Greener on the other side? Mapping China's overseas co-financing and financial innovation

Chen, Yunnan; Emery, Teal Research Report Greener on the other side? Mapping China's overseas cofinancing and financial innovation ODI Report Provided in Cooperation with: ODI Global, London Suggested Citation: Chen, Yunnan; Emery, Teal (2025) : Greener on the other side? Mapping China's overseas co-financing and financial innovation, ODI Report, ODI Global, London This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/317061 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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Yunnan Chen and Teal Emery ODI Global 203 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NJ United Kingdom © ODI Global 2025 Online ISSN: 2052-7209 This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. ODI Global requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI Global website. Views and opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author(s) and should in no way be attributed to the institutions to which they are affiliated or to ODI Global. How to cite: Chen, Y. and Emery, T. (2025) Greener on the other side: mapping China’s overseas co-financing and financial innovation. Report. London: ODI Global (www.odi.org/en/publications/greener-on-the-other-side-mapping-chinasoverseas-co-financing-and-financial-innovation/) Front cover image: Shutterstock ID: 2480041573 Acknowledgements About this publication We are hugely grateful to reviewers, Ammar Malik, Christoph Nedopil Wang and Frederique Dahan, for their thoughtful feedback and comments, which have shaped and improved the development of the paper. We also thank Sheng Zhang for methodological feedback and advice on the social network analyses, and Jeremy Stevens and Jiang Mengnan, as well as other sector practitioners in Beijing and London, who shared their time and insights on this topic. Thank you to Maegan Rodricks, Jane Lanigan and Steven Dickie for their support of the design and publications process. Finally, we are grateful to the European Climate Foundation Pooled Fund on International Energy, and to the Gates Foundation for their support of this work. About the authors Yunnan Chen (ORCID: 0000-0002-3286-3949) is a research fellow in the Development and Public Finance team at ODI. Teal Emery (ORCID: 0009-0002-4804-2202) is an independent consultant and founder of Teal Insights. He serves as an Adjunct Lecturer at Johns Hopkins SAIS. Contents Acknowledgements / v Acronyms/Glossary / vii Executive summary / 1 1 Introduction / 3 1.1 Why co-financing? Balancing risk and reward in overseas lending / 4 1.2 Methodological approach and data collection / 10 1.3 Structure of the report / 13 2 Syndicated lending and co-financing / 14 2.1 The role of syndication in China’s overseas lending / 14 2.2 Who is financing? Commercial banks dominate syndicated lending / 16 2.3 Syndicated loans skew commercial in sector and geography / 19 3 Multilateral partnerships and co-financing / 21 3.1 Co-financing with MDBs: key trends / 21 3.2 Co-financing via multilateral funds / 22 4 Green co-financing networks in overseas lending / 27 4.1 Who is co-financing green investments? / 28 5 Beyond development finance: other sources of green investment / 32 5.1 Private sector participation in green infrastructure / 32 6 Conclusions and policy implications / 38 6.1 Policy implications / 39 References / 42 Appendix 1 / 46 Acronyms/Glossary ADB Asian Development Bank AfDB African Development Bank AGTF Africa Growing Together Fund AI artificial intelligence AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BOC Bank of China BRI Belt and Road Initiative CAF China-ASEAN Fund CBIRC China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission CCB China Construction Bank CDB China Development Bank CGIF Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility CPV concentrated photovoltaic (solar power) DFI development finance institution EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EIF European Investment Fund ESG environmental, social and governance (impact, investment) FDI foreign direct investment FI financial institution FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation GCDF Global Chinese Development Finance ICBC Industrial and Commercial Bank of China IDB Inter-American Development Bank IFC International Finance Corporation IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency MCDF Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance MDB multilateral development bank MOF Ministry of Finance (China) MW megawatts NDB New Development Bank OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PBOC People’s Bank of China PDB public development bank PPI private participation in infrastructure PPP public–private partnership PRC People's Republic of China PV photovoltaics RMB Renminbi/Chinese yuan SBG Standard Bank Group (South Africa) SNA social network analysis SOE state-owned enterprise TDB Trade and Development Bank (East Africa) USD US dollar 7 Greener on the other side? In response to these risks, Chinese FIs and financial authorities have responded in several ways. First, lending has been significantly cut back, reflecting a reduced risk appetite and reduction of risk exposure, particularly for higher-risk or carbon-intensive sectors following the announcement of ‘no new coal’ in 2021. The boom in overseas lending that followed the global financial crisis was partly driven via capital from policy banks and the sovereign wealth fund, mobilised 7 These mainly comprised a small number of countries: 45% of all swaps were targeted to Argentina, followed by 22% to Pakistan, while other major recipients included Mongolia, Egypt and Venezuela. 8 This chart adapts the framework developed in Parks et al. (2023), which introduced the periodisation of ‘Early BRI’ (2014–2017) and ‘Late BRI’ (2018–2021). As in their analysis, the Late BRI period reflects the significant pullback in Chinese overseas infrastructure lending that began around 2017, allowing for more meaningful comparison of lending patterns across these distinct phases of the Belt and Road Initiative. to help offshore Chinese industrial capacity and surplus capital to higher returns overseas (Chin and Gallagher, 2019; Liu, 2023; Franz et al., 2024). This lending for infrastructure has retrenched since 2016, stalled further by the shock of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020–21. Meanwhile, the rise of emergency lending, in the form of short-term refinancing, foreign exchange swap lines and rollovers after 2016, indicated a growing need to support borrower countries facing repayment difficulties (see Figure 3).7 Figure 3 Total Chinese lending commitments (2000–21) Note: Emergency lending rises quickly in the Early BRI period. See Parks et al. (2023) for an in-depth discussion. Source: AidData GCDF v3.0; authors’ elaboration8 Loan commitments (constant 2021 USD) Infrastructure lending OtherEmergency lending 2000 2005 2010 Commitment year 20202015 $0 billion $25 billion $50 billion $75 billion $100 billion Early BRI (2014–17) Late BRI (2018–21) 8Greener on the other side? Second, a shift to ‘green’ China’s overseas activities reflects strengthened risk management frameworks and a broader focus on clean energy cooperation. At the Conference of the Parties (COP) 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, China’s Vice Premier announced the country had provided $25 billion in climate finance since 2016, signalling its political commitments to green cooperation and support for climate finance.9 Discourse around the BRI after 2020 has seen a pivot to a ‘Green BRI’. Likewise, ‘green’ cooperation has featured in the Global Development Initiative (GDI), as well as under regional cooperation initiatives such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, no date). The BRI’s new narrative of ‘small and beautiful’ and growing prioritisation of green projects also reflects a stronger focus on due diligence and the commercial viability of projects (Chen, 2022; Nedopil, 2022). The introduction of new green guidelines and green investment principles serves to raise standards for environmental protection. Guidelines for FIs, such as a ‘traffic light’ system for BRI projects and a green taxonomy for green bond use of proceeds, also help direct project selection and financing decisions. Third, China’s overseas finance architecture has sought to diversify its instruments and institutional 9 Other climate finance researchers have estimated figures between $34 and 45 billion over a 10-year period (Cichocka and Mitchell, 2024; Liu et al., 2024). partnerships to share and delegate risk. Since 2015, China’s overseas lending has seen a growing commercialisation in terms of the participation of commercial creditors in project finance (Wu and Chen, 2024), and growing emphasis in policy discourse on commercial, marketoriented finance and third-party cooperation. The BRI Forum in 2019 encouraged ‘third-market, tripartite cooperation and Public Private Partnership (PPP) cooperation’, to encourage greater risk-sharing between project financiers and developers, and for Chinese enterprises to take on a greater share of project risk, but also as a means to ensure commercial viability and reduce sovereign debt risks (van Wieringen and Zajontz, 2023). Co-financing between Chinese FIs and third-party actors has emerged as one response to these pressures, becoming a prominent modality of financing in the minerals and mining sector, as well as in infrastructure (Lu et al., 2024; Escobar et al., 2025). We use the term ‘co-financing’ in this paper to encompass diverse means of financial risk-sharing between two or more institutions, particularly between Chinese FIs and third-party actors. We focus particularly on co-financing via lending: syndicated lending between commercial banks and co-financing partnerships with multilaterals and other development banks, since these are the most salient channels of 9 Greener on the other side? financing at scale. However, Section 5 also evaluates recent data on other non-lending instruments, including foreign direct investment (FDI) and bond financing, as potential forms of risk-sharing structures, to assess how the broader financing landscape for green investments is diversifying. Syndicated lending structures generally entail direct co-financing between FIs to the same project (usually under the same loan terms). PPPs indicate similar risk-sharing structures through private sector investments in debt or equity; however, these entail the longer-term involvement of an investment partner (such as an enterprise) – for example, in operation of an infrastructure concession. Co-financing can involve the delegation of risk, through the transfer of funds to be managed by a third party, in the form of on-lending, or the use of co-financing funds and trust funds (for example, with an MDB). These forms of co-financing serve to reduce the volume of exposure for individual FIs, but also offload responsibility to other parties in areas such as project inception, preparation and ESG management that have contributed to the financial and reputational risks of the past (Parks et al., 2023; Cichocka and Mitchell, 2024; Escobar et al., 2025). The growth and relative resilience of co-financed loans raises the question whether co-financing may be a potential source of future climate finance (Cichocka and Mitchell, 2024). The domestic market for green finance in China has boomed in the last five years. Meanwhile, China’s thriving clean technology sectors in renewables, battery production and new energy vehicles are reaching domestic overcapacity, making overseas markets, particularly in the Global South, more strategically important. These trends are salient given the potential for Chinese technologies in enabling energy transition and supporting greener, low-carbon development pathways in the Global South (Helveston and Nahm, 2019; Shen, 2020; Chiyemura et al.,2021). Chinese FIs now balance new competing mandates (see Figure 4): to mitigate risk, ensure profitability and financial stability, while still supporting national strategies to finance green investments in the Global South. Our analysis looks at the trends and actors driving these different financing modalities to evaluate the following: 1. In an era of ‘de-risking’, what is the role of co-financing modalities in China’s overseas finance? Who are the key driving institutions and who are they co-financing with? 2. What potential role can emerging financing modalities play to support energy transition investments? Where does the financing go, in sector and geography? What are the challenges and barriers to scale? 10 Greener on the other side? Figure 4 Chinese FIs must balance risk exposure against new expanded mandates Source: Authors' elaboration 10 Other datasets on China’s regional and global lending are available, including from Boston University Global Policy Development Center (GPDC) and the World Resources Institute’s (WRI’s) China overseas financing, which provide slightly more recent data and more conservative estimates of financing volumes. However, these datasets do not have granular data on co-financing and financial data. Both institutes provide transparent and comprehensive methodology documentation on how their data is collected, analysed and verified, using a mix of algorithmic, web-scraping methods, as well as official sources, and large-scale human expert verification. AidData uses the Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology, while Boston University and SAIS-CARI (John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies; China-Africa Research Initiative), which built the initial China-Africa loan dataset, also provide a Database Methodology Guide. See: www. aiddata.org/methods/tracking-underreported-financial-flows; www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/03/ GCI-Database-Methodology-Guide_2023-FIN.pdf. 1.2 Methodological approach and data collection Like the proverb of the three blind men feeling the elephant, this report explores dynamic parts in a bigger picture of China’s overseas finance that is incomplete – and evolving. Our analysis draws from multiple publicly available datasets on China’s overseas financing: primarily, the AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance (GCDF) v3.0 dataset, which gives a comprehensive overview of all official sector finance from 2000 to 2021, as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines (Custer et al., 2023), including data on syndication, on-lending and trust funds, with granular data on financing terms and conditions. The dataset includes financing from all state-owned entities, including policy banks, and commercial banks and enterprises.10 While the AidData data is comprehensive, it does not shed light on post-2021 trends. We trace some more recent trends in Section 5 using lending data Risk mitigation Increase profitability Avoid sovereign debt, ESG and reputational risks Maintain domestic financial stability Green finance Climate finance provision Support national green technology sectors Scale up green finance instruments Mandate Divest in coal Strengthen ESG standards Co-financing ! 11 Greener on the other side? from Boston University (BU) China Overseas Development Finance, data on green bond issuances from Bloomberg, World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure data, and FDI markets for Africa-only projects. As such, these analyses are supplemented by secondary academic and grey literature, as well as off-the-record interviews with sector experts and practitioners. For overseas lending, we look at two main areas: first, the major trends in the instruments and institutions of cofinancing, and second, to what extent they go on to support green investments for energy transition. We outline the key steps of our approach below. A full methodology is provided as a separate annex to this paper. 1. Defining co-financed loan transactions Our analysis uses AidData’s GCDF v3.0 dataset, which provides specific tags for co-financing, syndicated loans, on-lending and multilateral involvement. To identify single co-financed transactions involving multiple listed lenders, we identified cases of co-financed project transactions using a heuristic method, classifying transactions using the recipient and the date of signature of the loan agreement. We conducted extensive validation of this approach by examining all transactions with multiple records and combined funding over $1 billion, calculating string distance metrics between descriptions in multi-record transactions, and manually reviewing cases with high description divergence. This analysis confirmed that our transaction identifier approach effectively consolidated related financing activities into coherent transactions. The few edge cases typically represented multiple government-to-government agreements likely signed during a single diplomatic engagement and would not change the substantive findings. The data comes with caveats. First, loan commitments do not reflect disbursement of financing or debt outstanding. Second, syndicated loans do not give consistent data of the share of lending from each financier. Finally, the data on Chinese FIs and enterprises covers only lending and not broader activities, including FDI, financing to non-sovereign borrowers or other capital flows that sit outside OECD development finance definitions. 2. Network analysis of co-financing banks Drawing from the approaches of Joosse et al. (2025) and Escobar et al. (2025), we employ a social network analysis (SNA) method to identify the clusters of cofinancing between different Chinese and non-Chinese banking institutions, which we categorise by the institution’s mandate (whether commercial or a policy-oriented public development bank). We analyse how connected the financial institution is within the network through metrics of degree centrality, betweenness centrality and constraint. Our analysis treats co-financing as a binary relationship (whether institutions are co-financed or not) with edges weighted by the number of transactions rather than financial volumes, as consistent contribution data 12 Greener on the other side? is not available across institutions. This approach, while not capturing the full financial exposure of each lender, still reveals important structural relationships between financial institutions that traditional quantitative analysis would miss, highlighting which institutions act as key connectors or bridges between distinct financing ecosystems. A detailed discussion of the SNA methodology is available in a methodological annex to this paper. 3. Identifying transition-oriented investments We apply a specific lens on energy transition, a key component both for the achievement of global climate goals, as well as to support equitable lowcarbon development in lower-income countries (Simpson et al., 2023). Our analysis complements existing efforts to categorise China’s climate finance, which use OECD methods and Rio Markers for mitigation or adaptation purposes (Tsang et al., 2023; Cichocka and Mitchell, 2024; Liu et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025). Our paper takes a narrower focus on co-financing flows only, where it supports transition-oriented activities. This overlaps in capturing mitigation activities (such as deployment of renewable 11 The consideration of natural gas as a transition fuel is a contested area; in our analysis we include this as a ‘grey’ category. energy) but widens the lens to look at ‘grey’ sectors that have significant upstream or downstream implications for energy transition, and where China has a salient role – for example, transmission infrastructure, in critical mineral mining, in sustainable transport (for example, new energy vehicles or NEVs) and in the development of natural gas.11 We developed criteria for transitionoriented investments as follows, drawing from existing green taxonomies based on the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), European Union (EU) taxonomies and China’s green development guidelines for the BRI. A full discussion of the criteria and their mapping on existing taxonomies is included in the methodological annex to the paper. • Green : clear positive impact for energy transition and climate mitigation objectives – for example, renewable energy projects, microgrid infrastructure and energy storage infrastructure. • Grey : indirect positive impact for broader energy transition in the context of other investments, but do 13 Greener on the other side? not directly contribute to energy transition – for example, energy transmission and energy efficiency infrastructure, electric vehicle and sustainable transport, natural gas,12 and mining of critical minerals.13 • Brown : negative impact for energy transition and climate mitigation objectives – for example, oil, coal and other fossil fuel infrastructure, non-critical mineral mining, and energy-intensive industrial projects (such as steel or glass). • Neutral : mixed or minimal impact for energy transition – for example, non-energy sector projects, transport, social, education and health programmes. We systematically classified nearly 18,000 AidData project descriptions using DeepSeek-V3, an advanced large-language model (LLM), following our criteria for transition-oriented investments. This efficient artificial intelligence (AI)-driven methodology allowed us to comprehensively identify green financing patterns in ways previously infeasible at scale. The LLM achieved 91.8% agreement with human classifications during validation testing. A detailed discussion of the AI-methodology is included in a separate annex to his paper, including model selection, prompt design and validation process. The taxonomy of transition investments is also expanded upon in the annex. While this analysis is subjective in classification, with a margin of error due to the AI-methodology, it gives an estimate comparable to other scholarly exercises, making it a useful analysis of recent trends. 12 The consideration of natural gas as a transition fuel is a contested and literal ‘grey’ area. While natural gas is not included as part of IRENA’s transition fuel, certain natural gas projects are included in the EU taxonomy in playing a role in transitioning from other more carbon-intensive fossil fuels in the context of other renewables investments moreover, natural gas development remains an important part of the energy mix in Africa and other developing regions (IEF, 2021; ACF, 2022; Escrig, 2022; IRENA, 2024). 13 We utilise International Energy Agency (IEA) definitions of critical minerals as being lithium, nickel, cobalt, copper and rare earth minerals (IEA, 2022; Escobar et al., 2025). 4. Non-lending financing for green investment To give a horizon scan of more recent trends, Section 5 includes analyses using World Bank data on private participation in infrastructure (PPI), as well as FDI markets, emerging trends in firm-level investments, and Bloomberg data on Chinese onshore and offshore green bond issuances. This provides an overview of other forms of risk-sharing and co-financing outside of development finance, in order to understand the broader shifts in China’s financing architecture that may indirectly enable investments in climate and energy transition-related sectors. These give an indication of more recent firm-level and FI-level activities that may not be captured in overseas lending datasets. 1.3 Structure of the report This report is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the use of syndicated loans, which constitutes the bulk of co-financed transactions, and the role of commercial creditor networks within this. Section 3 then focuses on the role of multilateral co-financing and the key instruments Chinese actors have deployed, including multilateral funds. Section 4 goes on to analyse the financing of green and transition-oriented projects in co-financed loan projects. Section 5 then widens the perspective to look at emerging trends beyond development finance lending from policy and commercial bank lending, to briefly examine green investments via green bond and FDI finance. Finally, Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 14 Greener on the other side? 2 Syndicated lending and co-financing Syndicated lending – where multiple banks jointly provide financing to a single project – represents the most dominant form of co-financing in China’s overseas financing portfolio. In a classic syndication structure, structuring transactions across multiple banks, lead financiers (or lead arrangers) structure transactions across multiple banks to share the risk exposure for bigticket or high-risk transactions, as well as dividing technical or legal responsibilities for the transaction between other participants in the syndication. This section analyses the landscape of syndicated lending, its trends and key players. We examine the key Chinese and international players, both by the number of transactions and by the centrality of their role within the network of lenders. We identify major co-financing partners and clusters within the financing ecosystem. 2.1 The role of syndication in China’s overseas lending Between 2013 and 2021, syndicated loans from Chinese policy banks and state-owned commercial banks reached more than $180 billion. As shown in Figure 5, while bilateral policy bank lending saw a sharp decline starting in 2017, syndicated loan volumes have proved more resilient. Even when bilateral lending in 2021 remained at a low, syndicated lending matched nonemergency bilateral loans in volume. This marks a structural shift in how Chinese institutions deploy capital overseas. Figure 5 The rise of syndicated lending (2000–21) Note: In dollar terms, syndicated lending has remained steady as bilateral lending without co-financing has dropped dramatically. This excludes emergency lending. Source: Authors' chart, AidData GCDF v3.0 Involves multilateral co-financingBilateral loan without co-financing Syndicated Loan 2000 2005 2010 Commitment year 20202015 Loan commitments (constant 2021 USD) $0 billion $25 billion $50 billion $75 billion $100 billion Early BRI (2014–17) Late BRI (2018–21) 15 Greener on the other side? Compared to bilateral lending from a single bank, syndicated loans show striking differences in the terms of financing, most notably in maturity. Syndicated loans have a median tenor of 5 years, compared to 10 years for CDB loans; meanwhile, Eximbank loans are four times as long, at 20 years. Combined with median grace periods of three years for syndicated loans, this necessitates regular refinancing. While this shorter-term structure helps lenders manage risk, it transfers significant rollover risk to borrowers. Syndicated loans carry a median interest rate of 3.78%, making them relatively lower cost compared to CDB’s higher median rate of 4.80% though higher than China Eximbank’s 2.00% median. However, the prevalence of variable interest rates differs markedly across the lending modalities. We find variable rates mentioned in 54% of syndicated loans (predominantly LIBOR 14 14 LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) was a benchmark interest rate at which major global banks lent to one another, widely used to set borrowing costs for loans and financial products until its phase-out starting in 2021. based), compared to 49% of CDB loans and only 17% of China Eximbank loans. Like the shorter maturities, variable rates protect lenders, but transfer risk to the borrowers, with substantial impacts. For a typical $250 million LIBOR-based syndicated loan with a 3.5% spread, annual interest payments would have more than doubled from about $9 million to over $23 million as the 6-month LIBOR rose from 0.15% in 2021 to 5.9% in 2023. Notably, unlike bilateral loans, which are predominantly denominated in US dollars (USD) or Chinese yuan (RMB) (for concessional loans), syndicated loans show a notably higher share of eurodenominated lending (10% versus 2% for policy bank bilateral loans), consistent with the prominent role of European banks in these transactions. This also reflects the broader global pool of capital that these cofinancing modalities can potential tap into. Figure 6 Median loan maturity Note: Syndicated loans have a median maturity of 5 years. The median maturity of a CDB loan is twice as long. The median maturity of China Exlm loan is four times as long. Source: Authors' chart, AidData GCDF v3.0 Median loan maturity (years) 0 5 10 15 20 Syndicated loan CDB (non-cofinanced) Eximbank (non-cofinanced) 16 Greener on the other side? 2.2 Who is financing? Commercial banks dominate syndicated lending Drawing from the approach of Joosse et al. (2025) and Escobar et al. (2025), which pioneer an application of social network analysis (SNA) to Chinese development finance, we analyse the key actors and web of relationships between banks participating in syndicated lending. This approach allows us to identify not just the key players, but those with a central role in coordinating syndication networks and arranging deals. We find that the largest Chinese stateowned commercial banks sit at the heart of syndicated lending networks within a dense commercial core of commercial banks. Figure 7 shows the network of top 20 most active banks, according to their degree centrality and other metrics. Bank of China (BOC) and ICBC occupy a prominent central position and high centrality, while China Construction Bank (CCB) and policy banks like CDB play a more peripheral role in the network. By volume, ICBC and Bank of China participate in the highest number of transactions (see Figure 8). Figure 7 Syndicated lending networks: top 20 banks Source: Authors' chart, AidData GCDF v3.0 Profit orientation Mixed mandate Policy driven Profit maximising Degree centrality 250 300 350 Lender type Chinese Non-Chinese: profit maximising Weight 30 60 90 Credit Suisse DZ Bank ICBC Citibank HSBC Mizuho Mitsubishi UFJ Sumitomo Mitsui Bank of China ING Societe Generale China Construction Bank JPMorgan Commerzbank Intesa Sanpaolo Natixis China Development Bank Standard Chartered Credit Agricole BNP Paribas 23 Greener on the other side? Most of the funds are modest, ranging around contributions of $50 million. Many have a regional orientation: for example, several older funds created in the late 2000s were targeted to the Asia and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region and involved the Asian Development Bank, including the Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) and the China-ASEAN fund (CAF). The largest of these funds, and the most prolific sources of co-financed transactions, have been the PBOCsupported funds at three MDBs, the African Development Bank (AfDB), InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The China Co-financing Fund for Latin America at IDB and the Africa Growing Together Fund (AGTF) focus more strongly on sustainable investments in the infrastructure and energy sectors (see Table 1 in the appendix). 17 The UA (Unit of Account) is the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) internal currency used for financial reporting and transactions, designed to provide a stable reference value for its operations across member countries with different national currencies. Established between 2013 and 2014 at the IDB, IFC and AfDB, these funds amounted to $7 billion total in contributions via the PBOC. They were part of a wider movement to offshore surplus capital, both in the multilateral system, as well as bilaterally through the BRI (Humphrey and Chen, 2021; Franz et al., 2024). Box2 highlights the case of the AfDB fund, which has supported several energy projects across Africa. However, none of the co-financing funds have seen further replenishment from PBOC, despite coming to the end of their 10-year tenor. At the recent FOCAC 2024 forum, China announced additional support to the China-World Bank Partnership Facility, financed by the MOF, but no further commitments were made to the PBOCfunded AGTF. Given the key role that capital via these co-financed funds has played in supporting energy transition investments, there is a clear case for their expansion and replication. Box 2 Africa Growing Together Fund (AGTF) The Africa Growing Together Fund was established in 2014 as an AfDB-administered fund, to provide low-cost financing to sustainable infrastructure projects. The PBOC injected an initial capitalisation of $2 billion into the fund to be deployed over a 10-year period; as of 2024, UA1.5 billion17 ($1.9 billion) had been committed to 54 projects. Much of this has gone to sovereign projects, although a growing proportion (a total of 11%) has also gone towards supporting non-sovereign recipients. According to the AfDB, around 21% of AGTF funds have supported the banks’ Light Up and Power Africa initiatives. 24 Greener on the other side? Disbursements have been much slower, stalling since the pandemic (see Figure 13). While the AGTF was mentioned as a key achievement in the 2024 Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation, future commitments or funding from China to the AGTF have not been confirmed. Geographically, the biggest recipients have been Nigeria, Tanzania and Egypt, followed by Kenya and Angola (see Figure 14). AidData figures tracked around $571 million in commitments to the AGTF, of which 52% (around $300 million) went towards projects in transport, with water and sanitation, and energy projects receiving 34% and 14%, respectively. A significant part of the recorded energy projects (around $50 million) went to supporting off-grid (mainly solar) electrification projects in Nigeria, as well as large hydroelectric plants in Tanzania. A few projects have mobilised financing from other partners, including the Islamic Development Bank and European Investment Bank, as well as co-financing from the EU Africa Trust Fund. Small amounts of AGTF funds (up to $30 million) have also been used to co-finance AfDB packages to national banks, including to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Bank for Investment and Development (EBID),18 Senegal’s National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE),19 the Commercial International Bank of Egypt (CIB) for trade finance,20 and Egypt’s Banque Misr,21 highlighting its small role in supporting national PDBs in Africa. 18 AfDB (2023) ‘West Africa: African Development Bank, Ecowas Bank for Investment and Development sign loan agreement for $50 million and €50 million to enhance regional food security’ (www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/west-africa-african-developmentbank-ecowas-bank-investment-and-development-sign-loan-agreement-50-million-and-eu50million-enhance-regional-food-security-64828). 19 AfDB (2019) ‘Senegal: African Development Bank approves over 22 million euros to BNDE to support SMEs and job creation in rural areas’ (www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/pressreleases/senegal-la-banque-africaine-de-developpement-approuve-plus-de-22-millions-deurosla-bnde-pour-soutenir-les-pme-et-la-creation-demplois-en-zone-rurale-30402). 20 AfDB (2023) ‘Egypt: African Development Bank supports Commercial International Bank with $148 million to prop up SMEs and trade’ (www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/ egypt-african-development-bank-supports-commercial-international-bank-148-million-propsmes-and-trade-66385). 21 AfDB (2022) ‘Egypt: African Development Bank extends $160 million loan to Banque Misr to strengthen private sector participation in Egypt’s economy’ (www.afdb.org/en/news-andevents/press-releases/egypt-african-development-bank-extends-160-million-loan-banque-misrstrengthen-private-sector-participation-egypts-economy-56328). 25 Greener on the other side? Figure 13 AGTF commitments and disbursements (2015–23) Note: Converted from UA (Unit of Account) using USD (2023) rates. Source: Authors' chart, African Development Bank data Figure 14 AGTF all commitments by country (2015–23) Note: Converted from UA (Unit of Account) using USD (2023) rates. Source: Authors' chart, African Development Bank data Sum of total disbursements Sum of total commitments USD billions 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Nigeria Angola Egypt Tanzania Kenya 1 Billion 800 million 600 million 400 million 200 million 0 n/a 26 Greener on the other side? While the scale of these MDB funds has diminished over time, there are strong political signals for the continued importance of MDB cooperation. The creation of the recent Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development Finance (MCDF) in 2020, with a modest finance facility of $150 million commitment from China’s MOF, indicates a desire to bring multilateral cooperation with MDBs into BRI and infrastructure initiatives (Calabrese and Chen, 2020; Gu, 2020). The MCDF funds support project preparation but also capacity building for implementing partners, with the goal of improving project quality, as well as accountability and safeguarding standards. To 2024, it had disbursed around $38 million in grants, mainly for projects from CAF, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and AfDB (MCDF, 2024). Likewise, policy banks, and China Eximbank in particular, have been prominent in supporting regional and sub-regional development banks such as Afreximbank and TDB via on-lending. More recently, China Eximbank signed cooperation agreements with both the ADB and BRICSled New Development Bank (NDB): with ADB, the agreement emphasised knowledge sharing and exchanges for high-quality 22 Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2023) ‘ADB, CEXIM sign agreement to support co-financing of private sector investments in Asia and the Pacific’ (www.adb.org/news/adb-cexim-signagreement-support-co-financing-private-sector-investments-asia-and-pacific); The ExportImport Bank of China (2023) ‘A cooperation framework signed between the Export-Import Bank of China and the New Development Bank (NDB)’ (http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/News/ NewsR/202312/t20231211_54494.html). 23 AIIB (2021) ‘China: China EXIM Bank Enhanced Environmental and Social Management Systems (ESMS)’ (www.aiib.org/en/projects/details/2021/special-fund/China-EXIM-Bank-EnhancedEnvironmental-and-Social-Management-Systems.html). infrastructure and green projects; with NDB, the two sides pledged cooperation via syndication, co-financing and parallel financing in sustainable infrastructure, including clean energy.22 Eximbank has also received funds from AIIB and MCDF as part of a partnership to support the enhancement of its environmental and social management systems (ESMS) for domestic projects.23 These demonstrate the continued importance of MDB collaboration for Chinese FIs, and the prospect of growing MDB partnerships, not only as a way to mitigate financial and nonfinancial risks, but also to upgrade and build the risk management capacities of bilateral financiers for the future. 27 Greener on the other side? 4 Green co-financing networks in overseas lending 24 See the methodological annex for discussions relating to categorisations of project type and the classification. 25 This likely reflects the relative rise of emergency lending, refinancing and foreign exchange swap lines over this period. This section examines how the cofinancing networks explored in previous sections intersect with trends in loan financing for green projects. Looking at all financing trends, based on our AI-powered methodology to classify all overseas lending data, we estimate approximately $86.5 billion in transition-oriented ‘green’ investments committed between 2000 and 2021, as captured by AidData, representing 5.8% of total lending commitments. Large hydropower dominates this category, accounting for around $61 billion (71.6%) of ‘green’ investments, followed by nuclear projects at $10.4 billion. ‘Grey’ and ‘brown’ investments, respectively, account for $131 billion and $549 billion. The most prominent ‘grey’ investments (which we define as projects that may not directly contribute to, but can support, broader energy transition pathways), include grid infrastructure ($38 billion), critical minerals mining ($51 billion) and natural gas power ($34.6 billion).24 However, across all categories, with the exception of neutral-classified loans,25 we see a decline in overall lending since 2015. Figure 15 Trends in project type lending (2000–21) Source: Authors' chart, authors' categorisation and calculations based on AidData GCDF v3.0 Green Grey Brown Neutral USD billions $0.00 $10.00 $20.00 $30.00 $40.00 $50.00 $60.00 $70.00 $80.00 $90.00 $100.00 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 28 Greener on the other side? How much of this green lending is cofinanced? Of the $86.5 billion committed to green projects, around $34.6 billion, or 40%, is co-financed, though this differs substantially between different types of green projects. Around 48% of hydro projects involve co-financing – unsurprising given the large-ticket and high-risk nature of dam projects – while we see no observed co-financing for nuclear projects. Though solar and wind power loan volumes are smaller, they also appear to be attractive sectors for co-financing: a third of solar projects are co-financed, while for wind, this is onequarter (see Figure 16). Figure 16 Co-financing trends across green projects Source: Authors' chart, calculations based on AidData GCDF v3.0 4.1 Who is co-financing green investments? In contrast to the wider commercial syndicated lending financing network, social network analysis of green projects reveals a markedly different institutional ecosystem. This involves a distinct ecosystem of clustered cofinancing, where policy-oriented public development banks, which include development finance institutions (DFIs) and multilateral development banks (MDBs), play an outsized role, compared to non-green conventional lending, where commercial banks feature more significantly. Notably, PDBs constitute approximately two-thirds (66%) of non-Chinese co-financiers for projects classified as ‘green’, compared to all other lending, where PDBs are around one-third (33%) of the composition of non-Chinese co-financiers. As Figure 17 shows, there is a fundamentally different lender composition for green finance, with a bifurcated network structure between commercial and PDB financing ecosystems. % Non-cofinanced % Co-financed Financial servicesClean energy manufacturing facilities Renewable energy portfolio Geothermal powerOther low-carbon energy Wind powerGreen transportationSolar powerNuclear powerHydropower 29 Greener on the other side? Figure 17 Key network financiers in green co-financing: top 20 banks Source: Authors' chart, calculations based on AidData GCDF v3.0 Social network analysis highlights ICBC and Bank of China’s uniquely critical role in bridging otherwise disconnected commercial and policy-oriented financing networks. Their structural position indicates a substantial, though currently underutilised, potential to channel commercial capital towards green transition projects. ICBC and Bank of China occupy central positions with high betweenness, indicating their role as strategic bridges between commercial and policy-oriented clusters. A handful of commercial banks are extremely central and active in green co-financing, such as Societe Generale and Standard Chartered. However, policy-oriented PDBs dominate the green co-financing network, with KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), French Development Agency (AFD), IFC and AfDB emerging as crucial partners in ways not visible in International Finance Corporation African Development Bank China Development Bank ICBC Bank of China Credit Suisse KfW Societe Generale Standard Chartered Citibank Sumitomo Mitsui Export-Import Bank of China CDC European Investment Bank OPEC Fund for International Development Proparco Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund French Development Agency BBVA BNP Paribas Weight 1 2 3 4 5 Profit orientation Mixed mandate Policy driven Profit maximising Degree centrality 20 30 40 50 Lender type Chinese Non-Chinese: policy driven Non-Chinese: profit maximising 30 Greener on the other side? the overall lending network, with high representation in green transactions, though with limited participation in the number of transactions overall. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), with centrality metrics so low it doesn’t appear in our network visualisation, nevertheless participates in a significant number of green co-financed transactions, primarily through specialised co-financing funds established at multilateral development banks, as previously discussed in Section 3 of this paper. This suggests a strategic approach to green finance that operates through targeted institutional relationships rather than broad market participation. These findings should be interpreted with appropriate caution given the relatively small sample of green financing transactions, but they point to distinct institutional pathways for different types of green investments. Detailed information on the SNA metrics and network construction is available in the methodological annex to this paper. This PDB-centric network structure likely reflects several factors: these institutions have a stronger mandate to support green projects; they can provide lowercost capital; they often enjoy de facto or de jure preferred creditor status; and they have expertise in project preparation and environmental standards. The ‘butterfly’ nature of the network indicates a bifurcated pattern of green financing, with a distinct ecosystem of PDB cofinancing but weak linkages to other commercial financing ecosystems. When examining financing patterns, commercially co-financed green projects typically involve brownfield investments with existing cashflows, such as sale or refinancing of established hydropower assets, while greenfield renewable energy investments tend to be either directly financed by policy banks or co-financed with other PDBs. Our text-based classification of green projects, while approximate and subject to methodological caveats, offers some clear implications. First, that co-financing for green projects relies on fundamentally different institutional networks than conventional project lending, with policy-oriented PDBs playing a dominant co-financing role, rather than profitmaximising commercial lenders which dominate overall syndicated lending networks. This bifurcation of networks suggests at a distinct and separate ecosystem of PDB-reliant co-financing networks for green finance. Second, rather than policy banks, it is Chinese commercial banks that play a central role both in overall syndication networks and in green financing networks. Their high measures of centrality indicate their critical role in ‘bridging’ between the bifurcated PDB and commercial lending ecosystems. These observations have important implications for scaling up transition finance. Past trends suggest that Chinese co-financing for green projects requires different risk-sharing networks than traditional commercial BRI projects. It also indicates that Chinese commercial 31 Greener on the other side? banks can ‘play with both sides’ in cofinancing with both PDB and commercial networks, with the potential to bridge between them and mobilise commercial capital towards green investments. The next section outlines additional recent trends in green project finance that reflect other modalities of risksharing, going beyond lending and development finance. 32 Greener on the other side? 5 Beyond development finance: other sources of green investment 26 The database records contractual arrangements for public infrastructure projects in lowand middle-income countries (as classified by the World Bank) that have reached financial closure, in which private parties assume operating risks. While this includes PPP-like models, such build-own-transfer or build-own-operate-transfer (BOT/BOOT) projects, it does not give definitive figures for equity investments. This section widens the lens beyond development finance and lending, to track the activities of Chinese commercial financiers in more recent trends post2021. As China’s financing architecture evolves to share and mitigate risk in lending, we see growing signs of diversification in the modalities of financing. This section outlines the use of direct equity investments through FDI and other forms of public–private partnership, and notes emerging trends in green finance instruments. 5.1 Private sector participation in green infrastructure Aside from bond finance, policy signals in recent years have encouraged greater use of PPPs and private investment in overseas infrastructure. Such investments may not be captured in existing development finance or loan data but may play a salient role. This may be the case particularly for energy transition investments, including in renewables, or in major commercial transactions in mining commodities, where financing for infrastructure can be tied to a larger investment and its income streams. Studies in Africa find several PPPlike projects, mainly in expressways, roads and ports, with a few power sector projects, though the data is not comprehensive (van Wieringen and Zajontz, 2023). In contrast to many syndicated lending transactions, these transactions are largely driven by Chinese contractors, sometimes with support from Chinese lenders who take on a longer-term stake in the project, and do not generally entail co-financing with international partners. World Bank PPI data estimates around $74 billion between 2010 and 2023 in overseas infrastructure finance coming from China with private participation, often involving operation or long-term concessions with a Chinese company.26 This has shown a rise and fall over time, with a small uptick in 2023 (Figure 18). 39 Greener on the other side? commercial banks such as ICBC appear to play a clear bridging role between these bifurcated networks, with central and strong relationships with both financing ecosystems. We also highlight the role of multilateral funds, including PBOC-established cofinancing funds at the IDB and AfDB, in supporting energy infrastructure. Many of these funds were established in the boom period before 2014, and while they have largely been disbursed, they have not been recapitalised. No new funds have been established to the same scale. Nevertheless, there is a clear political willingness to collaborate with MDBs within the broader architecture, as seen in the establishment of the MCDF platform and growing on-lending to regional banks. There is also a clear appetite on the part of policy banks like China Eximbank to collaborate and co-finance with MDBs in projects for sustainable infrastructure and clean energy, indicating this will be a rising area going forward. Beyond development finance and official state-backed financial institutions, risksharing is taking place through other forms. One area is in the rising trend of green investments via FDI, involving equity (usually from a commercial business) rather than debt finance from an FI. This appears to be in line with policy trends that have emphasised new financing through investment promotion rather than direct lending, where implementing firms take on a greater share of project investment risks. Meanwhile, the modest boom in Chinese green bond markets, driven by domestic and domestic energy transition investments, may also see growing use for overseas projects. The use of BRI-branding in more recent green bond issuances by major FIs after 2021 demonstrates a model of project financing where commercial banks can channel investment capital towards green projects in BRI countries where direct lending may otherwise be unfeasible. 6.1 Policy implications Co-financing with commercial and development finance has been an attractive modality for FIs as a means of reducing risk exposure in overseas investments. However, it has not led to a significant expansion of support for green projects to date. Green project lending with co-financing has involved PDBs or taken place via earmarked co-financing funds. This highlights the importance of PDBs in providing long-term concessional financing, and in prioritising green sectors for project development and finance. The bulk of commercial syndicated loans have a short maturity, making it challenging for infrastructure projects, including renewables investments, which require significant capital outlays and often longterm patient capital to match their long payback periods. These issues raise several policy implications: Chinese commercial banks play a role in bridging commercial and development co-financing ecosystems. Our network analysis shows distinct networks and clusters in how commercial 40 Greener on the other side? banks and development banks support projects as part of co-financing clusters, with limited overlap between the two. However, major Chinese commercial banks act as a bridge, bringing PDBs into regionally concentrated commercial network transactions, and redirecting pools of commercial capital or ameliorating their risk aversion towards more developmental and green transactions. This could involve pioneering blended finance structures or leveraging PDBs’ guarantees to derisk projects, provide more favourable financing terms and, crucially, extend the maturity of these commercial instruments for long-term energy investments. Successful green financing is not merely about the amount of capital deployed, but about the structure of institutional relationships that facilitate it. By strengthening the connections between policy and commercial financing ecosystems, China has the opportunity to substantially increase the scale and impact of its green overseas investments. Collaboration with MDBs and PDBs is vital in enabling energy transition finance. Concessional development finance remains essential in supporting higher-risk sectors and economies. Major MDB co-financing funds at IDB and AfDB have been active in financing green and energy transition infrastructure projects. There is a strong case to be made for China or other donors to replenish or recapitalise these multilateral funds or on-lending facilities, some of which are coming to the end of their tenor. Meanwhile, regional development banks should prioritise and earmark on-lending facilities to green and other transitionoriented activities and infrastructure. Regional partnerships have been a winwin for Chinese and other international southern FIs and a means for capacity building. International collaboration also brings diverse advantages for Chinese FIs, not only through risk-sharing but also via the regional depth and technical expertise that partners hold. This includes in managing ESG and climate impacts, and in establishing projects and developing project pipelines. Partnerships with regional banks such as Standard Bank South Africa have provided a successful model for other regions, as a means to channel capital and bolster domestic banking sectors in capital-scarce economies. FIs seeking to co-finance with regional banks or MDBs should also leverage their technical advantages for systematic capacity building and knowledge exchange in ESG monitoring and compliance as a part of co-financing relationships, strengthening the capacity of Chinese FIs and firms in this area. Green financing and innovation will need to go beyond development finance. In supporting the ‘going out’ of green technologies such as renewable energy, direct commercial investments in higher-risk regions such as Africa have been faster to recover than direct debt-finance. Chinese commercial FIs can help facilitate overseas FDI through credit enhancement instruments, such as investment insurance or through mezzanine structures or PPPs. Greater 41 Greener on the other side? internationalisation of banking networks, or forming regional partnerships with local banking institutions, can help derisk overseas investments for firms and reduce information and investment costs. 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(2024) China’s creditor diversification in Africa: Impacts and challenges of infrastructure debt-financing by Chinese commercial creditors. Working Paper. London: ODI Global. Available at: https://odi.org/en/publications/ chinas-creditor-diversification-in-africa-impacts-and-challenges-of-infrastructuredebt-financing-by-chinese-commercial-creditors/ (Accessed: 7 November 2024). Xia, Y. (2019) Influence through Infrastructure: Contesting the Chinese-Built Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya. Research Brief 9, p. 6. 46 Greener on the other side? Appendix 1 Table 1 Major co-financing funds with Chinese contributions Name of fund (year) Bank/cofinanciers Size/China share (USD millions) Details PRC Regional Cooperation and Poverty Reduction Fund (2005) Asian Development Bank (ADB) 90 This fund supports regional cooperation, poverty reduction and sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region. Largely supports technical assistance and project grants. $75 million has been approved to support 125 projects. Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF) (2010) Japan, Asian Development Bank, Korea 1,158 (China 342.8) The CGIF bond guarantee operation is aimed at supporting ASEAN+3 companies access the region’s bond markets across different countries, currencies and tenors. CGIF has a AAA credit rating (Fitch), AA/A-1+ (S&P). Main issuers have been Viet Nam, Thailand and Singapore, with the biggest shares in the real estate, consumer and industrial sectors. China-ASEAN Fund (CAF) (2013) ASEAN Unknown The China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund (‘CAF’) is a USD-denominated offshore quasi-sovereign equity fund sponsored by the Export-Import Bank of China (‘Eximbank’), among other institutional investors, under the direction of the PRC State Council and the National Development and Reform Commission. The fund targets investment opportunities in infrastructure, energy and natural resources in the ASEAN countries. It was formally announced by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in 2009 and further approved by the National Development and Reform Commission in 2013. Managed Colending Portfolio Program (MCPP) (2013) World Bank (IFC) 16,000 (China 3,000) The Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Program (MCPP) is IFC’s syndications platform for institutional investors. Since its launch in 2013, the MCPP has raised more than $16 billion from 17 partners, supporting the mobilisation of institutional capital and credit insurance for direct lending to IFC’s borrowers in developing countries. Participants include the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which supported the Trust Fund of $3 billion over six years. They were joined by Allianz Global Investors, the HKMA, Liberty Specialty Markets, Munich Re, Eastspring Investments, Axa Group, Swiss Re, Aspen Insurance, Everest Insurance and Tokio Marine HCC, the latter four of which all provide credit insurance and joined in 2018–20. Initial funds raised $1.6 billion for 47 projects in 30 countries. 47 Greener on the other side? Name of fund (year) Bank/cofinanciers Size/China share (USD millions) Details China Co-financing Fund for Latin America and the Caribbean (2013) IDB Invest, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 2,000 This fund supports public and private sector projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a focus on infrastructure, energy and sustainable development. It was established by the People’s Bank of China and the IDB; funds have earmarked $500 million for public sector loans and $1.5 billion for private sector finance. Africa Growing Together Fund (AGTF) (2014) African Development Bank (AfDB) 2,000 This fund was established with the PBOC. It co-finances development projects in Africa, both sovereign and nonsovereign, focusing on infrastructure, energy, transport and industrialisation. It is managed by the AfDB, with 54 projects committed as of 2024, with UA1,464.16 million committed (approx. $1,923 million). China-Mexico Fund (2014) World Bank (IFC) 1,200 Launched in 2014, the $1.2 billion China-Mexico Fund is a country-specific fund that makes equity, equity-like and mezzanine investments along with IFC in Mexico. It focuses on infrastructure alongside other sectors, including manufacturing, agribusiness, services and banking. As of 30 June 2020, the fund had made three investment commitments totalling $320 million. The fund does not appear to have made any active investments since 2017. Recent financial statements show 362 million in cumulative investments to around four projects as of 2022. China-World Bank Group Partnership Facility (CWPF) (2015) World Bank 50 The China-World Bank Group Partnership Facility (CWPF), established in July 2015, is a partnership between the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the World Bank Group (WBG). The Facility’s overall objective is to assist WBG client countries in achieving inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Through this Facility, the Government of the People’s Republic of China has provided $52.74 million from FY2016 through FY2022. CWPF seeks to enhance tripartite cooperation between China, recipient countries and the WBG by leveraging different pools of resources, both financial and knowledge based, to support demand-driven activities. The Facility is intended to support activities that are aligned with priorities of the recipient countries, as well as the WBG’s strategy, and that are replicable. 48 Greener on the other side? Name of fund (year) Bank/cofinanciers Size/China share (USD millions) Details China-Africa Investment and Industrialisation Programme (2016) African ExportImport Bank (Afreximbank) 1,000 The African Export-Import Bank (‘Afreximbank’) and the Export-Import Bank of China have signed a cooperation agreement to create a $1-billion China-Africa Investment and Industrialisation Programme. The fund will facilitate the construction and creation of industrial parks and special economic zones on the continent. The agreement will see the two institutions working together to provide Africa with the capacity for light manufacturing and primary processing of raw materials and commodities. It will also look at the acquisition of shipping equipment, railways and rolling stock, and trade facilitating infrastructure, such as power. Equity Participation Fund (2016) European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 380 The EBRD’s Equity Participation Fund (EPF) mobilises funds from global institutional investors to take part in its own direct equity investments, with the goal of attracting long-term institutional capital into the private sector in the countries where it works. The value of joint China-EBRD investment stood at €3.47 billion as of February 2023. EBRD finance accounted for €1.93 billion and China investment accounted for €1.54 billion. The joint investment has been across the region covered by EBRD in various countries: in Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Broken down by industry, the joint investment has taken place in the following industries: sustainable infrastructure, industry, commerce and agribusiness, and financial institutions. China-EU CoInvestment Fund (CECIF)(2018) European Investment Bank (EIB), European Investment Fund (EIF), Bpifrance, 694 (China 500) The China-EU Co-investment Fund (CECIF) programme was established by the EIF and Silk Road Fund (SRF) with the aim of developing synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Juncker Plan. The fund will support mid-cap companies with high growth potential in Europe and China, in areas such as healthcare, high-end industries, consumer goods and business services. The fund is backed by the EIF under the Juncker Plan’s European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), as well as the China Development Bank, French national promotional bank Bpifrance, China’s Silk Road Fund, sovereign funds, and institutional and other private investors. Chernobyl Shelter Fund European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 48 This fund promotes clean energy, sustainable infrastructure and green finance in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Mediterranean.