A Translator at Work: Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles's Translation Notes on Alexander's De Anima

RESEARCH ARTICLE A Translator at Work: Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles’s Translation Notes on Alexander’s De Anima [version 1; peer review: 1 approved, 2 approved with reservations] Hanna Paulmann Religions, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Hamburg, 20148, Germany First published: 07 Oct 2025, 5:306 https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.20551.1 Latest published: 07 Oct 2025, 5:306 https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.20551.1 v1 Abstract Background Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles’s mid-fourteenth-century Hebrew translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s De anima, made from Is?aq ibn ?unayn’s ninth-century Arabic translation of the original Greek, survives in four manuscripts. Three of these contain Samuel’s notes on his translation, which disclose a wealth of information concerning textual problems he faced, editorial decisions he took, and his understanding of the text and its arguments. Methods The present paper analyses these notes, which have never been studied before, according to philosophical and philological methods. Results My analysis shows that Samuel is a philosophically engaged translator who approaches Alexander’s text with a text-critical attitude that enables him to render it in a more coherent and accessible form than that found in the Arabic manuscript that served as his source. Thus, this paper deepens our understanding of Samuel’s activity as a translator, Conclusions These results shows that we should take translators seriously as philosophical agents in their own right and compels us to study manuscripts that contain translations to find and explore the translators’ own voices within or next to their works. Open Peer Review Approval Status 123 version 1 07 Oct 2025 view view view Yehuda Halper, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel 1. jacobus naude, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa 2. Richard Pleijel, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden 3. Any reports and responses or comments on the article can be found at the end of the article. Open Research Europe  Page 1 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 Corresponding author: Hanna Paulmann ([email protected]) Author roles: Paulmann H: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Investigation, Resources, Visualization, Writing – Original Draft Preparation Competing interests: No competing interests were disclosed. Grant information: This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No [101041376] (project name: [HEPMASITE]). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. Copyright: © 2025 Paulmann H. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. How to cite this article: Paulmann H. A Translator at Work: Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles’s Translation Notes on Alexander’s De Anima [version 1; peer review: 1 approved, 2 approved with reservations] Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.20551.1 First published: 07 Oct 2025, 5:306 https://doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.20551.1 Keywords Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles; Alexander of Aphrodisias; De Anima; Translation; Hebrew Philosophy; Hebrew Manuscripts; Medieval Philosophy; Aristotelian Psychology. This article is included in the European Research Council (ERC) gateway. This article is included in the Horizon 2020 gateway. Open Research Europe  Page 2 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 1. Introduction Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles, a rather colourful figure of the intellectual circles of fourteenth-century France, translated Isḥaq ibn Ḥunain’s Arabic translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s De Anima in 1324 and then revised his translation in 1340. The work survives in four manuscripts, three of which contain his working notes covering textual problems, editorial decisions, and explanations. These notes are an important first-person testimony of a scholar at work, and they can teach us both about his translating methods (including his editorial decision-making regarding variants that accompany the text) and about his understanding of the philosophical arguments in the text. Furthermore, some of Samuel’s notes refer directly to Isḥaq’s lost Arabic version of the work, which allows us a glimpse at the textual tradition of the Arabic text. Though previously recognized by scholars, the research on these notes so far has been very limited.1 The present paper will study Samuel’s working notes on his translation, with a view to deepening our understanding of Samuel and his work as a translator. As such, it also serves as a contribution to the small but important body of scholarship about Hebrew translators’ working notes.2 In the course of this paper, it will become evident that Samuel is a philosophically engaged translator who approaches the text with a text-critical attitude. To achieve this, I will first give a short introduction to Samuel and Alexander’s De Anima (Section 2). Then, I will offer a detailed discussion of five of Samuel’s translation notes, which give insight into different aspects of his translation process (Section 3). Finally, I will summarize the results of the discussion, contextualize them, and present the takeaways of this paper (Section 4). 2. From Alexander to Samuel Alexander (born between 140 and 165 CE in Aphrodisias, a city in Caria, modern-day Turkey) wrote many highly influential commentaries on Aristotle’s works and also composed original works in which he elaborates on and defends Aristotelian points of view. Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul served as material for Alexander on two separate occasions, but while most of his commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima was lost quite early (11, pp. 317–24), his independent work on the soul (together with its supplement, usually referred to as “Mantissa,” a collection of smaller texts on various matters) has survived, preserving access to his understanding of Aristotle’s De Anima and rendering it a valuable resource for engagement with the history of Aristotelian psychology since the Middle Ages. For the most part, Alexander’s De Anima follows both the structure and the doctrine of Aristotle’s De Anima. However, he approaches the topic in a systematic way rather than making use of Aristotle’s dialectical manner and draws from the complete Aristotelian corpus to embed the discussion of the soul in its theoretical frame (12, pp. 1–3). With this approach, he not only clarifies Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul, but also presents it as a coherent part of Aristotle’s overall philosophical system. Alexander’s De Anima was translated into Arabic by Isḥaq ibn Ḥunain (d. 910 or 911 AD), who translated directly from the Greek (5, p. 317), but his translation is lost (2, p. xiv).3 Samuel completed his Hebrew translation of Alexander’s De Anima in 1324 in Murcia, southern Spain, and made it accessible to the public after a revision in Montélimar in 1340 under the title שפנב רמאממ (Treatise on the Soul) (5, pp. 296, 298).4 As he was active in the first half of the fourteenth century, Samuel stands rather at the end of the translation movement that saw many philosophical works being translated from Arabic into Hebrew.5 According to Moritz Steinschneider, Samuel’s translation is based on a good Arabic manuscript (4, p. 152), and he closely follows the Arabic text (2, pp. xiv–xv). Samuel’s Hebrew translation survives in four manuscripts: Paris BN héb. 89313, Paris BN héb. 89414, Berlin Or. Oct. 33215, and, fragmentarily, in Munich Cod. Hebr. 38916.6 Of those four, no manuscript contains all the notes, and Berlin 332 contains none. Samuel closes his translation with a colophon,7 in which he gives details of the translation process and methods. Many of the things he addressed in the colophon can be seen in the surviving manuscripts. He complains about the obscurity of the text, worsened by the chain of translations (5, p. 317), a remark that is also found in some of his translation notes in the margins of the text. Samuel also gives some details 1 Research on Samuel’s translations and his notes can be found in Günsz1, which describes the Hebrew manuscripts and printed the section of Samuel’s translation that deals with the intellect as well as part of the colophon; Alexander of Aphrodisias2, which contains parts of Steinschneider’s translations from the Hebrew text, his comments about some passages, and even some of Samuel’s translator’s notes; Berliner and Hoffmann3, in which Steinschneider printed the complete colophon (pp. 8–10); Steinschneider4, which gives a brief overview of Samuel’s translation and the manuscripts in which it is preserved (pp. 152–53); and, more recently, Berman5, which gives an account of Samuel’s life and works and contains a translation of his colophons, and finally, in Berman’s editions of two of Samel’s translations (6 and 7). 2 Namely, Fontaine8, which discusses ibn Tibbon’s translation notes; Fraenkel9, which studies ibn Tibbon’s glosses and analyses them in order to learn about his translation methods, his way of explaining technical terminology, and his understanding of Maimonides’s text; and Meyrav10, which is dedicated to Moses ibn Tibbon’s working notes and retraces the history of translation and revision of the Hebrew version of Averroes’s Epitome of the Physics. 3 The Greek text also served as the source for Latin translations, which have no relevance for this paper. Hence, I will merely note briefly that there is one translation by Hieronymus Donatus that was published in 1495 and a partial translation dated to the sixteenth century by a certain Antonius de Albertis, who may, according to F. Edward Cranz, be identical with Antonio di Niccolò degli Alberti (born 1495) (17, pp. 84–88; 2, p. xiv). 4 For the most recent efforts to illuminate Samuel’s biography and works, see Berman5– 7, and Zonta18. 5 For information on the timeline of this translation movement and the different ways philosophy became accessible in Hebrew, see Harvey19. 6 I have given a more detailed description of the manuscripts in the extended data (20, pp. 1–4). 7 The abridged version of Samuel’s colophon to his translation of De Anima found in Berlin 332 was first published by Günsz1. The first complete printing of the colophon as found in the two Parisian manuscripts, which was undertaken by Steinschneider, can be found in Berliner and Hoffmann (3, pp. 8–10). It was reprinted in the chapter on Samuel in Renan (21, pp. 553–67) and translated in its entirety by Berman5. Page 3 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 about his translation method. He states that in his first translation, he did not follow all the variant readings he found in the Arabic, but sometimes preferred the reading of the main text (p. 318). This can be seen in the manuscripts that contain variants in the margins that are marked with the Arabic letter nun, two of which Samuel discusses regarding which reading should be preferred. He describes that his guiding principle in editing was what he thought to be the truth (ibid.). Many of the things that he corrected during his revisions were amended according to his “conjecture and opinion and what seemed to me to be correct after extraordinary study” (p. 319). This too can be seen in the manuscripts, which contain marginal notes in which Samuel suggests or points out corrections. In the last part of his colophon, he mentions that he introduced divisions into the text according to its subject matter (pp. 319–20), which still exist in the surviving manuscripts. 3. Notes In total, there are nineteen different notes written by Samuel found across the manuscripts and they include both philological and philosophical content. In the following discussion, I will examine five of them in detail to show Samuel’s engagement with the text during the translation process. All of the notes and their reference passages can be found alongside the Greek text and a corresponding English translation in the extended data, (20, pp. 4–24). For simplicity’s sake, I have numbered them and will henceforth refer to them by their respective number. 3.1. Note 1: Engagement with a textual problem8 In his first surviving note, Samuel addresses a problem he has noticed in the text and offers alternative readings in an attempt to solve it. The passage in question belongs to the beginning of Alexander’s De Anima, in which Alexander discusses how matter and form constitute a body and in what way they contribute to the qualities of the body they constitute. In the Greek passage (right half of Table 1a), Alexander argues that a compound of matter and form has its being in virtue of its form. His first premise is that every body, be it artificial or natural, is what it is in virtue of its form (2, 7.4–5). He then equates the form of a thing with its completion and perfection (Gr: τελειότης: teleiotēs; Hebr.: תומלשש: šelemut) (2, 7.5–6) and draws the conclusion that “when converted” (Gr.: ἀντιστρέψαντι: antistrepsanti; Hebr.: �פ�ת�ש��פ�ת�ש��: ke-še-hithapekh), it is also true that every body has its being in virtue of its form and that this form is the perfection of its body (2, 7.4–8). The distinction that Alexander drew between artificial and natural bodies that is mentioned in this argument precedes this passage. Artificial bodies are those that are crafted by someone possessing an art, for example, a carpenter (2, 2.25–3.13). Natural bodies, on the other hand, are formed naturally without anybody intentionally crafting them, and are prior to artificial bodies (2, 3.13–17). The Hebrew translation of the quoted passage (left half of Table 1a) differs from the sense of the Greek text as it is transmitted regarding Alexander’s antecedent, according to which every body, be it artificial or natural, is what it is in virtue of its form. Most notably, the Greek passage καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἔτι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν (kai poly proteron eti tōn kata physin: “and, even prior to that, each thing <formed> naturally”) undergoes a transformation in the corresponding Hebrew passage םייעבט� םימשג� וארקי �רובעבוו (u-baʿavurah yiqqare’u ha-gešamim ha-ṭiveʿiyyim: “and for its [i.e., art’s] sake, they are called natural bodies”). Instead of πολὺ πρότερον (poly proteron: “prior”), the Hebrew text reads �רובעבוו (u-baʿavurah: “and for its sake”). Furthermore, in the Hebrew passage, a Table 1a. The reference text for note 1 in Hebrew and Greek with English translation. Hebrew passage (13, f. 4א)English translation Greek passage (2, p. 7) English translation (9, pp. 35–36) Therefore, it should necessarily be said that each body’s culmination is through a form. But if each body that is constituted by art, and for its [i.e., art’s] sake, is called a natural body, then it is what it is by form, and this [i.e., the form] is the culmination of each of them. Therefore, this statement, when converted, is true, and it is that the thing by which each body composed of matter and form is what it is is the same thing, its form and culmination. [7.2–8] […] εὐλόγως ἑκάστῳ τῶν σωμάτων ἐν τῷ εἴδει ἡ τελειότς ἂν εἶναι λέγοιτο. Ἀλλὰ εἰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἑκάστῳ τῶν τε κατὰ τέχνην συνεστώτων καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἔτι τῶν κατὰ φύσιν τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτ΄ ἔστιν ἡ ἑκάστου τελειότης, καὶ ἀντιστρέψαντι ἀληθὲς τὸ καθ’ ὃ τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐξ ὕλης τε καὶ εἴδος συνθέτων, τοῦτ’ εἶναι τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν τελειότητα. […] then it would make sense to say that each body’s culmination is in its form. Yet, if each thing put together by art and, even prior to that, each thing formed naturallyis just what it is in virtue of its form, and [the form] is the culmination of each, then it is true, when converted, that that in virtue of which every compound of matter and form has its being is its form and culmination. 8 This note is the first one in Paris 894. Despite the passage being marked, it is not found in Paris 893 and is thus the only surviving note that is not found in that manuscript. Page 4 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 repetition of םתדימעע (ʿamidatam: “their constitution”) is neither assumed, as happens in the Greek with the word συνεστώτων (synestōtōn: “put together”), nor explicitly repeated, but instead, the new verb וארקיי (yiqqare’u: “they are called” or “they are called upon”) is added. If וארקיי is understood as “they are called,” then the Hebrew maintains that artificial bodies are called natural bodies, which differs from the Greek meaning, according to which natural bodies are prior to artificial bodies. This Hebrew reading renders the text philosophically problematic. Perhaps understanding וארקיי as “they are called upon” makes better sense; it may mean that natural bodies are utilized for the sake of art, which is coherent with Alexander’s view. Nonetheless, with the Arabic translation lost, it remains unclear how exactly this phrasing came to be based on the Greek. The second difference is the structure of the antecedent. In its Hebrew translation, the antecedent of the conditional in the Greek is broken up by an additional �נ�� (hine: “then”) to create a conditional within the antecedent. The new antecedent is “if each body that is constituted by art, and for its [i.e., art’s] sake, is called a natural body” and the consequent “then it is what it is by form.” This conditional, if true, would require a lot of additional information to explain why this should be the case. Samuel’s note on this passage (Table 1b) suggests that he noticed that the text is problematic in its current state. In his note, he addresses the four words םייעבט� םימשג� וארקי �רובעבוו (“and for its [i.e., art’s] sake, they are called natural bodies”), suggesting that they were not in the original Greek text and noting that he cannot make sense of them. Still, he decided to leave them in the text and offers alternative translations for וארקיי – namely, ואבויי (yuve’u: “they are brought forth”) and ובושיי (yašuvu: “they become, they return”) – in an attempt to solve it. The verb ואבויי has the basic meaning “to bring,” which can also take on a causal note of “to bring forth.” Replacing וארקיי with ואבויי would create a sentence that expresses that natural bodies are brought forth for the sake of art. Since natural bodies can, in fact, be used for art, this reading preserves the correct relation between natural and artificial bodies. The second option Samuel mentions is ובושיי, which in this case seems to carry the meaning “to become.” There are two ways to understand the passage with this meaning. Either it is read as artificial bodies becoming natural bodies, which would turn the actual relation between artificial and natural bodies upside down, or it is read as natural bodies coming to be for the sake of art, which is similar to the reading with ואבויואבויי. All three options can be read in a way that is philosophically meaningful and that avoids identifying artificial and natural bodies. However, they do not give any more clarity to the first conditional that is formed from the antecedent in the Greek text by an additional �נ�� in the Hebrew text, so this passage remains problematic. 3.2. Note 6: Insertion of a correction into the text In note 6, Samuel explains that he has inserted a negation into the text that he did not find in the Arabic manuscript that provided him with his source text. Even though he had no access to the Greek text, he correctly restored a negation that existed in the Greek, but was lost at some point during the transmission process, thereby remedying an absurdity created by the lost negation. It refers to a passage in which Alexander argues that the soul has more than one power. Alexander’s argument is that if there was only one power of the soul, then the soul of every living being would be able to exert every kind of activity as long as adequate objects for this activity were present. There are, however, living beings that cannot exert some powers of the soul despite the presence of adequate objects. If only the lack of corresponding organs were to blame, then one would have to admit that these powers existed in vain in this living being, thus undermining the claim that nature does nothing in vain (right half of Table 2a). The Hebrew text follows the argument of the Greek text (left half of Table 2a). In his note, Samuel describes how the negation ןיאא (ein) in the phrase “these actions will not be in these species of animals due to the lack of organs” was not in the Arabic manuscript from which he translated and that he added it (Table 2b). Without this negation, this passage would be rendered absurd, Table 1b. Samuel’s note 1 in Hebrew and with English translation. Note 1 in Hebrew (14, f. 3א) English translation Samuel the translator said: It seems to me that the four words listed were not created [i.e., they were not in the original text], and I cannot make sense of them in any way, but so I found them and so I have left them. Instead of the word וארקי, it is possible to translate the word ואבוי (“brought [forth]”) or the word ובושי (“become”). I do not understand [the text] in any manner [of reading it]. Page 5 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 since there is no meaningful way to say that an animal can exert certain activities because they lack the corresponding organ. Samuel’s intervention, therefore, eliminates the absurdity and corresponds to the text as it is transmitted in Greek. It should be noted that changing the main text constitutes a rather drastic intervention. Samuel informs the reader about the change in his note, but notes are not always copied. A reader of the Berlin manuscript15, which does not contain Samuel’s notes, would not know that Samuel was the one inserting it. They would therefore be completely unaware that there was a problem in this passage and would moreover lack information to make up their own mind about which version is correct, which, in turn, affects the way the text is received and understood. 3.3. Note 2: Reproduction of a marginal note Note 2 reproduces a marginal note that Samuel found in the Arabic manuscript from which he was translating, which explains the term ἐντελέχεια (entelecheia: “completion”). He deems that it does not belong to the main text and attributes it to the Arabic translator Isḥaq ibn Ḥunain. However, a comparison with the Greek text as transmitted shows that parts of it belong to the main text, which gives rise to questions about the origin of this passage. The passage to which this note refers is part of an argument that the soul is the first completion of a living being. In the Greek text, Alexander describes how Aristotle equates the culmination of a thing (Gr.: τελειότης: teleiotēs; Hebr.: תומילשש: šelemut) with its completion. He explains that it is called “completion” because it is responsible for a thing becoming complete and that therefore, Aristotle characterized the soul as the “first completion” (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη: entelecheia hē prōtē) (right half of Table 3a). The Hebrew text shows that the Arabic translation followed the Greek text closely, even transcribing ἐντελέχεια into Arabic, from which a Hebrew transcription was made (אי�לטנאא), since the discussion is about a Greek term. However, the explanaTable 2a. The reference text for note 6 in Hebrew and Greek with English translation. Hebrew passage (13, f. ב13)English translation Greek passage (2, p. 27) English translation (12, p. 53) We find some animals that have a power of the soul, and it is impossible for them to perform its [i.e., the soul’s] other activities, even though the things that it needs for the actions that it performs through the same powers exist. For if someone says that these actions will not be in these species of animals due to the lack of the [corresponding] organs, then he denies that nature does nothing in vain. [27.9–13] […] εἶναι δὲ τινα <ζῷα>, ἃ δύναμιν ψυχῆς ἔχοντα μηκέτ΄ ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἐνεργείας δύναται καίτοι τῶν πραγμάτων ὄντων περὶ ἂ ἁι κατ΄ ἐκείνας τὰς δυνάμεις ἐνέργειαι. Εἰ γὰρ λέγοι τις δι΄ ὀργάνων ἀπορίαν ἐν τούτοις μὴ γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐνεργείας, ἀναιρήσει τὸ μηδὲν μάτην ποιεῖν τὴν φύσιν. […] and there are things that have a power of soul, but cannot engage in other activities beyond it, even when there are objects present which the activities corresponding to these powers concern. For if someone were to claim that these activities do not occur in them [solely] due to a lack of organs, he will undermine the claim that nature does nothing superfluous. Table 2b. Samuel’s note 6 in Hebrew and with English translation. Note 6 in Hebrew (13, f. ב13) English translation Samuel the translator said: The word “not” was not in the Arabic from which I translated. I this negation of my own accord. Page 6 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 tion of ἐντελέχεια and the characterization of the soul as a first completion (underlined in the Greek and in Caston’s translation in the table) is missing in the Hebrew main text. After equating the thing’s culmination with its completion, the text immediately continues by distinguishing between two kinds of culmination (right half of Table 3a). In the note to this passage, Samuel explains that he found a note in the margins that does not seem to belong to the main text. He relates that note in Hebrew and, after the quotation, says that he thinks that it stems from the Arabic translator Isḥaq ibn Ḥunain (Table 3b). Parts of the note he quoted contain the parts that are missing in the Hebrew main text: namely, the description of the meaning of the word ἐντελέχεια as “that which is in a thing when it ends” (ם� רשא� רבדב �י�יש �מ: ma še-yihye be-davar ka-ašer tam). After that, however, there is an additional follow-up explanation that does not exist in the Greek, which describes that the completion is what a thing has in the end and that this completion is the cause of action. The Greek phrase “it makes sense, then, that he offered this sort of the characterisation” is rendered as “Therefore, it is necessarily uttered in this way, and this is an expression that includes the definition and the description,” and the quotation ends by saying that “its” definition, which, according to context, should be the soul’s definition, is a first completion (Table 3b). The note that Samuel quotes is an explanatory passage that is missing from the Hebrew main text, but contains an additional explanation that is not found in the Greek. This constellation raises questions about the origin of this passage and the additional explanation within it. Bruns does not note that this passage is missing in his sources in his critical apparatus. Nevertheless, it remains an open question whether it was removed in the Arabic tradition or in the Greek tradition, and also, if it was removed in the Greek tradition, whether it was originally part of the main text or not. The same applies to the question of where the additional explanation comes from and how it entered the passage in question. This note, therefore, tells of a problem that might go back to the Greek tradition, and as such, it is also of interest to scholars of classics. 3.4. Note 3: Criticism of an argument In note 3, we find a note by Samuel that does not pertain to the translation. Rather, it contains a critical stance towards Alexander’s manner of argumentation. This passage is part of Alexander’s argument that forms cannot be bodily. After giving an argument as to why forms are not bodily according to his own conception of a body, he also argues that forms are not bodily according to the Stoic conception of a body, because according to the Stoics, qualities – and with that, forms – are bodies (12, p. 100n162). The overall claim for which Alexander wants to argue is that forms cannot be bodies (even according to the Stoics), and he does so by way of a reductio argument. According to the Stoic conception of a body, he says, a body is either matter Table 3a. The reference text for note 2 in Hebrew and Greek with English translation. Hebrew passage (13, ff. ב8–9א)English translation Greek passage (2, p. 16) English translation (12, p. 43) And it has already been explained that the form is a culmination for that of which it is a form. It is also in the habit of Aristotle to call the culmination entelechy in Greek. This completion is of two kinds. One of them is a disposition and potentiality, and the other is the actuality that [proceeds] from that potentiality. And the potentiality is the first completion of these two. [16.4–10] […] τὸ δὲ εἶδος, οὗ ἐστιν εἶδος, ἐδείχθη καὶ τελειότης ὄν, ἔθος δὲ Ἀριστοτέλει τὴν τελειότητα καὶ ἐντελέχειαν λέγειν, ῶς τοῦ ἐν τῷ τέλει εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐστιν οὖσαν αἰτίαν, εἰκότως αὐτῆς ἀπέδωκε τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον: ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη. Διττὴ γὰρ ἦν ἤ τελειότης, ἠ μὲν ἓξις τε καὶ δύναμις, ἡ δὲ ἀπο τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνέργεια, ὧν ἡ δύναμις ἦν πρώτη […]. […] and it has further been shown that the form is a culmination of that of which it is a form; and it is characteristic for Aristotle to say that the culmination is a completion, since it is responsible for the fact that the object to which it belongs is complete, it makes sense, then, that he offered this sort of characterisation: [the soul] is a “first completion.” For there are two kinds of culmination, (a) one which is a disposition and power and (b) another which is the activity issuing from that power, and of these the power is first […]. Page 7 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 or composed of matter. In the passage quoted in the table, he denies that form can be matter, because matter does not possess any quality, while form is, in a way, a quality (right half of Table 4a). After this passage, Alexander continues by giving several arguments that the form cannot be composed of matter and form either, thus concluding that the form cannot be bodily according to the Stoic definition of a body (2, 17.18–18.10). The Hebrew diverges from the Greek in two significant aspects. The first is that the enumeration of options as to what a body might be in the Greek text no longer applies to bodies, but to the form. In the phrase “whoever says that it is…” that precedes the enumeration, the “it” is a feminine pronoun (אי�שבב: be-še-hi’) and thus refers to “form” (�רו��: ṣurah) and not to “body” (םשגג: gešem), which is masculine (left half of Table 4a). The second difference is that simple bodies (טושפ םשגג: gešem pašuṭ) were added to this enumeration as a first option (left half of Table 4a). This addition can be explained by Alexander’s discussion that the soul cannot be a simple body, which follows his discussion of whether forms can be composed of matter and form (2, 19.21–20.26). Bruns’s critical apparatus for the Greek text does not mention this variant. However, it is possible either that the simple bodies were an original part of the enumeration, but are missing from the Greek manuscripts that survived – they might have been removed because simple bodies are themselves composed of matter and form and therefore seemed redundant – or that they were added in some manuscripts to make the list of options at the beginning correspond with all the discussed options of how a form (or the soul, which is a kind of form) could be a body. These two changes create a text stating that forms cannot be bodies, not even according to those who think that forms are either simple bodies or matter or composed of matter and form. So, while the conclusion of the argument is still the same – namely, that forms are not bodies – the reductio argument does not work as it does in the Greek text, because now, instead of enumerating what kinds of being count as a body, the Hebrew text enumerates what kinds of beings count as a form. In the passage in the table, Alexander rules out that forms are matter, and afterwards, he argues that forms are not composed of matter and form either (2, 17.17–19.20), nor are souls simple bodies (2, 19.21–20.26). So if, according to the Hebrew text, the Stoics claim that forms are either simple bodies or matter or composed of matter and form, and the only thing for which Alexander subsequently argues is that forms are neither, then the conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the Stoics had a wrong conception of form, not that forms are not bodies. Therefore, there is no explicit argument in the Hebrew text for the claim that forms are not bodies. Samuel addresses this problem in his note. He complains that while Alexander wants to argue against the claim that a form is a body, he ends up providing an argument that form is not matter (and later that form is not composed and that souls are not simple bodies), which only addresses the Stoic conception of form, not the claim that forms are not bodies. This discrepancy leaves Samuel demanding that Alexander close the gap with a proof for the original claim that the form is not a body. Furthermore, even if such a claim were self-explanatory, he suggests a different continuation of the sentence. In the main text, the sentence continues with “for form is not matter” (ילוי� �ניא �רו��ש �זוו: we-ze še-ha-ṣurah einah hiyuli). This phrasing suggests that the argument that forms are not Table 3b. Samuel’s note 2 in Hebrew and with English translation. Note 2 in Hebrew (13, f. ב8) English translation Samuel the translator said: I found one annotation here and I think that it is not part of the main text, and it is this: The meaning of this noun in Greek is “that which is in a thing when it ends,” meaning that in the end, this completion is what the thing has. That which is the completion for this thing is the cause for action. That which is the completion for this thing is the cause of action. Therefore, it is necessarily uttered in this way, and this is an expression that includes the definition and the description. And its definition is the first entelechy I said: I think that this annotation was [made] by Isḥaq ibn Ḥunayn, the first translator. Page 8 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 matter is part of the argument that forms are not bodies, which, as we have seen, does not work in the Hebrew text. Instead, Samuel suggests changing it to “and form is not matter” (ילוי� �ניא �רו��וו: we-ha-ṣurah einah hiyuli) (Table 4b). This phrasing detaches the argument that form is not matter from the claim that form is not a body and instead starts a new argument, thus doing justice to the altered context of the argument. 3.5. Note 7: Engagement with a textual variant The last note I will discuss is note 7, in which Samuel discusses a variant found in the margins. This variant belongs to a group of marginal notes containing variants that are marked with the Arabic letter nun. In his colophon, Samuel mentions that he found marginal notes in the Arabic manuscript from which he was working and that he did not always follow them, depending on whether the marginal note or the main text seemed more reliable to him (5, p. 318). Note 7 attests to this engagement with variants in the margins to which Samuel refers. The passage to which note 7 refers discusses the relationship between being nourished and growing. In the Greek passage, Alexander explains why nourishing and growing are not the same activity. Animals nourish themselves during their whole lives, which makes nourishment the most continuous (συνεχεστάτη: synechestatē) activity of the soul. Growing, on the other hand, is something animals only do for a certain period of their lives, since some start to shrink after reaching a certain age (right half of Table 5a). The Hebrew text contains the same kind of explanation. An animal is nourished as long as it “endures” (ראשנ דימת�ש �ממ: ma še-hitmid niš’ar), meaning as long as it exists. Therefore, as per the main text, it is “below” (�טמלל: le-maṭa) the activities of the soul. This notion diverges from the Greek, which describes this activity as “continuous.” The final part of the explanation concerns the contrast between growing and nourishing by saying that things will not always grow, even though they are nourished, because they are nourished as long as they exist, but things that are already decreasing, and thus no longer growing, still exist (left half of Table 5a). In his note, Samuel discusses a marginal note he found, writing that the “inner formulation” (תימינפ�� אחסנ��: ha-nusḥa’ ha-penimit), meaning the formulation in the main text, is correct and that he thinks that the “outer one” (�נו�ח��: ha-ḥiṣona), meaning the one in the margins, is wrong. The formulation this note addresses is “below the activities” in the main text and “without the activities” (תולועפ ידעלבב: bil‘adei pe‘ulot) in the margins. Samuel expresses his preference for nourishing being understood as an activity “below” the activities of the soul (Table 5b). The formulation in the margins heavily contradicts the Aristotelian definition of the soul as a life principle that enables living beings to perform the activities that are typical of living Table 4a. The reference text for note 3 in Hebrew and Greek with English translation. Hebrew passage (13, f. ב9)English translation Greek passage (2, p. 17) English translation (12, p. 44) And because of this, it [i.e., a form] is also not a body, since this is not possible; neither according to whoever says that it [i.e., the form] is a simple body, or matter, nor [a composite of] matter and form, as the followers of [the way of] darkness [i.e., the Stoics] It is not clear how exactly the Stoics became “followers of the way of darkness.” In Bruns’s edition, Steinschneider remarks that the Arabic term might have been Ahl al-ruwāq, which Samuel might not have understood (2, p. 17). Herbert A. Davidson, on the other hand, mentions that the Arabic translation of Alexander’s De Intellectu translates the Stoics as “members of the shaded area” (al-miẓalla) (22, pp. 297–80), which might serve as an alternative explanation for Samuel’s translation of Stoics as “followers of the way of darkness.” There is only one other occurrence of the Stoics in Alexander’s De Anima (2, 26.16), which Samuel translated in the same way as he did in this passage (13, f. 13r). thought, that the form is a body. For the form is not matter, because matter does not receive qualities, whereas the form is a certain quality. [17.15–18] Ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ κατὰ τοὺς λέγοντας πᾶν σῶμα ἢ ὕλην ἢ ἐξ ὕλης, εἶναι (ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς δοκεῖ) εἴη ἂν τὸ εἶδος σῶμα. Οὔτε γὰρ ὕλη τὸ εἶδος (ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄποιος, τὸ δὲ ποιότης τις) A form, furthermore, cannot be a body along the lines of those who claim, like the Stoics, that every body is either matter or composed from matter. For form is not matter, since the latter is qualityless, while the former is a kind of quality. Page 9 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 Yes Is the argument persuasive and supported by evidence? Yes If any, are all the source data and materials underlying the results available? Yes Does the research article contribute to the cultural, historical, social understanding of the field? Yes Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed. Reviewer Expertise: Linguistics of Premodern Hebrew (Syntax (synchronic and diachronic), Semantics, Discourse Analysis, Sociolinguistics and Applied Linguistics) as well as alterity and orality in Religious Translation. My research seeks to understand alterity (“otherness”) of ancient culture and to preserve it while representing it intelligibly for modern users. In my current research I utilise complexity theory to integrate seemingly disparate foci (pre-modern Hebrew linguistics and religious translation). I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above. Reviewer Report08 November 2025 https://doi.org/10.21956/openreseurope.22236.r62585 © 2025 Halper Y. This is an open access peer review report distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Yehuda Halper Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel This is an important contribution to an area of study that is until now almost entirely neglected. I refer to treating the marginalia of a translator as their own contribution to a study. The only work to do this has been Carlos Frankel's study of Samuel Ibn Tibbon's marginal notes (see note 9). Still, this is a very different work, since it is marginalia to a scientific text by a single author, Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles. There has been an important study of this thinker by Berman (see note 6), but this new study adds a great deal of nuance that is not present in the earlier study. There are three things that I would suggest for improvement. 1. The movement between the notes and the manuscripts is cumbersome. The folio listed is usually following Paris BNF 893, but not always (in the first one). The folio numbers of each Open Research Europe  Page 16 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025 manuscript in the edited note should be mentioned each time. 2. How do we know that these notes are all by Samuel ben Judah? Some of them are attributed to him in some (or all?) manuscripts. Note 1 is not attributed, though I could not find it in the manuscript. But these could be misattributions made at an earlier ms source. This should be addressed in detail and explained. Reference here should be made to Fraenkel's work, which notes the difficulty in attributing to Samuel Ibn Tibbon every marginal note conveyed in his name. 3. In 3.1.Note 1, the author notes that the Greekπρότερον comes into Hebrew as . It should be noted that in many medieval Hebrew scripts  is quite similar to  and that the latter may have been a reading earlier in the chain of transmission.  is, in fact, a fairly good translation of πρότερον. Is the work original in terms of material and argument? Yes Does it sufficiently engage with relevant methodologies and secondary literature on the topic? Yes Is the work clearly and cogently presented? Yes Is the argument persuasive and supported by evidence? Yes If any, are all the source data and materials underlying the results available? Yes Does the research article contribute to the cultural, historical, social understanding of the field? Yes Competing Interests: No competing interests were disclosed. Reviewer Expertise: Medieval Jewish and Islamic Philosophy. Transmission of Greek philosophy into Hebrew and Arabic. Medieval Hebrew manuscripts. I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard. Open Research Europe  Page 17 of 17 Open Research Europe 2025, 5:306 Last updated: 21 NOV 2025