The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round

Finger, J. Michael Working Paper The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round ERD Working Paper Series, No. 21 Provided in Cooperation with: Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila Suggested Citation: Finger, J. Michael (2002) : The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round, ERD Working Paper Series, No. 21, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila, https://hdl.handle.net/11540/1970 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/109241 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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Michael Finger September 2002 Asian Development Bank The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round 31 ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND J. MICHAEL FINGER September 2002 J. Michael Finger is Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington D. C. Mr. Finger would like to thank Nicole Pasricha and particularly Simona Pasca, American Enterprise Institute interns, for skilled assistance and for their constructive participation in many conversations over the content of this paper. This paper was prepared for ADB’s Study on Regional Integration and Trade: Emerging Policy Issues for Selected Developing Member Countries. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author. ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 32 Asian Development Bank P.O. Box 789 0980 Manila Philippines 2002 by Asian Development Bank September 2002 ISSN 1655-5252 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Asian Development Bank. 33 Foreword The ERD Working Paper Series is a forum for ongoing and recently completed research and policy studies undertaken in the Asian Development Bank or on its behalf. The Series is a quick-disseminating, informal publication meant to stimulate discussion and elicit feedback. Papers published under this Series could subsequently be revised for publication as articles in professional journals or chapters in books. ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 34 Abstract The Doha Agenda continues the Uruguay Round’s expansion of trade negotiations into behind-the-border policies, regulations, and institutions. This distracts attention from the part of the Agenda most directly linked to poverty reduction and economic development: removal of distortions to agricultural trade and of import restrictions on industrial goods—by developing as well as developed countries. Behind-the-border areas are important for development but Uruguay Round experience indicates that trade negotiations provide here a troubled approach to development. On these, development institutions should lead. They are more comfortable with the necessary technicalities of project design and cost-benefit analysis. Development institutions’ legalities are country-specific and project-specific, more suited to the one-off problems and trialerror rhythm of what is needed than is WTO’s generic approach to legal obligation. If there is momentum behind the development dimensions of the new areas, then the trade dimensions can be managed; but one cannot push the string. 35 Contents Abstract vii INTRODUCTION 1 I. URUGUAY ROUND OUTCOME 2 A. Market Access Outcome and Impact 3 B. WTO New Areas 4 C. Different Agreements Provide Opportunities in Different Ways 6 D. Implementation Successes and Problems in Developing Countries 6 II. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND NEW AREAS: REFORMS HAVE DIFFERENT ECONOMICS 8 A. Implementation has a Real Cost 8 B. Implementation can be Bad Economics 8 C. Development Institutions not Trade Negotiations are Designed to Take on Such Economics 9 III. LESSONS FROM TRIPS AND STANDARDS 10 A. Magnitude of the TRIPS Obligation 10 B. The Quid Pro Quo 11 C. A Legal Obligation is not an Economic Result 13 D. Converting Claims into Commercial Realities is Business, not Diplomacy 13 E. Apples for Oranges: It Never Did Work 14 IV. THE DOHA AGENDA: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY 16 A. Market Access: Import Restrictions on Agricultural and Nonagricultural Products 16 B. Services 17 C. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 17 D. Singapore Issues 19 E. Antidumping 20 F. Subsidies 21 G. Technical Assistance, Capacity-Building 21 H. Implementation 22 V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 23 Appendix 26 References 28 1 INTRODUCTION At the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Ministerial Conference of November 2001 Trade Ministers agreed to open a new round of multilateral negotiations. Viewed from a development perspective the strength of the Doha outcome is the persistence of its commitment to helping developing countries. It provides however little perception of how to do so. My objective is to help to develop such a perception: to inform the development community of the Doha Agenda and to begin a dialog on how the development community might help to turn the Agenda’s commitment to development into action. To do so I review the outcome of the Uruguay Round, then apply the lessons I draw from this review to the Doha Agenda. The Uruguay Round provides particularly relevant experience in that the Doha Agenda proposes to extend negotiations on many topics taken up in that Round. Furthermore, a major new concern about the WTO and development, “the implementation problem,” stems from the Uruguay Round results. It is important to note that only part of the Uruguay Round results has created an implementation problem. On tariff reductions, developing countries’ commitments were larger than those of developed countries and all were fully implemented by the January 2000 deadline. Services trade is another area where developing countries made substantial commitments—though less here than developed countries—and there is no implementation problem. The approach I take is to compare where there is a Uruguay Round implementation problem for developing countries and where there is not. The immediate purpose of this analysis is to suggest how the negotiations might advance the development dimensions of the Doha Agenda, both where implementation has proceeded smoothly and where it has not. The more ambitious purpose of the comparison is to provide a way of thinking about which development issues can be effectively addressed through WTO negotiations and which are more effectively addressed through development institutions such as the Asian Development Bank. WTO negotiations and development banks are different—created to address different issues, their evolutions conditioned by different objectives and constraints. What then is the “comparative advantage” of these different institutions, and what does an understanding of such comparative advantage suggest the role of each should be in advancing the various issues listed in the Doha Agenda? This overview provides the basis to argue development institutions should take an active role in much of the Doha Agenda. On traditional trade liberalization they have a lot to offer; in the new areas they are indispensable. The analysis of the Uruguay Round outcome deals with four basic propositions: (i) The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) never evolved a capacity for project design or cost-benefit analysis because none was needed. With tariff ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 2 reductions, legal obligation and project design are identical. Furthermore, what trade negotiators describe as a “concession” is, in real economics, a benefit for the giver as well as for the receiver. No need for cost-benefit analysis, a “diplomats’ economics” is good enough.1 (ii) The new areas demand better economics. The new areas (services, standards, intellectual property) deal with behind-the-border regulations and institutions that establish the fundamental structure of the domestic economy. There is a wide span between what is possible to write as generic obligation and what is needed countryby-country to develop functioning economic regulations and institutions and the commercial capacities to take advantage of them. (iii) WTO negotiations (at least in rhetoric) limit themselves to the “trade-related aspects” of the new areas. Development however is about the nontrade-related aspects as well, about the environment in which domestic economic activity takes place. Often it is not possible to find the development dimensions of the new areas from their “trade-related aspects” much less to advance them. (iv) Implementation in the new areas requires real investments: to provide laboratories, equipment, etc. This will take money and development expertise, of which trade ministers have neither. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides a review of the Uruguay Round negotiations from the point of view of what the Round achieved in the areas of trade in goods and services as well as in the new areas of intellectual property and standards. Section II elaborates on the difference between the administrative burden of traditional tariff cuts and these new areas while Section III discusses these two new areas in more depth. Section IV discusses the Doha Agenda with particular reference to the challenges presented by the agenda items of market access, trade in services, intellectual property, standards, antidumping, and the so-called Singapore issues of competition policy, trade facilitation, and government procurement. The paper concludes with a series of recommendations in Section V. I. URUGUAY ROUND OUTCOME Few would question that opportunities offered by the open international trading system have been an important vehicle for development, nor that multilateral negotiations have played a critical role in creating that system. The Uruguay Round was a significant step, particularly in bringing developing countries to use multilateral negotiations as a vehicle for their own trade reforms. 1I confess here a semantic debt to Robert E. Hudec, particularly to his classic article “The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence” (Hudec 1970). 9 More striking still, through TRIPS developing countries took on as legal obligation a cost of $60 billion per year, but there is no legal obligation in the agreement on any Member to provide anything in exchange. This point will be taken up in Section III below. C. Development Institutions not Trade Negotiations are Designed to Take on Such Economics Generally speaking, tools that serve well in one use may not serve well in another. It is possible that the “comparative advantage” of multilateral negotiations to support correct policy choices on trade restrictions does not carry over to the construction of behind-the-border regulations and institutions that provide the basic business environment. On trade restrictions, each country has the sovereign authority to impose them and most tend to overdo it. The advantage of concentrated producer interests over disbursed consumer interests is the familiar explanation—the political incorrectness of unilateral openness dominates its economic correctness. Reducing import restrictions through reciprocal exchange alters the politics. For one thing, it brings not only export interests into the game, it brings in general foreign policy interests to support liberalization. In the years just after World War II the view that a web of countries interlinked by commerce would contribute to peace and security was an important part of the base for negotiations. Taking up import liberalization through multilateral negotiations did little to change the mercantilist perception that imports were the costs of trade, instead, it shifted attention to other effects that the public considered more important. To the negotiators the GATT process was diplomacy, not economics. There was a casual concern that each country accept more or less the same depth of cut on more on less the same fraction of imports, but no delegation equipped itself with precise tabulations of either its own or its trading partners’ concessions—much less with analysis of the effects of such on trade, production, or economic welfare. Furthermore, GATT’s “member countries” saw no need to create a Secretariat capacity for such tabulation or analysis.6 As an instrument to help the international community make correct decisions about the reduction of trade barriers, multilateral negotiations did not need a capacity for economic analysis. What in mercantilist economics is a “concession” is in real economics a benefit to the concession giver as well as to the concession receiver. The economic results are positive for all parties.7 Furthermore, implementation requires no investment. While the politics of reaching agreement might be difficult, implementing the lower tariff rates requires no more than an official document instructing customs agents accordingly. 6The matter is elaborated in Finger (2001) and Winters (2002). 7There are, of course, distributional issues (winners and losers) within countries. Real economics does not suggest that trade liberalization will not have domestic losers as well as domestic winners, only that the gains will generally exceed the losses. Section II Trade Liberalization and New Areas: Reforms have Different Economics ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 10 Development institutions were created to take on different issues with more difficult economics. To create or replace a transport system or an education system is different from reaching an agreement to mutually reduce import restrictions in two key ways: it requires real investment, and it brings one into the realm where some alternatives have higher rates of return than others. These matters require a different set of tools, one that includes project design and cost-benefit analysis. Legal obligation is a familiar GATT/WTO tool; perhaps less recognized is that development institutions also employ legal obligations. Differences in the tasks of GATT/WTO and of development institutions have led to different forms of legal obligation. With a development institution, a country’s legal obligations are the commitments it makes when it borrows money from the institution. One country may borrow to finance transportation, another to finance education; within education one country may need classrooms, another teachers. Hence with a development institution legal obligations are country-specific and project-specific. As such development institutions are more suited to the one-off problems and trial-error rhythm of what is needed to build behind-the-border regulations and institutions for countries at different levels of development than is WTO’s generic approach to legal obligation. With negotiations, legal obligation comes before project design and cost-benefit analysis; with development institutions it comes after. When the objective was reduction of import restrictions, this difference did not matter. When the objective is to set up behind-the-border regulations and institutions, it does matter. The following section elaborates. III. LESSONS FROM TRIPS AND STANDARDS The TRIPS agreement for intellectual property rights obligates member governments to provide the regulations and the enforcement mechanism that would allow owners of intellectual property to establish and defend these rights—i.e. to collect revenues on them in all Member countries. More simply, it has the effect of creating claims by intellectual property owners against intellectual property users. As developing countries are more often users than vendors of intellectual property, the impact is a significant economic obligation on developing countries—users owe royalties, copyright fees, etc. on the use of knowledge not previously protected in their countries by patents, copyrights, etc. As with the economics of the MFA, these are basically economic rents: negative in adding up the gross domestic product (GDP) of those who pay, positive in the GDP of those who receive. A. Magnitude of the TRIPS Obligation The World Bank provides estimates of one part of that obligation, the obligation created by increased patent claims by owners of intellectual property (World Bank 2002). Table 2 reports estimates of the amounts by which full implementation of TRIPS obligations on patents would 11 change net payments. For the first six countries on the list (United States, Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, and Switzerland), the figures sum to $40 billion/year of increased payments. Table 2. Changes of Net Annual Patent Rent Obligations Resulting from Full Application of TRIPS (millions of 2000 dollars) Country Net Change of Patent Rents United States 19,083 Germany 6,768 Japan 5,673 France 3,326 United Kingdom 2,968 Switzerland 2,000 Australia 1,097 Netherlands 241 Ireland 18 Portugal -282 Canada -574 New Zealand -2,204 Spain -4,716 Greece -7,746 South Africa -11 Brazil -530 India -903 Mexico -2,550 Israel -3,894 People’s Rep. of China -5,121 Rep. of Korea -15,333 Source: World Bank (2002, Table 5.1). The International Intellectual Property Alliance’s (IIPA) estimates of losses from copyright piracy provide additional information on the obligation implicit in the TRIPS agreement.8 IIPA estimates that losses due to piracy of US (alone) copyrighted material around the world at some $20-$22 billion per year (IIPA 2002a). B. The Quid Pro Quo The Uruguay Round “grand bargain” was that developing countries would take on obligations in the new areas and in exchange developed countries would provide better access to their markets, particularly on agricultural products and on textiles and clothing. 8IIPA is a private sector coalition comprised of six trade associations whose members are some 1,100 US companies who produce and distribute copyright-protected materials throughout the world. Section III Lessons from TRIPS and Standards ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 12 As compared with the outcome of the market access negotiations, the TRIPS amounts described above are big money. Comparing (Table 3) the net gains from changed patent obligations with the gains from Uruguay Round liberalization of tariffs on industrial goods by all WTO Members shows that TRIPS-patents are worth 13 times more to the US than is the Uruguay Round tariff package on industrial goods. On the other side of the ledger, for the three developing countries for which both the World Bank and the Harrison et. al estimates are available, TRIPS-patents bring increased claims against them several times larger than what they will gain from Uruguay Round tariff liberalization on industrial goods. For Republic of Korea, the TRIPS obligation is 18 times as large as her gain. Table 4 likewise compares the IIPA estimates of copyright obligations with gains from Uruguay Round tariff liberalization on industrial goods. Again, data from the two sources overlap for only a few Members. Of these, only in the case of Argentina is the ratio greater than one, i.e., copyright obligations greater than gains from trade liberalization. Table 3. TRIPS Patent Requirements and Uruguay Round Tariff Liberalization on Industrial Goods: Impacts Compared Gain from TRIPS Patents Requirements/ Country Gain from Industrial Goods Tariff Liberalization (ratio, not percentage) United States 13.1 Germany + France + United Kingdom # 3.6 Japan 2.1 Australia 1.8 People’s Rep. of China -4.7 Mexico -7.0 Rep. of Korea -18.0 Note: # The line for Germany + France + United Kingdom compares the gains from TRIPS-patents requirements for these three countries with Harrison et. al estimates of the gains from tariff liberalization to all members of the European Union. Sources: Estimates of TRIPS impact: World Bank (2002, Table 5.1). Impact of tariff liberalization on industrial goods: Harrison et. al (1996, Table 8.6). Table 4. IIPA Copyright Obligation Estimates and Uruguay Round Tariff Liberalization on Industrial Goods: Impacts Compared Copyright Obligation / Member Gain from Industrial Goods Tariff Liberalization (ratio, not percentage) Argentina 1.22 People’s Rep. of China 0.97 Taipei,China 0.53 Brazil 0.49 Indonesia 0.19 Malaysia 0.16 Thailand 0.12 Sources: Impact of copyright obligations: IIPA (2002b). Impact of tariff liberalization on industrial goods: Harrison et. al (1996, Table 8.6). 13 Taking into account agricultural plus textiles and clothing liberalization would not make the comparison look more favorable for developing countries. As noted in Section I, agricultural liberalization was minimal; removal of import quotas on textiles and clothing is a loss for developing countries, a gain for developed. There is a plausible economic argument that the higher level of intellectual property protection the TRIPS agreement demands will attract foreign investment into developing countries, and induce inventions particularly suited to the needs and opportunities of the developing countries. Conversely, one might argue that once the intellectual property rights of outsiders are recognized there is less need for a local presence, and that the opportunity to produce unlicensed copies free from legal hassle may be the more attractive investment opportunity. The evidence here is mixed,9 but which ever way it cuts it imposes no legally bound obligation. A Member cannot take “economists”, much less “investors” or “inventors” before the WTO dispute settlement body if no investment or invention results. The New Area agreements also promise technical assistance for implementation, but these promises avoid the compulsion of legal obligation. They are unbound promises that developing countries accepted in exchange for their legally binding obligation to pay $60 billion per year. C. A Legal Obligation is not an Economic Result The numbers presented above—that cover only patents and copyrights for a few countries —sum to a claim of $60 billion/year. However, having a claim on $60 billion/year and collecting it are not the same. In between the two lie both the mechanics of collection and the “wiggle room” in the TRIPS text, or more diplomatically phrased, the “creative ambiguity” on which the magnitude of the claim might be questioned. Available facts suggest that there is considerable slippage from claim to collection—owners of these claims sometimes settle for a few cents on the dollar. Bristol-Myers, the New York Times reported, has offered to sell in Africa a leading AIDS medicine at $1 for a day’s dosage; the price in the US is $18 (Petersen and McNeil 2001). IIPA data report low collection rates in many countries on copyrighted products; e.g., on copyrighted business software, collection rates of less than 50 percent in more than three quarters of the 39 countries covered by a recent survey; collection rates on entertainment software of less than 10 percent in many countries. D. Converting Claims into Commercial Realities is Business, not Diplomacy In the US, the affected business interests are at the front line to spot commercial opportunities to which other countries’ WTO obligations might give them claim and to identify changes of foreign regulations and enforcement practices that would enable them to increase their revenues. This information and the people who assemble it are linked to US negotiators through 9See Maskus (2000) and World Bank (2002). Section III Lessons from TRIPS and Standards ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 14 a formal, legally established Industry Consultations Program that advises on trade negotiations and on the system the US Congress has established to support US enterprises to advance their commercial interests abroad. “Section 301” and “Special 301” are familiar instruments created to implement these interests.10 The Industry Consultations Program and its related business associations play a similar role in developing US negotiating agendas and in evaluating proposals from others. The system provides a business perspective that evaluates the potential revenue from different trade-related activities for a variety of business interests. It also provides an advantage in the depth of expertise the US brings to WTO negotiations that is perhaps as important as the larger scope of expertise that has been documented by comparing sizes of Geneva delegations (Michalopolous 1999). The system provides constituent ownership of the US negotiating position. Trade policy in the US is business. Having and bringing to bear the business/legal skill to capitalize the outcome is critical, not just after the agreement is in place, but to negotiate it in the first place. E. Apples for Oranges: It Never Did Work It is important to notice how different is the exchange implicit in agreements that function by establishing a common standard versus those that are a direct exchange of concessions. Such is exemplified by the differences between tariff negotiations and TRIPS. However it is equally important to notice that the difference is not between traditional market access and new areas. GATS, through its process of specific, scheduled negotiations, has the capacity to avoid the problems taken up in this section. 1. All Reciprocity is Local11 Trade negotiations have never supported broad exchanges. Even within tariff negotiations, exchanges that demanded significant shifts across sectors have been difficult; agriculture, textiles and clothing have been handled separately from the normal exchange of concessions. The problem with shifts across sectors is to achieve domestic reciprocity; e.g., paying the US textile industry from gains enjoyed by the US aircraft industry. There have been few such direct swaps. Overcoming resistance from potential losers has been, in practice, part power politics, e.g., where negotiating 10 No doubt enterprises in other countries are as capable as US enterprises to identify sales opportunities that foreign adherence to WTO obligations might provide, and that other governments, like the US government, have ways to work with such enterprises. Indeed, the creation by the US Congress of the Industry Consultations Program and such instruments as Section 301 was motivated by a perception that foreign trade negotiators did a better job of advancing the commercial interests of their enterprises than did US negotiators. We have not yet had the opportunity to study such mechanisms in other countries. 11 I acknowledge another semantic debt, this time to Tip O’Neil (1995) from his book titled All Politics Is Local. 15 authority must be specifically granted, using export industries to win more Congressional votes than the opposition could rally. It has been, in other part, compensation. Adjustment assistance is the straightforward example, the familiar political coin of public works has also been used.12 With agriculture and textiles and clothing set aside, much of the growth of trade has been intra-industry. Gilbert Winham reports (1986, 65) a tendency to look for “self-balancing sectors” —or, one might add, to construct them; e.g. craft North American Free Trade Agreement rules of origin to condition access to the US market for textile products on the use of US-made fibers or fabrics. 2. Shifting among Constituencies versus Creating Constituencies Tariff negotiations worked by switching domestic political clout from one producer constituency to another, from import competing industries to exporters. The politics was relatively easy because the receiving constituency already existed and it was more dynamic than the one who lost influence. Taking up intellectual property rights as a trade issue cannot build on a similar shift within domestic politics (in poorer countries there is no producer constituency for intellectual property rights) perhaps because these economies have come to depend on knowledge from outside. The easier politics of shifting domestic political support to an existing (and dynamic) constituency is not available.13 For intellectual property rights to take root, a constituency to support the reforms that the agreement demands must be built. 3. Domestic Reciprocity is the Challenge In summary, exchanging market access for intellectual property rights brings with it a more challenging domestic politics than do more traditional trade agreements. It demands a broader domestic pay-off from winners to losers than trade negotiations have supported in the past. It also requires that the benefiting domestic constituency be created by the exchange, something trade negotiations have never done. The advantage the advanced countries have to let their commercial constituencies lead the negotiations (to depend on them to identify possible benefits and risks) may be insurmountable. The complementary constituencies do not exist in most developing countries. 12 Zeller (1992) provides examples of the trades US President John F. Kennedy made to win Congressional approval of the authority to negotiate in what came to be called the Kennedy Round. Providing quota protection for the textile industry was part of it; an extensive waterways project for the state of Oklahoma was another part. 13 Building on user constituencies has never worked in trade politics, it would be particularly difficult with intellectual property because the TRIPS agreement imposes a burden on users, not a benefit. Section III Lessons from TRIPS and Standards ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 16 4. This is What Development Institutions Do, Not Trade Negotiations With tariff concessions, project design follows directly and obviously from legal obligation. A commitment to lower tariffs brings forward minimal issues of “How?” The same is not true for intellectual property, standards, and other behind-the-border areas of regulation and institutions. A commitment to enforce intellectual property rights is a long way from a judicial and legal enforcement system that will do so. Here there is a broad gap between project design and the generalities that a generic, one-size-fits-all, statement of legal obligation can provide. There is also a considerable need for cost-benefit analysis, as a considerable share of the development budget may be at stake, rate of return comparisons are a necessary part of good management. Development institutions will have to lead here, trade negotiations cannot. IV. THE DOHA AGENDA: SUMMARY AND COMMENTARY The Appendix summarizes the content of the work program that the Doha Ministerial Declaration sets out. There are three categories: (i) subjects on which there will be negotiations,14 (ii) subjects on which negotiations will not be opened though there will be continuing WTO work within special working groups, and (iii) cross-cutting considerations related mostly to how development or developing countries will be included in the negotiations. This section expands on the summary given in the Appendix. It applies the lessons drawn from the previous discussion to a selected number of negotiating issues. The purpose of this section is to provide an overview and to initiate a discussion of the Doha Agenda from a development perspective. A. Market Access: Import Restrictions on Agricultural and Nonagricultural Products The removal of distortions to agricultural trade and of import restrictions on industrial goods is the trade agenda most directly linked to poverty reduction and economic development. Agriculture is important because poverty in developing countries is in large part rural. Industrial reform is important because many poor people work in the production of basic manufactures. Getting rid of developing country restrictions is as important as getting rid of developed country restrictions. Developing countries are a large market. Their protection is as biased against the exports of developing countries —and considerably higher—than is developed country protection. On agriculture the Doha Declaration lists import protection, export subsidies, and domestic support as subjects for negotiation. However, it also expressly acknowledges the possibility of 14 Under provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements, negotiations on agriculture and services began in early 2000. The Doha Agenda incorporates these and adds negotiations on other issues. 17 accomplishing nothing—“without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations” is the phrase. It goes on to explicitly recognize the domestic politics in developed and in developing countries of doing nothing. It also commits to making operational the absence of reform commitment by developing countries. One finds little there to indicate a momentum toward reform. On nonagricultural products the Declaration names tariff peaks, tariff escalation, and products of export interest to developing countries as specific targets. These are important targets. The Declaration also commits to “take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and least developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments.” The comparable statement in the Punta del Este Declaration (that launched the Uruguay Round) pointed in the opposite direction, saying “Emphasis shall be given to the expansion of the scope of tariff concessions among all participants.” If this shift represents backing off good economics in order to win agreement to hold negotiations, then its priorities are wrong; likewise if it represents backing away from developing country trade liberalization on merchandise in order to maintain pressure on New Areas implementation. If the shift bought the inclusion of the Singapore issues (discussed below) then the priorities are particularly wrong. B. Services As discussed above (Section I.D) the services agreement has proved to be a useful vehicle for solidifying reforms in developing countries. The agreement—a framework for negotiation of one-by-one liberalizations—is more suited to the realities of the underlying economics and particularly to the underlying politics than are other “new areas” agreements. The politics is largely domestic, as the interests of users, particularly of producers who need business services of competitive quality at competitive prices are served by services liberalization. (Table 5 provides information on the share of services in the imports and the exports of Asian countries.) The Doha Declaration paragraph carries forward without qualification the basis for previously successful negotiations. C. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights On intellectual property, the Ministerial declaration narrowly constrains the negotiating agenda to geographic indicators, and within that subject to a multilateral system of notification and registration for such. Possible extension of protection of geographic indicators is left to an inquiry by the TRIPS Council, which is also to look into the relation between TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity, and into the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. The Doha Ministerial also produced a separate Declaration on TRIPS and public health, worded ambiguously enough so that one side could say that existing legal obligations were maintained, the other that their position on the overriding importance of public health over individual owners’ rights had been vindicated. In a legal sense, there has been no agreement to Section IV The Doha Agenda: Summary and Commentary ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 18 renegotiate TRIPS. In a commercial sense TRIPS is being renegotiated every day. The one dollar in eighteen offer on AIDS pharmaceuticals is one illustration. The bilateral negotiations over how far a country must advance to protect the interests of US owners of intellectual property in order to maintain or regain eligibility for US tariff preferences are another example. The US Trade Representative’s “watch list” indicates that such negotiations are under way with some 50 countries. Table 5. Services Trade as a Percentage of Merchandise Trade, 1999 Exports + Imports: Exports: Imports: Commercial Services Commercial Services Commercial Services as % of Merchandise as % of Merchandise as % of Merchandise World 23 23 23 North America 22 30 17 Latin America 19 18 19 Western Europe 26 27 25 Africa 27 27 28 Asia 21 18 25 Australia 28 30 26 Japan 24 14 37 New Zealand 33 34 31 Australia+Japan+New Zealand 25 17 35 Other Asia 36 32 39 Bangladesh 12 5 17 Cambodia 29 21 36 PRC 16 13 19 Fiji 61 78 48 Hong Kong, China 122 166 89 India 38 38 38 Indonesia 22 9 47 Korea, Rep. of 20 18 22 Lao PDR 18 32 9 Macao, China 78 123 29 Malaysia 18 14 23 Maldives 98 548 27 Mongolia 28 22 33 Myanmar 21 38 12 Nepal 25 50 14 Pakistan 19 17 20 Papua New Guinea 32 13 61 Philippines 18 13 23 Samoa 49 235 17 Singapore 32 34 29 Solomon Islands 54 35 78 Sri Lanka 22 20 23 Taipei,China 17 14 21 Thailand 26 25 27 Vanuatu 126 408 50 Viet Nam 27 24 31 Source: Tabulated from WTO data (available: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2001_e/appendix/a07.xls). 25 Round new areas was unbound. He did not however go far enough, he overlooked that the economic benefits themselves were unbound. First, make sure the benefits are as legally bound as the costs, then see that the frills such as adjustment assistance are also legally bound. Do not trust trade ministers when they talk about money, they do not have any. In tariff negotiations each country’s costs are in the same coin as its benefits, one as legally bound as the other. GATS allows the same, stick with that model. The softness in TRIPS and other agreements that take the form of generic obligations over behind-the-border regulations and institutions is more than creative ambiguity. It is reality. TRIPS regulations that relate to domestic institutions and rules are necessarily flexible because reform needs differ across countries. It is not technically or otherwise possible to address in a one-sizefits-all way the specific needs of many different countries. If this mode of agreement is proposed for additional areas of behind-the-border regulations and institutions, Members should be aware that “project design” becomes then the turning of legal obligations into commercial realities. That activity depends on the business skills of the commercial constituencies with interests at stake. Commercial, not just diplomatic interests must be brought to bear early – on negotiations that create the legal obligations that commercial skills later turn into commercial realities. The shift of power from diplomacy to business is not easy—it took the US Congress 25 years to reorient the US delegation. Those that have accomplished the shift will dominate future negotiations. An agenda of agriculture, industrial tariffs, and services would have considerable potential. In each part each party would gain from its own concessions as well as from those of others. This is the situation in which traditional trade negotiations have done a lot of good in the past. Remember, the contribution of trade negotiations stems from their capacity to overcome the political incorrectness of good economics, not from their capacity to supply good economics. A broad agenda, some argue, is needed to provide something for everyone, but this is contradicted by GATT’s history. The domestic politics of winners versus losers will not support it. Furthermore, a broad exchange is not necessarily a positive one. A broad agenda can trade nothing for nothing as well as something for something. If the developed countries put in competition policy only to have a “receivable” to nullify their “payable” on agriculture, shame on them. Financial negotiations recognize that the subject is money and they send the accountants first. The diplomats do not come until the parties agree on the numbers, and diplomats not comfortable talking to accountants do not come. Trade negotiators, Run the numbers! Particularly if you stray into behind-the-border matters, Run the numbers. Draw on commercial constituencies and on Ministries who have operational responsibilities in the areas being negotiated. In tariff negotiations each country’s costs are in the same coin as its benefits, one as legally bound as the other. GATS allows the same, stick with that model. Development institutions, Get into the game. If there is momentum behind the development dimensions of the new areas, then the trade dimensions can be managed; but one cannot push the string. Run the numbers. This is about money, not diplomacy. Section V Conclusions and Recommendations ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 26 APPENDIX Summary Content: Doha Ministerial Declaration Work Program I. Negotiations Agriculture 1. Negotiations aimed at substantial improvements of market access, reductions, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies, substantial reductions of tradedistorting domestic support; 2. without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations; 3. allow developing countries to take into account development needs including food security and rural development; 4. taking nontrade concerns into account is confirmed; and 5. special and differential treatment shall be an integral part.… embodied in the schedules of concessions.… in the rules and disciplines.… so as to be operationally effective. Market Access for Nonagricultural Products 1. Negotiations shall aim to reduce or eliminate tariffs, tariff peaks, high tariffs, tariff escalation, nontariff barriers, 2. in particular on products of export interest to developing countries; and 3. less than full reciprocity from developing and least developed countries. 4. Modalities will include studies and capacity-building measures to assist least developed countries to participate effectively in negotiations. Services 1. With a view to promote economic growth of all members, the development of developing and least developed countries; 2. previously agreed guidelines and procedures are reaffirmed; and 3. participants shall submit initial requests by 30 June 2002, initial offers by 31 March 2003. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1. Ministers stress the importance of implementation and interpretation supportive of public health … adopt a separate Declaration…; 2. agree to negotiate a multilateral system of notification and registration of geographic indicators for wines and spirits; and 3. extension of protection of geographic indicators will be addressed in the TRIPS Council. 4. Ministers instruct the TRIPS Council to examine the relation between TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore… Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Transparency in Government Procurement, Trade Facilitation 1. Negotiations will take place after the Fifth Ministerial, by explicit consensus, according to modalities adopted there. 2. Until the Fifth Ministerial the relevant Working Group or Council will continue preparatory work on scope and definition, modalities, etc. 27 3. Ministers support technical assistance and capacity building. 4. Negotiations on government procurement explicitly limited to transparency, not to restrict the scope for countries to give preferences to domestic supplies and suppliers. WTO Rules 1. Clarify and improve disciplines under the antidumping and subsidies and countervailing measures agreements; and 2. preserve basic concepts and objectives of these agreements and their instruments. 3. Clarify and improve disciplines on fisheries subsidies; on WTO provisions on regional agreements. 4. Take into account development needs of developing countries (mentioned three times in the section) Dispute Settlement Understanding 1. Negotiations on improvements and clarifications. Trade and Environment 1. Negotiations without prejudging their outcome; 2. on procedures for information exchange between Secretariats of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and WTO; 3. on relationship between WTO rules and trade obligations in MEAs; (limited to the impact of existing WTO rules among parties to the MEA in question); 4. on reduction or elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers on environmental goods and services; and 5. include identification of any need to clarify WTO rules. Electronic Commerce 1. Ministers agree to continue the Work Program on electronic commerce; and 2. declare that Members will maintain their current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions until the Fifth Ministerial. II. Continuing Consideration (Not Negotiations) Small Economies 1. Ministers agree to a work program under the General Council; and 2. to further integrate small, vulnerable economies into the multilateral trading system, not to create a WTO subcategory. Trade, Debt, and Finance 1. Ministers agree to examination in a Working Group under the General Council, of the relationship among trade, debt, and finance; and 2. strengthen coherence of international trade and financial policies. Trade and Transfer of Technology 1. Ministers agree to examination in a Working Group under the General Council of the relationship between trade and transfer of technology. Appendix ERD Working Paper No. 21 THE DOHA AGENDA AND DEVELOPMENT: A VIEW FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND 28 III. Cross-Cutting Considerations Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns 1. Where there is a negotiating mandate implementation issues will be an integral part of the negotiations; and 2. other implementation issues to be addressed as a matter of priority in the relevant WTO bodies. Technical Cooperation and Capacity Building 1. Confirm that technical cooperation and capacity building are core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system. 2. Instruct the Secretariat with other agencies to support domestic efforts to mainstream trade into development, poverty reduction strategies. 3. WTO technical assistance is to assist developing and transition countries to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines, implement obligations, and exercise the rights of membership, including drawing on the benefits. Least Developed Countries 1. Ministers recognize the needs for market access, support for technical assistance, capacity building, diversification of production, and export structures; 2. welcome past market access improvements and commit to consider additional market access; 3. agree to work to facilitate and accelerate negotiations with acceding least developed countries (LDCs); 4. endorse the Integrated Framework and urge development partners to increase contributions to the Integrated Framework trust fund; and 5. instruct the Subcommittee for LDCs to design and report a work program consistent with the WTO mandate adopted at the Third UN Conference on LDCs. Special and Differential Treatment 1. Ministers reaffirm that special and differential treatment is an integral part of WTO agreements; and 2. agree that special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective, and operational. 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New York: Columbia. 31 PUBLICATIONS FROM THE ECONOMICS AND RESEARCH DEPARTMENT ERD WORKING PAPER SERIES (WPS) (Published in-house; Available through ADB Office of External Relations; Free of Charge) No. 1 Capitalizing on Globalization —Barry Eichengreen, January 2002 No. 2 Policy-based Lending and Poverty Reduction: An Overview of Processes, Assessment and Options —Richard Bolt and Manabu Fujimura January 2002 No. 3 The Automotive Supply Chain: Global Trends and Asian Perspectives —Francisco Veloso and Rajiv Kumar January 2002 No. 4 International Competitiveness of Asian Firms: An Analytical Framework —Rajiv Kumar and Doren Chadee February 2002 No. 5 The International Competitiveness of Asian Economies in the Apparel Commodity Chain —Gary Gereffi February 2002 No. 6 Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia—The Chiang Mai Initiative and Beyond —Pradumna B. Rana February 2002 No. 7 Probing Beneath Cross-national Averages: Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in the Philippines —Arsenio M. Balisacan and Ernesto M. Pernia March 2002 No. 8 Poverty, Growth, and Inequality in Thailand —Anil B. Deolalikar April 2002 No. 9 Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who Benefits and How Much? —Brett E. Coleman April 2002 No. 10 PovertyReduction and the Role of Institutions in Developing Asia —Anil B. Deolalikar, Alex B. Brilliantes, Jr., Raghav Gaiha, Ernesto M. Pernia, Mary Racelis with the assistance of Marita Concepcion CastroGuevara, Liza L. Lim, Pilipinas F. Quising May 2002 No. 11 The European Social Model: Lessons for Developing Countries ERD TECHNICAL NOTE SERIES (TNS) (Published in-house; Available through ADB Office of External Relations; Free of Charge) No. 1 Contingency Calculations for Environmental Impacts with Unknown Monetary Values —David Dole February 2002 No. 2 Integrating Risk into ADB’s Economic Analysis of Projects —Nigel Rayner, Anneli Lagman-Martin, and Keith Ward June 2002 —Assar Lindbeck May 2002 No. 12 Costs and Benefits of a Common Currency for ASEAN —Srinivasa Madhur May 2002 No. 13 Monetary Cooperation in East Asia: A Survey —Raul Fabella May 2002 No. 14 Toward A Political Economy Approach to Prolicy-based Lending —George Abonyi May 2002 No. 15 A Framework for Establishing Priorities in a Country Poverty Reduction Strategy —Ron Duncan and Steve Pollard June 2002 No. 16 The Role of Infrastructure in Land-use Dynamics and Rice Production in Viet Nam’s Mekong River Delta —Christopher Edmonds July 2002 No. 17 Effect of Decentralization Strategy on Macroeconomic Stability in Thailand —Kanokpan Lao-Araya August 2002 No. 18 Poverty and Patterns of Growth —Rana Hasan and M. G. Quibria August 2002 No. 19 Why are Some Countries Richer than Others? A Reassessment of Mankiw-Romer-Weil’s Test of the Neoclassical Growth Model —Jesus Felipe and John McCombie August 2002 No. 20 Modernization and Son Preference in People’s Republic of China —Robin Burgess and Juzhong Zhuang September 2002 No. 21 The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round —J. Michael Finger September 2002 No. 3 Measuring Willingness to Pay for Electricity —Peter Choynowski July 2002 No. 4 Economic Issues in the Design and Analysis of a Wastewater Treatment Project —David Dole July 2002 32 MONOGRAPH SERIES (Published in-house; Available through ADB Office of External Relations; Free of charge) EDRC REPORT SERIES (ER) ERD POLICY BRIEF SERIES (PBS) (Published in-house; Available through ADB Office of External Relations; Free of charge) No. 1 Is Growth Good Enough for the Poor? —Ernesto M. Pernia, October 2001 No. 2 India’s Economic Reforms What Has Been Accomplished? What Remains to Be Done? —Arvind Panagariya, November 2001 No. 3 Unequal Benefits of Growth in Viet Nam —Indu Bhushan, Erik Bloom, and Nguyen Minh Thang, January 2002 No. 4 Is Volatility Built into Today’s World Economy? —J. Malcolm Dowling and J.P. Verbiest, February 2002 No. 5 What Else Besides Growth Matters to Poverty Reduction? Philippines —Arsenio M. Balisacan and Ernesto M. Pernia, February 2002 No. 6 Achieving the Twin Objectives of Efficiency and Equity: Contracting Health Services in Cambodia —Indu Bhushan, Sheryl Keller, and Brad Schwartz,March 2002 No. 7 Causes of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis: What Can an Early Warning System Model Tell Us? —Juzhong Zhuang and Malcolm Dowling, June 2002 No. 8 The Role of Preferential Trading Arrangements in Asia —Christopher Edmonds and Jean-Pierre Verbiest, July 2002 No. 9 The Doha Round: A Development Perspective —Jean-Pierre Verbiest, Jeffrey Liang, and Lea Sumulong, July 2002 No. 1 ASEAN and the Asian Development Bank —Seiji Naya, April 1982 No. 2 Development Issues for the Developing East and Southeast Asian Countries and International Cooperation —Seiji Naya and Graham Abbott, April 1982 No. 3 Aid, Savings, and Growth in the Asian Region —J. Malcolm Dowling and Ulrich Hiemenz, April 1982 No. 4 Development-oriented Foreign Investment and the Role of ADB —Kiyoshi Kojima, April 1982 No. 5 The Multilateral Development Banks and the International Economy’s Missing Public Sector —John Lewis, June 1982 No. 6 Notes on External Debt of DMCs —Evelyn Go, July 1982 No. 7 Grant Element in Bank Loans —Dal Hyun Kim, July 1982 No. 8 Shadow Exchange Rates and Standard Conversion Factors in Project Evaluation —Peter Warr, September 1982 No. 9 Small and Medium-Scale Manufacturing Establishments in ASEAN Countries: Perspectives and Policy Issues —Mathias Bruch and Ulrich Hiemenz, January 1983 No. 10 A Note on the Third Ministerial Meeting of GATT —Jungsoo Lee, January 1983 No. 11 Macroeconomic Forecasts for the Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Republic of Korea —J.M. Dowling, January 1983 No. 12 ASEAN: Economic Situation and Prospects —Seiji Naya, March 1983 No. 13 The Future Prospects for the Developing Countries of Asia —Seiji Naya, March 1983 No. 14 Energy and Structural Change in the AsiaPacific Region, Summary of the Thirteenth Pacific Trade and Development Conference —Seiji Naya, March 1983 No. 15 A Survey of Empirical Studies on Demand for Electricity with Special Emphasis on Price Elasticity of Demand —Wisarn Pupphavesa, June 1983 No. 16 Determinants of Paddy Production in Indonesia: 1972-1981–A Simultaneous Equation Model Approach —T.K. Jayaraman, June 1983 No. 17 The Philippine Economy: Economic Forecasts for 1983 and 1984 —J.M. Dowling, E. Go, and C.N. Castillo, June 1983 No. 18 Economic Forecast for Indonesia —J.M. Dowling, H.Y. Kim, Y.K. Wang, and C.N. Castillo, June 1983 No. 19 Relative External Debt Situation of Asian Developing Countries: An Application of Ranking Method —Jungsoo Lee, June 1983 No. 20 New Evidence on Yields, Fertilizer Application, and Prices in Asian Rice Production —William James and Teresita Ramirez, July 1983 No. 21 Inflationary Effects of Exchange Rate Changes in Nine Asian LDCs —Pradumna B. Rana and J. Malcolm Dowling, Jr., December 1983 No. 22 Effects of External Shocks on the Balance of Payments, Policy Responses, and Debt Problems of Asian Developing Countries —Seiji Naya, December 1983 No. 23 Changing Trade Patterns and Policy Issues: The Prospects for East and Southeast Asian Developing Countries —Seiji Naya and Ulrich Hiemenz, February 1984 No. 24 Small-Scale Industries in Asian Economic Development: Problems and Prospects —Seiji Naya, February 1984 No. 25 A Study on the External Debt Indicators 33 Applying Logit Analysis —Jungsoo Lee and Clarita Barretto, February 1984 No. 26 Alternatives to Institutional Credit Programs in the Agricultural Sector of Low-Income Countries —Jennifer Sour, March 1984 No. 27 Economic Scene in Asia and Its Special Features —Kedar N. Kohli, November 1984 No. 28 The Effect of Terms of Trade Changes on the Balance of Payments and Real National Income of Asian Developing Countries —Jungsoo Lee and Lutgarda Labios, January 1985 No. 29 Cause and Effect in the World Sugar Market: Some Empirical Findings 1951-1982 —Yoshihiro Iwasaki, February 1985 No. 30 Sources of Balance of Payments Problem in the 1970s: The Asian Experience —Pradumna Rana, February 1985 No. 31 India’s Manufactured Exports: An Analysis of Supply Sectors —Ifzal Ali, February 1985 No. 32 Meeting Basic Human Needs in Asian Developing Countries —Jungsoo Lee and Emma Banaria, March 1985 No. 33 The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Investment and Economic Growth in Developing Asia —Evelyn Go, May 1985 No. 34 The Climate for Energy Development in the Pacific and Asian Region: Priorities and Perspectives —V.V. Desai, April 1986 No. 35 Impact of Appreciation of the Yen on Developing Member Countries of the Bank —Jungsoo Lee, Pradumna Rana, and Ifzal Ali, May 1986 No. 36 Smuggling and Domestic Economic Policies in Developing Countries —A.H.M.N. Chowdhury, October 1986 No. 37 Public Investment Criteria: Economic Internal Rate of Return and Equalizing Discount Rate —Ifzal Ali, November 1986 No. 38 Review of the Theory of Neoclassical Political Economy: An Application to Trade Policies —M.G. Quibria, December 1986 No. 39 Factors Influencing the Choice of Location: Local and Foreign Firms in the Philippines —E.M. Pernia and A.N. Herrin, February 1987 No. 40 A Demographic Perspective on Developing Asia and Its Relevance to the Bank —E.M. Pernia, May 1987 No. 41 Emerging Issues in Asia and Social Cost Benefit Analysis —I. Ali, September 1988 No. 42 Shifting Revealed Comparative Advantage: Experiences of Asian and Pacific Developing Countries —P.B. Rana, November 1988 No. 43 Agricultural Price Policy in Asia: Issues and Areas of Reforms —I. Ali, November 1988 No. 44 Service Trade and Asian Developing Economies —M.G. Quibria, October 1989 No. 45 A Review of the Economic Analysis of Power Projects in Asia and Identification of Areas of Improvement —I. Ali, November 1989 No. 46 Growth Perspective and Challenges for Asia: Areas for Policy Review and Research —I. Ali, November 1989 No. 47 An Approach to Estimating the Poverty Alleviation Impact of an Agricultural Project —I. Ali, January 1990 No. 48 Economic Growth Performance of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand: The Human Resource Dimension —E.M. Pernia, January 1990 No. 49 Foreign Exchange and Fiscal Impact of a Project: A Methodological Framework for Estimation —I. Ali, February 1990 No. 50 Public Investment Criteria: Financial and Economic Internal Rates of Return —I. Ali, April 1990 No. 51 Evaluation of Water Supply Projects: An Economic Framework —Arlene M. Tadle, June 1990 No. 52 Interrelationship Between Shadow Prices, Project Investment, and Policy Reforms: An Analytical Framework —I. Ali, November 1990 No. 53 Issues in Assessing the Impact of Project and Sector Adjustment Lending —I. Ali, December 1990 No. 54 Some Aspects of Urbanization and the Environment in Southeast Asia —Ernesto M. Pernia, January 1991 No. 55 Financial Sector and Economic Development: A Survey —Jungsoo Lee, September 1991 No. 56 A Framework for Justifying Bank-Assisted Education Projects in Asia: A Review of the Socioeconomic Analysis and Identification of Areas of Improvement —Etienne Van De Walle, February 1992 No. 57 Medium-term Growth-Stabilization Relationship in Asian Developing Countries and Some Policy Considerations —Yun-Hwan Kim, February 1993 No. 58 Urbanization, Population Distribution, and Economic Development in Asia —Ernesto M. Pernia, February 1993 No. 59 The Need for Fiscal Consolidation in Nepal: The Results of a Simulation —Filippo di Mauro and Ronald Antonio Butiong, July 1993 No. 60 A Computable General Equilibrium Model of Nepal —Timothy Buehrer and Filippo di Mauro, October 1993 No. 61 The Role of Government in Export Expansion in the Republic of Korea: A Revisit —Yun-Hwan Kim, February 1994 No. 62 Rural Reforms, Structural Change, and Agricultural Growth in the People’s Republic of China —Bo Lin, August 1994 No. 63 Incentives and Regulation for Pollution Abatement with an Application to Waste Water Treatment —Sudipto Mundle, U. Shankar, and Shekhar Mehta, October 1995 No. 64 Saving Transitions in Southeast Asia —Frank Harrigan, February 1996 No. 65 Total Factor Productivity Growth in East Asia: A Critical Survey —Jesus Felipe, September 1997 No. 66 Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: Policy Issues and Operational Implications —Ashfaque H. Khan and Yun-Hwan Kim, July 1999 No. 67 Fiscal Policy, Income Distribution and Growth —Sailesh K. Jha, November 1999 34 No. 1 International Reserves: Factors Determining Needs and Adequacy —Evelyn Go, May 1981 No. 2 Domestic Savings in Selected Developing Asian Countries —Basil Moore, assisted by A.H.M. Nuruddin Chowdhury, September 1981 No. 3 Changes in Consumption, Imports and Exports of Oil Since 1973: A Preliminary Survey of the Developing Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank —Dal Hyun Kim and Graham Abbott, September 1981 No. 4 By-Passed Areas, Regional Inequalities, and Development Policies in Selected Southeast Asian Countries —William James, October 1981 No. 5 Asian Agriculture and Economic Development —William James, March 1982 No. 6 Inflation in Developing Member Countries: An Analysis of Recent Trends —A.H.M. Nuruddin Chowdhury and J. Malcolm Dowling, March 1982 No. 7 Industrial Growth and Employment in Developing Asian Countries: Issues and Perspectives for the Coming Decade —Ulrich Hiemenz, March 1982 No. 8 Petrodollar Recycling 1973-1980. Part 1: Regional Adjustments and the World Economy —Burnham Campbell, April 1982 No. 9 Developing Asia: The Importance of Domestic Policies —Economics Office Staff under the direction of Seiji Naya, May 1982 No. 10 Financial Development and Household Savings: Issues in Domestic Resource Mobilization in Asian Developing Countries —Wan-Soon Kim, July 1982 No. 11 Industrial Development: Role of Specialized Financial Institutions —Kedar N. Kohli, August 1982 No. 12 Petrodollar Recycling 1973-1980. Part II: Debt Problems and an Evaluation of Suggested Remedies —Burnham Campbell, September 1982 No. 13 Credit Rationing, Rural Savings, and Financial Policy in Developing Countries —William James, September 1982 No. 14 Small and Medium-Scale Manufacturing Establishments in ASEAN Countries: Perspectives and Policy Issues —Mathias Bruch and Ulrich Hiemenz, March 1983 No. 15 Income Distribution and Economic Growth in Developing Asian Countries —J. Malcolm Dowling and David Soo, March 1983 No. 16 Long-Run Debt-Servicing Capacity of Asian Developing Countries: An Application of Critical Interest Rate Approach —Jungsoo Lee, June 1983 No. 17 External Shocks, Energy Policy, and Macroeconomic Performance of Asian Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis —William James, July 1983 No. 18 The Impact of the Current Exchange Rate System on Trade and Inflation of Selected Developing Member Countries —Pradumna Rana, September 1983 No. 19 Asian Agriculture in Transition: Key Policy Issues —William James, September 1983 No. 20 The Transition to an Industrial Economy ECONOMIC STAFF PAPERS (ES) in Monsoon Asia —Harry T. Oshima, October 1983 No. 21 The Significance of Off-Farm Employment and Incomes in Post-War East Asian Growth —Harry T. Oshima, January 1984 No. 22 Income Distribution and Poverty in Selected Asian Countries —John Malcolm Dowling, Jr., November 1984 No. 23 ASEAN Economies and ASEAN Economic Cooperation —Narongchai Akrasanee, November 1984 No. 24 Economic Analysis of Power Projects —Nitin Desai, January 1985 No. 25 Exports and Economic Growth in the Asian Region —Pradumna Rana, February 1985 No. 26 Patterns of External Financing of DMCs —E. Go, May 1985 No. 27 Industrial Technology Development the Republic of Korea —S.Y. Lo, July 1985 No. 28 Risk Analysis and Project Selection: A Review of Practical Issues —J.K. Johnson, August 1985 No. 29 Rice in Indonesia: Price Policy and Comparative Advantage —I. Ali, January 1986 No. 30 Effects of Foreign Capital Inflows on Developing Countries of Asia —Jungsoo Lee, Pradumna B. Rana, and Yoshihiro Iwasaki, April 1986 No. 31 Economic Analysis of the Environmental Impacts of Development Projects —John A. Dixon et al., EAPI, East-West Center, August 1986 No. 32 Science and Technology for Development: Role of the Bank —Kedar N. Kohli and Ifzal Ali, November 1986 No. 33 Satellite Remote Sensing in the Asian and Pacific Region —Mohan Sundara Rajan, December 1986 No. 34 Changes in the Export Patterns of Asian and Pacific Developing Countries: An Empirical Overview —Pradumna B. Rana, January 1987 No. 35 Agricultural Price Policy in Nepal —Gerald C. Nelson, March 1987 No. 36 Implications of Falling Primary Commodity Prices for Agricultural Strategy in the Philippines —Ifzal Ali, September 1987 No. 37 Determining Irrigation Charges: A Framework —Prabhakar B. Ghate, October 1987 No. 38 The Role of Fertilizer Subsidies in Agricultural Production: A Review of Select Issues —M.G. Quibria, October 1987 No. 39 Domestic Adjustment to External Shocks in Developing Asia —Jungsoo Lee, October 1987 No. 40 Improving Domestic Resource Mobilization through Financial Development: Indonesia —Philip Erquiaga, November 1987 No. 41 Recent Trends and Issues on Foreign Direct Investment in Asian and Pacific Developing Countries —P.B. Rana, March 1988 No. 42 Manufactured Exports from the Philippines: A Sector Profile and an Agenda for Reform —I. Ali, September 1988 No. 43 A Framework for Evaluating the Economic Benefits of Power Projects —I. Ali, August 1989 No. 44 Promotion of Manufactured Exports in Pakistan