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Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration

Meier, Volker,Wenig, Alois

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Meier, Volker; Wenig, Alois Article Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS) - Vierteljahresschrift der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Verein für Socialpolitik Provided in Cooperation with: Duncker & Humblot, Berlin Suggested Citation: Meier, Volker; Wenig, Alois (1997) : Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS) - Vierteljahresschrift der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Verein für Socialpolitik, ISSN 0342-1783, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, Vol. 117, Iss. 4, pp. 505-524, https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/291894 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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Sozialwissenschaften (ZWS) 117 (1997), S. 505 - 524 Duncker & Humblot, Berlin Weif are Implications of International Labor Migration* By Volker Meier and Alois Wenig 1. Introduction In a seminal paper Berry and Soligo (1969) have demonstrated that, under quite general assumptions, international labor migration increases the income per capita of the native population in the country of immigration in the short run. If people with no or a relatively small capital endowment immigrate, then standard macroeconomic theory predicts both the wage rate in the economy to decrease and the rate of interest to rise. Berry and Soligo have shown that the decline in the natives' wage income is offset by the increase in their capital income. As a consequence the average income of the native population rises although the average income of the whole economy may well decline due to the relatively low per capita income of the immigrants. If rich people immigrate, then the rise in wages offsets the decline in capital income of the natives so that in this case the natives are again better off in terms of average income. This proposition has been confirmed and generalized by Khang (1990), Tu (1991), Borjas (1995), and others. Kenen (1971), Rivera-Batiz (1982), Wong (1986) and Quibria (1988) have incorporated short-term effects of migration into models of international trade. It can be demonstrated that immigration never decreases the aggregate income of the natives if the terms of trade of the immigration country do not deteriorate. Again, economic theory predicts that, in general, the native population will benefit from immigration in the short run. The results on the long-term welfare effects of migration have, however, been ambiguous so far. In their paper Berry and Soligo have conjectured that immigration raises the steady-state per capita income of the natives if the immigrants differ from the natives with respect to their "propensity to hold wealth". This conjecture has been challenged by Rodriguez (1975). In his overlapping-generations model the steady-state real income of the natives may well decline as a consequence of an initial inflow of immigrants * Verantwortlicher Herausgeber / editor in charge: B.F. ZWS 117 (1997) 4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 506 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig because there are two effects which may, in the long run, work in opposite directions. First, per capita real income of the natives rises if immigration takes the economy closer to the Golden Rule path and falls if the capital stock moves away from its Golden Rule level. Second, income is redistributed towards the group of individuals whose savings pattern becomes relatively more scarce. Starting with Galor (1986), several authors have extended the analysis of Rodriguez by including endogenous migration in various versions of overlapping-generations models (Kemp and Kondo (1989), Kondo (1989), Galor and Stark (1991) and Meier (1994)). The welfare results in these papers are, however, very similar to those in the Rodriguez paper. Instead of using an overlapping generations framework, we analyze a Solow-type growth model with a general neoclassical production function and constant savings rates. We will show that the conjecture of Berry and Soligo holds if all natives have the same savings rate. This result is in line with Steinmann (1994) where a CES technology is employed. However, we demonstrate that if the natives are heterogeneous in their savings behavior, immigration of individuals with a high propensity to save may lower the steady-state per capita income of the natives. There are no welfare effects from immigration in the long run if the immigrants adopt the pattern of behavior of the native population. There are many cases of such perfect "assimilation". However, we also observe immigrants who remain a distinct sub-group with behavioral characteristics predominantly determined by their tradition. This applies obviously to the case of a perfect economic integration of two originally separate economies. While this is not immigration in a narrow sense, it is tantamount to immigration from a theoretical point of view. Suppose two countries decide to lift all barriers to the free movement of capital, labor, technology, commodities and services. In the ideal world of perfectly competitive markets all prices will be the same in the long run, and the two economies will also produce with the same technologies. However, the two populations may well remain separate and maintain their original savings rates, their rates of population growth, or other behavioral parameters. After integration the population of the united economy has two sub-populations whose members may well ask whether economic integration will be beneficial to them in the long run. In our analysis we proceed in three steps. First we assume that the initial endowments with labor and capital are exogenously given and that these endowments change due to immigration. This is the type of framework Berry and Soligo have already analyzed. Next we consider a growing economy with an initial flow of immigration where the savings ratio of the immigrants is different from the savings ratio of the natives. Immigration is permanent, i.e. the immigrants do not return to their country of origin, and ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration 507 both the immigrants and the natives maintain their savings behavior over time. In the third step we allow for differences in the savings behavior among the natives. Immigration then changes the initial mix of people with respectively high and low savings rates. In all three steps we ask how immigration affects the average income of the natives as well as of the whole economy. 2. The Basic Elements of the Model and the Short-Run Effects of Migration In our model there are only two types of individuals, "natives" and "immigrants". Their numbers respectively are L0 > 0 and L\ > 0. Total population is L = L0 + Li >0. We assume that every individual is also a member of the workforce so that L represents the total supply of labor. There is no unemployment and every laborer receives the same wage rate. Instead of full employment we could also assume exogenously given rates of unemployment for both population groups. The capital stock of the economy K is partly owned by natives (= K0) and partly by the immigrants (= Ki). We assume K0 > 0 and Ki > 0 so that K = K0 + Ki > 0. Wealth per capita is denoted by fc0 = fjj- and fci = respectively. No capital is owned by individuals living abroad.1 Then the capital-labor ratio k = ^ of the whole economy is (1) k = mko + (1 - m)k\ where m = ^ and (1 - m) = ^ are the fractions of respectively the natives and the immigrants in the total population. The economy produces its output Y with the two inputs L and K. The marginal productivities of both capital and labor are positive and decreasing and there are constant returns to scale. The technology can then be represented by a per capita production function (2) y=f(k), in which y = J is the average productivity of labor. Given our assumptions the marginal productivity of capital f'(k) and the marginal productivity of labor/(/c) - kf(k) are both positive and we havef"(k) < 0, i.e. the marginal productivity of capital is decreasing. 1 Omitting this assumption can lead to completely different results, see Berry (1974). ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 508 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig The two factors are paid their respective marginal products: (3) w = w(k)=f(k)-kf(k), (4) r = r(k) — f'(k), where w denotes the real wage rate and r the rate of interest. Since we assume that immigration is non-recurring, there is no further immigration after some initial immigration in the beginning of our period of analysis. The immigrants may come with or without capital. Once they have arrived they offer their services in the labor market and they invest the capital they own in the host economy. This will, in general, affect both the wage rate and the rate of interest. The newcomers may also save and accumulate capital. In this section, however, we consider only the impact of immigration on the wage-interest ratio without taking into account capital accumulation so that our analysis captures only short-run effects. Let us now first assume that there are only natives before the newcomers arrive. Then Li = 0, L0 = L, k = fc0, and m = 1 initially, and L\ > 0, m < 1 after immigration. The natives' income before immigration is yo = /(fc0). After immigration the capital-labor ratio is k = rafc0 + (1 - m)k\ where fci denotes the wealth per capita of the newcomers. The natives' new income is yo = w(ic) + r(fc)fc0 = f(k) + /'(fc)(fco - fc). If fco = so that the natives are as "rich" as the immigrants, then immigration does not change the capital-labor ratio and, hence, yo =yo- Let us, therefore, assume ko ± fci so that immigration changes the initial capital-labor ratio in the economy. Then it can be shown that the income of the natives rises, i.e. (5) yo = f(ko) < f(Jc) + /'(fc)(fco - k). A proof of this proposition can be found in Khang (1990). The economic interpretation of this result is straightforward. If relatively rich people immigrate so that the capital-labor ratio increases (fc > fco), then both the average income in the economy and the wage rate rise (f(k) > /(fco)j w(fc) > w(ko)) while the rate of interest declines (r(fc) < r(fc0)). The whole economy is better off in terms of average per capita income. The natives benefit from the immigration because the increase in the wage income is higher than the decline in capital income. If the immigrants' per capita wealth is smaller than the initial capitallabor ratio, then the capital-labor ratio declines (fc < fco). Average income per person in the economy and the wage rate, too, also go down ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration 509 (f(k) < f(ko),w(k) < w(ko)). However, since / is concave, there is a relatively strong increase in the rate of interest. The natives' rise in capital income offsets the decline in the wage income they receive. As we may assume that the immigrants' income in the host country is also larger than the income they earned in their country of origin, immigration makes no one worse off in the country of destination provided that every native owns the same per capita wealth. However, if the capital stock of the natives is not equally distributed, there may be winners and losers among the natives. Laborers, for example, with little per capita wealth will not be compensated by an increase in capital income if their real wage falls due to an immigration of relatively poor people. Next we analyze the extent to which the natives gain from immigration. Let us define h = ko - k and (6) G(h) =f(k0 -h)- (k0 - h)f(k0 -h) + k0f(k0 - h) -f(k0). Obviously, G(h) = y0 - y0 is the natives' gain in average per capita income from immigration while h = (1 - m)(ko - ki) represents the difference in per capita wealth of respectively the natives and the total population. Differentiating G with respect to h yields (7) G'(h) = -hf"(k). The function G is strictly decreasing for h < 0 and strictly increasing for h > 0. From this we conclude that for any arbitrary hi and h0 with sgn[hi] = sgn[ho] the inequality \hi \ > \ho\ implies G(h\) > G(h0). Therefore, in both cases, /c0 < ki and k0 > ki, a larger difference in per capita wealth between immigrants and natives implies a larger difference in the natives' per capita income before and after immigration. However, since the function G need not be symmetric, we can in the case of sgn[hi] ^ sgn[ho] in general not expect that G(hi) > G(ho) if \hi\ > \ho\. An intuitive explanation of the short-term results is straightforward. The principle that the price of a factor rises if it becomes relatively more scarce obviously also applies to factor combinations. Thus if, as a consequence of immigration, the "average native" becomes relatively more scarce, then his compensation in terms of income increases. So far we have assumed that m = 1 before immigration. Let us now briefly look at the situation in which m < 1 initially. Then there is an old immigrant population whose share in the total population is (1 - m). We assume that the "new" immigrants own the same per capita wealth ki as the old ones. Otherwise there would be a third group after immigration, a case which we ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 510 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig do not want to discuss here. The usage of the terms "old" and "new" does not mean that much time has elapsed between the different waves of migration. If m < 1 then yo, the natives' income, and 3/1, the immigrants' income, are both differentiate functions of m: (8) y0(m) =f(k) +f(k)(ko - k) =f(k) +f(k)( 1 - m)(k0 - fci), (9) 1/1 (m) =f(k)+f(k)(k1-k) =f(k) -f(k)m(k0 -fci) with k = mk0 4- (1 - m)k\. Differentiation with respect to m yields (10) y'0(m) = (1 - m)(k0 - k{ff{k) < 0, (11) y\(m) = -m(k0 - fci)2/"(fc) > 0. An increase in the immigrant population, i.e. a decrease in m, therefore reduces the income of the old immigrants whereas the income of the natives rises. Whether total average income in the economy grows or declines depends again on the change in the capital-labor ratio in the economy k(m) = mko + (1 - m)k\. Differentiation yields k'(m) = ko - k\. Thus if m decreases as a consequence of immigration, then both the average income y =f(k(m)) and the capital-labor ratio fc(ra) decrease if ko > fci, i.e. if the immigrants are poorer in terms of per capita wealth than the natives. For fco <fci the opposite holds true. Thus also for m < 1 we have obtained the result that, on the average, the native population gains from immigration. Emigration instead of immigration reverses all results. Furthermore, in the case of immigration the natives' gain depends on the assumption that they do not share the additional financial burden caused by the immigrants for the provision of public goods and other services. 3. The Long-Run Effects of Migration Let us now take capital accumulation into account. In order to then study the consequences of migration we consider a strictly neoclassical growth model. We show how, in this framework, an inflow or outflow of individuals affects the steady-state income of both natives and immigrants. Again we confine our analysis to the case in which migration takes place only in the initial period. After this period there is no further change in the ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration 511 ratio between the sizes of the two groups. If the two populations grew at different rates, then one group's share in total population would asymptotically become zero. Therefore, let us assume that both the immigrant and the native population grow at the same rate n. This rate is assumed to be positive. Let time t be a continuous variable and let a dot on a variable indicate a derivative with respect to t. Then n«x U(t) Li(t) L(t) L0(t) Li(t) L(t) and (13) ~m ' ~m * where m is constant over time. Furthermore we now assume 0 < m < 1. Since all individuals in our economy are at every time t paid the same wage rate w(t) and the same rate of interest r(t) and since migration is nonrecurring, it can affect the economy in the long run only if immigrants and natives differ in their economic behavior. We assume that it is the rate of savings that distinguishes the members of the two groups. Let So and si denote the savings rate of respectively the natives and the immigrants. For our analysis we assume so > si. This is not a restriction because we could rename those individuals as "natives" whose rate of savings is lower. It is of importance, however, that the two groups maintain their savings behavior over time. In other words, assimilation with respect to savings behavior does not take place. In the following individuals with the lower savings rate Si will be called "low savers" while the term "high savers" denotes the individuals with a savings rate so. K0(t) and Ki(t), the stocks of wealth of the two types of individuals, change in time according to the following two differential equations: (14) k0(t) = s0[w(k(t))L0(t) + r(k(t))K0(t)i (15) K1(t)=s1 [w(k(t))Li (t) + r(fc(t))Ki (t)]. There is no depreciation. We know from growth economics that a positive rate of depreciation does not essentially affect the results of a standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation. ZWS 117 (1997) 4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 512 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig From (14)-(15) and from our previous assumptions it follows that (16) k0(t) = s0[w(k(t)) + r(k(t))k0{t)} - nk0{t), (17) /ci (t) = SiMfc(f)) + r{k(t))ki(i)] - nfci(t) with w(k(t))=f(k(t))-k(t)f'(k(t)), r(k(t))=f(k(t)), k{t) = mk0(t) + (1 - m)k\(t). (16)-(17) is the dynamical system whose properties will be described subsequently2. Let k*0 and k\ denote steady state values of the system. These two variables are solutions of the three equations (18) w(k*) = f-f(k*) Sq /c0, (19) (20) w(k*) = f-f(fc') Sl k* = mk*0 + (1 - m)k\. Assuming that the two Inada conditions lim^o /'(&) = oo and limfc^oo/^/c) = 0 are fulfilled, we can show that there exists a unique steady state (/eg,k\) with k*0 > 0 and k\ > 0. Theorem 1: Let the production function f meet the two Inada conditions lim/c^o f(k) = oo and limfc^oo f(k) = 0. Then the system (16)-(17) possesses a unique equilibrium {k*0,k\) with 0 < k\ < k* < k*0. This equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, i.e. lim[fc0(t),fci(t)] = t—* oo for every pair of initial values (ko,ki) sufficiently close to (k*0,k\). Proof. See Appendix A. 2 Formally, our system bears a strong similarity to a model used by Pasinetti (1962) and Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) to study the properties of a two class society with "capitalists" and "laborers". In their analysis the two groups are also distinguished by their savings rates. However, in their model the capitalists, i.e. the ones with a higher rate of savings, do not work and do, therefore, not earn wages. With respect to the results this makes a big difference to our model. ZWS 117 (1997) 4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration 519 This inequality, however, must be true because the left-hand side is negative and the right-hand side is positive. The following Figure shows ip and ip for k > k: From this the existence of a unique pair (&*, t) with b* > 0, k > 0 which solves (I) and (II) is obvious. ip(k) > 1 implies 6* > 1 and 0 < k\ < k < k0 because k' = mk0 + (1 — m)k\ and k\ < k0. k\ > 0 follows from k' > k in combination with (19). b) Stability Let M denote the Jacobian matrix of (16)-(17), i.e. M = ^ dieo dk0 \ dk0 dki die i die i \dk0 dkiJ 91 9 2 h\ hi Given the uniqueness of the equilibrium it suffices to show that trace M = g, + h2 < 0 and det M = g}h2 - hlg2 > 0 in equilibrium. In order to simplify the notation we write vJ = uf(k), f = f'{k), and /" = f"(k) in the following calculations: ZWS 117 (1997) 4 33* OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 520 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig <7i = so[w'm+f + kof'm] - n = (s0f - n) + s0mf"(k0 - k) = (s0f -n)+m( 1 - m)s0(k0 - k\)f". g2 = so[w'(l -m)+ k0f"( 1 - m)} = s0(l - m)2(/c0 - kx)f". h\ = s\[w'm +f"mk\) =s\m2(k\ -/c0)/". h2 — Si[^'(1 - rri) + /' + (1 — m)k\f"] - n = (S\f - n) 4- Si?n(l - m){k\ - ko)f". From this we get trace M = gi + h2 = (s0f - n) + (si/' - n) + m(l - m)(s0 - si)(k0 - fci)/" < 0 and detM = gih2 - g2hi = (s0f - n)(sif n) + (sif - n)m(l - m)s0f"(k0 - ki) + (so/' - n)m( 1 - m)si/"(fci - fc0) = (so/' - ~n) - 772.(1 - m)/"n(s0 - Si)(k0 - ki) > 0 where the inequalities for trace M and det M hold for k0 = /eg, k\ = k\, and k = k*. Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2 In this proof we consider only steady-state values (i.e. solutions of the equations (18), (19), and (20)). These three equations define k0, ku and k as functions k0 = k0(m), kx = fc^ra), and k = k(m) of the share m of the natives in the population. This is due to the uniqueness of the steady state. By definition i/o = w(k(m)) + f (k(m))ko(m) = y0(m), y1 = w(k(m)) + f (k(m))ki(m) = yi(m), y=f(k(m)) = my0{m) + {l-m)y1{m) = y(m). In order to prove y0 > yl it suffices to show that k0> k,. This, on the other hand, follows from equations (18) and (19) and from the assumption s0 > s,. Let us now calculate hf0(m) and kf^m). In order to prove assertion (b) we have to show that kf0(m) < 0 and kx(m) > 0. Subsequently we write uf for u/(k), f for f'(k\ kf0 for kf0(m), and kx for kx(m). Differentiating the two equations s0(w(k) +/'(/c)/c0) - nk0 = 0, Si(w(k) +f'(k)ki) - nki = 0 we get ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration 521 s0{w'k' + fk'0 + k0f"kf) - nk'0 = 0, S\{w'k' +fk[ + kif'k') - nk\ = 0. Since h! = mkf0 + (1 - m)^ + (k0 - k\)t we finally obtain gik'0 + g2k\ = h\k'0 + h2k\ = 62 where bi = -s0(l - m)(k0 - kiff", b2 =s1m(k0 -kiff" and where gi, g2, hi, and h2 are defined as in the proof of Theorem 1. Solving this system of two linear equations yields K = (-n^toa - m)(Slf - n) < 0, k'1=r{ko i-t^)2s1m(sof-n)>0, with det M = gih2- g2h\ > 0. The inequality signs for k'0 and k\ then follow from (s0f - n) < 0 and (sj' — n)< 0. Inserting equations (18) and (19) into the definitions of y0 and yl we get y0 =j^k0 and yl =j^k1. Thus we get y0 = < 0 and y\ =^k[ > 0. Therefore, a decrease in m (i.e. an increase in (1 - m)) increases y0 and decreases yx. Assertion (c) of this theorem can be shown by using the definition k = mk0 + (1 - m)kx. Differentiating with respect to m yields kl = mk'0 + (1 - m)k\ + (k0 - ki). Hence k>= f"m(l-m)(k0-ki)n(s0-si) _ _ (s0f-n)(Slf-n)-f"m^-m)(ko-kl)n(so-s1){ 0 u ^ ^ 0 l) = {Sof - n)(sif - n)(fe0 - fci) detM From this we get y = f'k' > 0, i.e. immigration reduces both the capital-labor ratio and the average income per capita. ZWS 117 (1997) 4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 522 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 3 Differentiating y'N with respect to m yields ^ = w'k' + kNf"k' + r(mk' + (1 - m)k\) am with kN = mko(m) + (1 - rn)k\{m). Inserting our results for k, kf0 and ^ from the proof of Theorem 2 we get dy*N _ ~f"(ko - fei) dm det M + f(k0 - fci)[m(l - m)s0(sif' - n) - (1 - m)msi{s0f - n)]}. To determine the sign of we can omit positive factors, so sgn = sgn -sgn (m - m)(k0 - k,) + (fc0 - fci)(™{\,mn' ~ \ J s0 J sx ' -j'-mf-r+i j-mf-f+% J s0 fi-n j Si = sgn[mmf(so — si) + n(m - m) + /'(sira - So^i)] = sgn\f'm(m - l)(s0 - Si) + (n -fs0)(m - m)]. From the last expression it is obvious that Wn dm dm < 0 if 0 <m <m and > 0 if ra 1. Furthermore we see that Wn n if ™ ™ ~ n-f%+f'(so-Si) ^ _ , =0 it m = m = m > m, dm n - f'so + mf (s0 - ) and if we differentiate C = f'm(m - l)(s0 - si) + (n -fso)(m - m) with respect to m, we get dC -—=fm(s0 - si) + n-f'so + [m(ml)(s0 -si) - s0{m - m)}f"k', am ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration 523 which is clearly positive for m > m, so we can conclude that ^ <0 if 0 <m<m and dm ^ >0 if m < m < 1. dm References Berry, R. A. (1974): Impact of Factor Emigration on the Losing Region, Economic Record 50, 405-422. Berry, R. A./Soligo, R. (1969): Some Welfare Aspects of International Migration, Journal of Political Economy 77, 778 - 794. Borjas, G. J. (1995): The Economic Benefits from Immigration, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9,3- 22. Galor, O. (1986): Time Preference and International Labor Migration, Journal of Economic Theory 38, 1-20. Galor, O./ Stark, O. (1991): The Impact of Differences in the Levels of Technology on International Labor Migration, Journal of Population Economics 4,1-12. Kemp, M. C./Kondo, H. (1989): An Analysis of International Migration: The Unilateral Case, in: K. E Zimmermann (Ed.), Economic Theory of Optimal Population, Springer, Berlin etc. Kenen, P. B. (1971): Migration, the Terms of Trade and Economic Welfare in the Source Country, in: J. N. Bhagwati et al. (Eds.), Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth, North Holland, Amsterdam and London. Khang, C. (1990): Dynamic Gains from International Factor Mobility: A Reexamination of the Theorem, Journal of Macroeconomics 12, 399-413. Kondo, H. (1989): International Factor Mobility and Production Technology, Journal of Population Economics 2, 281 - 299. Meier, V. (1994): Long-Run Migration Incentives and Migration Effects: The Case of Different Fertility Rates, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 213, 321-338. Pasinetti, L. L. (1962): Rate of Profit and Income Distribution in Relation to the Rate of Economic Growth, Review of Economic Studies 29, 267 - 279. Quibria, M. G. (1988): On Generalizing the Economic Analysis of International Migration: A Note, Canadian Journal of Economics 21, 874 - 876. Rivera-Batiz, F. L. (1982): International Migration, Non-Traded Goods and Economic Welfare in the Source Country, Journal of Development Economics 11, 81 - 90. Rodriguez, C. A. (1975): On the Welfare Aspects of International Migration, Journal of Political Economy 83, 1065 - 1072. Samuelson, P. A J Modigliani, F. (1966): The Pasinetti Paradox in Neoclassical and More General Models, Review of Economic Studies 33,269-301. ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51 524 Volker Meier and Alois Wenig Steinmann, G. (1994): The Effects of Immigrants on the Income of Natives, in: G. Steinmann and R. E. Ulrich (Eds.), The Economic Consequences of Immigration to Germany, Physica, Heidelberg. Tu, P. N. V. (1991): Migration: Gains or Losses?, Economic Record 67,153 - 157. Wong, K.-y. (1986): The Economic Analysis of International Migration: A Generalization, Canadian Journal of Economics 19,357-362. Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag werden kurz- und langfristige Wirkungen einer Zuwanderung auf das Einkommen der einheimischen Bevölkerung untersucht. In der kurzen Frist führt Immigration gewöhnlich zu einer Änderung des Lohn-Zins-Verhältnisses, was sich in einer Erhöhung des Einkommens der Einheimischen niederschlägt. Langfristig kann eine Zuwanderung die gesamtwirtschaftliche Sparquote ändern. Wenn die Einheimischen ein heterogenes Sparverhalten aufweisen, erhöht (senkt) die Immigration von Individuen mit niedriger (hoher) Sparneigung ihr Pro-Kopf-Einkommen. Einheimische mit einer hohen (niedrigen) Sparquote profitieren immer von einer Verringerung (Erhöhung) der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Sparquote. Abstract In this paper both short-term and long-term effects of immigration on the income of the native population are analyzed. In the short run immigration usually changes the wage-interest ratio which increases the income of the natives. In the long run immigration may also have an impact on the rate of savings. If the natives are heterogeneous in their savings behavior, then immigration raises (lowers) their average income if the immigrants have a low (high) propensity to save. Natives with a high (low) rate of savings always benefit from a decline (rise) in the aggregate savings rate. JEL-Klassifikation: F22 ZWS 117 (1997)4 OPEN ACCESS | Licensed under CC BY 4.0 | https://creativecommons.org/about/cclicenses/ DOI https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.117.4.505 | Generated on 2023-04-04 12:23:51