Multi-stakeholder data access in space-based climate monitoring

Urban, Kathryn Working Paper Multi-stakeholder data access in space-based climate monitoring CIGI Papers, No. 299 Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario Suggested Citation: Urban, Kathryn (2024) : Multi-stakeholder data access in space-based climate monitoring, CIGI Papers, No. 299, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo (Ontario) This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/303160 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ CIGI Papers No. 299 — September 2024 Multi-stakeholder Data Access in Space-Based Climate Monitoring Kathryn Urban CIGI Papers No. 299 — September 2024 Multi-stakeholder Data Access in Space-Based Climate Monitoring Kathryn Urban About CIGI The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) is an independent, non-partisan think tank whose peer-reviewed research and trusted analysis influence policy makers to innovate. Our global network of multidisciplinary researchers and strategic partnerships provide policy solutions for the digital era with one goal: to improve people’s lives everywhere. Headquartered in Waterloo, Canada, CIGI has received support from the Government of Canada, the Government of Ontario and founder Jim Balsillie. 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Permission to reproduce this content must be obtained from third parties directly. Centre for International Governance Innovation and CIGI are registered trademarks. 67 Erb Street West Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 6C2 www.cigionline.org Table of Contents vi About the Author vi Acronyms and Abbreviations 1 Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 The Current State of Space-Based Climate Monitoring 4 Major Challenges of the Existing Space-Based Climate Monitoring Regime 5 The Need for Multi-stakeholder Co-operation on Climate Data Access 6 Current, Future and Potential Roles for Militaries in Satellite Data Collection 10 A Framework for Multi-stakeholder Climate Data Access 12 Potential Flashpoints 14 Conclusion 15 Works Cited vi CIGI Papers No. 299 — September 2024 • Kathryn Urban About the Author Kathryn Urban is a Ph.D. student in political science at MIT, specializing in security studies and international relations. Her research interests include emerging military technologies, strategy formulation and defence aid. Before coming to MIT, Kathryn worked in US defence policy and academic programming, including as deputy director of Bridging the Gap. She graduated summa cum laude from George Washington University with a B.A. in international affairs. She also holds a master’s from American University’s School of International Service, where she received her department’s Academic Performance Award and Outstanding Research Award. Acronyms and Abbreviations CASC China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation CSDA Commercial Smallsat Data Acquisition ESA European Space Agency ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance LEO low-Earth orbit MEO medium-Earth orbit NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 1Multi-stakeholder Data Access in Space-Based Climate Monitoring Executive Summary Data collected from satellite imagery and spacebased instruments is essential to informing climate modelling. However, there is a fundamental tension between the public and private entities, who fund and maintain most of the data collection assets in orbit, and the civilian researchers, who seek to use that data to further our understanding of a changing climate. This paper puts forward a multistakeholder framework for climate data access, drawing out existing synergies across the public, private and scientific sectors to build on current climate data initiatives. This framework portends a leading role for defence actors owing to data requirements that mirror gaps in current researcher climate data access. The paper concludes with highlighting potential flashpoints in implementing the framework and makes recommendations for alleviating the concerns of key stakeholders. Introduction Earth is relying on her brightest scientific minds to track the impacts of climate change, provide ample warning of impending natural disasters and devise solutions for mitigating the worst effects of global warming and adaptation strategies for unavoidable outcomes. But the answers that researchers are able to deliver hinge on the quality of data used in modelling and analysis. There is a major disconnect between the interests of the government and commercial actors who operate most climate data collection assets, and the civilian researchers who seek access to that data. Bridging this owner-user gap means scientists are working with long lag times between collection and publication, patchy data coverage and competing priorities among collection organizations. Nowhere is this disjoint more keenly felt than in spacebased data collection. Outer space is one of the key domains of actionable climate data and is made up of assets that are prohibitively expensive to most researchers. Scientists are therefore entirely reliant on the limited body of climate data regularly released by government satellite operators. The status quo state of climate data access is not commensurate to the increased demands being made of the scientific community. As researchers are asked to devise solutions to save a planet facing record levels of heat and sea level rise, issues of irregular data coverage, poor satellite imagery resolution and restrictions on processing power represent important limitations. But these are also challenges with relatively low-cost and loweffort solutions. A comprehensive redress plan to these data access challenges is therefore a climate initiative with one of the best payoff ratios. This paper puts forward a multi-stakeholder framework for climate data monitoring, proposing a whole-of-government approach to collecting, reviewing and releasing satellite data on climate indicators that covers data gathered both intentionally and incidentally. This framework carves out continued lines of effort for government scientific agencies, advisory roles for civilian researchers and supplementary programs by which proprietary information from commercial satellite actors can be brought into national repositories of climate data. The most important improvement over existing government climate data collection efforts, however, is a lead role for the defence sector. Military and intelligence agencies are not only major existing operators of satellites and other space-based assets, but their data collection needs also represent crucial complements to those of civilian climate researchers. The implementation of this framework should not be taken up lightly. There are immense security implications associated with releasing data collected by military and intelligence agencies, and appropriate precautions must be taken both to secure buy-in from defence actors and to ensure that climate data efforts do not compromise national security priorities. Nevertheless, military and intelligence agencies have generally played a limited role thus far in living up to national commitments for climate change alleviation and readiness. This proposal represents an opportunity for these actors to bear out rhetoric on climate change as a national security priority by mitigating the data access problems that currently plague space-based data collection initiatives. In order to lay the groundwork for these policy proposals, this paper proceeds in six parts. The first section, “The Current State of Space-Based Climate Monitoring,” details the role space-based data plays in climate research, outlines the major actors responsible for current satellite collection of climate data and describes current data-sharing 2CIGI Papers No. 299 — September 2024 • Kathryn Urban practices between the public sector and scientific communities. The second section, “Major Challenges of the Existing Space-Based Climate Monitoring Regime,” highlights pressing areas for improvement in the space-collected data currently available to researchers. The third section, “The Need for Multi-stakeholder Co-operation on Climate Data Access,” describes the current allocation of data collection satellite capabilities and details difficulties in cross-sectoral collaboration. The fourth section, “Current, Future and Potential Roles for Militaries in Satellite Data Collection,” addresses trajectories in the defence sector’s use of space-based data collection assets and points to major synergies between military and intelligence agencies’ data requirements and those of civilian climate researchers. The fifth section, “A Framework for Multi-stakeholder Climate Data Access,” offers specific recommendations for how civilian and military government actors can effectively engage researchers and commercial satellite firms to provide data on pressing climate indicators. The sixth and final section, “Potential Flashpoints,” anticipates challenges in implementing the framework and offers solutions for alleviating them. The Current State of Space-Based Climate Monitoring Space-collected data plays a major role in modelling the ongoing effects of climate change across the globe. But there is a disconnect between the public actors, who fund most of the datacollection space assets in orbit, and the civilian scientists, who draw on that data to produce robust research. Understanding the politics of climate data collection therefore requires a survey of the field of the types of space-collected data used in climate research, the primary actors who pursue that data collection and aggregation and existing policies on sharing climate data across sectors. Role of Space-Based Data Collection in Climate Science Good data is key to how scientists understand the progression and ramifications of climate change. After all, according to John E. Kutzbach, “One golden observation is worth a thousand simulations” (Kutzbach 1988, 5). Researchers draw on a variety of Earth-based monitoring systems to obtain data, including from weather stations, buoys and soil samples. But more than half of the Essential Climate Variables — the key indicators of climate change — can be obtained through space-based monitoring. Satellite imaging and data from space-based systems are therefore an essential component of climate research. The full breadth of uses for space-based data in climate research is impossible to capture here. But among the most common applications are: → atmospheric observations to measure greenhouse gas emissions; → radiometer data calculating the amount of energy radiating from Earth and the temperature of the land and sea surfaces, tracking heatwaves and small changes in climate temperature; → remote sensing of wind speeds and satellite imaging to track the scale, course and extent of severe weather patterns and flooding; → scatterometer observations to measure surface soil moisture levels, providing insight into potential drought conditions; → satellite imaging to track glacier retreat and remote sensing to monitor sea-level changes with up to a millimetre of precision; → microwave radiometer data and images to create a digital picture of Earth’s surface, differentiating between land, water and ice and monitoring changes in surface composition; → radar and laser altimetry to measure the thickness of sea ice, delivering highly precise data even across spots of uneven melting or rough terrain; and → satellite imaging to track the burn patterns and smoke pollution from wildfires and to monitor deforestation. Most space-based data collection initiatives rely on satellites: imaging equipment and scientific measurement tools are mounted to the outer shell of satellites that then gather data during an orbit path and transmit this data back to Earth to be received by antennae at ground stations. Larger outer space installations such as the International Space Station also house scientific instruments that collect and transmit data. 9Multi-stakeholder Data Access in Space-Based Climate Monitoring and Development Canada exercise in the Arctic experimented with accessing small commercial satellites for imaging of the ships that participated in the exercises, as well as data of marine automatic identification system messages. The exercise aimed at evaluating how data from private firms could reduce the time for collecting, processing and acting upon relevant information in the event of a real military crisis (Government of Canada 2024). Beyond the climate space specifically, security actors lean on commercial agents to procure access to satellite data. This may be carried out through direct contracting, purchasing commercial data with exclusive rights and purchasing commercial data with unrestricted usage rights. Each channel is addressed below in turn. Military and intelligence agencies may contract with satellite providers to fund specific projects carried out with commercial assets. Ordinarily, contractors will design or update satellite assets, launch them and then coordinate data gathering specifically to accommodate security actors’ requirements. The satellite contractor industry has boomed in recent years, as militaries pour hundreds of millions of dollars into such programs. This also means that contracted programs can be subject to comparable security requirements as that of in-house government missions: security actors retain the rights to screen personnel working on the project and can classify any collected data. Firms in this space include established military contractors such as Raytheon and Northrop Grumman that also operate in non-outer space domains; companies such as SES Space & Defense and Intelsat that established themselves specifically for military space contracts; and companies such as Boeing, Airbus and SpaceX that act as both military contractors and marketoriented commercial entities (Erwin 2023). An alternative to contracting out entire space operations is the selective purchase of satellite data collected by commercial firms. Security actors have the option of buying specific relevant pieces of data on an exclusive basis — which is markedly more expensive but precludes other actors from accessing the same information — on a non-exclusive basis, in which a military or intelligence agency is just one of many buyers. Some commercial satellite firms also offer subscription models for customers to access their entire catalogue of data, usually on a non-exclusive basis. Government security protocols and acquisition restrictions have historically been barriers to military or intelligence agencies purchasing commercial data (Harrison and Strohmeyer 2022), though that is beginning to change (Cooper 2024). Not only is purchasing offthe-shelf data a cost-savings measure, but having access to information flows not publicly associated with security actors also increases their resiliency in case of attack on national satellite infrastructure. One trend driving military and intelligence actors’ reliance on the private sector is simply the increased demand for satellite data. Contracting and data acquisition remains much cheaper than independent satellite launches and information can be more readily procured. Another trend worth noting is the rising fragmentation of the commercial satellite market. As the number of firms operating in outer space has grown exponentially, firms are able to remain profitable while delivering extremely narrow types of data (Patriarca, Costantino and Di Gravio 2019). This ensures that security actors can bid for very specialized information. It also means that any type of coordinated effort on climate data access must necessarily be state driven, since there are so many disparate interests and capabilities represented in the commercial space. A Framework for Multi-stakeholder Climate Data Access Given that civilian researchers are facing serious shortfalls in their existing access to space-collected climate data and that defence actors have a unique synergy of hardware capabilities and human capital to fill those gaps, an effective framework for climate data access necessitates a whole-ofgovernment approach with a more limited role for the commercial sector. This section outlines the essential tenets of such a framework and points to leverage buy-in from relevant stakeholders. Essential Tenets of the Framework Whole-of-Government Commitment to Climate Data Review and Release Although it may not be feasible to consistently redirect military and intelligence satellites toward 10 CIGI Papers No. 299 — September 2024 • Kathryn Urban climate objectives, the incidental data collected by these assets could be of enormous importance to civilian researchers. The first key tenet of the framework is therefore a whole-of-government commitment to reviewing the data routinely collected by space-based assets and releasing information with climate relevance to the extent allowable by national security. This necessitates the establishment of satellite data review offices within the defence establishments of major satellite operators such as the United States, Canada, China and the European Union. It will certainly be necessary for data review processes to scrub some information from the collected data to prevent compromising ongoing military operations. However, reviewers should be apprised of the scientific value of collection details such as precise collection dates, times and locations, and should strive to maintain complete records of such data points as much as possible. State actors should also follow Canada’s example in establishing a single national portal through which to release data from all government offices, maximizing the ease of access and analysis for civilian researchers. Opportunities for Civilian Researchers to Weigh in on Collection Priorities A second tenet of the framework is giving climate researchers opportunities to engage with government actors in voicing their priorities for data access. A multilateral body such as the UN Climate Change office may be a natural intermediary to host regular convocations of top climate scientists from around the world to assemble lists of climate data priorities to be passed along to government actors. For emergency climate data access, such as to track rapidly spreading wildfires or an impending super-storm, this body of scientists may petition state actors to launch or re-route satellite assets to specifically collect the needed data. For routine climate data requests, the framework should establish a regular process by which civilian scientists can request data collection instruments be embedded on government or commercial satellites with comparable orbit paths. Investing in this on-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing approach by which data collection instruments can be added to satellites already in orbit rather than returning them to Earth means that monitoring capabilities can be attached at minimal cost, can be tacked on as satellites approach a beneficial orbit pattern with minimal deviations, and can be replaced with the most upto-date monitoring technologies as they become available. The data collected by civilian-placed instruments would also be subject to government review, particularly for those mounted to defence assets. But giving civilian scientists access to data collected by their chosen instruments along an optimized orbit path offers researchers greater buy-in to the data collection process, improves the quality of resulting scholarship, and does so at minimal cost to state satellite operators. Establishment of Robust Bounty Programs for Commercial Climate Data A final tenet of the framework is the establishment (or expansion) of government bounty programs to buy proprietary data from commercial satellite providers that has relevance to climate indicators. This represents an additional means by which state actors can meet the climate data priorities set forth by researchers, should government satellites be unable to provide the needed data. Commercial actors may agree to freely provide information in the case of climate emergencies, as in existing agreements for private satellite operators to share data on imminent threats to space assets with national intelligence agencies (Erwin 2023). Otherwise, states should expect to provide compensation to private actors for their data, using initiatives such as NASA’s CSDA program as a template. Structure and Authority of the Framework Ideally, a multi-stakeholder framework for climate data sharing would be implemented at the global level with a UN agency as coordinator. However, it is unlikely that such a multinational effort would include full buy-in from all states with national satellite assets. The United States, Russia, and China have an extensive track record of disagreement and mistrust surrounding both climate issues and outer space governance. Rather than expect that all three powers would back an agenda for co-operation on both contentious issues, the framework is best implemented within existing state partnerships. One area that may benefit from piloting the framework is the Arctic. This is a space of great interest to climate researchers, but with relatively limited commercial satellite data coverage. Militaries, however, are investing heavily in both land-based and space-based Arctic observation capabilities. The Arctic Council is a promising 11Multi-stakeholder Data Access in Space-Based Climate Monitoring institutional facilitator for this framework for several reasons: It has a long track record of coordinating multilateral co-operation, including on satellite observation; it already coordinates with scientists working on climate protection and resiliency initiatives; and although the Arctic Council explicitly excludes work on military issues, there is precedent for security actors being involved in co-operation around search and rescue and other human security issues. The Arctic therefore represents the case in which a co-operative framework for climate data sharing could be both most useful and most easily accepted. Should the efforts yield promising results in the Far North, governments may be incentivized to expand the framework’s coverage elsewhere. Stakeholder Buy-In There is little reason for civilian researchers or commercial actors to reject the proposed framework. The scientific community gains access to better climate data, processing and aggregation assistance, and opportunities for more direct participation in setting monitoring priorities. Private firms have limited data reporting obligations outside of emergency circumstances and therefore have the opportunity to profit off of government bounties for data they may be collecting incidentally. This revenue channel becomes particularly attractive if government actors recruit likely satellite vendors instead of relying exclusively on requests for proposals. Even civilian government actors should find the proposed framework attractive. Beyond the resourcing requirements associated with unified national portals for climate data access, the framework does not ask scientific research agencies to do much more than they are already doing. The funding and personnel sacrifice these agencies are asked to make remain closely tied to their core mission of scientific discovery. The stakeholder most likely to resist the framework, therefore, is the defence sector. Military and intelligence agencies in most countries have had a limited role to play in national climate policies, other than building resiliency into military operations. However, NATO (NATO 2023), the United States (Garamone 2023b), Canada (Bronskill 2023) and the European Union ( European Commission 2023) have all issued official statements calling climate change a national or multilateral security threat. The seeming disconnect between these statements and the subsequent lack of action has opened up defence actors to criticisms of hypocrisy in their climate policies. Militaries are frequently cited as major polluters, with the global military footprint estimated to be responsible for 5.5 percent of greenhouse gas emissions and the United States military pointed to as the globe’s single largest consumer of petroleum (De la Garza 2022). The United States military’s Climate Action Plan and similar efforts are criticized as grasping at low-hanging fruit such as infrastructure initiatives by the Army Corps of Engineers (Myers 2022). And military actors have virtually entirely ignored calls to “supplement ongoing datadriven efforts” in climate communities (Best et al. 2023) and regularly share “information related to climate change impacts and adaptation” (United Nations 2015, 11), even among signatory states to the Paris Climate Accords bound by provisions for state participation in “strengthening scientific knowledge on climate” (ibid., 6). Participating in the proposed multi-stakeholder framework for climate data access gives defence actors a means of addressing criticisms that they have shirked efforts to expand the scope of military missions to address the threats presented by climate change. But this is not an instance of cheap talk. Bringing the defence sector into the framework would address important shortcomings in the existing quality and availability of climate data and would go a long way toward improving climate modelling and adaptation and mitigation research. Furthermore, the framework prioritizes existing capabilities and talent to minimize the resource outlays or bureaucratic reorganization asked of governments. Potential Flashpoints A multi-stakeholder framework for space-based climate data collection is a relatively low-cost and low-effort way for governments to advance critical climate research and demonstrate their commitment to climate security. But despite clear benefits for states, commercial actors and the scientific community, implementing such a framework will not be without controversy. Drawing on contemporary debates around climate politics and satellite data, the following are anticipated challenges that could threaten the 12 CIGI Papers No. 299 — September 2024 • Kathryn Urban initiative, as well as proposals for ameliorating them, focusing primarily on issues that could be of major concern to military and intelligence agencies, as the actor with the least inherent buy-in. Government Fears of National Security Risks Military and intelligence actors are understandably hesitant to release information collected as part of classified operations for fear of adversaries gleaning insight into forthcoming foreign policy or national security efforts. Defence actors are notoriously plagued by over-classification problems due to fear that even seemingly innocuous information could later be weaponized by adversaries. Such resistance would likely be magnified in this instance, since climate change tends to be classified as a human security challenge as opposed to the hard security issues on which military actors usually focus. State actors would obviously need to vet collected data in order to remove observations that pertain to ongoing military operations, identifying intelligence assets or data that could otherwise damage national security. However, security actors may remain fearful that compromising information could slip past censors. There are several reasons to believe that the satellite-collected data that would be released as part of the multi-stakeholder framework would have a negligible risk of compromising national security. First, climate scientists have little use for high-resolution images of foreign military bases or weapons installations. The data that would be valuable to these civilian actors is incidental to military targets — images and instrument readouts collected during the normal course of satellite orbit. Second, most of the satellite-collected data that is currently available from civilian agencies is not published in its raw form. These state analysts instead devote personnel and resources to aggregating raw data into databases that are less computationally intensive and in software readable formats. Certain pieces of information collected from military and intelligence satellites, such as high-resolution images of sea ice, would be valuable to researchers. But aggregating the majority of data prior to public release further shields research consumers from potentially sensitive information and minimizes seepage of compromising details due to human error. If it is highly unlikely that climate data published by military and intelligence agencies will be damaging to national security, then the only other potential risk is that the released data would reveal classified satellite orbits and therefore the targets of interest to state security actors. This is not an insignificant risk, but it is one that is already null. It is challenging to shield the presence and path of satellites for the simple reason that space is transparent. Numerous websites exist for amateur astronomers to monitor the progress of different satellites and make educated guesses at the purpose and national origin of each due to distinctive design features and orbit patterns. Cybersecurity Cybersecurity is an ongoing concern for the military and intelligence agencies that rely on satellites for critical information. Cyber incursions from an adversary risk compromising data relays to Earth, taking down expensive pieces of hardware or causing collisions with other space-based equipment. And while government actors are prioritizing robust defences against cyber vulnerabilities (Gedeon 2023), commercial actors — especially those that profit off of small, low-cost satellites in LEO — have largely failed to engage in cyber concerns. Given the lax regulatory requirements on private firms to protect against malicious cyber incursions (Verco 2021), there is little incentive for commercial satellite actors to do so going forward. Governments may therefore be concerned about deepening involvement with private satellite firms if such partnerships risk bringing government systems into contact with malware or compromised data. Incommensurable cybersecurity standards represent a challenge, but not an insurmountable one. Most states already have protocols in place for engagement with the private sector, for either long-term contracts or one-off services or both. NASA’s CSDA program could act as a template for putting in place security protocols on external satellite data. Alternatively, state actors may rely on extensive software scanning or off-network information systems to handle any suspicious files. Resourcing Government spending is a reflection of state priorities. Implementing a whole-of-government commitment for climate data collection and distribution therefore represents an opportunity cost for prioritizing other domestic programs. Funding would certainly be a sticking point for many governments. One advantage to this 13Multi-stakeholder Data Access in Space-Based Climate Monitoring proposal is that climate data collection makes use of the material and human resources that many states currently rely on for other purposes. The additional costs involved to private firms and civilian researchers for data review and outreach are relatively minimal; it is therefore low risk for states seeking to deliver on their commitment to climate change as a security priority. States could also invoke principles enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty or UN Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, both of which commit governments to carrying out activities in space for the benefit of all humankind. Despite their reliance on existing capabilities and the virtue-signalling advantages of participating in the framework, some states with significant government satellite usage will likely refuse. There is no reasonable way to compel these states to participate, but participant governments putting pressure on their allies and security partners may be a starting point. The involvement of civilian researchers could also be a benefit in this regard, since their position as intellectual elites may carry weight in lobbying their home governments for public access to state-collected climate data. Politicization of Climate Data Collection Climate change is already a politicized topic in many states, sparking ongoing debates among national leaders about the scale of its impact, the role of humans in causing it, the degree to which the state should be involved in its mitigation and adaptation and the global balance of responsibility for it— and for addressing its consequences. There is therefore a risk that implementing a whole-ofgovernment approach to collecting and distributing climate data could create political backlash. Opposition leaders may co-opt such initiatives as a political talking point. The program could also face variability across administrations, with sympathetic politicians bolstering support only to face defunding as a new leader comes to power. One source for optimism is that climate data collection is a relatively technical matter: a national leader or political candidate looking to take aim at climate initiatives would likely begin with more obvious targets, such as decarbonization. The best defence against politicization is therefore keeping the framework as a technical initiative. Governments and citizens should lobby to bring on board a diverse set of satellite-operating states. However, details of the framework should be negotiated within the professional circles of multilateral institutions and security partnerships and advocated for by the scientists who seek data access. It is not an issue that should be put forward by national leaders as a hallmark of international climate accords, used as leverage in climate bargaining between the Global North (which launches the greatest proportion of government satellites) and the Global South or hammered as a political talking point in national debates. Preventing climate data collection from becoming a hot-button political topic can insulate it from a variability of support with changes in national politics and prevent it from becoming an attrition target when government resources are constrained. Conclusion The urgency of addressing climate change demands a cohesive and proactive approach to climate modelling. Yet the current state of satellite data collection and dissemination presents significant challenges to effective scientific enterprises. This paper has explored the constraints of the existing data-sharing regime driven by civilian scientific agencies, assessed the role various sectoral stakeholders can play in improving climate data, put forward an initial multistakeholder framework prioritizing high-quality data of the type normally collected by the defence sector and closed with recommendations for implementing this framework with full buy-in. Outer space has long been hailed as a domain of co-operation transcending divisions here on Earth. As the planet faces impending climate catastrophes, the need for such co-operation is more important than ever. This multi-stakeholder framework for climate data access is a relatively low-cost and low-effort initiative that could lay the groundwork for future co-operation across sectors. 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