JUDICIAL AMBIGUITIES IN THE CASE, DISQUALIFICATION OF PRIME MINISTER NAWAZ SHARIF: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ARTICLE 62 (1) (F) IN THE LIGHT OF PLD 2017 SC 692

Pakistan’s Multidisciplinary Journal for Arts & Science ISSN 2789-2611 Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License https://pmdjas.com | Special Issue (LAW) Page. 81– 91 | 81 JUDICIAL AMBIGUITIES IN THE CASE, DISQUALIFICATION OF PRIME MINISTER NAWAZ SHARIF: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ARTICLE 62 (1) (F) IN THE LIGHT OF PLD 2017 SC 692 Sharjeel Khalid1, Shah Muhammad Zarkoon1* 1University Law College, University of Balochistan, Quetta. A R T I C L E I N F O: Received: 15/11/2025. Accepted: 29/11/2025. Published: 04/12/2025. A B S T R A C T This research paper offers a deep doctrinal, analytical and constitutional analysis of the apex court of Pakistan’s disqualification of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif under Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) in PLD 2017 SC 692 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2017). The paper deeply evaluates and assess the ambiguity and vagueness of the constitutional morality and uplift clauses that are Sadiq and Ameen, and points their inconsistent judicial application, shows in the controversial doctrine and rule of lifetime disqualification established in PLD 2018 SC 405 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018) and in addition overturned in 2024. The research draws upon primary legal sources that is constitution, comparison with India and the United Kingdom, scholarly writings, talk show discourse, and, democratic theory. It argues that Pakistan’s dependency on undefined moral standards has produced inconsistent judicial laws, undermined the rule of law, and, destabilized democratic processes. This research concludes by proposing proper legislative reform, judicial restrictions, procedural safeguards, and liberty, and democratic accountability mechanisms to stand Pakistan’s constitutional system with international democratic laws. Keywords: Constitution of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif Article 62((1)(f), Disqualification, Parliament, Judiciary, Morality, Ikama, Non-Disclosure, PLD2017 SC662. Author info: Corresponding Author. Shah Muhammad Zarkoon [email protected] DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zen odo.17883088 Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 82 Sharjeel Khalid INTRODUCTION. The elimination of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif under Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) of constitution of Pakistan, 1973 in July 2017 marked one of the most resulting judicial interventions and interference in Pakistan’s constitutional development history. The Supreme Court in Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi versus Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif held that the nonappearance of a gettable salary from his son’s UAE private company constituted deception and, therefore, a violation of the constitution that legislators be “Sadiq” (truthful) and “Ameen” (trustworthy). This rational pointed intense domestically and internationally debate, not only because the ground for disqualification appeared technical rather, than substantive, but also because the court has defined an unexplained moral criterion that is originally inserted during the Zia-ul-Haq era that is to remove an elected prime minister from his office. Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015), unlike Article 63 which contains specific rules and criteria of exclusion that are (criminal conviction, insanity, insolvency, corruption), is rooted in the constitution but lacks statutory definitions, legislation and period of expiry. This unclarity allowed the court to follow important expound discretion. In 2018, this discretion winded exceptionally when the Supreme Court held in Sami Ullah Baloch v. Abdul Karim Nousherwani, that disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) was permanent. The Court explained that a person once declared not truthful or honest remained morally tainted forever unless Parliament clearly legislated otherwise. This judicial in depth of constitutional Words raised instant concerns about the separation of powers in the system, proper process, and people sovereignty. The 2018 decision put bar on excluded individuals from elections for life that is, even though the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 does not contain any such article. The wave tilted again in the mid of January 2024, when a larger bench of the Supreme Court again turned the lifetime exclusion doctrine. The Court adopted that Article62(1)(f) is inconsistent with the natural principles. This reversal has raised fundamental questions about constitutional freedom, judicial interpretation, and democratic legality. This research paper argues that the legal knowledge of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) shows deep legal confusion and, political instrumentalization. Through a broader review of case law, academic literature, media narratives, and, comparative constitutional models, the paper explains that least defined moral clauses cannot serve as acceptable constitutional levels for disqualification. Without legal clarity and, procedural safety, such provisions threaten democratic stability, judicial neutrality, and the rule of law in the country. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This research has applied a doctrinal legal methodology, which is the main method applied in legal literature to identify and interpret constitutional provisions, judicial knowledge, statutory sections, and, scholarly writings. Doctrinal methodology is suitable and effective because the central conflict Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 83 Sharjeel Khalid of interest and issue in this study that is the understanding and implementation of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015), is basically a matter of constitutional interpretation rather than numbering or empirical measurement. Courts themselves take the assistance on doctrinal knowledge, making this method analytically compatible along judicial practice. In addition, the research includes a comparative legal approach, if different countries, analyzing India’s Representation of People Act (Government of India, 1951), and, the United Kingdom’s Disqualification Act, shows how other countries avoid morality-based judicial disqualification. This comparative mirror assists the study to build Pakistan’s legal system within global constitutional norms, rules, and implementation, exposing its exceptionalism. Nature of the Research This study adopts a doctrinal legal research methodology, often described as “black letter law research.” The focus is on the analysis of statutes, constitutional provisions, judicial precedents, and academic writings. Given that the subject matter revolves around constitutional interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) and its judicial application in PLD 2017 SC 692 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2017), doctrinal analysis is the most appropriate approach. Unlike empirical research, which relies on interviews, surveys, or field data, doctrinal methodology enables an in-depth exploration of judicial reasoning, constitutional text, and scholarly commentary. This method allows the study to critically evaluate how the Supreme Court interpreted terms like Sadiq and Ameen, and to highlight inconsistencies across different judgments. Scope of the Research The scope of this study is primarily jurisdiction-specific, with emphasis on Pakistan’s constitutional framework and judicial decisions. However, in order to provide a more balanced understanding, selective references are made to comparative jurisdictions such as India and the United Kingdom, where disqualification laws are codified and not morality-based. The temporal scope of the study is equally important. It begins with the Panama Papers revelations in 2016, which set the stage for Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification, and extends to the post2018 jurisprudence, including the Sami Ullah Baloch case declaring lifetime disqualification. While subsequent political developments are mentioned for context, the focus remains on the judicial interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015). Sources of Data The research is primarily based on secondary sources of data, drawn from the following categories: • Primary Legal Sources: The Constitution of Pakistan, statutory provisions, and especially Supreme Court case law including PLD 2017 SC 692 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2017) (Nawaz Sharif), PLD 2018 SC 320 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018) (Khawaja Asif), PLD 2016 SC 97 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2016) (Jahangir Tareen), and PLD 2018 SC 405 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018) (Sami Ullah Baloch). Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 84 Sharjeel Khalid • Secondary Legal Sources: Academic commentaries, law journal articles, and scholarly books, such as Osama Siddique’s Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law and Khaled Abou El Fadl’s works on Islamic constitutionalism. • Media and Public Discourse: Televised debates from major Pakistani talk shows (e.g., Hamid Mir’s Capital Talk, Kashif Abbasi’s Off the Record, and Saleem Safi’s Jirga), as they reflect the popular constitutional consciousness and supplement legal debate in a society where public trust in institutions is contested. • Comparative Material: Indian and UK statutes on parliamentary disqualification, along with leading constitutional law texts (e.g., Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Data Analysis and Discussion (Full-Length, In-Depth) This section shows a deep analysis of constitutional provisions, and, judicial interpretations, political context, comparative legal systems, scholar writings, and media discourse. Its goal is to answer the research questions, literature gap, and address the problem statement by demonstrating the doctrinal limitations, and democratic challenges arising from Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015). Textual Ambiguity of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) needs that a Member of Parliament be “truthful and honest,” but the Constitution provides no such explanation to test, evidentiary standard, or procedural mechanism for determining these things. The language and conceptual ambiguity and vagueness of these terms is the root of doctrinal limitations. Jurists criticize that morality clauses in constitutional law are vague and due to their subjectivity; without any such statutory explanation, they leave excessive room for judicial discretion. Unlike Article 63, which contains clear standards such as conviction, loan, default, or citizenship issues, Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) relies on personal character. Expansion of Judicial Power in PLD 2018 SC 405 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018) (Lifetime Disqualification) The decision given by the court in 2018 increased the consequences of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) strikingly by upholding the disqualification under the clause which was for life. The reasoning of disqualifications which was given rested on a logic that once a person is declared dishonest will remain disqualified permanently The legal experts gave their reviews that this judgment as a clear instance of judicial legislation that one of the provisions of Constitution contains disqualification for lifetime, the Court legislated it through interpretation. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 85 Sharjeel Khalid The three major concern raised: 1. Violation of Separation of Powers The parliament has the constitutional authority to define disqualification durations not the judiciary 2. Violation of Due Process The Individuals could be disqualified permanently without a trial, appeal, and evidentiary standard. 3. Democratic Disruption A lifetime ban can remove a political leader from electoral competition indefinitely, undermining voters’ rights under Article 17. The judgment given was criticized globally and became a trade mark of judicial overreach. Supreme Court Reversal (A Landmark Correction) In the month of January 2024, a bench consisting of seven members declared that heinous ban of lifetime lacked constitutional basis. The Court held: • Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) of the constitution of Pakistan does not contain procedure, no duration, and no process of appeal • A person cannot be permanently stopped from politics without following a due process • The judgments given earlier had extended judicial authority beyond the limits of constitution This reversal made sure that the earlier criticisms raised by scholars and aligns Pakistan more closely with democratic norms. It also retains a foundational constitutional principle given by Lord Diplock, “Judges are not legislators.” Inconsistency in Precedent: Selective Accountability By comparing the Nawaz Sharif case with cases of Imran Khan and Khawaja Asif shows inconsistency. In PLD 2018 SC 320 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018), Imran Khan was not disqualified for non complete financial disclosure despite more hard allegations. also, Khawaja Asif was firstly disqualified by the High Court but replaced by the Supreme Court of Pakistan on proportionality grounds. The application of inconsistency of the same constitutional provision undermines rule of law values: • Equality before law • Legal certainty • Predictability Legal scholars emphasized that when molarity clauses are applied by judges unevenly, it creates “constitutional opportunism” law used apparently depending on political view. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 86 Sharjeel Khalid Comparative Constitutional Analysis The comparative analysis reinforces the argument of this study, Pakistan’s approach is exceptional and chaotic. • India The people’s representation Act governs disqualification through practical criteria like that of conviction, corrupt practice, or insolvency. There exists no molarity clause. Indian courts have continuously render to support moral oversight functions. • United Kingdom The United Kingdom’s House of Commons Disqualification Act (UK Parliament, 1975) contains only technological reasons such as imprisonment or bankruptcy. The removal by judiciary of MPs on grounds like moral is unheard of in British constitutional practice. • Conclusion from Comparison No democracy in the world uses uncertain moral tests which are enforced by judges to remove elected officials. Pakistan is an exception. Media as Constitutional Arena The crisis was created worse by commentary made on media. The foremost legal disputes were thoroughly examined by different programs including Capital Talk, Off the Record, Jirga and Aj Shahzeb Khanzada Kay Sath. Different analysts on the show characterized the decision as part of Pakistan’s history of removing prime ministers in Pakistan through non-electoral means, claiming as it resembles judicial engineering. Media articles shape the legitimacy of judiciary. When the talk shows present the decisions of judiciary as politically motivated, public trust in the judiciary decreases. Synthesis: What the Data Shows The combined doctrinal, comparative, and media analysis reveals: • Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) is structurally flawed • Its judicial application has been inconsistent • Judicial power expanded beyond constitutional limits • Media and public discourse viewed the rulings as political • The 2024 reversal signals acknowledgment of prior excesses This part of the research answers directly the research questions and demonstrates why Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) is disparate with democratic constitutionalism. DISCUSSION This analysis shows that the jurisprudence of Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) is deeply rooted with Pakistan’s historical, political, and constitutional changes. This discussion section Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 87 Sharjeel Khalid consists of synthesized doctrinal, comparative, and contextual insights which shows how uncertainty on morality of constitution clauses has produced judicial overreach, harmed the sovereignty of democracy, and unstable political institutions. The Nawaz Sharif disqualification (PLD 2017 SC 692 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2017) is the foremost example of this disfunction. In the modernized constitutional democracy has an empowered prime minister been disqualified for his failures to disclose a salary which he didn’t receive that is, money he neither got nor got any benefit from. The interpretation by the supreme court fades the borderline between technical avoidance and dishonesty, using a very high moral standard. The decision shows what experts’ term “hyper-moralistic judicial review,” in which the courts examines character examination over fairness of the procedure or considerable misconduct. This development is not firmly established in judicial principle but in political context it has. The history of Pakistan’s judiciary expands its role during the time of instability of politics or civilmilitary contestation. In addition to, the non-consistent across the cases shows the absence of a logical standard of judiciary. In Khawaja Asif and Imran Khan cases, the Court used a pardoning interpretation. In Nawaz Sharif’s case, it relied on strict liability. This illustrates what Mariana Mota Prado describes as “selective institutional enforcement,” where rules are erratically put on due to political or institutional pressures. The non-consistent method is itself evident that Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) is way too much vague to function as a stable, suitable constitutional rule. In another famous case PLD 2018 SC 405 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018) that is Samiullah Baluch verses Nousherwani the announced a very strict and regid verdict declaring that such disqualification on exercising the article 62 1 f would last for a lifetime such punishment is way more harsh than many criminal penalties without any specified procedural ground as that in criminal cases. By announcing such verdict of lifetime disqualification which is inconsistent with Article 4, 10-A and 17 of the constitution of Pakistan. The reversal that happened in 2024 that reversed the lifetime disqualifications causes a lot of criticism here. A seven-member bench admitted that lifetime bans were unconstitutional. Comparatively, Pakistan’s judicial system stands in a powerful contrast with democratic custom. India and the UK depends upon on clear lawful disqualification rules, keeping away with moral clauses altogether. Even the Islamic legal experts, such as Abou El Fadl, stress that moral decisions need clear standards and due process none of which is provided in Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015). Pakistan’s stands on vague morality clauses makes it an exception international level and doctrinally. Media thoughts further raise these issues. The talk shows in Pakistan functions as separately constitutional forums, making public perception of judicial truth. massive criticism in popular media change shaped the mind of public regarding the judiciary following Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification. Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 88 Moomal Qadir Media functioned as a check on judicial power by showing inconsistency and emphasizing on political consequences. This play between expert decisions and media framing highlight that constitutional validity is both legal and social. Adding all, these views shows that Article 62(1)(f) (Bingham, 2010; Fallon, 2015) makes doctrinal turbulence, institutional disbalance, and democratic difficulty. It is used in the removal of elected leaders highlights a broader pattern of extra-electoral era change in the history of Pakistan. This research paper emphasized that the provision of constitution that frequently disbalance political leadership, depends on subjective interpretation of judiciary and lack of procedural safeguards cannot survive with democratic stability. It must therefore be rebuilt, clear made, or repealed. Findings and Recommendations Key Findings This research reveals about the unjustified disqualification of a sitting Prime Minister Mr Nawaz Sharif under Article 62 (1)(f) and what consequences it could leave in upcoming cases. There exists judicial ambugity which could lead to dangerous consequences in the constitution supremacy. The first and farmost key finding is that the term “sadiq” and “ameen” gives judiciary a very broad interpretative mandate. There exists a lac of clear definition in the article 62 (1)(f) of the Constitution. Which has led to such inconsistent and unjustified application of the Law. In Nawaz Sharif’s case (PLD 2017 SC 692 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2017) a bare non-disclosure of an offshore account from which he didn’t received any salary for life resulted in disqualification. In comparison to other cases such as Imran Khan versus Hanif Abbasi and Khawja Asif versus Muhmmad Hanif the Court has adopted a more relaxed and contextual approach rather than such rigid approach as in Nawaz Sharif’s approach. There exists a contradiction that shows judicial uncertainty over the meantime and application of moral clauses, which undermines the prediction of law and violetes the principles of justice. The second finding is concerned with the judicial explanation of the constitutional text article 62(1)(f). In another case Sami Ullah Baluch verses Nousherwani (PLD 2018 SC 405 (Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2018) the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the disqualification exercising the same article for a period that extends to a life time. This shows the the principle know as legislating from the bench raising a concern regarding separation of powers. This shows amended in the constitution (done by Parliament) but here the Court is doing that is regarged as Parliament’s exclusive law making. The third finding is that the role of judiciary that is interpretation has shifted to political arbitrator often known as “judicialization of politics”. It is the exercise of moral judgement over the elected representative without any solid evidence. The Courts have entered the political sphere by doing this. A famous saying of John Marshall, Chief justice of United States of America that is “iI Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. 89 Sharjeel Khalid is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, not what it ought to be”. The fourth finding is that the Public disclosure and Media cell including both print media and television broadcast have amplified the Constitutional crises. The public perception has been framed by the television broadcast debates and newspaper editorials of judicial consistency, fairness and legitimacy. Further that the legal decisions can not be isolated from the context of social and political aspects. Therefore, the judiciary credibility is not only associated with its judgements but also with how those judgements are interpreted and received in the public. Finally, the comparative analysis shows that Supreme Court of Pakistan applied the constitution vaguely without any procedural aspects whereas the India and UK constitution there exists a strict disqualification statutory criterion such as criminal convictions or insolvency. Such vaguely applied provision of the constitution requires further codification and legislative intervention to align Pakistan’s legal frame work with the democratic norms and stability use of power. Recommendations From the above-mentioned findings one can construct the following recommendations to address the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Article 62 (1)(f). • First, there is a urging need for legislative reforms. The Parliament should either repeal article 62(1)(f) for being ambiguous and undemocratic provision or further elaborate the portion of Sadiq and Ameen. Without any legislative reforms the Courts will exercise unrestrained power without any consequences. As Montesquieu said in the spirit of laws, “There is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from legislative and executive”. If the Parliament failed to legislate on this provision of the constitution that one could say that the Parliament has surrendered before the judiciary weakening democratic sovereignty. • Second, there must exist a judicial restraint in the political cases, courts should interpret the constitutional provisions in the light of democratic principles and avoid vague interpretation and extending the scope of morality clauses beyond their contextual limits. Lord Bingham famously stated in the Rule of law (2010), “the core of rule of law is that all persons and authorities within the state should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publically made, making effect in the future and publicly administered.” • Third, the procedure regarding disqualification process must be clear with our any double or ambiguity. Individuals being accused and convicted on the grounds of Sadiq and Ameen should be entitled to fair trial and must be given opportunity of appeal. By adding procedural reforms could result to fairness in the legal framework and restraining public confidence in the judiciary. • Fourth, there should be emphasis on parliamentary accountability rather judiciary exercising their powers such as in other democratic states in which the electorate decides whether a