Social cohesion in the context of the Venezuelan displacement to Colombia

López Villamil, Stephanie Working Paper Social cohesion in the context of the Venezuelan displacement to Colombia IDOS Discussion Paper, No. 14/2025 Provided in Cooperation with: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Bonn Suggested Citation: López Villamil, Stephanie (2025) : Social cohesion in the context of the Venezuelan displacement to Colombia, IDOS Discussion Paper, No. 14/2025, ISBN 978-3-96021-259-1, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Bonn, https://doi.org/10.23661/idp14.2025 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/319871 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Social Cohesion in the Context of the Venezuelan Displacement to Colombia Stephanie López Villamil IDOS DISCUSSION PAPER 14/2025 Social cohesion in the context of the Venezuelan displacement to Colombia Stephanie López Villamil Bonn 2025 Dr Stephanie López Villamil is an independent consultant. Published with financial support from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), based on a resolution of the German Bundestag. The institutes of the Johannes-Rau-Forschungsgemeinschaft are institutionally funded by the state of NRW. Suggested citation: López Villamil, S. (2025). Social cohesion in the context of the Venezuelan displacement to Colombia (IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025). German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). https://doi.org/10.23661/idp14.2025 Disclaimer: The analyses expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). Except otherwise noted, this publication is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0). You are free to copy, communicate and adapt this work, as long as you attribute the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) gGmbH and the author(s). IDOS Discussion Paper / German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) gGmbH ISSN 2751-4439 (Print) ISSN 2751-4447 (Online) ISBN 978-3-96021-259-1 (Print) DOI: https://doi.org/10.23661/idp14.2025 © German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) gGmbH Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn Email: [email protected] https://www.idos-research.de Printed on eco-friendly, certified paper. IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 III Contents Abbreviations Executive summary 1 1 Introduction 3 2 The context of Venezuelan forced displacement and social cohesion in host communities 5 2.1 Venezuelan forced displacement to Colombia 6 2.2 Colombian government’s approach to welcoming Venezuelans 7 3 Methodology 8 3.1 Research questions 8 3.2 Case selection and research sites 9 3.3 Data collection 10 4 Findings and analysis 11 4.1 Horizontal dimension (individual): “We are equal, and we have the same rights and the same duties” 11 4.1.1 Shared identities 11 4.1.2 Cultural ties: “feeling at home” 12 4.1.3 Resilience and leadership of displaced communities 13 4.2 Horizontal dimension (social): relations between social groups 14 4.2.1 Inequality and class divisions in host communities 15 4.2.2 Potential sources of conflict: violence and resource scarcity 16 4.2.3 Xenophobia and discrimination 18 4.2.4 The role of media and social media in the narratives 18 4.3 Vertical dimension: “We are not in Venezuela; the system is completely different” 20 4.3.1 Institutional mistrust 20 4.3.2 Politicisation of migration 21 5 Conclusion 22 6 Recommendations 23 References 25 Figures Figure 1: Constitutive elements of social cohesion 4 Tables Table 1: Number of Venezuelans per city and percentage of the total population 7 Table 2: Attributes of focus group discussion participants 10 Table 3: Attributes of interviewees 10 IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 IV Abbreviations DANE Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística ETPV Temporary protection status for Venezuelan migrants / Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos FGD focus group discussion GBV gender-based violence IADB Inter-American Development Bank IDOS German Institute of Development and Sustainability IDP internally displaced person JAC Juntas de Acción Comunal LGBTQ+ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer + NGO non-governmental organisation PEP Permiso Especial de Permanencia PPT Permiso por Protección Temporal TPS temporary protection status IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 1 Executive summary The Colombian government’s response to the Venezuelan displacement crisis has largely been lauded for its efforts to support displaced persons by granting legal residency. This comes with challenges, as resources at the local level are strained. These challenges can be understood through the lens of social cohesion, which encompasses aspects such as a sense of belonging, trust, the common good, shared values, identity and, at its core, inequality. When cohesion is lacking, exclusion and marginalisation rise. In contexts of displacement, social cohesion shapes the socioeconomic conditions of host communities and can influence the state’s response to the influx of forcibly displaced persons. This Discussion Paper is part of the broader project “Social Cohesion in Displacement Contexts” (IDOS, s.a.), which examines how social cohesion is affected in different contexts of displacement where there is broad demographic, religious and political diversity. Grounded in an understanding of history and national contexts, the project examines the contemporary mechanisms that influence social cohesion in communities hosting displaced persons. By examining the case of Colombia, this research provides context-specific findings that potentially deepen our understanding of social cohesion in displacement contexts. In a very short period, Colombia has received more than 3 million displaced Venezuelans. The government of Colombia responded to this displacement with open-door policies that included large regularisation programmes. The Colombian context is no stranger to displacement; the country has had a long-standing armed conflict that has resulted in millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and hundreds of refugees in the neighbouring countries of Venezuela and Ecuador. Additionally, despite being considered an upper-middle-income country by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, poverty and job informality are among the unresolved socioeconomic structural issues hindering social cohesion in Colombia. Moreover, in the South American context, rising xenophobia, the politicisation of migrants and more restrictive migration policies have negatively affected social cohesion. Beyond the myths and xenophobic narratives, what are the factors that influence social cohesion between displaced Venezuelans and host communities in Colombia? This paper approaches the discussion of social cohesion in displacement contexts for the case of Colombia, focusing on forcibly displaced Venezuelans and Colombian returnees. The study indicates that the negative narratives around Venezuelans have decreased over the past 10 years. Colombians have learnt to live with them in relative harmony, despite the structural economic and social issues affecting the communities. Through a qualitative methodology, the study focused on host communities in three selected cities: Bogotá, Barranquilla and Riohacha. The analysis of the horizontal dimension of social cohesion at the individual level reveals Venezuelans and Colombians share identities. Indeed, a common language, similar weather and culture are cohesive factors in host communities. The cultural ties allow Venezuelans to feel at home in Riohacha and Barranquilla, and they have either adopted or integrated the Colombian culture into their daily lives. Moreover, Venezuelans and Colombian returnees have taken on leadership roles to support their communities. This is especially apparent in cooperative efforts by Colombian and Venezuelan women to address their common struggles. Looking to the future of developing greater social cohesion in the context of Venezuelan displacement in Colombia, four main issues were identified: IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 2 1) Inequality and class divisions in Colombia are different from those in Venezuela. This was highlighted by many Venezuelan research participants, who struggled to understand where they belonged in this societal structure. Investments in civic education and support with integration at the local level can help Venezuelans and host communities better understand one another’s social and economic realities in the present and future. 2) Venezuelans also struggle to understand the long-standing Colombian conflict and how the violence permeates the society and their communities. This violence is fuelled not only by inequality but also by scarce resources. Engaging with local peacebuilding actors can help develop a shared understanding about violence in Colombia for Venezuelans and host communities. 3) Participants recalled issues of xenophobia and discrimination, particularly towards women and LGBTQ+ persons, but noted that this has diminished over time. Policy-makers should build on the local efforts that have helped tamp down xenophobia. 4) It was emphasised in interviews how the media has an important role in spreading xenophobic narratives about migrants harming social cohesion in the communities. These narratives can have a toxic effect on building social cohesion in host communities, and leaders need to push back against these messages. IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 3 1 Introduction South-south migration represents more than one-third of all international migration (Schewel & Debray, 2023). Latin America, once a region of emigration, has become a region of transit and immigration as well. However, there are differences between subregions. In South America, intra-regional migration increased significantly in the first two decades of the 20th century and has seen an increase in extra-continental migration from Africa (Schewel & Debray, 2023). The Venezuelan displacement crisis marked a turning point in this context. Food scarcity, lack of medicines, increased inflation and growing human rights violations, among other issues, has led to a massive exodus of the Venezuelan population since 2015 before expanding in 2018 (Castro Franco, 2019). By June 2024, the mounting humanitarian and economic crisis under the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro, in power since 2013, had led to at least 7.7 million Venezuelans fleeing the country; 6.5 million remain in Latin America and the Caribbean, and almost 3 million are hosted by Colombia. In July 2024, Maduro was re-elected for the third time, despite alleged claims of fraud, which led to political unrest and massive numbers of arbitrary detentions reported by human rights organisations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2024). Reports by local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) assert this may result in another massive displacement in the short term (Vitto, 2024). This situation has presented a significant challenge for the Colombian government in the past 10 years: On the one hand, Colombian institutions were not equipped to handle large numbers of refugees. On the other hand, the host communities have had to deal with structural socioeconomic issues such as poverty and job informality. Furthermore, Colombia has been affected by a long-standing armed conflict and violence, which has led it to becoming one of the countries with the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world, with 5.1 million registered as of 2023 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2024). Additionally, the human rights situation in Colombia is still dire. Human Rights Watch reports abuses by armed groups, limited access to justice by victims, violations by public security forces, violence against human rights defenders and other people at risk, and widespread gender-based violence (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The influx of refugees and migrants from neighbouring Venezuela has led to unprecedented economic strains, particularly in border regions, where resources are scarce. In response to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, in 2021, the Colombian government decided to grant Venezuelans temporary protection status (TPS) (in Spanish: Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos – ETPV) after implementing, successively, other temporary regularisation programmes since 2017. This permit allows them access to services and the labour market, and they can eventually enter the visa regime to receive a permanent residency permit. However, many barriers remain to their socioeconomic inclusion. The arrival of displaced Venezuelans to Colombia has also had important impacts on Colombian society that have yet to be studied. Colombia had been a country of emigration and, within a few years, became a country of transit and immigration. However, research on social cohesion is scarce and has focused on xenophobia and discrimination rather than on the mechanisms that affect social cohesion from a historical, structural, localised and contextual approach. This paper provides a qualitative approach to host communities receiving displaced Venezuelans and towards an understanding of the mechanisms that trigger or hinder social cohesion in three selected cities: Riohacha, Barranquilla and Bogotá. The literature review gives us a first glance at social cohesion in Colombia regarding identity, trust and, more generally, topics of discrimination and xenophobia among different localities and settings as well as different population groups. However, the gaps in social cohesion studies vary, and there is scarce data available. Moreover, myths about migration have propagated within host communities from the beginning of the crisis. Phrases such as “They’re stealing our jobs”, “Women come to take our husbands” and “They are criminals” are commonly heard within IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 10 various projects and programmes, integrating them into existing policies while creating local migration policy. Riohacha is situated in the northern part of the country, just one hour from Maicao, which is an entry point at the border with Venezuela. It is a city where Indigenous communities – the Wayuu, who are nationals of both Colombia and Venezuela – Venezuelans and Colombian returnees come together. Riohacha is home to 46,817 Venezuelans. We partnered with Asociación Salto Angel, which is funded by Venezuelan women and working on economic and social inclusion by providing access to women community leaders, and with Fundación Brisas del Norte, which is funded by a Colombian returnee who empowers local communities living in settlements to help them create governance structures. 3.3 Data collection I used a community and gender-based approach to select participants. The participants were invited in partnership with the four refugee and migrant-led organisations. The discussions took place in their organisations or in the communities where they work and/or live. The data from fieldwork was collected between 10 June and 26 July 2024. I organised five (5) focus group discussions (FGDs) with community leaders for a total of twenty-four (24) people, and seven (7) semi-structured interviews with key informants in both host and displaced communities. One of the FGDs in Riohacha was held in a settlement with eleven (11) women – members of recently created committees for the governance of their community. For the sample, gender was a critical characteristic, since most of the interviewees and participants were female, and many of them being community leaders. The nationalities of the participants were considered for the sample. It was finally composed of Venezuelans and binationals: people who are both Venezuelan and Colombian nationals, which is quite common, particularly in the borderlands. Six participants were Colombian. Table 2: Attributes of focus group discussion participants FGD # City Number of participants Male Female Colombian Venezuelan 1 Bogotá 4 1 3 0 4 2 Riohacha 3 1 2 1 2 3 Riohacha 11 0 11 1 10 4 Barranquilla 4 2 2 1 3 5 Barranquilla 2 0 2 0 2 TOTAL 24 4 20 3 21 Table 3: Attributes of interviewees City Number of interviewees Male Female Colombian Venezuelan Bogotá 2 0 2 1 1 Riohacha 4 0 4 2 2 Barranquilla 1 1 0 0 1 TOTAL 7 1 6 3 4 Source: Author IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 11 The results were compared with four (4) key informant interviews with experts and media workers working with displaced Venezuelans. 4 Findings and analysis 4.1 Horizontal dimension (individual): “We are equal, and we have the same rights and the same duties” 4.1.1 Shared identities In general, Venezuelans have a good relationship with Colombians in their communities due to shared values such as solidarity and empathy. Most of the Venezuelan participants in the research had Colombian friends and colleagues, and some even highlighted the help they received from other Colombians when they arrived, despite a hostile environment towards Venezuelans: A Colombian lady, she was like a bridge to make me know other people. She has a beauty salon, and she offered me work in her house, and through her, I met a lot of other good people and others who were not good. (Interviewee 1) Family ties also play an important role in social cohesion. One interviewee told me the story of her marriage in Colombia to her husband. Her husband had Colombian parents and they both lived in Venezuela, but due to the circumstances, they decided to move to Colombia and get married. She said she did not organise a single thing for her marriage. She had the solidarity of his family and friends, so she had always felt welcome in Colombia. Indeed, Venezuelans share family members who are also Colombian nationals. On the one hand, many Colombians have children who were born in Venezuela, have been naturalised and are nationals of both countries. On the other hand, Venezuelans living in Colombia have children who are eligible for Colombian citizenship.2 Another representative group are Colombian returnees, who once were also refugees in Venezuela. To emphasise the importance of family bonds, a returnee shared how his family found refuge in Venezuela after being forcibly displaced in Colombia: Venezuela was a country that received my family in the worst moments of that forced displacement. My mother went to Venezuela looking for better opportunities, and I believe that there she got what Colombia could not give her at that time, such as protection, allowing her to live peacefully and safely. (Participant 14) Another Colombian returnee affirmed, “I had the opportunity to be accepted in Venezuela and I also accept Venezuelans, I treat them with respect because they are human beings who also deserve opportunities” (Interviewee 3). She lived for several years in Venezuela. A Venezuelan participant in an FGD told us he had assisted Colombians in Venezuela for more than 16 years, and he is now a community leader assisting his fellow nationals in Bogotá. Indeed, both communities share solidarity and empathy. The displacement to Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s fuels some of these shared values: Having a lived experience of displacement results in empathy. 2 Nationality by birth is given only to those who reside lawfully in the country. However, in the context of the Venezuelan displacement, the Colombian government adopted Law 1997 in 2019, which provides an exception for Venezuelan parents to register their children as Colombians if they are born in Colombia (Global Compact on Refugees, s.a.-a). IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 12 For those Venezuelans who arrived in 2017 and 2018, Colombia felt like home. Even if the situation in Venezuela improved, they told me that they were not planning to go anywhere. One participant told me: “The children are already studying and everyone has a job; we do not lack anything, but to return to Venezuela now is to start from scratch and go backward, right?” (Participant 21). Another Venezuelan underlined: I have already created some kind of roots where I have arrived, and I have always believed that where one is planted, the important thing is to flourish with that learning. I feel that I have put down some roots in Colombia, some roots in Barranquilla and that my vocation of permanence is strong. (Interviewee 5) This sense of feeling at home is, for some Venezuelans, key to their inclusion. Shared values, cultural ties and even similar weather in Barranquilla and Riohacha provide a positive scenario for improving social cohesion with host communities. The Venezuelan identity prevails over regional, political, religious or gender identities. 4.1.2 Cultural ties: “feeling at home” One main difference between the Venezuelan displacement to Colombia compared to other major displacements in the world is the shared Spanish language, shared Catholic religious beliefs, and historical and cultural ties. One common topic raised when Colombians and Venezuelans are asked about their culture is whether the “arepa” is Colombian or Venezuelan – this is described by a Venezuelan woman as “the eternal conflict”. Arepa is a typical cornbased food offered in more than 100 different varieties in both countries; both nationalities claim it is theirs. Even if this might be anecdotal, communities gather around a shared language and some common food culture. A participant told me: My best friend is Colombian and, for example, yesterday I went to her house […] she told me, I have something from your country that you like, I made you cachapa [a type of arepa]. I mean, for me, that is something very nice because people accept your culture, people even let your culture in. (Participant 19) Locally, similarities are stronger once we get closer to the border with Venezuela. Riohacha, which is located one hour from the border with Venezuela, is part of La Guajira, where the Indigenous Wayuu have their ancestral land. Being close to the border means sharing families, so there are fewer differences with Colombians. Traditionally, this region has had a circular migration and buoyant informal commerce. Venezuelans and Colombians used to cross the border mainly for trade purposes. However, ever since the situation in Venezuela deteriorated, Venezuelans and Colombians who once lived in or were displaced in Venezuela crossed the border to settle in cities such as Riohacha. A returnee told me: I also find many similarities in the city as a cultural Maracaibo and the climate and culture as we are at the border. So, we have shared a lot there in Maracaibo, we met many Colombians, and many are now here in La Guajira. (Participant 12) At the border between Venezuela and Colombia, the identities of those living in the border region are not defined by the official border set up by Colombia and Venezuela. From his ethnographic research, Price discusses the complexities of identities in La Guajira, a region in the north of Colombia where there are no strong national identities but multiple identities that intersect (Price, 2023). In Barranquilla, there is also a sense that forcibly displaced Venezuelans feel more at home because of the weather and similarities to some of the cities in Venezuela, such as Maracaibo. Both cities have high temperatures, are close to the Caribbean Sea and share cultural ties. During the FGDs and interviews, many recalled that it was easier to live in Barranquilla because IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 13 of its weather and the culture of the “costeño” – which is the name for those in Colombia who have been born and settled on the Caribbean coast. An interviewee who arrived in Barranquilla in 2018 told me, I always say that I look for similarities in Barranquilla, the city, and the environment. It is very similar; we share many things with at least where I live, which is also on the coast, so I feel that the climate was not such a big change in relating with people, I feel that in Barranquilla. I have found people who have become like family to me. (Interviewee 5) A Venezuelan woman participating in an FGD also told us: “The ‘maracucho’ [person from Maracaibo] is very loud and speaks very loudly and sometimes very fast, he is not understood, that is the same way as the ‘costeño’. So, I feel that there is not much difference” (Participant 15). For her, people from these two cities have many things in common, including their personalities. Barranquilla is well-known for its Carnival, which takes place every year in February and where hundreds of people gather to celebrate the cultural variety and folklore of the Colombian Caribbean region. In the Carnival, there are usually representations of typical characters of the city and the country. Participants in an FGD recalled that, a few years ago, Venezuelan women were portrayed as being coffee sellers in the streets. Despite being invited to participate in the Carnival, the participant withdrew from the group, saying, “That person doesn’t represent me”, underlining that it was not a cultural expression but rather a “mockery” of his nationality. He said the situation has improved in recent years, notably when, one or two years ago, the Queen of the Carnival, in her choreography, paid tribute to Yolanda Moreno, a very famous ballet dancer from Venezuela. He now participates in the Carnival. Another participant stated that he takes part in the Carnival because it is the way he feels part of the city: I am a fan of the Carnival of Barranquilla, I love to dress up, I love to appropriate, so to speak, to use that term, of the Barranquilla culture because it is a way for me to feel that I am part of something, and I think that is the most difficult thing for a person when he is not from a country to feel part of something […] I am part of this city, that I am part of this society, and for me, it has been like that refuge, to be able to feel part of this city to speed up a little more the processes of integration. (Interviewee 5) The cultural appropriation of this tradition shows how deep cultural values can be shared between the two countries and have a positive effect on social cohesion, creating a group identity. In Bogotá, there are differences concerning the weather and the culture. Bogotá does not have high temperatures, and being the capital city, it is home to people from all around the country. Even if identity does not play a different role in these three cities, in Riohacha and Barranquilla it is salient that, because of the proximity, the weather and the accent, Venezuelans feel more at home. 4.1.3 Resilience and leadership of displaced communities Identity comes from being Venezuelan in the first place. When I asked participants what it means for them to be Venezuelan, pride and nationalism were the first answers. There is also the sense of being strong, persevering and resilient. One participant defined himself as follows: For me, being Venezuelan is to be very persevering, to be very resilient, and I am very constant to adapt to the different changes, because if you ask me and you see my story, I come from being a journalist, but I have also washed cars, but I have also worked as a waiter, but I have also sold in the streets, but I have also defended the rights of other migrants, and today I also lead an organisation to defend those migrants so that they do not go through the same situations that I went through. (Interviewee 5) IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 14 “Resilience” is a word that comes up constantly among Venezuelan participants. For one of them, “Resilience is perseverance, it is never to give up because I know many people who, like me, have found it very difficult to come to do things that we never thought of doing in our lives” (Interviewee 5). Some interviewees said they had a diploma but came to work in other areas, selling coffee and washing cars, and their resilience comes from learning. The interviewee cited said it never meant a “disgrace” for him to work on this type of job, despite holding a bachelor’s degree in communications. Resilience is about “the power to adapt to unimaginable scenarios with the sole purpose of subsistence and also to subsist and live together” (Interviewee 5). It is then resilience that allows them to coexist peacefully, despite many having had to “start from zero” when they arrived in Colombia. Additionally, strong leadership skills develop from assisting others and the newly arrived as well as helping them to understand the Colombian system and society. Women have proved to be leaders and a cohesive factor in several communities. For most of the female participants, nationality was not raised when speaking about gender-based violence (GBV) in their communities and how they face this issue together: “What we also have is an approach within the community of what female empowerment is to raise many voices. The community suffered a lot from marital violence and demonstrated that women can be very strong, that we are brave” (Interviewee 2). Community leadership is appreciated whether it comes from the host community or the displaced persons. An interviewee articulated her relationship with the community, emphasising that Venezuelans and Colombians are very similar, saying “We are one.” She stressed that most of the people who approach me are Colombian, and they say that for them it is incredible that a person who comes from another country here is the one who is at the forefront of the community fighting for the rights of others. (Interviewee 2) During an FGD in a settlement in Riohacha, this was emphasised by all the women who participated. They have put in place informal mechanisms in their community to address issues such as water scarcity and lack of aqueducts. With the help of Fundación Brisas del Norte, they have set up subcommittees for each one of their issues, and they are all led by women. They said they have learnt to coexist peacefully. One woman said to another during the FGD, “Neighbour, I am your family.” Union and love came up in our conversation a couple of times. There is still a long way to go in analysing the effects of gender norms in displacement contexts (Brück, Hanmer, Klugman, & Arango, 2024) and its implications for social cohesion. Despite their strong resilience, there are also displaced persons who arrive with several traumas and damages that need to be treated. Whether these are due to the humanitarian crisis back in Venezuela or their experiences crossing the border on foot, the toll on their emotional well-being has been high. Malnutrition, GBV and other extreme situations that Venezuelans have been through are carried with them on their journeys before being brought to communities affected by inequality and poverty. Even if they had different lives and projects in Venezuela, there is an inclusive identity that emerges from their resilience and expands to the host communities in the form of leadership that addresses, in some cases, the same issues for both populations. 4.2 Horizontal dimension (social): relations between social groups The literature review suggests there are two types of research and information available about social cohesion in communities hosting forcibly displaced Venezuelans in Colombia. These are quantitative and qualitative studies based on a range of methodologies, including ethnographies (Price, 2023). These studies target different populations, including students, adolescents, women and Indigenous peoples (Aliaga, Baracaldo, Pinto, & Gissi, 2018; Bellino & Ortiz- IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 15 Guerrero, 2023; Lebow, Moreno Medina, Coral, & Mousa, 2024; Woldemikael et al., 2022; Zhou, Rojas, & Peters, 2024). These groups are also sometimes analysed from the perspective of the rural/urban divide as well as poverty levels (Lebow, Moreno Medina, & Coral, 2020), which is more interesting. I focus on the policy preferences of Colombians and the effects of inclusion policies in shaping the differences between people who live in border regions and those who live in the inner cities, as well as the role of social media in the narratives about migrants and migration. I include all of this information in the analysis of the findings. 4.2.1 Inequality and class divisions in host communities Poverty, inequality and a lack of opportunities can prevent social cohesion. One participant highlighted when speaking about Colombia: “The country has its own problems. Well, there is a very big inequality, and it is very marked, and the opportunities are not so many. I didn’t understand it” (Interviewee 6). According to her, in Venezuela, she had more opportunities, for instance, to access higher education, and she thought it was very expensive in Colombia. Displacement can be experienced differently depending on the person’s socioeconomic status in Venezuela. Participants agreed that class plays a more important role in Colombia – marginalisation and social class divisions are different. In Venezuela, although there are rich and not so rich and poor, the social class is not felt as it is felt here. Moreover, Colombia is the only country that has that so marked and has the estratos [Colombian social stratification system]. It is the only country in the world, isn’t it? (Participant 22) Another participant explained to me that in Venezuela, they did not pay for the water and rent; they were owners, but the displacement experience has been useful to teach their kids that not everything is free. There had been high incomes in Venezuela due to the oil boom, and during the Chavez government there were installed social policies, the “Misiones”, which were aimed at reducing exclusion. These policies were highly dependent on the prices of oil and did not impact the basic needs of Venezuelans. Instead, they were short-term solutions which helped them afford houses, cars and other benefits (Castro Herrera, 2016). One common phrase heard when Venezuelans arrived in Colombia was that they wanted everything for free. This has its roots in the social policies adopted by Venezuela and, at the same time, contradicts the fact that they fled the regime. Some of the interviewees had nostalgia that once there was a better Venezuela. An examination of the policy preferences of Colombians in response to the forced displacement from Venezuela reveals that they prefer more open policy options regarding access to the labour market and public health care. At the same time, they support restrictions on the number of Venezuelans (Allen et al., 2024). The study also analyses the responses of Colombians with higher levels of humanitarianism, concluding they prefer less restrictive policies. Using threatbenefit theory to analyse the attitudes of Colombian informal workers towards Venezuelans shows that they are ambivalent about them (Alizadeh Afrouzi, 2024). Negative perceptions are predominant and are associated with realistic economic and physical threats, including to the labour market, public services, housing, security and conjugal relationships. There are also symbolic threats to societal cohesion and modernity, and there are symbolic benefits related to humanitarian and cultural diversity, contributions to lifestyles, and an attitude of empathy and understanding. All of these perceptions continue to evolve in both positive and negative directions over the long term. In terms of a comparison with IDPs, Venezuelans and host communities in Colombia, a study about social protection responses to forced displacement concludes that social cohesion is influenced by the provision of assistance (Ham et al., 2022). The authors affirm, “While assistance for displaced populations strengthens their relations with the state, government IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 16 support to Venezuelans can damage community relations, where it appears to divert public resources away from vulnerable citizens” (Ham et al., 2022). According to the study, the horizontal dimension of social cohesion shows that, in low-income areas, there was tension related to Venezuelans regarding the provision of resources from the government. Another argument expressed by Colombians when Venezuelans arrived in 2018 was that they were stealing their jobs. On the side of Venezuelans, many people in the research study mentioned that they were abused and paid less than they deserved, most of the time less than the minimum wage. One interviewee, for example, declared she was paid only around USD 6 per day for working in a bakery.3 Additionally, one interviewee explained that in her community, most had attained different levels of education, but their qualifications were not valued. She said that most must do the work for a lower wage out of necessity (Interviewee 3). Indeed, validating diplomas is a long and expensive process in Colombia, which prevents Venezuelans from accessing decent jobs (Graham et al., 2020). More generally, in Riohacha, there is a lack of state services, capacities at the local level are weak and there is a high poverty index, which makes economic inclusion difficult for Venezuelans who are struggling to find job opportunities (Guerrero-Blé & López Villamil, 2022). There are several studies on the effects of Venezuelans on the labour market. I emphasise three studies that show the effects of Venezuelan displacement on the labour market and the impact of providing work permits. Lebow shows there is little or no effect on the wages of Colombians due to the arrival of Venezuelans, but notes that this varies in larger cities with higher rates of job informality (Lebow, 2022). When addressing the gender issue, Pedrazzi and PeñalozaPacheco found that the labour force participation rate of high-skilled women with children was affected positively, whereas for lower-skilled women, it was negatively affected because of the disproportionate amount of competition (Pedrazzi & Peñaloza-Pacheco, 2023). Regarding the impact of work permits, they have expanded employment prospects for those who were previously unemployed, but the authors suggest that there is a need to implement programmes for younger workers to match migrants to appropriate jobs in the labour market (García-Suaza, Mondragón-Mayo, & Sarango-Iturralde, 2024). Moreover, a study analysing rural and urban areas finds that there is a large and positive level of trust towards immigrants in larger urban, educated and productive regions (Lebow et al., 2020). Regarding this divide, another study finds that the effects of migrant arrivals are more positive in more rural locations. This divide is reduced over time as the amount of meaningful contact increases (Lebow et al., 2024). 4.2.2 Potential sources of conflict: violence and resource scarcity Venezuelans arrived in host communities that were already experiencing conflict due to poverty, drug trafficking, drug abuse, violence (particularly GBV) and a lack of state services. The myth about “becoming Venezuela” has been present in public opinion. It is related to the “fear of losing the privileges of the middle class if we reach a situation similar to that of Venezuela, which is a myth, but it is a myth that is constant”, according to one expert. The role that the middle class of Colombia plays in reproducing this type of discourse is key to understanding the possible lack of social cohesion among host communities that have received Venezuelans. There is the middle class, and then there are the vulnerable populations that activate mechanisms of resistance due to the lack of state services. Difficulties concerning social cohesion also arise from the fact that Colombia has had a longstanding armed conflict and problems related to drug trafficking. This is particularly visible in the context of Riohacha, where non-state agents have built parallel powers based on the use of 3 The minimum wage in Colombia was around USD 300 per month for 2024. IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 17 force and violence (Trejos Rosero & Luquetta Cediel, 2014). Colombia has high levels of violence, and that can be difficult for Venezuelans to understand, according to a participant. She remarked that Venezuelans are often targeted as being the causes of violence and stresses: I have not yet robbed anyone or anything like that, but it is difficult for people to understand it, to understand that we did not come to this country to increase the violence, that the violence was already there, only that there are people who joined that because it was part of the possibilities they saw to survive, but that in the end, we all come to survive, just as many Colombians have done. […] And you say a lot of things have happened and we were next door and we didn’t find out. I mean, I, for example, understood about two years ago because it was almost all about mafia and drug novels. I saw them, but I didn’t understand. I mean […] it was very strange until I came, and I heard from the people too, who have been displaced, who were violent to social leaders and social defenders. (Interviewee 6) In Colombia, both human rights violations and normalised violence are exacerbated by conflicts arising from resource scarcity. Rivalries often emerge due to unequal access to state resources. This situation is prevalent even among Venezuelan-led organisations competing for public funds, driven by the fear that the presence of others may jeopardise the achievements that Colombian organisations have made. An interviewee recalled that there have also been conflicts related to humanitarian aid: They said that everything was for Venezuelans many times. At least here we had the example of a neighbourhood of a colleague where a foundation came to open a soccer team in the community, and they said that they only wanted migrant children. And then the other people from the community felt offended because the [Colombian] children also wanted to play, they are children, and they don’t know. So, I think that I have also felt like a little bit of an error that some organisations have made. (Interviewee 2) She said that this has changed over time because the community leaders have insisted on bringing aid to all the vulnerable people in their communities and not only focusing on Venezuelans. Another interviewee said Colombians share many of the needs of the Venezuelans, and therefore aid must include them both. This example is quite common among vulnerable communities, and it was particularly true during the COVID-19 pandemic, when there was a competition for humanitarian aid within the host communities (López Villamil, 2022). A hyperconcentration of Venezuelans in some areas can generate more conflicts than in areas where there is a lower concentration. For instance, there are conflicts because of overcrowding in some neighbourhoods. In Bogotá, participants in the FGD declared that sometimes more than 20 people were living in one flat. One of them shared: If there is domestic violence or there is consumption of psychotropic substances, there’s a problem. Then, of course, I already made all the neighbours upset, they call the police saying that there is a knife, that there is blood, that there is broken glass. (Participant 21) Micro-trafficking, GBV, marginalisation and resource scarcity can significantly undermine social cohesion in host communities. These issues, which often precede the arrival of displaced populations, negatively impact both the displaced Venezuelans and the host communities. The lack of state services in some host communities is often filled by non-state actors, leading to increased violence and heightened competition over limited resources, which further exacerbates conflict. IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 18 4.2.3 Xenophobia and discrimination With regard to a violent environment, the participants mentioned that there is discrimination and xenophobia, and many shared their own stories related to the topic. They stated that it comes from both women and men. However, they recognised that the situation has improved from when they moved to Colombia in 2015 or 2018. One issue discussed in FGDs and interviews was the discrimination against Venezuelan women who are labelled with stereotypes. Many Venezuelan women in Riohacha said they were called “Placas Blancas”, which translates to “white plates”. This term is a reference to car plates from Venezuela, which are white and were smuggled into Colombia in the 2000s, whereas Colombian plates are mainly yellow. The term is a discriminatory way of labelling Venezuelan women who come to Colombia, suggesting that they are there to “steal husbands and work as prostitutes”. One Colombian woman who lived for more than eight years in Venezuela recalled hearing from a man, “Here comes the white plate”. Another man explained to him that she was Colombian but lived in Venezuela, so he should not call her that. She then told him not to mess with her. Another Venezuelan woman remembered not knowing the meaning of that expression and was hurt when she found out they were called that. Moreover, both women and LGBTQ+ persons have suffered from discrimination. One interviewee from Riohacha recalled being hired by a woman to sell juices in front of a hospital and telling her to come to work with less clothing on. She answered, “I came here to sell cheese arepas; I didn’t come to sell my body” (Interviewee 1). She emphasised that there are ways to earn money decently. According to one expert interviewed, there is a hyper-sexualisation of Venezuelan women that has sometimes led to GBV, including sexual violence and trafficking in persons. These issues are also encountered by LGBTQ+ persons who additionally face discrimination due to their nationality. A community leader pointed out: The path of migration is not easy, and it is not the same for everyone. For some, it is more bearable, for others, it is more difficult. For LGBTQ+ people, it is twice as difficult because, in addition, they face discrimination for being from another country. Discrimination for being a diverse person is not the same as being a gay LGBTQ+ migrant, non-binary or trans person. (Interviewee 5) In the FGDs in Bogotá, participants mentioned they would not rent apartments to Venezuelans or “costeños”. Some Venezuelans have a strategy for blending into Colombian society; an interviewee revealed to me: When I arrived in Barranquilla, my partner who received me, or my friend who was going to receive me here, she gave me some tips and recommendations on how to pass myself off as a Colombian in order to close those gaps that could discriminate against me, that could lead me to a job, that could even use me in the sense that if they notice your accent they can charge you more in the ticket, and so on. I thank her for that. (Interviewee 5) He then recalled that nowadays, seeing/hearing a migrant, a Venezuelan, has been normalised. 4.2.4 The role of media and social media in the narratives Regarding the role of media, some participants agreed that the amount of discrimination had diminished, although they were still reading negative news about Venezuelans, particularly in the local media. As one interviewee told me: “Sometimes it’s hard to read comments in the press that say that it’s good that they should all go away, that they are all murderers, and you are faced with the reality that they sell” (Interviewee 5). Another participant added: IDOS Discussion Paper 14/2025 19 I see a newscast that is constantly talking bad about Venezuelans. It only shows the bad things. Obviously, this will feed me and attract me to a Venezuelan, but it will not be the best thing, so I feel that it has decreased a little. Obviously, there is still a lot of work to do; there is still a long way to go. I still feel that there is a lot to work to do on social cohesion and integration. (Participant 19) According to a journalist I interviewed, Venezuelans were targeted during the COVID-19 pandemic and the xenophobia was exacerbated. In this context, many Venezuelans wanted to return to their country but, since the borders were closed, they were stranded, and some were living in the streets in different cities. This provoked people to target Venezuelans as the ones who were spreading the virus. A study found that politicians did not link the migrants to the spread of COVID-19 (Zhou et al., 2024). This could mean that public opinion differed at the time from the narratives of the politicians. DANE (2024) reports that 28.6 per cent of Venezuelans felt discriminated against. Of these, 61.7 per cent felt it was because of their migratory situation, and 29.2 per cent because of their ethnic origin, colour or language. There were 47.8 per cent who felt discriminated against in the streets or public spaces, 40 per cent who felt this while looking for a job and 27.1 per cent while working their job. Only 12.2 per cent felt discriminated against in their neighbourhoods. For instance, a report from 2024 analyses the regional politics and discourses from local authorities that were related to Venezuelans and insecurity issues, which are then reported on by the media (El Barómetro, 2024). Despite the solidarity discourse from the national government, the media produced contradictory messages regarding Venezuelans, portraying them as a threat to public health and security (Ordóñez & Arcos, 2019b). This is more intense in border cities such as Cúcuta and Riohacha, where local newspapers portray Venezuelans negatively: A problem group that exacerbates conflicts in the regions they reach (Norte de Santander and La Guajira). They [media] narrate them from violence, illness, territorial possession – of border crossings and public places. They are represented as a failure to follow established norms and values, in short, as undesirable subjects that trigger territorial and social conflicts. (Castellanos-Díaz & Prada-Penagos, 2020, p. 924) This portrayal lacks the contextual analysis of displacement and harms the protection and inclusion of Venezuelans, according to the author. Not only the mainstream media but also social media have influenced perceptions about Venezuelans: Information digitisation and social media virtual platforms have contributed to a widespread discourse of discrimination and xenophobia and even incited violence against Venezuelans (Cabrera, 2021). Narratives around migration can be xenophobic but also integrative. El Barómetro (s.a.), an NGO that monitors and analyses data from social media, published a report on the narratives about migration in the media in Colombia (El Barómetro, 2024). Its findings are that the media portray Venezuelans as criminals and associate them with insecurity; they repeat stereotypes associated with women and the xenophobic discourses of public figures; they legitimise the violence against migrants; and they have narratives that can encourage competition for resources. However, they also highlight that there are integrative narratives concerning political measures and the need to guarantee the human rights of Venezuelans. This is associated with news about human rights violations, trafficking in persons and violence or threats towards migrants. Colombia has had positive, humanitarian narratives towards Venezuelans, and it has experienced very little unrest compared to other countries in Latin America. These narratives are based on the two countries’ shared history and cultural ties. However, these narratives have limits. 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