The voice of the fourth pillar: How Security Council discourse drove counter-terrorism expansion at the UN

The voice of the fourth pillar How Security Council discourse drove counter-terrorism expansion at the UN September 2025 September 2025 The voice of the fourth pillar How Security Council discourse drove counter-terrorism expansion at the UN Ali Altiok and Jordan Street Acknowledgements This discussion paper was written by Ali Altiok and Jordan Street. Invaluable advice and suggestions were provided by Shelagh Daley and Tamara DuffeyJanser. Generous input was also provided by Georgia Nash. The paper was copyedited by Scott Yearsley and Martha Crowley and designed by Jane Stevenson. Errors that remain are the authors’ own. Cover photo: The Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1269 (1999), unequivocally condemning all forms of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation. © UN Photo/Evan Schneider Acronyms C/PVE countering or preventing violent extremism CTC Counter-Terrorism Committee CTED Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate CTITF Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force CVE countering violent extremism GCTS Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy ISIS/ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant P5 permanent five Member States of the UN Security Council PVE preventing violent extremism TPB Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UN United Nations UNCCT United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNOCT United Nations Office of CounterTerrorism UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution WPS Women, Peace and Security © Saferworld, September 2025. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication. Contents Executive summary i List of figures iii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Methodology 3 2 Evolution of counter-terrorism at the 9 UN Security Council Phase 1: Not ‘our’ issue: pre-9/11 9 BOX 1: The birth of the Terrorism Prevention 11 Branch Phase 2: Panic period! 9/11 and its aftermath 12 (11 September 2001–31 December 2003) BOX 2: High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges 14 and Change Phase 3: Growing in the shadows: 14 counter-terrorism at the UN (1 January 2004–31 December 2013) BOX 3: The Counter-Terrorism Executive 14 Directorate (CTED) BOX 4: The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 16 (GCTS) Phase 4: Panic redux 16 (1 January 2014–31 December 2016) BOX 5: Excerpt of remarks by Barack Obama, 18 President of the United States of America, at the UN Security Council Summit on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, 24 September 2014 BOX 6: The Secretary-General’s Plan of 19 Action on Preventing Violent Extremism Phase 5: A golden chip: the creation of 19 UNOCT (1 January 2017–31 December 2024) BOX 7: The United Nations Office of 21 Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) 3 Threat inflation and other trends at 25 the UN Security Council 3.1 The UN’s role in its own securitisation 25 3.2 Which UN entities have led the ‘terrorism’ 27 discourse at the UN Security Council? 3.3 Which States have led the ‘terrorism’ 30 discourse at the UN Security Council? 3.4 Russia and the US: the ebb and flow of 31 rhetorical leadership? 3.5 Where does gender come in? 33 4 Observations and reflections 37 5 Conclusion 41 Previous Saferworld publications on 43 UN counter-terrorism At a special decorating ceremony at UN headquarters, the Peace Monument sculpture was decorated with the Croatian cravat. © UN Photo/Loey Felipe i Over the past 25 years, counter-terrorism has transformed from a peripheral concern into a major institutional architecture of the United Nations (UN). This evolution has been led primarily by the UN Security Council through the adoption of a series of legally binding resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Mapping the periods of institutional growth, we can observe five distinct phases within the UN’s relationship with counter-terrorism. The first phase – throughout the 1990s – saw the UN treat counter-terrorism as a technical, legal issue, one that was not a core concern. This all changed following the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 (commonly known as 9/11). Thus commenced the second phase – with the UN Security Council unanimously adopting UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, establishing the CounterTerrorism Committee (CTC). Three years later, in the third phase, UNSCR 1535 created the CounterTerrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), and the UN General Assembly adopted the UN’s Global CounterTerrorism Strategy (GCTS), giving the UN a more permanent institutional footprint in the counterterrorism space. Yet dramatic expansion did not really begin until the fourth phase in 2014, following the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also sometimes known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) and the growing focus on ‘foreign terrorist fighters’. UNSCR 2178 introduced the language of ‘violent extremism’ into the UN’s official discourse, expanded reporting obligations, and – together with the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) – laid the groundwork for the fifth phase: the establishment of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) in 2017. Since then, UNOCT has grown rapidly and – with the creation of the Global Compact – has since become the largest coordination body in the UN system. Its emergence has significantly reshaped the UN’s approach to international security, prioritising counter-terrorism and securitisation objectives over traditional mandates such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, mediation and peacebuilding. Executive summary ii the voice of the fourth pillar At the heart of this discussion paper is a critical question: has the UN’s counter-terrorism architecture grown in proportion to security threats, or has a process of threat inflation led to the exaggeration of the issue of ‘terrorism’ to aid institutional growth? To answer this, we applied corpus-assisted discourse analysis to verbatim UN Security Council speeches, allowing us to move beyond anecdotal observations and test the relationship between language and institutional growth. Our findings show that, at a broad level, the frequency of terror-related language in UN Security Council discourse does track with major global ‘terror’ attacks and incidents. This helps explain a mutually reinforcing dynamic between discourse and institutional development: new threats lead to new resolutions, which create new structures, which in turn generate more meetings, reports and– ultimately – more rhetoric. This institutional momentum often outlasts the crises that triggered it, embedding counterterrorism more deeply into the UN’s architecture. However, as we interpret it, these rhetorical spikes are not simply reactive to ‘terror’ acts. We argue that the institutional expansion of the UN’s counter-terrorism architecture has also been enabled by the broadening of what states and the UN define and frame as ‘terrorism’. This scepticism lies at the core of our analysis. States, particularly the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (P5), have been in agreement as they have increasingly framed events through expansive definitions of ‘terrorism’. These waters have been further muddied through the introduction of ambiguous terminology such as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’, which has expanded the scope of counter-terrorism activities– and brought new UN entities into the conversation. Over time, this conceptual expansion has blurred the boundaries between terrorism and other forms of violence, allowing states to reconstruct the nature of the threat in ways that serve their own interests. Looking more closely at the dynamics of speech patterns, we find that the UN is not merely a passive arena for state-driven agendas. Each successive Secretary-General has increasingly embraced the counter-terrorism agenda, with UN entities, especially UNOCT, becoming among the most active contributors to this discourse. This shift has raised growing concerns that counter-terrorism is skewing the UN away from its foundational commitments to peace, human rights and sustainable development, and instead towards state security objectives. The analysis draws out five key insights: 1. Rhetorical leadership has shifted between major powers: While the US led initial efforts, Russia and China now dominate the discourse. 2. Discourse drove institutional expansion: Institutional growth followed rhetorical trends. 3. Counter-terrorism at the UN is a self-sustaining agenda: Counter-terrorism discourse has become routinised and institutionalised, even during periods when the overall trend of ‘terror’ attacks declined. 4. The UN had a role in the expansion of counterterrorism architecture: The Secretariat and UN entities have made strategic choices that deepened engagement with counter-terrorism, reflecting institutional incentives. 5. Not all concepts endure: Terms like ‘radicalisation’ remain contested and have not gained the same institutional traction as ‘terror’ or ‘extremism’. Ultimately, this paper calls for a recalibration of the UN’s counter-terrorism approach. We urge UN leadership and Member States to re-evaluate the language they use, reconsider the scope of the counter-terrorism agenda, and ensure that it does not undermine the UN’s foundational purposes. new threats lead to new resolutions, which create new structures, which in turn generate more meetings, reports and – ultimately – more rhetoric. This institutional momentum often outlasts the crises that triggered it, embedding counterterrorism more deeply into the UN’s architecture. iii List of figures Figure 1: Mentions of ‘terror’ at the UN Security 4 Council vs deaths by ‘terror’ attacks per year Figure 2: Annual mentions of ‘terror’ by 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, 1990–2024 Figure 3: Annual mentions of ‘extremism’ by 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, 1990–2024 Figure 4: Annual mentions of ‘radicalisation’ by 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, 1990–2024 Figure 5: Annual trends of keywords 6 (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council, 1990–2024 Figure 6: ‘Terror’ mentions at the UN Security 10 Council vs deaths by ‘terror’ attacks per year, 1990–2010 Figure 7: 'Terror' attacks, deaths, injuries per 10 UN Security Council mentions of ‘terror’, 1991–2000 and 2001–2010 Figure 8: Mentions of ‘terror’ by permanent 10 UN Security Council members from 1945 to 11 September 2001 Figure 9: Proportion of ‘terror’ mentions per 13 words at the UN Security Council between 11 September 2001 and 31 December 2003 Figure 10: Annual total mentions of ‘terror’ 15 among permanent UN Security Council members, 2004–2013 Figure 11: Annual total mentions of ‘extremism’ 17 and ‘radicalisation’, 2004–2015 Figure 12: Number of different speakers from the 18 UN who mentioned ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council, 2004–2016 Figure 13: Annual total mentions of ‘terror’ 21 among permanent UN Security Council members and UN speakers, 2017–2024 Figure 14: Annual average mention of keywords 22 in UN Secretary-General ISIL/ISIS reports, 2016–2024 Figure 15a: Annual total mentions of ‘terror’ 26 by Member States and UN entities at the UN Security Council, 1994–2024 Figure 15b: Annual relative frequency of ‘terror’ 26 mentions by UN entities and Member States at the UN Security Council, 1994– 2024 (as a share of the total words used) Figure 16: Top 25 mentions of keywords 28 (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by UN entities, 1990–2024 Figure 17a: Annual total mentions of keywords 29 (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the UN SecretaryGeneral, 1990–2024 Figure 17b: Annual total mentions of keywords 29 (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the Under-SecretaryGeneral of UNOCT, 2017–2023 Figure 17c: Annual total mentions of keywords 29 (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs, 2005–2017 Figure 18: Total number of distinct UN speakers 29 mentioning ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council and total mentions of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council by UN entities, by UN SecretaryGeneral terms Figure 19: Top 15 UN Member States by mentions 30 of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council, 1990–2024 Figure 20a: Total mentions of keywords in 31 speeches to the UN Security Council by the US and Russia, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2009–2024 Figure 20b: Relative frequency of keywords 32 in speeches to the UN Security Council by the US and Russia, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2009–2024 (as share of total words) Figure 20c: Ratio between Russia and the US's 32 total mentions of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2008–2024 Figure 20d: Ratio between Russia and the US's 32 relative frequency of ‘terror’ mentions at the UN Security Council, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2008–2024 Figure 21a: Total mentions of keywords 33 (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the gender of the speaker Figure 21b: Relative frequency of mentions of 33 keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the gender of speaker Figure 22: Annual total co-occurrence of ‘terror’ 34 with gender-related terms in UN Security Council speeches, 1990–2024 Figure 23: Annual total co-occurrence of ‘terror’ 34 with gender-related terms in UN Security Council speeches, 1990–2024 A view of the sun rising behind Long Island City and the sculpture, 'Good Defeats Evil', by Zurab Tsereteli, in the north garden area of UN Headquarters. © UN Photo/Manuel Elías introduction 7 Notes 1 Altiok A, Street J (2020), ‘A Fourth Pillar for the United Nations? The Rise of Counter-Terrorism’, Saferworld, June (https://www.saferworldglobal.org/resources/publications/1256-a-fourth-pillar-for-theunited-nations-the-rise-of-counter-terrorism) 2 United Nations (1945), ‘Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice’, 26 June (https://treaties.un.org/ doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf) 3 Street J, Altiok A (2024), ‘Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch Prevent Terrorism? Assessing the Role and Impact of the UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch’, Saferworld, June. 4 Rosand E (2003), ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the CounterTerrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism’, American Journal of International Law 97 (2), pp333–41. 5 Hinojosa-Martinez LM (2014), ‘A Critical Assessment of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373’, in B Saul (ed.), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (Edward Elgar Publishing), pp626–50 (https://www.elgaronline.com/downloadpdf/edcollchap/ edcoll/9780857938800/ 9780857938800.00046.pdf); Happold M (2003), ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations’, Leiden Journal of International Law 16 (3), pp593–610; van Ginkel B (2010), The Practice of the United Nations in Combating Terrorism from 1946 to 2008: Questions of Legality and Legitimacy, School of Human Rights Research Series (Antwerp: Intersentia);Talmon S (2005), ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’, American Journal of International Law 99 (1), pp175–93. 6 Shor E (2011), ‘Constructing a global counterterrorist legislation database: dilemmas, procedures, and preliminary analyses’, Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations 2 (3). 7 For a comprehensive analysis on the evolving global counter-terrorism frameworks, see De Londras F (2022), The Practice and Problems of Transnational Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press). 8 Attree L (2022), ‘Function before form: optimising the UN’s counterterrorism architecture’, Saferworld, July (https://www.saferworldglobal.org/resources/publications/1396-function-before-formoptimising-the-unas-counter-terrorism-architecture); Romaniuk P (2010), ‘Institutions as Swords and Shields: Multilateral CounterTerrorism since 9/11’, Review of International Studies 36 (3), pp591– 613; Boulden J, Weiss TG (2004), Terrorism and the UN: Before and after September 11 (Indiana University Press) (https://books.google. com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=zO3m-4c5rEsC&oi=fnd&pg= PP1&dq=Boulden+and+Weiss+2004%3B&ots=iVJr0wrhgF&sig=uIpM vgMcnVVq_17pvXpWbGgC1VM); Messmer WB, Yordán CL (2011), ‘A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 9 Global Center on Cooperative Security, ‘The Blue Sky Series: An Independent Review of the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Architecture’ (https://globalcenter.org/resource/the-blue-sky-series-anindependent-review-of-the-uns-counter-terrorism-architecture/) 10 UNODC (2021), ‘Learn Better, Together. Independent Meta-Synthesis under the Global Counter-terrorism Strategy’ (www.un.org/ counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/ methasynthesis_gcts_report_dec2021.pdf) 11 Martini A (2021), The UN and Counter-Terrorism: Global Hegemonies, Power and Identities, Routledge Critical Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge); Sakamoto T, ‘Threat Conceptions in Global Security Discourse: Analyzing the Speech Records of the United Nations Security Council, 1990–2019’, International Studies Quarterly 67 (3). 12 Roele I (2022), ‘Style Management: Images of Global CounterTerrorism at the United Nations’, Law and Critique 33 (3), pp273–97 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-022-09330-5) 13 Our working definition of ‘securitisation’ is one in which ‘authorities inflate and manipulate security threats to justify narratives and execute policies through “hard” security interventions.’ ‘Threat inflation’ is the underlying main mechanics of securitisation as others have already argued; Cramer and Thrall define threat inflation as: ‘The effort by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that disinterested analysis would justify.’ This definition emphasises the role of political elites in amplifying perceived threats to garner public support for specific policies or actions. See Cramer JK,Thrall AT (eds.), (2009), American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11 (Routledge). Mueller discusses the tendency to overstate terrorist threats: ‘The threat presented by terrorism has been systematically and often grossly exaggerated.’ Mueller argues that the perception of terrorism as an existential threat has led to disproportionate policy responses. See: Mueller JE (2006), Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (Free Press). 14 In academic writing, ‘density’ would be the term used. Here we use quantity for our audience. 15 Altiok, Street (2020), op. cit. 16 For a more comprehensive explanation of this analysis method, please see Gillings M, Mautner G, Baker P (2023),Corpus-assisted discourse studies (Cambridge University Press). 17 Sakamoto T, Matsuoka T (2023), ‘The UNSC Meetings and Speeches’, Harvard Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml? persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/CKPTRB) 18 While corpus-assisted discourse analysis is a powerful tool for identifying patterns and shifts in language over time, it also has important limitations. For example, the structure and procedures of the UN Security Council shape the language captured in the meeting transcripts we analysed. Member States – particularly the five permanent members, ‘the P5’ – play an important gatekeeping role in setting the agenda; the Council President – which alternates between members every month following a continuous alphabetical order of UNSC members – decides the focus of open debates and who is invited to speak. Given permanent members are permanent, they hold the presidency almost annually. Thus, what appears in the official record reflects institutional dynamics that are not always visible in the text itself. Similarly, when meetings on terrorism are convened, Member States often invite UN officials to speak, which can reinforce certain framings of the issue at a fundamental level. These procedural features must be taken into account when interpreting the corpus. 19 Attree L, Street J (2022), ‘No Shortcuts to Security: Learning from Responses to Armed Conflicts Involving Proscribed Groups’, Saferworld, May (https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/ publications/1389-no-shortcuts-to-security) 20 See Figure 1: Mentions of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council vs deaths by ‘terror’ attacks per year. 21 Crenshaw M (2008), ‘“New” vs. “Old” Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal’, in R Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge in Europe, pp25–36; Mueller, op. cit. 22 Institute for Economics & Peace (2025), ‘Global Terrorism Index 2025. Measuring The Impact of Terrorism’, March (http://visionofhumanity. org/resources) 23 United Nations General Assembly (2015), ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674’, December. Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, briefing the Security Council on evidence of Iraq's failure to disarm. © UN Photo/Mark Garten 9 The expansion of counter-terrorism at the UN has progressed in waves over the past three decades. Rather than unfolding at a steady pace, counter-terrorism at the UN Security Council has expanded through phases of intensified activities. From the birth of the counter-terrorism agenda at the UN through to 2025, we organise our analysis in this section in five defining phases where the response, activity and architecture related to UN counterterrorism experienced significant changes. This periodisation enables us to validate our interpretation and test assumptions we hold about these specific time periods that are shaped by sequences of events. Each phase reveals unique ways in which the growth of counter-terrorism has taken root within the wider UN system. PHASE 1 Not ‘our’ issue: pre-9/11 The relationship between how frequently ‘terrorism’ is discussed at the UN Security Council and the occurrence of deadly ‘terror’ attacks is complex. Although the number of ‘terror’ attacks steadily increased from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, this trend was not accompanied by a corresponding rise in attention from the Security Council. Before 9/11, the UN Security Council was not regarded as the primary forum for addressing ‘terror’ attacks.24 Instead, the adoption of legal treaties was the primary method by which states managed to respond to ‘terror’ attacks through the UN. In response to a few high-profile incidents in the 1970s and 1980s, the UN Security Council adopted thematic resolutions addressing specific international aspects of terrorism, such as aviation security and hostage-taking. These responses were narrow in scope, reflecting a limited but emerging recognition of terrorism as an issue relevant to the maintenance of international peace and security. 2 Evolution of counter-terrorism at the UN Security Council 10 the voice of the fourth pillar Figure 6: ‘Terror’ mentions at the UN Security Council vs deaths by ‘terror’ attacks per year, 1990–2010 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 Word count 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 1990 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 ‘Terror’ mentions KEY Mentions of ‘terror’ Terror-related deaths 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 Deaths by ‘terror’ attacks Fig 5 Fig 6 0 50 100 150 200 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Word count KEY China France Russian Federation UK US Fig 10 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 KEY Extremism radicalisation Word count 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 20132003 2004 2007 2009 2014 2015 Fig 11 Figure 7: ‘Terror’ attacks, deaths, injuries per UN Security Council mentions of ‘terror’, 1991–2000 and 2001–2010 Word count 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 Russian Federation United Nations Israel Syria US China France India UK Pakistan Iran Egypt Japan Ukraine Iraq KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 19 0 5 10 15 20 25 KEY Attacks Deaths Injuries 1991–2000 2001–2010 Events per UNSC ‘terror’ mention Fig 7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Trygve Lie Dag Hammarskjöld 1st Dag Hammarskjöld 2nd U Thant 1st U Thant 2nd Kurt Waldheim 1st Kurt Waldheim 2nd Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Boutros Boutros-Ghali Kofi Annan 1st Kofi Annan 2nd Ban Ki-moon 1st Ban Ki-moon 2nd António Guterres 1st António Guterres 2nd Fig 18 Distinct speakers Total ‘Terror’ mentions KEY Total ‘terror’ mentions Distinct speakers 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror Word count KEY Russian Federation US Fig 20a Figure 8: Mentions of ‘terror’ by permanent UN Security Council members from 1945 to 11 September 2001 UN Security Council Permanent Member Total mentions France 190 People’s Republic of China (formerly Republic of China) 174 Russia (formerly Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 832 UK 358 US 723 As shown in Figure 7, before 9/11 there was one mention of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council for every six ‘terror’ attacks (or, measured alternatively, for every 23.7 injuries or 16.6 deaths). In the decade after 9/11, every mention of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council accounted for 0.7 attacks, 4.4 injuries or 2.3 deaths. ‘Terror’ clearly became an important agenda itself at the UN Security Council. Before 9/11, Russia and the US were the most prominent in mentioning ‘terror’ in their speeches, far outnumbering other permanent members of the Security Council. Their interest in bringing counterterrorism to the UN Security Council was not limited to those years; both continued to lead discussions on the issue in Council debates in later decades, as will be shown in the next sections. Figure 8 shows that total mentions of ‘terror’ by either Russia or the US were more than three times the total mentions by either France or China. With the end of the Cold War, Member States began to pay more attention to the threat of ‘terrorism’. However, during the 1990s, states tended to view ‘terrorism’ primarily as a security threat to be addressed through enhanced law enforcement and expanded national legislation, rather than as a transnational threat requiring coordinated multilateral action by the UN Security Council. During this period, states increasingly adopted domestic counter-terrorism measures aimed at strengthening their legal and security frameworks.25 The UN Security Council’s most notable action in the pre-9/11 period was adopting UNSCR 1267 in 1999. This resolution established the 1267 Sanctions evolution of counter-terrorism at the un security council 11 Committee, which represented the UN Security Council’s most notable counter-terrorism-related decision to date. The adoption of UNSCR 1267 was an early signal that the UN Security Council was starting to engage more deeply with counterterrorism efforts. Yet, unlike the broader and more comprehensive counter-terrorism measures adopted in the aftermath of 9/11, the sanctions imposed under UNSCR 1267 were narrowly targeted at specific groups and individuals associated with the Taliban in Afghanistan and, later, al-Qaeda. This resolution was enacted in the context of the increased use of sanctions following the end of the Cold War, during a time when sanctions gained popularity among the US, the UK and France.26 In this decade, sanctions gained importance as an economic tool that these states were using against other states such as Libya and Sudan for their perceived support or incubation of ‘terror’ groups. Ultimately this resolution presaged a shift towards more structured and coordinated counter-terrorism efforts through the UN system. In parallel to developments within the UN Security Council, another institutional structure dedicated to counter-terrorism, the TPB, was established in Vienna in 1997 by the UN General Assembly as part of UNODC. The creation of the TPB marked a significant milestone, as it was the first dedicated institutional body within the UN system specifically tasked with counter-terrorism. In contrast to the UN Security Council’s approach, which treated terrorism as a distinct form of violence requiring targeted sanctions, the UN General Assembly embedded counter-terrorism within broader frameworks of drug control and crime prevention, highlighting a strategic divergence between these two UN organs. In 1997, amid system-wide institutional reforms spearheaded by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the UN Drug Control Programme and the Centre for International Crime Prevention were merged, forming UNODC. This reorganisation gave UNODC the mandate to assist Member States not only in drug control and crime prevention but also in their efforts to combat international terrorism. Vienna was strategically selected as the hub for drug control, crime prevention and counter-terrorism. Within this new structure, the TPB was established as a small unit, tasked with providing substantive capacitybuilding support to Member States to comply with international instruments, and conducting research and analysis on terrorism. The creation of the TPB was historically significant, representing the UN’s first dedicated institutional structure specifically aimed at addressing international terrorism. With an emphasis on capacity building and legal assistance, the TPB has contributed to the ratification of more than 2,599 terrorism-related conventions and protocols and the revision of more than 200 national laws. This compliance-oriented mandate reflected the dominant perspective among Member States at the time, viewing terrorism primarily as a legal issue best managed through international laws, conventions and treaties rather than solely through security or military interventions. Consequently, the TPB’s role focused extensively on legal assistance and legislative support rather than enforcement of compliance. Despite its major and widespread operational field presence, the distance from the political centre of conversations at the UN Security Council means that the TPB remained largely disconnected. For a deeper exploration of the history and role of the TPB, see Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch Prevent Terrorism? BOX 1 The birth of the Terrorism Prevention Branch 12 the voice of the fourth pillar PHASE 2 Panic period! 9/11 and its aftermath (11 September 2001–31 December 2003) Views on the UN Security Council’s role in counterterrorism shifted dramatically following the attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11). The devastating events in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania brought the issue of terrorism firmly into the UN Security Council’s scope. The coordinated and catastrophic nature of these attacks highlighted the significance of the threat posed by organised transnational proscribed groups, notably al-Qaeda. In the two years following 9/11, references to ‘terror’ in UN Security Council speeches increased significantly. This heightened political attention was not driven by an escalation in the frequency and fatality of ‘terror’ attacks. Yet, this two-year period marked a crucial transformation in the UN Security Council’s approach, characterised by the adoption of a binding resolution and the establishment of institutional mechanisms to monitor state compliance with emerging global counter-terrorism norms. Seventeen days after the attacks, UNSCR 1373 was adopted, becoming ‘the cornerstone’27 of the UN’s involvement in counter-terrorism and dramatically changing the UN as we now know it. UNSCR 1373 was ‘the first legally binding Chapter VII resolution that applied to all UN membership as opposed to previous counter-terrorism efforts’, which had neither time limits or any conditions attached.28 The adoption of UNSCR 1373 marked the beginning of an effort to extend legislative and executive counterterror capacities in every Member State. For the first time, a Chapter VII mandate handed Member States the legal right to defend themselves against nonstate actors. Additionally, for the first time, the UN Security Council labelled terrorism as a phenomenon to be combatted rather than just an act.29 The resolution also called for new measures to eradicate ‘terror’ financing, improve border security, facilitate international information-sharing and assist criminal justice systems to handle terrorism cases via enhanced legislation and administration. As argued by Fink, Miller and Rosand, ‘Resolution 1373 remains the most far-reaching and consequential component of the UN Security Council’s response to 21st century transnational “terrorism.” The UN Security Council began treating “terrorism” differently than other issues on its agenda, requiring a set of tools, frameworks, and institutions distinct from those already available for other international security threats.’30 From UNSCR 1373 emerged the CTC, an instrument of the UN Security Council set up to monitor the resolution’s implementation. The CTC’s broad mandate, ‘facilitating the provision of assistance to those States, which are having difficulties in implementing the resolution [1373]’,31 set the stage for counter-terrorism to spread across the UN. While the CTC was first set up as the UN Security Council’s monitoring mechanism, its function evolved over time towards surveillance and disciplinary mechanisms to control state behaviours in dealing with international peace and security threats. Composed of all 15 UN Security Council members, the CTC reviews ‘country assessment reports’, identifies gaps in implementation, and coordinates technical assistance for capacity building. Although it lacks enforcement powers, the Committee’s assessments and recommendations carry considerable diplomatic weight and influence international compliance and cooperation on counter-terrorism norms. Given that the attacks of 9/11 targeted the US, action at the UN was predictably spearheaded by the US delegation. The US saw the UN as a critical platform for advancing its counter-terrorism agenda and tried to use the UN Security Council to build international consensus around the global ‘war on terror’. However, rather surprisingly, the US appears to be behind Israel and UN-affiliated speakers in total number of mentions of the word terror at the UN Security Council during this period. Israel, despite delivering only 38 speeches, placed a significant focus on ‘terrorism’, with 774 mentions constituting approximately 0.017 per cent of their total spoken content, by far the highest proportion among all Member States. The high number of ‘terror’ mentions by Israel is largely related to its framing of violence during UN Security Council meetings related to the Israel-Palestine Question. What can be observed in this period is that although speeches made by the US elevated the importance of ‘terror’ on the agenda of the UN Security Council during the post-9/11 ‘Panic period’, the overall frequency of mentions of ‘terror’ by the US did not permeate its wider discourse at the UN Security Council. This is shown by the close distribution of the proportion of mentions by the US compared with other Member States. After Israel, UN-affiliated speakers had the secondhighest total number of mentions. However, when UN mentions are considered in proportion to the total mentions of all words spoken, the UN had a comparatively low frequency of mentions, only once per 100,000 words. This low number suggests institutional reluctance to prioritise terrorism as a dominant theme. for the first time, the UN Security Council labelled terrorism as a phenomenon to be combatted rather than just an act. evolution of counter-terrorism at the un security council 13 UN Member State Total speeches given at the UN Security Council Total mentions of ‘terror’ Total words used Proportion of ‘terror’ mentions per words used Israel 38 774 45,532 0.017 UN-affiliated speakers 332 459 454,090 0.001 US 325 370 113,836 0.003 Pakistan 197 316 80,065 0.004 Russia 434 294 112,828 0.003 Syrian Arab Republic 261 273 105,321 0.003 Colombia 208 261 80,980 0.003 Mexico 300 260 123,380 0.002 Spain 192 255 68,150 0.004 France 283 222 127,040 0.002 Bulgaria 263 211 86,276 0.002 UK 465 210 147,009 0.001 India 31 209 35,867 0.006 Cameroon 365 206 114,105 0.002 China 216 200 72,097 0.003 Figure 9: Proportion of ‘terror’ mentions per words used at the UN Security Council between 11 September 2001 and 31 December 2003 While the UN Security Council acted decisively after 9/11, the broader UN system, under the leadership of Kofi Annan, approached the integration of counterterrorism into its core mission with caution. This cautious approach was driven by a commitment to uphold human rights, prevent overreach in counterterrorism and ensure that the UN’s founding principles remained intact. Broader institutional engagement on counterterrorism remained fragmented, not constituting a central offering of the UN system. Yet by the end of 2003 the UN had taken on extraordinary counter-terrorism functions through the UN Security Council, marking a fundamental shift in its role (see Box 2 for the UN’s response outside the UN Security Council). This phase set the stage for considerable future growth across the wider UN system. Broader institutional engagement on counterterrorism remained fragmented, not constituting a central offering of the UN system. 14 the voice of the fourth pillar PHASE 3 Growing in the shadows: counter-terrorism at the UN (1 January 2004–31 December 2013) When the story of the rise of the counter-terrorism agenda at the UN is told, this phase might not be considered the most consequential, but important seeds were sown nonetheless. The adoption of UNSCR 1535 in 2004 established CTED to support the CTC’s work. CTED – set up as a Special Political Mission– was given the mandate to conduct in-country visits to assess states’ counter-terrorism policies and readiness.34 This gave the UN Security Council a more permanent counter-terrorism mechanism to influence and bolster national counter-terrorism efforts with the wider UN General Assembly membership. In 2003, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to assess both the new global security priorities in the wake of 9/11 and the far-reaching measures already taken by the Security Council.32 Noting the issue of ‘terrorism’ as a central concern, particularly for the US, the panel acknowledged its prominence in international discourse. However, it sought to broaden the conversation beyond the dominant post-9/11 lens. One of the key messages emanating from the High-Level Panel was that terrorism is just one of six major threats to international peace and security, along with poverty, disease, environmental degradation, civil conflict and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This framing emphasised that while ‘terrorism’ requires urgent attention, it is deeply intertwined with other global challenges, underscoring the need for an integrated and coordinated international response. Importantly, the panel sought to challenge the growing dominance of the pre-emption doctrine and instead advocated a commitment to multilateral cooperation firmly rooted in international law and collective responsibility. Such an approach emphasises the need to address not only immediate security threats – such as ‘terrorism’ – but also the underlying factors that contribute to insecurity, thus promoting a more comprehensive and cooperative framework for international peace and security. Released in 2004, the panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,33 aimed to shift the discussion at the UN from reactive, security-oriented measures to a more integrated and preventive approach to global peace and security efforts. BOX 2 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change The UN Security Council established CTED in 2004 with the adoption of UNSCR 1535. The establishment of CTED transformed the work of the CTC from a monitoring mechanism into a Special Political Mission, with larger staff capacity. The main task given to CTED is to assist the CTC in monitoring the implementation of UNSCR 1373 and conducting assessments of Member States’ counter-terrorism capacities, laws and regulations. CTED is the first entity under the UN Security Council mandated to conduct in-country visits to assess state compliance with the UN Security Council’s counter-terrorism resolutions. These assessment reports are typically confidential and shared only with the assessed Member States and the 15 members of the CTC. In addition to country assessment reports, CTED publishes thematic and analytical reports summarising trends, challenges and best practices in various dimensions of counterterrorism. CTED’s mandate is renewed every four years, and was most recently renewed by UNSCR 2617 in 2021. As of 2025, CTED has 52 staff who are experts in legal affairs, law enforcement, border security, countering the financing of ‘terrorism’, and human rights.35 BOX 3 The Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) evolution of counter-terrorism at the un security council 15 Following the establishment of CTED under the UN Security Council, an important shift occurred in how the permanent members have used the term ‘terror’. Figure 10 illustrates that Russia’s mention of ‘terror’ increased, surpassing those of the US. By 2008, Russia was the leading voice at the UN Security Council on rhetoric related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. This pattern shows the relationship between the deepening of Russia’s involvement in counter-terrorism debates at the UN Security Council and major counter-terrorism institutional expansion. This is a repeated trend observed in the broader timeline of the evolution of counter-terrorism at the UN. It is especially apparent after 2014 when the US, during the Obama administration, pushed for another institutional expansion (see Figures 17a–17d in Section 3 for more information). Beyond the UN Security Council, decisions taken at the UN General Assembly gradually integrated counter-terrorism into the wider UN system during this phase. This broader approach, which differed from the more security-centric focus of the UN Security Council, represented a significant shift. In 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan set up the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) to enhance the UN’s counter-terrorism activities. In 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted the GCTS by consensus; this began the institutionalisation of a programmatic counter-terrorism offering of UN funds, agencies and programmes. The CTITF was given the mandate to provide support to states to implement the GCTS, but for the first years of existence, these efforts stalled. However, to reinvigorate implementation of the strategy, the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) was founded in 2012, aided by a voluntary contribution of USD$100 million by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.36 This funding influx breathed new life into UN counterterrorism coordination as UNCCT and CTITF– two sides of the same coin – began exerting influence across the UN system. Yet, while the UN’s counter-terrorism architecture and activities began to steadily expand, these efforts remained largely siloed from wider UN Security Council and other UN peace and security efforts. In the initial period after 9/11, UN leadership was reluctant to be associated with the militarised aspects of the US-led global ‘war on terror’ and sought to protect the institution against the securitisation of other UN agenda items. It was logical that early running on counter-terrorism at the UN was spearheaded by the UN Security Council– given a select few UN Member States held power to steer this new agenda. This allowed for a ‘proliferation of UNSC counterterrorism measures, mandates, and engagements unchecked by considerations of their impact on UN efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, build peace, and promote human rights’.38 However, despite these institutional developments, throughout this phase counter-terrorism remained somewhat peripheral to the UN’s core mission and was not considered a major agenda at the UN in New York. Figure 10: Annual total mentions of ‘terror’ among permanent UN Security Council members, 2004–2013 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 Word count 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 1990 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 ‘Terror’ mentions KEY Mentions of ‘terror’ Terror-related deaths 0 3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 15,000 Deaths by ‘terror’ attacks Fig 5 Fig 6 0 50 100 150 200 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Word count KEY China France Russian Federation UK US Fig 10 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 KEY Extremism radicalisation Word count 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 20132003 2004 2007 2009 2014 2015 Fig 11 In the initial period after 9/11, UN leadership was reluctant to be associated with the militarised aspects of the US-led global ‘war on terror’ and sought to protect the institution against the securitisation of other UN agenda items. 16 the voice of the fourth pillar PHASE 4 Panic redux (1 January 2014–31 December 2016) A fresh wave of anxiety around new ‘terror’ groups started to brew in the early 2010s. The rise of Boko Haram and then ISIL/ISIS changed the global counter-terrorism landscape and precipitated a major change at the UN. In February 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Nigeria, an event that drew significant media attention and sparked the ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ campaign.39 When, just months later, the then little-known ISIL/ ISIS captured Mosul and declared a caliphate across Iraq and Syria, media and campaign attention turned into policy attention at the UN. With thousands of individuals from around the world travelling to Syria and Iraq to join ranks with ISIL/ISIS, policymakers scrambled to devise a response. As it spread across Iraq and Syria, and with high-profile attacks by ISIL/ISIS and affiliated individuals in Paris, Brussels and Istanbul dominating global coverage, the UN Security Council sprang into action. With six new counter-terrorism-focused resolutions in 2014, the Security Council most notably adopted UNSCR 2178, which instructed all UN Member States to criminalise the travel and support of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’. However, for the UN system, arguably the most notable response happened outside of the UN Security Council chamber. In 2014, President Barack Obama hosted the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. The affable cousin to counter-terrorism, C/PVE was championed by the US as part of an effort to move beyond more militarised approaches that had been prioritised in the years following 9/11. Premised on the need to “break the cycles of conflict … that have become magnets for violent extremism”,40 CVE was closely linked to the Obama administration’s attempt to move away from a permanent war footing and towards an approach focused on root causes. In Figure 11 (below), the impact of the Obama administration’s push on rhetoric at the UN Security Council is clear. The emergence of ‘extremism’ as a key security concern reflected a growing recognition that counter-terrorism efforts should go beyond military responses and should address the underlying ideological, social and economic drivers of violence. This shift was particularly evident around 2014–2015, when the UN Security Council began to frame violent extremism as a critical threat that must be addressed through preventive measures. UNSCR 2178 (2014) played a pivotal role in this shift, explicitly linking ‘extremism’ to the phenomenon of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and calling on Member States to adopt strategies to counter ‘radicalisation’ and recruitment into proscribed groups. Similarly, around the same time, the term ‘radicalisation’ began to gain traction in international discussions, albeit at a lower frequency than ‘extremism’ and ‘terror’. The increased use of ‘radicalisation’ suggests a shift in focus within the global security discourse, consistent with the The GCTS was adopted in 2006 by consensus in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288). It has been reviewed and updated eight times since. It is composed of four pillars: 1. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. 2. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism. 3. Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN system in that regard. 4. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. The eighth review of the GCTS (A/RES/77/298), adopted in June 2023, included 123 operational paragraphs, outlining the work and future direction of the UN counter-terrorism architecture. It is ostensibly used to guide the work of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Compact and of UNOCT. Although every review has, thus far, resulted in the consensus adoption by the UN General Assembly, the eighth review was fiercely contested and edged closer to a breaking of the consensus precedent.37 BOX 4 The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) The emergence of ‘extremism’ as a key security concern reflected a growing recognition that counter-terrorism efforts should go beyond military responses and should address the underlying ideological, social and economic drivers of violence. 23 Barack Obama, then President of the United States of America, addresses the UN summit for the adoption of the post-2015 development agenda. © UN Photo/Mark Garten 25 The five phases of institutional development of the UN counter-terrorism architecture paint a picture of how, when and why certain changes occurred, what underpinned the rhetoric of the day, and the resultant impact of the said discourse. This section explores some further observable shifts in the UN's counterterrorism architecture. 3.1 The UN’s role in its own securitisation During previous research, when these authors asked UN staff members why – and how – the UN counterterrorism architecture had grown so rapidly, we repeatedly heard that the responsibility lay with Member States as the driving force. UN staff would often explain that the UN’s increased involvement in counter-terrorism was founded upon “what Member States want us to do” or “that we are pushed by Member States”. A quantitative analysis of the frequency of keyword mentions supports these claims, as shown by Figures 15a and 15b. During periods when Member States significantly increase discourse related to terrorism, we can observe a corresponding institutional development and an expansion of the UN’s counter-terrorism footprint. This trend began with UNSCR 1267 in 1999 and rapidly accelerated with the adoption of UNSCR 1373. The first wave of heightened rhetoric related to terrorism led to the establishment of the CTC and CTED. 3 Threat inflation and other trends at the UN Security Council 26 the voice of the fourth pillar The second spike was driven by another panic that arose primarily in response to the rise of ISIL/ISIS. This panic drove a new wave of counter-terrorism discourse which began in 2011 and peaked in 2016. The adoption of UNSCR 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters in 2014 and the more frequent reporting requirements established by the adoption of UNSCR 2253 pulled the UN further into counterterrorism work. Again, in parallel, the UN General Assembly established the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and Saudi Arabia gave an unprecedented donation of $100 million to the UN Counter-Terrorism Trust Fund, followed by another large donation from the State of Qatar. This was consolidated with the creation of UNOCT, which ultimately has enabled the UN to dramatically expand its engagement in counter-terrorism programming. With some confidence, we identify a relationship between the increasing mentions of ‘terror’ in Member States’ speeches and resolutions and the growth in UN counter-terrorism architecture and activities. One obvious explanation for this relationship is that when an issue ‘seizes’ the attention of the UN Security Council, meetings are subsequently called and UN Security Council members speak on said issue. The UN Security Council President (which rotates monthly) sets the agenda of the UN Security Council and quite often lacks imagination in terms of inviting different viewpoints and perspectives; there is a consequent Figure 15a: Annual total mentions of ‘terror’ by Member States and UN entities at the UN Security Council, 1994–2024 Fig 12 0 10 20 30 40 50 Word count 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 20132004 2007 2009 2014 2015 2015 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Word count KEY China France Russian Federation United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations United States Fig 13 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Word count UNODC – TPB UNSCR 1267 UNSCR 1373, CTC CTED GCTS CT Trust Fund UNCCT UNSCR 2178 UN Plan of Action on PVE UNOCT United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Fig 15a KEY Member States UN Figure 15b: Annual relative frequency of ‘terror’ mentions by UN entities and Member States at the UN Security Council, 1994–2024 (as a share of total words used) 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden 0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Share of ‘terror’ mentions KEY Member States UN Fig 15b 0 30 60 90 120 150 0 20 40 60 80 100 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2005 2010 2015 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17b&c 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17a 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Russian Federation United States Word count Word count Word count Word count KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror we identify a relationship between the increasing mentions of ‘terror’ in Member States’ speeches and resolutions and the growth in UN counterterrorism architecture and activities. threat inflation and other trends at the un security council 27 tendency to invite the same UN speakers to brief. The UN is therefore somewhat hostage to UN Member State preferences in this regard, providing an explanation for the relationship between the word frequencies used by Member States and those used by the UN. However, when we look more closely at the speeches made by the UN as an organisation, we can also see that the UN follows the language used by UN Member States. When there has been an increase by UN Member States, UN representatives closely track and adopt the language. This mirroring somehow suggests that the UN is ‘doing what its Member States want’. Yet, it is also open to an alternative interpretation, which points to a willingness from UN staff and leadership to engage in the counterterrorism agenda. This was clearly demonstrated by the current UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who tapped into the political interest of permanent Member States and paved the way for the institutional expansion of counter-terrorism through the creation of UNOCT. A future assessment would be needed to decipher whether lower mentions of keywords by UN representatives indicates a pushback, and whether the content of their speeches contain any form of questioning or criticism of the Member States’ positions or whether they include positive echoes of Member State rhetoric on terrorism. 3.2 Which UN entities have led the ‘terrorism’ discourse at the UN Security Council? While the UN system is often discussed as a single actor, there is considerable variation among UN entities in their approach to, and their level of engagement in, counter-terrorism. To better assess the UN’s role, in Figure 16 we disaggregate which UN entities are most vocal in Security Council discussions on terrorism. Figure 16 lists the top 25 UN entities based on combined keyword mentions of ‘terror’, ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ in their speeches at the UN Security Council. This gives a sense of which UN entities have been the most vocal on counterterrorism, and it also reveals differences in how different entities select specific terminology. As expected, the Secretary-General leads with the highest total number of mentions, demonstrating a broad engagement with all three terms. What stands out, however, is the Secretary-General’s relatively higher emphasis on ‘extremism’ compared to other speakers. Additionally, the significant presence of the UnderSecretary-General of UNOCT is notable. Despite the Office being established less than a decade ago, UNOCT has rapidly emerged as a prominent voice in UN Security Council discussions. Its extensive engagement reflects the growing influence and institutional legitimacy it has gained in a relatively short time: in just eight short years, the total mentions of ‘terror’ by UNOCT at the UN Security Council almost outpace the number of mentions by the UN Secretary-General over the studied period (35 years). A key insight from Figure 16 is not just who speaks on these issues, but which terminology they choose to use. It becomes clear that UN entities do not rely on the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ uniformly. While the UN Secretary-General, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs engage with both ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, other offices show a preference for one over the other. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, along with Special Representatives in Missions such as Kosovo, Mali and West Africa, tend to favour the term ‘extremism’ over ‘radicalisation’. Meanwhile, ‘radicalisation’ appears more frequently in the language of representatives appointed to address specific conflicts, particularly in the Levant and Middle East – such as the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. This pattern suggests that ‘radicalisation’ is a context-specific term that may be more closely associated with particular regions or proscribed groups. Although we cannot state this definitively, it appears that ‘radicalisation’ is used predominantly in relation to ISIL/ISIS and similar actors in the Levant, implicitly linking the term to only Muslim-majority contexts in UN discourse. Another striking observation comes from the Legal Counsel and the Chair of the Security Council Committee, established by UNSCR 1373 (2001). This is the only entity on the list that does not engage with the keywords ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’. Similarly, we observe that the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, the Executive Director of the UNODC and the Security Council Committee established by UNSCR 1267, which focuses on 28 the voice of the fourth pillar al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, also use these terms with notable restraint. Even among lower-ranked entities, such as lower-rank representatives from UNOCT or of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordination, we see a more cautious approach to invoking the relatively newer terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. A closer look at how rarely these terms appear in their speeches suggests a divergence in rhetorical choices within the UN system. On one side, we see entities employing a discourse which is underpinned by legalistic frameworks. For example, the Legal Counsel is more likely to avoid politically charged or ambiguous terminology. On the other side are entities and Secretariat representatives– for example, the UN Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General, or the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations – who are inclined to use ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ in alignment with dominant counter-terrorism narratives, the political priorities of UN Member States, or UN institutional approaches or shifts. In Figure 17a, the trend lines for the SecretaryGeneral reflect broader patterns in how the UN Security Council has engaged with terrorism-related discourse over the past two decades. The two major spikes in their engagement align with major geopolitical inflection points, namely the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the influence of ISIL/ISIS between 2014 and 2017. For the Secretary-General, the term ‘extremism’ gained prominence after 2010, peaking in 2016, likely reflecting a shift in global discourse towards broader ideological and social dimensions of violence. ‘Radicalisation’ also appears more consistently after 2010, though always to a lesser extent. Prior to the establishment of UNOCT, the UnderSecretary-General for Political Affairs was responsible for coordinating the UN’s counterterrorism efforts. After UNOCT was formed, the participation of the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Political Affairs (subsequently the Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) in the discourse almost entirely ceased. Figures 17b and 17c show this trend. This suggests that UNOCT Figure 16: Top 25 mentions of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by UN entities, 1990–202465 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 Fig 16 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela China Egypt France India Iraq Islamic Republic of Iran Israel Malta Nigeria Pakistan Russian Federation Sweden Syrian Arab Republic Turkey United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States of America United Nations Uruguay KEY boy/boys gender girl/girls sexual women/woman 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 The Deputy Secretary-General Assistant Secretary-General for Africa Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Legal Counsel Office of Counter-Terrorism Office on Drugs and Crime. Executive Director Secretary-General Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities. Chair Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism. Chair Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism. Executive Director Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism. Executive Directorate Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 23 Word count Word count threat inflation and other trends at the un security council 29 Figure 17a: Annual total mention of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the UN Secretary-General, 1990–2024 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden 0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Share of ‘terror’ mentions KEY Member States UN Fig 15b 0 30 60 90 120 150 0 20 40 60 80 100 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2005 2010 2015 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17b&c 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17a 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Russian Federation United States Word count Word count Word count Word count KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden 0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Share of ‘terror’ mentions KEY Member States UN Fig 15b 0 30 60 90 120 150 0 20 40 60 80 100 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2005 2010 2015 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17b&c 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17a 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Russian Federation United States Word count Word count Word count Word count KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden 0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 Share of ‘terror’ mentions KEY Member States UN Fig 15b 0 30 60 90 120 150 0 20 40 60 80 100 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2005 2010 2015 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17b&c 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 17a 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Russian Federation United States Word count Word count Word count Word count KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Figure 17b: Annual total mention of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the Under-Secretary-General of UNOCT, 2017–2023 Figure 17c: Annual total mention of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, 2005–2017 Figure 18: Total number of distinct UN speakers mentioning ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council and total mentions of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council by UN entities, by UN Secretary-General terms Word count 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 Russian Federation United Nations Israel Syria US China France India UK Pakistan Iran Egypt Japan Ukraine Iraq KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 19 0 5 10 15 20 25 KEY Attacks Deaths Injuries 1991–2000 2001–2010 Events per UNSC ‘terror’ mention Fig 7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Trygve Lie Dag Hammarskjöld 1st Dag Hammarskjöld 2nd U Thant 1st U Thant 2nd Kurt Waldheim 1st Kurt Waldheim 2nd Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Boutros Boutros-Ghali Kofi Annan 1st Kofi Annan 2nd Ban Ki-moon 1st Ban Ki-moon 2nd António Guterres 1st António Guterres 2nd Fig 18 Distinct speakers Total ‘Terror’ mentions KEY Total ‘terror’ mentions Distinct speakers 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror Word count KEY Russian Federation US Fig 20a 30 the voice of the fourth pillar not only took over the coordinating role from the Department of Political Affairs, but has also established itself as the central authority on the counter-terrorism discourse within the UN system. The involvement of certain UN Member States in the counter-terrorism agenda at the UN is well known– although there are some surprises when analysing the rhetoric at the UN Security Council. For UN leadership, there is a clearer trend. Although not neatly fitting within the contours of the five phases, there is a notable increase in the number of different UN representatives who mention ‘terror’ in their speeches and total mentions of ‘terror’ by each subsequent UN Secretary-General (as shown in Figure 18). This data shows that UN leadership clearly embraced the agenda, as shown by each Secretary-General engaging with the discourse more than the last. 3.3 Which states have led the ‘terrorism’ discourse at the UN Security Council? Was it just the P5 responsible for the discourse of counter-terrorism at the UN or have other states played outsized roles? Figure 19 shows clearly that others played their part. Figure 19 ranks the 15 states with the highest frequency of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) mentioned in their speeches at the UN Security Council. As expected, the P5 are among the most engaged in these discussions, but there are notable differences in the extent of their involvement. Russia, the US and China lead the group, with ‘terror’ being the most frequently mentioned term. As previous sections have noted, their level of involvement is significantly higher than that of France and the UK. In particular, the US stands out for its extensive use of ‘extremism’. Meanwhile, France and the UK show similar levels of engagement, with ‘terror’ dominating their discourse, though their overall mentions remain significantly lower. This distribution shows that Russia, China and the US are clearly the most vocal on these issues from the P5. It is striking, but perhaps unsurprising, that Israel, Syria and India have engaged in the discourse on ‘terror’, ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ at a level comparable to some of the P5 members. Given that these countries do not hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council, their prominence in the discussion indicates a strong focus on these issues in their limited engagements at the UN Security Council. The graph shows that their total number of keyword mentions exceeds those of France and the UK, underscoring their active participation in shaping the UN Security Council’s security narratives. The relatively high frequency of mentions from these three countries suggests that certain nonpermanent members and other states have been able to enter the discourse at comparable levels. The other countries listed – Iraq, Ukraine, Venezuela, Iran, Egypt and Pakistan – paint a complex picture of the geographic expansion of the ‘terror’ discourse within the UN Security Council. Iraq’s presence is unsurprising, given the illegal US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ongoing efforts to address the Word count 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 Russian Federation United Nations Israel Syria US China France India UK Pakistan Iran Egypt Japan Ukraine Iraq KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror Fig 19 0 5 10 15 20 25 KEY Attacks Deaths Injuries 1991–2000 2001–2010 Events per UNSC ‘terror’ mention Fig 7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Trygve Lie Dag Hammarskjöld 1st Dag Hammarskjöld 2nd U Thant 1st U Thant 2nd Kurt Waldheim 1st Kurt Waldheim 2nd Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Boutros Boutros-Ghali Kofi Annan 1st Kofi Annan 2nd Ban Ki-moon 1st Ban Ki-moon 2nd António Guterres 1st António Guterres 2nd Fig 18 Distinct speakers Total ‘Terror’ mentions KEY Total ‘terror’ mentions Distinct speakers 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror Word count KEY Russian Federation US Fig 20a Figure 19: Top 15 UN Member States by mentions of keywords (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) at the UN Security Council, 1990–2024 It is striking, but perhaps unsurprising, that Israel, Syria and India have engaged in the discourse on ‘terror’, ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ at a level comparable to some of the P5 members. threat inflation and other trends at the un security council 31 challenges posed by ISIL/ISIS in the post-war period. Pakistan’s presence on this list is also unsurprising, given its frequent rhetorical exchanges with India in UN Security Council debates on the issue of Kashmir. Similarly, Iran’s involvement is to be expected, as it frequently engages in a back-and-forth debate with Israel, the US and other states in meetings focused on the Middle East. Egypt, with its longstanding interest in counter-terrorism and security issues, maintains a strong presence in these discussions. What stands out, however, is the notable engagement of Ukraine and Venezuela, two countries not traditionally associated with the dominant counter-terrorism discourse. Ukraine’s frequent mentions may reflect its efforts to frame the Russian occupation as a form of terrorism, while Venezuela’s presence in the rankings is likely linked to discussions of criminal violence or rhetoric framing the sanctions or ‘coercive measures’ from the US as a form of terrorism. Recalling Figures 2–4, up until approximately 2008– 2010, the US used the terms related to ‘terror’ more frequently than any other permanent UN Security Council member – consistently leading in mentions since the post-9/11 period. However, after this period, a noticeable transition occurs: Russia and China begin to engage more prominently with the term, at least matching and then overtaking the US in most years. This shift becomes particularly evident after the rise of ISIL/ISIS in 2014, when the US experiences another peak in mentions of ‘terror’. Following this peak, Russia and China increase their engagement significantly, indicating a changing dynamic in the way terrorism is framed within UN Security Council debates. Between 2014 and 2016, the terms ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ surged in UN Security Council speeches by the P5. Figure 19 shows that this increased use of the term ‘extremism’ was driven especially by the US, UK and Russia. China and France, in contrast, maintained a relatively low usage of ‘extremism’ throughout the period. This surge reflects the peak of global concern over ISIL/ ISIS, the concern surrounding ‘foreign terrorist fighters’, and escalating instability in Syria and Iraq. These events created a moment of convergence, where the P5 broadly seemed inclined to use the term ‘extremism’. Interestingly, the use of ‘extremism’ by both the US and Russia rose again in 2022–2023, suggesting a continued or renewed rhetorical investment that extends beyond the immediate crisis period. 3.4 Russia and the US: the ebb and flow of rhetorical leadership? Many would simply assume that the US was the most active UN Member State guiding counter-terrorism debates for the past three decades. This assumption stems from the fact that the US Government was the main actor dragging the UN system into counterterrorism work after the deadly terrorist attacks across the country on 11 September 2001. Yet, as previously discussed, Russia has actually been more proactive in using the word ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council than the US. Figure 20a shows that, during the two terms of the Obama administration, there was a rise in the US’s rhetorical focus on counter-terrorism, especially in President Obama's second term, reflecting a historical moment whereby the rise of proscribed groups such as ISIL/ISIS and the resultant increase 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror Word count KEY Russian Federation US Fig 20a 0 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035 0.0040 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror KEY Russian Federation US 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 Women Men Unknown KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror 0 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 Women Men Fig 20b Fig 21a&b Relative frequency Word count Relative frequency Figure 20a: Total mentions of keywords in speeches to the UN Security Council by the US and Russia, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2009–202466 32 the voice of the fourth pillar 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror Word count KEY Russian Federation US Fig 20a 0 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035 0.0040 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Extremism Radicalisation Terror KEY Russian Federation US 0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 Women Men Unknown KEY Extremism Radicalisation Terror 0 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 Women Men Fig 20b Fig 21a&b Relative frequency Word count Relative frequency Figure 20b: Relative frequency of keywords in speeches to the UN Security Council by the US and Russia, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2009–2024 (as share of total words) Figure 20c: Ratio between Russia and the US's total mentions of ‘terror’ at the UN Security Council, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2008–2024 Ratio Ratio 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Figure 20d: Ratio between Russia and the US's relative frequency of ‘terror’ mentions at the UN Security Council, categorised by US presidential administrations, 2008–2024 in ‘terror’ attacks propelled the issue to a top foreign policy concern once again. Mentions of ‘terror’, ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ increased in President Obama’s second term, which can be explained by the administration’s interest in popularising the C/PVE lexicon within the UN system. This trend shifted during the first Trump administration, with a slight decline across all three terms. This decline may be due to specific policy decisions made during that time. However, it can also be interpreted as the consequences of the reduced frequency of major ‘terror’ attacks during President Trump’s first term or the diminished value the Trump administration placed on the UN. It should be noted that during the first Trump administration the US made fewer and shorter interventions at the Council. What stands out, however, is the increase in the number of mentions relative to the number of words during this period. When we divide the total number of mentions of ‘terror’ by the total number of words spoken by US speakers, it becomes clear that this rhetoric was used at a higher relative frequency. While the total number of mentions of ‘terror’ by the US declined, the increase in mentions by Russia continued, with more ‘terror’ mentions during the period 2017–2020 than the period 2013–2016. During the Biden administration, the total number of US mentions of ‘terror’ declined, reflecting a broader shift away from counter-terrorism-focused discourse. A telling example of this shift can be seen in the Biden administration’s 47-page National Security Strategy, where the issue of counter-terrorism does not appear until page 30, behind other apparently more pressing national security concerns. Russia, although it also shifted its rhetoric, still maintained a clear dominance over the US (see Figures 20c and 20d). Figure 20d shows that when the US increases its use of ‘terror’ language, Russia tends to respond by increasing its own use at a faster rate. Conversely, when the US pulls back, as it did during the Biden administration, Russia also pulls back, but at a slower pace. Ratio Ratio 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Obama I Obama II Trump Biden Observation 4: The UN is a contributor to the process of threat inflation/securitisation in the context of counter-terrorism The discourse of counter-terrorism – once kept at an arm’s length by UN leadership – is now embedded within the institution’s lexicon. The UN ranks second in total mentions of keywords related to ‘terrorism’ out of all those speaking before the UN Security Council. Assumptions that this is pushed by Member States – with the UN merely responding to their concerns – might need further interrogation. Each UN Secretary-General has embraced the counterterrorism agenda more than the last (as shown by Figure 18), and more and more UN entities have contributed to the ‘terrorism’ discourse at the UN Security Council (as shown by Figure 16). This trend points towards incentives to focus on counterterrorism as a means of sustaining and expanding the UN’s institutional growth. The UN, and especially the Secretariat, responds to Member State priorities in ways that advance its own institutional interests. The claim that the UN’s expanding engagement with counter-terrorism is the result of requests from its Member States often overlooks the agency of UN leadership and staff. The growth of the counterterrorism agenda reflects not only external pressure, but also internal decisions to capitalise on it as a site of institutional growth. Observation 5: Not all language sticks Despite the clear evidence of threat inflation and the securitisation of discourse related to terrorism, the process is not always a successful one. Figure 5 shows that ‘radicalisation’ discourse has so far not reached the heights of discourse related to ‘terror’ or ‘extremism’, and neither has it had the institutional impact. Aside from a spike in 2022, the term ‘radicalisation’ has not become a defining term at the UN Security Council.72 This can be interpreted as skepticism about the term’s utility, given significant research and evidence pointing to the flaws and shortcomings of the terminology related to radicalisation. It also shows how comparatively little traction a term gains when it is not embraced by the UN or integrated into a policy framework (for example, in the way ‘extremism’ discourse was integrated into the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on PVE). observations and reflections 39 Notes 71 Rosand, Chowdhury Fink, Miller, op. cit. 72 This spike, for which Russia was responsible, can be partially explained by the use of the term ‘radical’ in the context of Russia’s lexicon related to the war in Ukraine. 40 threat inflation: counter-terrorism at the united nations security council? Secretary-General António Guterres attends the tenth meeting of the Coordination Committee of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. © UN Photo/Evan Schneider 41 We set out to interrogate whether counter-terrorism discourse at the UN is part of a threat inflation process by UN Member States. The most difficult result to interpret in this analysis is the apparent alignment between deaths by ‘terror’ attacks and the trends in mentions of ‘terror’, ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ in UN Security Council speeches. At first glance, this might suggest that the UN is fulfilling its role by providing a platform for states to respond to rising security threats. However, we argue that this connection is not straightforward. What we observe in the rhetoric employed by Member States is not a neutral reaction to objective threat levels but a reflection of political manoeuvring, enabled by the strategic ambiguity of the term ‘terror’. The flexibility of this term allows states to broaden its meaning, reclassifying a wide range of violence as terrorism, whether political, criminal or related to conflict. In doing so, the UN system has both provided the stage for these narratives and acted as an institutional actor whose growth has been shaped by the continuation of counter-terrorism debates. We showed clearly that the keywords in question (‘terror’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’) have been firmly part of the UN Security Council’s discourse. We observed and showed that there are clear relationships between certain parts of this discourse and certain UN Security Council Member States. We also identified and revealed clear moments when a rise in rhetoric matches institutional growth of the UN counter-terrorism architecture. 5 Conclusion 42 the voice of the fourth pillar Five years have passed between our first major writing on this issue (in 2020) and the publication of this paper. We have observed that the UN counterterrorism architecture has continued to grow, while the rest of the institution has not fared as well, threatening its ability to deliver its core mandate. An inflated temporary budget provided by Saudi Arabia and Qatar has allowed UNOCT to grow unchecked and gain influence across the UN system. When UN Member States accepted the UN SecretaryGeneral’s rationale that the unsustainability of these contributions from these illiberal, authoritarian states demanded that the regular UN budget contribution to UNOCT should rise seven-fold, they allowed these states to ‘pay to play’ and artificially grow the place of counter-terrorism within the UN system. In 2020, it seemed conceivable that if certain UN Member States and UN leadership invested appropriate political capital, they could ‘protect the UN from the counter-terror agenda’ or at least put up more considerable guardrails to protect human rights, civic space, fundamental freedoms, and avoid downstream harms. However, as each year passed, and the counter-terrorism architecture continued to grow, this began to appear less possible. This paper indicates that the language and discourse of certain UN Member States and UN leadership has had – and will continue to have– an important role in shaping the institutional trajectory, both in the periods of growth and decline. Yet, as the wider UN system enters a period of deep institutional contraction, the expansive counter-terrorism architecture might begin to retreat – given it offers little support for preserving or revitalising the UN’s core functions. In the short to medium term, the UN counterterrorism architecture is here to stay, regardless of the outcome of any reform occurring in 2025 or beyond. The nature of any potential reforms, whether they merely put a band-aid on the structural problem with a reputational risk firewall or an oversight mechanism, remains to be seen. While there are some harmless engagements and useful coordination tasks performed by UNOCT and other parts of the system, the UN counter-terrorism architecture still has considerable bloat; it is also arguably too deferential to certain Member States. In some ways, the UN counter-terrorism architecture has become a platform for illiberal UN Member States to engage in the multilateral system. UNOCT leadership welcomes collaboration with governments who consistently use the counterterrorism agenda to suppress political opponents, minorities, human rights defenders and activists. Naming multilateral counter-terrorism processes after Member States that instrumentalise ‘terrorism’ language for repression and political control is unbefitting of the UN and a perfect illustration of the architecture’s vulnerability to abuse by autocratic governments. For those UN Member States who are worried about a further shift towards the securitisation of the UN system at the hands of the counter-terrorism agenda, or who believe that the UN counterterrorism footprint should be right-sized, it is clear that resources – both political and financial – need to be invested to correct the architecture. These investments should prioritise peace, sustainable development, and human rights and humanitarian affairs – the three core pillars of the UN. Our findings have important implications for states, UN leadership and other stakeholders: language and terminology are both revealing and influential, and UN Member States that are concerned about how counter-terrorism is evolving at the UN should be clear, deliberate and thoughtful about their rhetorical choices. 43 Previous Saferworld publications on UN counter-terrorism A fourth pillar for the United Nations? The rise of counter-terrorism June 2020 Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch prevent terrorism? Assessing the role and impact of the UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch June 2024 Twenty years since the attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11), this briefing explores how the United Nations (UN) has learnt to co-exist with the global ‘war on terror’, and whether the compromises it has struck in doing so ultimately enhance or undermine the contribution the UN needs to make to global peace, development and human rights. From the ‘cornerstone’ provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1373 in 2001, via the adoption of a UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, through to the deployment of UN peace operations into key war-on-terror battlegrounds, to the embrace of countering and preventing violent extremism (C/PVE), up to the establishment of the Office of Counter-Terrorism in 2017, counterterrorism is now– for good or ill– a big part of the UN system. This briefing provides much-needed scrutiny of these trends, asking: n How has this shift affected the UN and the people it serves? n What are the current impacts and future threats? n What should be done in response? The rise of counter-terrorism at the UN | Impacts of 20 ye ars of war on terror | Problems with the UN’s embr ace of counter-terrorism and preventing viole nt extremism | The politics of counter-terrorism at the UN | Future threats to the UN system Building the case for a value-bas ed UN approach to counter-terrorism INSIDE The rise of counter-terrorism at the United Nations Two decades later BRIEFING | SEPTEMBER 2021 DISCUSSION PAPER Larry Attree, Jordan Street and Luca Venchiarutti September 2018 United Nations peace operations in complex environments Charting the right course United Nations peace operations in complex environments: charting the right course argued that UN peace operations would risk losing impartiality, alienating communities and worsening conflict if mandates included counter-terrorism tasks. Larry Attree, Jordan Street & Luca Venchiarutti, 2018 https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/ publications/1183-united-nations-peace-operations-incomplex-environments-charting-the-right-course A fourth pillar for the United Nations? The rise of counter-terrorism examined how counter-terrorism evolved into a de facto fourth pillar of the UN, potentially undermining the foundations of the UN Charter. It called on UN leadership to restore balance by re-centring peace, human rights and development and right-sizing the UN counterterrorism architecture. Ali Altiok & Jordan Street, 2020 https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/ publications/1256-a-fourth-pillar-for-the-united-nationsthe-rise-of-counter-terrorism The rise of counter-terrorism at the United Nations: two decades later marked 20 years since UN Security Council Resolution 1373, and explored how counter-terrorism has reshaped UN structures. It assessed impacts on peace, development and human rights, and suggested responsive reforms for the UN counter-terrorism architecture. Jordan Street & Larry Attree, 2021 https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/ publications/1371-the-rise-of-counter-terrorism-at-theunited-nations-two-decades-later Does the Terrorism Prevention Branch prevent terrorism? assessed the role and impact of the UNODC’s Terrorism Prevention Branch amid an expanding UN counter-terrorism architecture. It reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the Terrorism Prevention Branch and offered recommendations for it to navigate institutional shifts. Jordan Street & Ali Altiok, 2024 https://www.saferworld-global.org/resources/ publications/1446-does-the-terrorism-prevention-branchprevent-terrorism-assessing-the-role-and-impact-of-theuns-office-on-drugs-and-crimes-terrorism-preventionbranch About Saferworld Saferworld is an independent, not-forprofit international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives in countries and territories across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. We work in solidarity with people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity. uk office Brick Yard, 28 Charles Square London N1 6HT, UK Phone: +44 (0)20 7324 4646 Email: [email protected] Web: www.saferworld-global.org Saferworld saferworld.bsky.social www.facebook.com/Saferworld @Saferworld @saferworld_org Registered charity no. 1043843 A company limited by guarantee no. 3015948 ISBN: 978-1-912901-49-4