Financial system stability, the timing of climate change action and the Federal Reserve

Schellho n, Ca olin D. A icle Financial sys em s abili y, he iming o clima e change ac ion and he Fede al Rese e Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice P o ided in Coope a ion wi h: Cen al Bank o Mon eneg o, Podgo ica Sugges ed Ci a ion: Schellho n, Ca olin D. (2020) : Financial sys em s abili y, he iming o clima e change ac ion and he Fede al Rese e, Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice, ISSN 2336-9205, Sciendo, Wa saw, Vol. 9, Iss. 3, pp. 45-59, h ps://doi.o g/10.2478/jcb p-2020-0035 This Ve sion is a ailable a : h ps://hdl.handle.ne /10419/298991 S anda d-Nu zungsbedingungen: Die Dokumen e au EconS o dü en zu eigenen wissenscha lichen Zwecken und zum P i a geb auch gespeiche und kopie we den. Sie dü en die Dokumen e nich ü ö en liche ode komme zielle Zwecke e iel äl igen, ö en lich auss ellen, ö en lich zugänglich machen, e eiben ode ande wei ig nu zen. So e n die Ve asse die Dokumen e un e Open-Con en -Lizenzen (insbesonde e CC-Lizenzen) zu Ve ügung ges ell haben soll en, gel en abweichend on diesen Nu zungsbedingungen die in de do genann en Lizenz gewäh en Nu zungs ech e. Te ms o use: Documen s in EconS o may be sa ed and copied o you pe sonal and schola ly pu poses. You a e no o copy documen s o public o comme cial pu poses, o exhibi he documen s publicly, o make hem publicly a ailable on he in e ne , o o dis ibu e o o he wise use he documen s in public. I he documen s ha e been made a ailable unde an Open Con en Licence (especially C ea i e Commons Licences), you may exe cise u he usage igh s as speci ied in he indica ed licence. h ps://c ea i ecommons.o g/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 45 Financial Sys em S abili y, he Timing o Clima e Change Ac ion and he Fede al Rese e * Depa men o Finance Sain Joseph’s Uni e si y, Philadelphia, USA E-mail: [email protected] Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice, 2020, 3, pp. 45-59 Recei ed: 19 July 2019; accep ed: 25 No embe 2019 UDK: 336.711:551.583(73) DOI: 10.2478/jcb p-2020-0035 Ca olin Schellho n * Financial Sys em S abili y, he Timing o Clima e Change Ac ion and he Fede al Rese e Abs ac : Timely and e ec i e clima e ac ion is a p econdi ion o he s abili y o he global inancial sys em and o long- e m, inclu- si e p ospe i y. Because he Fede al Rese e and o he cen al banks sha e esponsibili y wi h legisla i e and egula o y au ho i ies and o he expe s o main aining inancial sys em s abili y, he Fed also sha es esponsibili y o e ec i e clima e ac ion. Fo clima e ac ion o be e ec i e in educing g eenhouse gas emissions and limi ing global wa ming, i mus be widesp ead, i mus be subs an i e, and i mus come soone a he han la e . The new low-in e es a e mone a y policy en i onmen a o s sus ainable long- e m, bu also high- isk, in es men s. Ma ke pa icipan s need imely guidance and suppo om egula o y and supe iso y au ho i ies, including he Fede al Rese e, in o de o expedi e global und alloca ions o low-ca bon asse s. Keywo ds: Clima e Change; Cen al Bank Independence; Fede al Rese e; Financial Sys em S abili y; Low-Ca bon T ansi ion. JEL Classi ica ion: E44; E58 Timing Ma e s The G ea Recession es ablished beyond a doub ha he abili y o he Fede al Re- se e o ul ill i s dual manda e o p ice le el s abili y and maximum sus ainable employmen c i ically depends on inancial sys em s abili y. The e o e inancial sys em s abili y, as a p econdi ion o hese dual goals, mus be pa o he e- sponsibili ies o he Fede al Rese e (Dudley, 2009). Howe e , he s abili y o he 46 Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice inancial sys em will become inc easingly di icul o main ain when con on ed wi h he s eep losses in GDP and inc eases in inequali y ha a e p ojec ed o he end o he cen u y i cu en ends o g eenhouse gas emissions con inue (Bu ke e al, 2015; Au hamme , 2018). To a oid massi e economic dis up ions om he physical consequences o clima e change and a po en ially ab up shi away om high-ca bon asse s, he Fede al Rese e mus ac now o help o ches- a e a smoo h ansi ion o a low-ca bon economy. Because he esponsibili y o a s able inancial sys em is widely sha ed among egula o s, lawmake s, he media, academics and o he expe s (Adma i, 2017 and 2019), he esponsibili y o success ully add ess he h ea s om clima e change is sha ed as well (Cœu é, 2018; Campiglio, 2018). Long- e m success wi h ei he one o hese challenging global goals depends on success wi h he o he . Financial mone a y and egu- la o y au ho i ies in o he coun ies ha e ecen ly come o simila ealiza ions (Sco e al, 2017; NGFS, 2018 and 2019) wi h 34 cen al banks and supe iso s publishing an open le e on he subjec .1 The u gen need o imely ac ion o educe g eenhouse gas emissions, which inc ease a e age global empe a u es and induce an h opogenic clima e change, has long been ecognized (AAAS, 2014). The impo ance o ac ing soone a he han la e is also emphasized in Chap e 29 o he Fou h Na ional Clima e As- sessmen (USGCRP, 2018). Clima e change om global wa ming is associa ed wi h mo e ex eme wea he e en s ha inc ease physical isks o heal h, ood p oduc ion, anspo a ion, housing, ene gy p oduc ion and dis ibu ion, and o he c i ical sec o s as well as ela ed asse and inancial ma ke s. Thus, he con inued ise in a e age global empe a u es is nega i ely ela ed o he abil- i y o cen al banks o s abilize he global inancial sys em. Pe haps due o he eno mi y o he challenge and public ine ia, he c i ical impo ance o iming is gene ally unde es ima ed o neglec ed. Ye ea ly mi iga ion e o s ha e s a- bilizing e ec s on ecosys ems and he clima e in he sho un and, in he long un, inc ease he p obabili y ha he wo s ou comes o clima e change may be a oided. F om a business pe spec i e, cu bing he use o ossil uels ea ly is im- po an because i in luences cu en o ecas s o u u e demand and, he e o e, long- e m und alloca ions owa ds ossil uel p oduc ion and dis ibu ion ha a e di icul o impossible o e e se. The iming o e ec i e clima e ac ion hus c i ically de e mines he speed o clima e change mi iga ion and i s ul ima e suc- cess wi h s abilizing global a e age empe a u es and he many in e connec ed sys ems on which ou li es depend. 1 Bank o England, Open Le e on Clima e-Rela ed Financial Risks. A ailable a h ps://www. banko england.co.uk/news/2019/ap il/open-le e -on-clima e- ela ed- inancial- isks 47 Financial Sys em S abili y, he Timing o Clima e Change Ac ion and he Fede al Rese e In addi ion o he physical isks associa ed wi h clima e change, he e a e isks associa ed wi h he ansi ion o a low-ca bon economy. As businesses, house- holds and go e nmen s educe in es men s in high-ca bon asse s and p ocesses in a o o low-ca bon inno a ion, he e may be unexpec ed economic shocks. I he ansi ion ini ially p oceeds oo slowly, and la e has o be accele a ed ab up - ly, po en ial dis up ions may become disas ous o inancial ma ke s. Since he Fede al Rese e sha es esponsibili y o he s abili y o he global inancial sys- em, i mus mo e expedi iously o assume i s posi ion as key ca alys and sup- po e o he low-ca bon ansi ion. Will Low In e es Ra es Su ice? Gi en in la ion a es ha ha e ended o emain below i s wo-pe cen a ge in he a e ma h o he G ea Recession, he Fede al Rese e is inc easingly consid- e ing he possibili y ha in e es a es may ha e o s ay lowe o a longe pe iod o ime han ini ially expec ed (Be nanke, 2019). Del Neg o e al (2018) documen a secula global end owa d lowe eal go e nmen in e es a es du ing he pas se e al decades ha may be a ibu able o slowe economic g ow h wo ldwide as well as an inc eased demand o low- isk asse s om aging popula ions. The global low in e es - a e en i onmen suppo s in es men s in esea ch and in- no a ion ha a e needed ac oss all economic sec o s o d i e he ansi ion o low-ca bon asse s, p ocesses and sys ems. Ye , in he ea ly s ages o his ansi- ion wi h un e e ed ma ke s, low in e es a es also inc ease he isks o inancial sys em s abili y om he po en ial building o “bubbles,” especially in ma ke s o ossil uels and o he high-ca bon asse s. Asse bubbles a e no o iously di icul o spo be o e hey bu s unexpec edly and cause he a ec ed asse p ices o plumme . Gi en es ima es o a ca bon budge , which a ge s limi s o inc eases in a e age global empe a u es by mid-cen u y, he Ca bon T acke Ini ia i e (2013, 2015) has documen ed e idence ha asse s in ossil uel and ela ed indus ies a e likely o e alued. I he low-ca bon an- si ion cu en ly ad ances oo slowly leading o ab up and des abilizing adjus - men s in la e yea s, hese asse s may become s anded hus c ea ing la ge losses wi h se e e isks o inancial sys em s abili y (G os and Schoenmake , 2016).2 Raising in e es a es o p ick a possible ‘ca bon bubble’ is oo blun a mone a y policy ool because i would impose highe inancing cos s no jus on high-ca - bon indus ies bu on all o he pa s o he economy as well. 2 While Delis e al (2019) ind some e idence ha clima e- ela ed isks a e p iced in bank loans since 2015, li le is known abou how ma ke s a e aluing hese isks in he a ious indus ies du ing he low-ca bon ansi ion. 48 Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice I low in e es a es con inue o p e ail, i is possible ha some indi idual eco- nomic decision-make s, i.e. businesses, ins i u ional in es o s, households and local go e nmen s, will choose o change cou se, and some ha e al eady done so. The low in e es - a e en i onmen does aise he p o i abili y o many in es - men s ha a e needed o he low-ca bon ansi ion, such as R&D, enewable ene gy, ene gy e iciency and in as uc u e, because hese p ojec s end o ha e posi i e payo s in he mo e dis an u u e. Low in e es a es a e less damag- ing o he ne p esen alues o hese long- e m p ojec s and, hus, may make hem mo e a ac i e ela i e o sho e - e m, mo e ca bon-in ensi e p ojec s. Decen alized decision-making, howe e , equi es s anda dized clima e- ela ed inancial disclosu es and budge ing exe cises ha conside no only he alloca- ion o inancial capi al, bu also he alloca ions o a mosphe ic capi al (ca bon emissions) ac oss al e na i e in es men oppo uni ies (Schellho n, 2018). While possible, hese undamen al changes a e di icul o implemen in an economic and poli ical en i onmen ha is no suppo i e. Too much unce ain y and syn- ch oniza ion isk (Ab eu and B unne meie , 2002) p e en ma ke pa icipan s om co ec ing he misp icing o high-ca bon asse s in a easonable ime ame. Hence, i is unlikely ha decen alized clima e ac ion, e en i suppo ed by low in e es a es, will lead o he equi ed ou comes. Al e na i ely, poli ical ep esen a i es, legisla o s and egula o s could ac col- lec i ely and decisi ely o accele a e a ealloca ion o esou ces o he low-ca bon economy by imposing egula ions o educe g eenhouse gas emissions including ca bon p icing schemes. Businesses and in es o s a e unable o p ice clima e isks co ec ly wi hou go e nmen in e en ion because he e a e no p ope y igh s o he a mosphe e (Daniel e al, 2018). Leise owi z e al (2017) documen subs an ial poli ical will o suppo some go e nmen ac ion o add ess global wa ming, and Ko chen e al (2017) ind some public suppo o paying a ca bon ax ha could a leas pa ially in e nalize he nega i e en i onmen al and a mosphe ic ex e nali- ies om g eenhouse gas emissions. Howe e , p og ess wi h he implemen a ion o ca bon p icing schemes in he Uni ed S a es has been minimal, possibly be- cause he ca bon p ice ha would be equi ed o e ec i ely add ess he p oblem is poli ically unaccep able (Hansen and Kha echa, 2018). E en i su icien poli i- cal will o adop ca bon p icing schemes exis ed, i would be di icul o iden i y and ag ee on op imal le els o ca bon p ices and emission es ic ions. I ca bon axes and emission es ic ions a e oo low, hey ail o accomplish a low-ca bon ansi ion a he equi ed speed. Se oo high, hey a e likely o igge economic and inancial s esses ha could jeopa dize he s abili y o he inancial sys em. As long as policymake s a e unwilling o unable o add ess he clima e challenge, he low-in e es a e en i onmen will con inue o acili a e la ge capi al lows 49 Financial Sys em S abili y, he Timing o Clima e Change Ac ion and he Fede al Rese e in o high-ca bon asse s.3 While some p og ess has been made wi h enewable ene gy, elec i ica ion and imp o emen s in ene gy e iciency, go e nmen s and businesses appea unable o co ec his massi e ma ke ailu e in a imely man- ne . Gi en he lack o high-le el clima e leade ship in he Uni ed S a es, is i pos- sible ha he Fede al Rese e could s ep in o ill his oid? The Fed as Clima e Leade o Las Reso Since he Fede al Rese e’s incep ion in 1913, he Fed’s in luence in he economy has g own o e ime wi h i s esponsibili ies adjus ing in esponse o c ises and he changing needs o he Uni ed S a es economy. While long pe cei ed o be independen (Walle , 2011), he Fed’s independence has always been con es ed,4 and con inues o e ol e in esponse o con es a ion, legisla i e changes, poli i- cal p essu es, bu eauc a ic p ac ice, and he p e e ences o indi idual Fed Chai s (Boe ke and Smi h, 2013; Con i-B own, 2015). Compa ed o o he cen al banks pa icula ly in Eu ope, he Fed’s independence is ela i ely weak (Dince and Eicheng een, 2014) and may ha e weakened u he in ecen yea s due o a change in i s ope a ing sys em in 2008 (Jo dan and Lu he , 2019). Measu ing cen al bank independence is no s aigh o wa d as de ini ions and measu emen s a y and me ics con inue o be e ised (Jasmine e al, 2019). While some le el o cen al bank independence appea s o be necessa y o achie ing and main aining low in la ion (Rado ic e al, 2018), absolu e independ- ence is no equi ed o adjus ing cen al bank p io i ies in esponse o a chang- ing economy. The Bank o England, which Dince and Eicheng een (2014) show o be only sligh ly mo e independen han he Fed, has begun o add ess he isks om clima e change (Sco e al, 2017) and o suppo he ansi ion o a ca bon- neu al economy. Ma k Ca ney, Go e no o he Bank o England, has been one o he main d i e s o his de elopmen .5 The h ea s o inancial s abili y om 3 A no able excep ion o U.S. go e nmen inac ion on clima e change is he ecen public e o by Ros in Behnam, Commissione o he U.S. Commodi y Fu u es T ading Commission, o d aw a en ion o he majo isks posed by his global challenge o he inancial sys em (Lang on, 2019). 4 See, o ins ance, Fede al Rese e Bank o Richmond, “Pe spec i es on Mone a y Policy In- dependence,” las upda ed on Oc obe 26, 2016, h ps://www. ichmond ed.o g/-/media/ ich- mond edo g/ esea ch/ou _pe spec i es/pd /pe spec i es_mone a y_policy_independence. pd 5 “Enable, Empowe , Ensu e: A New Finance o he New Economy.” Speech gi en by Ma k Ca - ney, Go e no o he Bank o England, a he Lo d Mayo ’s Banque o Banke s and Me chan s o he Ci y o London a he Mansion House, London, June 20, 2019. 50 Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice clima e change pose new challenges o all cen al banks, and he Fed is no excep- ion. Rudebusch (2019) and B aina d (2019) acknowledge he Fede al Rese e’s esponsibili y o add ess clima e change by moni o ing and managing he ela ed inancial isks. The Fed Chai enjoys some p o ec ion om poli ical p essu e be- cause he e is no p eceden o emo ing a Fed Chai om o ice and because he law is ambiguous on his issue. Thus, emo al would come wi h signi ican legal and poli ical hu dles o he Uni ed S a es P esiden . The cu en Fed Chai could employ his de ac o emo abili y p o ec ion o ini ia e collabo a ions be ween he Fed, he Bank o England and o he cen al banks o designing much needed e o ms ha would add ess clima e- ela ed sys emic isks in a imely manne . In ac , some Democ a ic p esiden ial candida es unning o elec ion in 2020 a e u ging he Fed o do jus ha (Lippe , 2019). Recen commen s by Williams (2019) sugges ecep i eness o b oad-based inno a ion in esponse o unda- men al changes in he economy also a he Fede al Rese e. While he e a e cu en limi a ions on he Fed’s abili y o ac , his o y shows ha pas ba ie s ha e been nei he pe manen no immu able. One example is he c ea ion o he Financial S abili y O e sigh Council (FSOC) a e he inancial c isis o add ess he sys emic isks posed no only by banks bu also by nonbank inancial ins i u ions. As a membe o FSOC, he Fede al Rese e was gi en au- ho i y o iden i y la ge inancial ins i u ions ha could pose h ea s o inancial sys em s abili y and subjec hem o mo e s ingen egula o y s anda ds. Recen a emp s o oll back his expansion o Fede al Rese e au ho i y ha e been me wi h esis ance because he c ea ion o he FSOC is iewed as an e ec i e way o add ess blind spo s in he supe ision o sys emic isks in inancial ma ke s (Hocke , 2015; Schwa cz and Za ing, 2017). The Bank o England, oo, supe - ises nonbanks h ough i s P uden ial Regula ion Au ho i y. This esponsibili y has ecen ly enabled he Bank o in oduce s ess es s ha assess clima e isks in he insu ance indus y.6 Fo pu poses o sa egua ding inancial sys em s abili y in he case o clima e change, wai ing o a c isis be o e ini ia ing e o ms is ill- ad ised. By he ime a clima e c isis a i es, ac ions o add ess i a e likely ine - ec i e because hey would be coming oo la e. In addi ion o using i s supe iso y and egula o y au ho i y o add ess he sys- emic isks om clima e change, he Fed could suppo he low-ca bon ansi ion wi h i s asse pu chases. The Fed has adi ionally es ic ed i s asse pu chases o U.S. T easu y secu i ies in o de o a oid poli ical in ol emen , sa egua d i s independence, and main ain he sepa a ion be ween iscal policy and mone a y 6 See h ps://www.banko england.co.uk/p uden ial- egula ion/le e /2019/insu ance-s ess- es -2019 51 Financial Sys em S abili y, he Timing o Clima e Change Ac ion and he Fede al Rese e policy (B oaddus and Good iend, 2001). This app oach wo ked well as long as a ocus on p ice le el s abili y and ull employmen ook p ecedence o e inancial sys em s abili y conside a ions. Since i s incep ion, he Fed has been esponsible o inancial sys em s abili y and, since he inancial c isis, his cha ge has be- come inc easingly p ominen (English e al, 2013). Wi h his shi in he Fed’s ocus, he ques ion o wha kinds o asse s he Fed should buy, and o whom he Fed should lend, has aken on enewed ele ance. Meh a (2010) a gues ha he Fed’s asse pu chases du ing he inancial c isis exceeded i s s a u o y au ho i y. Simila ly, Johnson (2011) and O phanides (2016) wa n ha cen al bank balance shee decisions in imes o c ises may ha e iscal and dis ibu ional consequences ha a e no well unde s ood and may be inconsis en wi h he go e nance and pu pose o cen al banks in democ a ic socie ies. Ten yea s a e he inancial c isis, he Fed con inues o hold agency mo gage-backed secu i ies.7 Gi en un- esol ed ques ions abou he Fed’s au ho i y o ac in esponse o c ises, i is c i i- cally impo an o conside ways in which he Fed could help p e en a inancial sys em collapse om clima e- ela ed isks in he i s place. I he Fed is cu en ly able o buy T easu y and agency-backed secu i ies, he Fed could buy ce i ied clima e bonds as long as hey a e issued by he U.S. T eas- u y o backed by U.S. go e nmen agencies. Wi h o ganiza ional suppo om he Clima e Bonds Ini ia i e, go e nmen al o ganiza ions a all le els, businesses and NGOs a e cu en ly in he p ocess o de eloping a ma ke o g een bonds wi h a segmen de o ed speci ically o ce i ied clima e bonds. The Eu opean Cen al Bank has pu chased g een bonds unde bo h i s Public Sec o Pu chase P og amme (PSPP) and i s Co po a e Sec o Pu chase P og amme (CSPP) (De San is e al, 2018). While he Fede al Rese e is able o buy only go e nmen and go e nmen -agency secu i ies, should g een U.S. go e nmen bonds become a ailable, he Fede al Rese e would be able o conside including hem in i s asse pu chases. Thus, i is concei able ha he Fede al Rese e’s balance shee would be able o suppo he inancing o low-ca bon, clima e- ela ed housing, in as uc u e and o he p ojec s associa ed wi h he ansi ion o a ne -ze o ca - bon economy.8 I ese a ions p e ail in he ace o legal ambigui y ega ding he Fede al Re- se e’s abili y o hold clima e- ela ed asse s, he Fed should, a he e y leas , aise awa eness in i s public communica ions ega ding he isks ha high-ca bon as- 7 See h ps://www.newyo k ed.o g/ma ke s/opolicy/ope a ing_policy_190530 8 In ac , F eddie Mac ecen ly announced he issuance o newly designed en i onmen al bonds: h ps:// eddiemac.gcs-web.com/news- eleases/news- elease-de ails/ eddie-mac-launch-new- line-en i onmen al-and-social-impac 52 Jou nal o Cen al Banking Theo y and P ac ice se s pose o he global inancial sys em. Kashka i (2017) a gues ha he Fed should also use i s supe iso y ools o di e capi al lows away om asse ma - ke s ha a e a isk o de eloping bubbles. While he Fed may no be able o ill a leade ship oid a he na ional go e nmen le el, i could be ins umen al in s ee ing in es o s owa d a smoo h low-ca bon ansi ion ha will a oid dis up- i e shocks o global inancial sys em s abili y once i becomes abundan ly clea ha oo many esou ces ha e been pou ed in o ossil- uel ela ed indus ies. Collabo a i e Inno a ion Public awa eness is g owing ega ding he unp eceden ed na u e o he unce - ain y aced by he global economy as a esul o accele a ing clima e change and he need o ansi ion expedi iously ou o high-ca bon asse s. Simul aneously, i is becoming inc easingly clea ha he Fede al Rese e mus explo e new ap- p oaches o dealing wi h he eme ging clima e- ela ed isks o inancial sys em s abili y. Clima e s abili y and global inancial sys em s abili y a e in e wined. E o s ha educe g eenhouse emissions on a la ge scale o slow human-induced clima e change depend on a well- unc ioning inancial sys em. Financial sys em s abili y, in u n, depends on success wi h clima e change mi iga ion and adap a- ion. Because bo h challenges a e global in na u e, he Fed mus collabo a e wi h o he cen al banks o add ess hem oge he . In he spi i o Elino Os om’s esea ch on he p oblems posed by “ he agedy o he commons” (Os om, 2015), Ma k Ca ney in a 2015 speech a Lloyd’s o London9 e e ed o he lack o adequa e clima e ac ion as “ he agedy o he ho izon.” S abili y o he clima e and s abili y o he global inancial sys em may be iewed as common-pool esou ces ha equi e imely main enance by all ha ely on hem o suppo ing li es and ci iliza ions. The adi ional ope a ing p ac ices o cen al banke s p e en o wa d-looking ac ion on clima e change isks, because he b un o he bu dens a e expec ed o eme ge beyond ypical planning ho izons and will all mos hea ily on u u e gene a ions. B eaking he agedy o he ho izon will equi e he disclose o clima e- ela ed i- nancial isks by businesses and ins i u ional in es o s, as well as he collabo a ion o cen al banks and o he egula o y au ho i ies when moni o ing and add ess- 9 “B eaking he T agedy o he Ho izon – Clima e Change and Financial S abili y.” Speech gi en by Ma k Ca ney, Go e no o he Bank o England and Chai man o he Financial S abili y Boa d, a Lloyd’s o London, London, Sep embe 29, 2015. A ailable a : h ps://www.bis.o g/ e iew/ 151009a.pd 59 Financial Sys em S abili y, he Timing o Clima e Change Ac ion and he Fede al Rese e 46. Walle , Ch is ophe . 2011. “Independence + Accoun abili y: Why he Fed is a Well-Designed Cen al Bank,” Re iew, 93 (5). Fede al Rese e Bank o S . Louis. 47. Williams, John C. 2019. “When he Fac s Change…,” Rema ks a he 9 h High-Le el Con e ence on he In e na ional Mone a y Sys em, Zue ich, Swi ze land. A ailable a : h ps://www.newyo k ed.o g/newse en s/ speeches/2019/wil190514