Capitalising on criminality: A new lusophone route through Mozambique

Jesperson, Sasha; Verrier, Martin Article Capitalising on criminality: A new lusophone route through Mozambique Journal of Illicit Economies and Development (JIED) Provided in Cooperation with: LSE Press, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) Suggested Citation: Jesperson, Sasha; Verrier, Martin (2024) : Capitalising on criminality: A new lusophone route through Mozambique, Journal of Illicit Economies and Development (JIED), ISSN 2516-7227, LSE Press, London, Vol. 5, Iss. 3, pp. 37-46, https://doi.org/10.31389/jied.160 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320682 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ RESEARCH CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Sasha Jesperson Independent, UK [email protected] KEYWORDS: Mozambique; Brazil; cocaine; Lusophone; elites; state capture; PCC TO CITE THIS ARTICLE: Jesperson, S and Verrier, M. 2024. Capitalising On Criminality: A New Lusophone Route through Mozambique. Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 5(3), pp. 37–46. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31389/ jied.160 Capitalising On Criminality: A New Lusophone Route through Mozambique SASHA JESPERSON MARTIN VERRIER ABSTRACT Mozambique is becoming recognised as an emerging hub for cocaine trafficking, with links stretching back to Brazil. The arrest of a well-known associate of Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) suggests the emergence of a new ‘lusophone route’ driven by the group. Mozambique’s connection to other illicit flows – heroin and methamphetamines from the Makran Coast, and natural resources moving outward – provides the infrastructure to begin moving a new commodity through the country, however the PCC should not expect a silent partner in Mozambique. Political elites have played a key role in other illicit flows, and there is no reason to suggest cocaine would be any different. *Author affiliations can be found in the back matter of this article 38Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 Brazil has been playing a vital role in cocaine trafficking to Africa. UNODC’s World Drug Report 2022 reports that 70 per cent of all seizures made on the continent between 2015 and 2021 arrived from Brazil (UNODC 2022). Within Africa itself, Mozambique has gained significance as a hub for the transit of cocaine. The existence of a Lusophone route, linking Brazil with Lusophone countries in Africa is not new – cocaine has been moving from Brazil to Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau for decades; however, the emergence of Mozambique as a hub for cocaine trafficked from Brazil is relatively recent. It intersects with an already well-founded route for the movement of heroin and now methamphetamines, arriving on the Mozambican coast, and being redirected north and south overland. The rise of Mozambique as a transit hub for cocaine is part of well-established displacement effects, where increased law enforcement attention on one part of a route results in the shift of trafficking elsewhere. In Africa, this has mostly been analysed in relation to the opening of West Africa as a transit hub for cocaine in the late 1990s following significant seizures of vessels shipping cocaine directly from South America to Europe. Within Africa, analysts have focused on shifts in cocaine trafficking from West Africa to North Africa (Herbert 2018), or heroin trafficking from the Makran Coast of Pakistan and Iran to Kenya moving further south, first to Tanzania, and then to Mozambique (Haysom 2018). Mozambique provides a very conducive environment for cocaine trafficking because of the other illicit commodities moving in and out of the country, as well as the involvement of political elites, and more recently the cover of insurgency in northern Mozambique. For the Brazilian Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which controls the movement of cocaine through Brazil, Mozambique presents an opportunity for expansion. However, the interests of political elites in Mozambique should not be underestimated. This article reviews the addition of Mozambique to the Lusophone route for cocaine trafficking and the role of the PCC in trafficking cocaine into Mozambique. It begins by charting the rise of the PCC as the primary actor involved in cocaine trafficking in Brazil, followed by the rise of a Lusophone route to Europe, including through West African countries. The article then explores the shift into Mozambique, discussing the existing criminal environment in Mozambique, the convergence of multiple commodities, considering how cocaine trafficking fits within the criminal marketplace and highlighting the potential for conflict between the PCC and Mozambican elites. The research for this article arose from research commissioned by the European Commission into the convergence of different crime types along what has previously been understood as the ‘Cocaine Route’ to Europe. The research engaged with EU funded projects through the Global Illicit Flows Programme, involved a desk review to understand the presence of different crime types along the ‘Cocaine Route’, and involved key informant interviews with individuals involved in project delivery in the countries of focus, including Mozambique, as well as experts focused on organised crime trends. THE LUSOPHONE COCAINE TRADE Brazil represents an attractive hub for cocaine trafficking organisations in South America. The country has a sizeable domestic market – the 2015 National Drug Use Survey found that 4.68 million people between 12 and 65 had consumed powder cocaine in their lifetime, 1.34 million in the 12 months preceding the survey (Bastos, et al. 2017). Brazil’s geographical position, bordering the core cocaine producers – Bolivia, Peru and Colombia – provides an opportunity to consolidate cocaine flows and manage exports to the European market. Brazil’s strong domestic market has strengthened local criminal groups, to the detriment of foreign actors present elsewhere in South America. Local criminal groups, such as the Commando Vermelho and the PCC started as local organisations controlling cocaine flows into specific neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the main Brazilian cities. These neighbourhoods provided a stronghold for local criminal organisations to resist attempts by the state to undermine their operations. Prisons played a similar role, as local kingpins used their financial resources to corrupt penitentiary officials, turning prisons into unofficial headquarters for their organisations. The PCC was potentially the most effective at exploiting this vulnerability, resulting in significant expansion. 39Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 The PCC was formed in 1993, when several inmates of the Taubate prison in Sau Paulo established an alliance and killed other leaders in the prison. The first stage of the PCC’s expansion was characterised by disruptive action inside Brazilian jails, which improved their negotiating capabilities with the government on detention conditions. The second stage was defined by domestic consolidation and diversification of criminal activities. In 2001, the PCC attracted government attention for taking control of 29 prisons in 19 cities, forcing authorities to negotiate (Kaminsky and Squeff, 2001). From 2006, a third stage of expansion began with the PCC directly challenging the government’s legitimate monopoly of force in the country. The PCC conducted 293 coordinated attacks on police stations, transport facilities and state buildings (Coutinho 2019). A fourth phase is evident in the groups international expansion – first regionally, and then across the Atlantic (Coutinho 2019). The PCC extended its networks and operational routes to Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia (Clavel 2017). Regionally, the PCC took control of the entire cocaine supply chain. It established alliances with other criminal organisations such as the ‘Ndrangheta, where it acted as a supplier for shipments heading to Europe. More recently, the PCC started to explore new routes, evading competition from other criminal organisations. Due to an increase in commerce, cultural affinity and institutional weakness, the Lusophone countries appeared to be an attractive entry point. THE EMERGENCE OF A LUSOPHONE ROUTE TO WEST AFRICA While West Africa has received the most notoriety for cocaine trafficking, connections between Lusophone countries have expanded the sphere of influence of Brazilian organised crime groups in particular. The Lusophone route – from Brazil to Portugal – has grown in prominence, beginning with a spike in cocaine seizures between 2003 and 2007 in Portugal (EMCDDA 2009). The 2013 UNODC World Drug Report identified that ‘Brazil occurs more frequently among individual cocaine consignments seized by Portugal than those reported by Spain’, a trend that increased significantly between 2008 and 2009 (UNODC 2013c). From the seizures made in Portugal and Spain between 2007 and 2011, Brazil, together with Lusophone countries in Africa, consistently accounted for more than half (59–83%) of the cases (UNODC 2021). While the Lusophone route is not the primary entry point to Europe, particularly as the Netherlands and Belgium have overtaken the Iberian Peninsula as key European ports for cocaine, it can reasonably be expected that strong links remain between Lusophone countries (UNODC 2021). Legal exports from Brazil to Africa grew from 64 million USD in 2000 to 800 million USD in 2021 (Trading Economics 2022). This explosive expansion in legal commerce between Brazil and the African continent has been exploited by organised crime to ship cocaine to African shores, with the most recurrent method being Rip-on/Rip-off, where illicit goods are placed in a container just prior to departure and removed immediately on arrival, before inspection. The Brazilian port of Santos plays a vital role in this route. Cocaine seizures rose from 1,672 kg in 2013 to 27,000 kg in 2019 (Proinde 2021). Large cocaine seizures were registered from 2005–2011, mainly in three transhipment hubs: the northern hub, comprising of GuineaBissau, Guinea, Gambia and Senegal, the southern hub, comprising of Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana and the eastern hub comprising of Mali and Mauritania, with Brazil identified as the main departure point (UNODC 2013a). Maritime trafficking coexists with trafficking by air, both through commercial and general aviation. The most common departure points for cocaine trafficking through commercial flights are the Sao Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport and Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão International Airport. In 2021, Brazil’s Federal Police made several drug seizures related to cocaine trafficking to destinations in Africa (Linsell 2021). Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau are frequently associated with the Lusophone route, particularly during the time periods noted above, when cocaine flow through West Africa peaked (UNODC 2013b), however Lusophone countries in southern Africa have also grown in importance. In 2010, nine Angolans were arrested in Portugal linked to cocaine trafficking, and in 2011 every passenger was screened on two flights to Luanda from Sao Paolo, resulting in the identification of over 20 cocaine couriers on each flight (UNODC 2013b). In 2019, there was a seizure of 238 kg of cocaine onboard the ‘Grande Africa’ in Luanda (Benjamin 2019). The cocaine was hidden inside Renault cars manufactured in Brazil and exported to Angola. While Angola has become less of a recognised hub for drug trafficking, with a low ranking for drug trafficking according to the Organised Crime Index – cocaine is still the most prevalent drug moving 40Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 through the country (GITOC 2021a). In 2020, two individuals were detained at Luanda airport coming from Brazil with 12 kilos of cocaine (Macau Business 2020). In March 2021, an Angolan was detained in Sao Paolo-Guarulhos airport (Ver Angola 2021). In June 2021, an Angolan individual was arrested at Recife airport for attempting to traffic 4.6 kgs of cocaine to Angola (Globo 2021). Alongside Angola, Mozambique has become a growing concern. The country is already well established for heroin trafficking from the Makran coast, and there have been increased levels of cocaine arriving in the country for onward transit to South Africa and Europe. THE RISE OF MOZAMBIQUE AS A CRIMINAL HUB Mozambique became a hub for illicit flows as heroin transiting the Indian Ocean began to move further south after successful interdictions in Kenya and Tanzania. Heroin is currently the primary illicit commodity moving through Mozambique. The same route – dhows departing from the Makran Coast in Pakistan and Iran – is now also being used for the transport of methamphetamine from Afghanistan to South Africa (GITOC 2021c). Mozambique is also a hub for illegal logging, trafficking of ivory and rhino horn and the illicit trade in rubies, as well as migration crimes and arms trafficking (GITOC 2021b). The growth of Mozambique as a hub for illicit activity is also linked to allegations that key party officials are profiting from organised crime. Despite civil war between 1977 and 1992, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) has been in power since independence. The primary opposition party and the main belligerent in the civil war, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), has claimed that FRELIMO has engaged in electoral fraud, however. There is also limited public trust in government institutions, particularly the criminal justice system and anti-corruption infrastructure. This creates a conducive environment for the movement of illicit goods. The emergence of an Islamist insurgency in northern Mozambique in 2017 has expanded the enabling environment for illicit activity, as well as the number of actors seeking to profit from it. Cabo Delgado province in northern Mozambique has been the primary hub for illicit activity, as dhows transporting heroin from the Makran coast to East Africa have moved down the coast from Kenya and Tanzania following significant seizures. Initially dhows were landing near Mocimboa de Praia, and transferring heroin to fishing boats (Haysom 2018). Mocimboa de Praia has been a hub for the trafficking of heroin, arms and people, but since the town was taken over by the insurgent group Ahlu Sunna wa Jammu (ASWJ) in August 2020, dhows have been moving further south to Pemba and even Nacala to avoid risks posed by the insurgency.1 Increasingly, dhows have been combining the movement of heroin with methamphetamine, also produced in Afghanistan (GITOC 2021c). Dhows have also been used to transport people from the Horn of Africa to the Mozambican coast. Once landed, drug shipments move in different directions. Methamphetamines are primarily destined for the South African market, whereas heroin moves both north and south overland (Eligh 2021). Although insurgents don’t appear to be engaged in illicit activity directly, as discussed in more detail below, drug shipments are also being used to bring weapons for ASWJ fighters (Norbrook 2021). As well as being the entry point for heroin and methamphetamines, ports in Cabo Delgado – particularly Pemba and Nacala – are also being used to export commodities, particularly wildlife, Illegal timber, rubies, ivory and pangolin scale have all been identified (USAID 2020). Weak governance in Cabo Delgado has provided an opening for illicit activity, and this is further exploited by OCGs to expand their activities. From these ports of entry, illicit commodities also rely on porous borders and/or corruption into Tanzania and South Africa. InsightCrime argues that the routes established by the heroin trade have attracted Brazilian organised crime to begin shipping cocaine (Ford 2021). With InsightCrime first raising the alarm regarding cocaine trafficking into Mozambique in 2014, seizures have steadily increased. Cocaine has traditionally arrived by air in Maputo, carried by mules from South Africa, Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania (Mimi 2014). However, 1 As of August 2021, Rwandan forces had pushed insurgents out of Mocimboa de Praia. 41Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 there are also instances where cocaine has been seized in Pemba, arriving in containers from Brazil (All Africa 2021). Once in Mozambique, cocaine uses the same routes as heroin and methamphetamine to reach markets in South Africa and Europe. InsightCrime points out how the ‘pre-existing heroin and methamphetamine routes are also doubling as cocaine trampolines to South Africa and then European ports’ (Ford 2021). The link to Brazil has been well established through the seizure of containers mentioned above. Cocaine destined for Mozambique is also being seized in Brazil. On 7 June 2021, two people were arrested at Rio de Janeiro airport enroute to Maputo with 18 kg of cocaine. This followed a March 2021 arrest at Sao Paolo airport with 5kg, and a January 2021 arrest at Fortaleza airport with 32kg, the latter travelling to Mozambique via Portugal (Ford 2021). As mentioned above, prior to Covid-19, many more incidents were recorded with smaller amounts of cocaine, including the five incidents in 2019 at Sao Paolo airport (Ford 2021). Travel restrictions in 2020 forced traffickers to rely on post and commercial freight, as in the case of cocaine disguised in soap bound for Mozambique (Brazilian Ministry of Economy 2020). A trade agreement signed between Brazil and Mozambique in 2015 that facilitated the import of containerised goods from Brazil eased container movements, even though it is not the shortest route (Johnson 2021). In October 2021, 5 tons of cocaine disguised in washing powder was seized in the port of Rio de Janeiro port, about to depart for Mozambique (El Pais 2021). However, seizures only represent a fraction of the current flow of cocaine to Mozambique, particularly given the allegations on the involvement of state officials. THE ENTRY OF THE PCC As discussed above, cocaine shipments are not new in Mozambique. A more recent trend has been attempts by the PCC to consolidate control over Mozambique as a cocaine hub for eastern Africa and the far east. In 2020, one of the PCC leaders, Gilberto Aparecido Dos Santos, aka Fuminho, was caught in Mozambique negotiating increased cocaine shipments (Radwin 2020). Fuminho, a well-known PCC associate, is reported to have been operating in Bolivia and Paraguay and his detention in Mozambique supported theories that Mozambique was growing as a cocaine trafficking hub (GITOC 2020). According to the local newspaper Carta MZ (Carta de Mozambique 2020) Fuminho, at the moment of his detention, was already in control of the main cocaine supply lines in Mozambique and coordinated shipments to South Africa, from where cocaine could easily reach other parts of Africa and Europe. Senior sources at the Brazilian Federal Police have confirmed that the PCC is exploring new routes to Africa and that Fuminho had been operating in Africa for at least 10 years. Months after the arrest of Fuminho, a Brazilian judge issued an order for the detention of Marcos Roberto de Almeida, also known as “Tuta”, a former official at the Mozambican consulate in Belo Horizonte (Portal de Angola 2020). A Mozambican citizen, Tuta had become a leader within the PCC in Brazil, and a strategic link between Brazil and Mozambique. According to the Brazilian press, the main mission of Fuminho was to secure the African route in a move that would have represented the second international expansion of the PCC after consolidating its control of Paraguayan cocaine routes. In recent years, Fuminho trafficked both cocaine and arms to several African countries and built an association with Nigerian partners (Diniz 2020). Nigerian organisations frequently rely on the PCC to export cocaine to Nigeria through the port of Santos (Adeleye 2023). These Nigerian partners provided the necessary nexus with local elites, and the establishment of an import/export company that worked as a front for cocaine smuggling operations. The role of Tuta may have been to provide a similar connection to Mozambique. While the PCC appears to be expanding abroad, there is little indication of appetite to clash with other international drug trafficking criminal groups, such as the ‘Ndrangheta or the Albanians. On the contrary, to date the PCC has collaborated with other organisations. For example, links with ‘Ndrangheta have been well documented, especially when the Pelle clan was involved (Anesi 2018). In this case, the PCC acted as the main wholesale supplier for the Italian organisation. 42Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 However, when it comes to domestic groups, the PCC has been more forceful. Cocaine routes through Paraguay used to be controlled by local criminal organisations, the most prominent of which was the Rotela Clan. This clan was eliminated when the PCC sought to control cocaine trafficking chokepoints into Brazil, more specifically in Pedro Juan Caballero. As the PCC moved into Paraguay, it became one of the dominant actors, controlling jails, opening new routes and eliminating local organisations by force. While pushing out local criminal organisations, local corrupt elites took advantage of new opportunities brought by the PCC, and quickly established alliances with the group. The PCC didn’t have, and still hasn’t shown any political interest in Paraguay, so its agreement with local elites was, and is still founded amidst a symbiotic relationship where the PCC provides funding, and local elites provide protection and facilitate cocaine export operations. The Paraguayan case may provide a solid base to make prognosis on PCC interests in Mozambique. The first hint is that Fuminho, the PCC associate, had been operating in Southern Africa for 10 years without clashing with any other local organisations, or raising any significant alarms among local institutions. In addition, it is likely that Paraguay was seen by the PCC as an open market, ready to be captured and transformed into a drug trafficking hub that was tied into Brazil. In other areas, the PCC has revealed an interest in colluding where necessary, rather than clashing, as evidenced in the partnership with Nigerian organisations. The PCC has potentially also tapped into their networks with other international organisations to access senior officials and elites to provide protection, infrastructure and financial services. The PCC has also demonstrated that it prefers operating in states that are already criminalised, or are in an advanced state of criminalisation. This allows them to operate with a lower profile, exploiting existing routes, facilitators and corrupt local elites. In sum, investment needed to consolidate new routes is significantly lower than in places where they must replicate those conditions through the use of force. The challenge with Mozambique will be the extent to which the PCC can support the interests of the political elite cashing in on organised criminality rather than compete. Criminal markets in the country are not dominated by domestic criminal groups, rather they are overseen by powerful individuals. Viewed from this perspective, the arrest of Fuminho may have been an indication that the PCC have been too disruptive of the local power balance, providing another example of what Shaw has described in the Guinea Bissau case as ‘cracks in systems of political protection’ (Shaw 2021). AN ELITE DRIVEN CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENT Organised crime in Mozambique is dominated by political elites, with commodities split between different actors. For example, the illegal wildlife trade is controlled by police on the condition that they don’t disrupt the drug trade, which is more lucrative and controlled by politicians. To maintain this division, law enforcement have also been recipients of significant bribes related to drug trafficking, such as the Chief of Customs Domingos Tivane (Wikileaks 2010). Mohamed Bashir Suleman, identified in 2010 as one of the largest drug traffickers in Mozambique, was linked to then President Guebeza (president from 2010–2015) and former President Chissano (president from 1986–2005), and provided substantial campaign finance to both (Wikileaks 2010). Nicknamed ‘Mr Gue-Business’, President Guebeza is reported to have instigated political involvement in illicit activity, initiating ‘an uptick in elite self-enrichment’ (Norbrook 2021). A major scandal involving Guebeza was the take-over of the Northern Development Corridor in July 2009 by Insitec Ltd, a company of which Guebeza was a major shareholder (Wkileaks 2010). The contract involved management of Nacala port and the northern rail network – both key conduits in the movement of illicit commodities. Celso Correira was installed as the head of Insitec Ltd, later becoming the campaign manager for current president Filipe Nyusi, and later Minister for Land and Rural Development (Norbrook 2021). The current president, Filipe Nyusi (incumbent since January 2015) has taken a stronger stance against some forms of illicit activity, particularly the illegal wildlife trade. However, Nyusi 43Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 allegedly received significant bribes in connection with the ‘hidden loans’ scandal in 2014 while he was Minister of Defence (Thomas & Jenkins 2019). Criminal markets have involved foreign criminal actors until established, at which point domestic actors take over. This is likely because the profit margin in Mozambique, as a transit hub, is not high and political elites are eager to capitalise on the profits that are available. The most long-standing illicit trades are flora and fauna. The trade in timber is controlled by Chinese syndicates, but they work in partnership with Mozambican police as noted above. Rhino horn and ivory are produced by local poaching gangs, which has included FRELIMO officials shooting elephants from helicopters (USAID 2020). Chinese syndicates operate fishing vessels along the coast that are used to transport wildlife products (USAID 2020). Initially, the heroin trade was dominated by Pakistani organised crime groups but has since shifted to Mozambican actors. As stated, the arrest of Fuminho in 2020 indicates interest from the PCC in controlling the cocaine trade into Mozambique, with Fuminho working to build partnerships in Mozambique. As with the other illicit flows, there is an expectation that Mozambican elites will be keen to profit from the growth of a cocaine route through the country. A CONTESTED MARKET In recent years, Mozambique has become a central hub for multiple illicit commodities. The ports in Cabo Delgado province have become points of convergence with different commodities being imported and exported. While weak rule of law initially encouraged Pakistani OCGs to use Mozambique as a transit hub, political elites have been known to take advantage of heroin flows in particular, using other illicit commodities to appease law enforcement. While there is some appetite among law enforcement to respond, the operating environment is difficult. The impact of Covid-19 and the insurgency in northern Mozambique both created a distraction, justifying the lack of government response. The growth of organised crime in Mozambique is facilitated by the involvement of political elites, who have an interest in increasing profits. Political involvement also ensures that the criminal justice system remains weak. Most seizures that have occurred in Mozambique are as result of investigations conducted alongside international actors. Police that are not corrupt are reluctant to pursue criminal actors because of the linkages to politicians (Wikileaks 2010). In addition, government agencies do not coordinate, which limits those investigations that do go ahead (USAID 2020). Democratisation is reported to be in retreat in Mozambique, and the response to corruption is also in decline (USAID 2020). The judiciary is susceptible to pressure from the executive, and while there is a Central Office for Combatting Corruption (COCC), it lacks independence and a mandate to instigate or prosecute cases (USAID 2020). Journalists reporting on corruption or other sensitive issues are at risk of violent attacks (Freedom House 2021). The most prominent case of corruption was the ‘hidden loans’ scandal, where senior officials provided government guarantees for loans to the value of 2 billion USD, a scandal that was only made public following a concerted campaign by CSOs. Money laundering is also relatively straightforward as a result of a casino law introduced by President Guebeza in January 2010 to reduce gambling restrictions, reducing the minimum investment for a casino from 15 to 8 million USD, legalising online gambling and allowing slot machines to be positioned in otherwise non-gambling environments (Wikileaks 2010). As a hub for illicit flows, Cabo Delgado province is highly marginalised, with few livelihood options and limited state presence. As a result, it has also become a hub for exploitative practices in other industries, with human trafficking networks using forced labour in ruby mines (USAID 2020). The lack of state presence has been a factor in the emergence of ASWJ insurgency since 2017. ASWJ does not appear to be directly involved in illicit activity in Cabo Delgado, although the group does reportedly tax flows moving through towns and areas under their control (Haysom 2018). It is likely that the presence of insurgents is making it more difficult for political elites to benefit from illicit flows moving through ports in northern Mozambique. As a result, there have 44Jesperson and Verrier Journal of Illicit Economies and Development DOI: 10.31389/jied.160 been increased raids on drug traffickers. In 2020, a government taskforce intercepted multiple vessels resulting in arrests of several foreign drug traffickers, who all received a 15-year prison sentence (USAID 2020). However, some analysts claim the government doesn’t want the intervention of foreign forces in Cabo Delgado because ‘then all eyes will fall on the scale of illicit trafficking that goes on in the province and a lot of other things could come to light’ (Norbrook 2021). More recent analysis points to the resilience of trafficking routes in northern Mozambique, shifting away from areas controlled by insurgents and taking alternatives such as through south Cabo Delgado and Nampula (Stanyard et al. 2022). CONCLUSION The growth of cocaine trafficking in Mozambique can be seen as an expansion of the Lusophone route. Links between Brazil and Europe have been strengthening, even as Antwerp and Rotterdam have overtaken Portugal and Spain as the primary entry points. While the importance of African transit hubs has waxed and waned depending on international law enforcement attention, the expansionist objectives of the PCC have evidently resulted in investment into the cultivation of Mozambique as a new frontier for the movement of cocaine. Viewed objectively, the country presents as a strong candidate. Mozambique has become a major hub for heroin and methamphetamine arriving from the Makran coast, with wellestablished routes to distribute drugs to other parts of Africa and Europe. The insurgency in Cabo Delgado, and the government’s inability to control fighting provides a strong cover for what has been proven to be a resilient criminal market. Accordingly, Mozambique has the infrastructure to support the entry of another commodity. However, unlike other countries where the PCC has taken a key role in cocaine trafficking, such as Paraguay, the political elite are not looking for an external actor to support their interests. For other commodities, these elites have taken control of criminal markets once they have proved to be profitable. As a result, the arrest of Fuminho in 2020 may have been collateral damage as Mozambican elites appease donors keen to strengthen the fight against organised crime in the country, or it may be evidence that the PCC has established a criminal market these elites are eager to capitalise on. COMPETING INTERESTS Data collection that informed this article was conducted as part of a paid consultancy for the European Commission’s Global Illicit Flows Programme. The authors were contracted by the Royal United Services Institute. AUTHOR AFFILIATIONS Sasha Jesperson orcid.org/0000-0002-3899-3218 Independent, UK Martin Verrier orcid.org/0000-0002-5446-704X Independent, Argentina REFERENCES Adeleye, P. 2023. How Nigeria has become key transit hub for global cocaine trafficking. The Africa Report, 16 June. Available at. https://www.theafricareport.com/312261/how-nigeria-has-become-keytransit-hub-for-global-cocaine-trafficking/ [Last accessed 29 December 2023]. AllAfrica. 2021. 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