Corporate capture of energy communities: a threat for a citizens energy transition in Europe

A threat for a citizens energy transition in Europe CORPORATE CAPTURE OF ENERGY COMMUNITIES REPORT COMMISSIONED BY FRIENDS OF THE EARTH EUROPE, WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Author: Francesc Cots, eco-union Reviewer(s): Maria Santos (FoEE), Emilie de Bassompierre (FoEE), Colin Roche (FoEE), Laura de Rosa (Greenpeace), Jérémie Fosse (eco-union), Josh Roberts (RESCoop.eu) Design: Blush Design Agency Date: February 2025 1. INTRODUCTION 4 2. CORPORATE CAPTURE OF ENERGY COMMUNITIES 6 2.1 LOBBYING AND POLICY INFLUENCE 8 2.2 PURSUE OF INCENTIVES AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 9 2.3 MISLEADING CLAIMS AND “CITIZEN WASHING” 12 3. A PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH FOR CITIZENS ENERGY COMMUNITIES 14 3.1  NON-COMMERCIALPURPOSE 16 3.2 OPEN AND VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 17 3.3 ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE 19 3.4 EFFECTIVE CONTROL 20 3.5 AUTONOMY 22 3.6 MECHANISMS OF CONTROL 25 4. RECOMMENDATIONS 26 1. ENSURE TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 26 2. P REVENT THE EXPLOITATION OF INCENTIVES AN PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 27 3. BAN MISLEADING CLAIMS AND “CITIZEN WASHING” 28 4. ENSURE THE NON COMMERCIAL PURPOSE 28 5. GUARANTEE OPEN AND VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 29 6. DEFEND THE ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE 29 7. ENABLE EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY THE CITIZENS 30 8. PROTECT THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE 30 9. PROVIDE MECHANISMS OF CONTROL 31 5. CONCLUSIONS 32 6. REFERENCES 35 Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or CINEA. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. 3 Europe’s energy transition is witnessing a surge in grassroots initiatives known as energy communities, empowering local residents to actively engage in producing and distributing renewable energy. These communities, fostered by European and national political and legislative efforts, aim to democratize the energy system by enabling collective citizen participation. This not only fosters social acceptance and empowers individuals but also unlocks access to financing and cultivates innovative business models. Ultimately, community energy holds the potential to transform the current energy system from an oligopoly controlled by a few powerful companies to a commons managed by and for the benefit of local communities. This movement gained significant momentum in 2019 when the EU finalized the Clean energy for all Europeans package, establishing the concepts of Citizen Energy Communities (CECs) and Renewable Energy Communities (RECs). Driven by the desire to empower consumers and democratize the energy market, the legislation aimed to give individuals and communities a greater voice in the energy transition. The EU Directive on common rules for the internal electricity market (2019/944) (IMED) granted consumers, both individually and through CECs, the right to participate in all electricity markets by generating, consuming, sharing, selling electricity, or providing flexibility services. Furthermore, the revised Renewable Energy Directive (2018/2001/EU) (RED) strengthened the role of RECs, which differ from CECs in several key aspects. RECs adhere to stricter requirements regarding proximity (local participation), autonomy, and eligibility (shareholders or members limited to natural persons, SMEs, or local authorities), primarily focusing on expanding renewable energy sources. Conversely, CECs have no geographical constraints, encompass all energy technologies, and have more flexible eligibility criteria, but confine their activities to electricity. Despite a June 2021 deadline for transposition, the implementation of these directives across EU member states has been fragmented. This inconsistency stems from different ways for interpreting the legal definition for energy communities. Some countries, like Sweden, lag in incorporating these definitions into their national legislation. Others have opted for a superficial approach, merely replicating the EU directives without providing clarity or establishing a supportive framework. Conversely, countries like Ireland, France, and Italy have adopted clearer definitions and developed legal frameworks and support mechanisms for energy communities, to different extents, seeking to facilitate the growth of energy communities by creating conditions where they can compete with traditional energy players However, this progress is threatened by the looming risk of corporate capture. Large energy companies and industrial consumers are exploiting regulatory loopholes and ambiguous definitions to gain control of these initiatives. This appropriation allows them to reap benefits at the expense of citizen-led energy communities, circumvent environmental regulations, stifle competition, and secure advantageous feed-in tariffs. A paradigm example for that is Greece, which, for instance, initially pioneered the concept of energy communities with law 4513/2018, incorporating most EU criteria. However, commercial entities exploited the framework for their gain (REScoop.eu. (n.d.)). To counter this, a new Law 5037/2023 in 2023 introduced stricter definitions for CECs and RECs, and capped profit distribution at 20% for communities benefiting from priority grid access or financial support, among other measures oriented to avoid corporate capture (Cots, 2024). The inherent challenge lies in defining energy communities at a national level without a pre-existing model, especially when the introduction of incentives is tied to this loose definition. This lack of clarity creates an opening for capture by entities that may not embody the true spirit of community energy, potentially diverting resources away from genuine grassroots initiatives. Section 1 INTRODUCTION Without a clear framework, it becomes difficult to distinguish between projects that prioritize collective benefits and those that simply exploit the system for financial gain. In this context, it is crucial that national legislations adhere to the principles established in the directives (non-commercial purpose, open and voluntary participation, eligibility to participate, effective control and autonomy or democratic governance) that ultimately define energy communities. These principles ensure that energy communities remain true to their core values of local ownership, democratic control, and social benefit. By aligning national legislation with these principles, policymakers can create a regulatory environment that fosters the development of genuine community energy projects while mitigating the risk of capture and ensuring that the benefits of energy communities are widely shared. This report delves into the multifaceted nature of corporate capture within the energy community model, examining the enabling conditions and proposing recommendations both for policy makers and energy communities to ensure the respect of these principles. To achieve this, the report follows a multi-pronged approach. Firstly, it establishes a foundational understanding of corporate capture, exploring its underlying mechanisms and manifestations. This includes a specific focus on: • Lobbying and policy influence: The influence of large corporations on policymaking and regulatory frameworks can create an uneven playing field that favors corporate interests over community-led initiatives. This can manifest in various ways, such as lobbying for regulations that benefit large-scale projects over smaller communitybased ones or influencing the design of subsidy schemes to favor corporate participation. • Exploitation of incentives and preferential treatment: While subsidies and other types of incentives and preferential treatment (for instance, priority accessing the grid) can play a crucial role in supporting the development of energy communities, their design and implementation can inadvertently create opportunities for corporate capture. This can occur when support schemes favor larger entities or projects that prioritize profit maximization over community benefits. Furthermore, a lack of transparency and accountability in subsidy allocation processes can increase the risk of corporate influence and favoritism. • Misleading claims and “citizen washing”: The misuse of the “energy community” label for marketing purposes can mislead consumers and undermine the genuine goals of community energy. This practice often involves large energy companies promoting projects or services that lack true community ownership or control, perhaps no energy community at all (i.e. no legal form), exploiting the positive connotations of the term “energy community” to attract customers and gain market share. This not only misrepresents the nature of these projects but can also create confusion and distrust among consumers, hindering the development of authentic community energy initiatives. Secondly, the report adopts a principles-based approach to identify risks associated with each defining characteristic of energy communities and emphasizes the critical need for robust oversight mechanisms. To ensure transparency and accountability, regulatory authorities must have the power to verify that energy communities genuinely meet legal requirements. This includes accessing documents like ownership structures and energy data, conducting audits, and investigating complaints. Authorities should also be able to impose penalties on companies engaging in misleading advertising or failing to meet the criteria for operating as an energy community. The case studies of potential corporate capture analyzed in this report have been gathered through a combination of desk research in academic and grey literature, and a questionnaire conducted in 2024 by Friends of the Earth Europe, in collaboration with Greenpeace CEE, addressed to the European Civil Society movement. This questionnaire aimed to gather information on instances where for-profit entities might be undermining citizen-led efforts by co-opting the concept of energy communities or capturing resources for their benefit. The goal was to map how this phenomenon occurs across different countries and to identify the underlying causes and structural gaps that enable it. Key information gathered through the questionnaire was then cross-checked and validated through in-depth interviews with respondents. By exploring these critical areas and offering targeted recommendations, this report aims to contribute to a policy landscape that fosters the authentic development of energy communities. The report concludes by elaborating the main conclusions and key findings. Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 5 “Corporate capture” describes how incumbent actors, in this case large energy companies, employ strategies to maintain their market dominance and prevent transformative change. (Pel 2016; Späth, Rohracher, and von Radecki 2015;) For instance, Pel (2016) suggests that corporate capture arises when less powerful actors, like community groups, try to bring about significant change. Larger, more influential actors, such as established energy companies, might not share the same transformative goals. These powerful actors can hijack the change process by framing alternative solutions that distort the original intent. This interaction forces both sides to adapt, leading to a compromise where the initial vision of change is diluted and the meaning of the proposed solutions shifts. Essentially, established energy corporations are inherently inclined to preserve the existing power structures within the energy system, meaning they want to retain control over energy production, supply and distribution (Kivimaa et al. 2019; Strachan et al. 2015). These actors maintain their dominance by adopting the language of change while subtly redirecting it to serve their own interests (Tilsted et al. 2022). In the energy sector, this can be seen in how companies use rhetoric to downplay truly disruptive solutions and appease those dissatisfied with the current system, all without altering their fundamental practices (Wright et al. 2022). This body of research suggests that the narratives of transformation promoted by large energy corporations may be a smokescreen, concealing actions that prevent transformative change in the energy system, without truly shifting the balance of power (Stirling, 2014). In the context of energy communities, this involves appropriating citizenled initiatives, often driven by financial incentives and a desire to control the evolving energy landscape. This can manifest through influencing policy and regulations or directly controlling community energy projects (Harnett, 2024). While many energy corporations initially showed limited interest in participatory energy models, the EU’s Clean Energy Package (CEP), with its provisions for energy communities and the promise of financial aids and public support, has incentivized their involvement (Fina, and Fechner 2021; Krug et al. 2023). This raises concerns about the erosion of community ownership and control, given the inherent power imbalance between corporations and local communities in a market which is characterized by its technical complexity and the need of having a very strong financial umbrella. Traditional market actors have been pushing for broader definitions of “citizen energy communities” during the transposition process, despite these risks. This could weaken the impact of recognizing non-commercial groups who need support to enter the market. Furthermore, by including large energy companies and industrial consumers in a concept originally meant to empower citizens, public trust could be damaged, leading to a form of “citizen washing” where these companies appear more community-focused than they truly are (Harnett, 2024). Section 2 CORPORATE CAPTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY COMMUNITIES In this context, the lack of clear definitions of energy communities in the CEP and in the transposition in national legislations, particularly regarding membership and ownership, coupled with weak regulatory oversight and enforcement, creates opportunities for exploitation by corporations (Bauwens et al. 2016). Other factors that may contribute to this situation are lack of transparency and information asymmetry. In fact, limited transparency in operations and decision-making, coupled with corporations’ greater knowledge and expertise in navigating complex energy markets, can lead to communities making uninformed decisions that ultimately favor corporate interests (Dóci et al. 2015). An underlying issue is that while self consumption schemes or other renewable energy business models can be promoted at policy level, the label “energy community,” with its associated benefits and support, should be reserved for initiatives truly embodying its core principles. This means genuine community ownership, prioritizing local benefits and sustainability, and ensuring democratic governance. Allowing large energy companies to claim this designation without adhering to these principles undermines the concept. It could lead to unfair competition, greenwashing, and loss of public trust. Clear criteria are vital to ensure only authentic energy communities receive the recognition and support they deserve, fostering truly community-driven energy solutions. Ideally, energy communities seek to contribute to create a fairer energy system by redistributing power from large energy companies to local communities, empowering people and promoting local ownership. Therefore, the corporate capture of energy communities poses a significant threat to this discourse, leading to the erosion of community ownership and control, reduced community benefits, the undermining of social and environmental goals, and a loss of public trust (Harnett, 2024). Addressing this issue requires a multi-faceted approach. This includes strengthening legal frameworks with clearer definitions of energy communities that prioritize genuine community ownership, enhancing regulatory oversight with robust monitoring and enforcement, promoting transparency and accountability, and ensuring that financial incentives prioritize community-led initiatives with safeguards against corporate capture. Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 7 2.1 LOBBYING AND POLICY INFLUENCE As incumbent actors, large energy corporations possess substantial resources and political influence, which they can leverage to shape the transposition process of energy community definitions and enabling frameworks to their advantage. This influence can manifest in various ways, ultimately undermining the transformative potential of community-led energy initiatives. Firstly, corporations may engage in lobbying efforts to dilute the core principles enshrined in the definition of energy communities. This can involve advocating for less stringent membership requirements, thereby allowing for greater corporate involvement and potentially enabling them to dominate decision-making processes. Furthermore, they may push for an emphasis on financial profitability over social and environmental goals, effectively shifting the focus away from community empowerment and towards market-driven objectives. Secondly, corporate lobbying can result in the weakening of enabling frameworks that are crucial for the development of independent energy communities. This can include advocating for limited public funding or complex application processes that disproportionately favor largescale projects over smaller, community-led initiatives. By influencing grid connection rules, they can further prioritize established energy corporations and hinder the integration of decentralized community energy generation, thus stifling competition and maintaining their control over the energy landscape. Moreover, large energy corporations can utilize their influence to shape the narrative surrounding energy communities, promoting a vision that aligns with their interests. This can involve co-opting the language of empowerment while subtly promoting models that maintain corporate control, effectively masking their self-serving agenda behind a veneer of community participation. They may also actively discourage truly disruptive solutions that challenge the centralized energy system, thereby preserving their dominance and limiting the transformative potential of community-led initiatives. Furthermore, corporate influence can extend to the creation of alternative concepts and definitions that deviate from the EU framework. This can manifest in the emergence of “energy community adjacent” concepts, such as “industrial energy communities” (as seen in Hungary), which may blur the lines between genuine community-led initiatives and industry-dominated projects. By promoting these alternative frameworks, energy corporation can create loopholes and exceptions that allow them to participate in — and potentially control — initiatives designed to empower local communities. This tactic further undermines the original intent of the Clean Energy Package and risks diluting the core principles of democratic governance, local ownership, and social benefit. The consequences of such corporate capture are farreaching and detrimental to the goals of the Clean Energy Package, since the social and environmental benefits of energy communities may be diminished, with a greater focus on corporate profits. In 2022, the Association for Hungarian Energy Communities and Flexibility Providers (MERSZ) was established to represent both aggregators and energy communities. MERSZ’s rules allow the leading partner of a government-granted pilot energy community to join the association before that community is officially registered. As the application process for these pilot projects was designed in a way that favored established energy companies over community-driven initiatives, most of the pilot projects, and subsequently MERSZ members, are companies, not citizen groups. Of the eleven members in its “Energy Community” branch, the majority are for-profit companies, including major players like E.ON, STS Group, ON-Energy, PannonWatt, and Capitol Consulting. Source: Friends of the Earth Survey on Corporate Capture (2024) As evidenced by Eurogas’s call for supportive measures in the Gas Directive Revision, major energy companies, like E.On and Engie, actively explored how to leverage energy communities for commercial gain and expand their service offerings including this concept in the proposal. This marked a shift from their previous opposition to energy communities during the Clean Energy Package negotiations. In fact, the definition of energy communities that they were pursuing in the Gas Directive Revision included large energy companies, to join and potentially dominate them. Happily, the Parliament and the Council ultimately agreed to delete the citizen energy community concept from the text. Source: Rescoop (2024) 2.2 PURSUE OF INCENTIVES AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT The rise of energy communities has presented a unique opportunity for many actors, unfortunately also for large corporations, driven by the increasing availability of financial support. This support comes from various sources. Governments are increasingly establishing dedicated public funding to help energy communities overcome initial financial hurdles. This funding assists with early-stage project planning, including setting up a legal entity, conducting feasibility studies, and obtaining technical expertise. It can also provide guarantees or low/ zero-interest loans for construction, preferential treatment in accessing the grid, and expedited permitting processes. Furthermore, various EU funds, like the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Structural Funds, and Cohesion Funds, can be utilized to jumpstart energy communities. These funds often support capacity building and access to expertise throughout project development. While energy communities existed before the adoption of the Clean Energy Package, they primarily operated as citizen-led initiatives with limited corporate involvement. However, the Clean Energy Package, which requires Member States to establish supportive frameworks for energy communities, including financial incentives and subsidies, has changed the landscape. These incentives are tremendously important to allow energy communities to compete with traditional actors in the electricity market, but they have also attracted the attention of energy corporations and created collateral effects. Essentially, aligning with the energy community model now increases the chances of securing funding. This has led to a surge of corporate interest, with companies utilizing their resources and expertise to adapt their projects accordingly. There’s a risk that large companies may try to dominate these community-led projects, primarily to access funding and advance their own agendas, potentially sidelining the original goals of these initiatives. Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 9 Recently in 2024 Hungary launched three pilot programs to fund community energy projects, but it seems most of the money went to large companies instead of local communities. The first program had about 5 million euros to distribute. Five out of the seven winning projects were led by for-profit companies, with each receiving at least 500,000 euros. These companies included the state-owned utility MVM, the energy trader Ewiser, the solar panel installer Danubia, Capital Consulting, and energy trader VPP Hungary. Only two projects were led by community-focused groups, but they received much less funding. The second program, with 10 million euros available, showed a similar trend. Nine out of fifteen winning projects were led by for-profit companies, including big energy utilities like MVM and E.ON, solar panel companies, and energy software companies. The rest went to municipalities and public bodies, with no funding for community groups or cooperatives. In the third program, all 33 million euros were given directly to a single charity, the Maltese Order, without any competitive process. While they plan to install solar panels and help low-income households, there’s no community involvement in the project. Source: Friends of the Earth survey on Corporate Capture, 2024 Greece’s Apollon program, designed to combat energy poverty and reduce municipal energy costs, funded by the Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF), is focusing on the development of 10-year Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) between private energy providers and regional CECs. This model relegates communities to a passive consumer role since they do not hold ownership and control over renewable energy generation and storage. As a consequence, municipalities, despite being members of the CECs, are denied any management role in projects, which are instead implemented by private entities selected through tenders outside of community control. This approach raises concerns about transparency and accountability, potentially channeling public funds, including the €100 million earmarked for energy communities in the Greek Recovery Plan, towards other initiatives that are not genuine,citizeninclusive, EU-definitions-aligned energy communities. While the Apollon program’s goals of mitigating energy poverty are commendable, the program’s reliance on private investors and centralized project implementation risks undermining social acceptance and community ownership, raising serious concerns about its adherence to the principles of genuine energy communities. Source: Electra Energy. (2024, November) To prevent corporate dominance in energy communities, some countries are refining their regulatory approaches to funding allocation. Germany, for example, now exempts certain community-led renewable energy projects from competitive auctions, recognizing their unique nature and aiming to provide them with easier access to funding. This exemption applies to smaller wind turbines (up to 6 MW) and those owned by citizen energy companies (up to 18 MW). To safeguard against exploitation of this exemption, Germany has implemented stringent criteria for defining citizen energy companies, emphasizing genuine community involvement, democratic decision-making, and local control, as outlined in the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG). However, it remains to be seen whether these criteria strike the right balance between preventing corporate capture and enabling the growth of community energy. Similarly, Greece’s 2023 energy law (Law 5037/2023) introduced measures to prevent abuse of the energy community model. It mandates a minimum number of members and limits profit distribution for communities receiving grid priority access or financial support. These measures aim to curb past instances where large energy companies and investors exploited the system for financial gain, undermining the goals of community-led initiatives. While these legislative changes in Germany and Greece demonstrate a growing awareness of the potential for corporate capture, their effectiveness in achieving the desired balance remains to be evaluated. It is crucial to monitor the impact of these regulations and ensure they effectively prevent corporate dominance without unduly hindering the development of genuine community energy projects. This highlights the ongoing need for adaptive policymaking and continuous evaluation. Repsol, a major Spanish energy company, indirectly manages over 30% of the European subsidies for energy communities in Spain. Specifically, €24.3 million from the Next Generation funds, intended to support citizen-driven energy communities, have been allocated to projects involving Repsol subsidiaries. These subsidiaries manage 28 out of the 151 projects that have received CE-Implementa grants. Edinor, Repsol’s renewable energy branch, handles 15 of the subsidized communities (€9.9 million), while Ekiluz, a joint venture with the Mondragon Corporation, promotes 13 initiatives (€14.4 million). Although Edinor and Ekiluz don’t directly receive these funds as they are not members of the energy communities, they play significant roles as managers, promoters, designers, or technology partners. In fact, 60% of the subsidies granted in the latest CEImplementa call (December 2023) went to projects connected to Repsol. This raises concerns about potential corporate influence within these supposedly community-led initiatives. Repsol’s subsidiaries may be exerting significant control over strategic decisions, despite not being formal members. Sources: Muñoz-Padrós and Marcos (2024, April 14); and Friends of the Earth Survey on Corporate Capture (2024) Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 11 2.3 MISLEADING CLAIMS AND “CITIZEN WASHING” Even if self-called energy communities that don’t adhere to the principles of community ownership, local control, and democratic governance don’t receive financial aid or subsidies, they can still misuse the “energy community” label for marketing purposes. This tactic, which can be considered a form of “citizen washing,” involves presenting a project as a genuine energy community to attract customers and gain a competitive advantage, even if it doesn’t truly meet the criteria of authentic community energy. This practice misleads consumers and undermines the trust in and development of genuine community-led initiatives. It exploits the positive image associated with community empowerment and local engagement for commercial gain, without genuinely embodying those principles. This misleading portrayal can take various forms, such as: • Exaggerating community involvement: Companies may claim that their projects are community-owned or controlled, even if the community has limited decision-making power or ownership stake. • Misrepresenting benefits: They might overstate the social and economic benefits to the local community, creating unrealistic expectations. • Using vague or misleading language: Companies may use terms like “community-based” or “locally driven” without clearly defining what those terms mean in practice. To address this issue, the European Union has mechanisms in place to protect consumers from misleading claims. These mechanisms are primarily enshrined in two key directives: • Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (UCPD): This directive prohibits unfair commercial practices, including misleading actions or omissions that deceive or are likely to deceive the average consumer. It provides a framework for assessing misleading claims, including those related to social and community aspects, and empowers enforcement authorities to take action against companies that engage in such practices. • Directive on Consumer Rights (CRD): This directive strengthens consumer protection by requiring clear and transparent information about products and services. It mandates that companies provide accurate and understandable information about the ownership, governance, and benefits of energy communities, enabling consumers to make informed decisions. These directives, and their transpositions into national frameworks, empower consumers and enable enforcement authorities to take action against companies that misuse the “energy community” label or make false claims. However, given the novelty of the energy community concept, further clarification and guidance are needed to effectively apply these directives. This includes developing specific guidelines that outline how the UCPD and CRD apply to energy community advertising, accompanied by practical examples of acceptable and unacceptable practices. Additionally, clear orientation on which type of information should be disclosed would be helpful, specifying the types of information that must be included in advertisements, such as ownership structure, governance arrangements, benefit-sharing mechanisms, and community involvement. In this sense, the recently adopted Directive on Green Claims strengthens the framework for combating greenwashing, including misleading claims related to environmental sustainability and social responsibility. This directive requires companies to substantiate their environmental claims with robust evidence and prohibits vague or unsubstantiated assertions. In the context of energy communities, this directive can play a role in preventing companies from exploiting the “community” label for greenwashing purposes. In Portugal, major energy companies like EDP1 and Cleanwatts2 are promoting what they claim to be energy communities. However, a closer look reveals a discrepancy between these claims and the reality of the projects. As of June 2023, an analysis of licensing applications in Portugal showed that 95% of the projects were collective self-consumption schemes, while only 5% met the criteria for true energy communities. This distinction is crucial. While both models involve sharing energy, collective self-consumption is primarily a technical arrangement where at least two consumers share the energy produced. In contrast, a renewable energy community, as defined by the European Union, must be a legal entity with open participation, democratic governance, and a focus on community benefits beyond mere financial profit. Many projects promoted as “energy communities” by these companies, where they retain investment, ownership, and management control, fall short of these criteria. This raises concerns about potentially misleading advertising and the need for greater transparency in the sector. Sources: Harnett (2024), Sequeira (2024) and Friends of the Earth survey on Corporate Capture (2024) 1 https://www.edp.com/en/news/edp-creates-solarenergy-community-caldas-da-rainha-involving-over200-companies-and-families 2 https://cleanwatts.energy In Spain, Repsol highlights its “Solar Communities” on its website, emphasizing the benefits and ease of joining these communities, even though they are examples of third party CSC, not genuine energy communities that strictly follow all the principles mentioned in the report. Source: https://www.repsol.com/en/energy-and-the-future/ future-of-the-world/solar-communities/index.cshtml and Harnett (2024) Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 13 Section 3 A PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH FOR CITIZENS ENERGY COMMUNITIES To effectively analyze the various ways corporations may hinder the principles encapsulated by the energy community definition contained in the Directives, this study adopts a structured approach focused on the core principles that define genuine energy communities This approach allows for a systematic examination of how corporate capture manifests in practice, even when formal compliance with regulations may appear to be met. By dissecting case studies through the lens of each principle, we can pinpoint the specific pressure points where corporate influence undermines the community-led ethos of energy initiatives. The following sections delve into each of these principles, drawing on data analysis and case study findings to expose the tactics used by corporations to circumvent the spirit and intent of the REC and IMED Directives. This analysis will be structured around the following key principles: • Non-commercial purpose: Examining how the prioritization of community benefits over financial profits is upheld or compromised. • Open and voluntary participation: Investigating whether membership and engagement within energy communities are truly open and accessible to all. • Eligibility to participate: Assessing whether participation criteria are designed to promote genuine community involvement instead of favoring corporate interests. • Effective control: Analyzing the extent to which decision-making power resides with local citizens or is unduly influenced by corporate actors. • Autonomy: Examining the extent to which energy communities are independent of external influence and control, particularly from large energy companies. By systematically analyzing each principle, this report aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the diverse manifestations of corporate capture and offer targeted policy recommendations to safeguard the integrity of the energy community movement. However, it’s crucial to clarify our interpretation of “risk” in this context. When we identify a specific factor – such as high capital entry requirements – as potentially increasing the risk of corporate capture, we are not suggesting that all instances of high capital entry requirements inevitably lead to corporate capture. Nor are we implying that energy communities with low capital entry requirements are automatically immune to this phenomenon. Instead, we aim to highlight potential vulnerabilities within the energy community model. Certain characteristics can create an environment more susceptible to corporate influence. This is because such requirements may favor larger, well-resourced entities that are primarily profit-driven, potentially hindering the participation of smaller actors and genuine community-led initiatives. Similarly, the choice of legal form for energy communities can also influence the risk of corporate capture. Allowing them to be structured as profit-driven entities, like jointstock companies, can prioritize profit maximization over community benefits, since the decision making powers in these legal forms are tied to capital ownership rather than democratic principles of one person, one vote, creating inherent incentives that favor profit distribution to members over reinvestment or the pursuit of social and environmental goals. This doesn’t mean that all energy communities structured as joint-stock companies may automatically become examples of corporate capture, but it does introduce a potential vulnerability that warrants careful consideration. On the other hand, it’s important to acknowledge that the infringement of principles, such as autonomy and effective control, are more directly linked to the corporate capture phenomenon. These principles go to the essence of the corporate capture concept, since they address fundamental issues like who holds control and who exercises influence within the energy community. For instance, in RECs, effective control must be exercised by members located in proximity to the community’s renewable energy projects. Therefore, infringement of these principles may weigh more heavily than infringement of other principles when determining if a case of corporate capture has occurred, sending a stronger signal in this direction. The Bicesse kindergarten project, advertised as an “inclusive energy community” by Greenvolt Comunidades (a subsidiary of the Greenvolt group), located in Portugal, aimed to address energy poverty by providing renewable energy to vulnerable groups in the vicinity of the kindergarten as part of a corporate social responsibility strategy of the company. The anchor member (owner of the space where the renewables were installed) of this project was Santa Casa da Misericordia da Cascais (SCMC), a non-profit institution that receives public and private funding to provide kindergartens to lower-income groups. The consumer members were selected by SCMC based on economic and social vulnerability criteria, in consultation with Greenvolt. However, Greenvolt and the anchor member retained ownership and control of the renewable energy system, while citizens were essentially consumers rather than active participants. While the project undoubtedly provided social and environmental benefits by addressing energy poverty and promoting renewable energy, the lack of a community organisation and the consequent lack of effective control by the “citizens/users” undermines the core principles of community ownership and democratic governance that define genuine energy communities. Therefore, in this case the infringement of the effective control principle and the lack of a constitution of a formal organisation is more significant when assessing whether it constitutes corporate capture than the provision of social and environmental benefits or respect for the non commercial purpose principle. Source: Harnett, 2024 However, in this report, we have opted for a comprehensive approach to include the risks associated with each principle, even if they are more indirect, keeping in mind that identifying these risks is not about making absolute judgments or generalizations. Rather, it’s about recognizing potential red flags and understanding the factors that can increase the likelihood of corporate capture. This nuanced approach allows for a more comprehensive assessment of the energy community landscape and enables the development of targeted safeguards to protect the integrity and purpose of this movement. Finally, this analysis will also address the mechanisms of control employed to ensure the implementation of the above-mentioned principles, such as registration processes, and monitoring bodies, as a key element in preventing corporate capture. Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 15 3.1 NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSE The primary goal of energy communities, as defined by the European Union’s Clean Energy Package, is to deliver benefits to their members and the local community, r ather than maximizing financial returns. These benefits can be environmental, such as reducing carbon emissions and promoting renewable energy sources; social, such as fostering community cohesion through the empowerment of citizens to collaboratively develop projects of local significance, promoting education and awareness, and addressing energy poverty; or economic, such as lowering energy costs for members and creating local jobs (Roberts, 2020). While energy communities can generate economic profit, and provide a return on investment to members, this should be a secondary objective. Revenues obtained from engaging in market activities should be primarily reinvested back into the community to fund new projects, improve energy efficiency, support educational initiatives, or provide assistance to vulnerable households (Energy Community Secretariat, 2024). This focus on community well-being distinguishes energy communities from traditional energy companies driven by profit maximization. RISKS OF CORPORATE CAPTURE One of the main risks associated with this principle is the choice of legal form. Allowing energy communities to be structured as profit-driven entities, like joint-stock companies, can prioritize profit maximization over community benefits and potentially lead to exploitation of support mechanisms. To avoid this, some Member States specify certain legal forms, often favoring those that promote cooperative, social economy, or non-profit objectives. However, it’s important to balance this with the need for financial sustainability and the ability to attract investment. Allowing limited profit sharing or disbursements to members can incentivize participation and enable larger projects. Even if the choice of legal form is left open, the requirement to comply with EU principles is intended to mitigate the potential for prioritizing profit over community benefit. However, this reliance on compliance alone can make it more challenging to ensure genuine community focus, as it necessitates robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. It’s also important to distinguish between two key aspects of financial viability: • Turnover: This refers to the revenue generated by the energy community through its activities, such as selling electricity or providing energy services. Generating turnover is essential for any organization to be financially sustainable and cover operational costs. • Return on Investment: This relates to the financial gains that members or investors receive on their initial investment in the energy community. Allowing for a reasonable return on investment can incentivize participation and attract necessary capital for larger projects. Such disbursements to members, within reasonable limits, should not disqualify an energy community from being recognized as a citizen or renewable energy community. Furthermore, banning disbursements altogether could hinder the financing of larger projects, limiting the potential impact of community energy. Therefore, finding the right balance between promoting community benefit and allowing for financial viability is essential for fostering the growth of genuine and sustainable energy communities. Member states have used different approaches in their transpositions to prioritize community benefits over profits for energy communities: •Strict non-profit models: Some countries, like Croatia, and Lithuania, explicitly forbid profitmaking or restrict energy communities to nonprofit legal structures. •Limited profit distribution: Others, such as Slovakia and Greece, allow some profit generation but mandate that a significant portion be reinvested into the community or used for reserves. For instance, the 2023 law in Greece established a 20% limit on the profits that can be distributed to the members of the energy communities if they take advantage of priority access to the grid or are eligible for financial support. •Purpose-driven approach: Belgium and Latvia emphasize the community’s primary purpose in their statutes, ensuring that profit motives remain secondary to community goals. •Specific legal entities: Some countries like Hungary promote community focus by limiting the allowed legal entities to cooperatives and non-profit companies. Source: European Commission (2023a) Another risk is the election of the business model. Corporations may prioritize business models that are profitable but don’t necessarily align with community needs or desires, marketing them as “energy communities”, even though these models often don’t even create formal organizations, which is a fundamental requirement for being recognized as an energy community under the EU framework. They simply represent decentralized energy production and consumption arrangements, falling short of the core principles of community ownership, democratic governance, and social benefit. For instance, third party Collective Self Consumption (CSC) relies on a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), which is essentially a long-term energy contract. In this arrangement, a client agrees to purchase electricity, at a fixed price, from an energy provider who installs a renewable energy system, like solar panels, on the client’s property. The energy provider takes care of all the initial hurdles, including the upfront investment, securing permits, installation, and ongoing management of the system. Since the energy company retains control, the users have little influence over decisions regarding the system’s operation, maintenance, or technology. This can lead to disengagement and prevent the community from tailoring the system to its needs. In Portugal, several for-profit energy companies (e.g., EDP, Greenvolt, Cleanwatts) are misrepresenting themselves as providers of “Energy Community” products to attract new and existing clients. However, these offerings are merely examples of third-party CSC models, which fall short of the true definition of energy communities. While third party CSC arrangements offer consumers access to clean energy at a fixed price, they significantly limit community participation and benefits. Essentially, these models relegate communities to the role of passive consumers, depriving them of opportunities to generate revenue by selling excess energy or participating in demand response programs. This lack of ownership can also diminish engagement in energy conservation efforts, as the community may feel less responsibility for the system’s efficiency. Ultimately, third party CSC models offer limited social, economic, and environmental benefits compared to genuine energy communities where citizens actively participate in ownership and decision-making processes. Source: Harnett (2024) and Friends of the Earth Survey on Corporate Capture (2024) 3.2 OPEN AND VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION The principle of open and voluntary participation means that energy communities should be accessible to all who wish to join and that membership should always be a free choice, without arbitrary or discriminatory restrictions (Roberts, 2020). This ensures that the benefits of community energy are accessible to a wide range of individuals and entities, promoting social inclusion and broad participation in the energy transition (Hoops, 2021). However, the level of openness can be adjusted depending on the specific context of the energy community. For example, a community might require members to live in the same area where the community operates. This makes sense because the community’s activities, like sharing energy from local solar panels, are likely focused on that specific area. Voluntary participation means that individuals and entities should have the freedom to join or leave an energy community without facing undue pressure or penalties (Energy Communities Secretariat, 2024). This respects individual autonomy and ensures that participation is based on genuine interest and commitment. While the right to leave is essential, energy communities may implement reasonable rules to manage membership changes, especially when it comes to investment and shareholding. For example, requiring members to maintain their investment for a specific period can help ensure the stability and long-term viability of community projects (Energy Communities Secretariat, 2024). However, such restrictions should be balanced with the members’ right to withdraw and should not be excessively burdensome. Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 17 7. ENABLE EFFECTIVE CONTROL BY THE CITIZENS • Establish a robust definition of “effective control” that goes beyond simple majority ownership of the General Assembly or main representative body and considers factors such as voting rights, board representation, and influence over key decisions. • Avoid options like guaranteed seats on the Board or similar to prevent large corporations or external actors from dominating community governance. • Mandate that energy community governing documents clearly define how control and decisionmaking power are distributed among members. This includes specifying membership rights, outlining the governance structure and decision-making procedures, and establishing dispute resolution mechanisms. • Ensure that companies controlling energy communities are not subsidiaries of, or controlled by, large corporations or companies whose primary activity is energy (with the exception of other RECs and CECs). • Prioritize local control in RECs by defining “proximity” in a way that balances local ownership with the need for broader participation and access to expertise. Ensure that those most affected by renewable energy projects have a decisive voice in their operation. 8. PROTECT THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE • Implement a “one member, one vote” system in the general assembly or equivalent decision-making body. This ensures that all members have an equal say in the direction of the energy community, regardless of their investment level or ownership stake. • Introduce caps on the percentage of shares any single member can hold. This prevents any individual or entity from gaining excessive control over the energy community and ensures a more equitable distribution of ownership. • Establish minimum participation quotas for local citizens in both membership and decision-making bodies. This ensures that the energy community remains rooted in the local community and that decisions reflect the interests of local residents. Consider setting a minimum threshold for local residents’ representation on the board of directors or other governing bodies. • Develop and implement clear and transparent decision-making procedures that ensure all members have access to information and opportunities to participate in the decision-making process, such as open meetings (hold regular open meetings where members can discuss issues, propose ideas, and vote on key decisions), accessible information (make all relevant information about the energy community’s activities, finances, and governance readily available to all members), and incorporate member’s input (establish mechanisms for gathering and incorporating member input into decision-making, such as surveys, consultations, and working groups). • Establish term limits for leadership positions, such as board members or executive directors, to prevent the concentration of power and ensure regular turnover. This promotes fresh perspectives and prevents any individual or group from dominating the decisionmaking process over long periods. • Prioritize community-based funding sources, such as crowdfunding, cooperative loans, or local investment schemes, to reduce reliance on external investors or financial institutions that may exert undue influence. • Explore alternative financing models that align with the community-focused principles of energy communities, such as revolving loan funds, community bonds, or ethical investment partnerships. • Invest in developing internal expertise within the energy community to reduce reliance on external consultants or service providers. This could include providing training opportunities for members, hiring staff with relevant skills, or establishing partnerships with knowledge-sharing networks. • Participate in and contribute to knowledge-sharing networks with other energy communities to exchange best practices, learn from each other’s experiences, and collectively build capacity. • Mandate full transparency in all collaboration agreements with external actors, including clear disclosure of all terms and conditions, financial arrangements, and potential conflicts of interest. • Explicitly prohibit clauses in collaboration agreements that grant external actors control over the energy community’s decision-making processes, governance structure, or strategic direction. • Prioritize short-term contracts with external collaborators, with clearly defined scopes of work and limitations on their involvement in the energy community’s internal affairs. • Establish transparent and objective criteria for selecting external collaborators, ensuring that decisions are based on merit, community benefit, and alignment with the energy community’s values. • During the transposition of EU directives into national legislation, explicitly extend the principle of autonomy to CECs like some countries/regions did (France and Brussels, for instance). This ensures that CECs, like RECs, operate democratically and in the best interests of their members, preventing undue influence by large energy corporations or other external actors. 9. PROVIDE MECHANISMS OF CONTROL • Require all energy communities to register with a designated public authority, such as a Social Economy registry or a dedicated energy community registry. This allows for ongoing monitoring of membership composition, financial activities, and compliance with regulations. • Establish independent regulatory bodies with the mandate and resources to effectively monitor and enforce energy community regulations, including the compliance with all the principles. • Grant specific inspection powers to regulatory bodies to verify compliance with eligibility criteria and other regulations. Ensure that these bodies have the authority to investigate complaints, conduct audits, take enforcement action and penalties against any violations, including the authority to enforce advertising regulations and issue cease-and-desist orders, and impose penalties. Corporate Capture of Energy Communities 31 This report has delved into the intricate world of energy communities in Europe, exploring their potential to revolutionize the energy landscape and empower local citizens. While the promise of these initiatives is undeniable, a significant challenge threatens their success: corporate capture. This phenomenon, where large energy companies leverage their resources and influence to gain control of community energy projects, casts a shadow over the democratization of energy production. This report has delved into the intricate world of energy communities in Europe, exploring their potential to revolutionize the energy landscape and empower local citizens. While the promise of these initiatives is undeniable, a significant challenge threatens their success: corporate capture. This phenomenon, where large energy companies leverage their resources and influence to gain control of community energy projects, casts a shadow over the democratization of energy production. Our investigation has uncovered a complex web of vulnerabilities that enable corporate capture. Ambiguous definitions and inconsistent implementation of EU directives across Member States create fertile ground for exploitation. Large energy companies, adept at navigating regulatory loopholes, can readily exploit these inconsistencies to their advantage. They may leverage financial incentives, engage in misleading advertising campaigns that portray them as champions of community energy, and even influence policymaking to serve their own interests. The consequences of corporate capture are far-reaching and detrimental to the very essence of community energy. It can lead to the erosion of community ownership and control, diminish social and environmental benefits, and ultimately erode public trust in the energy transition. When energy communities become dominated by corporate interests, the original vision of citizen empowerment and local self-determination is compromised. Section 5 CONCLUSIONS To counter this threat, a multi-pronged strategy is required, encompassing both proactive measures by energy communities and robust regulatory frameworks. Energy communities must prioritize transparency and accountability in their governance structures, ensuring that decision-making power truly resides with their members. They need to actively cultivate internal expertise and diversify funding sources to reduce reliance on external actors. Crucially, they must remain vigilant against subtle forms of corporate influence, actively advocating for their interests and holding policymakers accountable. On the policy front, clear and concrete definitions of energy communities are paramount. These definitions must include detailed enough requirements to emphasize genuine community ownership, local control, and democratic governance, leaving no room for ambiguity or exploitation. Robust monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are essential to ensure compliance and prevent corporate capture. Financial incentives should be designed to prioritize community-led initiatives, with safeguards in place to prevent corporate dominance. Furthermore, regulations must combat misleading advertising, requiring clear and transparent disclosure of information to empower consumers and prevent them from being misled by “greenwashing” tactics. Beyond these specific measures, a broader shift in perspective is needed. We must recognize that the energy transition is not merely a technological challenge but also a social and political one. It presents a unique opportunity to reimagine our relationship with energy, shifting from a centralized, profit-driven model to a more decentralized and community-centric one. Energy communities embody this vision, offering a pathway towards a more democratic and equitable energy system. However, the success of this vision hinges on our collective commitment to safeguarding the integrity of energy communities. This requires a concerted effort from policymakers, regulators, energy communities, and citizens alike. By fostering a policy environment that prioritizes genuine community empowerment and by empowering communities to protect their autonomy, we can unlock the transformative potential of community energy. By ensuring that energy communities remain truly community-led, we can pave the way for a future where energy production is more democratized, local communities are empowered, and the benefits of the energy transition are more distributed than in the current model. 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