Migrant returnees as (anti‐)migration messengers? A case of street‐level representative bureaucracy in Senegal

Glyniadaki, Katerina; Ratzmann, Nora; Stier, Julia Article — Published Version Migrant returnees as (anti‐)migration messengers? A case of street‐level representative bureaucracy in Senegal International Migration Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Glyniadaki, Katerina; Ratzmann, Nora; Stier, Julia (2025) : Migrant returnees as (anti‐)migration messengers? A case of street‐level representative bureaucracy in Senegal, International Migration, ISSN 1468-2435, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, Vol. 63, Iss. 1, pp. 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13382 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/315354 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ International Migration. 2025;63:e13382. | 1 of 15 https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13382 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/imig Received: 28 June 2024 | Revised: 4 November 2024 | Accepted: 23 December 2024 DOI: 10.1111/imig.13382 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Migrant returnees as (anti- )migration messengers? A case of streetlevel representative bureaucracy in Senegal Katerina Glyniadaki1 | Nora Ratzmann2 | Julia Stier3 1London School of Economics, London, UK 2DeZIMInstitut, Berlin, Germany 3WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany Correspondence Julia Stier, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany. Email: [email protected] Funding information London School of Economics and Political Science; Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend; Open Access funding was provided by the WZB through the DEALConsortium Abstract International organizations and foreignfunded NGOs run campaigns in Senegal to raise awareness of the perils of irregular migration. To increase their effectiveness, these organizations often enlist local migrant returnees to share their personal migration experiences and transmit an antiirregular migration message to their compatriots. This article examines whether policymakers' assumptions regarding the representativeness of migrant returnees operating as (anti- )migration messengers in terms of shared identities corresponds to reality at the street level. It draws from theories of streetlevel bureaucracy and representative bureaucracy and is based on 31 qualitative interviews with migrant returnees and experts. The study shows that migrant returnees engaged in migration information campaigns are not as representative of the local population as envisaged by policymakers, potentially impacting policy outcomes. They stand out from their compatriots in terms of skillsets and social status – partly because of the selection mechanism employed by organizations and partly because of the training and capacitybuilding efforts directed at migrant returnees. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © 2025 The Author(s). International Migration published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of International Organization for Migration. 2 of 15 | GLYNIADAKI et al. INTRODUCTION While political decisions on migration management are frequently backed by arguments about national sovereignty and border security, the practical implementation of migration policies often entails the involvement of nonstate actors. This is particularly pronounced in countries characterized by ‘weak state institutions’ (Peeters & Campos, 2023) where the presence of international organizations and internationallyfunded NGOs is more prevalent. Individuals tasked with implementing policy on the ground, commonly known as streetlevel bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980), are therefore not always public servants; they may also be private sector employees (Infantino, 2016) or members of the civil society, paid or unpaid (Glyniadaki, 2021). The growing presence of policy implementers from diverse sectors complements the existing diversity in terms of ethnic, racial and other identity categories. Studies in the field of representative bureaucracy have highlighted the importance of these identities in the delivery of social services and its impact on citizens; when streetlevel bureaucrats share key demographic characteristics with the population they serve, they are more likely to meet this population's needs and interests (Meier, 1993). For example, the presence of ethnic minority police officers is associated with lower levels of racial profiling (Hong, 2017); increasing the representativeness of individual policy implementers is likely to have positive outcomes for the target population. In line with recent calls for greater inclusivity in terms of the multiple and diverse identities and backgrounds of today's streetlevel bureaucrats (Bishu & Kennedy, 2020; Murdoch et al., 2022; Portillo et al., 2022), this article examines the implementation of migration information campaigns and initiatives in Senegal, a case where both the employment sector and the racial and national identities of streetlevel bureaucrats hold significance. ‘Migrants as Messengers’ is one prominent such programme run by the International Organisation for Migration. Its purpose is to assist locals ‘to make informed decisions about migration’ and ‘raise awareness on the risks of irregular migration’ by leveraging the narratives of community members who have previously migrated to Europe or attempted to do so. These community members are expected to offer ‘authentic firstperson testimonies’ of their migration experience (IOM, 2024; see also Tjaden & Dunsch, 2021). Similar programmes are also spearheaded by international NGOs, such as Caritas and the German development cooperation agency GIZ. These international NGOs often operate in collaboration with smaller, local NGOs and also rely on local actors to carry out policy tasks, aiming to dissuade future irregular migration attempts from Africa to Europe. Of high scholarly interest in this context is the presence of local migrant returnees employed by internationally funded organizations to share their stories of (commonly irregular and dangerous) migration journeys towards Europe with their compatriots (Maâ et al., 2022; Marino et al., 2023; Trauner et al., 2023; Vammen, 2021). These international donorled initiatives build on imaginaries (Salazar, 2020) of migration as a threat to EU countries which needs to be prevented and discouraged (Bartels, 2019; Schenetti & Mazzucato, 2024). Migrant returnees are chosen as implementing actors by European policy makers because they are seen as (nationally and racially) representative of their compatriots, who are considered to be future potential migrants. This representativeness is meant to facilitate policy implementation and the delivery of an antimigration message on the ground. The degree to which this is effective, however, is yet to be studied and understood. Through a series of semistructured interviews, this study examines the views and experiences of local implementing actors at the streetlevel – ‘migrant messengers’ – and the degree to which they operate as representatives of the organizations they volunteer for or of the local communities they are expected to serve. We analyse these perspectives alongside the perspectives of migrant returnees not involved in such campaigns, as well as those of local migration experts. The aim of this article is not to assess the effectiveness of these information campaigns, as this is beyond the scope of this study. This research contributes to the existing literature by shedding light on the principle of representativeness in the implementation of migration information campaigns in Senegal. We find that underpinning the ideas of ‘sameness’ between migrant returnees and the local population are imaginaries held by international policy makers which do not necessarily correspond to reality on the ground. Through an intersectional lens, this study | 3 of 15 RETURNEES AS (ANTI- )MIGRATION MESSENGERS? reveals important differences between the two groups in terms of skillset and status, or sociocultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Ironically, such differences are largely created due to returnees' involvement in these initiatives and the relevant training they acquire. The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The first section offers a concise review of the relevant literature, focusing on characteristics of today's streetlevel bureaucrats and the degree to which they are considered representative of their target population. This is followed by contextual background on return migration to Senegal. Next, there is a brief overview of the methodology employed, followed by the presentation and analysis of the research findings. This is centred around the themes of (a) selection of messengers, (b) training and (c) message reception from the perspective of our interviewees, who were part of implementing the campaigns. The article ends with concluding remarks on the study's findings and its contributions to the literature. BUREAUCRATIC REPRESENTATIVENESS AT STREETLEVEL There has been an increased presence of nonstate actors in the practice of migration policy and the broader landscape of policy implementation in recent decades. With the administrative reforms following the rise of New Public Management in the 1980s (Dunleavy & Hood, 1994), contracting and privatization became more prevalent. In turn, many frontline public agencies have been replaced by profitseeking contractors, nonprofit organizations or ‘hybrid’ organizations (Brodkin, 2012, 2016; Evers, 2005; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Despite widespread recognition of this shift, few studies have examined and captured its complex ramifications on the ground, especially in the field of migration management and in the Global South (e.g. Glyniadaki, 2021, Infantino, 2016). In addition to the diversification of streetlevel bureaucrats working in various sectors delivering ‘directly policy to people’ (Brodkin, 2013, p. 18), there is a heightened focus on the various identities these bureaucrats hold. According to the theory of representative bureaucracy (Dolan & Rosenbloom, 2003), when bureaucrats share the key demographic characteristics with the citizens they serve (passive representation), they are more likely to meet their needs and interests (active representation). As such, AfricanAmerican administrators are more inclined to be helpful to the AfricanAmerican community (Bradbury & Kellough, 2008) and having a female maths teacher is likely to have positive effects on the maths scores of female pupils (Keiser et al., 2002). In addition to race and gender, other identity characteristics have also been found to play a role, including ethnicity (Grissom et al., 2022), region (Rivera, 2016), culture (Cohen, 2018) and language (Murdoch et al., 2022). The case of migrant returnees participating in migration information initiatives in Senegal presents a good analytical opportunity to examine the linkage between passive and active representation at the street level in a context of diverse implementation actors, both in terms of sectors and individual identities. Partly due to weak state institutions (Peeters & Campos, 2023) and partly due to Europe's efforts to externalize migration management (Moctar, 2022), there is a strong presence of international organizations and agencies (e.g. IOM, UNHCR and FRONTEX) as well as internationally funded NGOs (e.g. Caritas) in Senegal. These organizations tend to involve streetlevel bureaucrats from a diverse range of backgrounds, including Senegalese migrant returnees. The goals and interests of some of these organizations, however, are not always congruent with the goals and interests of the local population, particularly concerning future migration prospects from Africa to Europe. In this conundrum, it is unclear whether migrant returnees who take on the role of ‘messengers’ are more likely to operate as representatives of the organization they work for or the local population they are meant to serve. This kind of selfidentification is found to play a crucial role in whether or not bureaucrats make use of their discretionary power to the advantage of the target population, thereby actively representing them (Selden et al., 1998). Considering the country's history of colonization, it is unclear whether the local population accept the messengers' words and actions at face value or regard them with suspicion due to their association with foreign organisations. This article also builds on existing research on migration information campaigns in West Africa. Relevant studies have discussed the intricacies present in the delivery of these campaigns. A common theme among them 4 of 15 | GLYNIADAKI et al. concerns the asymmetrical power dynamics between European policy makers and local populations – including migrant returnees – and how these dynamics are shaped within the current postcolonial environment (e.g. Maâ et al., 2022; Marino et al., 2023; Vammen, 2021; Van Dessel, 2023). Instances of exploitation of migrant returnees and reproduction of inequalities are presented and discussed in this line of research. Another common theme is the impact and (in)effectiveness of migration information campaigns in terms of the stated goal of decreasing people's willingness to migrate irregularly (Cham & Trauner, 2022; Morgenstern, 2024; Tjaden, 2022; Tjaden & Dunsch, 2021). There is also a third theme linked to the previous two, and this is the focus of this study: how misconceptions and limited understanding of the local context among policymakers can compromise the reception of the campaigns' antiirregular migration message (e.g. Cham, 2024; Trauner et al., 2023, 2024). These studies note that local populations are already largely aware of the dangers involved in irregular migration and highlight the importance of everyday material pressures which push people to migrate regardless, such as lack of economic alternatives and lack of regular migration channels (e.g. Tjaden, 2022). They also point to the longheld beliefs and narratives prevalent in local communities which cannot be easily overridden through externally imposed information sharing efforts (e.g. ‘predestination thinking’ in The Gambia – Cham, 2024). Maâ et al. (2022) specifically question the assumption of ‘peerness’ between migrant returnees and local communities, highlighting how the existing hierarchies among migrant returnees, as well as between returnees and local populations, have been overlooked by European policy makers. They suggest that the assumed peerness is not naturally there, but is either staged or performed for the purposes of transmitting a message more effectively. Paradoxically, it is their involvement as ‘peers’ that further differentiates migrant messengers from their target audience (p. 11). This is similar to the notion of representativeness discussed above. Aiming to build further on this observation, this article combines insights from the theoretical frameworks of streetlevel bureaucracy and representative bureaucracy, as well as from the literature on migration information campaigns. Based on the discussion above, the expectation is that migrant messengers' representativeness on the ground is not the same as the representativeness imaginaries construed by European policy makers and programme donors. In this article, we scrutinize the assumed representativeness – or ‘peerness’ – between migrant messengers and the target population. The views and experiences of migrant messengers are at the focus of this analysis, further enriched by the perspectives of other migrant returnees and local migration experts. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF RETURN MIGRATION TO SENEGAL Return migration to Senegal is a multifaceted phenomenon which varies greatly across individuals in terms of voluntariness. Some migrants return by choice and independently from Europe or other parts of the world (Beauchemin et al., 2018; Flahaux, 2015). These individuals may do so based on subjective factors, such as having achieved sufficient financial stability to build a livelihood back home or reaching retirement age and wanting to spend the remainder of their life with family and friends. There are also cases, however, where migrant returnees are deported from Europe and do not voluntarily return to Senegal. This is not a particularly large proportion of the total of migrant returnees, as the execution of forced returns by European countries remains relatively low. Currently, a considerable number of migrant returnees are making use of assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes (AVRR) to Senegal. These return programmes are financed by the European Union or European countries and executed by the IOM (see OlivierMensah & Feneberg, 2023 for the case of Germany). AVRR programmes have been criticized regarding their ‘voluntariness’ because they predominantly target migrants with rejected asylum claims and low chances of receiving residence permits (Bartels, 2019; OlivierMensah & Feneberg, 2023). Since the 2010s, AVRR has become part of European migration management strategies. Included in this group are migrants who return to Senegal from transit countries in West and North Africa – mostly from Morocco, Libya | 5 of 15 RETURNEES AS (ANTI- )MIGRATION MESSENGERS? and Niger. In 2017, following a CNN report about West Africans being sold as slaves in Libya (Elbagir et al., 2017), a public outcry over the inhumane living conditions and lack of safety for West Africans in Libya prompted an increase in assisted returns, especially voluntary humanitarian return (VHR), through the support of the IOM (Zanker & Altrogge, 2019). A total of 8761 Senegalese nationals returned to Senegal with AVRR and VRH programmes between 2017 and June 2022 (IOM, 2022). The majority of these returnees were men, with women comprising only 7 percent, and the average age was 27 (IOM, 2022). Their main regions of origin were Kolda (28 percent), Dakar (26 percent) and Tambacounda (13 percent). The process of return migration to Senegal poses numerous challenges for returnees. Economic and social reintegration is difficult and can complicate the decision to return. Even if migrants abroad often contemplate returning home, the expected challenges may lead to a delayed or indefinitely postponed return (Riccio, 2006; Riccio & Degli Uberti, 2013). These economic responsibilities and familial obligations can lead migrants to delay their return (Sinatti, 2011). Given that many Senegalese families are dependent on remittances, returning means they can no longer support their families to the same extent they did while abroad. Moreover, for those return migrants who do not decide to voluntarily return but are either deported or return through AVRR programmes, achieving social reintegration seems daunting. The act of migration, more generally, is socially and culturally embedded. Interregional migration has occurred for centuries in West Africa, and migration from Senegal to Europe has been going on for more than a century (Beauchemin et al., 2018; GierczynskiBocandé, 2016; Mourre, 2018). This has led to the construction of collective imaginaries surrounding migration. Migratory imaginaries portray migration to Europe as a road to success (Stier, 2021). If migrants and return migrants are not able to live up to the societal expectations linked to this migratory imaginary, they face stigmatization by their communities, including from their own families (King & Kuschminder, 2022; Maher, 2013; Stier & Altrogge, 2024, Strijbosch et al., 2023). Return migrants engaged in migration information initiatives therefore navigate a social context in which migration to Europe is portrayed as success and return is often perceived as failure, especially when the returnee returns without substantial financial resources. METHODS This study uses a qualitative research methodology comprised of indepth, semistructured interviews conducted at intervals between October 2019 and March 2023 in Senegal. These included interviews with 15 migrant messengers, referred to as MM, involved primarily in IOM's ‘Migrants as Messengers’ campaign or other bilaterally funded programmes implemented by local or international NGOs (e.g. GIZ). One of these participants was not active as a messenger but chose to speak about his migration story when prompted by members of his local community. The interviews took place across different cities and regions, including Dakar (7), Tambacounda (4) and others (4). We spoke to return migrants who had either reached an EU country such as Italy, Germany, France or Spain (7) or attempted to but remained in Libya, Tunisia, Gambia, Mauritania or Morocco (8). They were conducted in person (12) or remotely via Zoom, Messenger or WhatsApp (3). Most interviews lasted between 40 and 60 minutes but some lasted longer, especially those conducted as small group interviews (6 participants were interviewed in groups of 3). Moreover, background conversations were held with 7 policy experts (referred to as PE) from the field, such as policy activists, researchers and representatives from IOM and GIZ Senegal offices. These discussions complemented and enhanced our contextual understanding, particularly regarding the policy landscape within which our project is situated. We followed a purposive sampling approach. Insights from this interview dataset were augmented by a subset of interviews conducted for one of the authors' PhD research. This included 5 indepth interviews with 8 migrant returnees from the Southern Casamance region who had returned from Spain (2) or Niger, Benin, Morrocco or Algeria after failed attempts to reach Europe (6) and who had not engaged in any migration information initiatives. These migrant returnees are referred to as MR. The 6 of 15 | GLYNIADAKI et al. interviews were conducted in person, assisted by a Senegalese researcher who occasionally translated. Four more interviews with policy experts (PE) from international organizations or local NGOs were included. The interviewees were either recruited directly through their public profiles or with the assistance of local Senegalese contacts. This research followed the ethical guidelines and principles established by the authors' respective research institutions where an explicit ethical clearance was not deemed necessary for this project. The three researchers involved are female white Europeans, affiliated with European research institutions. During the fieldwork for this project, there were instances where the researchers encountered suspicion from the side of interviewees, which partly aligns with the thematic focus of this study. The authors acknowledge that their positionalities may have potentially impacted the participants' responses. The 31 interviews were conducted in French, English, Pulaar or Wolof, depending on the language skills and preference of each participant. Interviews in French, English and Wolof were conducted by the researchers; the help of a translator was used for Pulaar. The interviews were transcribed and, where necessary, translated. The interview data was anonymized and thematic analysis was followed (Braun & Clark, 2006). FINDINGS We can identify three main themes relating to the research questions at hand: (a) the selection process of migrant messengers – from the perspectives of the organization and the individual migrants, (b) the training and capacitybuilding process of those selected for migration information initiatives and (c) migrant messengers' perceptions of the reception of their message by the local population, which we broadly categorize under ‘acceptance’ and ‘suspicion’. Migrant returnees who undertake the role of ‘messengers’ are not highly representative of the population they aim to reach. The recruitment process used by these organizations tends to favour specific profiles of migrant returnees while excluding others, based on these organizations' priorities. Moreover, performing the role of a ‘messenger’ requires undertaking specific training and following a particular capacitybuilding process, which also fall within a predefined institutional logic (Zilber, 2017). Inadvertently, these processes further increase the distance between messengers and locals in terms of their social skills, social status and, more generally, their social and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). While messengers may often feel that their message is effectively communicated, they also frequently encounter mistrust, suspicion and general opposition from the members of their target audience. Given the selfselection among those who return, the low level of representativeness of migrant messengers is also likely to influence policy outcomes. Selection process The basic rationale behind selecting migrant returnees as messengers is that they are locals with previous migration experience in or towards Europe. International policy experts consider them better placed to convey the migrationdissuasion message to their compatriots than international or European staff. Migrant returnees who have made use of assisted voluntary return, as opposed to those who have been deported, are perceived as especially suited for this messenger role, as this policy expert explains: What gives them this leadership, this power, is that as a young person who's never been to Europe, for example, I don't know what's going on over there, what's being done over there. I only see the good things on TV, etc. whereas this migrant who has been, he's lived both. He's lived here, he's lived there, so he knows. This knowledge that he really has, this knowledge really gives him the ability to say ‘voilà’. (PE05) | 7 of 15 RETURNEES AS (ANTI- )MIGRATION MESSENGERS? Only a minority of migrant returnees assume to role of ‘migrant messengers’, either for IOM's homonymous programme or for a similar programme of another organization. With that in mind, we can question why some returnees become ‘messengers’ and others do not. Our research shows that this is partly incidental and influenced by factors such as opportunity, or which returnees were nearby and available when the programme started (PE05): It was IOM who brought me here to Senegal, IOM Morocco. In Senegal, I'm already on their list. So, since they have a MAM [Migrants as Messengers] program, they said why not put me on it since I've travelled, and I know a lot about irregular immigration. This is why I joined this MAM program. (MM08) He interviewed me and then he said listen, we have a project called MAM which takes in returned migrants, but we're volunteers in this project, so if you're interested, we'll go and raise people's awareness. He too is a returnee. He explained it to me, and I said it's a great idea. (MM06) In these interview extracts, migrant messengers explain that their recruitment into the programme was due to their proximity to and familiarity with the organization or other returnees already involved. Some had previously made use of IOM's assisted return programme, leading to their identification by the organization (e.g. MM09 and MM15). This shows a degree of selfselection, as individuals who return with AVRR or VHR programmes or have associations with returnees are more likely to know about the possibility of becoming a volunteer in migration campaigns by IOM and other internationally funded organizations. Due to their own experiences, they are also often more inclined to support the message discouraging irregular migration and exhibit willingness to spread that message. Migrant returnees who have become migrant messengers tend to share common attributes with the local population – this is why they are recruited. In addition to nationality and race, they also share aspirations to find employment and support their families (MM04, 05 and 09). Having a negative migration experience to share is of course a precondition as well: Well, here in Senegal, you could say it's a bit tough. You see your family, they don't have anything to eat, your brothers and sisters don't have money to go to school. (MM08, also MM07) For me, it wasn't easy because when I left Senegal for Morocco, that's when I started to struggle. I spent some very difficult days and nights, even in the forest, and after Morocco I suffered too. When I was in Europe it was the same thing. I suffered. I spent nights in the streets. I almost did all my needs in the streets. It wasn't easy. Sometimes you meet racism, mistreatment. Too many difficulties. [Once I had arrived in Europe], yes, I was expelled. I was expelled. (MM13) There are also more specific criteria that organizations use when they select certain returnees for the ‘messenger’ role, including a certain level of eloquence and the ability to express themselves and persuade an audience. This emerges through the narratives of both administrative employees in relevant IOs and NGOs and those of migrant messengers themselves: 8 of 15 | GLYNIADAKI et al. There are even those who did not study at all, who did not go to French school and who only studied the Koran, but who are very good, who are real models, who are leaders. This is really what determines the choice [to recruit them into the program]. (PE05) You have to know how to talk, how to calm [an anxious] person down. (MM06) The first quote suggests that leaderships skills and education constitute key criteria in selecting migrant returnees as messengers. The second, voiced by a migrant messenger, emphasises the importance of emotional intelligence and interpersonal skills, suggesting that the role cannot be undertaken or fulfilled effectively without these qualities. Considering these expectations against the 58% (French) literacy rate in Senegal in 2022 (World Bank, 2024), migrant messengers may already stand out, not only among the local population but among migrant returnees as well. These observations about representativeness gain further context with the juxtaposition of messengers' perspectives with those of migrant returnees who do not assume a messenger role. The latter category of returnees feel great shame at returning without having succeeded, strongly discouraging them from sharing their migration stories with their community: [When you return] people look at you as a failure, cursed. They hate you a little only because you've come back… Relationships with family and friends have deteriorated. We talk very little… They look at you when you go out, because you tried to leave and didn't succeed. If there's someone who didn't know, they're told that it was [you] who tried to go to Spain and didn't succeed. (MR06) It was very difficult for me and that's why I stayed in Dakar for two years before coming to the village. Since I've been back, I haven't been going out – I spent almost a month without leaving the house. It has been really very difficult. (MR07) Unlike their counterparts who assume the role of messengers, these returnees refrain from extensively engaging with their compatriots and sharing their own migration narratives, largely due to the shame and stigma they experience upon their return. A local migration expert notes that ‘They don't want to talk about it, they keep to themselves because they're ashamed’ (PE07). Additional factors deterring them from joining migration information initiatives and campaigns may be that they returned to Senegal prior to 2017 when the first ‘Migrants as Messengers’ programmes started or did not encounter these programmes (e.g. MR18), so they were not recruited. Training and capacity building After being selected, the migrant messengers receive some training. Through such training and capacity building sessions, they acquire a certain array of new personal professional skills (MM02, MM04, MM14 and MM15). These include practical skills (e.g. video editing), interpersonal skills (e.g. public speaking) as well as psychosocial support and personal development. In doing so, they differ more and more from their compatriots in terms of these skillsets or, put differently, their sociocultural capital: | 15 of 15 RETURNEES AS (ANTI- )MIGRATION MESSENGERS? Zanker, F. & Altrogge, J. (2019) The political influence of return: from diaspora to Libyan transit returnees. International Migration, 57(4), 167–180. Zilber, T. (2017) How institutional logics matter: a bottomup exploration. Research in, how institutional logics matter: a bottom-up exploration, Emerald Group publishing limited. The Sociology of Organizations, 48A, 137–156. How to cite this article: Glyniadaki, K., Ratzmann, N. & Stier, J. (2025) Migrant returnees as (anti- ) migration messengers? A case of streetlevel representative bureaucracy in Senegal. International Migration, 63, e13382. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13382