis. The zines reflect that all parcipants had specific border experiences and documented that the border was a factor shaping their percepon of the border region, cross-border living and their specific borderland minority situaon. Narraves on the border The high school students of the German minority as well as the interviewed university students of the Danish minority have all experienced the Danish-German (and other EU-borders) as open, most have crossed it frequently in their daily lives for educaonal purposes, work, and leisure acvies, especially family visits and shopping. The Danish-German border is an important factor shaping their percepons of belonging. It’s not just a border (DKDE_1) The students had no or only distant memories on the special situaon of migraon in autumn 2015, but all remembered the closures from March-May 2020, which had an impact on all informers. The border was a key theme in the interviews and in all zines, showing that the students here had a personal relaonship with different aspects of the border in the region. Narrave of the Border as a Bridge of Everyday Pracces Even though hardly physically visible, quite a few menoned that they perceive the border crossing as a change of system, language and culture – even on a personal base: But I feel a bit like it also feels a bit strange. I mean, I know when I drive into Germany that I am in Germany. I don’t know what it is, but I can definitely feel that I just crossed the border. (DKDE_2) While this young Danish minority member felt very conscious about which side of the border she was on, generally parcipants tended to perceive the border as "just there”. Their minority background has induced them to cross the border regularly for private acvies, as well as educaonand workrelated acvies. Many perceive the local border as an open border with lots of opportunies, especially for them as members of borderland naonal minories. Some perceive it even as a best D.4.2, V1 34 pracce case and role model for other border regions; which is in line with the narrave spread by key stakeholders in the region (Kla, 2024). While in general this applies to all informants, both from the Danish minority in Germany and the German minority in Denmark, there is a percepon of difference and so discriminaon in the interview narraves. These percepons are about being othered by the Danish majority in form of being ridiculed or teased as Nazis (German minority in Denmark) or not accepted as real Danish (Danish minority in Germany). Narrave of the border as opportunity Narraves of the border as a site of opportunity emerged frequently in the interviews but not so much in the zines. Interviewees generally felt that it was an advantage to live in a border region with an open border and to grow up in a naonal minority with a kinstate on the other side. Living on the border is advantageous because it makes you feel close to both countries and you don’t live so isolated in the interior [of a country] (DKDE_3) Youth from the Danish minority (who all had le high school some years before) were especially keen on menoning the perceived beer educaon opportunies in Denmark. For the students from the German minority, the aspect of cross-border shopping was relevant and pracced regularly as a key opportunity. One informant from the Danish minority menoned that bordercrossing opened up student job opportunity (working in one of the supermarkets catering specifically for customers in Denmark). This reflects the professionalized cross-border shopping structures of the region, resulng mainly from a connuous, sectoral price level difference between the two countries. I chose this picture of the supermarket with the border shop. I do that a lot. I like these cheap things. In our family, we usually make it a fun oung. We all go together, then we eat, then we shop, and then we drive home. (DKDE_3)(speaks Danish in the discussion) D.4.2, V1 35 Image 1: Zine image showing the ‘return’ to normal border life after the COVID-19 pandemic: shopping and the beach. One student from the German minority also mentioned the possibility to cross-border commute to high school as a great opportunity. Narraves of the border as a site of control A dominant theme in the interviews, the zines, and the discussion was border control. Overall, narraves were crical of border control at the local border (Denmark-Germany), while some informants voiced understanding for the need to control other borders, which represented more conflictual sengs, such as the US-Mexican border and external EU borders. The zines were crical of border control in general, expressed in different ways. Referring to the two periods of crisis used in the media analysis, it became clear that the informants did not or only faintly remembered the so-called ‘migraon crisis’ of autumnwinter 2015-16, but they did remember the impact of the border closures induced by the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020, as well as the insecurity during the restricted re-opening from summer 2020. Some of the research parcipants felt themselves to be privileged because of dual cizenship, or as German cizens residing in Denmark – these persons could always leave their country of residence to enter their country of cizenship. Others faced challenges when aending educaon facilies on the other side of the border, as well as complicated rules on exempons from the general travel ban. The “temporary” border controls introduced in January 2016, relaxed in summer 2023, but sll in effect when entering Denmark, as well as recently introduced border controls by Germany, are widely considered out of proporon, and some students recounted experiences of racial profiling by the police when picking out cars for inspecon. A general sense of insecurity about border controls was menoned by several parcipants. It was also menoned that border controls pose the risk of construcng borders in people’s minds and increasing stereotypes: If you start controlling at the border, you imply that something about this country is criminal, or something bad is coming from there, that you do not want to have in your country, and this builds up stereotypes against the people of that country (DKDE_4) Narrave of the border as a fence/security device The direct associaon of the border as a fence was not very present in the interviews, as the informants had not experienced crossing fenced borders. A special feature at the Danish-German border is a wild boar fence constructed unilaterally by Denmark in 2019 to prevent transmission of the African Swine Fever into the Danish pork producon industry. The fence, about 1.5 m in height, covers the whole land border and is the first visible demarcaon/fencing of the border, except for a short period aer WWII. It does not hinder free movement of people, as there are gates even at small paths crossing the border. Nevertheless, the fence caused widespread anger in the region (Eilenberg and Harrisson, 2023). It was featured in several of the zines and described as an intrusion into the cross-border landscape, seng parallels to other border fences. D.4.2, V1 36 Image 2: the Wild Boar fence at the Danish-German border dividing a nature idyl, and the fenced and militarized border between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai/Negev. Both reflect a securized approach to borders, cung tradional lifeways of wildlife (DE-DK) and Bedouins (IL-EG). When the researcher told the students that the headline “The trip ended shortly aer the border”, used as moo for some zines, referred to criminals being stopped, there was a discussion about crime and the effecveness of borders and border control to stop crime. The zines based on this headline were associated with border control stopping people from perceived (or real) transgression of the border. The students did not know that the headline referred to a police record but associated the narrave with more regular stoppings and selecve inspecons fing racial profiling. Then we travelled from Denmark to Germany, and at the German border, I think it was a black family who were rudely pulled out of the bus, just this one family. (DKDE_4) Our informants did not perceive the border as a place of transgression, but rather as a place perceived by state authories to be a place of transgression: When they said I should drive back home, I had to drive back home – it’s not at the border you can solve a problem, you must look where the problem comes from. (DEDK_3) Border security and border identy D.4.2, V1 37 One of the headlines used for the zines was “The Minories were le out”, referring to the headline of an arcle in the German minority’s daily newspaper Der Nordschleswiger, 23 May 2020 (“die Minderheiten wurden im Sch gelassen”), in which a Danish majority polician cricized the Danish government for not having taken the situaon of the borderland minories into consideraon when closing the border. In these zines, the young parcipants explored the specific percepons of minories regarding border closures. One zine reflected young people’s dreams of the freedom provided by open borders, now destroyed by the border closures of the pandemic. A (ficonal) diary reflected on the isolaon and loneliness at home many teenagers experienced in March 2020. Parcipant narraves reflected not being able to visit family members living in the neighboring country because of travel restricons. All informants menoned the impact of the pandemic-induced border closures on their daily cross-border living pracces. Zine Image 3: This story of a border crossing reflects insecurity: “we are allowed to drive on. But you don’t really feel like it anymore. One feels foreign in a part of one's home (Heimat), which one can only enter with an uneasy feeling”. Borders and minority identy The impact of the border on shaping minority identy was very present in the interviews, while not directly present in the zines. “No minority without the border”, was a frequent statement, reflecng the historic reality of the constuon of the two reciprocal minories aer the border delineaon in 1920, as well as the strong role of minority-kinstate relaons in the region. One interviewed went so far as to define herself differently when crossing the border: It's also because my life in the different countries isn't the same. I have two different lives, and I know that. When I cross the border, I'm a different person because I'm surrounded by different people and, well, I go to different places. (DEDK_2) All four of the interviewed Danish minority youth reflected on their specific minority identy shaped by their socio-cultural living pracces within the triangle minority-kinstate-home state nexus (Brubaker, 2010). Danish minority youth menoned their special experience of cultural immersion with the kinstate D.4.2, V1 38 when moving to Denmark for secondaryor higher educaon as a “wow” effect of experiencing difference, a percepon of a cultural border not only between Denmark and Germany, but also between the Danish minority and its kinstate. This may result in an in-between percepon, which is shared by youth from the German minority. I also have to say […] that the same border, because I come from the Danish minority, is perhaps something like a so border. (DEDK_4) This in-between or “both-and” percepon is not perceived as a barrier or disadvantage, but as a resource and opportunity. It is an experience common to both minories, but none of the informants perceived it as a basis for a joint Danish-German minority identy. Narraves on Europe The interviews asked specifically about the EU and its role for the border region and naonal minories, and the zine-making workshop included a specific discussion round on the EU. All parcipants reflected an awareness and sense of gratude for being European. Both the German minority and Danish minority parcipants were aware of the Schengen agreement of open borders and the EU’s role in securing the openness of borders, as well as other privileges of being EU cizens (travel, work). Europe as opportunity All parcipants supported an open Europe narrave and the opportunies it gave them, such as the Erasmus study exchange program or the possibility to live and work in the kinstate. Yes, I think that what a person experiences here in Europe with a border and what a person can experience in Europe at a border is very different from other countries and other connents, because we have the European Union and therefore things like the Schengen Agreement. (DEDK_3) The informants from the Danish minority all had experiences of border crossing for educaon and/or work, and frequent border crossing is part of their daily life, due to their border region minority identy and socializaon. This has not been the case with the informants from the German minority, very probably because they were sll in high school. The informants expressed a percepon of cross-border regional life. Only a few idenfied barriers concerning taxaon and/or recognion of educaon. Most informants expressed a percepon of a backlash on border openness, fearing restricons to the freedom of movement, a return to more naonalism and more border control. There was no difference between the members of either minority. One member of the German minority stressed the opportunity of being able to cross-border commute to high school – which, in fact, is not a general opportunity but restricted to residents of Germany. Some interviewees from the Danish minority ed the perceived best pracce of minority-majority accommodaon and relaons in the region to Europe; Europe being an actor making border-regional diversity possible (in fact, it is a bilateral Danish-German arrangement which has preceded European integraon). D.4.2, V1 39 Europe as a protector of minories “If Europe becomes more unified, the minories will be overshadowed and not get as much aenon because everything can then be presented in such a simple and straighorward way.” (DEDK_1) The quote above is the only quote directly expressing fear that too much European integraon could harm small minority communies because of assimilaon threats. Most other informants perceived the EU to have a posive role in supporng diversity and protecng minories. Quite a few informants ed the EU to the relaxed minority-majority seng of the region, as well as to the opportunity to aend minority schools. The students were aware of the more difficult situaon of other minories living in the EU (though none was menoned specifically). One informer from the Danish minority was also aware of the failure of the Minority Safe Pack Iniave, nevertheless she appropriated the EU a special role for minories and menoned the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (passed by the Council of Europe). This reveals a posive percepon of the EU as norm-seer for the treatment of naonal minories, when in effect the norms have been set by the Council of Europe in general, and for the Danish-German border region by the two naonal governments, in fact decades before the menoned Council of Europe frameworks. Europe in the background Europe or the EU were not key themes in the interviews or zines, unless asked for specifically. This indicates the “it’s just there” percepon or what we have idenfied as banal Europeanism. Freedom of movement and open borders are taken for granted in principle. “Okay, it's Europe and I can travel through the countries and stuff, but it's not something I think about that much.” (DEDK_6) Disrupon of this freedom through border controls was considered as an annoyance by one student specifically. Narraves of open/closed Europe Europe was reflected on in the zines referring to the German minority’s chairman’s quote of European failure, when Denmark reintroduced border controls in January 2016 to migate the perceived threat of migraon. In effect, though, neither of the two zines with these headlines made specific reference to the EU as a decisive actor with the power to close or open borders. Open borders vs. closed borders (borders as bridges or barriers) were a clear focus, where the EU was idenfied with open borders, or, reciprocally, open borders were idenfied with the EU. The students agreed that life in internal EU/Schengen borderlands was very different from life in other borderlands. But they also menoned the challenges of re-bordering and border controls on this percepon of open borders and an EU where cizens enjoy equal rights and freedom of movement. There was a percepon of policians reverng to naonalism as the main cause of border securizaon: people fearing open borders and border controls resulng in a percepon of more security. Border controls could create a border in D.4.2, V1 40 the minds, a percepon that something bad or criminal comes from the other side, which you do not want to have in your country and thus building up stereotypes about people from the other side. Zine Image 4: Direct criticism of the EU not interfering with the national governments’ extension of border controls. Nevertheless, EU borders were perceived as peaceful borders, despite border controls at internal EU borders. EU: United in diversity? Another theme touched on in the workshop discussion and the interviews was about a united or divided Europe/EU. Here, the students reflected on the perceived contradicon of the EU’s cultural diversity with a strong focus on perceived naonal cultures. This cultural diversity was seen as an immaterial wealth to be preserved, perhaps contradicng the aims of European integraon, acknowledging the perceived difficulty of having all these cultures to funcon together. A student (f) commented, though, that most cultures in Europe probably were very similar, but perceived as different because of a focus on differences or lack of knowledge about the other. One student (m) remarked on a cleavage between the perceived more similar cultures of the founding EC members on the one side and the post-socialist countries’ culture on the other – with the similarity of each block creang an antagonism making European integraon more difficult. EU and identy When asked directly, European identy did play a role for all informers, but not necessarily straighorward, and not ed to specific characteriscs. It was a vague, “it’s just there” form of acknowledgment of being European, an awareness of the advantages of being from a European country. I don't really know how to describe my feelings about Europe, because I feel quite secure in Europe, I must say. I'm quite happy that I come from a European country. But I also see a lot of things that are very complicated. Especially when you think about the different instuons we have. (DEDK_5) Here, security, the welfare state, good educaonal opportunies, and easy travel around the EU were menoned. No informer named directly the disadvantages of being an EU cizen. D.4.2, V1 41 Comparison with media analysis The media analysis conducted in the Danish-German borderland region (Engl et al., 2024), extrapolated around the “Border as a bridge” and “Border as a fence” narrave, with almost one arcle coded per day referring to “border as a bridge”. This reflects the periods of crisis (migraon, COVID-19) that were analyzed. While giving room for other opinions in quotes of policians etc., editorials of the newspapers Flensborg Avis and Der Nordschleswiger, as well as quotes of minority policians, were biased towards open borders, cricizing re-bordering and the introducon of border controls as detrimental to the border region’s development, as a step back, and as harming the minories more severely than others. As a surprising result, the “border as a place of transgression” was coded rather frequently, appearing in about 40% of the newspaper edions selected for the analysis. The arcles studied usually referred to police reports about pey criminal acvies stopped at the border. This narrave did not feature in the interviews and zines. It was also apparent that voices of young people were underrepresented in the media analysis, as well as a very male bias (about ¾ of the quotes were from male actors). Furthermore, a key narrave presented in the media analysis was the percepon of being le out – decisions (on border controls) were made without consulng the minories, and without consideraon of the special impact they had on their cross-border lives. Our interviews and zines were intended to present boom-up percepons of young minority members. As the border was open in principle and only controlled randomly at the me of the data collecon (spring 2024–spring 2025), these percepons were not so directly impacted by the border crises of 2015–16 and 2020, and thus differed from the media narraves. The situaon at the border was perceived as peaceful and the border as open, and the informants did not experience difficules crossing in person – only stories about others who encountered difficules because of racial profiling or not being EU-cizens. There was, however, a percepon of the open border as being threatened: the pandemic has demonstrated that borders can be physically closed in an instant. The students are also aware of populist demands for more control or closed borders, as well as a threat to the EU as they perceive it today (with open borders and the freedom to work and live in any EU country). Altogether, the material collected demonstrates a very balanced percepon of European sociees and border region life by the young minority members, combined with a consciousness that the border shapes percepons and impacts their daily lives and their identy as borderland residents belonging to a naonal minority with the kinstate across the border. The young minority members expressed a clear desire for open borders in the region and within the EU, while threats were idenfied that could jusfy control and more closed borders elsewhere. Specifically, southern Europe and the US-Mexican border were named here. This applies for informants from both minories, with the slight difference that the interviewees from the Danish minority in Germany had already graduated from high school, and all of them had gained border-crossing life experience by studying and/or working in Denmark. D.4.2, V1 48 Europe as a space for opportunies Overall, the parcipants were expressing different atudes toward Europe and especially the European Union (EU). The only thing they all shared was the high level of appreciaon of the open intra-Schengen borders, which was even seen as the single most important benefit of EU membership generally. Other advantages idenfied included various EU programs such as Erasmus, the youth voluntary service program, opportunies related to employment and various youth camps, as well as feelings of security. One interviewee said: ‘I believe there are many advantages for young people. For instance, Interrail… I’m travelling around a lot and it’s great that there are no border controls.’ (SKHU_5) Some of the Euroscepc voices were formulated in a strongly emoonal and even vulgar manner. One research parcipant believed that the EU was ‘ramming stupid ideologies’ and ‘spreading nonsensical bullshit’. Others cricised its governance and priories, where too much focus and resources were invested into the wrong issues. One contributor opined that ‘they are trying to interfere in domesc polics way too much, which is not good’ (SKHU_Zine_workshop_3). Another parcipant claimed that ‘it is an economic alliance that is basically trying to make its own countries bankrupt through its dumb economic decisions’ (SKHU_Zine_workshop_4). EU and the lack of minority protecon The aspect pertaining most to WP4 is that several respondents lamented the EU’s lack of acon in the field of (autochthonous) ethnic minority protecon, as the following two quotes reflect. I’m rather against the EU as while it holds human rights important, it isn’t really concerned with the rights of minority Hungarians [...]. The EU should play a bigger role in embracing minority rights. If everyone is equal then members of minories should be equal, too. It’s not just the Hungarians – there are numerous other minories in Europe, and I feel the EU isn’t doing much for them either. The opposite is being communicated externally but not perceived locally. (SKHU_1) Europe and Security While all research parcipants appreciated the openness of internal borders, as was shown above, their majority considered the protecon of external borders important (Image 5). As one informant put it: ‘Borderless Europe is good within, but Fortress Europe would be good toward the outside’ (SKHU_1). Another one had a different opinion: ‘I think there is some truth in both noons. Recently, Fortress Europe has received more emphasis, unfortunately. I also think the reading of someone living in Europe will be different from that of someone living on another connent.’ (SKHU_2) When debang the pros and cons of EU membership, one parcipant thought that ‘small states such as Slovakia need military protecon […] and can feel being part of a larger enty and thus stronger’ (SKHU_Zine_workshop_5). When the discussion revolved around the EU’s external borders, one parcipant believed that the current level of openness and protecon is ‘well-opmised’ (SKHU_Zine_workshop_1). He recalled travelling to Egypt and having to pass all kinds of checks but assessed that these were jusfied. Another parcipant had much more radical views: D.4.2, V1 49 The EU’s external borders are a disaster! All Frontex staff should be fired and the competences handed over to the naon-states. There should be fire command at the border to stop people from even aempng to cross illegally. There is no other way to protect the border. Just as Russia or the US have fire command at their borders.’ (SKHU_Zine_workshop_4). Image 5: The le zine page acknowledges the freedom of mobility within the EU. The right one shows a historical map of a fort in Komárno, with the label ‘Fortress Europe’ added right below. Then the quote: ‘If we don’t win, the Carpathian Basin will be a country of immigrants!’ Comparison of workshop and interview analysis with media analysis The three different points of analyses all pointed to a plurality of views within Slovakia’s ethnic Hungarian community. In the media analysis (of hundreds of arcles), a conscious choice was made to pick two different news portals with diverging polical leanings; ujszo.com and felvidek.ma, which are also the two largest ones. But even within those two media, different opinions were present. Concerning the first, much smaller sample, the parcipants of the zine workshop (especially the more vocal ones) were a bit more ethno-naonaliscally tuned. This can be explained by the fact that they have chosen to study history at the Pedagogical Faculty of Slovakia’s small and only Hungarian-language highereducaon instuon. The J. Selye University is located in Komárno in southwestern Slovakia, yet the majority of the parcipants have moved there from the south-central and southeastern parts of the country – oen hundreds of kilometres away. These young people could have chosen to study at universies in Hungary that are geographically closer to their nave regions. But their choice to go for a history program in more distant Komárno can be interpreted as reflecng an ambion to stay in Slovakia and probably become a teacher in Hungarian-language schools in their nave communies. Although we did not ask about their future migraon plans, when this topic popped up only one expressed a desire to potenally move to Hungary in the future. Regarding EUrope, different viewpoints were shared even by the same parcipants. These included posive and negave percepons, but no one expressed any desire for either Slovakia or Hungary to exit the EU just as no one could be deemed an explicit Europhile. Open D.4.2, V1 50 internal open borders and concomitant opportunies were seen as the main plus, while a perceived interference into certain domesc issues (like migraon policy) as the main minus. The other minor sample was even smaller, but the nature of data collecon – interviewing – has allowed for deeper engagement with different individuals. With one excepon, the informants in this case were living in the border city of Štúrovo (two now in Budapest but even they regularly commute home). They generally seemed happy with their lives as well as their community, which was now oen understood to incorporate the neighbouring Hungarian city of Esztergom as well. Hence, they were all crossing the border on a regular basis – and not just for short visits (like shopping or eang out) but also for acvies that imply greater commitment, like studying or engaging in extracurricular acvies. Quesons around selfidenficaon were even more explicit than in the zine workshop, and it became clear that the interviewees primarily idenfied as Hungarians from Slovakia or Felvidék (the two labels refer to the same territory, but their respecve use was explained by the respondents and thus also in the interview analysis). As explained in the interview analysis, there was just one identy label taken from the media analysis that they found peculiar and could not relate to: ‘szlovmagy’ – a label some journalists may have used to refer to a hybrid identy. The rejecon of (or unfamiliarity with) that label does not mean that the informants have not shared any self-idenficaon narraves that resemble the sort of hybrid features oen encountered in border situaons. But it seems that people are more comfortable with indicang one or another identy label even in mulcultural contexts, or at least to rank one above another – perhaps to maintain the illusion of a stable self. That again does not imply that the interviewees have not selfidenfied as Europeans (which several of them explicitly have), but that comes secondary and is of course also another scale of socio-spaal idenficaon. Regarding EUrope, their percepons were mixed but were overall more posive than among the zine parcipants. Sll, several of the interviewees have lamented the EU’s lack of agency concerning autochthonous ethnic minority rights. 5.5 Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borderland Authors: Marn Kla, Nazrin Gadimova-Akbulut, Petranka Nedelcheva B-SHAPES arranged a combined zine-making and interview workshop on 12 October 2024 in Xanthi, Greece, facilitated by the European Federaon of Western Thrace Turks (ABTTF), an NGO represenng different Turkish minority organizaons and instuons in north-eastern Greece. The workshop was aended by 25 young (18-30) members of the Turkish minority, 11 male and 14 female. Petranka Nedelcheva explained the procedure in Greek, assisted by facilitators from ABTTF explaining it in Turkish. Aer the zine-making, nine parcipants were interviewed in Turkish by other parcipants, using the standard interview guide, which had been machine-translated into Turkish and edited by a facilitator from ABTTF. All workshop parcipants stressed the importance of their Turkish identy and the difficult situaon of the minority, which is characterized by non-recognion and discriminaon. They emphasized an inbetween situaon within the triad of Europe/the EU, the Greek state and their Greek cizenship, and the D.4.2, V1 51 Turkish kinstate and their Turkish identy. Their religious identy as Muslims in a predominantly Chrisan Greek-Orthodox country did not play an important role in the narraves – with only a few comments to the conflict of who may appoint imams of Muslim communies: in most cies, there is a mosque led by an imam appointed by the Greek state in compeon to a mosque led by an imam chosen by the community. In that sense, respondents reported that while the Greek government does not recognize the ethnic identy of Turks in the region, it also restricts their religious rights even though they are protected by the Treaty of Lausanne. Narraves on the border The parcipants perceived borders as being constructed by naon states, not by communies. Borders were seen to enforce sovereignty, security, and economic control, but also segregate people who share language, culture and identy. This is evidenced in the following quote: We are Turks, but we live in Greece and there is a border with Türkiye that separates us (GKBUTK_1) All informants frequently crossed the Turkish-Greek border for educaon, work, family visits, and other leisure acvies. The border crossing experience is described as cauous, reflecng the community’s vulnerability, and fear. The border is perceived as very visible to the Turkish-Greek minority workshop parcipants and interviewees. In contrast to the other case studies, there were no narraves about the invisible border. Border as a fence/barrier The Greek-Turkish border is an external EU border and has at mes been a hot-spot of irregular migraon. It is both heavily fenced and militarized. As EU cizens, no visa restricons apply for members of the Turkish minority in Greece when entering Türkiye, but relaves and friends from the kin state usually need a visa to enter Greece. Parcipants of the workshop and in the interviews shared personal accounts of racial profiling, inmidaon, and psychological pressure applied by Greek border police when crossing the border: You get scared when you’re about to cross the border – when the border security sees our names, some of them are racists … some act as if we have commied crimes. (GKBUTK_2) Crossing the border is not just perceived as a bureaucrac act, it is a moment of fear and self-censorship, shaped by historical trauma and current policies. The symbolic power of the border is not only about territory, but about who is seen as a threat. The act of crossing is not neutral, it is policized. This is evidenced in the following quote: Strict controls, fear of being stopped, or being treated as suspicious – it makes you feel like a criminal for simply crossing. (GKBUTK_3) The policizaon of borders was linked to broader reflecons on passports, ID cards, and the invisible walls that structure daily life for non-recognized, not acknowledged minories like the Turkish one in Greece. That said, many parcipants accepted the principle of sovereignty: that countries control or even close D.4.2, V1 52 borders to guard against migrants and the influx of illegal contrabands as drugs or weapons. Nevertheless, the young adults’ narraves emphasized the impact of border closures on the people residing in the border region (who cannot cross and visit) as well as on trade. They highlightedthat fences and other obstacles placed in front of people to prevent them from freedom of expression, communicaon and socializaon. Fences were also seen to symbolize a lack of communicaon, and the increased security checks on the Turkish-Greek border that have le the minority in a dead end situaon. Image 1: The zine page on the le describes the feelings of being limited within borders. The capon under the picture says: “Doesn't the feeling of boredom in the picture describe people stuck within their own boundaries?” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_3). The zine page on the right explains the loss of me bringing another dimension of border as a barrier: “When it comes to borders, the first thing that comes to mind is losing me. The concept of me challenges us all! And it gets harder every day.” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_11). Border as a site of opportunity The parcipants made only a few direct references to the border as a site of opportunity. Several parcipants emphasized the economic significance of crossing points, with shopping trips across the Bulgarian border becoming part of everyday life. Others stressed how economic changes have made crossings easier “comparing to the old mes”. Beyond economics, the border was also imagined as a bond that connects different sides. The Evros river bridge was described as a symbol of cultural transfer, where people, ideas, and tradions flow across. Some of the parcipants referred to the Turkish minority of Western Thrace as a potenal bridge of friendship between Türkiye and Greece (GKBUTK_1). Finally, despite the physical and polical borders, the shared Turkish language across the region funcons as a powerful connector, which was seen as soening the harshness of borders. While here it implies minority-kin state relaons, this focus on language as a tool to bridge borders could inspire other border sengs as well. D.4.2, V1 53 Image 2: “There are no boundaries actually. The boundary is just our creaon” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_14). Border as an element of security Borders were also understood as protecve tools that safeguard society from external threats. As some parcipants menoned, borders play an essenal role in sustaining cultural uniqueness in the face of European integraon. One interviewee argued that: Having borders is very important to preserve culture. Because cultures become homogenized, the things that disnguish countries from each other disappear and nothing will be different, special, beauful (GKBUTK_4). Others stressed the importance of borders in maintaining order and security. Border controls and technologies such as X-rays were seen as necessary (“Border control should be done more oen, there are many mes things and people that cross the border which should not cross it”, GKBUTK_2). In this perspecve, borders are not only symbolic lines but also mechanisms of regulaon: “Borders exist to separate two naons, to prevent a messy, chaoc situaon” (GKBUTK_2). Finally, borders were seen as a protecon device prevenng the onset of new conflicts and wars, but also the place of a potenal clash between the two sides, the place where new conflicts might emerge. On the other hand, respondents warned against reducing borders to mere fences or obstacles. Instead, they suggested that borders can also serve as opportunies for cooperaon and mutual recognion: “Polics means not a fence, but solidarity (of reaching hand in hand)” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_2). Border and minority identy For members of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace, the border is inseparable from quesons of belonging and identy. It was a central focus of parcipants’ narraves, and border experiences were described as decisive for their percepon of minority identy. This applies to the physical border between Greece and Türkiye, which is experienced differently than the internal EU Greek-Bulgarian border, but it also applies to experiences of societal bordering within the region (minority/majority). Minority identy D.4.2, V1 54 is clearly shaped by the border triad of Turkish-Greek, minority-suppressive majority, and Greece-Rest of the EU/The “true” Europe. This is highlighted in the following quote: The border shows that even though I am a Turkish minority, I live in Greece and not in Türkiye. And this way I understand that I am a minority because I am a Turk (GKBUTK_4) This perspecve reflects the layered idenes many parcipants expressed, defining themselves simultaneously as Turks, members of the Turkish minority, Thracians, European cizens, and Greek cizens. Others, however, emphasized the exclusivity of Turkishness, rooted in language, religion, and heritage: “Because my mother tongue is Turkish, my homeland is Türkiye. I have never felt myself as a Greek and I have never had this nature” (GKBUTK_4). Experiences of discriminaon and repression shaped these narraves. Parcipants spoke of assimilaon pressures, unequal schooling condions, bans on associaons using the word “Turkish,” and exclusionary treatment at border checkpoints. One of the interviewees referred to the percepons of modernity vs. ignorance dominant in Greek society about the usage of Turkish language: If you are in Western Thrace, you can speak any language you want, except Turkish. If you spoke Greek, you were considered a modernist, educated. If you spoke Turkish, you were a reaconary, a bigot, an ignorant (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_10). Also, the sense of being treated as a threat was menoned in the answers of several interviewees. One of the respondents referred to the policy of de-minorizaon implemented by the Greek government: This policy forces Turks to migrate in Western Thrace through methods such as economic sancons, heavy taxes and restricons on job opportunies. The goal is to remove the Turks from Western Thrace, a border region, and to fully mobilize the region (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_15). At the same me, for some, bilingualism and belonging to several cultures were described as privileges, offering the ability to navigate across naonal and cultural landscapes. Most importantly, minority identy was framed as a source of resilience:“If we are not courageous, if we do not take risks and if we do not uphold unity as a minority, then and only then, we will disappear” (GKBUTK_Zine_workshop_2). Image 3: The le zine page presents the queson of belonging in the symbolic pictures of Greek and Turkish flags standing side by side. The capon under the picture says: “Two countries, two homelands. What is homeland?” D.4.2, V1 55 (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_6). The right zine page shows a lonely soldier on the balefield with a capon: “Being a minority is like loneliness. A minority individual deprived of minority rights in their homeland and feeling homesick for their motherland” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_ 9). Narraves on Europe There is a clear percepon of Europe’s borders, where Türkiye is perceived to be outside, but also their home state Greece not really perceived as European because of its restricve minority policies. The EU to the north of Greece, on the other hand, is perceived as real Europe, with a lot of hopes that it will put pressure on Greece to stop discriminatory pracces, or as a space to migrate to if Greek policies become too suppressive. Greece, in contrast, was not perceived as a true European country, while Türkiye was perceived to be outside Europe, too, despite being a candidate country of the EU. Some parcipants have sharply challenged the percepon of Europe as a space of openness and civil rights referring to Europe as an expression of colonialism and the failure to respect human rights. Despite being EU cizens, parcipants felt excluded from Europe’s promises, experiencing the EU as an abstract idea that has failed to protect their rights. Europe as a place of progress and safety For many respondents, Europe represents a space of aspiraon and advancement. It is described as a “gateway, dreamland, or paradise,” though these images are usually associated with Western and Northern Europe rather than Greece. In this framing, Europe is equated with prosperity, stability, and modernity. Technological innovaon and rich history are central to this image: “When I think of Europe, I think of technological developments and that Europe has a great history” (GKBUTK_9). The European Union is also seen as a space of personal safety, a place to turn to in moments of uncertainty (“a place that we can see as an escape point if we get into trouble in Greece, if it gets worse”). Beyond material progress, Europe embodies values of freedom, human development, and integraon, offering opportunies for individuals and communies to flourish. Image 4: Both zine pages describe one message with the pictures of a European airport and a border field: “There is no need for borders within Europe” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_4/19). Europe as a distant space D.4.2, V1 56 Despite these posive associaons, Europe is also depicted as distant, divided, and at mes disappoinng. Eastern Europe is perceived as “not really Europe,” reflecng an imagined hierarchy within the connent. Similarly, Greece is judged to be “European in name only,” falling short of the standards of development and minority protecon associated with Europe. This sense of distance extends to the European Union as an instuon. Respondents cricize Europe’s “introversion”, which they believe has historically limited economic, cultural, and social development” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_5). The EU is also seen as “not doing enough,” and in some cases “doing nothing” for the region, failing to exert adequate pressure on Greece or provide meaningful engagement. Such shortcomings are viewed as undermining the EU’s credibility as a normave power. In parcular, parcipants expressed hope what Europe could be, a Europe that lives up to its own ideals and protects minories rather than ignoring them: Communies such as the Turkish minority in Western Thrace are part of Europe’s cultural richness and historical diversity. In addion, the Western Thrace minority is an important example to test Europe’s commitment to human rights and democrac values (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_1) It was menoned that the real strength of Europe lay in embracing diversity and mutual understanding, bringing different communies together – something which they did not see happen in their home region. The difficult experiences of the Turkish community in Thrace were clearly perceived as contrary to the standards of human rights and minority rights in Europe. Several respondents called for more acve engagement from Europe, with some respondents expressing hope for the EU to support minority rights and reduce border hardships. According to the respondents, the EU should invest in educaon, and should put more pressure on Greece to improve the situaon of minories: The difficules experienced by the Turkish minority in Western Thrace are contrary to EU human rights and minority rights standards. It is vital that Europe takes a more acve role in this maer to protect the fundamental rights and identy of the minority. True unity is possible if the rights of minories are protected (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_5). In several statements hope was expressed on the future of Greece which might one day become “truly European” by fully accepng and safeguarding minority rights. Europe as a closed fortress Finally, Europe is also imagined as a fortress, parcularly in relaon to migraon. The EU’s restricve policies are seen as damaging not only to migrants but to Europe itself. As one parcipant menoned: The percepons and thoughts of the local populaon, polical rhetoric, and economic condions make the integraon of migrant communies difficult. Because of these reasons, migrants' efforts to return or move to other countries are increasing, and as a result, the European Union is experiencing difficules (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_1). D.4.2, V1 57 Image 5: The zine picture on the le describes the growing security measures in Greece: “As a result of increased security checks at the borders, European countries have entered a posion where they are virtually declaring war on the world in terms of tourism, economy and polics (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_12). The zine picture on the right delivers the message of closed borders with the capon: “Why is Europe closing its doors?” (GKBUTK_zine_workshop_17). 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Tato zpráva konkrétně zkoumá, jak mladí lidé z národnostních menšin žijících v evropských pohraničních regionech vnímají hranice, Evropu a Evropskou unii (EU). Opírá se o pět případových studií – Jižní Tyrolsko (Itálie– Rakousko), Zaolzie/Těšínské Slezsko (Polsko–Česko), Severní a Jižní Šlesvicko (Dánsko–Německo), jižní Slovensko (Maďarsko–Slovensko) a Západní Thrákie (Řecko–Bulharsko–Turecko) – aby nabídla pohledy zdola na každodenní zkušenos s hranicemi a evropskou integrací. Studie, uskutečněná v letech 2024–2025, se zaměřila na mladé dospělé ve věku 18–31 let a kombinovala polostrukturované rozhovory a workshopy tvorby zinů. Tyto přístupy umožnily účastníkům vyjádřit své naravy vizuálně i textově/verbálně, a m vytvořit perspekvy přesahující diskurzy elit a médií. Porovnáním výpovědí mladých lidí s menšinovými mediálními naravy (Engl et al., 2024) studie zdůrazňuje jak shody, tak i rozpory mezi veřejným a osobním chápáním Evropy. Analýza odhaluje výraznou mezeru mezi menšinovými mediálními naravy a vnímáním mladých lidí. Zamco média často rámují hranice a Evropu polizovaně nebo opkou bezpečnos, mladí lidé mají tendenci přijímat pragmacké, funkční pohledy. Tento rozdíl ukazuje, že hlasy mládeže jsou ve veřejných naravech často nedostatečně zastoupené, přestože jsou klíčové pro budoucnost evropské integrace. Zjištění ukazují, že pro většinu účastníků studie jsou hranice prožívány jako otevřené a do značné míry neviditelné – výsledek schengenské mobility a znormalizovaných přeshraničních prakk. Hranice jsou často vnímány jako příležitos, nikoli bariéry, a spojují se se vzděláním, prací, nákupy, volným časem a rodinnými vazbami. Přesto zůstávají symbolicky významné: mnozí mladí lidé označují kulturní a jazykové rozdíly, spíše než státní hranice, za „skutečné“ hranice ve svých životech. Historické dědictví a rodinné vzpomínky také nadále utvářejí představy o hranicích, i tam, kde fyzické hraniční kontroly již zmizely. Okamžiky narušení volnos překračování hranic, jako byla pandemie COVID-19, odhalily křehkost tohoto pocitu otevřenos. Nedávné procesy znovuohraničování ukázaly, jak silně jsou mladí lidé z menšin závislí na mobilitě, čímž posílily hodnotu, kterou přikládají Schengenu, ale zároveň jim připomněly i potenciální nejistotu evropské integrace. Srovnání s vnějšími hranicemi Schengenského prostoru, například mezi Řeckem a Tureckem, ještě více zdůraznilo kontrast mezi každodenní otevřenos a realitou vyloučení jinde. Vnímání Evropy a EU bylo obecně pragmacké. Účastníci zdůrazňovali hmatatelné přínosy členství v EU – zejména volný pohyb, Erasmus, Interrail a regionální fondy EU – spíše než symbolickou idenfikaci s Evropou. EU byla často brána jako samozřejmá součást každodenního života, což vytvářelo formu „banálního evropanství“. Zamco někteří mladí lidé oceňovali EU jako garanta menšinových práv a zdroj financování, jiní ji vnímali jako vzdálenou, neefekvní nebo nekonzistentní v ochraně menšin. Pozivní vnímání role EU ve dvou případech (Jižní Tyrolsko a Severní a Jižní Šlesvicko) bylo silně ovlivněno dřívějšími D.4.2, V1 69 dohodami o menšinových právech, které byly vytvořeny nezávisle na EU. Ačkoli tyto dohody vycházely z národních či bilaterálních smluv a širšího rámce Rady Evropy, účastníci výzkumu v těchto pohraničních oblastech je spojovali s EU, kterou vnímali jako garanta rozmanitos a ochrany menšin. Výrazně se projevily regionální a menšinové identy. Mnoho účastníků se idenfikovalo především se svým pohraničním či národnostním menšinovým společenstvím – jako Jižní Tyrolec, Zaolziak (Polák žijící v české čás Těšínska), Šlesvičan či Maďar na Slovensku (felvidéki) – spíše než s širšími národními nebo evropskými kategoriemi. Tyto lokalizované identy často nabízely způsob, jak překračovat národní rozdělení, a zároveň potvrzovaly kulturní odlišnost. Celkově zpráva ukazuje, že mladí lidé z menšin v pohraničních regionech normalizují evropskou integraci prostřednictvím svých každodenních prakk, ale ne vždy arkulují silné emocionální pouto k EU. Jejich pohledy odrážejí pragmacké přije mobility a příležitos, doplněné skepsí vůči instucionálnímu závazku k ochraně menšinových práv. Tato zjištění poukazují jak na úspěchy, tak na zranitelnos evropské integrace v dobách krize a zároveň podtrhují důležitost naslouchání hlasům mladých lidí při formování inkluzivních vizí budoucnos Evropy. Dansk B-SHAPES-projektet fokuserer på, hvordan mennesker opfaer Europa, med særlig opmærksomhed på, hvordan grænsefortællinger og processer med genopreelse af grænser og grænsekontrol kan påvirke disse opfaelser. Denne rapport undersøger specifikt, hvordan unge fra naonale mindretalssamfund i europæiske grænseregioner opfaer grænser, Europa og Den Europæiske Union (EU). Den bygger på fem casestudier – Sydtyrol (Italien–Østrig), Zaolzie/Těšín Silesia (Polen–Tjekkiet), Nordog Sydslesvig (Danmark–Tyskland), Sydslovakiet (Ungarn–Slovakiet) og Veshrakien (Grækenland–Bulgarien–Tyrkiet) – for at give boom-up-indsigt i hverdagens oplevelser af grænser og europæisk integraon. Undersøgelsen, der blev gennemført i 2024-2025, fokuserede på unge voksne i alderen 18-31 år og anvendte en kombinaon af semistrukturerede interviews og workshops i zine-produkon. Disse lgange gjorde det muligt for deltagerne at udtrykke deres fortællinger både visuelt og tekstmæssigt, hvilket skabte perspekver, der går ud over eliteniveauet og mediediskurserne. Ved at sammenligne unges beretninger med minoritetsmediers fortællinger (Engl et al., 2024) fremhæver undersøgelsen både konvergenser og uoverensstemmelser mellem den offentlige og den personlige forståelse af Europa. Analysen afslører en markant klø mellem minoritetsmediers fortællinger og unges opfaelse. Mens medierne oe fremsller grænser og Europa i poliserede eller sikkerhedsmæssige termer, har unge en tendens l at anlægge pragmaske, funkonelle perspekver. Denne divergens understreger, at unges stemmer oe er underrepræsenterede i offentlige fortællinger, på trods af deres betydning for fremden for den europæiske integraon. Resultaterne viser, at de fleste deltagere i undersøgelsen oplever grænser som åbne og stort set usynlige, hvilket er et resultat af Schengen-mobiliteten og normaliseringen af grænseoverskridende praksis. Grænser opfaes oe som muligheder snarere end barrierer, der er forbundet med uddannelse, arbejde, D.4.2, V1 70 shopping, frid og familiebånd. De forbliver dog symbolsk betydningsfulde: Mange unge betragter kulturelle og sproglige skel snarere end statsgrænser som de »rigge« grænser i deres liv. Historiske arv og familieerindringer fortsæer også med at forme opfaelsen af grænser, selv hvor de fysiske grænsekontroller er forsvundet. Forstyrrende begivenheder, såsom COVID-19-pandemien, afslørede denne følelse af åbenhedens skrøbelighed. De seneste begivenheder med genindførelse af grænser og grænsekontrol har understreget, hvor stærkt unge fra minoriteter er aængige af mobilitet, hvilket forstærker den værdi, de llægger Schengen-aalen, men også minder dem om den potenelle usikkerhed ved den europæiske integraon. Sammenligninger med sikrede ydre grænser, såsom den græsk-tyrkiske grænse, understreger yderligere kontrasten mellem den daglige åbenhed og virkeligheden med udelukkelse andre steder. Opfaelsen af Europa og EU var generelt pragmask. Deltagerne fremhævede de konkrete fordele ved EUmedlemskab, især fri bevægelighed, Erasmus, Interrail og EU's regionale finansiering, frem for symbolsk idenfikaon med Europa. EU blev oe taget for givet som en baggrundsbengelse for dagligdagen, hvilket skabte en form for »banal europæisme«. Mens nogle unge værdsae EU som garant for mindretalsregheder og kilde l finansiering, betragtede andre det som ernt, ineffekvt eller inkonsekvent i sin beskyelse af mindretal. Den posive opfaelse af EU's rolle i to af lfældene (Sydtyrol og Nordog Sydslesvig) var stærkt præget af dligere mindretalsreghedsaaler, der var indgået uaængigt af EU. Selvom disse aaler stammede fra naonale eller bilaterale aaler og bredere rammer nedfældet i Europarådets konvenoner, forbandt forskningsdeltagerne i disse grænseområder dem med EU og betragtede det som en garant for mangfoldighed og beskyelse af mindretal. Regionale og minoritetsidenteter fremstod som særligt stærke. Mange deltagere idenficerede sig først og fremmest med deres grænseområde eller naonale minoritetssamfund, sydtyroler, zaolziak, schleswiger, ungarere i Slovakiet, tyrkere i Grækenland, snarere end med bredere naonale eller europæiske kategorier. Disse lokaliserede identeter gav oe mulighed for at overskride naonale skel og samdig bekræe kulturel særpræg. Samlet set viser rapporten, at unge fra mindretal i grænseregioner normaliserer den europæiske integraon gennem deres daglige praksis, men ikke nødvendigvis udtrykker en stærk følelsesmæssig lknytning l EU. Deres synspunkter afspejler en pragmask lslutning l mobilitet og muligheder, tempereret af skepsis over for instuonernes engagement i mindretalsregheder. Disse resultater fremhæver både resultaterne og sårbarhederne ved den europæiske integraon i kriseder, samdig med at de understreger viggheden af at lye l de unges stemmer i udformningen af en inkluderende vision for Europas fremd. Deutsch Das Projekt B-SHAPES untersucht, wie Menschen Europa wahrnehmen, und achtet dabei besonders darauf, wie Grenznarrave und Grenzprozesse diese Wahrnehmungen beeinflussen können. Dieser Bericht untersucht insbesondere, wie junge Menschen aus naonalen Minderheitengemeinschaen in D.4.2, V1 71 europäischen Grenzregionen sowohl Grenzen, als auch Europa und die Europäische Union (EU) wahrnehmen. Der Bericht stützt sich auf fünf Fallstudien (Südrol (Italien–Österreich), Zaolzie/Teschener Schlesien (Polen–Tschechien), Nordund Südschleswig (Dänemark–Deutschland), Südslowakei (Ungarn– Slowakei) und Weshrakien (Griechenland–Bulgarien–Türkei)), um Boom-up-Einblicke in die alltäglichen Erfahrungen junger Menschen mit Grenzen und der europäischen Integraon zu gewinnen. Die Studie, die zwischen 2024 und 2025 durchgeführt wurde, konzentriert sich auf junge Erwachsene im Alter von 18 bis 31 Jahren und kombiniert halbstrukturierte Interviews mit “Zine-Workshops”. Diese Ansätze ermöglichten es den Teilnehmern und Teilnehmerinnen, ihre Erzählungen sowohl visuell als auch textuell auszudrücken und Perspekven zu entwickeln, die über die Eliteund Mediendiskurse hinausgehen. Durch den Vergleich der Erzählungen junger Menschen mit den Narraven der Minderheitenmedien (Engl et al., 2024) hebt die Studie sowohl Konvergenzen als auch Diskrepanzen zwischen dem medial-öffentlichen und dem persönlichen Verständnis von Europa hervor. Die Analyse zeigt eine bemerkenswerte Klu zwischen den Narraven der Minderheitenmedien und den Wahrnehmungen junger Menschen. Während die Medien Grenzen und Europa o in polisierten oder sicherheitspolischen Begriffen darstellen, neigen junge Menschen dazu, pragmasche, funkonale Perspekven einzunehmen. Diese Divergenz unterstreicht, dass die Smmen der Jugendlichen in öffentlichen Narraven o unterrepräsenert sind, obwohl sie für die Zukun der europäischen Integraon von großer Bedeutung sind. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die meisten Studienteilnehmer und -teilnehmerinnen Grenzen als offen und weitgehend unsichtbar erleben, was auf die Mobilität im Schengen-Raum und die Normalisierung grenzüberschreitender Prakken zurückzuführen ist. Grenzen werden eher als Chancen, denn als Hindernisse verstanden und mit Bildung, Arbeit, Einkaufen, Freizeit und Familie in Verbindung gebracht. Dennoch behalten sie ihre symbolische Bedeutung, wobei viele junge Menschen nicht ungbedingt Staatsgrenzen sondern eher kulturelle und sprachliche Trennungen allgemein als die „wirklichen” Grenzen in ihrem Leben betrachten. Familienerinnerungen und historische Bilder prägen weiterhin die Vorstellung von Grenzen, selbst dort, wo physische Grenzkontrollen verschwunden sind. "Störungsmoment” wie die COVID-19-Pandemie haben offenbart, wie fragil dieses Gefühls der Offenheit von Grenzen ist. Die Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen haben deutlich gemacht, wie stark junge Menschen aus Minderheiten auf Mobilität angewiesen sind. Vergleiche mit gesicherten Außengrenzen, wie beispielsweise der griechisch-türkischen Grenze, unterstreichen den Kontrast zwischen der alltäglichen Offenheit von innereuropäischen Grenzen und der Realität der Ausgrenzung andernorts. Die jungen Studienteilnehmer und –teilnehmerinnen nehmen Europa und die EU im Allgemeinen pragmasch wahr. Sie betonten die konkreten Vorteile der EU-Mitgliedscha, insbesondere die Freizügigkeit, Programme wie Erasmus und EU-Förderungen, und weniger die symbolische Idenfikaon mit Europa. Die EU wurde o als selbstverständliche Rahmenbedingung des täglichen Lebens angesehen, was zu einer Form des „banalen Europäismus” führte. Während einige junge Menschen die EU als Garant für Minderheitenrechte und als Finanzierungsquelle schätzten, betrachteten andere sie als distanziert, ineffizient oder inkonsequent beim Schutz von Minderheiten. Die äußerst posive Wahrnehmung der Rolle der EU in zwei der Fälle (Südrol und Nordund Südschleswig) wurde stark durch frühere D.4.2, V1 72 Vereinbarungen zum Minderheitenschutz geprägt, die unabhängig von der EU getroffen wurden. Obwohl diese Vereinbarungen auf naonalen oder bilateralen Abkommen und umfassenderen Rahmenwerken des Europarats beruhten, assoziierten die Forschungsteilnehmer und -teilnehmerinnen in diesen Grenzgebieten sie mit der EU und sahen in ihr einen Garanten für Vielfalt und Minderheitenschutz. Regionale und Minderheitenidentäten erwiesen sich als besonders stark. Viele der jungen Menschen idenfizierten sich in erster Linie mit ihrer Grenzregion oder naonalen Minderheitengemeinscha, also als Südroler, Zaolziak, Schleswiger oder Ungar in der Slowakei, und weniger mit übergeordneten naonalen oder europäischen Kategorien. Diese lokalisierten Identäten boten o eine Möglichkeit, naonale Trennungen zu überwinden und gleichzeig die kulturelle Besonderheit zu bekräigen. Insgesamt zeigt der Bericht, dass junge Angehörige von Minderheiten in Grenzregionen die europäische Integraon durch ihre alltäglichen Prakken normalisieren, aber nicht unbedingt eine starke emoonale Bindung zur EU zum Ausdruck bringen. Ihre Ansichten spiegeln eine pragmasche Akzeptanz von Mobilität und Chancen wider, die durch Skepsis gegenüber dem instuonellen Engagement für Minderheitenrechte gemildert wird. Diese Ergebnisse verdeutlichen sowohl die Erfolge als auch die Schwachstellen der europäischen Integraon in Krisenzeiten und unterstreichen gleichzeig, wie wichg es ist, den Smmen junger Menschen Gehör zu schenken, um eine integrave Vision für die Zukun Europas zu entwickeln. Italiano Il progeo B-SHAPES si incentra sul modo in cui le persone percepiscono l'Europa, prestando parcolare aenzione a come le narrazioni sui confini e sui processi di ridefinizione dei confini possano influenzare tali percezioni. In parcolare, questo report approfondisce il modo in cui i giovani appartenen a minoranze nazionali nelle regioni europee di confine vivono i confini, l'Europa e l'Unione europea (UE). Si basa su cinque casi di studio che riportano esperienze quodiane di confini e di integrazione europea: Alto Adige (Italia-Austria), Zaolzie/Slesia di Těšín (Polonia-Repubblica Ceca), Schleswig seentrionale e meridionale (Danimarca-Germania), Slovacchia meridionale (Ungheria-Slovacchia) e Tracia occidentale (Grecia-Bulgaria-Turchia). Lo studio, condoo tra il 2024 ed il 2025, ha coinvolto giovani adul di età compresa tra i 18 e i 31 anni, ulizzando una combinazione di interviste semi-struurate e laboratori di creazione di “fanzine”. Ques approcci hanno permesso alle e ai partecipan di esprimere le loro narrazioni sia visivamente che testualmente, generando prospeve innovave che si differenziano dai discorsi delle élite poliche e dei media. Confrontando i resocon dei giovani con le narrazioni dei quodiani pubblica dalle minoranze in tali territori (Engl et al., 2024), lo studio evidenzia sia le convergenze che le divergenze tra ciò che il pubblico e le persone pensano e comprendono dell'Europa. L'analisi rivela un notevole divario tra le narrazioni dei quodiani delle minoranze e le percezioni dei giovani. Mentre ques giornali spesso inquadrano le fronere e l'Europa in termini policizza o di sicurezza, i giovani tendono a adoare prospeve pragmache e funzionali. Questa divergenza soolinea che le voci dei giovani sono spesso D.4.2, V1 73 soorappresentate nelle narrazioni pubbliche, nonostante la loro importanza per il futuro dell'integrazione europea. I risulta mostrano che, per la maggior parte delle e dei partecipan allo studio, i confini vengono vissu come passaggi aper e in gran parte invisibili, grazie alla mobilità garanta dalla zona Schengen e alla normalizzazione delle prache transfrontaliere. I confini sono spesso intesi come opportunità piuosto che come barriere, associa all'istruzione, al lavoro, allo shopping, al tempo libero e ai legami familiari. Tuavia, essi rimangono simbolicamente significavi: mol giovani considerano le divisioni culturali e linguische, piuosto che i confini statali, come le “vere” fronere nella loro vita. Anche l'eredità storica e i ricordi familiari connuano a plasmare il modo in cui vengono immagina i confini, anche laddove i controlli fisici alle fronere sono scomparsi. Grandi momen di sconvolgimento, come la pandemia di COVID-19, hanno, tuavia, messo in luce la fragilità di questo senso di apertura. I recen even di riprisno delle fronere hanno evidenziato quanto le persone giovani appartenen alle minoranze facciano affidamento sulla mobilità, rafforzando il valore che aribuiscono alla zona Schengen, ma anche ricordando loro la potenziale precarietà dell'integrazione europea. Il confronto con le fronere esterne chiuse e rese “sicure”, come quella greco-turca, ha ulteriormente soolineato il contrasto tra l'apertura quodiana e la realtà dell'esclusione. Per quanto riguarda le percezioni dell'Europa e dell'UE, esse sono generalmente pragmache. Le persone partecipan hanno soolineato i vantaggi tangibili dell'adesione all'UE, in parcolare la libera circolazione, la partecipazione a programmi come l’Erasmus, i viaggi Interrail e i finanziamen regionali dell'UE, piuosto che l'idenficazione simbolica con l'Europa. L'UE è stata spesso data per scontata come condizione basilare della vita quodiana, producendo una forma di “banale europeismo”. Mentre alcuni giovani apprezzano l'UE come garante dei diri delle minoranze e fonte di finanziamen, altri la considerano distante, inefficiente o incoerente nella sua protezione delle minoranze. La percezione posiva del ruolo dell'UE in due dei casi (Alto Adige e Schleswig seentrionale e meridionale) è stata fortemente influenzata dai preceden accordi sui diri delle minoranze, stabili indipendentemente dall'UE. Sebbene tali accordi abbiano avuto origine da accordi nazionali o bilaterali e nel quadro più ampio dell’azione del Consiglio d'Europa, le persone partecipan alla ricerca in queste zone di confine li hanno associa all'UE, considerandola una garante della diversità e della protezione delle minoranze. Infine, è emerso che le identà regionali e minoritarie sono parcolarmente for. Molte persone partecipan si sono idenficate principalmente con la loro comunità di fronera o minoritaria nazionale, altoatesina, zaolziak, schleswigiana, ungherese in Slovacchia, piuosto che con categorie nazionali o europee più ampie. Queste identà locali hanno spesso offerto un modo per superare le divisioni nazionali, affermando al contempo la peculiarità culturale. Nel complesso, il rapporto mostra che le persone giovani appartenen alle minoranze nelle regioni di confine normalizzano l'integrazione europea araverso le loro prache quodiane, ma non esprimono necessariamente un forte aaccamento emovo all'UE. Pur essendo sceci nei confron dell'impegno istuzionale dell’UE a favore dei diri delle minoranze, le loro opinioni rifleono un approccio pragmaco alla mobilità e alle opportunità. Ciò evidenzia sia i risulta raggiun, sia le vulnerabilità dell'integrazione