Quantifying Cascading Impacts of Natural Hazards on Power-Communication Interdependent Networks (Slides)

Funded by: Quantifying Cascading Impacts of Natural Hazards on Power-Communication Interdependent Networks Balaji V Venkatasubramanian1,2, Christos Laoudias1, Mathaios Panteli1,2 1 KIOS Research and Innovation Center of Excellence 2 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Cyprus This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement 101168499. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Outline ▪Introduction ▪State of the Art ▪Proposed Framework ▪Simulation Results ▪Conclusion 11/29/2025 2 Introduction ▪Extreme events like hurricanes can trigger cascading failures across power and telecom systems. ▪Smart grids increasingly rely on communication networks — making both sectors tightly interdependent. ▪Existing frameworks oversimplify interdependencies and lack realistic spatial modeling. ▪Many models ignore hazard dynamics and overlook real-world layouts (e.g., shared poles, co-located assets). ▪Communication outages can cripple restoration efforts yet are rarely quantified in resilience analysis. 11/29/2025 3 Image Caption - Downed power and telecom lines after Hurricane Irma — a clear example of cascading CI failures Image Source: http://dx.doi.org/10.13189/ujeee.2019.060304 State of the Art 11/29/2025 4 Modeling Approach Cascading failures studied via probabilistic models, network theory, and graph-based simulations. However, most models assume abstract, static topologies disconnected from real-world infrastructure layouts. Resilience Assessment Metrics like load loss, asset failure, and control disruption are used to assess impact. Yet these metrics often ignore broader societal impacts — especially communication blackouts and affected population. Core Limitations Existing models lack spatiotemporal hazard progression — treating hazards as random triggers, not dynamic events. Infrastructure interdependencies are simplified as 1-to-1 static couplings, missing the physical complexity (e.g., shared poles, co-located assets). Proposed Framework 11/29/2025 5 Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Interdependent Power and Communication Networks Input Data 1. Telecommunication Towers data 2. Power Network data 3. Multi-polygons of municipalities or areas 4. Population in each region 5. Historical hazard data Data Processing 1. Data cleaning 2. Mapping of multi-polygons with population (if required) Data Collection and Processing Substation Power lines Telecommunication Tower Power-Communication Coupled Network Spatial Coupling of Power and Communication Network Hazard Scenario Generation Failure Propagation & Impact Quantification Demand Not Served Electrical Assets Affected Telecom Towers Affected Population Affected Proposed Framework 11/29/2025 6 Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Interdependent Power and Communication Networks Input Data 1. Telecommunication Towers data 2. Power Network data 3. Multi-polygons of municipalities or areas 4. Population in each region 5. Historical hazard data Data Processing 1. Data cleaning 2. Mapping of multi-polygons with population (if required) Data Collection and Processing Power Poles/Pillars Hypothetical Power Network Telecom Towers Municipalities & Population Proposed Framework 11/29/2025 7 Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Interdependent Power and Communication Networks Input Data 1. Telecommunication Towers data 2. Power Network data 3. Multi-polygons of municipalities or areas 4. Population in each region 5. Historical hazard data Data Processing 1. Data cleaning 2. Mapping of multi-polygons with population (if required) Data Collection and Processing Proposed Framework 11/29/2025 8 Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Interdependent Power and Communication Networks Substation Power lines Telecommunication Tower Power-Communication Coupled Network Spatial Coupling of Power and Communication Network Proposed Framework 11/29/2025 9 Framework for Assessing the Resilience of Interdependent Power and Communication Networks Substation Power lines Telecommunication Tower Power-Communication Coupled Network Example Spatial Coupling of Power and Communication Network Integration into the Cyprus Digital Twin (CyDT) 11/29/2025 16 Power Networks Intelligent Transportation Systems Water and wastewater networks Telecommunication networks Emergency Response Impact assessment Risk estimation ‘What-if’ scenarios Decision support 1st version demo video Conclusion 11/29/2025 17 Windstorms cause cascading disruptions across power and communication networks. Interdependencies amplify failure propagation, worsening both technical and societal impacts. The proposed framework captures spatial, temporal, and functional interconnections, improving realism. Quantifies resilience with sector-specific and populationlevel metrics. Enables risk-informed planning and preparedness for complex hazard scenarios. 11/29/2025 18 Funded by the European Union This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement 101168499. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Christos Laoudias Research Lecturer KIOS Research and Innovation Center of Excellence University of Cyprus [email protected] http://www.kios.ucy.ac.cy