African Perspectives on South–South Migration

Zeleke, Meron (Ed.); Smith, Lahra (Ed.) Book African Perspectives on South–South Migration Routledge Studies on African and Black Diaspora Provided in Cooperation with: Taylor & Francis Group Suggested Citation: Zeleke, Meron (Ed.); Smith, Lahra (Ed.) (2024) : African Perspectives on South– South Migration, Routledge Studies on African and Black Diaspora, ISBN 978-1-040-00619-1, Routledge, London, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003368267 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/290436 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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Centring themes of agency, resource flows, and transnational networks, the book examines the enduring appeal of the Global South as a place of origin, transit, and destination. Popular media, government pronouncements, and much of the global research discourse continue to be oriented towards migration from the Global South to the Global North, despite the fact that the vast majority of migration is South‑South. This book moves beyond these mischaracterisations and instead distinctly focuses on the agency of African migrants and the creative strategies they employ while planning their routes within and across the African continent. Case studies explore the flow of resources such as people, money, skills, and knowledge throughout the continent, while also casting a light on the lived experiences of migrants as they negotiate their sometimes precarious and vulnerable positions. Underpinned by intensive empirical studies, this book challenges prevailing narratives and provides a new way of thinking about South‑South Migration. Composed by a majority of scholars from the Global South, the book will be crucial reading for researchers, students, and policy makers with a focus on South‑South Migration, Migration and Inequalities, Migration and Development, and Refugee and Humanitarian Studies. Meron Zeleke is Associate Professor at the Center for Human Rights, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. She has years of teaching and research experience at renowned academic institutions in Africa, North America, Europe, and Asia, and is a member of several international academic associations and an editorial board member of internationally renowned journals. Lahra Smith is Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, USA, and the Director of the African Studies Program. She is a political scientist with a par‑ ticular interest in citizenship, migration, and political institutions in Africa. 5 Afro-Nordic Landscapes Equality and Race in Northern Europe Edited by Michael McEachrane 6 Pilgrimage Tourism of Diaspora Africans to Ghana Ann Reed 7 The Poetics and Politics of Diaspora Transatlantic Musings Jerome C. Branche 8 Post/Colonialism and the Pursuit of Freedom in the Black Atlantic Edited by Jerome C. Branche 9 Race and Afro-Brazilian Agency in Brazil Miles Tshombe 10 Locating African European Studies Interventions, Intersections, Conversations Edited by Felipe Espinoza Garrido, Caroline Koegler, Deborah Nyangulu and Mark U. Stein 11 British-born Black African Youth and Educational Social Capital Alganesh Messele 12 The Black Subaltern An Intimate Witnessing Shauna Knox 13 African Perspectives on South-South Migration Edited by Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith Routledge Studies on African and Black Diaspora Series editors: Fassil Demissie, DePaul University and Sandra Jackson, DePaul University African Perspectives on South-South Migration Edited by Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing‑in‑Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978‑1‑032‑43646‑3 (hbk) ISBN: 978‑1‑032‑43651‑7 (pbk) ISBN: 978‑1‑003‑36826‑7 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003368267 Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra Contents List of contributors vii PART I 1 Introduction 1 Introduction: Intra-Continental Migration Dynamics in Africa and the Importance of South-South Migration (SSM) 3 MERON ZELEKE AND LAHRA SMITH PART II 19 Agency in South-South Migration 2 Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation in Informal Settlements in Rustenburg, South Africa, 1994–2018 21 JOSEPH MUJERE 3 Unpacking the Reasons for Dominance of South-South Migration: The Ethiopian Case 36 FANA GEBRESENBET 4 Exploring the Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants along the Ghana-China Migration Corridor 55 LEANDER KANDILIGE, JOSEPH AWETORI YARO, AND JOSEPH MENSAH 5 Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse: The Case of Forced Migrants in the Global South 73 TIRSIT SAHLDENGIL vi Contents PART III 91 The Flows of Resources in South‑South Migration 6 Humanitarian Nomads: The Mobilities and Disjunctures Inherent to Aid Work in the Global South 93 LAUREN CARRUTH 7 The Flow of Resources in the Global South: The Transfer of Agricultural Skills between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso 112 TEBKIETA ALEXANDRA TAPSOBA AND BONAYI HUBERT DABIRÉ 8 Transnational Flow of Ideas in the Ethiopia‑South Africa Migration Corridor: Hadiya Experiences 126 DEREJE FEYISSA 9 Religious Place‑Making and African Mobilities: Muslim and Christian Moroccan Sites in Migrant Trajectories within and beyond the Continent 149 JOHARA BERRIANE 10 Djibouti, a Migratory Crossroads in the Red Sea Basin: Prospects and Challenges 169 AMINA SAÏD CHIRÉ AND GÉRALDINE PINAULDT 11 Forced Migration Life Trajectories and Politics of Contradictions: South Sudanese between Being IDPs and Refugees in Sudan and South Sudan 191 MOHAMED A. G. BAKHIT Index 203 Contributors Mohamed A. G. Bakhit is Associate Professor (prima facie), Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Faculty of Economic and Social Stud‑ ies, University of Khartoum, since November 2022. Currently, he is a post‑ doctoral researcher in the project of NORHED (Norwegian Higher Education Program) entitled: Borderlands dynamics II (2021–2023). His main research interests are identity change, urbanisation, forced migration, minority groups, and citizenship. Johara Berriane is Professor at the Institute of Cultural Studies of the University of the Bundeswehr Munich. Her research interests are trans‑Saharan entangle‑ ments and mobilities, religious presence and place‑making in African cities, bureaucratisation of belief, and humanitarian governance in North and West Africa. Lauren Carruth is a medical anthropologist specialising in humanitarian assis‑ tance, global health, nutrition, displacement, and migration. She is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Environment, Development and Health in the School of International Service at American University in Wash‑ ington, DC in the United States of America. Her research focuses on five themes: (1) labour and inequity within the humanitarian industry, (2) irregular labour migrations between Ethiopia and Gulf States, (3) the relationship be‑ tween food insecurity, medical insecurity, and diabetes, (4) nutritional wasting in emergencies and the development of therapeutic foods, and (5) emerging zoonotic diseases in the Horn of Africa. Carruth’s 2021 book, Love and Libera‑ tion: Humanitarian Work in Ethiopia’s Somali Region, was published in 2021 by Cornell University Press. Amina Saïd Chiré is Associate Researcher at the University of Djibouti and for‑ mer President of the Independent Institute of Research for the Horn of Africa (IRICA). She is the author of more than 20 publications in peer‑reviewed scien‑ tific journals and books in the field of human and social sciences. Hubert Bonayi Dabiré holds a PhD in demography from the ‘Université Catholique de Louvain’ in Belgium. He is a lecturer and researcher at the “Institut Supérieur 4 Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith and other ways that migrants are motivated and sustained and struggle in their journeys and at their destination. Such an orientation has obscured the flow of financial resources within the global South due to the underlying assumption of global resource inequality between the North and South, whereby the flows of re‑ sources are always presumed to move primarily and largely from the Global North to the South. By some estimates, there are at least 25 million international migrants in Af‑ rica (Saifaddin 2023). One estimation of South–South international migration puts its significance at between 33–45% of total global migration trends (Campillo‑ Carrette 2013: 12). Cross‑border, intra‑regional migration flows are a key feature of South‑South Migration whereby millions migrate in search for work and liveli‑ hoods. Intra‑regional migration in the Global South is multi‑directional and com‑ plex in terms of categories of migrants, drivers and outcomes (Maruja et al. 2019). However, South‑South Migration is not limited to intra‑regional migration patterns as there are cross‑continental migratory flows in the Global South as is the case in point of West African migrants in Brazil (Heil 2020) and African migrants in India (Kohnert 2021). In Africa, SSM migration is a story that is largely about intra‑African migration (IOM 2020). Hujo and Piper note that “in three developing regions, South‑South migration flows are greater than South‑North flows” (Hujo & Piper 2007: 19). In 2015, about 33 million Africans were living outside their home countries, and more than half of these international migrants moved within Africa (UNDESA 2015). In fact, an important study of SSM found that 80% of Africans who were thinking about migration had no interest in leaving the African continent (IOM 2020). The large majority of international migrants migrate within the same region (UNCTAD 2018). A similar pattern can be observed in the intra‑continental refu‑ gee flows. Two of the East African countries of Uganda and Ethiopia are some of the largest refugee‑hosting countries, respectively, over a million and 800,000 refu‑ gees (UN 2018). There is more cross‑national, aggregate data now being compiled by international organizations and think tanks such as the IOM (2020) and Afro‑ barometer about African citizens’ migration patterns, including the drivers, inten‑ tions, and challenges of African migration patterns indicating the intra‑continental migratory flows (Sanny et al. 2019). The authors in this collaborative volume aim to highlight these neglected themes of South‑South Migration (SSM) through qualitative and in‑depth case studies from across Africa. Although the aim of this volume is not to provide an exhaustive accounting of the research on the topic, it is worth noting that some of the themes of prior studies on migration patterns within and from Africa include: addressing the trends of intra‑African migration and challenges and prospects of integration (Nyamnjoh 2007); the growing number of sub‑Saharan African migrants moving to the west (RMMS 2014); African perspectives on migration and cultures of mi‑ gration (Hahn & Klute 2007); factors that shape and influence lives of Africans before, during, and after their migration (Triulzi & McKenzie 2013); the interplay between migration and development (Fokkema & De Haas 2011; RMMS 2015), and more. However, there remain a relatively few qualitative studies of intra‑Africa The Importance of South‑South Migration (SSM) 5 migration that explore South‑South Migration dynamics in Africa (notable excep‑ tions include Bakewell and Landau (2018), Flahaux and De Haas (2016), Moyo et al. (2021), and Hugo and Piper (2010)). The under‑researched intra‑regional migration dynamics in Africa is identified as a theme that calls for the attention of cross‑disciplinary research (Adepoju 2008). In this introductory chapter, we outline the intellectual stakes of the empirical focus on SSM, with a focus on three core themes of inquiry: the flows and dis‑ tinct types of resources within the Global South, the agency and limitations of the agency of migrants within the Global South, and the appeal of the ‘Global South’ as a place of origin, transit, and destination. Conceptualizing South-South Migration The rise of an empirical focus on South‑South Migration in the last decade or more follows a near‑hysteria in Europe and America about migration from the Global South. The need to draw attention to the ways in which African migra‑ tions are not always or even often out of the countries in developing regions and into the so‑called ‘developed’ or Global North countries led to the development of the term ‘South‑South Migration’ to capture this phenomenon. Campillo‑Carrette noted that while the term is fairly new, it is rarely problematized, and what con‑ stitutes the Global South and migration are contentious and substantively distinct (Campillo‑Carrette 2013). The contentions surrounding the concept of South‑South Migration is not in any way related to semantics. They are rather related to fram‑ ing issues, and the underlying assumptions behind the concept. One of the key problems is lack of clarity in the definition of the North‑South divide which is best reflected in the different ways the term is used by various institutions and actors (Bakewell et al. 2009). Bakewell, in what is the key study to critique meaningfully the term “South–South‑Migration,” notes that it is impossible to really characterize any location of a “global South” because there are as many differences among the countries of the “South” as there are similarities. Still, he finds some useful pat‑ terns among the regions, such as the fact that Africa is the region of the world with the highest percentages of South‑South migrants, at 64% remaining in the region (Bakewell 2009). The notion of the Global South is often used in a descriptive manner among scholars and non‑governmental organizations (NGOs), whereby the ‘Global South’ signifies countries of low or middle income (LMICs). The South is often equated with “developing countries” and hence, South‑South Migration is often understood and studied as migration between and among developing countries or LMICs (Ratha & Shaw 2007; Castles & Delgado Wise 2008). Ratha and Shaw estimate that 74 million, or nearly half, of all migrants from developing countries live and work in other developing countries (2007). In fact, the analytical field of the ‘Global South’ can indicate very different categories of people and communities. Furthermore, the general use of the term in the context of migration, as in the case of South‑South and South‑North Migration, obscures the fact that migration systems are not contained in a given space. South‑South migrants’ trajectories 6 Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith might have an intended destination in the Global North and but also end up quite differently. The discourse about South‑South Migration should be conceptualized in such a way that the mobility happening at intra‑regional levels might have a prospect of extending to inter‑regional South‑South Migration patterns happening across continents (ACP 2013; De Lombaerde et al. 2014). Human movements are complex and multi‑directional, rarely predictable, and are rarely planned in ad‑ vance. An additional critique of the term relates to the trend in which the concept is appropriated to show the invidious contrast with South‑North Migration patterns. By going beyond such a mere contrast to the South‑North migratory flows, there is a need to examine patterns in South‑South Migration in a given context (De Lom‑ baerde et al. 2014: 104). The other problematic surrounding the term is the underlying assumption in the homogeneity of countries located in the “North” and “South” (Bakewell et al. 2009). Crucial here is how and in what ways (if at all) movements within the South, and in this case, within Africa, differ from movement out of the South, that is, out of the continent of Africa. While it may be true as Bakewell and others suggest, that there are reasons to question that distinction, and to point to the similarities that exist in movements out of the Global South, as well as the differences within the Global South (surely our cases in this volume point to that rich diversity of experience), it is also the case that there is a qualitative difference in moving within the region/ Continent than moving to Europe. Shared experiences of contact with the slave trade, European colonialism, and relatively low levels of human and economic de‑ velopment shape patterns of migration, among many other factors (Bakewell 2009; Pierre 2012; Campillo‑Carrette 2013; Achiume 2019). The diverse socio‑economic and political developments and historical contexts highly shape the differences in the migration trends and trajectories of different nations located in the Global South. South‑South Migrations have a number of distinctive features related to the role of borders, the structure of the migration flows, the nexus between migration and conflict, the migration governance structures, and so on (De Lombaerde et al. 2014: 103). For instance, recent work by anthropologists like Hagan’s work in West Africa draws from the argument that in contemporary African societies, com‑ munities are thoroughly structured through processes of racialization and global white supremacy as a result of slavery and colonialism (Hagan 2019). In making a legal case, Achiume argues that “legal scholarship, however, has insufficiently grappled with the implications of colonial and neocolonial subordination for how we should think about the ethics of international migration and the theory of territo‑ rial nation‑state sovereignty that structures it” (Achiume 2019: 1519). Despite these similarities of history, as Fiddian‑Qasmiyeh and Carella note, there is so much variety within the Global South, and South‑South migratory flows are so diverse, that one should be aware that these expressions are “inevitably oversim‑ plifications at best, or sweeping generalizations at worst” (2020: 203–204). For this work, it may be less important to measure or define what that difference is because our concern is the experiences of migrants and others who travel across and remain within Africa. Such an African Continental grounding of the discussion challenges the prior trend of viewing the Global South as if it were a homogenized entity. The Importance of South‑South Migration (SSM) 7 Elements of geography and shared history interact to incentivize sub‑regional and continental migration in ways that are themselves patterned. Southern Af‑ rica, for instance, has long histories of male‑labor migration that structure and reinforce contemporary migrations within the sub‑region (Lubkemann 2009). These tend to encourage the growth of labor migration into South Africa in the post‑apartheid period, despite the challenges and response from both the state and larger society (Landau & Segatti 2009; Facchini, Mayda & Mendola 2013). The Sahel has formed a geographic, religious and trade corridor that predates the ar‑ rival of European colonialists in ways that similarly shape and structure contem‑ porary migration corridors (Raineri 2018; Hagan 2019). Likewise, the migration trend observed in the Northwestern and Eastern routes from Ethiopia to the Su‑ dan and through Djibouti to the Gulf States are highly impacted by the historical developments in the corridor related to the caravan trade and long‑existing trade ties (Haile Michael 2014). One of the new trends in intra‑regional migration is the longer distance between places of origin and destination unlike earlier trends of intra‑regional migration often happening between countries sharing borders (Adepoju 2008). Thus, South‑South Migration is both a lens for study and a site of interrogation. What makes each of the cases in this volume “the South” is something we have asked the contributors to consider, even as their inclusion assumes their location in that space, but in a circulating sense. Migrants in those spaces (presumably) do not desire or are not able somehow to get out of “the South,” at least not yet. However, it is also worth asking this question about temporality. For some set of migrants, it may be that there is an eventual goal of getting to Europe or North America, but moving within Africa is a first step in their plan, to accumulate more funds or other resources like connections or other support for the onward journey. Others embark on South‑South Migration because of the ease of getting a visa for a destination in the Global North outside of places of origin, as the case of some Ethiopian migrants in South Africa indicates. Still for others, they may become “stuck” in a transit country and not have intended to stay there. Nonetheless, we argue that while there is analytical value to theorizing “transit countries” as distinct spaces (Collyer 2007; Zeleke 2019), there is also reason to think of those who are in these countries as South‑South migrants, not merely transit migrants. Often, they stay there for long periods of time and contribute resources to the places they are, remit financial resources home, and even become more settled than they intended. In these spaces, they develop religious and social connections that shape and transform their own migration journeys and the communities in which they are resident. Fiddian‑Qasmiyeh and Carella (2020: 205) suggest that the use of the concept of South‑South Migration is helpful not just as a conceptual tool to dissect and understand migration flows but also to offset the rhetoric of portraying migrants from the Global South as groups “invading global North.” As a volume focusing on examining the South‑South Migration dynamics in a given geographical space, this work takes a Continental approach that allows a thorough analysis. Below we describe more of those themes that are highlighted by the various contributors. 8 Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith Intra-Regional Migration Dynamics: Agency, Resource Flows, and Diverse Patterns of Movement This book addresses four important lacunae in migration research in Africa. The first and most crucial aim is to contribute to the effort of changing the Eurocen‑ tric narrative that continues to marginalize SSM, where the largest amount of mi‑ gration is occurring. Because so much scholarship and policy analysis focus on South‑North Migration (SNM), it skews the presentation of the scale and dynamics of the African migration context (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2022). Far more empiri‑ cal studies on SSM are needed to redress this imbalance and contribute to a diverse, balanced, and theorized consideration of what these forms and patterns of migra‑ tion are. Although it is well known that the greatest proportion of migrants from the Global South is destined for other countries in the region, we do not have a commensurate scholarly understanding of the phenomena. The few existing works are anchored thematically in a discussion of particular and specific themes such as border and migration management (Moyo et al. 2021), child migration within the continent (Thorsen & Hashim 2011), the patterns of cross‑border, rural–rural mobility (Van Dijk et al. 2001) or the nexus between migration and development (Castles & Delgado Wise 2008). Because the histories of slavery, colonialism, and white supremacy are shared by African countries in particular, and evident in the anti‑Blackness represented by European and American anti‑immigrant sentiments toward migrants from African countries, theorizing SSM in Africa necessarily also advances a critical approach to race and power in the Global North as well. Two significant comparative research projects on migration – the Migrating out of Poverty (MOOP) and the Migration for Development and Equality (MIDEQ) have a primary focus on intra‑regional mobility in Africa. The MOOP Research Programme Consortium is focused on the relationship between internal and re‑ gional migration and poverty in Africa and Asia, and two of the six migration cor‑ ridors in the ongoing UKRI/GCRF MIDEQ research project, the world’s largest comparative migration research project, are located in Africa.1 However, much more work could and must be done to theorize the patterns and impacts of migra‑ tion within the Global South, in this case within and across Africa. This edited volume is one such endeavor aiming to contribute to the production of knowledge on the patterns and impacts of migration within the Global South. A second contribution of this volume is to add to the crucial discussions focused on the agency of migrants in the context of SSM, a theme that is often under‑ addressed or overshadowed by the victimhood discourse. By going beyond the normative victimization narrative of migrants often emphasized in prior research (e.g. Triulzi & Mckenzie 2013; Hoffman & Abidde 2021) or in policy texts (e.g., AU 2018), the contributors in this volume pay more careful attention to the agency of the migrants, including the creative strategies they employ while planning their migration, negotiating their precarious and vulnerable positions and in their lived experiences in the destination countries in the Global South. The discussions of mobility in Africa often portray migrants as individuals incapable of making a rea‑ soned decision. As De Haas argues, such a view is “devoid of any real sense of agency, as individual choices are supposed to be entirely predictable outcomes of The Importance of South‑South Migration (SSM) 9 individual cost–benefit analyses based on fixed, static sets of assumed preference” (De Haas 2021: 30). We argue that such over‑generalization often conceals the agency of migrants who tend to make informed decisions at different stages of their journey, as presented in Part II of this edited volume. Prior studies have indicated that the composition of South‑South Migration is different from the North–South Migration flows, as South‑South Migration is typi‑ cally conceived as the movement of migrants with lower skills and education levels (Hujo & Piper 2007) and those at younger ages (McKenzie 2008). The vulnerabil‑ ity discourse is also highlighted in the conflict–migration nexus, in which migrants in a south‑south context are portrayed to be affected more by wars and conflict than in the context of North‑North or North‑South Migration (De Lombaerde et al. 2014). The contributions here focus on an understanding of the agency of migrants which builds on De Haas’s classical concept of the Aspiration‑Capability Frame‑ work (ACF), which is framed as a meta‑theory for migration. De Haas appraised that neoclassical migration theory presumed people’s perceptions and preferences are driven by individual utility maximization and rather asserted the need to pay attention to the role of other factors such as culture, education and exposure to media in shaping people’s preferences and notions of the ‘good life’, personal life aspirations and more (De Haas 2021). By building on his critique of the liberal individualist outlook in migration decision‑making research, we ask if migration decision‑making should be analyzed with a mere focus on economic push and pull factors of migration. Furthermore, we also build on Zeleke (2023) who argues that migration decision‑making in the African context should be analyzed as a com‑ munal decision‑making process rather than as a decision made at an atomized indi‑ vidual unit level, especially in many African contexts. De Haas’s definition of human mobility as “people’s capability (freedom) to choose where to live – including the option to stay – instead of a more or less automated, passive and ‘cause‑and‑effect’ response to a set of static push and pull factors,” accents the need to pay attention to mobility and immobility in migration discourse (De Haas 2021: 2). Some literature on African migration pays more atten‑ tion to the multifaceted factors and trajectories affecting migrants’ decision‑making and portrays migrants as actors who cannot make a reasoned decision. We argue such over ‑generalization often conceals the agency of migrants, who tend to make informed decisions at different stages of their journey and the contributions made in this volume clearly exhibit the agency of migrants in making informed decisions about their further mobility/immobility. While there has been some critical work to challenge the passivity of migrants in their subjectivity to smugglers or traffickers by scholars (Raineri 2018; Belloni 2019; Zeleke 2019; Carruth & Smith 2022), the practitioner and policy literature, and especially the popular media portrayal of migrants in the Global South con‑ tinues to suggest that their agency is so severely limited that migrants are often in need of rescue (IOM 2020). New research ought to simultaneously engage with the demand and supply side of migration brokerage and the various intermediaries that enable the translation of aspiration into capability, making migration a reality and understand the different mechanisms migrants use to overcome the challenges they 10 Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith face and their different pathways of incorporation at the place of destinations and transit within Africa. Very often, migrants make informed decisions about mobil‑ ity and immobility, by identifying the migratory routes and their final destinations and other decisions they must make on a daily basis. While paying attention to the structural constraints that can be very real, it is important to engage with the agency and creativity of the migrants in coping with and overcoming the chal‑ lenges in the processes of sustaining their lives and making a living in both transit and destination countries across Africa. Hence, the discussions raised in the contri‑ butions here emphasize South‑South Migration as a source of vitality, expressions of agency and instances of resilience, even as migrants face enormous challenges at times, from the state, from economic circumstances, and from social and political circumstances. Multiple cases in this volume expound the theme of migrant agency. Joseph Mu‑ jere’s contribution underscores the agency of the migrant workers in informal settle‑ ments in South Africa on the margins of mining operations. These migrants have been remarkably successful at negotiating for jobs and basic amenities through the estab‑ lishment of community leadership structures and engagement with formal political institutions. Leander Kandilige, Joseph Awetori Yaro, and Joseph Mensah explore the ways in which Ghanaian migrants to China use their social networks, both in Ghana and in China, to make complex and risky migration journeys successful. This contribution further alludes to the creative strategies the Ghanian migrants use to get employed, such as teaching/tutoring children of their professors, showing the agency of Ghanian migrants, how they use different mechanisms to overcome the structural immigration challenge pertaining to the regulation that bans students from working. Through a focus on Ethiopian migrants to South Africa and the Middle East, the contribution by Fana Gebresenbet points as well to the agency of migrants in choice‑making in the process of deciding on the different destinations within the Global South. The Hadiya in Ethiopia in particular have increasingly more informa‑ tion about the different migration routes available, the risks and benefits of each and they make calculated and agentic choices about migration journeys. Similarly, the contribution by Tirsit Sahldengil challenges the dominant argument in the forced migration literature portraying the refugee movement as an arbitrary movement in which forced migrants lack the agency in choosing their migration routes, and their respective destinations. The chapter demonstrates that refugees from the Great Lakes regions living in the Sherkole refugee camp in northwestern Ethiopia con‑ struct social relatedness with host communities based on historical narratives of a ‘common origin’ and a desire to live peacefully in Ethiopia. The advantage of these disparate cases is that they not only highlight the central role that migrants play in choice‑making and strategizing, but these are cases of both so‑called ‘economic/vol‑ untary’ migrants and refugees and other ‘forced/involuntary’ migrants. The empiri‑ cal evidence points to the ways in which individuals and communities on the move can shape their own destiny outside of the binaries and constraints assumed by the literature and policymakers alike. The third key contribution of the cases presented in this volume is to help bet‑ ter theorize how the flows of resources from migrations contribute to the lives and The Importance of South‑South Migration (SSM) 11 livelihoods of the migrants, their home communities, and their social milieu. This discussion of resource flows challenges two mainstream lines of thinking. First, it questions the existing bias that emphasizes an unequal and unidirectional flow of resources from the Global North to the South as the former is considered to offer migrants a ‘greener pasture.’ The cases here point to the resource contributions within SSM and the vitality of these flows. Secondly, financial remittances have for long been at the center of the discussion of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2009; Smith & Saper 2019). Our perspective goes beyond this important focus on remittances that pays exclusive attention to financial resource flow including monetary remittances and diaspora investment (De Haas 2005; Van Hear 2014). The latest changing migration dynamics calls for a closer look at new actors in‑ volved and new types of intermediaries, as well as cross‑national businesses (Mue‑ nestermann 2017). It is only recently that studies have started foregrounding the role of South‑South Migration in economic development and poverty reduction (Bakewell & Landau 2018). By going beyond a mere focus on the flow of financial resource and remittances, and looking at human, social and community resource remittances, the contributions in this volume underscore the flow of knowledge, skills, capabilities, information as well as financial resources. In their latest work, Gelb et al. (2021) note that the flow of knowledge is a theme that is often over‑ looked as a diaspora investment category. Diasporas provide knowledge and skills to their country of origin together with finance, through: skills and knowledge net‑ works, skills and human capital exchanges, and returning diaspora entrepreneurs. As Levitt argues, migrants send home so much more than money, including social remittances such as new or revised social norms, practices, identities, and social capital (Levitt 2001). The contributions here expand the boundaries and content of transnational flows in the context of SSM. The flows of resources are hence widely conceptu‑ alized in this work as involving not only financial resources and goods but also knowledge‑related resources, such as skills, networks, or information. This be‑ comes very interesting in that the cases consider migrants who are considered to be in transit, those who are located within particular countries, and those who journey on and send this “capital” home, resources understood to be varied and sometimes vast. For example, in his contribution Dereje Feyissa addresses ideational resource flows within the African continent by paying attention to the experiences of re‑ turned Ethiopian migrants from South Africa. His analysis of the knowledge flow explicates the diffusion of liberal ideas within the continent and how such ideas are used to critique Ethiopia’s historically entrenched statist conception of devel‑ opment, as well as build local community development projects. Lauren Carruth expounds on how the case of local aid workers in the humanitarian aid industry reveals a limited form of “flexible citizenship” within the Global South by exhibit‑ ing the significant labor migrations of Somalis and other Ethiopians for aid work in East Africa. Local conceptions of citizenship and hospitality shape mobilities in these contexts. Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré examine the flow of valuable agricultural skills carried back to their home communities by migrants in the Burkina Faso ‑ Côte d’Ivoire migration corridor. Furthermore, 12 Meron Zeleke and Lahra Smith the contribution by Tirsit Sahldengil shows how refugees from the Great Lakes region bring in new sets of mining skills to their refugee areas in Ethiopia. The language training young Ghanaian migrants offer in China vividly shows the flow of resources in the form of knowledge and language skill within countries in the Global South. The flow of social remittances in the region entails the circulation of knowledge, ideas, practices, skills, and social capital between diverse sending and receiving communities located in the Global South. People are themselves resources, and migrants are resources, and indeed pro‑ vide knowledge and skills along the journey, particularly when journeys are inter‑ rupted, stalled, or blocked. Such a broader approach to flow of resources builds on the notion of social remittances that focuses on the circulation of non‑financial items in the context of migration including flow of ideas, diffusion of practices, identities, and social capital (Levitt 1998). By grounding the discussion within the African continent, the different contributions presented in Part II drive forward research on social remittances and intra‑continental flows. A fourth and final contribution of this volume is to home in on the local and the specific. Much of the available literature on migration research in Africa is pri‑ marily focused on macro‑explanations, and on the destination‑country perspective (e.g., Driss El Ghazouani 2019). This book is rather focused on places of origin, transit, and destination, and examines the migration dynamics from multi‑spatial perspectives and holistically. Existing evidence indicate heterogeneous and com‑ plex patterns of mobility and migration in the south (Tacoli 2001; Mafukidze 2006), requiring a closer, local, and contextualized look and a nuanced analysis to these migration trajectories. By challenging the mainstream discourse in migra‑ tion research that focuses on the North as a destination, the contributions in this volume posit the Global South fluidly and dynamically as arenas of origin, transit, and destination. The latest trend indicates the diversification of migration desti‑ nations on the continent (Mafukidze 2006). One of the major limitations in the conceptualization of transit migration relates to the Eurocentric undertones of the term, informed by an underlying assumption describing EU countries as intended destinations of transit migrants (Dvell 2012). Such presumption recognizes coun‑ tries at the fringes of Europe as main transit countries while paying lesser attention to countries located further away (Suter 2012). Some of the contributions included in the volume explore the SSM dynamics by paying attention to the pre‑departure phases, such as Fana Gebresenbet’s study of Ethiopian migrants’ choices between intra‑Africa migration over migration to the Middle East. Other contributors pay closer attention to the migration phase of the journey and transit experiences, re‑ flecting on issues of migration route patterns and dynamics. Amina Saïd Chiré and Géraldine Pinauldt consider the complexities of the concept of “transit” by considering the case of migrants in and through Djibouti. Some of these migrants are “transiting” in the classic sense of the term, but many more of these migrants stay, either by intention or by accident. It is imperative to consider the ways in which transit becomes multiple things to different migrants. Similarly, Johara Ber‑ riane focuses on migrants in Morocco, another country often conceptualized as a “transit” space. In fact, the ethnographic accounts suggest some migrants come for The Importance of South‑South Migration (SSM) 13 religious and historical reasons, and some establish deep roots, in this case often linked to religious pilgrimage and community. Each of these contributors points to the complexity of the notion of “transit” and a “transit country,” when in fact many of these countries are destinations in fact and in outcome. Some of the contributions address the lived experiences of migrants upon ar‑ rival and in their day‑to‑day lives at different destinations across the African con‑ tinent. Mohamed Bakhit explores the rich opportunities for building citizenship among South Sudanese living in the informal settlements in Khartoum, Sudan. Joseph Mujere’s work in the platinum mines of South Africa also suggests crea‑ tive and effective forms of sociability that link migrants with local governance and community life. Tirsit Sahldengil’s work in refugee camps also demonstrates the integration, even without formal recognition, of refugees and forced migrants, particularly when they have skills such as mining. Discussions on the destination addressed by authors in this volume include themes revolving around employment, living conditions, and the social well‑being of migrants. Such a critical appraisal of migration governing regimes links to Car‑ ling’s argument on the need to pay attention to forced/involuntary immobility in migration research in Africa where much of the emphasis has for long been on mobility (Carling 2002). As Schewel (2020) argues, such a focus on mobility in migration theories tends to overlook the countervailing forces that restrict or resist them. The contributions herein exclusively expound on intra‑regional/Continen‑ tal mobility, hinting at immobility beyond the defined geographic space, Africa. Hence, we go beyond the dominant discourse in migration research that portrays mobility and immobility as binary forces. We argue that one of the major limita‑ tions in the conceptualization of transit migration is the Eurocentric connotations of the term, which are highly informed by an underlying assumption that consid‑ ers EU countries as intended destinations of transit migrants, and pays little or no attention to countries located further away (Dvell 2012; Zeleke 2018). Return migration in the context of South‑South Migration, especially in intra‑continental migration unlike the migration to remote destinations, needs to be addressed with a reference to how much proximity between places of origin and destination impacts the trend in return migration dynamics. Each contribution in this volume is based on an intensive empirical study un‑ dertaken by the respective authors. The themes raised by the contributors are also cross‑cutting. Furthermore, the discussion goes beyond the dominant discourse of politicized migration narratives in Africa that often focus on “migration manage‑ ment” and with a Eurocentric focus. Using an explicitly Global South‑focused set of case materials, these contributions re‑focus academic inquiry on the trends and patterns of South‑South Migration within and across the African continent. It is also important to note, as many scholars do, the gendered nature of migration, and to that end, several contributors pay particular attention to the ways in which wom‑ en’s motivations and experiences of migration may be distinct. Amina Saïd Chiré and Géraldine Pinauldt consider the gendered experiences of Ethiopian migrants who stay in Djibouti, as well as those who migrate onward. Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré also consider the reasons for lower female DOI: 10.4324/9781003368267-4 2 Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation in Informal Settlements in Rustenburg, South Africa, 1994–2018 Joseph Mujere Introduction The repeal of apartheid‑era spatial controls in the 1980s, labour migration, and the platinum mining boom in the early 2000s engendered the rapid growth of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations in South Africa. Just like the gold mining industry preceding it, which relied on the labour recruitment agreements in the region and used labour recruitment agencies such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), platinum mining also relied mainly on both migrant labour from other provinces as well as countries such as Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique. With the end of the compound system, migrant workers and job‑ seekers increasingly settled in informal settlements that emerged on the margins of mining settlements. While extant literature on labour migrancy in southern Africa exists, there is a dearth of studies examining everyday life in informal settlements on the margins of mining operations and how denizens of these settlements strug‑ gle for recognition and access to social amenities and mining jobs. Informal settle‑ ments or shanty towns as seen in the empirical data presented in this contribution, can be defined as unplanned residential settlements that are usually built from poor quality material and lack basic amenities such as roads, water reticulation, electric‑ ity, and health facilities. Such settlements are characterized by low state presence and everyday struggles for access to basic amenities. This chapter examines the everyday struggles of labour migrants living in in‑ formal settlements on the margins of platinum mining operations around Rusten‑ burg Town in South Africa’s North West Province. Rustenburg has an estimated population of 574,000 in 2023. However, the population fluctuates due to labour migration. The chapter argues that the end of apartheid and the platinum mining boom of the early 2000s resulted in the rapid increase in labour migration within the region of Southern Africa and the establishment of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations. The chapter argues that citizenship, land ownership regimes, and politics of belonging have shaped the strategies deployed by residents of these informal settlements to construct their belonging and demand access to services and jobs. The contribution analyses strategies such as self‑provisioning or what Chatterjee (2004) calls quiet encroachment and community protests. In addition, it examines how residents of these settlements, who are mostly migrants 22 Joseph Mujere from other provinces and other countries in the region such as Lesotho, Mozam‑ bique, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, construct and negotiate their belonging in these settlements. The chapter also discusses residents’ use of grassroots structures to organize themselves, demand recognition, access to amenities, and job opportuni‑ ties. Overall, the chapter draws on the everyday struggles of residents of informal settlements in South Africa’s platinum belt to ask broader questions about labour migration, belonging, access to jobs and the place of informal settlements in the political economy of mining in South Africa. Brief Overview of Research Methodology and Conceptual Framework The study is mainly based on ethnographic research conducted between 2012 and 2018 in the Ikemeleng Informal settlement within the framework of the author’s Research Associateship in the Society Work and Politics Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, and the VW Foundation Knowledge for Tomorrow Postdoctoral Fellowships in the Humani‑ ties. Follow‑up interviews were conducted with the support of the Society Work and Politics Institute, University of the Witwatersrand. Interviews were conducted with people belonging to different sections of the communities: members of the Community Policing Forums (CPFs), mine workers, vendors, spaza shop owners, job seekers, and councillors, among others. Although some of the interviews were structured or semi‑structured, most were in the form of personal reminiscences and life histories. Apart from this, the chapter also draws on Rustenburg Municipality records (from the Department of Human Settlements) relating to land acquisitions by the municipality and the process of upgrading informal settlements to formal ones and newspaper reports. These methodological approaches were useful in the‑ orising the nature of the everyday struggles of people living in informal settlements close to platinum mines. Conceptually, the chapter draws on Chatterjee (2004)’s concept of “political society” and Bayat’s (1997) concept of the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary.” Chatterjee uses the concept of “political society” to distinguish between formally organized politics and the politics of people living in informal settlements. Political society is characterized by the urban poor’s subversive acts such as the occupation of land and illicit electricity, and water connections. Bayat (2010) describes such actions as “quiet encroachment of the ordinary.” This is a practice in which the urban poor occupy open areas in urban areas, get together to demand amenities such as electricity, health centres, and water, and organize themselves to defend their gains (Bayat 2010). Bayat (2010) uses this concept to unravel the agency of the urban poor in their struggles for recognition and access to services. In the case of Rustenburg, residents of informal settlements operate on the margins of the formal structures of the state and develop their own grassroots structures. The absence of the state (effective policing and provision of services) in these settle‑ ments forces residents to develop organic structures which they use to provision themselves through ‘quiet encroachment’ and more overt methods such as service Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation 23 delivery protests. The absence of the state in these places is mainly a result of the settlement’s lack of official recognition within the local municipality and the fact that the settlements are dominated by migrants, most of whom are undocumented. Writing about informal settlements in India, Chatterjee argues that community leaders in informal settlements are often keen to emphasize unity in the community at the expense of shared interests and describe their communities, in kinship terms, as a family (Chatterjee 2004). This is something that is common in informal settle‑ ments in Rustenburg and is often reflected in the names that residents give to these settlements such as Ikemeleng (stand on your own feet), Sondela (let us gather here), and Freedom Park, among other emotive names. Despite the prevalence of the use of the kinship idiom in informal settlements, Chatterjee (2004, 57–58) ar‑ gues that it is neither kinship ties nor cultural affinity that binds these people to‑ gether but “rather, it’s a collective occupation of a piece of land – a territory defined in time and space and one that is under threat.” There are layers of inclusion and exclusion depending on social location and economic and political changes. These layers impact one’s ability to make claims or access resources that may become available to those considered legitimate members of the community. Although the experiences of residents of informal settlements across the globe are generally similar, local circumstances shape the experiences of residents and frame the trajectories of development the settlements take (Bayat 1997; 2000). In the case of Ikemeleng Informal settlements, which is the subject of this chapter, platinum mining, labour migration, land ownership regimes, and politics of be‑ longing shape the strategies residents deploy in their everyday struggles for recog‑ nition and access to services and mining jobs. Labour Migration and Informal Settlements in South Africa: A Brief Overview Since the mineral revolution in the late 19th century, industrial mining in South Africa has relied on migrant labour sourced both within South Africa and from other countries in the region (see Crush, Jeeves & Yudelman 1991; Jeeves 1985; Trimikliniotis, Gordon & Zondo 2008). The demand for labour in South Africa’s diamond, gold, and platinum, among other mines, resulted in the establishment of labour recruitment agreements between South Africa and several countries within Southern Africa, Central Africa, and parts of East Africa. Labour recruit‑ ment agencies such as the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), popularly known as Wenela, recruited labour for South Africa’s gold mines from the 1940s (Crush, Jeeves & Yudelman 1991). In the 1970s, WNLA and the Native Recruitment Corporation (NRC) were merged to form The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA). Similarly, the platinum mining industry also relied on both local labour (es‑ pecially from the Eastern Cape Province) and regional labour from countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique. The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) began to recruit labour for the platinum mining sector in the 1960s, grow‑ ing to become the major recruiter for the sector sourcing labour for platinum 24 Joseph Mujere companies such as Amplats (Anglo American Platinum Ltd), Implats (Imapala Platinum Ltd), and Lonmin Plc operating in South Africa’s Bushveld Complex (Forrest 2015, 512). TEBA recruited labour across southern Africa, especially in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique, and within South African provinces (Forrest 2015, 511). However, spatial controls during the apartheid era limited the movement of African workers and largely restricted them from being re‑ cruited by the official labour recruitment agencies. African workers both from within South Africa and regional migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozam‑ bique, and Malawi, among other countries were also restricted mainly to infor‑ mal settlements (shanty towns). Although informal settlements characterized the development of urban and mining centres in South Africa since the 1890s, the repeal of apartheid‑era spatial controls in the 1980s was the major impulse in their rapid increase and expansion (Bonner 1990, 89; Murray 1987, 311). After the repeal of laws that restricted the movement of Africans in 1986, the apartheid regime implemented the policy of ‘orderly urbanization’ with the idea of allowing Africans to settle in urban areas as long as they could secure a job and housing (Murray 1987, 311). This saw African urban influx control being dependent upon one’s ability to get employment and housing which engendered what Colin Murray described as “displaced urbaniza‑ tion” which was characterized by a lack of access to housing and formal employ‑ ment (Murray 1987, 311). As Murray aptly puts it, on the one hand, the rapidly ‘urbanized’ inhabitants of the rural slums have been integrated, to a degree, into metropolitan labour markets. On the other hand, they are kept at arm’s length, as it were, from major ‘white’ industrial and residential areas. (Murray 1987, 316) Residents of these informal settlements were, thus, integrated into the urban political economies whilst at the same time they remained on the urban periphery in terms of access to amenities and their legitimacy. It was within the context of these policies in the twilight years of apartheid that informal settlements rapidly increased and expanded. This was more pronounced in mining towns such as Rustenburg, which attracted migrant labour from across South Africa and the southern African region. The platinum mining boom in the early 2000s especially attracted many jobseekers in several provinces in South Af‑ rica and other countries in the region to the platinum mines around Rustenburg. Jobseekers took advantage of the freedom of movement enshrined in the new con‑ stitution to bypass TEBA and use labour brokers (labour contractors) to get access to jobs or directly contact the mining companies (see Forrest 2015, 512). Local communities also took advantage of the fact that South Africa’s “Mining Chapter called for mines to promote employment and advance the economic welfare of South African mining communities” to demand services and preferential access to jobs (Forrest 2015, 512). This encouraged the rapid growth of informal settlements on the margins of mining operations. Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation 25 As jobseekers coalesced around platinum mining operations, several of them could not find formal accommodation, and they had to settle in numerous infor‑ mal settlements emerging on the margins of mining operations. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2015, 539) argued that while the national average of people liv‑ ing in informal settlements was 15%, that of Rustenburg was 41%. This was a result of platinum mines that attracted migrant labour that then coalesced in informal settlements on the margins of mining operations around Rustenburg. In 2012, Rajak contended that the informal settlements in Rustenburg accounted for between 15 and 30% of the total population of the municipality (Rajak 2012, 256). Most of these informal settlements do not have basic services such as tap water, electricity, or health centres, among other amenities (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2015, 539). The fact that the residents of informal settlements hail from different provinces, ethnic groups and nationalities often generates the development of discourses of in‑ clusion and exclusion. This usually resulted in internal schisms and tensions within communities. Thus, although residents of informal settlements seem to be united by their shared experiences, beneath this veneer of social cohesion are internal struggles and social differentiation based on citizenship, ethnicity, and length of stay in the settlement. In addition, although residents of informal settlements show a great sense of attachment to their communities, they also continue to maintain networks based on kinship, friendship, religion, and home‑boy associations which go beyond the informal settlement. For instance, residents established associations such as burial societies, social clubs, and home‑boy associations that brought mi‑ grants coming from the same province or district into close networks. The Setting: Labour Migration, Informal Settlements, and Platinum Mining in Rustenburg The end of apartheid and the phasing out of the compound system (a housing sys‑ tem used to control African migrant workers in which they were kept in securitized single‑sex accommodation) saw an attendant increase in the number and size of in‑ formal settlements around the mines (see Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011). Mining companies were expected to convert single‑sex hostels into decent family accommo‑ dation units and smaller multiple‑occupant units. Mining companies also supported workers through home ownership schemes and gave ‘living out allowances’ to in‑ dividuals who could not be accommodated in the remodelled former mine hostels (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011, 252). However, instead of using the benefits to rent in the suburbs, most employees chose to stay in informal settlements where they rented shacks or built their shacks out of corrugated sheets, timber, scrap metals, and plastics (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011, 252). By doing this, they saved on accom‑ modation and transport since most informal settlements are close to or even between mining shafts. As Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu aptly put it, “rather than spending the whole [living‑out] allowance on accommodation at their places of work, they [mine workers] cut their costs to the bone so as to save up money to return to their rural homestead” (Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011, 252). Thus, the phasing out of the 26 Joseph Mujere compound system coupled with the “living out” allowances system had a significant impact on the growth of informal settlements in the post‑apartheid era. Most informal settlements around Rustenburg are located on privately owned land or land belonging to customary authorities. Ikemeleng informal settlement (for‑ mally Matebeleng) started as a squatter camp for farm workers working on Kroon‑ dal Farm in the late 1970s (Marie 2009). The settlement, therefore, predates the post‑apartheid era platinum mining boom. However, only a few families were living in the settlement before the end of the apartheid era (Interview with Jane Khumalo, Ikemeleng, 1 August 2015). Aquarius Platinum Limited (one of the largest platinum mining companies operating in Rustenburg during the period) later bought one of the portions of the farms and began its platinum mining operations in Kroondal. The other portions remained in the hands of farmers who continued with their farming activities. However, the settlement grew rapidly after 1994 and neither Aquarius nor the farmers could stop the influx of people or evict them from the land. While the first people to settle in Ikemeleng informal settlement were mostly farm workers, in the 1990s most residents became mine workers, job seekers, and vendors. People became attracted to Ikemeleng by the possibility of getting em‑ ployed by platinum and chrome mining companies in the area or engaging in vend‑ ing and other forms of livelihood. Although the name Matebeleng’s etymology is unclear, residents loathed this name because they understood it to mean a com‑ munity composed of people from different ethnic backgrounds. The uncertainty regarding the name’s origins fed into the settlement’s identity as a community com‑ posed of people from different ethnic backgrounds. The community is composed of both local and regional migrants. The name, therefore, reflects the politics of exclu‑ sion in the North West Province as it is a euphemism for a community of migrants and people who do not belong to the area. Residents of this informal settlement loathed this name and changed it to Ikemeleng, a Setswana name that means ‘stand on your own feet’ (Interview with Evelyn Dube, Ikemeleng, 5 July 2012). Although Tswana farm workers established Ikemeleng informal settlement, and despite it being one of the most ethnically diverse settlements around Rustenburg, the Xhosa and Sotho are the most dominant groups. Thus, although Tswana dom‑ inates the North West province, informal settlements around mining operations tend to be dominated by labour migrants from outside the province. Furthermore, although the shacks are not arranged in a particularly orderly manner, often people of the same ethnic group tend to stay with each other. Similarly, migrants from other countries tend to coalesce around specific enclaves within the informal set‑ tlement. This was one of the strategies used by regional migrants from Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, among other countries, to create a sense of belonging in the area. Thus, like many other informal settlements in the platinum belt, Ikemeleng was a melting pot of different ethnic groups, languages, and na‑ tionalities. The creation of ethnic enclaves within mining settlements is one of the legacies of the apartheid‑era management of workers in the mine hostels in which “as a form of control, migrants were separated in hostels based on ethnicity. Con‑ tinuity of this segmentation is reflected in the new informal settlements emerging across the Rustenburg platinum district” (Chinguno 2013, 641). Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation 27 Informal settlements bring together different ethnic groups and nationalities which occasionally generates tensions among different groups. It is not unusual for violent clashes to occur between members of different ethnic groups in informal settlements over anything from petty jealousies to serious issues such as murders. As indicated by research participants, when any member of the community is mur‑ dered, other members of the community usually want to know the ethnicity of the victim and that of the perpetrator, which then usually triggers inter‑ethnic violence (Interview with Jane Moyo, Ikemeleng, 4 August 2015). Ethnic stereotypes also play a role in fanning ethnic tensions and discourses of inclusion. For instance, the presence of Sotho criminal gangs in both Ikemeleng informal settlements fed into the stereotype that Sothos are violent. Dunbar Moodie describes how, during the 2012 strike at Impala platinum, Xhosa‑speaking rock driller operators living in informal settlements “used strategically effective violence to ensure solidarity from the wider workforce” (Moodie 2016, 842). They characterized themselves as “beef eating stalwarts” and “madoda” while pejoratively referring to the National Union of Mineworkers shaft stewards as “mutton eaters” – a term which was associated with lesser men doing “less strenuous and dangerous jobs” (Moodie 2016, 842). This reveals the complex nature of workplace organizing and the contexts which engendered ethnic violence. Migrant Labour, Informal Settlements, and Local Communities Although the definition of who is local and who is not, especially for migrant work‑ ers, is contentious, the situation is even more tenuous for residents of informal settlements. For their part, residents of informal settlements use myriad ways to claim to belong and get recognition. This includes lobbying the local municipal‑ ity to formalize the informal settlement, using their South African citizenship to make the argument that everyone who is a citizen can enjoy that right anywhere in the country as well as claiming that they have been living in the community for a long period. Such strategies, of course, exclude foreign migrants who can‑ not claim belonging based on citizenship. Some of them, however, get married to locals to claim citizenship and belonging. However, in most instances, residents of informal settlements carry the tag of being migrants who have weak claims to belonging in the area. As Rajak (2012, 261) puts it, the categorization of residents of informal settlements by municipalities and mining companies as migrants “un‑ derpins the representation of the informal settlements as transitory, impermanent, and usually illegal, and in so doing rejects claims to entitlement by casting their inhabitants – many of whom have lived in the area for many years – as, in effect, ‘non‑stakeholders’.” Informal settlements are, thus, viewed by officials as places of “non‑belonging” because they are characterized by illegality. This is the com‑ plex context in which residents of both Ikemeleng informal settlements engage and negotiate with both the Rustenburg Local Municipality and mining companies to provide services. One way through which belonging is articulated in informal settlements and other areas around the mines is through the issuing of proof of residence documents 28 Joseph Mujere and access to employment opportunities at the mines. These proof of residence documents are usually a one‑page document bearing details such as the number of the ward, name of the bearer and their address. The document is then signed and stamped by either a Ward Councillor or the Headman. The proof of residence docu‑ ment is an essential document because it is used for various purposes including opening bank accounts, accessing services such as health and water, and accessing jobs reserved for locals. Migrants are ordinarily required to produce a passport with a valid permit before they can be issued with the proof of residence document by the Ward Councillor. Without a proof of residence document, opening a bank ac‑ count or getting a formal job would be impossible. However, a proof of residence document alone is usually insufficient to secure a job. There is often a need for one to be linked to local patronage networks. For example, in the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) areas, apart from obtaining proof of residence document from a Headman (Kgosana), one must also have a good relationship with the Headman to get the chance to get employed by a company operating in the area. Those outside the royal patronage networks would usually find it difficult to secure jobs. This demonstrates how labour migrants get excluded from the definition of “local” despite the length of their stay in the area. Informal settlements in mining areas are motley collections of labour migrants and job seekers from within South Africa and from other countries in the region. Despite the social differentiation within informal settlements, the popularity of community‑organized jobseeker and service‑delivery protests demonstrate that residents of these settlements have common grievances and largely identify mu‑ nicipalities and mining companies as having a critical role to play in alleviating their suffering. Consequently, they use their residence in informal settlements to craft a sense of belonging. Community leaders, who can be councillors, members of Community Policing Forums, or founding members of the community, help in articulating the discourses of social cohesion by using the metaphor of a family and imagined kinship. For example, community leaders described their communities as “one family” and members of the community as brothers and sisters. Whilst this was meant to show that there was cohesion in the community, such descriptions masked the internal contradictions and hierarchies within residents of the informal settlements. While residents of informal settlements build solidarities and a sense of unity based on their shared experience of living in an impoverished informal settlement, it is important to note that many of these residents maintain strong ties with their places of origin. They send remittances to support their families in their home provinces in South Africa or their countries of origin if they are foreign nationals. As one Somali operating a spaza shop in Freedom Park (Number 9) observed, most residents of informal settlements travel to their rural homes during the Christmas holidays which affects business to the extent that most spaza shops close during this period (Interview with Abdikadir Ali Hassan, Number Nine Informal settle‑ ment, 25 July 2015). Nkomo (2018) has demonstrated how homeboy networks are crucial in the everyday lives of residents of informal settlements as both mine workers and job seekers maintain strong ties based on where they come from. Platinum Mining, Migrant Labour, and Community Formation 29 In August 2009, Ikemeleng informal settlement engaged in a community protest targeting the surrounding mines. Residents barricaded roads and burnt tyres. The main objective of the protest was to force mining companies with operations in the area to recognize the community as a ‘local community’ deserving to be supported through Corporate Social Responsibility programs. The community also wanted the mines to employ ‘local labour’, in this case, members of the settlement. One of the positive outcomes of the protest was that members of the community were given an audience by most of the managers of the mines. In 2011, the community entered an arrangement with Aquarius Platinum Lim‑ ited and other mines that when a mine had vacancies, especially for unskilled and semi‑skilled jobs it would inform the councillor who would in turn forward names to the mines’ human resources managers. This gave birth in 2012 to the Unemployment Forum, a grassroots structure aimed at securing jobs at the mines for residents of the community, as well as ensuring that mining companies gave preferential treatment to job seekers from the community. The Unemployment Forum is one of the most critical grassroots structures in the community. Resi‑ dents used this structure to get access to both contract and permanent positions at the mines. This type of grassroots structure is quite common in communities located close to mining areas. What is interesting about Ikemeleng’s Unemployment Forum is how residents understand the problem of unemployment and the strategies they employ to alleviate it. When I first arrived in the community in 2012, I quickly observed how job seekers would mill around the community office all day, wait‑ ing for the councillor to give them proof of residence documents, enter them in the job seekers’ database or bring some good news about their job search at the mines. When I inquired about why job seekers camped at the community office all day long, the councillor explained: Our community is very organized. We have an Unemployment Forum which I chair. It is this forum that engages the mines and gets jobs or ‘learnerships’ for our people. For example, when a mine tells us that they have 20 vacancies for unskilled labour we just take the names of 20 people who would be in our database and forward their names for interviews. This is a very transparent system. We follow the list in our database, and no one jumps the queue. Some companies allow us to attend interviews as observers to ensure that there is transparency. (Interview with Jeffrey Putu, Ikemeleng Councillor, Ikemeleng Informal settlement, 22 July 2016) Many residents interviewed testified that this system was working since several of them got employment through this process. Mining companies would also engage unskilled job seekers and train them for different trades and, if there were vacan‑ cies, also employ them. However, this system was fraught with its uncertainties. For example, job seek‑ ers had no way of knowing whether the job seekers’ database list was transparent DOI: 10.4324/9781003368267-5 3 Unpacking the Reasons for Dominance of South-South Migration The Ethiopian Case Fana Gebresenbet Introduction It is not uncommon to read the three routes international irregular migrants from Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa, take: the Eastern, the Southern, and the Northern. The Eastern route takes migrants from various corners of the country – primarily originating from central and eastern parts of Tigray (before the onset of the war in Northern Ethiopia in November 2020), northeastern parts of Amhara region, and more recently from parts of Oromia – to crossing points to Somali territories (the Issa in Djibouti, the Isaaq in Somaliland, and also Puntland) before crossing to the Gulf countries through Yemen. The Southern route takes Ethiopians, primarily from Hadiya and Kambatta Zones of southern highlands, through Moyale to Kenya heading towards South Africa. The Northern route is taken by migrants – with no specific core sending area – intending to reach Israel or Western Europe by pass‑ ing through Sudan (see Asnake & Fana 2021; Fasil 2017; Meron 2020). Broadly speaking, the Eastern and Southern routes have destinations in the Global South, Gulf states, and South Africa, respectively, thus constituting cases of South‑South Migration (SSM), while the Northern route is a form of South‑North Migration (SNM). As such, Ethiopian international irregular migration is very helpful to examine the intrinsic differences between SSM and SNM, and explain the reasons for the more pervasive nature of SSM. IOM figures from 2020 (cited in ACAPS 2021) for example indicate that some 11,500 individuals cross from the Horn to the Gulf irregularly every month, making up close to two‑thirds of mobil‑ ity in the Horn region (IOM 14/02/2020; IOM 05/05/2020). More specifically, ac‑ cording to Africa Renewal (2020 cited in ACAPS 2021), some 400,000 Ethiopians took the eastern route between 2017 and 2020 alone. IOM (2022) figures from 2021 estimate that about 10,243 Ethiopians cross Moyale annually aiming to reach South Africa. Even fewer Ethiopian migrants take the northern route. The northern route is used “only in rare cases,” and the total number of irregular migrants reach‑ ing Europe from the Horn decreased to less than 4,000 in 2018 (a quarter of the figures from 2016) due to various risks and restrictions (Girmachew 2021). This chapter – by focusing on history and geographic proximity, capabil‑ ity requirements, geographic barriers, cultural enablers, and host societies’ socio‑economic and legal arrangements – illustrates why SSM evolves into the Reasons for Dominance of South‑South Migration 37 concentration of migrants in some localities and the eventual formation of ‘mi‑ gration system’ (Bakewell, de Haas & Kubal 2011; de Haas 2009). The intention therefore is to depict the major structural explanations for the relatively lower ex‑ tent of SNM, compared to SSM, at global levels too (Ratha 2016, 11). This argument is made by using the aspiration‑capability approach as an analyti‑ cal framework (de Haas 2021). All individuals are considered agents, conscious actors weighing among viable options before making the decision to migrate (or not) within the constraints and opportunities of the extant structural conditions. As such, structural macro‑level factors only provide the context within which agency is enacted, not replacing the latter (on structuration see Giddens 1984; Stones 2005). A focus on structural, macro‑level factors alone will not in and by itself sufficiently explain the differentiated decision of prospective migrants to reach dif‑ ferent destinations, in our case southern destinations being preferred more than northern destinations. While aspiring is a necessary initial step for irregular migration, it is not suf‑ ficient. It needs to be backed up with the capability to realize the aspiration. Ca‑ pability could come in the form of having the physical capacity to brave the harsh routes, the skills, and predisposition to succeed in the jobs migrants will be joining in the destination country, the financial means to cover required expenses as well as the social relations to access information as well as to enable migration and set‑ tlement in the destination country. In more recent years, international migration is conceived as one strategy of many young Ethiopians charting a decent future (see for example Fana 2021). Drawing on Appadurai (2013), future‑making is depicted in the chapter as a socio‑cultural pro‑ cess1 within which individuals draw on past experiences/archives of the community and what they are ‘taught’ to imagine and aspire in choosing the track one would adopt towards the future. This chapter will argue that SSM is more likely to emerge as a very strong alternative to a ‘viable future’ in core sending areas. This view of migration as a communal, collective, and shared future‑making project of youth (and the community at large) in core sending areas calls for the uti‑ lization of a revised Aspiration Capability Framework. The theoretical roots of the ACF, particularly as it relates to capability and rights, are anchored in the liberal, individualist academic tradition (see Dean 2009; Ibrahim 2021). Such conceptions do not fully capture African realities which are primarily entrenched in collectivist notions, norms, and values (see Kuhumba 2016; Metz 2016), and as argued else‑ where (Dereje, Meron & Fana 2023), there is a need to re‑conceptualize and apply the ACF with a ‘collectivist turn’. This chapter is based on extensive research the author conducted on Ethiopian migration since early 2017.2 The remaining part of this chapter is structured in seven sections. The first offers a brief context on Ethiopian international migration. The coming five sections provide the different factors explaining the entrenched and concentrated nature of SSM in Ethiopia. The second section covers historical factors which underlie the entrenched nature of SSM in Ethiopia. The third section further builds on the first and illustrates how different processes help in the build‑ ing of capabilities of individuals, households, and sending communities to enable 38 Fana Gebresenbet sustained migration. The fourth section compares geographic barriers between the three routes international migrants from Ethiopia take. The following section fo‑ cuses on culture, in its very broad definition, as an enabler and constraint of migra‑ tion to different destinations. The sixth section changes the focus to the destination country and the implications of socio‑economic and legal conditions for migration dynamics. The last section concludes the chapter. Core Sending Areas for SSM: History Matters Core sending areas are defined, for the purpose of this chapter, as localities with more than a decade‑long experience of migration to a particular destination. Char‑ acteristically, this experience of core sending areas builds a large presence of mi‑ grants from the locality in the destination country, social networks between those in the destination, the origin area, and in transit, and a significant impact on con‑ sumption and other aspects of socio‑economic life of the sending community. The presence of such a core sending area, it is argued here, is realized through historical dynamics, and will provide the momentum for continued large‑scale migration. The past weighs heavily on the migration decision‑making of potential mi‑ grants. The decisions and success of previous migrants help build aspirations of prospective migrants among other things through remittance‑based consumption and investment in the sending areas, as well as by creating networks that ease mi‑ grations of followers. In Ethiopia’s case (as well as most of Sub‑Saharan Africa), historic relationships with some important destinations have cultural, religious, socio‑economic, and political undercurrents, and are generally speaking geograph‑ ically closer to the sending areas. The political economy of Gulf countries experienced major changes in the 1970s with the increasing revenue from fossil fuels. This led to the creation and consolidation of a social pact in which the government’s guaranteed cheap domes‑ tic labour, among others through the Kafalla labour system (see Asnake & Zeri‑ hun 2015; Wearing 2014) in return for public acquiescence to the monarchy and authoritarian governments of the region. The neoliberal shift since the late 1980s had differentiated impacts on gendered labour arrangements in the Middle East and Northern Africa (see Moghadam 2005), but did not significantly affect the gendered nature of major destination areas, particularly Saudi Arabia, of female labour force from Ethiopia, let alone in the domestic sphere (see Ennis 2019, 62; Jawhar et al. 2022). This system continued unabated until the demands for reform grew louder including demands for Saudization of the labour force in Saudi Arabia (Looney 2004), and more particularly since the early 2010s when the ‘Arab Spring’ movement shocked things a bit more (Wearing 2014). By the 1980s, the migration of pioneers from eastern parts of Tigray (and pos‑ sibly northeastern Amhara) appears to have started (Kiros 2021, 225). This period was a time of consecutive failure of rains leading to famine and famine‑like con‑ ditions particularly affecting this part of the country (Kiros 2021). On top of this, the late 1970s also witnessed political violence by the Derg regime in response to urban‑based youth political movements in the late 1970s and later on the activities Reasons for Dominance of South‑South Migration 39 of the anti‑Derg Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray’s rural areas. As such, there was a significant socio‑economic and political push for early migration. This desire was also enabled by the relatively smaller distance to reach the coast‑ lines of the Red Sea in Eritrea from parts of eastern Tigray and northern Wollo. As such, the very start of the Eastern route was informal, and was an attempt to cope with challenges in the home area by tapping into the emerging opportunity struc‑ tures in the destination countries. This is also the case with the Southern route. The earliest Ethiopian migrants reached South Africa as the latter was transitioning out of the Apartheid system of governance. At the time, Black South Africans did not have the entrepreneurial and business skills (see Republic of South Africa 1994), while their consumption increased following the commencement of cash assistance programme to a wide range of social groups – war veterans, child support, disability support, and care dependency grant – created regular financial support to poor households by the South African state (James 2015; Torkelson 2020).3 On top of this, in the 1990s, South Africa had a very liberal asylum policy which made it easier for migrants to get asylum permits and over time residence papers. Moreover, many migrants also benefitted from the sympathies of South African women4 who had positive views towards Ethiopia and Ethiopians thanks to their support to ANC during the liberation struggle (e.g., the military training offered to Nelson Mandela just before his imprisonment, and the active memory of the images of poor famine‑stricken Ethiopians from about a decade ago at the time).5 The following quote from an FGD (Hossanna, August 2021) illustrates this point very well: Our migration to South Africa was a miracle. Most of us even did not know Hosanna, let alone South Africa. We went to South Africa crossing 7 coun‑ tries. We started making a lot of money by selling to South African women. We did that without knowing their language nor English. While South Af‑ ricans lived in marvelous houses, we would enter with our dirt and mud and tap our shoes on their carpets. They were very friendly, especially the women. They like the goods that we bring them. We used to put signs so that we would not lose direction. The first Hadiya who started the location busi‑ ness was Shikuto. He would simply say “Sawabona” (greeting) and “collect money” (I came to collect the money). He didn’t speak any of the languages of South Africa. He would simply say “Sawabona” (Zulu word for greet‑ ing) and “collect money”. That was all he could to say and we followed suit—Sawabona and collect money. We managed to do business only with these two words. If this is not a miracle, what else? Our main partners are South African women. The men who get money from the government use it for alcohol. As such, when Ethiopians reached the destination areas they were received by an opportune combination of factors – a more favourable asylum system and cash transfer schemes which created purchasing power and liberalized asylum policies which enabled ease of movement and work. 40 Fana Gebresenbet The Hadiya (and Kambatta) dominated the cohort of Ethiopian migrants since the 1990s due to a range of factors. The strong political opposition against the then ruling party the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in Hadiya, unlike other parts of the country, was met with repression and political violence (Tronvoll 2001), justifying the intention of some to migrate. In response, some decided to migrate. Later in the early 2000s, the assignment of Tesfaye Habisso, native to the Hadiya‑Kambatta area, as Ethiopia’s Ambassador to South Africa and a prophecy by Pastor Peter Youngren, a Canadian Christian evangelist, gave the additional impulse to the migration. It is reported that Ambassador Tes‑ faye facilitated the migration of a few individuals, while it is also likely that his very presence in Pretoria gave prospective migrants from Hadiya and Kambatta an additional moral boost. The prophecy has it that God spoke to Pastor Youngren and the message was that a ‘new door to the South’ will be opened to those from Hadiya. Many remember him as saying “I saw a vision of God opening a Southern route for the Hadiya through which people will go and bring back prosperity to Hosanna” at the festival held in 2001. This door is blessed, and through the for‑ tunes gathered through it Hosanna, the capital of Hadiya administrative zone, will be filled with buildings and vehicles (various interviews, see also Dereje 2022 and in this volume). The place of belief and the prophecy in migration decision‑making can be illustrated in the following quote from an informant who came from Johan‑ nesburg for a family visit to Hosanna: Peter’s prophecy made the journey a lot easier than one would have ex‑ pected. I migrated to South Africa in 2004, three years after Peter came. I was a student at that time. I talked to my friends about the idea of going to South Africa. They all readily agreed. When we decided to travel it felt as if we were already in South Africa. I remember the enthusiasm and the confidence we had. We never thought of the risks we might encounter during the journey and the language difficulties we might encounter. In fact, it felt like as if we were moving from one house to another within Hadiya. (Pastor Birhanu, interviewed in Hosanna, November 12, 2020) In both the eastern and southern routes, Ethiopians of particular localities were pushed by particular factors from their home areas, while they were received by an opportune mix of conditions that allowed them to flourish and enabled further mi‑ gration of followers in the coming years. In both cases, the pioneer migrants – the earliest migrants who took the risk and developed the linkages between areas of origin and the destination country, thereby facilitating higher rates of migration in later years (Bakewell, de Haas & Kubal 2011) – benefitted from particular histori‑ cal conjectures to settle and form a community in the destination areas. As will be discussed below, the sectors they joined in the destination countries enabled them to facilitate jobs to follower migrants as well. The historical factors underpinning Ethiopian migration to the northern destina‑ tion countries are very different from those detailed above. The earliest migrants travelled to Europe and North America as students during the imperial times and Reasons for Dominance of South‑South Migration 41 overstayed following the 1974 revolution and ensuing violence. They were later joined by young men and women who were fleeing terror campaigns of the military government. This later group would first become refugees in immediate neigbour‑ ing countries before benefitting from resettlement programs to northern countries (Lyons 2007). The composition of new migrants changed after the 1991 regime change, as those favouring ethno‑linguistic political organization had their heydays and those anchoring their politics on pan‑Ethiopian nationalism were marginalized. The leaders were persecuted, with some finding their refuge in northern countries. Graduate study‑related migration of those with university degrees increased too. As such, economic reasons are the primary factors for about a third of migrants taking the northern route (compared to more than 90% in the eastern and southern routes), while education (15%), family reunification (11%), and security/political factors (9%) together make a comparable justification for those taking the northern route (Kuschminder, Andersson & Siegel 2012). What we therefore see is the ‘dispersed origin’ of the earliest as well as more re‑ cent migrants taking the northern route. On top of this, the nature of the economies and stronger state regulatory powers in northern destination countries (see Section “Socio‑Economic Situation and Legal Arrangements of the Destination Country”) narrow down the possibilities of excessively benefiting from some informal eco‑ nomic engagements and creating the social networks to continue attracting new migrants to join the sector. Therefore, what we see is SSM from Ethiopia being constituted by and evolv‑ ing under particular historical factors which favour the concentration of migrants from particular parts of the country. On the other side, SNM attracted those with diverse backgrounds but with some academic achievements and those facing politi‑ cal persecution. There is no legitimate reason to argue that the later conditions of educational achievement and political persecution lead to the concentration of mi‑ grants from particular areas. As such, there is no core sending area for SNM from Ethiopia, and as such there are limited capabilities coming with that when it comes to enabling further migration, which the next section focuses on. Building the Capability to Migrate Historical trends and the creation of core sending areas in the case of SSM help consolidate the aspiration to migrate. This does not automatically translate into continued migration of people unless combined with a commensurate increase in the capability to do so. Two factors are important to explain the relatively higher flows of people using the eastern and southern route (thus SSM), than the northern (SNM): the relative cost and the relevance of social networks. At least in the SSM routes for irregular migration from Ethiopia, the destina‑ tions are much closer to the sending areas than destinations in the Global North. On top of this, the border regulatory capacities of Southern destinations are relatively weaker than those of Northern destinations. While this comes with the possibil‑ ity of evading border regulatory authorities6 or bribing one’s way into a Southern destination at a relatively cheaper rate, there is the accompanying higher risk of 42 Fana Gebresenbet inhumane treatment and human rights violations if captured by border authorities of the Southern destinations. Northern countries use various attempts to control migration, ranging from us‑ ing economic incentives to keep young potential migrants in their home country to externalization of their border regimes (Clemens & Postel 2018; Saferworld 2019). Stricter border regimes and control mechanisms will mainly push the cost of mi‑ gration as well as the associated risks upwards. While such policies are generally shown to fail in terms of meeting the targets of stemming migratory flows (Castles 2004), what is clear is that the possibilities of migration increasingly become lim‑ ited to high‑capability groups. Thus, such policies further entrench how inequality shapes migration processes, by further reducing the abilities of the powerless to realize their migration ambitions. High capability in this case could mean individuals with higher ‘budget alloca‑ tions’ trying to realize their migration project or individuals who are more likely to secure a visa (be it as a student, family visit, or re‑union). Both of these capabilities could be better met in more urban areas than rural areas, and are less likely to be concentrated in particular localities. This form of migration is therefore more ap‑ pealing to potential migrants of a certain social standing, be it literacy and/or wealth status, than a place of residence. Moreover, if a prior migrant is going to sponsor anyone, the choice will not be necessarily geographically focused (i.e., friendship, family,….), but rather focus more on the competencies mentioned above. On the contrary, the eastern and southern routes are relatively cheaper. The east‑ ern route is the cheapest, as low as 795 USD, leading to the labeling of this route as a ‘budget route’ by some (IOM 2021). The southern route, which could cost as much as 5,000 USD, is more expensive than the eastern route.7 However, this cost is not prohibitively high as the likelihood of getting one’s migration expenses cov‑ ered by a sibling/relative is higher among the Hadiya. Moreover, the likelihood of reimbursing this money is made easier by an arrangement, which could be dubbed ‘indentured labour’ for about two years (Meron 2020). Under this arrangement, a prior migrant will open and stock a new Tuck Shop to the sponsored migrant, with the latter being expected to fully give all revenue to the sponsor for a period of two years or so until the full expenses of the mi‑ gration are repaid. On top of this, the expected differential in pay of about 1,300 USD per month (IOM 2021) justifies the higher cost of the southern route. This arrangement – called Boss‑Border relationship by migrants – enables earlier mi‑ grants (Bosses) to sponsor new migrants who will hold the Border position when the Boss opens a new Tuck Shop. As such, chain migration and business expansion of bosses continue to further consolidate the SSM to South Africa. On the northern route, costs to migrate from Ethiopia to Europe or North Amer‑ ica are much higher than the southern route. Unlike the eastern and southern routes where employment is the most important reason for migrating (more than 90%), education, security/political considerations, and family reunion are important rea‑ sons as employment in the northern route. As such, the means of financing migra‑ tion also differs with gifts from family/friends being the main one to more than half of respondents taking the northern route (about a third in the other routes), Reasons for Dominance of South‑South Migration 43 and selling assets (0.64% compared to about 5% in the other routes) and savings (8.28% compared to 20.59% and 12.45% in southern and eastern routes, accord‑ ingly) making negligible contribution (Kuschminder, Andersson & Siegel 2012). Moreover, if one wants to sponsor a migrant, there is no clear mechanism to ar‑ range for the migrant to join a certain economic sector, and then repay the loan. Therefore, there are severely limited possibilities of creating a core sending area. The consequences of the above‑listed two factors work towards the entrench‑ ment of the ‘culture of migration’ (see Fana 2021; Meron 2020) in relatively con‑ fined localities, particularly in rural areas in the case of SSM and within families in cases of SNM. This will have the immediate consequence of the concentration of financial remittances and related increased consumption and a degree of higher material development (primarily in the housing sector) in core sending areas in SSM and particular households in SNM. The impact of migration and remittances on consumption could be felt in Hosanna, where migrant families do not engage in any bargaining for the items they buy, unlike other families. This has created a new class of consumers, dubbed Yehune (‘Let it be’) by traders. This market behav‑ iour is pushing the prices of daily consumables above neighbouring towns outside Hadiya, to the disadvantage of non‑migrant households who invested in education and joined the civil service early on. Migrants have also increased land market dy‑ namics and prices, as well as promoting a local‑level housing construction boom. The latter is also visible in Atsbi Endaselassie and Wukro towns of Tigray, but more impressively in Hosanna and Bonosha towns of Hadiya. In Hadiya, returnees often get surprised by the ease their families spend money, while the family that stayed behind calls the returnee ‘Kuralew’,8 and there is a dis‑ tinction between ‘ye‑lake’ and ‘ya‑lake’ families (migrant and non‑migrant fami‑ lies). The former profusely consume and buy without bargaining (the ‘yehune’ (Let it be)), while the latter bargain. As one returnee surmised: When I first visited Hosanna upon return from South Africa, I was shocked when I heard the price that I was hearing from the shops. Nearly all goods are much more expensive in Hosanna than in Addis. When I asked people why is it that goods are very expensive in Hosanna, they told me about the yihunes. The hard‑won money that we sent to support families is wasted here as if we dig money; thus endless. I also realised that shopkeepers, especially those who come outside of Hadiya, take advantage of this irresponsible consump‑ tion. If you haggle over a price they would say, ‘are you a mengist serategna/ civil servant?’, as if being a civil servant is something that one has to be ashamed of. Implicitly they are referring to the difference between migrant and non‑migrant families and their different spending behavior. (Informant: returnee migrant, Male, Hosanna, 12 August 2022) Although not comparable to the Hadiya, returnees from Saudi Arabia are recog‑ nized for higher consumption too. There was a locality in Atsbi Wenberta called ‘Riyadh neigbourhood’ (implying that the owners are those in the Gulf or with families there), and returnees were criticized for a higher degree of consumption, 44 Fana Gebresenbet including travel to nearby towns for entertainment. One returnee explained in the following words: In Saudi, buying coca and juice (soda and beverages) is trivial. Here you have to think twice before buying a bottle of coca, leave alone packed juice. We are sitting on dirt floors here, and we always think of the day we will re‑migrate to Saudi. The case is the same with buying clothes, modern mo‑ bile phone apparatus and the like. What is life if you cannot buy what you want, and enjoy it while you can! (Informant: Returnee Migrant, Female, Alamata, 23 January 2017) Moreover, migration‑related discussions – on progress and fate of recently de‑ parted migrants, work conditions of those already in the destination country, remit‑ tances made and other socio‑economic life of migrants – will be a routine part of community discussions at local levels in core sending areas (Teferi 2021). Such discussions will also have a significant bearing on the choices by placing migration among the important paths to a decent future. As such, migration strongly features among the leading viable alternatives to a future in such localities than others. This will create a cyclical process that reinforces the ‘culture of migration’ and adds further impetus to the drive. Geographic Barriers Migration – particularly irregular migration – is a risky endeavour. The risks involved in migration have increased in recent decades as destination coun‑ tries, especially in the Global North, started implementing stricter border and immigration policies. In northern destination countries of Europe and North America, regressive populist political positions started gaining traction since the mid‑2000s (Lazaridis & Wadia 2015). This has led to policy options that at‑ tempt to close borders off to irregular migrants and reduce the chances of legal migration, thereby intending to contain migrants in their origin areas including by economic incentives (Duffield 2007). The refugee crisis following the war in Yemen and Syria, and the dissolution of Libya further exacerbated public opinion and policy positions in Europe. Moreover, Europe attempted to export its border management to outside its territorial limits by cooperating with North African countries (Adamson & Tsourapas 2019; Norman & Micinski 2022). Stricter control over the Mediterranean Sea, which is crossed by African mi‑ grants into mainland Europe, had its share of adding manmade barriers to aspir‑ ing migrants. These political and policy‑generated barriers came into effect only after the migrant reaches closer to the coastlines. Further south to the coastlines of the Mediterranean migrants from Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in general would have to pass through the Sahara Desert. The Sahara Desert with its natural and human‑made risks, even with the services of skilled facilitators of migration, ends up being the burial ground of many migrants (Reitano & Tinti 2015). The natural Reasons for Dominance of South‑South Migration 45 challenges arising out of extreme desiccation are further intensified by the inse‑ curity and rebel and criminal activities in parts of north‑western Sudan, eastern Chad, and Libya. All these interacting natural and manmade risks necessitate the services of smugglers/facilitators, which do not come cheap. With increased fees, the number of Ethiopian migrants taking this route will be (relative to the eastern and southern routes) be lower (Ibid.). It is imperative to compare the risks involved in the northern route with that of SSM. In the eastern route, the risks involved cover shorter distances involved in crossing Somalia’s or Djibouti’s deserts, and then crossing a narrow strip of the Red Sea. There is the additional risk brought by the war in Yemen in the past few years, while the breakdown of order also allowed greater room for traffickers to manoeuvre (Wilson‑Smith 2019). The southern route is riskier, among others, as it involves crossing longer distances traversing at least four countries (but higher if a migrant passes through Zambia and Zimbabwe) or long trips (often from near Mombasa to the southern coasts of Mozambique) on shaky boats on the Indian Ocean for days. The above discussion aimed to illustrate the different geographic barriers mi‑ grants face in the three routes. Stiffer geographic barriers – including both natural and political/manmade – will necessitate the role of situated brokers/facilitators whose service fees increase with the increase in the level of risks. For the major‑ ity of potential migrants, the risks involved in the eastern and southern routes are more tolerable and somehow manageable. Although the rewards are perceived to be higher in northern destinations, the lack of capabilities to migrate legally or the much higher risks of engaging in irregular migration reduces the number of migrants braving this route. Cultural En/Dis-ablers Culture – in the broader sense, including religion – affects migration in general, and SSM in particular.9 An illustrative example here is the Hadiya term for explain‑ ing migration to South Africa as Darifrima, which takes male seasonal labour mi‑ gration as a rite of passage among the Hadiya. According to Dereje, Hagen‑Zanker and Mazzilli (forthcoming): For Hadiya, migration has now become part of the natural order of things, in which both long‑standing cultural norms of society and new trends converge. Concerning cultural norms, Hadiya perceive migration to South Africa as one – perhaps the ultimate – expression of darifirma. While the literal mean‑ ing of this word is ‘to stroll’, darifirma commonly symbolises the physical mobility that Hadiya have experienced and enjoyed since the beginning of time. As Dereje (2022) points out, in this context migration is not only seen as such, but also as an expression of the human disposition to move, thus perfectly natural (p. 37). The egalitarian but competitive nature of the Hadiya society, together with the guiding principles of darifirma, provided a fertile cultural ground where the migration trend could grow strong. 52 Fana Gebresenbet Duffield, M. 2007. Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peo‑ ple. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press. Ennis, C.A. 2019. Rentier‑Preneurship: Dependence and Autonomy in Women’s Entre‑ preneurship in the Gulf. In: The Politics of rentier States in the Gulf. Washington, DC: POMEPS Studies. pp. 60–66. http://pomeps.org/wp‑content/uploads/2019/02/POMEPS_ Studies_33.pdf. Fana, G. 2021. Hopelessness and Future Making through Irregular Migration in Tigray, Ethiopia. In: K. Asnake and G. Fana (eds.). Youth on the Move: Views from below on Ethiopian International Migration. 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DOI: 10.4324/9781003368267-6 4 Exploring the Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants along the Ghana-China Migration Corridor Leander Kandilige, Joseph Awetori Yaro, and Joseph Mensah Introduction In contemporary times, China–African relations have blossomed due to mutual economic interests, with China seeking trading and investment opportunities, ac‑ cess to cheap sources of raw materials, and externalisation of domestic unemploy‑ ment pressures while African countries seek heavily subsidised loans with fewer conditionalities compared with loans from the Bretton Woods Institutions (Xiang, 2016). As Park (2009) notes, China positions itself very well with anti‑colonial as well as post‑colonial narratives in its relations with Africa, and this foreign policy positioning is very attractive to the leadership of most African governments. As such, China projects itself as a less patronising and less condescending alternative to the European and North American development partners of Africa, albeit oth‑ ers view the relationship as rather neo‑colonialist in nature (Batchelor & Zhang, 2017). China strategically used aid as soft power during the Cold War period to win over friendly African countries at the expense of the then superpowers (Brautigam, 2003). The relations between China and Africa crystallised with time, and they became known as the Sino‑African relations that encompassed historical, politi‑ cal, economic, military, social, and cultural connections between China and Africa (Felbo‑Kolding, Leschke & Spreckelsen, 2019). Nonetheless, China is included in the nebulous categorisation of the global South, which tends to refer to countries that are underdeveloped and poor, in spite of China’s superior wealth of over 17 trillion USD in 2021 (as the second largest economy globally) (Morrison, 2019). Low per capita income, excessive unemployment and lack of valuable capital are often used as criteria for categorising these countries (World Population Review, 2023). South‑South Migration, especially to wealthier southern destination coun‑ tries such as China, has also not been the focus of most extant literature. The most apparent form in the Sino‑African relations has been economic, with investment in infrastructure dominating the Chinese portfolio in Africa. According to the World Bank, China’s finances have been the bedrock of several large‑ as well as medium‑size infrastructural projects in Africa and the value of these packages has risen sharply between the early 2000s and 2018 (Obeng, 2019). Beyond the financing of infrastructure, China has sustained a trading relationship with Africa, the volume of which has increased exponentially from US$1 billion to US$163 56 Leander Kandilige et al. billion within just 32 years, between 1980 and 2012 (Leslie, 2018). As a result of supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID‑19 pandemic, trade values reduced to US$176 billion in 2020 from the 2019 value of US$192 billion (China‑Africa Trade Institute, 2022). Ghana is emblematic of the expanding interest of China in Africa. The extant literature records substantial Sino‑Ghana relations, including waves of Chinese migration to Ghana from the 1950s (Hodzi, 2019; Jinpu & Ning, 2019). Earlier Chinese migrants in Ghana predominantly featured in the textile industry (Xiaoy‑ ang, 2018). The sectoral focus of Chinese migrants shifted to the construction and engineering sectors championed mostly by Chinese state‑owned enterprises be‑ tween the late 1980s and early 1990s (Amanor & Chichava, 2016). From the 1990s to date, a considerable number of Chinese have migrated to Ghana to operate as traders of imported Chinese goods (such as electrical equipment and electronic appliances, textiles, solar‑powered appliances, and everyday used goods), owners of Chinese restaurants, clinics, fish farms, and small and large‑scale gold mining (Jinpu & Ning, 2019). Chinese trade with Ghana and investments in a variety of sectors have seen a significant increase since the early 2000s (China‑Africa Trade Institute, 2022; Haugen, 2018). According to Pilling (2018), between 2000 and 2014, the value of Chinese investment rose sharply from US$4.4 million to US$1.6 billion and China became Ghana’s leading trading partner with bilateral trade in‑ creasing from less than US$100 million in 2000 to US$6.7 billion in 2017. The sustained relations between China and Ghana have informed a rise in the migration of Ghanaians to China for multiple reasons, including for education, commerce, and tourism (Kandilige & Yaro, 2020). As noted by Obeng (2019), Ghanaian migrants to China could be broadly divided into transient migrants (comprising transnational traders and business executives of Chinese companies) and semi‑permanent migrants (including entrepreneurs, diplomats, teachers of the English language, and tertiary students). The contemporary flows invariably have considerable effects on the economic dimensions of the lives of migrants, mi‑ grant households, and the broader communities, especially in the areas of poverty reduction. While there is a burgeoning literature on the activities of Chinese migrants to Ghana and their attendant positive and negative impacts on Ghana (Dobler 2008; Gyedu, 2018; McNamee et al., 2012), very little is known about the factors un‑ dergirding the perpetuation of Ghanaian migration to China, and even lesser still is understood regarding the experiences of Ghanaian immigrants in China. The chapter contributes to the literature by broadening our insights into the Ghanaian component of the Ghana‑China migration corridor. The extant literature on social networks focuses on how such networks have the potential to facilitate as well as perpetuate migration journeys. Our application of the social network theory ex‑ tends the discourses to cover how migrants’ lived experiences, even at the destina‑ tion, are equally shaped by social networks. We will explore the key drivers of migration from Ghana to China and how social networks mediate the lived experiences of Ghanaian migrations to China. This is essential as the lived experiences of migrants within the global southern Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants 57 context are often missing in the migration literature. In our view, even though all the initiation and perpetuation models are important in migration analysis, the pri‑ macy belongs to the dynamics of social network – and to some extent, institutional factors, when it comes to our understanding of South‑South Migration, especially as epitomised by migration along the Ghana‑China corridor. Data for this chapter were collected mainly using qualitative research methods (Bryman, 2012; Castro et al., 2010). A detailed semi‑structured interview guide was designed to aid in‑depth interviews with Ghanaian return migrants from China. The in‑depth interviews were conducted with 39 returnees: 31 males and 8 females. Interviewees were between the ages of 21 and 45 years. Returnees were recruited mainly through purposive and snowball sampling techniques. We purposively sam‑ pled returnees who were at least 18 years old and had at least Junior High School qualifications. This is consistent with extant literature that suggests that most Gha‑ naian migrants to China are literate (Obeng, 2019; Teye et al., 2022). We used key gatekeepers in the trading, education, and tourism sectors to gain access to Ghana‑ ian migrants who returned from China in the last ten years. We relied on different entry nodes in order to avoid sampling the views of close‑knit groups that might provide biased views on their experiences of migration. As such, we limited refer‑ rals from each group to a maximum of three participants. The main themes covered in the interviews included reasons for migration, migration decision‑making, the roles of intermediaries, migration experiences in China, remittance‑ sending be‑ haviour, and changes to the living standards of migrant households. Each interview was about an hour long. The interviews were conducted from May to July 2021. To protect the identity of our research participants, we use pseudonyms in place of their names. The Primacy of Social Networks in South-South Migration There has been a remarkable increase in South‑South Migration, with both China and Ghana deeply implicated as both migrant‑sending and ‑receiving countries. This trend has changed the socio‑economic and cultural dynamics of many coun‑ tries in the Global South, prompting many citizens in the region to learn how to live with different people in close quarters – e.g., as neighbours or co‑workers. Yet, the theoretical base for our understanding of South‑South Migration has remained woefully underdeveloped. As it stands now, there is no coherent set of theories to facilitate a sustained analysis of the emerging trends in South‑South Migration. Moreover, while there are some studies (e.g. Agadjanian, 2008; Malatji, 2021) dealing with intra‑African migration, research on the migration of Africans to other Southern regions is particularly lacking. Meanwhile, there are some features that make a typical South‑South Migration somewhat different from its south‑north counterpart, as we shall soon see from our exploration of the qualitative data on the Ghana‑China migration corridor. Massey et al. (1997) categorised international migration theories into migration initiation and perpetuation theories. The former focus on the factors that compel people to migrate in the first place, while the latter concern the variables that sustain 58 Leander Kandilige et al. the migration process once it is started. Examples of the initiation theories are the neoclassical economics theory, the new economics of labour migration (NELM), and the world‑systems theory, while the network and institutional theories are ex‑ amples of the perpetuation models. As noted by Newland (2009), migration could also be circular – repeated temporal movements across borders, either formally or informally, usually for work, and involving the same migrants. What motivates Ghanaians to migrate to China, and vice versa, considering that both countries are in the global South (i.e., outside the group of Western Advanced Nations), even though China is ranked higher, in 2021, along the spectrum of de‑ velopment by most yardsticks, including the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2022)? There is no simple reason why Ghanaians migrate to China; still, one can plausibly posit that the move is prompted mainly by economics. For one thing, most Southern destinations (e.g., China or Ghana) do not have the necessary social institutions that foster the settlement of a large number of migrants from differ‑ ent ethno‑cultural backgrounds, as is the case of Canada, Australia, or the United States. If, then, economics is the key to this South‑South Migration, the neoclassical economics and the NELM theories are not useful as explanatory heuristics. From the former, we know that people initiate migration mostly to take advantage of wage differentials between the origin and destination. This model is based on as‑ sumptions of rationality, perfect knowledge, and ceteris paribus. However, from behavioural economics, we know that everything is never equal; and, in this par‑ ticular case, institutional constraints concerning the acquisition of visa and work permits are always at play, not to mention the problems of racism. How applicable is the NELM, by which migration decisions are made by households, rather than individual migrants, to diversify the sources of their household income (de Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Jensen & Pedersen, 2007)? While the NELM has some veracity, it is also inadequate, since in Ghana, as in many African countries, it is an “open secret” that migrants do not mostly disclose their migration plans to friends and family. Many in Africa have the superstitious belief that one’s enemies could sabo‑ tage one’s travel plans, either materially or spiritually, when they get to know about these plans prior to the journey (Nyavor, 2019). Of the perpetuation models, we give primacy to the network theory and, to some extent, the institutional theory, in our analysis of South‑South Migration. Accord‑ ing to network theory, international migration is sustained through interpersonal connections among migrants, former migrants, and non‑migrants in both the origin and the destination (Massey et al., 1993: 448). Network theorists regard migrants as actors who are capable of drawing on both tangible and intangible resources for their benefit. From the standpoint of this theory, once the number of network con‑ nections reaches a critical mass, migration becomes self‑perpetuating, by way of cumulative causation‑a‑la‑Gunnar Myrdal (1957). Network connections are a form of social capital that migrants use to gain access to employment, accommodation, and other services abroad. Social capital in this sense refers to the “ability factors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social struc‑ tures” (Portes, 1998: 6). For social capital to be accessible and beneficial, a person Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants 59 must relate to others, and these other persons are the actual source of the capital or advantage. To be useful, social networks, and their attendant social capital, must be maintained, nourished, and strengthened through multiple interactions between members. Thus, the acquisition of social capital that undergirds the network theory of migration requires a deliberate investment of resources (e.g., time) towards ena‑ bling and inspiring people to migrate. As we shall soon see, social networks play a crucial role in a South‑South Migration context to foster the procurement of com‑ modities, housing, employment, local and foreign currencies, business partners, employees, and translators—just as one would expect in most South‑North Migra‑ tion contexts. The institutional theory, as presented by Massey et al. (1997), places its em‑ phasis on the activities of private and non‑profit (im)migration organisations that aim to “satisfy the demand created by the imbalance between the large number of people who seek entry into capital‑rich countries and the limited number of im‑ migrant visas these countries typically offer” (p. 265). These institutional actors include immigration consultants, travel agents, and employment agencies, which assist in the acquisition of travel, immigration, and employment documents for the migrant. Even though migration along the Ghana‑China corridor requires a visa at both ends, the visa application is, arguably, nowhere as uncertain and onerous as one would find in applying for a visa from Ghana or China to a Northern country, such as the United States, Canada, Germany, or Britain. It is with this in mind that we do not place much emphasis on the institutional theory, relative to the network theory, at least as the two theories apply to migration along the Ghana‑China cor‑ ridor. In fact, in both Ghana and China, most of the functions performed by such migration institutions are often maintained through social networks. Obeng‑Odoom, in his recent work, Global Migration beyond Limits (2022), broadens the conception of “institution” to include class, gender, religion, race, and land, placing his emphasis on the latter. As he rightly notes, the importance of land in the theorisation of migration goes beyond its role in rural–urban mi‑ gration or its status as a mere epiphenomenon of capital (as often portrayed in Marxist analysis of migration). Issues of land are implicated in nearly all types of migration, because of their ability to produce and sustain inequality and stratifica‑ tion of income, wealth, and race. Expectedly, we acknowledge the importance of racism in understanding migration in a south‑south context in general, and in the Ghana‑China corridor in particular. Indeed, any slight acquaintance with the lived experience of Chinese in Ghana and of Ghanaians in China would readily show that racism is a major social problem for migrants at both ends of this corridor. At the same time, since the labour markets of most southern destinations, including both China and Ghana, are, arguably, not as rigidly segmented along racial lines, as is often the case in Northern destinations (e.g., United States, Canada, and Britain), the impact of the racial factor is curtailed a bit in a South‑South Migration context. In fact, in most Northern countries, the social labelling, and the attendant seg‑ mentation, of some jobs as immigrant jobs or ethno‑racial minority jobs is rather rigid, relative to what obtains in most Southern destinations. This is not hard to envisage, since employment opportunities and the diversity of jobs are generally 60 Leander Kandilige et al. higher in the global North than in the South, and, consequently, citizens in the North tend to have the luxury of such negative tagging of jobs as “immigrant jobs,” than do citizens of the global South. Of course, we are only arguing in relative terms here; and we are by no means downplaying the impact of racism on its vic‑ tims, be they in Northern or Southern destinations. Still since pull and push forces of migration are often sensitive to socio‑economic disparities between origins and destinations, anytime the disparity is not that high, the impact of the pull or push factor involved is curtailed (Lee, 1966). Similarly, since the subjugation of females by males is, arguably, generally higher in most Southern countries (Aguilar, 2002; Halfacree, 1995), including both China and Ghana (relative to Northern countries), the influence of patriarchy as a pull or push factor in a South‑South Migration context is not that strong. It bears stressing that our argument is not that these in‑ stitutional factors (i.e., land, race, or gender) do not matter, but only that they are not as consequential in the South‑South Migration context, as in the South‑North Migration context – this is why we place our emphasis on the network factors. Migration of Ghanaians to China and the Role of Social Networks China has become a destination of choice for Ghanaian students looking for schol‑ arships to support their postgraduate studies, especially in the natural sciences. Several funded postgraduate programmes and professional courses in life/biologi‑ cal sciences, such as medicine and physical sciences such as physics, chemistry, earth sciences, and astronomy have been made available to African students across different Chinese universities. The continuing over‑subscription and exorbitant fees to European and North American universities have led to a sharp uptake of academic opportunities outside of the traditional centres of tertiary education, in‑ cluding China. Ghanaian students have embraced the novel postgraduate opportu‑ nities in China. There are specific scholarships targeting students from developing countries, especially African countries, and the tuition fees are relatively lower compared with those from European and North American Universities. As Pilling (2018) reported, an estimated 6,500 Ghanaian students studied in China in 2018 (making Ghana the top supplier of African students to China). In addition, migra‑ tion for the purpose of working in the construction sector in China, the teaching of the English language as well as the purchase of manufactured goods for retail in Ghana have characterised international migration along the Ghana‑China corridor. The overwhelming majority of these migration journeys are temporary and circular in nature. As such, return migration to Ghana is expected from the outset. This is partly because return is a core requirement of scholarships to Chinese universities, while businesspersons strategically access preferential markets in China to procure commodities that are in high demand in Ghana and then either supply retailers or stock their own shops in major cities and towns across the country. Social networks facilitate a feedback loop of information that informs the deci‑ sion of prospective Ghanaian students to China in targeting their applications to subjects and universities that provide generous scholarship funding. The majority of the interviewees went to China for educational purposes, with the conviction Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants 61 that China provides students access to sophisticated technological equipment to carry out research and other academic work at the tertiary level. They also believe, based on prior information by social networks in China, that the funding pack‑ age is quite generous to enable students who are on scholarships to focus on their academic work, without the need to look for paid employment. In line with this principle, China prohibits international students, especially those on scholarships, from working. The pursuit of a good education, in addition to an exploration of a different culture, including the language, the food, and the environment served as a key motivating factor for student migrations from Ghana to China. Over time, universities in some provinces have been exceptionally welcoming to international students, in spite of complaints of discrimination and racism experienced by stu‑ dents who worked on part‑time basis outside of their university campuses. This is how one interviewee described his rationale for choosing China: I chose China because of their advancement in engineering education…I also enjoyed the scholarship package I had as an international student. I had free accommodation, free tuition and a monthly stipend of about 3000 Cedis [equivalent to US$508].1 (Atawune, Male return migrant from Senya Bireku in the Central Region of Ghana) Similarly, some students who fail to gain admission into Ghanaian universities to complete their preferred courses apply and secure full scholarships in China. Serjua, for instance, was rejected admission to a Ghanaian university to complete a petroleum and technology‑related programme, but he gained admission with a full scholarship to a Chinese University to study in the same programme. His suc‑ cess was enabled by information and practical support that were provided by a friend of his who was already studying in China. The ability of students who do not gain admission in Ghana procuring full scholarships points either to the lower entry requirements in China compared to in Ghana or simply greater opportunities in China. This leads to some contestation on the equivalence of the value of a de‑ gree obtained in China compared with one in Ghana, especially in the professional sectors. Presently, an increasing number of universities in Ghana are establishing ex‑ change programs with Chinese universities, including the hosting of Confucius Centres2 for the study of Chinese culture. These collaborations allow for the enrol‑ ment of Ghanaian students on postgraduate studies on a “sandwich basis” where students are required to spend some time in both countries. Similarly, Ghanaian students who study medicine complete the first five years of their training in China and must return to Ghana to carry out their internship (housemanship) for a year before returning to China to complete their studies. This somewhat supports their insertion into the medical system in Ghana upon their return. In line with the geopolitical realignment with China assuming a more prominent position globally, some Ghanaian migrants reported that they were drawn to China as a destination of choice because they find the country as the leading global power 68 Leander Kandilige et al. anyone in Ghana because he was worried that people might take advantage of him. He paid off all his loans and only bought mobile phones for key persons in his fam‑ ily during his return trip to Ghana. I had to save enough to come and establish my own firm here. I could have sent a few Yuan periodically to some people here but if did so, they would think I was picking the money from the streets in China, and they would keep telling me about their problems. Some would even lie to me to get my money and waste it. I did not want that to happen to me. So, from the word go, I told them I was an illegal migrant in China, and I was not getting a good job to even pay my bills. Some of them even had pity for me. (Azumah, Male, Construction Engineer, from Cape Coast in the Central Region) Another return migrant (Atawune), who worked as a structural engineer set up a joint business together with his colleagues and they provided services to clients in Ghana even prior to his return: I started a business with my friends. We are a team of structural engineers so we set up a company that looked into structural engineering. For example, when a client contacts me for a structural design of a building, myself and my team here, we work on it and then we give the person the price and negotiate. If we agree on the price, then we do the work and send it to him in Ghana. (Atawune, Male return migrant from Senya Bireku in the Central Region of Ghana) Akin to Azumah, Ananga did not send any remittances to Ghana. Instead, he had an existing business in Ghana from where he extended support to family members who were in need. He stated that whatever he earned in China was used to provide for his personal expenses. Conclusion As our data show, most of the Ghanaians who go to China go for educational purposes, mostly as international scholarship students, by which they take ad‑ vantage of teaching English as a second language to mid‑ and upper‑income Chinese families. Since their scholarships often prohibit them from working, these students routinely seek such English‑teaching job opportunities from their own supervisors and professors (to teach the latter’s children at their homes), and thereby escape the surveillance of law enforcement agents. Another signifi‑ cant cohort of Ghanaian immigrants in China are businesspersons who come to (work and) purchase commodities for sale back home. While some Ghanaian immigrants in China work in construction, manufacturing, services, and other sectors of the economy, these workers are not that many, not only because of the limited job opportunities in China, given their own massive population, but Lived Experiences of Ghanaian Migrants 69 also because of institutional barriers having to do with the acquisition of em‑ ployment and resident permits and anti‑Black racism. Our findings indicate that regardless of the social class, gender, education, or age of Ghanaian immigrants in China, social networks play a crucial role in their immigration and settle‑ ment processes – in fact, more so than any other impetus, as far as our findings are concerned. Ghanaian migrants also display both individual and collective agency by adopting ways and means of evading the strict regulatory regime in China, relying on their social networks. We argue that this allows migrants to better negotiate their vulnerabilities and precarity within China. We also argue that the global South is not an undifferentiated collection of countries but that opportunities exist in richer global southern countries [such as China] that con‑ stitute similar pull factors to aspiring migrants, as those that exist in so‑called global northern countries. Our application of the social network theory within a South‑South Migration context has helped to expand the theory’s scope to include facilitating the realisa‑ tion of migration aspirations, negotiating complex lived experiences at destina‑ tions, return preparedness planning and enhancing the likelihood of sustainable reintegration upon return. Anti‑Black racism and discrimination in China are partly endured and/or resisted through network members. Since many of the Ghanaian students readily find employment as English tutors in China, our study recommends further studies on how the two coun‑ tries can develop bilateral arrangements to facilitate the teaching of English by Ghanaians in China for their mutual benefit. If China can exchange loans for resources in Africa, perhaps Ghana can exchange the teaching of English for loans – this is certainly worth exploring in the grand scheme of international development along this particular migration corridor. Secondly, our study found that Ghanaian students get reasonably good technical and practical sci‑ entific training in China, relative to what comparable students get in Ghana. At the same time, most of these Ghanaian students are unable to put their tech‑ nical training into practice upon their return. Thus, the need to find out what factors in the home environment undermine the use of such practical expertise cannot be over‑emphasised, if Ghana is to move forward with any meaningful import substitution industrialisation program. Finally, the renowned Marxist geographer David Harvey long talked about the tendency for capitalists to use “spatial fix,” or spatial manoeuvres, such as moving plants from one place to another, to facilitate capital accumulation. Relatedly, it would be interesting to examine whether Ghana and China are using, or can use, some form of “mi‑ gration fix” (Bird & Schmid, 2021) along this south‑south corridor to assuage their respective youth employment challenges and, thereby, boost their capital accumulation. 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DOI: 10.4324/9781003368267-7 5 Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse The Case of Forced Migrants in the Global South Tirsit Sahldengil Introduction The spatial and social displacement of people is becoming a global phenomenon. Particularly since the early 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase in the move‑ ment of people around the globe. By 2014, the figure of refugees in the world had surpassed the largest number of people who were displaced during WWII (UN‑ HCR 2016). Humanitarian donors and the host countries have been increasingly overwhelmed by the extended demand of supporting refugees and multidimen‑ sional and complicated problems of uprootedness. As countries in the Global North are increasingly fencing their borders in fear of the refugee influx from the Global South, the data shows that the majority of refu‑ gees end up in low‑income countries. According to UNHCR, in mid‑2022, there were 32.5 million refugees (UNHCR 2022a). The report also shows that 74% of these refugees reside in low‑ and middle‑income countries and 69% of the refugees reside in neighboring countries. Ethiopia is a good example of the case that the Global South is a significant destination for refugees. Despite the fact that currently there are about 4,509,081 Internally Displaced people IDPs in Ethiopia (IOM 2022), the country is also hosting 837,533 registered refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring and non‑neighboring countries (UNHCR 2022b). Among 103 million displaced people in the world, more than 5 million of them reside in Ethiopia. Forced migration literature mostly portrays the refugee movement as an arbi‑ trary movement in which forced migrants lack the agency to choose their respective destinations. Moreover, the refugee movement in Africa is mainly characterized by the fact that refugees’ destination choices are limited by geographical proxim‑ ity. This chapter challenges this dominant view and explores the agency of refu‑ gees in making a choice among hosting camps in Africa. Sherkole refugee camp is among the five refugee camps found in Western Ethiopia’s Benishangul‑Gumuz Regional State. As in the case of other camps in different African countries, the camp was originally established to serve refugees crossing the border from Su‑ dan and South Sudan. Practically, it is hosting refugees from other parts of Africa, including those coming from Cameroon, Liberia, Tanzania, the Democratic Re‑ public of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda. Though Ethiopia doesn’t share a direct border with the Great Lakes countries, Sherkole refugee camp is predominantly 74 Tirsit Sahldengil occupied by refugees from the Great Lakes Region. These refugees arrive at the camp by crossing and transiting through several countries in Eastern Africa. This chapter explores the agency of forced migrants in making informed decisions and their agency in place‑making. By drawing on an ethnographic study conducted in this camp over a period of five years, this contribution shows how the migrants capitalize on oral history, particularly those who claim to be Banyamulenge Tutsi, believing in the ethnic ties they claim with the Ethiopian people. The chapter will demonstrate how refugees from the Great Lakes regions living in Sherkole refugee camp construct their historical narratives to integrate and build a harmonious rela‑ tionship with the host community. The data used in this chapter draws on a qualitative study conducted as part of the author’s PhD research between 2016 and 2021. During the first phase of the study in 2017, key informant interviews (KII), in‑depth interviews (IDI), and focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted with refugees, the host community, UN‑ HCR, ARRA (the Ethiopian Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs), recently renamed as RRS (Refugees and Returnees Service), and other members of the government offices at Regional level in Ethiopia. In August 2019, the second major round of fieldwork was conducted, whereby 73 in‑depth interviews with refugees from different countries were undertaken. During this fieldwork, refugees from different nationalities were interviewed with the purpose of understanding the factors informing their decision to leave their respective home countries, their migration trajectories as well as their reason to choose Ethiopia as their preferred destination. The open‑ended questions and the follow‑up interviews also provided the researcher an opportunity to explore the refugees’ experience during their jour‑ ney and their expectations from their destination. Refugees from different nation‑ alities were incorporated into the study in order to tap into different experiences. Twenty‑five key informant interviews were conducted with the host government representatives at regional and federal levels. The empirical data obtained from the fieldwork were supplemented by findings from the literature review. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also conducted with various refugee groups and host communities. The FGDs were organized in the way that considered the national‑ ity of the refugees to allow open discussion about the factors for migration, their migration trajectories, and common reasons for choosing Ethiopia as a destination. The focus group discussions were conducted to triangulate the data obtained from individual informants. There was also a continuous communication with informants through phone calls so as to update some developments, and also to make clear any ambigu‑ ous information that is gathered during the main course of the fieldwork. All the informants’ names used in this study are pseudonyms in order to protect the research participants. This chapter is intended to show the agency of refugees in making choices about their destination and the ways in which they create a narrative to integrate with others at their destination. The section “Reflections on Agency of Refugees and Forced Migrants” in this chapter presents a brief review of key literature on the agency of refugees to choose their destination. The section “Brief Overview of Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse 75 Refugees Camps in Benishangul‑Gumuz Region” provides basic background in‑ formation about Sherkole refugee camp. The section “Discussing Agency of Refu‑ gees from the Great Lakes Region” presents empirical data about the reasons of refugees from the Great Lakes Regions and how they ended up in Ethiopia espe‑ cially in Sherkole refugee camp, demonstrating the agency that is evident in their migration journeys and pathways to their goal. The section demonstrates how other factors, beyond geographical proximity, contribute to refugees’ choice‑making of destinations. This section also shows how refugees capitalize on narratives to eas‑ ily integrate with the host community in their destination. Refugees’ economic and social capital investment in their destination is discussed in the section “Discussing Agency of Refugees from the Great Lakes Region”. The last section of the chapter, “Conclusion,” presents brief concluding remarks. Reflections on Agency of Refugees and Forced Migrants The field of migration research has for long been interested in forced displacement, which treats it as both a result and a cause of social transformation in the Global South (Castles 2003). Jacobsen (2003) argued that most forced migration research‑ ers seek to explain the behavior, impact, and problems of the displaced with the aim of urging agencies and governments to develop more operational responses (Jacobsen 2003). As a result, refugees are often portrayed by donors, policymak‑ ers, and researchers in the same way, as solely dependent on international aid, liv‑ ing in problematic situations, and as sources of problems for the host community and state. In contrast, anthropologists, with their fundamental interest in human experience and behavior were also interested to bring the migration experience, the memory of dispossession and displacement, and the lived experience of uprooted‑ ness into the core of a developing field of study (Malkki 1995; Chatty 2014). More specifically on refugee–host interaction, social science studies have fo‑ cused less on the agency of refugees in the host countries, as populations that can support themselves instead of merely being supported by the donors, and that can live peacefully with the host community for a better experience. There is also a neglect of a focus on the ways in which refugees are often deprived of personal rights, dreams, stories, and may be filled with fears or worries. This is clearly de‑ picted in the programs of UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations as well (Amin 2017). Amin further argued how the victimization discourse was predomi‑ nantly shared by donors and policymakers until recently. In addition to the focus on the victimization of refugees, empirical studies also focused on how refugees lack agency and they are mere opportunity grabbers to the host community in their destination. Particularly in studies in East Africa, refugees were portrayed as hos‑ tile combatants towards the host community and burdens for the host states. Many studies have looked at the economic competition between host and refugee com‑ munities for finite resources, as well as the resulting conflicts between the two groups (Martin 2005; Allen 2009; Grindheim 2013; Musielak 2016). The fear of refugees as spreading violence to host countries and communities, according to Shaver and Zhou (2017) has acquired central emphasis in today’s 76 Tirsit Sahldengil world politics. According to Milton et al. (2013), various factors can contribute to radicalization among refugees, including religious instruction, lack of jobs, lack of mobility, and lack of access to a well‑rounded education. However, they were un‑ able to locate any scholarly studies that demonstrated how refugees affect the secu‑ rity of host communities. These authors suggested that policymakers and scholars pay attention to the expanding demographic size of refugees, since the globe faces a serious humanitarian crisis as a result of large numbers of forced migrants. In this regard, the above argument looks reductionist and do not consider the positive contribution refugees to the host country, rather shows how the expansion of the refugee population can be a threat to the host. Argued that refugees are humanitarian migrants who want to move to a country where they can work and stay safe until they can return home. They emphasized that refugees prioritize two things in selecting a destination. Refugees first look at the policy of the host state, for a state that easily provides asylum and job opportunities. In the second place, refugees are looking for social networks, religious similarities, and peace in the host state, and these affect refugees’ choice of their destinations. However, case studies of asylum seekers find that the process of migration can change where asylum seekers go and that they do not always end up at their intended destina‑ tion. But it is obvious that they strive to get to their ideal destination. Ruegger and Bohnet (2018) also argued that no matter how refugees are under‑ stood to leave their homeland involuntarily, their decision to choose their direction of migration can be under their control. This can be seen from a significant number of refugees from the same country choosing different destinations. Refugees can still consider better opportunities to choose their destination. Ruegger and Bohnet underlined that vicinity alone does not resolve flight patterns to countries of first asylum. Furthermore, they identified four significant factors that are interwoven and determine the refugees’ destination (Ruegger & Bohnet 2018). The first one is geographical proximity and accessibility of the destination. The second factor is networking and rationality, which includes smugglers, brokers, as well as refugees’ connections and information about their destination. Further elaborating on this reason, Hein (1993) also argued that refugees use social networks in facilitating their flight and use their relation with friends and relatives to arrange their jour‑ neys. The third factor includes refugees’ consideration of economic opportunities, including better life and job opportunities. The fourth one is ethnic linkage with neighboring countries and historical narratives about their destinations as impor‑ tant factors in choosing a destination. Potentially, the existing narratives help the refugees to establish peaceful interaction and rapid integration with the host com‑ munity (e.g. Newland 1993; Schmeidl 1997; Moore & Shellman 2004). According to Alessandro (2004), social networks, family ties, and economic links are crucial elements that attract more migrants to a certain location. These practices reveal the existence of social networks between distant locations. These networks have a significant impact on the region from which migrants originate; they underpin migration as a domestic group strategy; and, finally, they provide information about current opportunities and forecast future migration flows. There are various perspectives on how refugees can participate in the host coun‑ try. For example, Erel studies the topic of cultural capital in migration (Erel 2010). Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse 77 He advocated a ‘rucksack approach’ to cultural capital, in which migrants are seen as bringing a package of cultural materials with them that may or may not mesh with the ‘culture’ of their new home nation. In migration studies, he recognizes the rucksack approach as a hidden but significant trend. Erel also shows how ethnic and human capital are formed in the motherland and transportation in his backpack ap‑ proach. The ability of an individual who is a member of a social network to access numerous resources inside that social network is defined by researchers as social capital. It is a key notion in the economic lives of refugees and immigrants. To put it another way, social capital is a collection of benefits shared by a group of people (Bourdieu 1986). How refugees find work and the quality of the jobs they find are determined by social capital in their economic lives. This theory is predicated on social capital’s potential to act as a link between immigrants and jobs. Established immigrants, according to scholars in the broader immigration literature, use their social networks to efficiently disseminate information (Allen 2009). Established immigrants, according to Allen (2009), reduce the costs of recruit‑ ing labor for employers and lessen informational asymmetries experienced by re‑ cent immigrants, benefiting both sides. As a result, immigrants who have access to social capital are more likely to obtain work and earn more than those who do not. There is a recent paradigm shift from considering refugees as a burden to op‑ portunities. As a result, arguments are being proposed to move beyond short‑term emergency responses and focus on finding ways for longer‑term solutions (Kai‑ ser 2005). This idea was formalized when the UN agencies in 2015 approved Agenda 2030 for sustainable development goals which consists of 17 declara‑ tions and 169 associated targets. Agenda 2030 became a vital event in changing the gaze from containing refugees in camps solely based on aid to people who deserve out‑of‑camp life and potentially positive forces for the development of the host communities. A further international initiative aimed at changing the status quo of refugees was the 2016 New York Declaration (UN 2018). The United Nations Summit on Refugees in September 2016 was held at New York in which 193 countries includ‑ ing Ethiopia participated and signed the Declaration. The Declaration put forth a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which focuses globally on measures to simplify pressure on countries that welcome and host refugees, supporting the self‑reliance of refugees, expanding access to resettlement, and fos‑ tering conditions that enable refugees to return voluntarily to their home countries. Moreover, the CRRF aimed at improving rights and expanding services to benefit both refugees and the host communities. The CRRF had nine pledges which in‑ clude, among other things, potential provisions to ease the refugees’ restrictions on matters of freedom of movement, labor rights, and access to services, livelihoods, and resources (World Bank 2018). Although the pledges were well crafted, there were many challenges to implement within a short period of time. Brief Overview of Refugees Camps in Benishangul-Gumuz Region There are about 60,000 refugees living in five refugee camps in the Benishangul‑ Gumuz Region in Ethiopia (UNHCR 2019). Most of the refugees came from Sudan 84 Tirsit Sahldengil While some refugees do not go far away from their camps, others go to Kuburhamsa town, 10 kilometers from the camp and Homosha 15 kilometers from the camp for marketing activities. Farming and mining are the major economic activities in which most of the refu‑ gees are involved. It is known that the Ethiopian government does not allow refugees to engage in any economic activity. Though the Ethiopian government does not allow refugees to be engaged in such activities, they are widely engaged in these activities informally. Refugees from different countries have different job preferences based on their economic networks and prior experience. Most of the refugees who came from Sudan prefer to open small shops and sell both food and non‑food items for both the refugee communities and for the hosts. There are also some refugees who have butchery houses in the refugee camp. These merchants buy oxen from the local people and sell them to the refugees. Sometimes the merchants go on foot and bring oxen from Assosa. When refugee merchants bring oxen from Assosa, their friends from the host community support them to pass the checkpoints since refugees are not eligible to transport animals and other agricultural products into the camps unless they are allowed by the camp administration. These friends of the refugees who assist the refugees to pass the checkpoints may get rewards from the refugee merchants. However, the reward can be for example one kilogram of meat at one time. Most of the time the reward is in kind not in cash. Some Sudanese refugees also bring cattle from the bordering areas between Ethiopia and Sudan for sale and supply for the butchers both in the refugee camps and in the towns of the host community. Some of the refugees from Sudan and many refugees from South Sudan also prefer to engage in farming activities. The local farmers employ refugees as laborers. Sometimes, refugees are employed to cultivate the land, and finally to share the crops with the owner of the farm. Some of the local farmers also employ refugees on a daily rate. On the other hand, refugees from the Great Lakes region predominantly engage in mining activities. Kuburhamsa (10 kilometers from the camp) and Homosha (15 kilometers) are the two towns that South Sudan and Sudanese refugees preferred to go to search for jobs especially, for labor work. These Great Lakes refugees go to Mänge Woreda (90 kilometers far from the camp) to engage in gold mining activities. Refugees from Great Lakes Regions generally have skills in mining and according to interviews and discussions with these refugees, most of them used to engage in the same activity in their home country. Hence they brought their skills to Ethiopia. After they reach an agreement, refugees move to the local cultivation land and may engage in different farming activities including sowing, plowing, cultivating, and preparing the land for the next harvest. The payment might be agreed based on the size of the farm and the duration of the activity. The social network and connectivity with the host community and refugees in the business network is vital, especially to be involved in mining activities. Refu‑ gees who have a well‑established relationship with the local people in Mänge have a better opportunity to get involved in the mining activity. As a result, refugees who go to the mining fields independently to try their luck without getting connected to a network of people may not be successful. A Burundian refugee shared his experi‑ ence as follows: Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse 85 The mining job is already held by some people and they do not allow other people to work. In February 2019, I went to the mining place with my friend to search for a job. However, let alone to get a job, we couldn’t get a place to rent to spend a night. The local people are only willing to host the refugees they have acquaintance with for a long period of time and they do not wel‑ come the newcomers. This is because the business is already dominated by some local people and some refugees in their network. (Aldise, August 15, 2019, Sherkole refugee camp) The mining network stretches up to Gambella region. There are brokers who create the business link from Assosa to Gambella. Legally speaking, the refugees are not allowed to move outside the camp without a pass permit. However, their business partners from the host community help them and facilitate the journey. The facilita‑ tion includes preparing fake pass permits and identity cards. Sometimes they bribe the gatekeepers of the camp to pass checkpoints. One of the informants was among the group of refugees who visited Gambella frequently for mining. He tells his Gambella experience as follows: …. first we learned about going to Gambella from one South Sudanese refu‑ gee who had been in the Gambella refugee camp. He told us there is a better gold mining field in Gambella. I also heard field owners in Gambella need skillful people from refugees of the Great Lakes. Then I decided to go. The field owners facilitated my transportation and pass permit to pass the gate with the local people. We were three Congolese, two Burundian and two Sudanese. Then we arrived at a place called Rooma in Gambella. We stayed there for one month and each of us came back with about 10,000 birr. We mined twenty‑five meters deep and the amount of gold we got was sixteen grams. There were also twelve local people with us, but the hardest part of the work was done by the refugees. However, the boss gave us the same amount of money for all of us. However, the local people who got the same amount of money as us were not happy because they knew we were refugees and that they are Ethiopian citizens. We suffered from lack of oxygen and faced every risk together digging the whole. I was not convinced that they should be paid better or even equal. (Magozi, April 7, 2017, Sherkole refugee camp) The refugees who participated in a focus group discussion disclosed there are busi‑ nessmen in the gold mining area who have a mining machine. The machine owners recruited refugees for intensive labor to dig out the place where they suspected the presence of gold. The machine owners recruited refugees, especially Great Lakes refugees because these refugees have the mining skills. Once the gold is found, the machine owner is responsible for paying for the labor of digging. He is supposed to divide the money for refugees and local participants based on their labor contribu‑ tion. A maximum of six people engage in a specific mining activity. However, they pay for the labor only if the laborers are lucky enough to find gold. Otherwise, the 86 Tirsit Sahldengil owner of the machine only gives them food and shelter for their stay while digging. A refugee from Congo shared his experience in the mining area as follows: For example, last month we were in the Mänge gold mining field. I was dig‑ ging with my five friends. After two days of digging, we got 10 grams of gold. Then we brought it to the machine owner. He took seven gram and gave the remaining three gram to us. This was a great success for us. Our friends were digging for five or six months. However, they were not successful. But we were lucky. Moreover, some machine owners may deny you payment for your labor and chase you away after taking the gold. Since we work infor‑ mally, we have nowhere to complain. (Jony, August 27, 2019, Sherkole refugee camp) Besides the low wages that refugees working in mining sites are suffering from, working informally in mining poses another risk for refugees. People who formally work in mining fields have life insurance because of the risk of the work. However, refugees working informally are not insured. This is because refugees do not pass through the formal employment process and they are not taxpayers. Hence, the employers and especially, the small mining organizations, do not provide insurance for refugees. Most of the employers are individuals who are not formally registered business owners. According to my discussion with informants who engaged in the mining, they lost their friends because of a landslide during excavation. The above Congolese refugee who shared his experience claimed, “I am a min‑ ing expert in Mänge mining site”. However, he complained the benefit he gets from the mining is not worth his effort. Moreover, the digging activity has its own risk and they dig about 20 or 30 meters deep to get 8–10 grams of gold. They are also supposed to move inside the hole for 45 minutes to get the gold. With all risks and challenges, the share that refugees get from the gold is very small and the largest portion is taken by the local bosses. This includes 20% for the people who do the digging, 30% for the digging machine rent, 20% for the boss, and the remaining 30% distributed for the diggers no matter how many they are. Most of the refugees who are working in the mining area also change their activity and engage in other activities during the rainy season and resume their engagement in mining in the dry season. There are many Congolese refugees who have been engaged in mining activities for six to ten years. Refugees also share the beliefs and superstitions of the local people about gold mining. According to informants, in the Mänge mining field, there is a big red and white snake which the local people believe that if it is seen in the place, that place is rich in gold and immediately it has to be excavated. In other words, it is a sign of good luck. Refugees who are working in the place also accepted this belief and according to informants who participated in the mining, they wait until they see a snake before they start digging for gold. Since they are told by the local people not to kill the snake, they are cautious to protect and obey the rule. A Congo‑ lese informant talked about the snake, that chasing the snake or talking bad things Looking beyond the Victimhood Discourse 87 about it is strictly forbidden. He also reiterated that the snake chased away some of his friends who ignored the rule and talked bad words about it. This shows that the refugees have close social relationships with the local community, including paying respect to the beliefs of the community and they are also influenced by it. Refugees who work with the locals in the mining area almost share the same beliefs regarding the snakes and many refugees testify that the community’s belief in the snake is also their belief.10 Refugees from the Congo are also engaged in electric work installation. Refu‑ gees engage in electric installation and other skilled work because most of them bring their skills and they used to do the same thing in their home country. There are many refugees who repair generators, mobile phones, and stoves for both the host community and the refugees. Conclusion This chapter discussed the agency of forced migrants in two different ways. First, it challenged the dominant discourse portraying refugees as migrants who cannot make any informed choice about their destination. By going beyond the domi‑ nant narrative, the chapter presented how refugees consider several factors in order to determine their destination. The South Sudanese and Sudanese prefer to take refuge in Sherkole camp because during their stay as refugees, they would, for example, navigate between the host camp and their place of origin for economic opportunities. Similarly, refugees from the Great Lakes have considered different reasons why they would join a camp in Ethiopia rather than staying in countries closer to their place of origin. At least within the limited options available, refugees have agency and may weigh the advantages and disadvantages of where to go. In addition to their agency of making a choice, refugees also anticipate the economic, cultural, and historical advantages they have in their destination. Hence, refugees from the Great Lakes regions come to Ethiopia considering all of the opportunities that they would get in Ethiopia. This finding supported the argument about refu‑ gees’ agency and disproved refugees’ movement as random movement. A second key argument with respect to the agency of refugees presented in this contribution is in the way they are able to capitalize on their economic skills and make temporary or permanent living arrangements in their destinations in the Global South. The chapter showed how the Great Lakes refugees capitalize on the skill gaps at places of destination and make the best out of the skills they might have acquired at their places of origin. Moreover, Ethiopia appeals as a transit pathway to several other destinations in the Middle East and the Gulf region and beyond to the refugees from the Great Lakes. Finally, the chapter pointed to the purported historical and ethnic links as well as social networks that the refugees draw upon in making their choices about camp settlement. This contributes to the emerging argument that demonstrates refugees are not docile people who just sit and await opportunity, but rather have multiple forms of agency that they deploy to create and make use of opportunities within their range. 88 Tirsit Sahldengil Notes  1 InformationobtainedfromtheRRSofficeofBambasirefugeecamp2017.  2 KIIwithTsoreCampCoordinator,April2017Tsorerefugeecamp.  3 IDIwithCongoleserefugee,Sherkolerefugeecamp,2019.  4 IDIwithCongoleserefugee,August2019,Sherkolerefugeecamp.  5 IDIwithCongoleserefugee,August2019,Assosatown.  6 IDIwithCameroonianrefugee,April2017,Sherkolerefugeecamp.  7 IDIwithCongoleserefugeeSherkolerefugeecamp.August2019  8 KIIWithregionalRRSprogramofficer,Assosatown.August2019  9 IDICongoleserefugee,April2017,Sherkolerefugeecamp. 10 IDIwithCongoleserefugee,Sherkolerefugeecamp,August2019. 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These aid workers2 – the world’s humanitarians – are often portrayed in Hollywood movies and news media stories as “white saviors” (Cole 2012) para‑ chuting into distant, crisis‑affected, faraway places. However, this image of unidi‑ rectional movements of people as well as expertise and resources from places in the Global North to places in the Global South, misrepresents the reality of humanitar‑ ian response today. A global network of relief agencies, donors, academics, and consultants called the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action, or ALNAP, finds that in 2020, over 90% of the humanitarian workforce were local and national staffers (ALNAP 2022, 63–64). In other words, the vast majority of aid workers are residents of the countries and communities where crises unfold and global relief agencies intervene. Most aid workers travel not from the Global North to the Global South, but within and between crisis‑affected countries and communities in the Global South. The global humanitarian industry – still head‑ quartered in and funded mostly by governments and institutions in North America and Europe – relies on the flexibility, mobility, and easy relocations of “local,” “subnational,” and “national” aid workers who can migrate, travel, and live within the Global South, in places where global humanitarian interventions recur. However, even though they must travel and migrate regularly as part of their jobs, most humanitarian aid workers from the Global South remain stubbornly stuck, year after year, job after job, in parts of the world where emergencies and re‑ lief operations unfold. Their expertise is typically characterized as “local” in nature and their experience is discounted as being only in the “local” circumstances, cul‑ tures, and languages at hand. These aid workers’ citizenship, country of origin, and their geographic and professional locations in the bottom echelons of the hierarchi‑ cal global aid industry limit their opportunities to move and work outside Global South localities. “One of the starkest divides falls between people who travel easily and people who do not,” Peter Redfield argues (2012, 358). 100 Lauren Carruth and back into Ethiopia. They settled in a sprawling refugee camp near the town of Degago. As a teenager and then young man, Mahamed worked for six different humanitarian organizations and two different governmental relief bureaus in and around the camp. Sometimes he volunteered in the clinic run by Doctors Without Borders and UNHCR, and he helped organize soccer games and other activities for youth in the area. As he got older, he was hired for temporary gigs with aid agen‑ cies, providing Somali‑to‑English or Amharic language interpretation, or helping lead expatriate aid workers through the desert expanses where nomadic pastoralist families camped. In his 20s, fluent in English, Amharic, and Somali, he worked short‑term salaried jobs monitoring distributions of food aid and conducting re‑ search for needs assessments whenever emergency conditions arose. Mahamed has for decades been invaluable to aid agencies. He knows nearly everyone living within a three‑hour driving radius of the Degago refugee camp. As of 2022, his father lived an hour away along the border with Somaliland, his mother lived in a small town closer to Djibouti, and his wife and children lived in the nearest city nearly three hours away where they attend high school. Mahamed spent most days traveling between these different homes, sleeping and eating in the homes of his friends and extended relatives, and staying in towns where work and training opportunities are available. He can do so because of common understand‑ ings, habits, and expectations of hospitality. Mahamed is not unique. Numerous professional Somalis now travel and stay in the homes of friends and family members in communities and countries nearby as they navigate the mercurial nature of ad‑hoc relief operations, and the unpredict‑ able flows and sites of international attention and funding. Every year greater num‑ bers of Somali women, like Nimo and Mona, join the humanitarian workforce and travel from place to place for work as well, despite women’s relatively lower rates of participation in the workforce and lower access to higher education compared to other Ethiopian groups (Elezaj et al. 2019; Teklehaimanot and Teklehaimanot 2013).4 The familiarity of mobility and the centrality of hospitality to everyday life and work allows local staffers, men and women, to take temporary jobs that require travel and relocations, whenever and wherever they emerge. Labor Hierarchies that Enable and Constrain Mobility Most humanitarian aid workers – both in the Horn of Africa and in the Global South more generally – at some point travel or relocate to communities or countries nearby for temporary work and training opportunities, as disasters, conflicts, and international attention to different crises ebb and flow. Mobility is fundamental to the humanitarian sector and the humanitarian mission to save lives in emergencies (Redfield 2008). While Somali aid workers’ mobility for aid work is made pos‑ sible by long traditions of regular migrations and hospitality, their mobility is also shaped and constrained by their positions within the hierarchical global humanitar‑ ian aid industry. Figure 6.1, below, describes the labor hierarchies inherent to the global humanitarian industry, using humanitarian response in eastern Ethiopia as Humanitarian Nomads 101 a case example. At the top of the industry hierarchy operating there, a relatively small number of expatriate staffers work for high salaries, enjoy generous work benefits, and can travel and relocate internationally with ease. These international aid workers typically have permanent homes in Western donor countries and capi‑ tal cities where aid agencies are headquartered. They may travel to places like the Somali Region of Ethiopia for site visits or data collection, but they do not spend more than a few days or weeks in the places where relief operations occur. National staffers populate the second highest, but still relatively small section of the workforce hierarchy. In Ethiopia, for example, these individuals mostly speak Amharic as a first language and are usually fluent in English as well. They are part of the burgeoning middle to upper class in the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa; most have university degrees and post‑graduate training in nursing, medi‑ cine, or the social sciences; and many occasionally travel around the country and internationally for conferences and education. These staffers may spend a few days or weeks outside urban headquarters offices, but like expatriates, these Ethiopians typically do not spend much time in communities, camps, or relief operations out‑ side these cities. The majority of the humanitarian workforce in Ethiopia, indicated by the largest and lowest part of the pyramid, are neither expats nor Ethiopians from the capital city. They are locals from places like the Somali Region of Ethiopia perpetually in crisis, who work in offices close to where crises and relief operations happen, and who struggle to advance to jobs located in offices in capital cities – much less to headquarters located outside their country of origin. Many workers at the bottom Figure 6.1 Labor hierarchies in the global humanitarian system, as experienced in Ethiopia. 102 Lauren Carruth of the aid work hierarchy, including Somali aid workers, are from minoritized and racialized ethnic groups, and remain simultaneously marginalized and distant from political power in Addis Ababa. In Ethiopia and elsewhere, this humanitarian labor hierarchy is characterized by gradations of power and material resources, marked by parallel racialized5 eth‑ nolinguistic distinctions, differences in educational attainment, everyday language use, wealth, and the capacity, frequency, and ease of international movement to and within Global North countries (Carruth 2021). More broadly, “[t]he contempo‑ rary professional structure of the liberal humanitarian space,” Junru Bian argues, is characterized by “a covert power hierarchy fueled by perceptions of expertise and competency along racial lines—particularly around one’s whiteness” (Bian 2022, 2 drawing on Benton 2016). Thus, the professional hierarchies that struc‑ ture aid workers’ positions and mobilities in Ethiopia are shaped by perceptions of and proximities to the whiteness that dominates global humanitarian aid work (as discussed in Carruth 2021), as well as histories of imperialism, ethnic federalism, and perceptions of racialized ethno‑linguistic distinction particular to the Ethiopian context (discussed in Abbink 2011; Kefale 2013; Mengisteab 2013). Somali‑Ethiopians, accordingly, mostly populate “local” “field” offices and hold most lower‑level, temporary, and subcontracted staff positions in eastern Ethiopia, whereas Amharic‑speaking Ethiopians from the central parts of the country hold most higher‑level, salaried positions in the capital city of Addis Ababa. A Somali man I call Aden, a leader for over 15 years in a UN relief office in the Somali re‑ gional field office in Jigjiga said, accordingly, “I cannot get an international post despite the fact I have applied many times. I have been rejected and rejected. … They want me to stay. They want to keep me here” (Carruth 2021, 4). Participation, Localization, and the Necessity of South‑South Mobility Several reform movements over the last few decades have attempted to ameliorate these kinds of structural inequities within the aid industry, worsened in low‑income countries by structural adjustment programs and the decimation of governmental budgets for health, disaster prevention, and social services. Beginning in the latter half of the 20th century, international aid programs began explicitly referencing the moral necessity of “local participation” as a way to address beneficiaries’ per‑ ceived innate and moral deficiencies and prevent their potential “dependency” on foreign aid distributions (Carruth and Freeman 2021; Chambers 1994; Hickey and Mohan 2004, 5–9; Mohan and Stokke 2000; Mosse 2003). Methods for designing international interventions, like “participatory rural appraisals,” for example, were designed to give recipients ownership of the aid they received and meaningfully engage them in shaping aid projects that unfolded in their communities. As participatory approaches were mainstreamed and supported by major aid or‑ ganizations and Global North donor countries during the 1990s and 2000s, the resi‑ dents of communities in the Global South where global aid agencies intervened, in some cases, gained a modicum of power to determine the design and priorities of Humanitarian Nomads 103 the aid packages in their communities. As such, some scholars argued, participa‑ tion could potentially be “transformative,” even sometimes undermining tyrannical and undemocratic regimes (Hickey and Mohan 2004). Many of these participatory projects modeled democratic participation in government and spurred democratic reforms (Fox 2007; Gaventa 2004; Gaventa and McGee 2013). The rising popular‑ ity of participatory methodologies and projects was part of humanitarian policy and workforce reforms as well (Asgary and Lawrence 2020). The 1991 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (UNOCHA 2016), the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (ICRC 2018), the new and revised Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (2014), and the Sphere Standards (2018) each underscore the importance of “local” people and “local” organizations to making relief more ef‑ fective and ethical. Local participation and participatory methodologies require substantial work on the ground. Local labor is necessary to liaise with local leadership and residents, distribute materials, enforce adherence to program designs, process paperwork, collect data, provide language translation, provide logistical support, distribute goods and services, and monitor and evaluate projects. Even in humanitarian cri‑ ses, when many governmental and nongovernmental emergency response agen‑ cies may be compromised, these jobs are mostly performed by people from the regions where the interventions unfold. While all these different forms of local labor are necessary for the production of participatory projects, they are often only performed as side gigs, or as part of subcontracted, temporary, or informal work, and are thus neither counted by human resource departments, nor necessarily lead‑ ing to promotions, professionalization, raises, or benefits packages. Within many global humanitarian aid institutions like the International Com‑ mittee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Hu‑ manitarian Affairs (or UNOCHA), and others, there has been increasing attention in the last ten years to the needs of the “locals” who are also the beneficiaries or targets of temporary global humanitarian interventions (ODI 2013; UNOCHA 2023). What’s called “The Grand Bargain,” for example, launched in 2016, is an agreement between major donor and aid organizations to provide beneficiaries, lo‑ cal aid workers, and local organizations the means to design, evaluate, and improve the humanitarian interventions in their midst. This is one part of an effort across the humanitarian sector to prioritize the “localization of aid,” and the decentralization of resources and staffing from institutions and offices in the Global North to sub‑ national and local organizations and citizens located in crisis‑affected countries in the Global South (Bennett et al. 2016; Charter4Change 2020; Gingerich and Owen 2015; Inter‑Agency Standing Committee 2022; Oxfam 2016; Mahmood 2017). Workshops and publications by relief organizations now portray the national and sub‑national staffs of relief organizations as the heroes and the rightful focus of global assistance (Oxfam 2014, e.g. UNICEF 2019). Lower overhead, lower salaries, and reduced logistical hassles by subcontracting or partnering with lo‑ cal organizations – compared to hiring and deploying expatriate staffers and consultants – mean “localized” interventions can potentially cost less and involve 104 Lauren Carruth fewer challenging logistics (Van Brabant and Patel 2018). But beyond these ma‑ terial and logistical concerns, interventions and people that are more “local” are also now perceived by global relief organizations as somehow better, more ethical, more attuned to local realities and cultures, and more accountable to beneficiary populations. As a recent report from the Brookings Institution argues, After generations of investment in education, technical training, and social infrastructure, no one now argues that developing countries lack talented people. Indeed, the ranks of development organizations are filled with highly qualified, deeply experienced local professionals who have grown up work‑ ing in international development. (Fine 2022) This has observable effects on humanitarian interventions and aid workers in places like eastern Ethiopia. Doctor Hamza, a physician and a former leader within the Somali regional government within Ethiopia said in an interview, Today the [governmental] Health Bureau here is 100% Somali. … Most IN‑ GOs [international nongovernmental organizations] are headed by Somalis now too, and before five years the heads of office were mostly either white or highlander.6 This is a big change for us now, and it really helps us to be free. Powerful global relief organizations working in eastern Ethiopia, such as UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, and others are progressively funneling more money to subna‑ tional governmental offices like the Somali Regional Health Bureau and local Somali‑run nongovernmental and civil society partners. These organizations are also hiring more locals, more Somalis, and fewer Amharic‑speaking Ethiopians from the capital Addis Ababa, as well as fewer expatriates, to staff subnational and field offices. As such, localization is a powerful movement within the hu‑ manitarian industry – a movement that can have profound local political and social effects. However, the burgeoning power of local people and organizations is still dwarfed by the power of donor governments and international NGOs headquar‑ tered in the Global North (shown elsewhere in Cooke and Kothari 2021). While local offices are almost exclusively staffed by ethnic Somalis in eastern Ethiopia, few if any ethnic Somalis from the Horn of Africa staff headquarters offices in the Global North, and according to recent research, more generally, few crisis‑affected people have managed to obtain leadership positions within the global aid industry or sit on international NGO governing boards (ALNAP 2022; Worden and Saez 2021). “Localization,” for the most part, has meant more work for residents of crisis‑affected communities, but not more power for individuals or organizations in the Global South. The global aid industry is paradoxically reliant on the mobility of local aid workers within the Global South for their localization efforts while leav‑ ing unaddressed the inability of local aid workers to travel or obtain visas or jobs Humanitarian Nomads 105 outside their countries or regions of origin (see also Tsanni 2023, regarding similar challenges in the field of global health). Humanitarian Assemblages: Global, Local, and Mobile The international humanitarian industry is comprised of complex relations of ac‑ tors and organizations that are at once products of globalization – or the global reach and movement of ideas about crisis, intervention, and humanitarianism, as “abstractable, mobile, and dynamic” phenomena (Collier and Ong 2005, 4) – as well as products of “localization” – or the effort to devolve power and resources away from Global North centers of power to the communities where interven‑ tions happen, mostly in the Global South (ALNAP 2022; Fine 2022). As such, the contemporary humanitarian industry represents what Collier and Ong (2005) call a “global assemblage” that is territorialized not primarily through nation‑state borders, but through its focus on locality and mobility. Humanitarian interventions must be adequately “localized” and staffed by locals, as well as flexible and re‑ sponsive to dynamic and dispersed emergency situations happening around the world. Within this, aid workers must be mobile and adaptable, exhibiting what Ong (1999) calls “flexible citizenship” in their ascertainment of resources, ben‑ efits, belonging, and rights outside governmental authorities and across territorial or political boundaries. As such, “flexibility, migration, and relocations, instead of being coerced or resisted, have become practices to strive for rather than stability” (Ong 1999, 19). However, Somali aid workers, most of the world’s humanitarians, are neither like Ong’s (1999) “flexible citizens,” able to fully seize economic opportunities in the global capitalist economy through global mobility, nor do they reflect the “lightness” of Redfield’s (2012) “expats” – global elites with passports from do‑ nor countries and the ability to travel and live in the Global North as well as the Global South. As shown in this chapter, Somali aid workers’ networks of mobility, social relations, and labor differ in three important ways: first, Somalis’ constant mobility within the Horn of Africa for work, livestock, trade, healthcare, and so on happens across Global South borders but often without hallmarks of imperialist or nation‑state territoriality in the forms of checkpoints or visas. Somalis easily and frequently pass over borders that were historically designed to partition them and thwart their geographic movements, kinship ties, economic ties, and political solidarities. Second, the increasing numbers of Somali aid workers from the Horn of Africa, traveling and relocating within the region frequently for job opportuni‑ ties, happens concurrently with the simultaneous sedentarization and displacement of nomadic pastoralists throughout the region. Humanitarian nomads reflect tradi‑ tions of mobility, hospitality, and samafal long held by nomadic pastoralists, but at the same time these legions of nomadic humanitarians are available to work largely because of the declining viability of careers in livestock pastoralism and the continuing political insecurity and displacement of Somalis from their homelands. Third, as aid workers, they are part of a burgeoning well‑educated, professional class in places like the Somali Region of Ethiopia, but they also remain alienated 106 Lauren Carruth from the means of producing policies and designing relief interventions. They lack equal power, capital, and global mobility compared to aid workers from the Global North. Global humanitarian aid assemblages, to riff on Collier and Ong’s (2005) phrasing – including aid workers, relief operations themselves, and all the different global and local relief agencies and governments involved in aid work – are there‑ fore not solely products of or subordinate to global capitalism, neo‑liberal politics, or donor countries and wealthy actors in the Global North – but neither are they in‑ dependent of these powerful forces and forms.7 These nomadic aid workers present alternative ways of working and providing humanitarian assistance today. Their power, mobility, and labor in post‑colonial, politically insecure, non‑capitalist, and economically precarious spaces have allowed for the emergence of subaltern but powerful global assemblages of nomadic aid work. These emergent humanitar‑ ian assemblages are shaped and enabled by Somalis’ long traditions of nomadism, hospitality, samafal, and transnational mobility but they are at the same time con‑ strained by inequities inherent to the global humanitarian system and the impos‑ sibility of Somalis’ migration, travel, and work outside the Global South. Arjun Appadurai (2000), likewise, finds that “relations of disjuncture” char‑ acterize contemporary global assemblages. Somali aid workers in Ethiopia – and other aid workers moving for work within the Global South – are thus neither com‑ pletely excluded from nor equally powerful within capitalist labor economies like the global humanitarian relief sector. Instead, he finds, “these disjunctures them‑ selves precipitate various kinds of problems and frictions in different local situa‑ tions … that produce fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice, and governance” (Appadurai 2000, 5). Relations of disjuncture, and unequal dis‑ tributions of power, resources, opportunity, and the ability to move and travel with the global humanitarian industry, shape the limitations and potentials of Somalis’ aid work. Somalis’ nomadic humanitarian work reveals important subaltern mo‑ bilities and emergent forms of power and success within the progressively local‑ izing aid industry – even as their work continues to be limited by long‑standing racialized global inequities. Disjunctured South‑South Mobilities Somalis’ “lightness” and their enjoyment of regular travel and migration enable their easy interpolations into nomadic forms of aid work. These humanitarian no‑ mads are remarkably skilled in the provision of emergency relief across geographic and political boundaries. However, throughout the Horn of Africa, traditions of nomadic pastoralism exist alongside the progressive sedentarization of pastoralists. Somalis’ regular travel for visiting, trade, livestock, religious practice, education, and work exists alongside conflict and forced migrations throughout the region. Somalis’ reliance on and love of travel and migration remain, even as most So‑ malis in the Horn of Africa lack access to visas, passports, and opportunities for travel and work outside the Global South. Somali aid workers retain a desire and enjoyment for fieldwork and site visits, even as their geographic and professional Humanitarian Nomads 107 mobilities are curtailed by an inequitable aid industry, inflexible laws, and global forces and trends largely beyond their control. Efforts to promote participation and localization within the aid industry have necessitated increased South‑South mo‑ bilities and migrations for aid workers, but never their true freedom or equality. In the face of these paradoxes, however, “moving out widens the heart,” Ahmed insisted, and travel and migration within and between crisis‑affected places in the Global South contain the potential to emancipate individuals from violent political and economic enclosures. As Appadurai points out, the uneven distribution of power, resources, and rights to move, or the disjunctures and inequities so characteristic of global assemblages like the global humanitarian aid industry, contain within them the potential for transformation and empowerment. Thus, for many Somalis, nomadic aid work enables and represents limited forms of freedom, fulfillment, and career advance‑ ment. Somali aid workers’ imagination of the world and the humanitarian industry otherwise, their mobility and work in defiance of inequities and borders, “allow people to consider migration, resist state violence, seek social redress, and design new forms of civic association and collaboration, often across national boundaries” (Appadurai 2000, 6). Global humanitarian assemblages can enable emancipatory politics, including potentially through what the global aid industry calls “participa‑ tory action” or “localization.” In this case, among Somali aid workers and local humanitarian industry in the Horn of Africa now staffed almost exclusively by Somalis, emancipation is imagined and enacted through mobility, in ways only nomads can imagine. Notes 1 Following ALNAP (2022), in this chapter I define the humanitarian industry as all the actors (people, institutions, laws, governments, etc.) that organize, fund, and implement relief operations. They may be local organizations, like civil society groups or religious organizations, and they may be global relief agencies and donors, such as UNICEF or USAID. Humanitarian relief operations, in contrast to development or health interven‑ tions, are defined as temporary programs or interventions designed to save and protect human lives during conflicts, population displacements, disasters, and major social, po‑ litical, or economic upheavals. 2 In this chapter, I use the phrase “aid workers,” to refer to people who work in some posi‑ tion within the humanitarian industry and who work on the ground or in the field plan‑ ning, implementing, or evaluating various responses to humanitarian emergencies. 3 All names in this chapter are pseudonyms to protect my interlocutors’ identities. 4 Unlike male aid workers, female Somali aid workers I spoke to during this research frequently mentioned they struggled to balance childbearing with the frequent travel required of humanitarian relief operations. However, more and more women were em‑ ployed every year by global relief agencies, and all women I spoke with expressed ex‑ citement about the growing number of women doing this kind of work. 5 Race in Ethiopia remains a complex rather than a binary or static concept. Racialized hierarchies include complex racialized and politicized differentiations between the many ethnic and linguistic groups in Ethiopia, whereby self‑identified Habesha Ethiopians from the central and northern mountainous parts of the country, who mostly speak Am‑ haric or Tigrinya as a first language, are perceived by Somalis and others to be dis‑ proportionately promoted to higher levels of authority within the humanitarian industry 108 Lauren Carruth compared to people from pastoralist groups and other ethnolinguistic groups from the southern and eastern part of the country. 6 The term “highlander” is typically used to refer to persons of Amhara and other ethnici‑ ties that mostly live in the mountainous central, northern, and western parts of Ethiopia. 7 Even people like Somali aid workers, for example, perhaps outside what Ong (2005, 698) calls “hypercapitalist zones,” are not, I find, completely “globally excluded,” or part of what Ong characterizes as “populations without rights” only working for “sheer survival.” They work as part of important global economies like the global humanitarian industry, and they have found professional success and relatively lucrative gigs as aid workers, compared to their peers in the declining sectors of nomadic pastoralism, for example. 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Data and Results We use the qualitative data of the MIDEQ project, focusing on migration biogra‑ phies of return migrants in the Center East region of Burkina Faso. The survey gath‑ ered information about their experiences and the contribution of their migration in areas such as trade, business, and agriculture. A total number of 42 interviews were conducted in Bobo Dioulasso, Center‑West, Center‑East, and South‑West regions of the country. We talked to returnees who got involved in the agricultural sector upon arrival We present some descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 7.1. The time spent in Côte d’Ivoire by returnees varies from being born overseas to residing in Côte d’Ivoire for 27 years. The cities in which the migrants resided are also Table 7.1 Demographic characteristics of respondents Pseudonym Age Gender First migration in Côte d’Ivoire Cultivation Education Years in CI Marital status Fatouma 36 Female Born in CI Vegetables Never been to school Born in CI Widow Albert 50 Male 2002 Vegetables Primary 3 Married Boris 61 Male 1986 Vegetables Never been to school 14 Married Boureima 44 Male 1995 Vegetables Never been to school 5 Married Idrissa 47 Male 1996 Banana Never been to school 6Married Boubacar 58 Male 1979 Banana and cassava Primary 15 Married Bruno 62 Male 1987 Cocoa Never been to school 20 Married Cyril 57 Male 1985 Rice and cassava Never been to school 27 Married Yara 69 Male 1976 Rice Primary 8 Married Michel 50 Male 1982 Vegetables Never been to school 15 Married Source: MIDEQ data and authors’ calculations. The Flow of Resources in the Global South 117 very diverse. Most of them resided in the southern part of the country with cities such as Tiassalé (south of the country), Divo (south of the country), Sassandra (extreme south of the country), Port Bouet (extreme south of the country), Adiaké (south of the country), and various districts of the economic city of Abidjan such as Anoumanbo or Marcory. The respondents were all initially employed in agriculture before moving to Côte d’Ivoire. One noticeable gap is related to the fact that of all these returnees there was only one woman aged 36, while the remaining were all male, with an age range of 22 to 66 years. This lack of women’s representation in our panel reflects two situations. Firstly, migration is predominantly a male phenomenon in Burkina Faso, with young men going to Côte d’Ivoire to work. Female migration, which is marginal, is mainly the case of women joining their husbands and coming back whenever he comes back. Secondly, women’s access to land in Burkina Faso is conditional in many parts of the country because a woman, even though she can access land, usually can’t be the owner. Therefore, women work most of the time in their father’s field or their husband’s. The entire sample is also all married, some with several wives in Burkina Faso and outside the country. The only woman on the panel was widowed but remar‑ ried after coming to Burkina Faso for the first time. Notably, most of the panel had not been to school either in Burkina Faso or Côte d’Ivoire. Only three respondents attended primary and secondary school, while the rest had been to Koranic school. Regarding their family life and living conditions in Côte d’Ivoire, three lived with former family members who preceded them in migration. Others lived with people from the same locality but were not directly related to them. For others who had no family before them, they lived in accommodation provided by their bosses at their place of work. For instance, one respondent said: Over there, if you agree to do the work to be paid per year, it is the boss who will find you a house to sleep in, but if you want to do your own work, if you want the boss to share the field and give you your share, it is you who will find a place to sleep. (Boubacar Interviewed on 29th November 2021 in Bagré, Center East region.) Causes of Return The concept of return migration can be dated back to the famous list of migration laws written by Ravenstein (1889, p. 287), where he stated that “each main current produces a counter current of feebler strength.” The scientific literature considers return migration as a component of this counter‑current (Bovenkerk 1974). From the economic point of view, neoclassical economic theories state that return migra‑ tion is a result of failed expectations in destination countries or the result of a bad arbitration between the cost and benefits of migration in the first place (de Haas and Fokkema 2011; Todaro 1969). In any case, these theories consider return migration as a failure, because people who are able to succeed in their migration process stay in their destination countries (Tezcan 2019). In the same way, some authors con‑ sider that for countries of origin, return migration receives little attention especially 118 Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré when the return is involuntary or subsequent to a failed migration and failed in‑ tegration in the country of destination. Return migrants are therefore even more overlooked when the origin countries’ economies and labour markets are weak (Haase and Honerath 2016). The New Economics of Labour Migration Theory states things differently. In fact, unlike the previous theory, migration decisions are taken at the household level, where the member who is more likely to succeed in migration is selected to travel. Success in that case means contributing to the household income by sending remittances or saving for investments in the origin country upon return. In a practi‑ cal way, the International Organization for Migration defines return migration in the context of international migration as “the movement of persons returning to their country of origin after having moved away from their place of habitual resi‑ dence and crossed an international border” (IOM 2019). In this chapter, we argue that return migration is not a failure, but rather is usually a choice of the migrant, even though some factors can make them return prematurely. Before discussing the skills acquired in the place of migration and used in Bur‑ kina Faso, it would be appropriate to take stock of the migrants’ intentions to re‑ turn. Indeed, it should be noted that, whatever the reason for their departure, all the people interviewed emphasised their long‑term desire to return when they started their migration journey. This is a common finding in the literature as argued by Batistella (2018), most migrants leave with the idea of returning home one day. In our case, the migration project is often framed as a plan, aiming to earn an income that will allow the migrant to send money home, and make savings for his return. Hence migration is described by the informants as a viable life option. Bruno, interviewed in Bagré on the 27th of November 2021, stated: I had the intention of coming back. I went there to search for money and have a better life. One who earns between a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand CFA returning home would be forced to migrate after spending his/ her savings. I came, went back, came back, and went back to Côte d’Ivoire more than ten times. However, in the meantime, we knew settling here in our country to find something to do would be better than staying away. So that is how we came back to settle here permanently. The geographical proximity of Côte d’Ivoire, accompanied by cultural proximity and regional agreements like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), reinforce the migration pattern and allow people to circulate easily between borders. ECOWAS agreements allow all citizens from member States to move freely within the community. However, it is important to note that since 22 March 2020, Côte d’Ivoire chose to unilaterally close its ground borders with neighbour‑ ing countries. Air borders were still opened however, but considering that the ma‑ jority of people moving from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire are relatively poor, they were stuck and had to use clandestine ground roads to enter the country. Note however that ground borders have been recently opened on the night of 15–16 February 2023. The Flow of Resources in the Global South 119 Those who are not involved in the migration process as such, as well as those who were born there, also mentioned the desire to return to their country of origin one day. The female respondent, Fatouma interviewed on the 23rd of November 2021 in Tenkodogo, shared her experience: “… even from the age of twelve (12), I kept bothering my parents with this story of “I want to go to Faso.” It should be noted that while the desire to return home was present in the minds of all migrants, some of them had to shorten their stay for reasons beyond their control. In fact, many mentioned family reasons that pushed them to return pre‑ maturely. These reasons are often related to old age or the death of a parent, which necessitates the premature return of the migrant, especially if the migrant is a man. The return is, therefore, sometimes imposed by family members. In circumstances where several members of the same household have migrated, those who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire are more likely to be called back home because they are consid‑ ered closer geographically.” Cyril, interviewed on the 27th of November in Bagré, emphasises the non‑voluntary character of his return by saying: In any case, my return was not good for me. I did not go back for a simple cause. The death of my older brother, leaving behind his wife and children, was the main factor for my return. It was a very sudden death that made me come back involuntarily. It was involuntary because if it was not for that, I was not going to come back right now. In addition to familial responsibilities many have mentioned that another reason for returning is the feeling of rejection and the harsh social conditions in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, Boubacar Interviewed on 29th November 2021 in Bagré, Center East region argues that Ah, concerning our return to Burkina, in any case, we can say that we left Ivory Coast for compulsory reasons. Because we were tired there. Every day it is just the blows that we take. So we saw in the end that the best thing was to arrive home. Our suffering was too much. This last statement refers to a common finding in the literature stating that per‑ ceived xenophobia, and difficulties to integrate the labour market in destination countries can catalyse migrants’ return to origin countries (Tezcan 2019). Return migrants come home with new sets of skills and a new mindset that direct them towards self‑employment and entrepreneurship upon return. In fact, with the help of savings acquired overseas, they are more likely to become entrepreneurs upon return (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; McCormick and Wahba 2001; Mesnard 2004). Studies emphasising the transfer of migrants’ skills in their countries of origin are however focused on the North‑South Migration. Moreover, they do not focus on the agricultural sector that employs the majority of people, especially in Africa. Agriculture is a common activity carried out both in Côte d’Ivoire and in Burkina Faso. Indeed, the interviewed returnees mention that they were already 120 Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré involved in agricultural activities before their migration and that by returning to Burkina Faso, they simply reintegrated into an activity they already knew, even if their cultivation techniques had changed. Albert, interviewed in Pakala on the 28th of November 2021, working in the gardening sector, argues that: “…we were in the business since our childhood”. As stated above most of the respondents were initially employed in agriculture before moving to Côte d’Ivoire. The qualitative survey results in the Centre‑East region show a whole range of skill transfers by returnees in agriculture. Indeed, whether they innovate by introducing species un‑ known in Burkina Faso or farming techniques, they add value to the Burkinabe agricultural sector. They all mention the undeniable contribution of their stay in Côte d’Ivoire in gaining new work culture and skills. As Boris, a market gardener interviewed on the 28th of November 2021 in Garango/Pakala, said: At the moment, if it was not for the fact that we were in Côte d’Ivoire, we would not be here today doing this work… Today the way of planting the different plants is no longer a secret for us. Idrissa, a banana farmer interviewed in Bagré on the 29th of November 2021, added: “Regarding our way of working, it is our migration to Côte d’Ivoire that taught us everything.” It should also be noted that returnees adapt their working methods to local con‑ ditions. Indeed, whether they are cultivating new or local agricultural species, they recognise fundamental differences between Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, which leads them to adapt their knowledge to the local context. Improvisation takes on its whole meaning when the return migrants consider the essential fact that climatic conditions and soil types are not comparable with the Ivorian context. New Agricultural Species as a Returnee Asset Our study found that some uncommon and new species of plants are cultivated in the Centre‑East region as a direct result of knowledge acquired by return migrants. Some of these species are directly imported from Côte d’Ivoire as well as all the techniques used in the culture. The main imported crop grown by the returnees surveyed in the market gardening sector is the flowering onion imported from Côte d’Ivoire. As Boureima stated during his interview on the 28th of November 2021 in Tenkodogo, “This new species is called here the Chinese onion…That is what I used to grow in Côte d’Ivoire. It came from Côte d’Ivoire. It came with the brother who is leaving there to return home.” We also noted the cultivation of cassava, which initially came from the local species but has gradually changed with the arrival of species cultivated in Côte d’Ivoire and with changes in consumption habits. The yields of these new crops are good and result in national sales, especially in the major cities. Localities such as Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Bittou, Pouytenga, and Manga are sometimes mentioned, indicating that these crops introduced by the returnee are well con‑ sumed in the large cities. It is important to note a point concerning the crop of The Flow of Resources in the Global South 121 which Côte d’Ivoire is one of the main exporting countries that is cocoa. One of the returnees in this study also imported this crop in Burkina Faso, and is growing it for sale. As he stated, after spending about twenty years in Côte d’Ivoire, Bruno, tried to grow cocoa in Burkina Faso with techniques he learned in Côte d’Ivoire: “Here, when I am growing cocoa, I learned that in Côte d’Ivoire.” After growing millet and rice in the first years of his return to Burkina Faso, he used the earnings from this activity to travel back to Côte d’Ivoire to get cocoa seeds: “It was recently in 2015 that I started growing cocoa. I used to grow maize, rice, and small millet. On 20 July 2015, I returned to Côte d’Ivoire with 300,000 CFA to buy cocoa seeds in Côte d’Ivoire.” The yields are good for Bruno, and he has international ambitions. He argues that “Here, if the production is a lot, you can go to Côte d’Ivoire to sell it. If it’s not much, you’ll connect to people who will come and buy it.” He continues by addressing an issue that seems common to our interviewees, which is the access to larger farmland: But as my plot of farm is not large, I am looking at it, if afterwards the gov‑ ernment sees that my idea is good and it comes back to add space, necessarily I will now have the market with the white people. In addition to Bruno, Idrissa tried to introduce a new variety of banana found in Côte d’Ivoire and Western countries. He argues: “There is another variety, the ‘grande‑naine,’ but that is only available in Côte d’Ivoire or in Western countries.” He was however not able to succeed in his enterprise because of the COVID‑19 pandemic, and lack of support from the government. We once ordered this variety of grande Naine in France to try it out. It was at the time of the COVID pandemic, the order was delivered and blocked some‑ where because of the closure of the borders. But as they were grains, they lost their necessary weight and qualities. So when we experimented here, it didn’t work. When it came, we asked the region to help us with a small area, even if it’s two hectares, to experiment with, but they flatly refused. With all that time added, the grains were totally spoiled. The Case of New Agricultural Techniques and Work Ethics Some of our interviewees did not cultivate new species but rather reintegrate into their old activities upon return, and yet one could see a significant difference in the new set of skills they brought with them. When asked whether the techniques they use are the same as those of the non‑migrants, Fatouma replied: “That is clear. Those who are here will not necessarily have the same techniques, let alone me, who learned outside…. Here, as there is not enough water, my partings are less wide than those in Côte d’Ivoire.” Similarly, Albert argues: The fact that we have been to Côte d’Ivoire is already a difference. The work cannot be the same. Even between us returning migrants, the way of doing things cannot be the same. That is it. The techniques we use differ. 122 Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré About the cultivation of the local variety of cassava already present in Burkina Faso, Cyril remarked that: For cassava, I have noticed that the ones growing here are often placed closer to each other. The gap here is not at all wide, so you have to leave a gap be‑ tween each cassava plant. You have to plant it so that it is wide… So if you plant in better measures, normally if you remove one cassava plant, it should be enough for several people. He further emphasised the contribution of Côte d’Ivoire to his way of working, maintaining that In the plantation process, I am faster than them (non‑migrants). I have a good understanding of that. I have a good grasp of water piping and everything. I know it well because I had to do it in Côte d’Ivoire. I have done in the big lowlands in Côte d’Ivoire, so I master all that. The region often offers capacity‑building training to farmers in order to help them in their activities. Migrants and non‑migrants take the courses; however, they seem not to have the same understanding of the training’s importance. Cyril, therefore, emphasises that even in the training courses they attend, they are more assidu‑ ous in the sense that those who have not migrated are less inclined to follow the recommendations given to them during the training. In addition to this rigour and assiduity at work, there is also a distinct difference in the eagerness to work, as many of our respondents mention the fact that they are more tenacious at work than non‑migrants. This is due to the fact that in Côte d’Ivoire, they were used to large areas of cultivation compared to the hectares that the Burkinabe government agrees to grant them here. Boureima emphasises that this has become a habit, a second nature for them: “Those who did not go out there cannot last long in the fields like us. It has become our habit. That is it.” Returnees’ Reflections on Their Return – The Contribution of Migration Migrants were also asked directly what they think about the non‑financial contribution of their migration experiences. Not surprisingly, they mention several contributions of this migration that are not only financial. The female informant Fatouma adds: Taking a step away from home is already like enrolling in a new school. There are things that you will never accept or refuse if it is not that you are once out. Someone who is out and someone who is not out these two are very different. The one who went out is doubly rich in the head than the one who stayed. If I have reached this level today, it is because I was born outside. This point underlines the awareness that migrants acquire during their migratory process. Thus, even if their migration does not succeed in economic terms, it still has some positive sides to it, as emphasised by Albert: “It is true that our migration The Flow of Resources in the Global South 123 has not enabled us to achieve anything, but at least we are mature and returned home with some lived experiences on what a hard work can pay one in life.” Some refer to the fact that their migration has made them value education. Fa‑ touma argues, In the village here, you cannot see a child who has his parents in Côte d’Ivoire leaving school because of school fees. You can never see that. It is not that they have more money than those here, but it is because they better under‑ stand the value of education. Given that the majority of the participants of the study have never been to school, this is significant and marks a shift in beliefs about the role of the school. This trend in South‑South Migration, as Chapter 1 argues (Zeleke and Smith 2023), partly relates to the migrants’ consideration of investment in education as a compensatory act, compensating for their own lack of educational attainment. Finally, as Cyril, one of our 57‑year‑old interviewees stated: “Knowledge is not something that can be measured; it is not something that rots away so that the traces will be there, and we will benefit from it. That is how it is.” Conclusion Return migration in the context of South‑South Migration, especially in intra‑continental migration, unlike the migration to remote destinations, needs to be addressed with reference to how much proximity between places of origin and destination impacts the return migration dynamic. In fact, our work showed that migrating to a country close to the origin country raises the probability of being required to come home in case of necessity. In that framework, return migration can be involuntary in the context of intracontinental and especially geographically closed migration. Nevertheless, the idea of returning home after migrating has always been in the minds of our interviewees. Hence, the skills and knowledge gained by Burkinabe migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire are not to be neglected. This contribution argues that any discussion on the flow of resources needs to unpack how the flow of skills and new work ethics, as part of the overall resources that migrants acquire at places of destination, has diverse impacts on origin communities, ranging from the creation of businesses to development of new activities in the agricultural area in our case. The benefits of their migration are also definitely impacting the econ‑ omy of their country of destination. In fact, they use their physical and intellectual strength in their place of migration, which undoubtedly contributes to the develop‑ ment of their host country. As for their country of origin, the financial spin‑offs sent are the primary source of benefits for migrants. In this chapter, we have discussed the non‑financial benefits of migration, including the introduction of new species in agriculture, new worldviews and work ethic, and the transfer of skills and knowl‑ edge as a whole, in the Centre East region of Burkina Faso. The results of the survey show that migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire dem‑ onstrate ingenuity in agricultural practices, both in terms of introducing new species 124 Tebkieta Alexandra Tapsoba and Bonayi Hubert Dabiré and new working techniques. The results also show difficulties related to the social acceptance of migrant labour, access to land, and the difficult climatic conditions of the country. 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The Hadiya have creatively used religion as a space to create agency to materialize the migration project. In effect, this prophecy sacralises and endorses migration as God‑sanctioned and God’s redemptive plan for the Hadiya. The Hadiya often use the spiritual term aberalin (God awakened us) while talking about why and how Hadiya migration to South Africa started. Abandoned by the Ethiopian state and lagging behind their neighbours, God, as it were, stepped in and is now engaging Hadiya by opening a southern route through which prosperity comes, helping them to catch up with and even excel compared to their neighbours. Most Hadiya who migrated to South Africa are from the villages and unskilled with little formal edu‑ cation and experience in business, as to be discussed below. In addition to this, Hadiya migration to South Africa, like other migrants from the Horn of Africa more broadly, has been enabled by a more liberal immigration policy especially for African migrants in post‑Apartheid South Africa, at least un‑ til 2011 when policy started shifting. This reversed Apartheid’s restrictive policy that instituted its vision of an all‑white South Africa through a system of ‘influx control’ applied to black South Africans as it was also used to contain and regulate migration from other African countries. Post‑Apartheid South Africa under Presi‑ dent Mandela opened its door to migrants partly as an act of gratitude to African countries that actively supported the African National Congress during the libera‑ tion struggle. President Mandela was also keen for black South Africans to learn from African migrants, especially business skills (Siddique 2004). South Africa is the only country in the continent where refugees and asylum seekers have freedom of movement and the right to work rather than being confined to camps. Drafted in 1998 under the post‑apartheid era of democratization, the law is among the world’s most progressive in terms of the rights it grants asylum seekers and refugees. Un‑ like other African countries, South Africa never established refugee camps. Instead, asylum seekers and refugees are free to settle anywhere in the country, and are also free to work and study.5 Even those claimants whose case is pending or their stay is extended for a short period found themselves at the workplace soon after their arrival. In principle, working without documents makes them illegal but there is a greater tolerance by South African authorities towards migrants, especially in the informal trade sector. However, this comes without a right to protection and ac‑ cess to social services. Some migrants negotiate their precarious existence through informal arrangements with South African law enforcement agencies and various brokers who help them secure fake documents. South Africa is one of the strong‑ est economies in Africa and offers opportunities for migrants to work both in the formal and informal economies. In addition to South Africa’s progressive immigra‑ tion policies, policy reforms in Ethiopia since 1991 also included the constitutional right of movement of people, including international travels (the 1995 Constitu‑ tion, Article 32. 1). Prior to that international travel was very much restricted, as this required government permission which issued an exit visa. This simultaneous liberal migration policies at the place of origin and des‑ tination have increased the momentum of Hadiya migration to South Africa. Hadiya Experiences 133 Although few Hadiya migrated to South Africa because of political persecution, especially the youth affiliated with the opposition HNDO in the early 2000s, most are irregular migrants who request asylum in order to get work permits so that they can be self‑employed in the informal trade. But as the number of migrants from the Horn of Africa seeking asylum in South Africa has reached unprecedented levels, South African border authorities have started refusing mi‑ grants entry. This has given way to the emergence of a robust smuggling industry that involves multiple intermediaries situated in places of origin, in transit coun‑ tries and in South Africa. Most Ethiopian migrants work in the informal trade sector, running busi‑ nesses in townships and business districts of bigger towns such as Johannesburg and Durban. From villages with little education, skills, and language barrier, nearly all Hadiya migrants in South Africa are self‑employed and engaged in small businesses. Typically, they start with home delivery of consumer goods in the townships. This business is known among migrants as ‘location’. The goods range from household appliances to belts and curtains. These types of businesses were enabled by the gaps created in service delivery to townships during Apart‑ heid (Ogura 1996). No proper shops were established in the black townships and blacks were either not allowed or were fearful of accessing goods and services in bigger towns which were predominantly inhabited by the white South Africans. When the country was opened in the post‑Apartheid period and the economy was liberalized with greater integration with the global economy, the hitherto scarce consumer goods became suddenly available for the black South Africans who now also have greater purchasing power thanks to South Africa’s welfare state. South Africa has one of the most extensive social welfare systems in the global south (Naidu 2022).6 Migrants involved in the informal trade entice black South Africans to spend their welfare money in purchasing consumer goods offered in the form of credit. Currently, the door‑to‑door delivery of consumer goods is replaced by small shops in the townships popularly known as Spaza or tag shops, instancing a form of economic mobility of migrants, Hadiya migrants included. Although this form of business has a darker side involving a growing form of violence, including xenophobia and shop robberies (Solomon and Kosaka 2019; Liwewe 2022), it has also enabled Hadiya migrants to accumulate wealth, evident in the volume of remittance and sprouting migrant businesses in places of origin, especially in Hosanna and other towns in Hadiya Zone. Above all, migration has equipped the Hadiya with the much‑needed entrepreneurial skills which they deploy in the businesses they set up in places of origin. Other forms of the flow of knowledge/ ideas include a belief in oneself; a culture of saving, networking skill, resilience, and perseverance, and an alternative conception of development that critiques Ethiopia’s historically sedimented statist conception and terms of development. In the following section, we discuss the flow of economic norms expressed in the form of new business skills and entrepreneurial drive more broadly and the transformational significance of this both at the individual and collective levels in places of origin. 134 Dereje Feyissa Development Dividends of Hadiya Migration to South Africa – Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Skills Animated by spirituality and determined to improve their conditions of life without the skill set and language competence, Hadiya migrants acquired business skills in South Africa the hard way. They are all self‑made. Most returnee migrants empha‑ sized non‑monetary gains when asked about the importance of their South African experience. Most described migration to South Africa in its transformational sense, as the following extracts from interviews with returnee migrants indicate: South Africa is like a big school for me. I was a grade 10 student when I dropped out of school and migrated. I had no idea about business. I used to think business is meant for the Amhara, Tigrayans, Gurage and other people from the north. But South Africa has showed me a different world – expand my horizon and most importantly that hard work pays off if the right system is put in place. Yes, there is discrimination and violence in South Africa but still you can succeed and improve your condition of life. We go there empty handed and come back not only with money but also with the knowl‑ edge and skills. Above all, we feel now good about ourselves. We Hadiya were made to feel inferior in Ethiopia. We also work hard in Ethiopia but no change. I am ever grateful to South Africa for the better person that I have become. I would have remained in a village for the rest of my life doing what my forefathers did for generations. But now I run a vibrant business – owning two Sino Trucks, a construction materials shop and plots of land, one of which I built a villa on. You see now many Hadiyas are do‑ ing business, which would have been unthinkable without South Africa. Most Hadiya businesses you see in Hosanna are somehow connected to South Africa one way or the other. (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, May 17, 2021) Another returnee migrant, Abraham (a pseudonym) shared a similar view, appre‑ ciating the transformational impact of migration not only through knowledge ac‑ quired in South Africa but also life life‑changing experiences during the journey: I was 16 years old when I migrated to South Africa. Not only that was I a boy but also, I did not have enough money to pay for the cost of migra‑ tion. The money I had took me only to Kenya. My situation forced me to be self‑reliant. I approached smugglers and worked with them. I connected them with many Hadiya migrants who were passing through Kenya. I did this for six months. With the savings that I made; I continued my journey passing through Tanzania. By the time I reached Malawi I run out of money. I went to the refugee camp where I again got connected with smugglers. I stayed with the smugglers for one year facilitating the money transfer between mi‑ grant families and the smugglers. I got commission for that. In fact, I wanted to stay in Malawi but when I heard that the borders of South Africa would Hadiya Experiences 135 be closed soon after the 2010 World Cup I rushed and crossed the border to South Africa. By the time I reached South Africa I already learnt a lot from my stay in Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi. Although I did not have relatives in South Africa, I knew many people and that social network helped me to get started the location business not long after my arrival. After some time, I opened shops in Durban and made lots of money. I realized how impor‑ tant social network is which helped me even get a Mozambique work permit where I used to do “brand” business [business in counterfeit products] from Mozambique to South Africa. Had it not been for the growing violence and robbery I would have liked to stay in South Africa longer; a country which made me a better person. It is not only money that I got from South Africa. I have also learnt how South Africans make a living. The most striking thing for me was how rich white people still do farming or keep cattle. I thought, once you are rich, you do something else. This is how people think in Ethio‑ pia, Hadiya included. I did not have a clear business plan when I returned from South Africa. I assessed the market and realised that there is milk short‑ age in Hosanna town. Then milk supply was only 25% of the demand. I sensed that the supply would be even less because of the rapid urbanisation in Hosanna. I decided to invest in dairy farm. I bought 25 milk cows with an in‑ vestment worth 8 million birr. That was shocking for many, including friends and relatives. They expected me to be modern and invest in other sectors, not going down and waste the money on cows. I told them that many rich white people in South Africa keep cattle and cultivate even those who are highly educated. Look where I am 3 years after my return – my dairy farm is grow‑ ing by the day supplying the town with 800 litres of milk per day. It makes me very happy to see I am contributing to food security supplying over 1000 children with the much‑needed milk. (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, July, 14, 2021) From Abraham’s story, we also learn how important social network is for mi‑ grants to cope with and thrive in their destination and upon return to their places of origin. Throughout his stay in South Africa, this returnee migrant made a robust socio‑economic network across religious and ethnic boundaries, and which he con‑ tinued upon his return. He recounted that he consciously crossed boundaries to enhance his life chances while responding to the imperatives of migration. It is no wonder thus that the fundraising for his send‑off party was the highest, earning him over 400,000 Rand which he used, in addition to his saving, as seed capital to start his dairy farm business in Hosanna. During his journey back to Ethiopia – he pre‑ ferred the land route from South Africa via Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya – he met an Indian businessman which evolved into an important economic network. The Indian businessman was keen on networking with Abraham who introduced himself as half South African and half Ethiopian in order to increase his business appeal. They planned a business venture in South Africa. While Abraham visited the brick workshop of the Indian businessman in Addis Ababa, he reciprocated by visiting Sisay and his dairy farm in Hosanna. More crucially, this network helped 136 Dereje Feyissa Abraham to travel to India where he visited a trade fair of dairy products. Two of his Muslim friends from Addis Ababa whom he met in South Africa also visited Abraham in Hosanna, also with a plan for a joint venture. Currently, Abraham is embarking on commercial farming with 300 hectares of leased land that he got from the government, itself a product of his newly found networking skill. He clearly identified where investment is most needed, as Hadiya have been progressively reduced from producers of grain to net importers. With a view of further modernizing his farms, Abraham is also networking with trending educated Ethiopian farmers on YouTube, who continue to inspire him and sustain his belief that it is possible to be modern and a farmer at the same time; an ex‑ panded business horizon thanks to his exposure to a different worldview during his stay in South Africa and in transit countries. For others, creating a new sense of self through the transformational impact of migration sometimes comes from parents who use the migration of their children to South Africa as a parental disciplinary measure, as the following story by a re‑ turnee migrant indicates: I come from a relatively well to do family. How I migrated to South Africa is somehow different from most cases. It was imposed on me by my parents. I was the naughtiest of all their children. I started smoking and drinking at an early age. I even joined gang groups in Hosanna and participated in hang‑ ing. My father vainly tried many things. He finally thought of sending me to South Africa. He said to me “go to South Africa and be somebody”. He did not mean this in the sense of go there and make money but rather he believed in the transformational power of migration. Many people who do not do any‑ thing in Hadiya would become hard workers in South Africa and come back not only with money but also as a better, responsible persons. South Africa proved my father right. I migrated reluctantly but now I am a successful businessman owning a house, plots of land. Shops and trucks. Above all, my parents are happy with me. (Returnee migrant, interviewed in Fonqo, August 5, 2021) Still for others what South Africa has taught them is perseverance and resilience. Although in the early years of migration, South Africa was safer, things started changing with a more visible sign of wealth expressed in the form of sprouting shops in townships making them vulnerable to robberies, as recounted by the fol‑ lowing returnee migrant: Yes, there are risks running shops in South Africa. As soon as your business expands it attracts robbers. Robbers know that we put our money in the shops because we can not use banks as we do not have documents. Black South Africans do not know how to make business but they see us prospering. That is why they think we are stealing their money. But as soon as we are robbed, we start the business from scratch. We have learnt how to persist and rebuild business. I have learnt the value of perseverance. Always find a way to come Hadiya Experiences 137 back, for example, if I am broke, I won’t just quit. I rather work harder to get back to business. Most people give up business when things go in the wrong direction; they lose the psychological battle that is not a good thing. You fight on with what you have until you get something better. You also need to be patient. That is in the logic of business. This is helping me a lot in my busi‑ ness here in Hosanna. I am a believer of myself. No matter how I go down in my business I know that I will get up again. (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, July 28, 2021) A value addition to the entrepreneurial skill set, and an important economic norm, is how migration has reinforced the culture of saving. A key component of Ethio‑ pian migrants’ success in business in South Africa is iqub. Iqub is a traditional means of saving in Ethiopia and exists completely outside of the formal financial system. It is a form of revolving savings. People voluntarily join a group and make a mandatory contribution (every week, pay period, or month for example). The “pot” is distributed on a rotating basis determined by a drawing at the beginning of the iqub. Amounts contributed vary according to the means of the participants. Iqub is adapted to the specific migration milieu of South Africa in which it plays a crucial role; part of migrants’ resilience repertoire and means of accumulation (Girmachew 2019). The revitalization of iqub in the situation of migration directly relates to the status of Hadiya migrants and the nature of the labour market. Most Hadiya migrants in South Africa do not have documents, which bars them from access to the South African banking system. Even those who have documents feel uncomfortable using the banking system for fear of losing money to South African immigration authorities. As a result, nearly all put their saving in the shops until either they invest it in the expansion of their shops or remit to families through the hawala system. They mitigate the risk of being robbed by entering into iqub. The nature of their business also encourages the use of iqub, especially during the form‑ ative ‘location’ phase of migrant businesses in which daily income comes in the form of small amounts (coins) which requires diligent saving to pay for the weekly iqub contributions. Otherwise, it would be very easy to lose earnings as they appear insignificant. Iqub functions based on trust. As Hadiya form the largest Ethiopian immigrant community in South Africa this has provided them a wider social net‑ work offering various forms of iqubs. The importance of iqub in migrants’ business can be gleaned from the following recount by a returnee migrant: The reason why Ethiopian migrants have become more successful in busi‑ ness than black South Africans is because of iqub. Iqub helps us save and be planned. We plan expansion of business based on the size of our iqubs. Once in an iqub you have to think twice before you spend your daily income. Iqub is also kind of addictive. The more money you earn the more iqubs you want to enter. Iqub is also important to restart business after a robbery. People who are robbed often get priority so that they get going as soon as possible. When the iqub money is not enough we also give each other money either as a gift or borrowing. Hadiya would have prospered even more had it not been for 138 Dereje Feyissa the jealousy and competition. People talk a lot about black South Africans robbing Ethiopian migrants and killing them. In fact, the rise in robbery and violence against migrants is related to migrants themselves. Those migrants who are not as successful in their business are now going to black South Af‑ ricans and tell them who gets the iqub money when and where they put their money. South Africans would not have known about these things otherwise. Now they say give me my iqub money. Migrants do this either to eliminate competitors or get a share of the loot. Hadiya community in South Africa has now established an informal institution that monitors criminal activities [the Enough Campaign] and report to the South African law enforcement agen‑ cies.7 A handful of such people have already been deported to Hadiya. (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, August 10, 2022) At any rate, the culture of saving epitomized by iqub, though it has local roots prior to migration, has been elaborated on due to the imperatives of the specific migra‑ tion context of South Africa and the nature of the labour market. As much as we speak here about social remittance, it is important to note also how migrants move with their traditional assets which are customized and appropriated to the contexts at places of destination. The evolution of iqub from a means of mobilizing financial resources into a safe deposit mechanism in the South African context goes beyond its original purpose at the place of origin. Returnee migrants further use the culture of saving to support their businesses. They stand out very differently from migrant families whom they supported while they were still in South Africa. Migrant families are known for their conspicuous consumption and display of the material wealth generated by the flow of resources from South Africa. They are nicknamed yihune which in Amharic means ‘let it be’; a reference to their spending culture including paying for whatever price suggested by a shopkeeper. Returnee migrants are shocked to see such extravagance and they seek to counter this by leading through example, for which they are sometimes mocked as qoraliyews; a term used in Ethiopia to people who go door to door to ex‑ change used cloth and shoes or any other household item in exchange for cheaper but functional imported Chinese goods. Calling returnee migrants as qoraliyaws is meant to discourage their ‘aggressive’ saving culture, as the following experience of a returnee migrant businessman in Addis Ababa indicates: When I first visited Hosanna upon return from South Africa, I was shocked when I heard the price that I was hearing from the shops. Nearly all goods are much more expensive in Hosanna than in Addis. When I asked people why is it that goods are very expensive in Hosanna, they told me about the yihunes. The hard‑won money that we send to support families is wasted here as if we dig money; thus endless. I also realised that shopkeepers, especially those who come outside of Hadiya, take advantage of this irresponsible consump‑ tion. If you haggle over a price they would say, ‘are you a mengist serategna/ civil servant?’, as if being a civil servant is something that one has to be ashamed of. Implicitly they are referring to the difference between migrant Hadiya Experiences 139 and non‑migrant families and their different spending behavior. Let them call us qoraliyaw. We should rather strive to make the yihune qoraliyaws. We should not waste this unique chance that is provided to us. South Africa is a gift from God to Hadiya. We should make use of it to transform our society. But if people [migrant families] become irresponsible in their spending all would be for nothing. (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Addis Ababa, July 25, 2021) A different flow of idea is the culture of working together; exposure to migrants from other countries who not only support each other financially but work together in the form of joint ventures that enables the pooling of capital and labour. This has led to self‑reflection on the saying that “Ethiopians are good at eating together but not working together”. A returnee migrant thus recounted: Many non‑Ethiopian migrants in South Africa found our culture intriguing, including our neighbours the Somalis. They say “Ethiopians are perhaps the only people who eat from a common tray and even feed each other, and yet we do not see you working together”. They wonder what will become of us if we combine our strong sense of sociality with working together. This is true, more so among Hadiya and migrants from southern Ethiopia. We support each other through iqub and all sorts of fund raising for social events – from welcoming new comers, weddings, to sending off parties for those who re‑ turn home. And yet it is rare to see us working together, except this temporary contractual arrangement between a boss (established migrants) and borders (new arrivals). There is also another problem with Ethiopians. We tend to do exactly the same business. If I open a shop somewhere and becomes profit‑ able, others would come and do the same. This is the reason why there is a lot of animosity and violence among Ethiopian migrants. In South Africa a certain business is often associated with a certain family [business profiling] so that they expand the business with greater profit margin. The same busi‑ ness is run as a family business for generation.” (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Shashogo, July 17, 2022) Some returnee migrants are moving towards a family firm, and few with friends. Abraham who is quoted extensively in the previous section, for instance, recently opened a video game and PlayStation business with a friend who is still in South Africa, combining financial resources and market information. A recent example of investing in shareholding would be six Hadiya migrants (some returnee, others still in South Africa) who have invested in the Addis Ababa City Administration’s Convention and Exhibition Centre. Such incipient forms of shareholding are very important, more so as Ethiopia is gradually opening its economy‑creating oppor‑ tunities for Hadiya migrants investing in the financial sector or embark on joint ventures. Migrants’ entrepreneurial drive and its potential for transformation of Hadiya society is also visible not only in catching up but also excelling in a certain sense. 140 Dereje Feyissa For instance, migrant investment in the public transport sector has not only tre‑ mendously enhanced rural–urban connectivity in Hadiya Zone but also enabled the Hadiya to successfully insert themselves into the national economic space, evident in the sheer number of inter‑regional buses Hadiya own and how Hadiya language has become the de facto lingua franca of autobus tera, the headquarters of inter‑regional public buses in Addis Ababa. A saying has it that whenever a pas‑ senger asks which bus, he should go to, the management would tell them “Go to a bus which posted ‘hulum be esu hone’ in its front window” (a bus with a statement “everything is the way it is because of God), an implicit reference to the Protestant religious identity of the Hadiya.8 What is an even more striking example of Hadiya excellence is how returnee migrants are engaged in a rare business in Ethiopia, more so in areas outside of Ad‑ dis Ababa such as Hosanna. There are a couple of Hadiya returnee migrants who are involved in digital currency trade and keen on spreading the information and the skill to fellow Hadiya youth, especially those who are tech‑savvy, as the follow‑ ing narrative by a returnee migrant indicates: I learnt about cryptocurrency in South Africa. I always tried to communicate with people even with those whose language I do not know. I had many black South African friends and they showed me how to do business with cryptocurrency. It is not that I am educated. In fact, I was born and grew up in a countryside; not even Hosanna. I did not know that people know about cryptocurrency in Ethiopia. After I returned, I met somebody in Addis Abeba who trades in cryptocurrency. He created a WhatsApp and telegram format. It was simple for me because I already knew about it in South Af‑ rica. The challenge was rather there was no bank access in Ethiopia to do cryptocurrency trade. We have accessed the money and the goods that we import through the Hawala system. It is a very lucrative business. World bil‑ lionaires such as Bill Gates are using it. I have 85 people in my group under one company only. Most of them are Ethiopians, also some blacks. You must read and study about the currency before you buy, that which company uses it. Individuals can also influence the value of a cryptocurrency such as what Elon Musk did; he wrote on social media about the currency as people’s currency next thing you know the price went up to the sky. But later his announcement about not selling the car by cryptocurrency also sharply de‑ creased the doch coin. By the way, it is legal in the rest of the world. I don’t think the Ethiopian government gives enough attention. In Kenya and South Africa, you can withdraw from the bank, which is not available in Ethiopia. I earn on average 30,000 birr a month, which is not bad. The good thing is that I can still work on other things. (A returnee migrant, interviewed in Hosanna, August 10, 2021) If this story is from an educated Ethiopian and more so from Addis Ababa, it might not be noteworthy. But this is indeed news coming from Hosanna with someone with very little formal education compensated by the experience in the situation Hadiya Experiences 141 of migration; instancing not only Hadiya’s catching up but also integration into a global financial market that is really cutting‑edge. In June 2022, Ethiopia joined the league of crypto‑antagonistic countries when its central bank issued a statement calling crypto transactions illegal and warning people to avoid using them. The bank claimed that only the birr, Ethiopia’s currency, can be used to settle transac‑ tions in the country. However, the policy quickly shifted to regulation. Instead of shutting out cryptocurrencies, it wants to regulate the space as part of a fight against cybercrime and fraud. Through its registration scheme, Ethiopia wants to be the first African country to offer investors protection from criminal crypto enterprises from a cybersecurity perspective.9 Cryptocurrencies give easy access to the dollar, which has been scarce in Ethio‑ pia. Importers have been going to the informal market to access foreign currency because the government reduced foreign exchange allocations to the private sector. Ethiopia can’t take the same drastic decisions as it might backfire. While it seems sceptical about digital currencies, Ethiopia is exploring innovative uses of block‑ chain technology.10 The current massive upgrading of Ethiotelecom and its partial privatization is expected to boost the ICT infrastructure which the trade in digital currency could benefit from. If and when this happens, Hosanna is already well placed to tap into a new economic niche thanks to the entrepreneurial drive injected by Hadiya migrants. The world is changing and it’s changing quickly. The speed at which cryptocurrencies are taking over is a clear indicator that traditional financial institutions can no longer be the only game in town.11 Beyond Statism – Migration and Diffusion of Liberal Economic Ideas in Places of Origin The state is big in Ethiopia at the various stages of the development process. It has little faith in the role of the private sector as a driver of economic development. Ethiopia under the EPRDF was characterized as a developmental state, a specific form of state that is said to enjoy high levels of autonomy from different segments of society and have strong institutional capacity, “both of which allow this spe‑ cific form of state to implement a set of successful state‑interventionist policies in pursuit of developmental goals” (Mollaer 2016, p. 2). But the statist conception of development through a top‑down planning process goes much earlier to imperial rule as well as the Derg period, though Ethiopia under EPRDF ‘provides one of the clearest examples of a ‘developmental state’ in Africa (Clapham 2018); the idea that development is made by the state and is offered to the Ethiopian people. PM Abiy who came to power in April 2018 and his Prosperity Party’s economic policy (the Home‑Grown Economic Reform – 2021–2030) somehow deviates from the developmental state model with a focus on “a gradual transition from public to private sector‑led growth” (MoFED 2020, p. 8). While some describe the approach under Abiy as a radical neoliberal departure, others say that it is more of a pragmatic affair, involving significant continuity as well as novelty (see for instance Davison 2019). As noted by Tsegab (2021, p. 51), “looking at the reforms underway […] features of a developmental state as well as neo‑liberal views of the economy are