The culture of policing in Armenia

ZOiS REPORT THE CULTURE OF POLICING IN ARMENIA No. 3 / 2018 · August 2018 Nadja Douglas ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 2 Content 02 ___ Executive summary 04 ___ Introduction 06 ___ Protest policing in Armenia 07 ___ Stages of police reform in Armenia 09 ___ Perceptions of the law enforcement sector in Armenia 12 ___ State reactions to protests 13 ___ Disproportionate use of force 14 ___ Illegal detention 15 ___ Increasing police strength 16 ___ Interaction between protesters and police 17 ___ Interaction between journalists and police 19 ___ Impunity 20 ___ ‘Serving the state, not the people’ 21 ___ Public control 21 ___ Evaluation of international involvement 23 ___ Conclusion: Implications for state-society relations 24 ___ References 25 ___ Imprint Executive summary In April and May 2018, anti-government protests1 mobilised thousands of people in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, and put law enforcement, the rule of law, and the overall political system in the country to the test. The most recent protest wave was directed against former president Serzh Sargsyan, who had tried to prolong his political career by moving from the post of president to that of prime minister. In line with Armenia’s transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system, he would have remained the central figure in Armenian politics. To the surprise of many, Sargsyan stepped down after eleven days of protests, having to admit that he had made a mistake.2 1 Demonstrations began in April 2018, when it became obvious that the majoritarian Republican Party would nominate president Serzh Sargsyan for the prime minister’s post after he resigned on 9 April. According to a 2015 referendum on a constitutional reform, following the end of Sargsyan’s second and last term in office and the inauguration of Armenia’s new president Armen Sarkissian, the parliament had to elect a new prime minister. On 17 April, the dayof the prime minister’s election, protesters tried to blockentrances to the building of the National Assembly obstruct the voting. Protest rallies were led by opposition leader and MP Nikol Pashinyan (Civil Contract Party/Yelk Alliance), who called for a ‘velvet revolution’. He was appointed as prime minister by the Armenian parliament on 8 May. 2 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, ‘It’s Not You, It’s Me: Serzh Sarkisian’s Breakup Letter To Armenia, Annotated’, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-annotating-longtime-leader-sarkisians-breakup-letter/29187836.html. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 3 He had underestimated the capacity of Armenian society to hold its political elites accountable, while trusting in the control exerted by state structures. How have state-society relations evolved over time to make these events possible and what role did state power structures play? Is there a chance for the new government led by Nikol Pashinyan to restore confidence in and reform the law enforcement sector? These most recent protests were the latest in a long series of protest cycles in Armenia, including Electric Yerevan in 2015 and the Erebuni hostage crisis in 2016, which have demonstrated the mobilising potential of social grievances and discontent. Before the April 2018 protests, the Armenian authorities had repeatedly reacted by displaying a mixture of weakness and intransigence and by considerably strengthening the law enforcement sector. Empirical research on the relationship between the police and protesters is rare, especially in the post-Soviet region. Due to the difficulty of accessing primary data from the Armenian police and other state authorities, this report draws mainly on qualitative interviews with local activists affected by police arbitrariness, and with observers and representatives of civic organisations, intergovernmental organisations, the media, the expert community, and lawyer associations that deal with police and law enforcement structures. The interview data was collected by the author in Yerevan in spring 2017 and is complemented by results from public opinion polls on trust and confidence in institutions, notably the law enforcement agencies, conducted by the Caucasus Barometer and the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor / Advanced Research Group.3 The emphasis is on the question of how changes in the culture of policing, especially protest policing, have altered state-society relations prior to the peaceful transfer of power in the country. The principal findings of the report are: – The worsening socio-economic situation in Armenia represents the backdrop for the recent wave of social and political protests. – Trust in executive and judicial structures in general continues to be low. The image of the police suffered most after the protests and riots following the disputed presidential election in March 2008. – Comparing 2015 and 2016 poll results, the level of arbitrariness by the police as perceived by the population rose. Perceptions are partly influenced by respondents’ residential origin, age, and socio-economic background. 3 The Caucasus Barometer is an annual survey on socio-economic issues and political attitudes conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers, a network of research centres from Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The sample size was 1,648 respondents. The most recent fieldwork was conducted between 13 and 27 October 2017. The Law Enforcement Arbitrariness Index is based on sociological surveys conducted by the Advanced Public Research Group at the request of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor in 2015 and 2016. Opinion polls were conducted in all the marzes (regions) of Armenia and in Yerevan. The methodology and survey tool to calculate the index were based on similar surveys conducted by the Russian-based Public Verdict foundation. The sample size was 1,200. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 4 – Armenian authorities tend to react to civic initiatives and social protests with a mixture of suppression, repression, and concessions. There is a widespread sense of a disproportionate use of force. The number of unlawful arrests increased significantly in the course of social protests during 2015 – 2016. Impunity among police officers is considered a serious problem with the rule of law in Armenia: there have been hardly any indictments of law enforcement officials who have broken the law. – The police budget has increased more than five times since 2007, and the number of police officers has risen considerably. – The police, rather than the army, plays the role of a “national guard”. – Public control of state power structures is not widespread in Armenia. Nevertheless, civic activists, for example police monitoring groups, make efforts to increase police accountability by monitoring and documenting malpractices. – Civic activists familiar with the police reform programme judge international efforts and involvement in the Armenian reform process as largely inefficient. There is a risk that citizens’ trust not only in national but also in international institutions is further eroding. – The lack of legitimacy of state power structures will most likely persist in the country for the time being, despite the recent political change induced by the 2018 ‘revolution’. The new government under Nikol Pashinyan faces the challenge to reform state power structures, a task that could become vital for the sustainability of the new regime. Introduction Two parallel trends can be observed in post-Soviet Armenia over the past decade. On the one hand, the socio-economic situation has clearly been worsening. According to official statistics, about 30 per cent of the population lives below the poverty line, while unofficial sources estimate that they amount to 40 – 50 per cent.4 The middle class is underdeveloped and made up mainly of the urban population. A perception of rampant social injustice in the country is pronounced, with a rising number of social protests and especially young people driving a new form of civic activism that attempts to emancipate itself from a stagnating state run by ‘old elites’ and rigid power structures already prior to the events in spring 2018. 4 Arka news agency, ‘About 45 percent of Armenia’s population is poor’, http://arka.am/en/ news/society/about_45_percent_of_armenia_s_population_is_poor/. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 5 On the other hand, the new government like the former Sargsyan regime, is faced not only with an unstable foreign policy situation (complicated relations with neighbouring Turkey and Azerbaijan, the latter reaching a low point with the four-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016) but also with authorities accused of corruption and therefore struggling with widespread societal dissatisfaction. FIGURES 1 + 2 The previous government’s response to civic protests has resulted in a considerable strengthening of the Armenian national police and the use of repressive forms of public order management. FIGURE 1 Trust in the executive government FIGURE 2 Do you agree or disagree that people like you are treated fairly by the government? n = 1,648 Source: Caucasus Barometer 2017 Source: Caucasus Barometer 2017 CaucasusBarometertime-seriesdatasetArmenia TRUEXEC:TrusttowardsExecutivegovernment Questiontext:Pleaseassessyourleveloftrusttowardeachofsocialinstitutionsandpoliticalunions-Executivegovernment(Primeministerandministers), Note:Thevariablewascodedfrom5-pointscaleinto3-pointscale Time-series(%),Distrust,Neithertrustnordistrust,Trust,DK,RA 2008,38,21,42,0,0 2009,32,28,35,5,0 2010,43,31,21,5,0 2011,44,23,26,7,0 2012,46,28,20,5,1 2013,63,21,13,3,0 2015,65,18,13,4,0 2017,59,16,20,5,0 Distrust Neithertrustnordistrust Trust DK RA 2008 38% 21% 42% 0% 0% 2009 32% 28% 35% 5% 0% 2010 43% 31% 21% 5% 0% 2011 44% 23% 26% 7% 0% 2012 46% 28% 20% 5% 1% 2013 63% 21% 13% 3% 0% 2015 65% 18% 13% 4% 0% 2017 59% 16% 20% 5% 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2017 Figure1 TrusttowardsExecuVveGovernment Distrust Neithertrustnordistrust Trust DK RA CaucasusBarometer2017Armenia Figure2:FAIRTRT:Peoplelikeyourselfaretreatedfairlybythegovernment Questiontext:UnderthepresentgovernmentinArmenia,doyoucompletelyagree,somewhatagree,somewhatdisagree,orcompletelydisagreethatpeoplelikeyourselfaretreatedfairlybythegovernment? Frequencydistribution(%) Completelydisagree,38 Somewhatdisagree,36 Somewhatagree,13 Completelyagree,5 DK/RA,8 Completelydisagree 38% Somewhatdisagree 36% Somewhatagree 13% Completelyagree 5% DK/RA 8% 38% 36% 13% 5% 8% Completely disagree Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Completely agree DK/RA n = 1,648 Distrust Neither trust nor distrust Trust DK RA ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 6 Protest policing in Armenia Protest policing refers to the ways in which the police handles protest events. While activists consider it a form of repression, state authorities usually see it as a means to guarantee law and order.5 Empirical research on the relationship between the police and protesters is rare, especially for the post-Soviet region. Nevertheless, an analysis of protest policing is particularly pertinent for gaining a better understanding of the wider state-society relationship. The police is usually conceived as the most visible manifestation of government authority (‘street-level bureaucrats’), and the police’s performance usually influences perceptions of the state and government.6 FIGURE3 State reactions to civic initiatives and political or social dissent vary from country to country. The characteristics of protest policing, however, are often quite distinctive for a type of police culture that can be found in certain regions. This is particularly relevant when state power structures, such as the police, have a high degree of discretionary power.7 Historical experiences with authoritarian regimes are also often decisive for the prevalent policing style.8 Characteristic for post-Soviet countries and styles of policing is that traditionalists often have a greater say than reformers, who recognise the organisation of demonstration as a fundamental right in the context of riot policing. The main emphasis of existing studies on institutional confrontation between society and authorities in Armenia, which emerged in the course of the protest cycle during the last decade, is on the social movement potential. Less attention has been paid to the types of responses by state power 5 Della Porta and Reiter 1998, 1. 6 Hofstra 2012, 151. 7 Della Porta and Reiter 1998, 10. 8 Ibid., 3. Total2015 Total2017 Number of respondents 1200 1200 How much do you trust law enforcement agencies (police, courts of law and prosecutor’s office /the entire system/ (altogether)? I fully trust. 15,5% 18,0% I rather trust. 46,2% 32,2% I rather distrust. 19,8% 21,0% I absolutely don't trust. 17,3% 27,0% Uncertain about the answer. 1,3% 1,8% Total 2016 15,5% 46,2% 19,8% 17,3% 1,3% 18,0% 32,2% 21,0% 27,0% 1,8% I fully trust. I rather trust. I rather distrust. I absolutely don't trust. Uncertain about the answer. Figure3Howmuchdoyoutrustlawenforcementagencies(police,courtsoflawand prosecutor’soffice/theenCresystem/(altogether)? FIGURE 3 How much do you trust law enforcement agencies? n = 1,200 Source: Law enforcement arbitrariness index 2015 – 2016, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor/Advanced Research Group 2015 2016 ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 7 structures such as the police. This report will begin to fill this gap by delineating the most significant stages of Armenian police reform during the past decade and illustrate the distinctive features of police culture, especially with regard to the interaction with and reactions by civic activists and protesters. Stages of police reform in Armenia The Armenian police continues to suffer from the legacies that plague most police structures in the former Soviet Union: a high degree of centralisation and hierarchy, deficient application of human rights standards, and a rigid educational structure that overemphasises legalism over practical knowledge and basic public-order management skills.9 One of the first reform efforts and principal changes occurred in 2002, when the Ministry of Interior was disbanded along with the Ministry of National Security. They were merged and reorganised into two non-ministerial institutions: the National Police of the Republic of Armenia and the National Security Service (NSS), which are now both directly accountable to the prime minister. Trust in and the overall image of the police suffered considerably after the deadly riots in context of the prolonged protests following the disputed presidential election in March 2008.10 International partners, donors, and the Armenian government saw the need to increase efforts to reform the police structure. Accountability mechanisms have gained in relevance in recent years, especially in the course of Western-led reform processes. Questions that are relevant here are whether police representatives wear identification tags, whether they have to submit to monitoring and review processes, and whether citizens can file formal complaints. As early as the end of the 1990s, the Open Society Foundations, sponsored by George Soros, launched comprehensive programmes in many former Soviet countries to strengthen the capacity of the police. Most of the programmes were assessed as by and large unsuccessful due to widespread corruption and a lack of willingness by the police authorities to engage. These are the reasons why – at least in Armenia – the foundation has stopped working directly with law enforcement agencies.11 9 Hofstra 2012, 151. 10 Mass protests were held in wake of the Armenian presidential election in March 2008. Supporters of the unsuccessful presidential candidate and first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, protested against allegedly fraudulent election results. There was a mass mobilisation of thousands of demonstrators in Yerevan’s Liberty Square, and on 1 March, after nine days of peaceful protests, national police, aided by the armed forces, dispersed the protesters and killed ten people. Today, the memory of 2008, when the army was called in to help quell the opposition protests, is still quite vivid among many civic activists. On 27 July 2018 former President Robert Kocharian was arrested on charges of ‘overthrowing the constitutional order’ during the post-2008 election events. Former Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Khachaturov was also charged but later released on bail. New Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, part of the Ter-Petrosian camp at the time, was imprisoned in 2009 on charges of instigating mass protests. 11 Interview with David Amiryan, Open Society Foundations Armenia, Yerevan, 11 April 2017. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 8 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international organisations, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Union (EU), started to invest in their own programmes to reform the Armenian police. However, this endeavour to change the mentality of an entire organisation, especially in the law enforcement field, proved more difficult than expected.12 The Police Assistance Programme launched by the OSCE in 2008 consisted of activities in the field of community policing,13 police education, renovation of police training facilities, and the establishment of an emergency call centre. Moreover, several Armenian human rights NGOs received grants to hold lectures and conduct training courses at the police academy for members of the riot police on how to behave during mass protests. However, these were usually one-time measures and, despite positive responses from police officers involved, were not continued.  I remember very well that in 2009, when I was invited to talk to officers of the internal troops of the police, we reflected about the relationship with citizens. There were more than forty officers… I can still divide them in three groups. One group understood the topic extremely well and knew what it was about… The [second] group knew absolutely nothing about anything and only had in mind that they had to submit to orders and the third group was somewhere in between. After many hours, a part of the second group began to understand that situations can be different from what they believe… Only a small part remained like they were, like mortars [knocks on wood]. They all came up to me during the smoking break and started telling me that there would be a need for more frequent encounters of this sort… However, after this one there were no more such seminars.  14 In April 2010, the official Police Reform Programme was launched and adopted by the government, under the guidance of the National Security Council. Salaries were significantly lifted (on average they now amount to 225,000 Armenian dram, or € 373 per month), police buildings and facilities were renovated, and the working conditions for police officers were improved. However, observers and members of Armenian civil society criticised the fact that no efforts were made to affect behavioural changes in interactions with the public to lower the high barrier that still exists between the police and society. Many of the changes introduced were perceived as cosmetic. Some interviewees even called the reforms ‘fake’, considering them a performance for attracting funds from foreign donors.15 An important factor in the way the police behaves is its organisational structure. In Armenia, a functional division exists between uniformed police on the streets, investigators, juvenile inspectors working with minors, patrol auxiliary police, and traffic police. There are still a large number 12 Hofstra 2012, 151. 13 Community-based policing is characteristic of OSCE police assistance programmes and implies a policing philosophy that advocates close working relations and physical proximity between the police and the public, including small local police outreach stations to foster cooperation, mutual respect, and trust between the police and the population. See Hofstra 2012, 153. 14 Interview with Avetik Iskhanyan, Helsinki Committee Armenia, Yerevan, 6 April 2017. 15 Interview with Armen Grigoryan, political analyst and civic activist, Yerevan, 11 April 2017. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 9 of well-armed interior troops, who are run similarly to standard military units. The so-called ‘red berets’, or Special Interior Forces, have taken on a role comparable with special forces like OMON from Soviet times. They are responsible for crowd control and act as riot police during mass protests. They also follow a different chain of command, being directly accountable to the chief of police. As part of the reform process, another unit, colloquially called the ‘Angel Force’, which also includes female police officers, was introduced to deal with mass protests before they escalate. Nevertheless, the general image of the police in society is still more of a controlling force than of a service to the population. Perceptions of the law enforcement sector in Armenia Since Soviet times, the Armenian population’s perceptions of and attitudes towards the police have not been characterised by trust. In fact, the police profession has a negative image and reputation:  Policemen are not respected by the public and smaller communities. So usually guys who have some opportunity to get a profession wouldn’t prefer to go there… We came to the conclusion that policemen are those who usually have been oppressed, maybe in their childhood… and then couldn’t find themselves in public life.  16 Comparing opinion poll results from 2015 and 2016, there was a rise in the level of arbitrariness by the police as perceived by both urban and rural communities – but mostly urban. FIGURE 4 One explanation for this could 16 Interview with Arman Gharibyan, Human Rights Power, Yerevan, 12 April 2017. 2015 2016 City/town It is a very serious problem. 54,92% 57,80% 61,0% It is a somehow serious problem. 23,50% 23,50% 22,0% It is not a too serious problem. 7,75% 6,60% 5,8% There is no such problem. 7,00% 8,60% 7,6% Uncertain about the answer. 6,83% 6,83% 3,6% Inyouropinion,howseriousistheconcernofunlawfulandarbitraryactionsbythelawenforcementagenciesforArmenia? 54,9% 57,8% 61,0% 49,9% 23,5% 23,5% 22,0% 27,3% 7,8% 6,6% 5,8% 8,6% 7,0% 8,6% 7,6% 11,0% 6,8% 6,8% 3,6 3,3 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 2015 2016 City/town Village Figure4:Inyouropinion,howseriousistheconcernofunlawfulandarbitraryacBonsby thelawenforcementagenciesforArmenia? Itisaveryseriousproblem. Itisasomehowseriousproblem. Itisnotatooseriousproblem. Thereisnosuchproblem. Uncertainabouttheanswer. FIGURE 4 In your opinion, how serious is the issue of unlawful and arbitrary actions by law enforcement agencies for Armenia? Source: Law enforcement arbitrariness index 2015 – 2016, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor/Advanced Research Group n = 1,200 It is a very serious problem. It is a somehow serious problem. It is not a too serious problem. There is no such problem. Uncertain about the answer. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 16 Interaction between protesters and police For protesters, the behaviour of the police is often unpredictable and arbitrary. One day demonstrators are allowed to protest on one street; another day access to the same street is banned for protests by one group but possible for another group.40 Yet, there is a general awareness that certain symbolic locations are usually banned, such as the area around the presidential building, the office of the Republican Party, and the Embassy of the Russian Federation.41 During the 2018 protests, demonstrators and the police opted for similar tactics as in 2015. Demonstrators conducted actions of civil disobedience, peaceful sit-ins and blocked several streets and squares in central Yerevan. In turn, police forces were forced once again into delicate situations, having to decide whether to apply force or not. Initially, they reverted to routine strategies, i.e. clearing streets by detaining protesters and blocking places in order to prevent large gatherings of people. On 22 April up to 280 people were arrested.42 These reactions by the police led again to the unintended consequence that even more people joined the protests. However, fewer journalists were detained compared to previous years and in the end, both the activists and the state avoided an escalation. During the Electric Yerevan protests, Vladimir Gasparyan, the chief of the Armenian police, tried to enter into dialogue with the protesters to appeal to their sense of patriotism. One activist reported that he asked the crowd to abandon Baghramyan Avenue, arguing that as a small country, Armenia could not afford this kind of upheaval. Although many people decided to obey and leave the street, hundreds remained seated.43 Simiarly, during the April 2018 protests, the deputy chief of the police of Yerevan, Valery Osipyan, came to the demonstration site to negotiate with the opposition and rally leader Nikol Pashinyan.44 Law enforcement agents, especially riot police, have not developed as predicted and intended by international donors that have been financing Armenia’s security-sector reforms for many years. The police has learned its lessons in the interplay with protesters, but this has made it even more unpredictable:  The police became smarter. They know when and what should be done to, let’s say, have the result they want but to avoid calls on police being tough. I wouldn’t say that this is a positive change, obviously.  45 At the same time, the police is reportedly more and more intimidated by the bold behaviour of protesters. According to some activists, police officers embarrassed themselves in an open display of weakness. In particular rank-and-file police became very reluctant to follow orders to use force. 40 Interview with Artak Kirakosyan, Civil Society Institute, Yerevan, 10 April 2017. 41 Ditord Observer 2017, 10. 42 Vesti.ru, ‘280 protivnikov Sargsyana zaderzhany v Erevane’ [280 opponents of Sarsyan detained in Yerevan], https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=3009980. 43 Interview with Vahram Soghomonyan, activist/political scientist, Yerevan, 11 April 2017. 44 Armenpress, ‘Protesters once again take to streets in Yerevan as demonstrations enter 2nd week’, https://armenpress.am/eng/news/930681.html. 45 Interview with Mikayel Hovhannisyan, activist, Yerevan, 12 April 2017. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 17 According to experts and observers of the events, this was because the protests were ‘humanised’ by the organisers. The population also displayed a greater willingness to express their dissatisfaction by means of open street protest.  FIGURE 10 Some activists reported that they ‘saw fear in the eyes of the chief of the police [who was present during Electric Yerevan] … whereas for the last twenty years he was able to do whatever he wanted to’.46 The fear spread to the government, especially during the 2016 Erebuni events, as one activist recalled:  During that time, authorities were trying to act very smoothly in order not to make people angry … So that’s quite interesting … people were forcing the police not to do anything … Maybe that’s why Freedom House thinks that civil society in Armenia is powerful.  47 46 Interview with Valentina Gevorgyan, research associate, American University of Armenia, Yerevan, 7 April 2017. 47 Interview with Daniel Ioannisyan, Union of Informed Citizens, Yerevan, 10 April 2017. FIGURE 10 Should people participate in protest actions? Source: Caucasus Barometer 2017 and respective readiness in society to participate in protest actions n = 1,648 People should participate People should not participate DK RA CaucasusBarometertime-seriesdatasetArmenia PROTEST:Shouldpeopleparticipateinprotestactions? Questiontext:Pleasetellmewhichofthefollowingstatementsyouagreewith?1.Peopleshouldparticipateinprotestactionsagainstthegovernment,asthisshowsthegovernmentthatthepeopleareincharge.2.Peopleshouldnotparticipateinprotestactionsagainstthegovernment,asitthreatensstabilityinourcountry, Note:Thequestionwasrecoded.Originaloptionsareasfollows:1.Participationinprotests-Stronglyagree2.Participationinprotests-Agree3.Non-participationinprotests-Agree4.Non-participationinprotests-Stronglyagree5.Agreementwithneither.Options1and2weregroupedtoYes3and4toNo,5-DK Peopleshouldparticipate Peopleshouldnotparticipate DK RA 2008 59% 35% 7% 0% 2009 55% 34% 10% 1% 2010 64% 26% 10% 0% 2011 55% 30% 14% 1% 2012 66% 20% 13% 1% 2013 70% 19% 10% 0% 2015 72% 17% 11% 0% 2017 70% 17% 13% 0% 59% 55% 64% 55% 66% 70% 72% 70% 35% 34% 26% 30% 20% 19% 17% 17% 7% 10% 10% 14% 13% 10% 11% 13% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 2017 Figure10 ShouldpeopleparXcipateinprotestacXons? PeopleshouldparXcipate PeopleshouldnotparXcipate DK RA ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 18 Interaction between journalists and police48 The events of March 2008 and later protests have contributed to a divide and mistrust between the media, especially critical media, and the police.49 The police is often convinced that the media deliberately misinterpret information to cast a bad light on it, whereas the media complain about a lack of transparency and communication by police structures.50 Both the media and the police play very specific roles in Armenian societal life. In Armenia, state agencies often seek to trespass the boundaries of public oversight, while the media try to narrow those boundaries as far as their scope allows.51 In the past, Armenian journalists were able to report more or less unimpeded on civic activities and protests. In recent years, since live broadcasts have become more common, the presence of journalists and camera people during protests has become more dangerous. During Electric Yerevan, on 23 June 2015, media representatives were required to gather in one place, where they were attacked by the police. When they showed resistance, they were beaten with truncheons and most of their equipment was confiscated. Many journalists were injured and / or arrested on this day.52 As early as 2009, the OSCE started to work intensively with both the police and the media, organising various workshops and a series of ‘Improvement of Police-Media Relations Roundtables’, resulting in a guidebook for police officers to help them cooperate with representatives of the mass media. In addition, the Council of Europe supported seminars in 2008 and 2009 held by the Helsinki Committee Armenia on cooperation between the police and the mass media. Although the exchange of information between the police and the media was improved, the problem is still not adequately solved, according to most interlocutors. The Armenian NGO Committee to Protect the Freedom of Expression published numerous statements expressing outrage about the inadequate use of force against journalists. The group complained in particular about the lack of accountability:  So there were twenty-two journalists and cameramen [during Electric Yerevan] recognised as aggrieved parties, but so far only four policemen have been held accountable for these incidents… which already happened almost two years ago.  53 During the Erebuni events, journalists testified that before 29 July 2015, police officers did not generally interfere in their work. However, on that date, several journalists were brutally beaten by both representatives of the police and unidentified officials in plain clothes acting in coordination with the police.54 48 The media landscape in Armenia is characterised by a relatively free Internet, but traditional media (print and television) are considered unfree and divided into various political and economic camps and interests (see Freedom House report, https://freedomhouse.org/ report/freedom-world/2017/armenia). Most journalists therefore feel more committed to their media entrepreneur than to public interest and informational value. 49 Hofstra 2012, 161. 50 Ibid., 161. 51 OSCE and National Center for Legal Researches, ‘Police-Media Relations in the Republic of Armenia’, 2010 report, https://www.osce.org/yerevan/68200?download=true, p. 6. 52 Interview with Arman Gharibyan, Human Rights Power, Yerevan, 12 April 2017. 53 Interview with Ashot Melikyan, Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression, Yerevan, 13 April 2017. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 19 Impunity Impunity among public officials, especially police officers, is considered by many interviewees a grave problem of the rule-of-law system in Armenia. If among the rank and file of the police somebody is held accountable, this usually concerns police officers of the lowest rank. Although ill treatment and torture in police custody or pre-trial detention have not been completely eradicated in Armenia, due to the practice of covering up crime, there have rarely been any indictments of state or law enforcement officials who have broken the law, a situation that is criticised by human rights activists:  The problem is that in cases when we discover – by ‘we’ I mean civil society or lawyers – evidence of torture we don’t see proper investigation… We don’t even have a single case of proper investigation on torture by police… The quantity is less now, because the police needs foreign or Western grants like from the OSCE, from the US Embassy, from the European Union.  55 If cases are investigated at all, they usually do not result in convictions, because often they are suspended by the Special Investigative Service (SIS). Problematic is also that the investigator’s facilities are not transparent or open to public control. Civic activists are particularly concerned that investigations related to the killing of ten people during the events on 1 March 2008 are still held in secret and have been unjustifiably delayed. They fear that the same could happen with investigations into Electric Yerevan and the Erebuni hostage crisis. This is also reflected in the trust in other institutions to legally restore breaches of law and violations by police officers. FIGURES 11 + 12 In fact, since the protests in 2015 and 2016, despite repeated demands by civil society and international organisations,56 the state has not published any account of police actions. Moreover, those responsible for violations of the laws on the freedom of assembly and expression have not yet been brought to justice. Those policemen who were indicted following the Erebuni events had to pay fines of around € 500 – 600, but were allowed to remain in their positions.57 A consequence that nevertheless followed the Erebuni hostage crisis was the dismissal of the chief of the Yerevan police, Ashot Karapetyan.58 Following the May 2018 events and the new government leader Nikol Pashinyan has appointed a new SIS head and launched an anti-corruption campaign against former elites. The anti-corruption drive has led to criminal charges or investigations into figures in Sarkisian’s formerly ruling Republican 54 Preliminary findings of the fact-finding mission of the Civic Solidarity Platform to Yerevan, Armenia, 28 July – 1 August 2016, ‘What happened in Armenia: the CSP reports’, https:// www.civicsolidarity.org/article/1155/what-happened-armenia-csp-reports. 55 Interview with Daniel Ioannisyan, Union of Informed Citizens, Yerevan, 10 April 2017. 56 Report of the Monitoring Mission on the civil society, media and human rights situation in Armenia in relation to the events of 17 – 31 July 2016 by the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, September 2016, http://eap-csf.eu/wp-content/uploads/Report_AM_Mission_final.pdf. 57 Interview with human rights lawyer, Protection of Rights without Borders, Yerevan, 13 April 2017. 58 Human Rights Watch, ‘Armenia Sacks Yerevan Police Chief’, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2016/08/09/armenia-sacks-yerevan-police-chief. Do you think the rights violated by the police can be legally restored in Armenia? Definitely yes. 19% Rather yes. 0,3 Rather no. 0,2 Definitely no. 0,3 Uncertain about the answer. 0,0 19% 29% 22% 27% 3% Figure12 Doyouthinkthe rightsviolatedbythe policecanbelegally restoredinArmenia? Definitelyyes. Ratheryes. Ratherno. Definitelyno. Uncertainabouttheanswer. FIGURE 11 If you ever suffer any arbitrary action by the police, do you think other law enforcement agencies will protect you? FIGURE 12 Do you think the rights violated by the police can be legally restored in Armenia? Ifyoueversufferanyarbitraryactionbythepolice,doyouthinkotherlawenforcementagencies(courtsoflawand/orprosecutor'soffice)willprotectyou? Definitely yes. 16% Rather yes. 29% Rather no. 24% Definitely no. 26% Uncertain about the answer. 5% 16% 29% 24% 26% 5% Figure11 Ifyoueversufferanyarbitraryac5onby thepolice,doyouthinkotherlaw enforcementagencies(courtsoflawand/ orprosecutor'soffice)willprotectyou? Definitelyyes. Ratheryes. Ratherno. Definitelyno. Uncertainabouttheanswer. 36% enforcement agencies to suppress n = 1,200 n = 1,200 Source: Law enforcement arbitrariness index 2016, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor/Advanced Research Group Source: Law enforcement arbitrariness index 2016, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor/Advanced Research Group Definitely yes. Rather yes. Rather no. Definitely no. Uncertain about the answer. Definitely yes. Rather yes. Rather no. Definitely no. Uncertain about the answer. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 20 party, including ex-army generals, customs officers and several other senior officials (see fn. 10 for charges against former President Robert Kocharian).59 ‘Serving the state, not the people’ There is a widespread belief in Armenia that the police is used for political purposes. Some also speak of a ‘politicisation of the police’.60 This is widely acknowledged by civil society representatives, who at least until recently saw in the police a ‘servant’ of the former regime :  If an extreme situation for different political reasons emerges, all police actions become politically motivated. By and large, the law enforcement structures, notably the police, do not serve the law but the regime. They are de facto part of the regime. They understand that these protests can have an influence… they can disrupt the regime. For the most part, the entire regime counts on this force.  61 The former leader of the Armenian parliamentary opposition and new Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who led the 2018 protests, called on the police not to protect Sargsyan any longer ‘because they are not Serzh Sarkisian’s police, but the police of the Republic of Armenia and its people’.62 Some interviewees went so far as to say that the state has been captured by the police in Armenia. This stands in contrast to other (semi-)authoritarian states, where the armed forces usually play the role of national guard. In Armenia, civil-military relations are of lesser relevance, because the police, not the army, have come to be the instrument of coercion and pressure.63 Both structures face significant challenges due to restricted state resources.  FIGURE 13 59 Deutsche Welle, ‘Ex-Armenian President Robert Kocharian arrested’, https://www.dw.com/ en/ex-armenian-president-robert-kocharian-arrested/a-44860220. 60 Interview with Armen Grigoryan, political analyst and civic activist, Yerevan, 11 April 2017. 61 Interview with Ashot Melikyan, Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression, Yerevan, 13 April 2017. 62 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, ‘More Arrests In Yerevan As Armenian Opposition Protests Resume’, https://www.rferl.org/a/more-arrests-in-yerevan-as-armenian-oppositionprotests-resume-/29180654.html. 63 Interview with Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Centre, Yerevan, 6 April 2017. FIGURE 13 Growth in the budgets of the police, National Security Service, and defence ministry of Armenia, 2011 – 2016 Source: Compilation by Journalists’ Asparez Club: In: Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor and Partnership for Open Society Initiative, ‘Deterioration of Freedom of Assembly in Armenia’ (2017) Growthvolumesofbudgetshares:Police,NSSandDefenceofArmenia(2011-2016) Overallstatebudget 30,28% Policebudget 64,43% NationalSecurityService(NSS)budget 61,07% Defencebudget 42,25% 30,28% 64,43% 61,07% 42,25% Overall state budget Police budget National Security Service (NSS) budget Defence budget ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 21 Public control Armenian civic activists engage in increasing police accountability by monitoring and documenting malpractices during protests. They take photos and send them to the police, asking for the names of the perpetrators. They criticise the police’s missing identification tags, which are mandatory under the 2001 law on the police. Yet, police authorities usually refuse to provide civic activists with the names of the policemen involved in managing public order. Several activists and NGOs applied to the courts to reveal the names of policemen who had acted unlawfully on the streets, but rarely succeeded. Often, especially since 2013, it is the other way around, and protesters are taken to court charged with an administrative offence – criticising or offending the police and its reputation – whenever a person has not complied with the legal order of a police officer. The sentence usually amounts to fines of 50,000 – 150,000 drams (about € 80 – 250). According to human rights lawyers, this practice contradicts the Armenian constitution.64 The Group of Public Observers, a civil-society monitoring group, operates in police detention centres and prisons under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. In the context of its mandate, the group focuses on the National Preventive Mechanism on the prevention of torture.65 It is the only group of civic representatives, except for the ombudsman, allowed to access police detention centres to monitor the human rights situation in closed facilities. Torture in pre-trial detention places used to preoccupy foreign donors supporting the monitoring groups. Several interviewees confirmed that now, psychological degrading treatment is applied more often than physical violence. Several activists have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the police monitoring groups, since often they are not permitted to enter facilities. Evaluation of international involvement Apart from the OSCE office, various European embassies as well as the United States (through USAID) and the EU have funded projects aimed at the transformation and modernisation of the Armenian police. The first phase was characterised and dominated by material support and confidence building between international partners and the Armenian police leadership. The OSCE managed to install a system of community policing. Until the closure of its Yerevan office in August 2017, the OSCE conducted workshops with representatives of the central and regional police as well as police detention centres. Carel Hofstra, a former representative of the OSCE Office in Yerevan, described the results of the OSCE project as rather disappointing: 64 Interview with Genya Petrosyan, Europe in Law Association, Yerevan, 13 April 2017. 65 National Preventive Mechanisms are the national implementation mechanisms of the preventive system established by the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Tortureand other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/OPCAT/Pages/OPCATIndex.aspx). They are mandated to conduct regular visits to all types of facilities where persons are deprived of liberty. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 22  The project would train tens of dozens of people, sometimes for several days at a time. They would sit through the training sessions, agree with the trainers and the philosophy, and sometimes participate actively and offer practical experiences and / or solutions. Then they would thank the trainers and the OSCE, fill in positive evaluation forms, and return to their daily lives, leaving the project team guessing as to the impact of their work.  66 Others harshly criticised the OSCE projects:  And the developments which we had after that in Yerevan, social movements and social protests, and the reaction of the police to these protesters showed that… this 2 million project of the OSCE was a waste of money and time.  67 Some of the interviewees were of the opinion that the reform programmes had an opposite, unintended effect, as one human rights lawyer described:  You can see that the work that was done, the money spent, and everything did not serve the idea to have democratic policing. But rather, we built a really strong police force with capacities to make them able to suspend everything that is happening in the country.  68 Generally, all sides put less emphasis on soft skills and accountability procedures as well as ethical guidelines, which with hindsight would have been critical for the reform process. Also, the lack of modules regarding the improvement of public order management techniques during the various police assistance programmes was a serious omission by the international actors involved. One observer noted that some of the riot police training tactics had a contrary effect:  It did not teach them responsibility of restraint. It instead gave them the techniques Western-style on how better to disperse or assault a crowd. Sadly. We saw this also in previous attempts.  69 Several studies confirmed that international assistance for the development of Armenia’s police-sector reform has largely failed.70 The sobering but necessary insight is that international assistance to reform state power structures in post-Soviet (semi-)authoritarian states should be reconsidered. Conducting and supporting largely ineffective or even counterproductive reforms leads to a further decrease of citizens’ trust not only in national but also in international institutions. 66 Hofstra 2012, 155. 67 Interview with David Amiryan, Open Society Foundations Armenia, Yerevan, 11 April 2017. 68 Interview with human rights lawyer, Protection of Rights without Borders, Yerevan, 13 April 2017. 69 Interview with Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Centre, Yerevan, 6 April 2017. 70 Transparency International Anticorruption Center, ‘Statement on the effectiveness of the international assistance in police sector reforms’, https://transparency.am/en/statements/ view/233. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 23 Conclusion: Implications for state-society relations The recent protest cycle, public opinion polls, and statements from civic activists demonstrate that law enforcement structures are still not trusted – or trusted even less today – by the Armenian population. This is emblematic for missing trust in state institutions generally. This widespread lack of trust ultimately culminated in the collapse of the ruling regime and the demise of Serzh Sargsyan himself. Large groups in Armenian society are no longer afraid of the police, of being arrested, or of being taken into pre-trial detention. Due to an ongoing emancipation process (which can be attributed to various factors, including better connections on social media, support from the Armenian diaspora, and frustration due to the feeling of having nothing to lose), young people especially feel less vulnerable to police arbitrariness today and therefore more willing to engage in social protest to express widespread societal dissatisfaction. A closer analysis of the evolution of the culture of policing in Armenia has demonstrated that some attempts to adapt the Armenian police to international security-sector standards have been undertaken. Yet, it is more adequate to speak of ‘transformation’ than of ‘reform’, because most state power structures, especially law enforcement agencies, have been rather averse to reform. This is despite huge efforts by international actors trying to support the reform process. These efforts are mostly assessed as futile or even counterproductive by Armenian civic society. Deep barriers continue to exist between society and the police in Armenia. This is indicative of the lack of legitimacy of state power structures in the country. It remains to be seen whether the new government under Nikol Pashinyan will manage to break down these structures. There are certainly more efforts needed than to showcase the jailing of past leaders. This difficult task could be vital for the sustainability of political change induced by the 2018 ‘revolution’. In fact, important changes were already under way before the toppling of the old regime in May 2018. This was reflected, on the one hand, in more confrontational interactions between state and citizenry, and, on the other hand, in the increasing heterogeneity of both entities. Since about 2013, Armenian society has become more diverse in terms of societal cleavages that run along geopolitical, socio-economic, and centre-vs-periphery lines. These cleavages also resonate, as shown above, in diverging perceptions of the police. The Armenian national police, according to numerous interview accounts, is not a monolithic bloc. There are traditionalists as well as reformers among high-ranking officials, and more open-minded and more submissive officers among the rank and file. Overall, however, the traditionalist and submissive elements still prevail. Given the nature of the security sector in Armenia, with its pronounced culture of secrecy, the degree of public control of state power structures is still very rudimentary. What is needed are more reliable methods of monitoring the law enforcement sector, at least until a change in thinking about the role and purpose of the police has trickled down into the core of Armenia’s state power authorities. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 24 The various protest waves in Armenia have shaped state-society relations through both the evolving culture of policing and the changing attitudes of societal groups. The increasing divergence in norms has made both state power structures and societal groups scrutinise the legitimacy of their respective actions and paved the way for the eruption of the underlying tensions. The patterns identified in this report are an important element in the causal chain that led to the unfolding of the recent protest wave and Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation, and they will continue to shape state-society relations under the new political regime. References Della Porta, Donatella, and Herbert Reiter (eds.), Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (Social Movements, Protest, and Contention, vol. 6) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). Ditord Observer no. 1 ‘Human Rights in Armenia 2016 Report’, Helsinki Committee of Armenia (January 2017). Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor, ‘Report on Indices characterizing actions of law enforcement agencies in the Republic of Armenia 2016’, RA Law Enforcement Arbitrariness Index and RA Police Trust Index (2017). Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly Vanadzor and Partnership for Open Society Initiative, ‘Deterioration of Freedom of Assembly in Armenia’ (2017). Hofstra, Carel, ‘Police Development Activities of the OSCE in Armenia’. In OSCE Yearbook, vol. 17 (2012), Nomos, pp. 151 – 166. Kutnjak Ivkovich, Sanja, and Aleksandr Khechumyan, ‘The state of police integrity in Armenia: Findings from the police integrity survey’. In Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, vol. 36/ 1 (2013), pp. 70 – 90. ZOiS Report 3/2018 The Culture of Policing in Armenia 25 Imprint Author Nadja Douglas Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Douglas, Nadja: The culture of policing in Armenia, ZOiS Report 3 / 2018, (https://www.zoisberlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_Report_3_2018.pdf) ISSN 2512-7233 Layout Yuko Stier