Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report

SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report Feridun Taşdan SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report Feridun Taşdan COPYRIGHT © 2022 by SETA SETA Publications 201 First Published in 2022 by SETA ISBN: 978-625-8322-11-8 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, without permission in writing from the publishers. The conclusions and recommendations of any SETA Foundation publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Layout: Sema Türk Bayazit Printed in Türkiye, Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., İstanbul SETA | FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Nenehatun Cd. No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TÜRKİYE Tel: +90 312.551 21 00 | Fax :+90 312.551 21 90 www.setav.org | [email protected] | @setavakfi SETA | Washington D.C. Office 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1106 Washington, D.C., 20036 USA Tel: 202-223-9885 | Fax: 202-223-6099 www.setadc.org | inf[email protected] | @setadc SETA | İstanbul Defterdar Mh. Savaklar Cd. Ayvansaray Kavşağı No: 41-43 Eyüp İstanbul TÜRKİYE Tel: +90 212 395 11 00 | Fax: +90 212 395 11 11 SETA | Berlin Kronenstraße 1, 10117 Berlin GERMANY [email protected] SETA | Bruxelles Avenue des Arts 6, 1000 Bruxelles BELGIUM Tel: +32 2 313 39 41 FERIDUN TAŞDAN Dr. Feridun Tasdan is a professor in the Department of Mathematics at Western Illinois University in the United States. In addition to his academic work on robust estimation methods, and generalized linear models, he also has been writing articles related to air defense systems and their operational concepts in several defense and aerospace journals in Türkiye Emerging Military Technologies Series is a SETA Project aims to shed light on the key aspects of new and developing key military technologies by elaborating on global trends and Türkiye’s capabilities. A part of the Project is sponsored by STM Savunma Teknolojileri, Mühendislik ve Ticaret A.Ş. SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report Feridun Taşdan Contents Introduction .07. A Survey of International Developments in EW Systems .11. Recent Developments of EW Technologies in Israel .15. A Special Case EW; Israel’s Cyber Warfare Application .16. The Recent Developments of EW Technologies in the U.S. .19. Russian Approach to EW Warfare .23. China’s EW Ambitions in the South China Sea .25. The EW Capabilities of Türkiye .29. A Review of the Turkish Defense Industry’s EW Productions Capabilities .30. Turkish Armed Forces Joint Military Operations in Syria .41. Current Trends: Digital Evolution of the EW Systems .45. Conclusion .47. Introduction A brief introduction to the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) could pave the way to explaining EW systems’ role in modern warfare. Not surprisingly, from cell phones to a simple TV remote control, many devices in our daily lives all use the EMS. What is the electromagnetic spectrum1? Basically, the EMS can be defined as electromagnetic waves that travel at the speed of light in certain frequency ranges and wavelengths. The full range of the EMS in frequency and wavelengths can be seen below in Figure 1.2 The top of the frequency and wavelength portion of the EMS belongs to gamma and X-rays, which are commonly used in medical fields (medical imaging) and nuclear physics due to the nature of their high energy photons and very small wavelengths (λ=10-10 cm). We see the EMS’s ultraviolet and infrared light portion right after the X-rays. This EMS is mostly invisible to the human eye but only in a small portion of this spectrum, the electromagnetic waves can be seen by humans and most animals. Infrared cameras (to detect the thermal image of objects) also work in this portion of the EM spectrum. The 1-300 GHz frequency (100 meter-0.5 mm wavelength) spectrum of the EMS field is mainly used by a wide range of radar systems that are mainly used for military applications, weather observations, and navigational aid purposes. The bottom of the EMS range is mostly used for radio communications and TV broadcasting purposes. 1 “The Electromagnetic Spectrum”, NASA, March 2013, https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/ emspectrum1.html 2 Christian Wolff, “Waves and Ranges”, Radartutorial.eu, https://www.radartutorial.eu/07.waves/ Waves%20and%20Frequency%20Ranges.en.html SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 08 . Figure 1: Electromagnetic Spectrum’s Frequency and Wavelength Scale Source: Britanica.com3 Most radar/communication systems work within the 1 to 40 GHz frequency band (100 meter-0.5 mm wavelengths), based on the design purpose of the radar. These radar systems use a narrow portion of the full EMS. For example, most long-range search radars use L (1-2 GHz, 30-15 cm wavelength) and S bands (2-4 GHz with a 15-7.5 cm wavelength), and most fire control radars use X, Ku, or Ka bands with the respective frequencies and wavelengths to optimize their performance against their intended targets. The range of radar bands and their frequency and wavelengths can be seen in Figure 2 below.4 So, electronic warfare (EW) is defined as any action or capability of using EMS to detect, deceive and disrupt the opponent’s weapon systems such as radars, communication systems, command control systems, data networks, or other digital infrastructures using EMS. Why do militaries around the world place particular importance on developing and fielding EW systems? The most obvious answer is to control the EMS to gain superiority on the battlefield to defeat the enemy. The second answer would be 3 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Electromagnetic Spectrum”,Britannica, https://www.britannica. com/science/electromagnetic-spectrum 4 Christian Wolff, “Waves and Ranges”, radartutorial.eu, https://www.radartutorial.eu/07.waves/ Waves%20and%20Frequency%20Ranges.en.html Recent Developments of EW Technologies in Israel Israel is the leading EW powerhouse in the Middle East and has been using EW systems extensively since the Yum Kippur War in 1973. Israel’s defense companies produce a wide range of EW systems used in all domains of the battlefield and have also exported these systems to foreign armies. Currently, Israel maintains a range of locally built fleets of Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) and ELINT/SIGINT/EW aircraft based on Gulfstream G550 business jets, which are code-named Shavit (ELINT/SIGINT) and Eitam (AEW&C aircraft). These special mission aircraft allow the IDF (Israeli Air Force-IAF) to conduct missions far from Israel and to support strike missions carried out by the Israeli Air Force in Syria and other classified locations. All IAF jets, including F-16Is and F-15Is, have locally built advanced EW self-protection suits or EW pods carried externally. The capabilities of these jets and special mission aircraft have been constantly demonstrated in strike missions over Syria and Lebanon. Many of these missions are highly classified, and not much information has been released about the status of the aircraft used in those missions; however, it is known that the IAF lost one F-16I on Feb. 5, 2018, due to Syrian air defenses. The IDF’s new F-35 Adir9 is also expected to have an indigenous or customized EW suite (AN/ ASQ-239 electronic warfare suite) to fit Israel’s requirements. In a recent news article10, it was revealed that Israel has recently introduced a new electronic warfare system called Scorpius, which is designed and produced 9 Mark Episkopos, “Israel’s F-35I Adir: The Most Dangerous Fighter on Earth?”, The National Interest, 8 January 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israel%E2%80%99s-f-35i-adir-most-dangerousfighter-earth-176008 10 Paul Iddon, “Israel Unveils ‘Revolutionary’ New Scorpius Electronic Warfare System”, Forbes, 11 December 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2021/11/11/israel-unveils-revolutionary-new-scorpius-electronic-warfare-system/?sh=72d7a0ff2fdd SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 16 . by Israel Aerospace Industries. The article states that Scorpius has capabilities that will revolutionize electronic warfare. Unlike older generation EW systems, Scorpius uses active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology to scan the airspace. It can also send narrowly targeted beams electronically formed at a specific wavelength and frequency in a specific direction against targets to disrupt hostile data communications, navigation systems, and radars without interfering with friendly forces. Before the innovation of such narrow beams, operators of EW systems only had two options. They could either aim a single narrow beam around the sky in search of a target, which is very difficult to do, or use a wider beam. While prior EW systems can neutralize specific targets, or perhaps a couple of targets, Scorpius can take out anything in the sky and engage multiple targets simultaneously. Basically, Scorpius uses a wide beam to scan for potential threats in all directions and narrow beams to target specific threats thanks to the combined use of AESA, Microwave Monolithic Integrated Circuit (MMIC), Digital Frequency Radio Memory (DFRM), and artificial intelligence/adaptive machine learning (AI/ AML) technologies used in the system design. Scorpius has land, air, and naval applications based on the operational needs of the military. Figure 5: Scorpius-G System from IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries) A Special Case EW; Israel’s Cyber Warfare Application Cyberattacks are a common phenomenon in today’s highly networked business and internet environments. Attackers usually infiltrate the computer system of Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 17 . a company and then hack it or plant a virus to damage the computer systems or collect secret data or even ask for ransom money. Something similar to these real-life cyberattacks could be performed by the newer EW technologies. A landbased EW system or Stand Off Jammer/SIGINT aircraft will be fielding cyberattack technologies that will allow it to hack or plant malware (virus) into the enemy’s command and control networks. In fact, open-source information provided by some researchers11 suggests that IAF’s Operation Orchard against a Syrian nuclear installation, near the Syrian city of Deir el-Zour in 2007, was largely attributed to a cyberattack carried out by the IDF’s EW platforms that supported the strike mission and blinded the Syrian radar networks. According to U.S. aerospace industry experts and retired military officials, the Israelis utilized a technology similar to the U.S.-developed “Suter” airborne network attack system, developed by BAE Systems and integrated into U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle operations by L-3 Communications. Israel has long been adept at using unmanned systems to provoke and spoof Syrian surface-toair missile (SAM) systems, as far back as the Beqaa Valley engagements in 1982. Even though the details of IDF’s operation are still unknown, either employment of cyberattack or effective jamming (the DRFM method could result in a similar outcome) would be among the possibilities. 11 Fulghum & Barrie, “Israel Used Electronic Attack in Air Strike Against Syrian Mystery Target”, ABC News, 8 October 2007. The Recent Developments of EW Technologies in the U.S. The first paragraph of the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2020 Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy Document12 starts with the following statement, which indicates the importance of controlling the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) from the U.S. perspective: “The Nation has entered an age of warfighting wherein U.S. dominance in air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is challenged by peer and near peer adversaries. These challenges have exposed the cross-cutting reliance of U.S. Forces on the EMS, and are driving a change in how the DoD approaches activities in the EMS to maintain an all-domain advantage. The core of the U.S. Navy’s EW capability relies on the EF-18G Growler, which became the standard EW aircraft of the U.S. Navy after retiring EA-6A Intruder electronic warfare aircraft in the early 1990s. EF-18G is purpose-built for EW missions and it is the derivative of the U.S. Navy’s two-seat F/A-18F strike fighter. The Growler carries several EW pods for self-defense or offensive purposes. Its main mission is about escorting carrier strike packages against enemy air defenses or providing EW protection against enemy interceptors by jamming them from a long distance. The current EW pod ALX-99 is an older generation EW pod, but the U.S. Navy is in the process of accepting the ALQ-249 NGJ (Next Generation Jammer).13 12 “Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 2020. 13 Tingley & Rogoway, “Navy’s New Jamming Pods For EA-18G Growler Eyed for Air Force Fighters”, The Drive, 28 July 2021, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/41727/navys-new-jamming-pods-for-ea18g-growler-eyed-for-air-force-fighters SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 20 . According to Raytheon, who developed the ALQ-249 NGJ, it can offensively reject, disrupt, and degrade hostile threats such as air defense systems and communications equipment. It also uses the latest digital, software-based, and Active Electronic Scan Array (AESA) technology to engage multiple targets over longer distances. The ALQ-249 NGJ can attack multiple targets at the same time and has a modular architecture that allows it to be quickly upgraded and expanded to a variety of missions and platforms. The ALQ-249 NGJ has at least three versions with low band, medium band, and high band capabilities incorporated in each pod. The EF-18G can carry two pods in one mission depending on the threat radar’s expectations to have full coverage for multiple band jamming (UHF/VHF to S, L, X bands). Surprisingly, the USAF lost its escort/stand-off EW jamming capability after retiring the EF-111A Raven in 1998 and is currently operating the EH-130H Compass Call EW aircraft, which is designed for electronic signal intelligence (ELINT) and communications jamming from a long distance by listening and jamming radio communications (UHF/VHF/FM bands) and cell phones, if necessary. The USAF’s current EW capability relies on the self-defense pods, such as the AL-131C, carried by F-15s and F-16s. The fifth-generation F-22s and F-35s have builtin, integrated, highly advanced EW suites like the AN/ALR-9414 and AN/ASQ23915, respectively. The AN/ASQ-239 EW suit in F-35 provides comprehensive broadband protection against new-generation radar threats and also suppresses enemy radars via active jamming and DRFM capability. Its ability to operate in dense threat environments protects F-35s from radar or infrared seeker-guided missiles. Moreover, the platform-level design improves reliability and maintainability and also optimizes long-term life cycle costs. The F-35’s AN/ASQ-239 EW system is also integrated with the Electro-Optical Targeting Sensor (EOTS) to have full (360-degree) self-defense EW coverage and also active electronic attack (EA/ECM) capabilities using the APG-81 AESA radar as part of the AN/ASQ-239 EW system. Even though the APG-81’s main role is to detect air and ground targets (SAR/GMTI modes), it can also be used as a jammer as part of the integrated AN/ASQ-239 EW system. This capability gives F-35s a highly effective and long-range EW performance. 14 “AN/ALR-94 F-22 Electronic Warfare System”, BAE Systems, https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/ product/an-alr-94 15 Ibid. Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 21 . In a recent development, in the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) press release issued on July 28, 2021, the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces announced a proposal to include a provision in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)16 that would require an assessment of Air Force airborne electronic attack capabilities and the feasibility of integrating the ALQ-249 Next Generation Jammer on Air Force tactical aircraft. This statement came as a surprise but considering the USAF’s lack of an escort jammer platform, it would make sense to integrate the ALQ-249 Next Generation Jammer with F-15EX. The USAF is tailoring F-15EX to support future air campaigns to carry heavier bombs and air-to-air missiles in support of fifth-generation F-22s and F-35s. Integrating ALQ-249 NGJ pods on F-15EX will provide escort jamming/stand-off jamming capability. The figure below depicts the USAF’s future jamming capability using several platforms. Figure 6: A Joint EW Application Concept Using Several Aircraft; while the EA/18G and EC-130H provide stand-off jamming, F-35s and F-22s can provide EW capability in the close range alongside miniature decoy jammers. Source: https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/wholl-fix-ew-task-force-gropes-for-answers/ There are published articles discussing the possibility of the ALQ-249 NGJ having artificial intelligence/adaptive machine learning (AI/AML) and cyberattack capability to complement the EW attack capabilities of the EF-18G Growler as well as performing SEAD/DEAD missions (using AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles), which would be giving the U.S. Navy three different mission profiles: jamming threat radars, SEAD/DEAD missions, and hacking enemy radar networks. With the 2022 NDAA bill, the USAF could be getting similar capabilities using the F-15EX as a 4.5th gen. platform. 16 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, U.S. Congress, 2021, https://www.congress. gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1605/text SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 22 . Another recent example of using artificial intelligence (AI)/adaptive machine learning (AML) technology on an EW system is called the Angry Kitten EW pod, which is being integrated on USAF F-16s. The Angry Kitten EW pod uses adaptive machine-learning software and chooses the “optimal jamming technique from available options in the library” during an EW attack and finds the best possible jamming technique. One of the Angry Kitten EW pod developers, research engineer Stan Sutphin17, states they are currently developing fully adaptive and autonomous capabilities that are not available in legacy jammers. With a cognitive electronic warfare approach, based on machine learning algorithms and advanced hardware, they are confident that the Angry Kitten EW system can provide significantly higher levels of electronic attack and protection capabilities and enhance the security of U.S. fighters. Similarly, the USAF’s traditional tactical aircraft EW pod ALQ-131 has been upgraded with new EW technologies. The new pod has been designated as ALQ131C18 and incorporates fully digital DRFM, highly sensitive wideband receivers, and coherent and/or non-coherent jamming techniques. Mostly USAF and Allied F-16s will benefit from this capability since the ALQ-131C is carried on the center pylon of the F-16s. 17 Inder Singh Bisht, “USAF Tests ‘Angry Kitten’ Electronic Warfare Pod on F-16”, The Defense Post, 10 November 2021, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2021/11/10/usaf-tests-electronic-warfare-pod/ 18 Revolutionized through digital technology, The Northtop Grumman, https://www.northropgrumman. com/what-we-do/air/an-alq-131v-electronic-countermeasures-ecm-pod/ Russian Approach to EW Warfare The electronic warfare (EW) capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces have been one of the prioritized areas of military modernization over the past decade for Russia. The domestic defense industry has continuously supplied the Russian Armed Forces with improved versions of a number of modern EW systems including Krasukha-4, which is a land-based, highly effective, modern EW system, and Borisoglebsk-2, which is designed to jam mobile satellite communications and radio-navigational units. The Washington-based Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) published a report19 indicating that four Russian EW systems were identified as the wellknown Krasukha-4 at the Khmeimim airbase, the R-330Zh Zhitel jamming station deployed at Aleppo airport, Samarkand and Rosevnik-AERO electronic warfare systems. The main purpose of these EW systems was to jam or degrade any threats that are aimed at Russian airbases in Syria. Russia paid special attention to jamming Global Positioning System (GPS) signals to make them unavailable in the vicinity of the Russian operational areas. One of the reasons is to prevent swarming drone attacks that took place against Russian forces by the Syrian opposition forces several times in the past years. GPS spoofing is another technique used by the Russian forces. GPS spoofing is basically done by creating false positioning information for adversary aircraft or GPS-guided missiles. The fake GPS signals are broadcasted on the same frequencies used by the U.S. GPS satellites to prevent receivers from locking on to the real GPS signals. Once Russia’s fake GPS signal is locked on instead of the real GPS signal, the EW system begins to transmit false positioning, navigation, 19 Above Us Only Stars, (C4ADS Rapor, 26 March 2019). SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 24 . and timing (PNT) data to give false location information, therefore, causing the adversary aircraft or missiles to miss their intended targets. One of the well-written reports about the Russian EW capabilities can be accessed from the Georgetown Security Studies Review based in Washington, D.C. The report20 states that the Russian forces modernized their EW capability in recent years and most importantly Russian operators have gained considerable EW experience in Ukraine and Syria in real-time war conditions. The report further argues that although the U.S. continues to possess military superiority in conventional weapons, Moscow now possesses a critical asymmetrical advantage that seeks to bridge this gap. In an age of renewed competition with Russia, the U.S. will need to increase its proficiency in EW missions or risk falling behind. This conclusion has also been supported by U.S. military officials on several occasions. 20 Madison Creery, “The Russian Edge in Electronic Warfare”, Georgetown Security Studies Review, 26 June 2019, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2019/06/26/the-russian-edge-in-electronic-warfare/ Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 31 . Meanwhile, the ISTIF Class Frigates (the first ship of its class will be commissioned in 2023) will be integrated with the AREAS 2NC Radar EA/ECM System and a pair of sub-band and high-band TX antennas (jamming heads/steerable transmitter units). Aselsan also developed the ARES-2SC ESM System to meet the requirements for the radar electronic support measure system to be used in Turkish Navy submarines. In the first phase, the system was integrated into two AY Class (Type 209/1200) Submarines (the TCG Doganay and TCG Dolunay) in 2013, and the ARES-2NS model of the system was selected for the REIS Class Type 214TN submarines. The ARES-2SC performs functions such as detection, identification, classification, and display (in the suitable format), automatic and manual recording, and replaying capabilities toward radar systems broadcasting in the 2-18 GHz band along with radars that have a low probability of detection. The system, with 360 degrees of horizontal azimuth coverage, has a compact antenna resistant to high pressure, high technology broadband digital microwave receivers, and high data processing capability. To reduce the acoustic signature, a liquid cooling system is used in the ARES-2SC, which meets the MIL-STD-810F environmental and MIL-STD-461E electromagnetic induction/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC) standards. The pressure-tight compact antenna structures, the high-tech wideband digital microwave receiver, and sophisticated design enable the ARES-2SC to perform ESM missions reliably and successfully within a short reaction time. While the ARES-2SC with the single balcony compact antenna and wide-band microwave receiver structure for AY Class Submarines and ARES-2NS Radar ESM Systems with the twin balcony antenna structure for Type 214TN REIS Class Submarines are currently available, the ARES-2NCL ESM System (2-18 GHz) with the single balcony compact antenna structure and combining both Radar Warning and ESM antennas for the FPBs has also been developed. Aselsan also exported “ARES-2NCL Extended” RESM Systems to the Pakistan Navy. They are believed to be mounted/or already mounted on two platforms in the inventory of the Pakistan Navy. Moreover, Aselsan also delivers the ARES-2SC/P RESM System under the Pakistan Navy Agosta 90B MLU Project which is carried out by STM, the main contractor of the project. For the land application, the ARES-2 Series Radar Electronic Support Measures (ESM) System of Aselsan will be integrated into the Naval Forces Command (TNFC) Long Horizon Maritime Surveillance System, which plays a critical role in SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 32 . protecting Türkiye’s interests in the surrounding seas. The Long Horizon System was put into use in the Aegean Sea under Phase I of the project, then extended to cover the Eastern Mediterranean with two additional Suricate Mk2 Surface and Air/Coastal surveillance radars. A total of five Suricate Mk2 Radars supplied within the scope of the Long Horizon System were deployed at the related sites established in Gökçeada, Bozdağ, Kuşadası, Kaş, and Kantara (TRNC). Moreover, three units of DR3000S Radar Electronic Support Measure (ESM) Systems from Thales were supplied in Phase I. To provide the active jamming capability for the Turkish Navy, the state-of-theart AREAS-2N Radar EA/ECM System, which features AESA arrays that can generate RF energy (electronic attack waveform) in a very tight beam format (pencil beam) to attack the RF systems threatening the ship, has been developed by Aselsan. Since the system can move and steer beams within microseconds and can put multiple beams out simultaneously, the AREAS-2N can engage multiple targets/threats at the same time. According to Aselsan, the AREAS-2C Radar EA System covers 8-18 GHz frequencies (but is extendable to various frequency coverages) and is capable of applying both Coherent and Non-Coherent jamming techniques, and it has similar and even better capabilities than the Scorpion II Radar EA System. Therefore, having two independent jamming antennas/steerable RF transmitter units, and employing the DRFM technology, AREAS-2NC is claimed to jam/degrade up to 16 simultaneous RF emitters. The LHD ANADOLU, amphibious assault ship, will be fitted with a comprehensive integrated ESM and ECM suite including Aselsan’s ARES-2N(V)2 ESM and new generation AREAS-2N Radar EA/ECM Systems. Featuring both wide and narrow band digital receivers, Digital RF Memory (DRFM, for modern coherent threats), and solid-state power amplifiers, the AREAS-2N will include a total of four AESA antennas (each covers a 90-degree field of view and incorporates over 1,000 T/R modules) of which two of them will be deployed on the port and the remaining two on the starboard side of the ships. Thanks to its directional RF radiation capability, which enables deceptive and noise jamming techniques in a dynamic threat environment, the AREAS-2N Radar EA/ECM System can jam/deceive up to 32 threats. Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 33 . Developed by TÜBİTAK MAM Materials Institute, the MAM-TFDLS26 is a ship-deployed anti-missile floating decoy system that will be able to seduce, distract, or confuse approaching RF-guided missiles. It complements other active and passive soft-kill and hard-kill countermeasures on board the ship. Floating decoys are used as off-board passive targets against RF-based threats (radar-guided missiles, surveillance and fire control radars, etc.) as part of electronic countermeasures (ECM), especially as part of the naval electronic warfare concept. One of the Turkish Navy’s most secretive projects is the TCG UFUK ship, which was commissioned in November 2021 and entered into service in January 2022. It is designed to provide stand-off ESM/SIGINT and possibly EA/ECM capabilities to the Turkish Navy. Even though not much technical information was released about the EW systems used on board the TCG UFUK, we can anticipate that all available EW capabilities of the Turkish defense industry, mainly Aselsan, were incorporated on the ship. With the commissioning of the TCG UFUK, the Turkish Navy can monitor warship activities around Türkiye’s coastlines and gather RF signals (including communications and wide range radar bands), emitted by the hostile warships from long distances. We can anticipate that the TCG UFUK has advanced (and also powerful) versions of Aselsan’s ARES-2 ESM/EA systems integrated with the ship’s combat management system. One of the futuristic projects of the Turkish Navy is called the NAZAR Project27 which is carried out by METEKSAN Defense and ALTINAY within the scope of the Turkish Navy’s requirements. NAZAR is a Directed Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM or Laser Electronic Attack System) System that uses a low power (power requirement is less than 10 kW) laser system designed to blind adversarial electro-optical and infrared sensors by projecting a dazzler laser beam at them. The NAZAR Naval System was planned to be used in TF-2000 Destroyers. After the production is completed, this system is expected to be installed on the LHD Anadolu for testing purposes. The Lite version will operate in several wavelengths (depending on customer decision) and will be lighter, so it can be installed on smaller surface platforms such as fast attack crafts, corvettes, or frigates. Thanks to its longer engagement range compared to existing CIWS, the NAZAR system can also be effectively used in simultaneous, salvo, or swarm 26 “TÜBİTAK MAM at IDEF”, TÜBİTAK MAM, 24 August 2021, https://mam.tubitak.gov.tr/en/haber/tubitak-mam-idef 27 Interview, “NAZAR Projenin Başından İtibaren TF-2000 İçin Uygun Bir Elektronik Karşı Tedbir Sistemi olarak Düşünüldü!”, Defence Türkiye, Issue: 110, (October 2021). SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 34 . attack scenarios. It can quickly deal with multiple threats by engaging in succession. After blinding the first threat, it can immediately engage the second. Airborne EW Systems of the Turkish Air Force The Turkish Air Force also operates several special mission aircrafts such as the E-7T AEW, CN235M SIGINT/ELINT, and C160D MILKAR. These aircraft are equipped with special electronic warfare and signal intelligence hardware and pods. The TURAF received delivery of four Boeing E-7T AEW platforms between 2015 and 2017. The E-7T operates Northrop’s MESA L-band AESA radar and is integrated with Elta’s ESM/ELINT system. The L-band AESA radar provides a 400 km+ detection range against fighter-type aircraft, while its ESM/ELINT system can detect, classify and geolocate RF emitters from long distances. With this capability, the TURAF can actively or passively detect air targets, naval warships, and land-based air defense systems from long distances. The E-7T can automatically share this intelligence information with joint command centers and aircraft nearby via encrypted datalinks such as Link-16. The TURAF also operates at least three CN-235 ELINT/SIGINT (named Goren-1) special mission aircraft with Aselsan-made MILSIS-II signal intelligence pods. CN-235 ELINT/SIGINT aircraft operate near the battlefield or enemy’s positions to collect communications or radar frequency signals and classifies them according to their types and roles on the battlefield. The signal information is later analyzed and decrypted for later use. For example, if an enemy introduced a new type of radar on the battlefield, the Goren-1 aircraft can detect this new radar’s RF signal and operational modes. Then this information is used to develop countermeasure algorithms to jam or for deception purposes as well as to update the threat library of the friendly aircraft’s EW systems. The TURAF’s C-160 MILKAR-2U EA/ECM aircraft supports air operations by jamming/confusing early warning or air defense radars of the enemy forces. With this capability, the TURAF can jam or degrade enemy air defense radars’ effective ranges and reduce the likelihood of interceptions by the land-based air defense systems. In the near future, C-160 MILKAR-2U EW platforms will be replaced by Stand of Jamming Air Craft (SOJ). At the tactical level, TURAF F-16s and F-4E/2020 fighter aircraft are integrated with self-protection EW suits. All Block-30/40 F-16s (under the Peace Onyx-I Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 35 . project) have been internally installed and integrated with full ALQ-178V3 EW suits that provide radar warning, jamming, and countermeasure dispensers for flare and chaff. 60+ F-16C Block-50s (Under Peace Oynx-II) were more recently integrated with more advanced ALQ-178V5+ with added low band jamming and DFRM capabilities. The last 30 F-16 Block-50+ (Under Peace Oynx-IV) are installed with Harris ALQ-211 V4 internal EW suits. In most recent years, the TURAF also decided to purchase 21+19 Harris ALQ-211 V9 EW pods to equip F-16Ds (two seated) that were not installed with any EW suits due to smaller internal volumes of D versions. Most internally mounted EW suites require enough volume inside the airframe to install EW hardware, LRUs, wiring harnesses, antennas, etc. As a side note, F-16Ds have 13% less internal fuel capacity compared to a single-seat F-16C for the same reason because the second seat in the airframe reduces the availability of internal space. With the acquisition of the ALQ211 V9 pods from the U.S., F-16Ds can now be used in the frontline missions such as Escort, CAP or BARCAP, etc. The Turkish F-4E/2020 operates with ALQ-178 V3 RWR suits (similar to the F-16s ALQ-178V3), but EA/ECM capability was added with Elta EL/L-82225 ECM pods during F-4E Phantom modernization in the early 2000s. The TURAF also obtained the in-house software upgrade and threat library upgrade capabilities of the EL/L-8225 pods. To complement or replace foreign-made EW pods, the EHPOD28 (Electronic Warfare Pod) project has been initiated for tactical aircraft in the inventory of the TURAF and it is in the final stages of its testing activities. The EHPOD project is a new generation electronic jamming pod that will be capable of smart jamming through its internal Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology. It will use the outer geometry of the F-16’s 300-gallon centerline fuel tank. This pod will be capable of analyzing and geolocating RF emitters, and performing DRFM jamming, deception, and noise jamming. With its broadband, narrow and wideband RWR (Radar Warning Receiver) frequency band coverage, highly accurate geolocation capability, DRFM-based broad beam jamming, and deception/ noise jamming capability are optimized according to its design criteria set by the TURAF. Its high RF power output, multiple engagement capability, and high-performance heating/cooling system (Environmental Conditioning System [ECS]) enable the system to operate in all flight profiles as required by the TURAF. 28 İbrahim Sünnetçi, “Status Report: EHPOD & EDPOD Projects”, Defence Türkiye, Issue: 99, (June 2020). SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 36 . Obviously, the TURAF has already invested heavily in obtaining self-protection EW suits for all tactical fighter aircraft. Most importantly, the TURAF has obtained the capability to upgrade the threat library of these mentioned self-protection systems. Whenever a new RF threat is introduced into the battlefield, Türkiye’s ELINT/SIGINT platforms can detect these new RF emitters’ EM signals and decrypt them to classify the systems and their operational modes. When necessary, new jamming algorithms can be developed and tested before integrating into the fighter aircraft. One of TURAF’s most interesting and powerful EW systems is called KORAL29, which is a land-based, full-spectrum radar electronic warfare system designed and produced by the Turkish EW powerhouse Aselsan. It became operational in 2015 and saw its first operation in Syria against a wide range of air defense systems, including the Russian S-400 or Syrian air defense systems. The system’s architecture is based on the operational needs of the TURAF. The KORAL system consists of two 8x8 military trucks, each carrying Electronic Support (ES System) and a multi-band Electronic Attack System to cover the full electronic spectrum. According to open sources, KORAL uses a phased array antenna structure to perform multi-band electronic support and attack duties. The system also uses the latest Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) technology to digitally copy the RF threat signals and retransmit them back to the original radar source with fake signal returns by altering the actual radar returns. This way, the threat radar is spoofed with false targeting information, and the air defense systems can misidentify or cannot track real targets for a firing solution. According to open sources30 again, KORAL is so powerful that it can perform electronic attacks up to a range of 150-200 kilometers against RF threats. To complete its full EW spectrum of systems, the TURAF is in the process of receiving four units of Stand-Off Jammer (SOJ) aircraft (based on Bombardier’s Global 6000 business jets), which will be delivered in the last quarter of 2023. Aselsan is the prime contractor of the project and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) will be modifying and installing the mission systems on the G6000 aircraft with the help of Aselsan. The SOJ will enable the identification of the enemy’s communications and radar systems (for land, naval, or air domains), accurately geolocate their positions, and jam/degrade/spoof them from stand-off 29 Feridun Taşdan, “TURKISH EW SYSTEMS - The Unseen Force Behind Recent Turkish Drone Successes”, Defence Türkiye, Issue: 106, (May 2021). 30 “Koral System to Paralyze the Hostile Radar”, Defence Türkiye, Issue: 67, (April 2016). Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 37 . ranges. With SOJ capability, TURAF fighters and other supporting aircraft will be able to conduct their operations closer to the enemy air defenses or deploy their weapons more accurately under the EW protection of the SOJ aircraft. The information about SOJ’s capabilities is kept secret but we anticipate that the SOJ system will feature numerous new technology electronic warfare capabilities including powerful GaN-made AESA antennas and DRFM techniques similar to the EHPOD and KORAL systems. All of the required hardware and software systems to be integrated into the SOJ systems will be developed and manufactured by the Turkish defense companies locally. The modification and certification processes (after SOJ modifications) of the G6000 aircraft to be procured as part of the contract are aimed to be executed in Türkiye by TUSAŞ and other local companies. One of Europe’s extensive EW Testing and Training Range, called EWTTR/EHTES, is built by Havelsan, a Turkish software company in Konya, Türkiye. The range contains wide ranges of real air defense threats or RF emulators to simulate certain radar bands. Some of the air defense systems (ADS) in the range include SA-6 Gainful/Straight Flush Radar, SA-8 Gecko, SA-10B Grumble, SA-11A/B Gadfly, SA-15 Gaunlet/TOR, SA-19 Tunguska, D7 Super Fledermaus Radar, ZSU23/4 Shilka, Skyguard/Sparrow, Rapier Mk2B, and I-HAWK systems. All of these ADS are instrumented (no real firing of missiles) and their radar engagements are controlled by the operators. During the engagement phase of the air warfare training flights, EHTES ADS threat radars engage participating aircraft as if it is a real war. In the meantime, training aircraft use their EW systems to eliminate threats by applying jamming or deception techniques available in their EW systems. The results of the engagements are recorded and analyzed during debriefings. The records of all radar tracking and EW jamming data are evaluated to determine if the EW tactics used during the engagements against ADS’ threat radars are a success. Thus, the EWTTR/EHTES system helps pilots in real-time if their mission is a success or a failure. EWTTR/EHTES’ capability also helps the development of a national RF threat database/ECM jamming library against a wide range of air defense systems in near wartime conditions. The TURAF’s EHTES EW training capability is also very popular among NATO members and other friendly countries. The Anatolian Eagle Exercise takes place in Konya several times a year and invites countries to bring their aircraft/crew to SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 38 . practice air warfare training in predetermined scenarios, including flying in the EWTTR/EHTES range against ADSs to check their EW systems and train their pilots. This training is also necessary for the development of new updates for the EW hardware and software. Land-Based EW Capabilities of the Turkish Land Forces When the subject is EW systems, one might think that land forces won’t be using EW systems as much as air and naval forces due to the character of warfare conducted by the land forces via tanks, artillery, or assault helicopters, among other platforms. However, the Turkish Land Forces have paid special attention to the employment of sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) systems. In fact, landbased Turkish EW assets are one of the lesser-known types of military hardware around the world and also very unique to the Turkish Armed Forces’ operational concepts. Moreover, no other country in NATO, including the U.S., has an extensive land-based EW system like the one operated by the Turkish Land Forces, which has paid special attention to gaining land-based EW capability since 1990 or even before31. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) have been continuously fighting asymmetric warfare against a separatist terrorist organization called the PKK in the southeastern part of the country. During these counterterrorism operations, the TAF used several locally developed VHF/UHF direction finders and other ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) systems to listen to the communications between PKK groups in northern Iraq or southeastern Türkiye near Syria and Iraq’s borders. This capability of locating the PKK’s radio broadcasting positions and deciphering its communications helped the TAF gain important intelligence about the PKK’s moves and foiling possible attacks against TAF positions or soldiers operating in the region. Toward the end of 2010, a new-generation threat appeared in the asymmetric warfare against terrorist groups. This threat is the improvised explosive device (IED),32 which is an unconventional explosive weapon mainly used by terrorist organizations around the world to target soldiers and civilians. IEDs mostly use 31 Dr. Feridun Taşdan, “Turkish EW Systems, Unseen Force Behind Recent Turkish Drone Success”, Defence Türkiye, Issue: 106, (May 2021). 32 “Improvised Explosive Devices”, NATO, 12 December, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_72809.htm Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report . 39 . TNT, military-grade C4-type explosives, or sometimes fertilizers planted inside a propane tank, older bomb casings, metal pipes, cars, etc. Most IEDs are radio-controlled weapons that can be remotely detonated from several kilometers away. To counter remotely operated IEDs, the TAF quickly incorporated EW solutions produced by the Turkish defense industry. Counter-IED systems are now standard equipment of the TAF units on the field. The Turkish Land Forces’ first comprehensive EW system designed against threat radars is called the REDET. The first version of the system entered the inventory of the Turkish Land Forces Command in 2002. The system consists of two Electronic Support Measures (ESM) trucks (6x6) and one electronic attack (ECM) truck (6x6) and works as pairs against enemy radar systems operating on the battlefield. According to open sources, the system can perform electronic support and attack capability in the 0.4-40 GHz frequency band. The most recent version of the REDET-II system, an improved version of the REDET-I, was ordered in 2015, and the first systems entered the inventory of the Turkish Land Forces in 2019. The REDET-II (named Vural) can simultaneously counter multiple hostile radar threats (for example, against artillery detections radars) by directing electronic beams through its active phased array jammer/transmitter antennas and active electronically scanned arrays, which are also used in the KORAL system operated by the Turkish Air Force. Ibrahim Sunnetci33 from Defence Türkiye adds that although similar technologies are used in both systems, there are differences between the REDET II and the KORAL systems in terms of output power and detection/ jamming range capabilities. KORAL has larger ECM antennas and transmitting power than the REDET II system because it needs to detect and jam hostile radars from longer distances. Although the REDET II is designed to be deployed and operated near the operational areas of the Turkish Land Forces Command, the KORAL’s system architecture (power and radar band coverage) is determined by the Turkish Air Force’s tactical needs, therefore, it has the required output power and wide frequency bands against early warning and tracking radars that could be located hundreds of kilometers away from the KORAL. For communications signal detection and jamming, the MILKAR-3A3, called ILGAR, is developed and produced by Aselsan. The system consists of two separate 33 İbrahim Sünnetçi, “Redet-II Deliveries Completed!”, Defence Türkiye, Issue: 96, (December 2019). SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 40 . 6x6 trucks with related system antenna assembly and generators. The system has been developed for electronic attack operations against UHF/VHF frequency band communication systems located on the battlefield. The system can either completely block the UHF/VHF frequency band or spoof enemy communications by sending incorrect information to the enemy forces on the battlefield. Similar to the MILKAR-3 system, Aselsan’s MILKAR-4A2 system, called Sancak, consists of two separate trucks, one for electronic support and one for the electronic attack on the high frequency (HF) band. The systems can intercept HF communications and jam/degrade the long-ranged communications of hostile forces. MILKAR-3A3 ILGAR Source: Aselsan To protect convoys and other military facilities against improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the MILKAR-5A5 system, which is called SAPAN, was added to the Turkish Land Forces’ inventory. It is designed to protect land forces command’s military convoys against IEDs (improvised explosive devices or radio-controlled drones, etc.). The system has a wide frequency coverage to disable remote-controlled IEDs and drones flying nearby. Conclusion It is not wrong to say that the future of conventional wars is heading toward the electromagnetic domain. Major military platforms, airplanes, air defense systems, missiles, UAVs, and warships are all integrated with electronic systems using the electromagnetic spectrum to see the environment around them, navigate, communicate, and engage with enemy forces. However, the enemy forces will also be using the same electromagnetic domain for all these activities. Thus, both sides will try to deny the other side the use of the electromagnetic domain. In this respect, the outcome of wars will be depended on the technological superiority, indigenous development of the EW systems (having full control of the systems), quick adaptation to surprises, and training of the personnel for either side. The proliferation of the EW technologies is controlled by the export laws due to the national security concerns of the producers. Therefore, EW systems must be designed and produced indigenously to use the systems effectively and securely in wartime conditions. There could be always a possibility that an imported EW system may not be used as effectively as possible due to many circumstances, such as a new radar or a weapon system being introduced during a war. To keep the EW systems up to date against new threats, they are constantly updated by militaries to counter these new threats. In some cases, militaries (if they have the capability) use all available ELINT/SIGINT capability (or even spying) to gather signal information about the hostile countries’ new weapon systems or threat radars to update their threat library during peacetime. This process is extremely critical to keep EW systems ready to use against new threats. Moreover, during active war times, the EW systems could also require software/hardware updates to counter new surprise threats as well. In reality, it would be almost impossible to receive any technical support from the original producer of the EW systems during an ongoing war. SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. . 48 . The current trends in recent EW system developments are showing that AESA, MMIC, DFRM, AI/AML, and cyberattack technologies are being incorporated into the designs of the new generation EW systems. The newer EW systems are scalable and adaptable to multiple platforms for land, air, and naval applications. As mentioned in the article, major military powers such as the U.S., Israel, Russia, and China are leading countries in the design and production of EW systems. To catch up with these countries, Türkiye’s investments in locally designed EW systems have been paying off in recent years. Many indigenously developed EW systems are introduced into all domains of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). It is now obvious that controlling the electromagnetic spectrum is a key to winning conventional wars in the future and therefore, the TAF places special emphasis on the EW capability. More importantly, in addition to controlling the EW domain of warfare, Türkiye is close to reaching the level of sophistication and development of its operational concepts compare to the leading countries in the EW domain. Moreover, the TAF has gained considerable experience in using national EW systems in recent symmetric and asymmetric warfare in Syria, Libya, and even Karabakh, Azerbaijan. These experiences are highly valuable for future conflicts in terms of updating the capabilities of the current EW systems, determining future EW needs, and training the operators under real war conditions. Considering the number of ongoing domestic EW projects (already delivered and in the process of delivery) in all domains, the TAF will be using locally designed and produced EW systems that will provide advantages against regional countries that rely on using important EW systems. As has been stated throughout this article, controlling the electromagnetic spectrum is key to the success of conventional wars in the future. Thus, we would expect that Türkiye’s future EW projects will closely follow technological trends and, more importantly, make necessary investments in the domestic production capability of gallium nitride (GaN) modules, IIR detectors, and Microwave Monolithic Integrated Circuit (MMIC) technologies. These investments must be prioritized as the main goal to become fully independent in the designing and production of EW systems in Türkiye. These investments will also benefit other systems’ design and production locally such as AESA radars, E/O systems, and RF/IIR seeker guided missiles since there are commonalities and similarities at the level of technologies used in these systems. SETA Emerging Military Technologies Series .1. Electronic Warfare: Global Trends & Turkish Capabilities Report Militaries around the world place particular importance on developing and fielding electronic warfare (EW) systems. This is based on the fact that states believe controlling the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is key to gaining superiority on the battlefield to defeat an adversary. Electronic warfare is defined as any action or capability of using EMS to detect, deceive and disrupt the opponent’s weapon systems such as radars, communication systems, command control systems, data networks, or other digital infrastructures using EMS. Due to their invaluable role on the battlefield, EW technologies can be placed at the top of the list of military technologies that are highly protected and controlled by the countries that developed the technology. Thus, developing national EW systems indigenously comes with great security benefits. Against this backdrop, this report sheds light on the key aspects of EW by focusing on global trends and analyzing Turkish capabilities.