Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? The National Identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its Citizens

ZOiS REPORT No. 4 / 2020 · September 2020 KAZAKH AND/OR KAZAKHSTANI? THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN AND ITS CITIZENS Beate Eschment in collaboration with Taissiya Sutormina ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 2 Content 02 ___ Summary 03 ___ Introduction 04 ___ Kazakh and Kazakhstani? — A chronological review 07 ___ Diverse assessments of an ambiguous concept 11 ___ Almaty residents’ identities — survey findings 14 ___ Kazakhs and other Kazakhstanis 17 ___ Conclusion 17 ___ Imprint Summary In the early 1990s, the leadership of the new Republic of Kazakhstan responded to the challenges posed by the state’s multiethnicity by adopting a dual approach, promoted from the top down, of ethnic Kazakh identity for the Kazakh population and, simultaneously, a civic Kazakhstani identity for all citizens irrespective of ethnicity. – This approach, which is strongly associated with the country’s First President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, is hailed by officialdom as a great success, with a unified nation of Kazakhstanis deemed to have been achieved in 2015. However, some more critical observers and academics point to an ongoing relationship of tension between the two forms of identity and between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs in the real world. – The results of a ZOiS survey conducted among Almaty’s multiethnic population in autumn 2019 show a strong predominance of ethnic self-identification among respondents for the first time; however, civic Kazakhstani identity also resonates so strongly that it is appropriate to refer to the population’s “multiple identity”. – However, several social and political factors indicate that there are multiple interpretations of the term “Kazakhstani” as well, with considerable differences between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs here. For the Kazakh majority, the terms “Kazakh” and “Kazakhstani” are largely synonymous; as they see it, there is no (longer a) special role for their non-Kazakh fellow citizens. It ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 3 is precisely for this reason that non-Kazakhs attach importance to their Kazakhstani identity as a form of protection against assimilation or exclusion. – First President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s legacy to his successor KassymZhomart Tokaev, then, is not a united nation of Kazakhstanis but a Kazakhdominated country in which many small ethnic groups fear for their survival. It remains to be seen which course Tokaev will pursue in relation to nationalities policy. Introduction “A Kazakh or Kazakhstani nation? This has been an unresolved dilemma for the past 25 years.”1 Underlying this observation by a Kazakh political scientist is a further question: does the multiethnic Republic of Kazakhstan view itself in ethnic terms as the state of the Kazakh people, and / or in civic terms as a state of all citizens irrespective of ethnicity — or both simultaneously, as Nursultan Nazarbaev’s government decreed in the early 1990s? And was this dual approach successful? The answer to this latter question continues to be significant for predicting Kazakhstan’s internal stability. Above all, it is a benchmark for assessing the success of the nationalities policy pursued by the First President until he stepped down on 19 March 2019. The conceptual development and implementation of this dual approach coincide with his time in office and reflect his own strong and active commitment to this ideal, particularly in the 1990s. For Kazakhstan’s officialdom, the success of Nazarbaev’s policy is beyond question: the multiethnic population’s achievement of unity as a single nation of Kazakhstanis was proclaimed in 2015. However, critical voices in Kazakhstan, as well as international human rights experts and academics, have been warning for some time about the Kazakhisation of the country or dispute the popular acceptance of a dual identity that was imposed from the top down. A ZOiS survey conducted from 26 September to 26 October 2019 by Obshchestvennoe Mnenie (‘Public Opinion’ Research Institute) among 1,500 residents (Kazakhs, Russians and members of five smaller ethnic groups) of Almaty shows that contrary to previous assertions, the large majority of respondents have a very strong sense of ethnic identity but also self-identify to a high degree in civic terms, i.e. they have a multiple national identity. 1 Talgat Ismagambetov, Natsstroitel’stvo v Kazakhstane: mezhdu kazakhstanskim narodom i natsiei, CA-portal.ru, 14.6.2018, http://www.ca-portal.ru/article:43289. All Internet sources accessed 17.6.2020. ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 4 This finding appears to confirm the success of the government’s dual approach. However, if it is analysed in relation to its domestic and social context, the conclusion to be drawn is that there are considerable differences between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs as regards their interpretation of the term “Kazakhstani”. For Kazakhs, it is obviously synonymous with “Kazakh”. The non-Kazakh population, by contrast, has embraced the notion of “Kazakhstani” precisely because it appears to offer some protection against burgeoning Kazakhisation. Unity thus exists in name alone; the reality suggests that there is reason to be concerned about growing Kazakhisation. Kazakh and Kazakhstani? — A chronological review When it gained its independence in December 1991, Kazakhstan was a multinational state inhabited by approximately 130 ethnic groups — and so it has remained, despite significant quantitative shifts in the meantime. In addition to the eponymous Kazakhs, Kazakhstan was (and is) home to a substantial Russian population — the second largest group — as well as other ethnic groups which migrated to Kazakhstan during the Tsarist or Soviet era, such as Tatars and Ukrainians, or which were deported to Kazakhstan by Stalin (Germans, Poles, Koreans and others). There is considerable variation in the urban-rural and countrywide distribution and population concentration of these groups, as well as striking differences in their socioeconomic status. Due to this configuration, the leadership of the newly independent state — whose members were all Soviet-era politicians, ethnically Kazakh but mainly Russian-speaking — under President Nursultan Nazarbaev faced particular challenges in relation to nation-building, and associated with it, the preservation of internal stability and legitimation of their own rule. What status should be conferred on Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs in the young republic? There was a broad spectrum of opinion at first; on the one hand, there were calls from Kazakh nationalists for a Kazakh-speaking state of the Kazakhs in which non-Kazakhs would at best be granted citizenship and otherwise merely be tolerated; on the other, there was the concept of a multinational state in which Kazakhs and all other nationalities would live together on the basis of equality. The leadership in the mid-1990s opted for a dual approach with a profoundly Soviet imprint. Even the terminology used — Kazakh / Kazakhstani — originated in the Soviet era; above all, the notion of ethnicity as a stable, objective factor was a component of Soviet ideology. The Republic of Kazakhstan was to be the homeland of Kazakhs and Kazakhstanis alike — in other words, of all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity. This dual approach to identity was enshrined in numerous documents over the past 30 years or so, as well as in speeches by Kazakhstani politicians, on posters and of course in practical policy measures. However, there was never any clear definition or demarcation of the two concepts. In speeches, government programmes and documents, Kazakh or Kazakhstani identity was emphasised, downplayed or modified as the need arose, depending on the language, audience and context. This makes the task of concisely summarising the two concepts ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 5 more challenging. Looking back over almost 30 years, however, an overall trend can be discerned. Kazakh identity is understood as monoethnic, primordial: the Republic of Kazakhstan was formed on indigenous Kazakh soil2 and for that reason, it is the ethnic heartland of the Kazakh people, who have no other country anywhere in the world. After decades of humiliation in the Soviet era, the Kazakhs’ own history and nomadic culture were to be rediscovered and enhanced in status. The Kazakh language became the state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Constitution, Art. 7,1), even though it was only spoken by a minority of the population in 1991. In parallel, a multiethnic civic, i.e. Kazakhstani identity was established, which was extended to all citizens, granting them equal constitutional rights and protecting them from discrimination (Constitution, Art. 14). The key phrase in the 1990s was: “Kazakhstan – our common home”. Indeed, multiethnicity was actively promoted, for like the Kazakhs, all other ethnic groups were meant to devote themselves, in (overtly non-political) local organisations to the rediscovery of their own history, culture and language within the framework of the common home. Their common language was Russian, which was granted special status under the Constitution (Art. 7,2). In order to promote the development and implementation of interethnic relations and also as a symbol of the “Kazakhstani” concept, the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (Assambleya Narodov Kazakhstana = ANK) was founded in 1995, consisting of representatives of all the country’s ethnic associations (EKOs)3 (1995: 28; 2020: 394) and with advisory rather than legislative powers. Until the early 2000s, the nationality issue played a major role in official policy and was closely connected with the person of Nazarbaev, who positioned himself as the guarantor of interethnic stability. In particular, the institutions associated with Kazakhstani identity (ANK and EKOs) are described as having been “an apple of the President’s eye”.4 With some justification, non-Kazakhs still regard the First President — even after his resignation in 2019 — as their protector. In 2002, it was then determined that the national cultures had reached a sufficiently advanced stage in their revival that it was no longer necessary to promote the rebirth of the individual ethnic groups. The focus shifted to the development of a shared Kazakhstani identity and Kazakhstani patriotism as the primary purpose of the ANK, with the Kazakh language and culture now assigned a central and unifying role for all the country’s citizens.5 Just five years later, as part of the 2007 constitutional reform, the ANK was granted constitutional status and the right to send nine of its elected 2 The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty 1995, Preamble, https://www. akorda.kz/en/official_documents/constitution. 3 The abbreviation “EKO” (Etno-kul’turnye Ob”edineniya, i.e. ethno-cultural associations) is used throughout this paper. Initially, however, the associations were termed “Natsional’nokul’turnye tsentry” (national culture centres). 4 Jorn Holm-Hansen, Territorial and ethno-cultural self-government in nation-building Kazakhstan, NIBR Report 1997:7, p. 64. 5 O Strategii Assamblei naroda Kazakhstana i Polozhenii ob Assamblee naroda Kazakhstana, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 1.5.2002. Non-Kazakhs still regard the First President as their protector. ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 6 representatives directly to Parliament; it was also renamed the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (not “peoples” as before) in an oblique reference to the unity of the population. However, the public — or at least those elements with an interest in politics — remained divided, evident in 2009 during the unveiling of the Doctrine of National Unity, whose development Nazarbaev had entrusted to the ANK. This draft was a profoundly Kazakhstani document which, while emphasising the special role of the Kazakh language, otherwise focused on the development of all the ethnic groups on the basis of equality. However, in 2010, following vocal protests by Kazakh nationalists, a document was adopted which no longer bore any resemblance to the draft; even the term “Kazakhstani” had disappeared. Instead, the role of the Kazakhs in the state was described as central, with the other ethnic groups to be clustered around the Kazakhs.6 In summer 2015, Nazarbaev then announced the end point, as it were, of the development. The country’s population, he said, no longer consisted of representatives of individual ethnic groups; now, a unified nation of Kazakhstanis with equal rights and a sense of identification with their state had emerged.7 Typical slogans in circulation since then are: “One people — one nation” and “Unity in diversity”. In previous years too, economic aspects (e. g. economic performance and competitiveness) rather than national issues in the narrower sense had increasingly been declared to be unifying factors for the Kazakhstani nation. Nationalities policy per se played an ever more subordinate role for Kazakhstan’s officialdom. Various programmes to promote unity and patriotism, such as Mangilik El (2016),8 emphasise the common history, culture and language of all people living in Kazakhstan and state that the cultural diversity of the people of Kazakhstan should be preserved. Yet at the same time, the message is one of a “unified nation” and the content is strongly Kazakh in orientation. Reports of events with potential to shake up the image of a unified Kazakhstani people, such as local interethnic conflicts, were suppressed — albeit with decreasing success in the age of the Internet and social media; likewise, “the term ‘Kazakhstani nation’ has been gradually downsized in the public discourse.”9 6 Doktrina natsional’nogo edinstva Kazakhstana, Proekt, Astana 2009, https://www.zakon. kz/152641-doktrina-nacionalnogo-edinstva.html; Doktrina natsional’nogo edinstva, (2010) https://assembly.kz/ank/Доктрина национального единства.pdf. 7 Prezident zayavil o tom, chto v strane sformirovalas’ kazakhstanskaya natsiya, https://kapital.kz/gosudarstvo/43192/prezident-zayavil-o-tom-chto-v-strane-sformirovalas-kazakhstanskaya-natsiya.html. 8 Patrioticheskiij akt Mangilik El, Pol’nyi tekst, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 26.4.2016, https:// www.kazpravda.kz/news/politika/patrioticheskii-akt--mangilik-el-polnii-tekst 9 Aziz Burkhanov, Multiculturalism and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan: Trends in Media Discourse, State Policy, and Popular Perceptions, The Muslim World 110(2019)1, pp. 24 – 39, here p. 33. In the Doctrine of National Unity, the role of the Kazakhs is central. ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 7 Diverse assessments of an ambiguous concept Increasingly, “Kazakhstani” has undoubtedly come to mean “Kazakh” over the years. Naturally, this shift was not only expressed in words. There are practical examples as well. In the 1990s, the narrative of the shared experience of suffering during the Soviet era (without any anti-Russian rhetoric in Kazakhstan) became a constituent element of civic identity, unifying almost all the country’s citizens. Kazakhs suffered terribly as a result of forced settlement and collectivisation (known as Dzhut in Kazakh). In addition, large numbers of non-Kazakhs from various ethnic groups were deported to Kazakhstan as victims of Stalinist oppression. These latter groups would tell, often unprompted, how Kazakhs — despite facing starvation themselves — had helped the new arrivals survive in the steppes in winter. Over the next 20 years, this evolved into a form of state-ordered gratitude. 2016 saw the introduction, at Nazarbayev’s initiative, of the Day of Gratitude, when non-Kazakhs “are supposed to praise Kazakh hospitality towards their ethnic groups”10. Nowadays, official representatives of the small ethnic groups take every opportunity to express their gratitude for the official nationalities policy as well. In 2018, a “Monument of the Oppressed Ethnic Groups’ Gratitude to the Kazakh People” (Qazaq eline myn algys) was erected in a new district of Astana. A new memorial to the Kazakh victims of the Dzhut is located several kilometres away in the old city centre. In other words, what was once the shared fate of Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs is nowadays commemorated separately in both thematic and visual terms. PICTURES 1 + 2 10 Ibid. Source: Beate Eschment Source: Beate Eschment PICTURE 2 Monument of the Oppressed Ethnic Groups’ Gratitude to the Kazakh People in Nur-Sultan PICTURE 1 Monument to the Kazakh Victims of the Dzhut in Nur-Sultan ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 8 Human rights campaigners and journalists have long been critical of Nazarbaev’s policy of Kazakhisation. In some cases, however, their criticism has focused on aspects which can be observed in other post-Soviet states as well and which are not overtly nationalist, such as the renaming of towns and streets, often a form of de-sovietisation.11 Kazakhstan has also become more Kazakh in terms of the composition of its population in recent years. As a result of emigration, not only of Russians but also of Germans and various other ethnic groups, the proportion of non-Kazakhs steadily declined in the 1990s, while the number of Kazakhs increased in absolute terms due to their higher birth rate and the state-sponsored “return” of the Kazakh diaspora. (To date, around one million oralman, i. e. returnees, have resettled in Kazakhstan.) These demographic changes were enough to shift the centre of gravity in favour of the Kazakhs. What’s more, as the returnees did not speak Russian, they were vocal in their demands for a stronger role for the Kazakh language. There is no doubt that in the last three decades, a form of state-sponsored Kazakhisation has occurred in relation to the use of the Kazakh language (and associated with it, employee recruitment, etc.). The majority of non-Kazakhs have presumably come to terms with the advance of Kazakh at the expense of Russian, and even the Russians are said to be showing more willingness to learn Kazakh.12 Kazakhisation in the sense of discrimination is perhaps most apparent in public service (government and administration, ministries, security forces) and politics, but is not statistically proven.13 However, many non-Kazakhs have found their niche in business; to the extent that some are visibly more affluent than Kazakhs, this sometimes even has the potential to trigger conflicts. TABLE 1 Aside from apologist tributes from Kazakhstani academics close to the government, assessments of the dual approach to Kazakh / Kazakhstani identity (and, indeed, Nursultan Nazarbaev’s nationalities policy as a whole) are surprisingly diverse and do not fit into a “Western criticism / plaudits from the post-Soviet world” schematic. Some Western academics, for example, underline the difficulties faced by the leadership in the early days and view the ambiguity of the two identities positively on the grounds that it placates Kazakh and Russian nationalists and ultimately preserves a balance of interests.14 However, like the author cited at the start of this paper, most academic studies of the development of national identity among Kazakhstan’s citizens posit a negative relationship of tension between the Kazakh and the 11 See, for example, Mehmet Volkan Kasikci, The Soviet and the Post-Soviet: Street Names and National Discourse in Almaty, Europe-Asia-Studies 71(2019)8, pp. 1345 – 1366. 12 Yves-Marie Davenel, Eunsil Yim, Minority Assimilation and Nation-Building in Kazakhstan, Nation-Building and Identity in the Post-Soviet Space: New Tools and Approaches, Rico Isaacs, Abel Polese (eds.), London NY 2016, pp. 48 – 64, here p. 49; Dina Sharipova, Aziz Burkhanov, Alma Alpeissova, The Determinants of Civic and Ethnic Nationalisms in Kazakhstan: Evidence from the Grass-Roots Level, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 23(2017)2, pp. 203 – 226, here pp. 214; 220. 13 Assertions of this kind are invariably based on empirical observations, as the nationality of ministers, MPs, etc. is not stated openly and recruitment processes are of course not public. In a non-democratic, paternalistic system such as today’s Kazakhstan, many Kazakhs are also disadvantaged. See Beate Eschment, Elitenrekrutierung in Kasachstan. Nationalität, Klan, Region, Generation, Osteuropa 57(2007)8 – 9, pp. 175 – 194. 14 For example, Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Rob Kevlihan, Threading a needle: Kazakhstan between civic and ethno-nationalist state-building, Nations and Nationalism 19(2013)2, pp. 337–356, here 350 f.; Alexander C. Diener, Imagining Kazakhstani-stan: Negotiations of Homeland and Titular Nationality, Kazakhstan in the Making: Legitimacy, Symbols, and Social Changes, Marlene Laruelle (ed.), Lanham 2016, pp. 131 – 154, here p. 132. Demographic changes shifted the centre of gravity in favour of the Kazakhs. ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 9 1989 2009 2013 2020 (1.1.) Absolute figure %Absolute figure %Absolute figure %Absolute figure % Total 16,222,324 100 16,009,597 100 16,909,776 100 18,631,779 100 Kazakhs 6,486,029 40.0 10,096,763 63.1 11,002,868 65.07 12,764,821 68.51 Russians 6,092,377 37.6 3,793,764 23.7 3,701,713 21.89 3,512,925 18.85 Uzbeks 330,417 2.0 456,997 2.9 507,509 3.0 605,137 3.25 Ukrainians 878,184 5.4 333,031 2.1 307,089 1.81 263,962 1.42 Uyghurs 181,155 1.1 224,713 1.4 242,119 1.43 274,509 1.47 Tatars 322,338 2.0 204,229 1.3 203,111 1.20 200,545 1.08 Germans 946,967 5.8 178,409 1.1 181,348 1.07 176,107 0.95 Koreans 101,336 0.6 100,385 0.6 104,406 0.62 108,551 0.58 Turks 49,219 0.3 97,015 0.6 103,049 0.61 113,421 0.61 Azerbaijanis 88,887 0.5 85,292 0.5 96,179 0.57 112,547 0.60 Belorussians 178,325 1.1 66,476 0.4 61,449 0.36 53,440 0.29 Dungans 29,785 0.2 51,944 0.3 59,898 0.35 74,409 0.40 Kurds 25,245 0.2 38,325 0.2 41,431 0.25 47,153 0.25 Tajiks 25,301 0.2 36,277 0.2 40,868 0.24 50,121 0.27 Poles 59,321 0.4 34,057 0.2 32,963 0.20 29,728 0.16 Chechens 49,007 0.3 31,431 0.2 31,974 0.19 33,507 0.18 Kyrgyzs 13,718 0.1 23,274 0.1 29,803 0.18 N / A N / A Bashkirs 41,060 0.3 17,263 0.1 17,006 0.10 16,674 0.09 Ingushs 19,523 0.1 15,120 0.1 15,607 0.10 N / A N / A Moldovans 32,352 0.2 14,245 0.1 14,083 0.08 N / A N / A Armenians 18,458 0.1 13,776 0.1 14,705 0.09 N / A N / A Others 253,320 1.3 96,811 0.8 100,598 0.59 194,222 1.04 Sources: Natsional’nyi sostav, veroispovedanie i vladeniya yazykami v Respublike Kazakhstan. Itogi Natsional’noi perepisi naseleniya 2009 goda v Respublike Kazakhstan, Astana 2010, https://stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=WC16200032705; Etnodemograficheskii Ezhegodnik Kazakhstana. Astana 2013, https://stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=ESTAT098189; Chislennost’ naseleniya Republiki Kazakhstan po otdelnym etnosam na nachalo 2020 g., https://www.stat.gov.kz/api/ getFile/?docId=ESTAT355258; author’s own calculations. TABLE 1 Development of the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan’s population ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 16 this assertion. A visual expression of this overt commitment to Kazakhstan could be observed, for example, at the Nauryz procession38 in Almaty in 2019: while the large majority of Kazakh participants, clad in elaborate costumes, followed behind the flag of the city of Almaty, the non-Kazakh participants, also in national dress, were the only ones who held a small flag of Kazakhstan in their hands. PICTURE 3 These observations suggest that within the united nation of Kazakhstanis, there are fracture lines which are not reflected in the survey results. One possible explanation is that the Kazakhs and representatives of small ethnic groups who were surveyed have very different motives for their expression of commitment to a Kazakhstani identity and / or attach different meanings to it. However, this aspect has not been explored in any of the surveys. The following thoughts are therefore largely hypothetical. For Kazakhs, there is growing convergence between their own identity as Kazakhs and the national identity of the state of Kazakhstan, whereas the above observations suggest that many non-Kazakhs self-identify as Kazakhstanis because — in stark contrast to the Kazakhs’ interpretation — they see the embracing of Kazakhstani identity as a way of protecting themselves from Kazakhisation, exclusion and / or assimilation. After all, in terms of the original concept, Kazakhstani identity was the roof under which they could develop and live their ethnic identity. This is borne out by the fact that among the ethnic groups surveyed, there is a close correlation between the relative strengths of the ethnic and the civic identity: anyone with a strong sense of ethnic identity is of course more likely to be worried about losing it. The original and deliberate ambiguity of the government’s approach, particularly its concept of Kazakhstani identity, has thus become self-sustaining and has produced worrying and unintended differences in interpretation within the populace as well. If this interpretation is correct, the findings of our survey give less cause for satisfaction from the government’s perspective; on the contrary, they may well be a cause for concern. It is not just that less internal unity exists than would initially appear. The hidden fears of non-Kazakhs (and the intermittent resurgence of conflicts) point to potential for unrest on the Kazakh side. The current economic downturn is likely to make matters worse. The core of the problem appears to lie in a seemingly illogical observation: the Kazakhs have obviously adopted the form of ethnic identity intended for them in the dual concept, while non-Kazakhs have identified and utilised the opportunities afforded by Kazakhstani identity. For genuine coexistence of the entire population, however, the Kazakhs would have had to identify a place for themselves in the originally postulated common home of all Kazakhstanis as well. Admittedly, they were initially assigned an integrating function and, later, even a central role in the nation-building process, but they never took on the role intended for them; instead, they regarded the ANK, for example, as merely representing the interests of non-Kazakhs and even considered that 38 The word “Nauryz” is of Persian origin and means “new day”. It is celebrated by Iranian and Turkic-speaking communities on the day of the vernal equinox to mark the beginning of spring. Hilda C. Eitzen, Nawriz in Kazakstan: scenarios of managing diversity, Ingvar Svanberg (ed.), Contemporary Kazaks: Cultural and Social Perspectives, Richmond 1999, pp. 73 – 102. Kazakhs and representatives of small ethnic groups might attach different meanings to a Kazakhstani identity. ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 17 it put them at a disadvantage.39 This clearly reflects an omission by policymakers, who need to take urgent action to protect non-Kazakhs here.40 Conclusion Our survey showed that the citizens of Kazakhstan self-identify both in civic terms as Kazakhstanis and as members of their ethnic group, in line with the leadership’s ambition. However, empirical observations and interviews suggest that Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs identify as Kazakhstanis for different and perhaps even conflicting reasons. As things stand, the question posed in the title of this report about the national identity of Kazakhstan’s citizens can be answered as follows: the overall trend is towards a Kazakh common home in which the non-Kazakh ethnic groups can (hopefully) keep a place for themselves. PICTURE 4 Despite official statements to the contrary, interethnic relations in Kazakhstan in the Nazarbaev era were not regulated conclusively and to everyone’s advantage, but require further policy monitoring, e. g. as regards the protection of minority rights, as well as further academic study, focusing, for example, on the status of individual ethnic groups, as along with qualitative interviews about their interpretation of the term “Kazakhstani”. It remains to be seen whether the forthcoming changes to nationalities policy under Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev will hold the line established by his predecessor and the architect of dual but ambiguous identity. His scope still appears to be limited, for as one of the numerous powers that Nazarbaev secured for himself for his retirement is his role as Chair of the ANK. 39 Formally, Kazakh ethnic associations may also join the ANK; however, no such groupings exist. At present, some prominent Kazakh individuals are members of the ANK. 40 This is also pointed out by Kazakhstani experts in private conversations. Source: Beate Eschment PICTURE 4 Model of the ethnic groups of Kazakhstan in the House of Friendship in Almaty Imprint Author Beate Eschment in collaboration with Taissiya Sutormina Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Beate Eschment “Kazakh and / or Kazakhstani? The national identity of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its citizens”, ZOiS Report 4 / 2020, (https://www.zois-berlin. de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_4_2020.pdf) ISSN 2512-7233 Translation from German: Hillary Crowe Layout Yuko Stier Cover image Denis Karpenkov / Alamy Stock Foto ZOiS Report 4 / 2020 Kazakh and/or Kazakhstani? 18