EU understandings of its image as a norms supporter and their relevance for EU policies

REDEMOS Working Paper D7.4 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17902290 EU understandings of its image as a norms supporter and their relevance for EU policies Tina Freyburg, University of St.Gallen Ioannis Vergioglou, University of St.Gallen Alexander Geisler, University of St.Gallen December 2025 Page | 2 Executive Summary Policy is formulated based on what decision-makers believe, not necessarily on what is. The European Union’s (EU) foreign policy is no exception. Yet we know little about how EU officials and institutional representatives perceive how the EU and its foreign policy are viewed by interlocutors abroad, or how these meta-perceptions shape their preferences for diplomatic instruments. This article revives earlier research from the 1950s and 1970s on external perceptions to theorize foreign policy-making as a reflexive process shaped by perceived reputational standing, using updated methodological tools. We modernize Qmethodology and combine it with original survey data to capture how EU representatives construe the Union’s external image and how these perceptions inform their diplomatic preferences. Focusing on democracy promotion in the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood, our analysis shows that respondents who believed the EU was seen as lacking strategic coherence or normative authority were less supportive of assertive or confrontational democracy promotion instruments. These findings highlight a reflexive, perception-driven dynamic in foreign policy preference formation, linking how the EU is viewed abroad to how its representatives understand legitimate and effective diplomacy. Page | 3 Table of contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 4 LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................... 5 LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................... 6 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. 7 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................... 8 THEORY. EXTERNAL PERCEPTIONS AND PREFERENCES FOR DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES .............................. 10 METHODOLOGY. SURVEY AND KEY VARIABLES ..................................................................................... 11 Key independent variable, Perception of EU external images ................................................................................. 12 Dependent variable. Preferred democracy promotion instruments ........................................................................ 16 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. THE EFFECT OF META-PERCEPTIONS ON PREFERENCES FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ........................................................................................................................................ 17 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 19 APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................ 21 A. Distribution of respondents ............................................................................................................................................... 21 B. Key independent variable: Perception of EU external images ........................................................................................... 22 C. Key independent variable: Clustering procedure and validation ....................................................................................... 26 D. Dependent variable: Practices of Democracy Promotion .................................................................................................. 28 E. Regression robustness check (listwise deletion) ............................................................................................................... 30 REFERENCES......................................................................................................................................... 31 Page | 4 Acknowledgments Financial support from the European Union’s Horizon research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 101061738 is gratefully acknowledged. For more information, please visit https://redemos.eu. We warmly thank our REDEMOS colleagues as well as the participants of the annual meetings of the ECPR Joint Sessions and General Conferences in 2024 and 2025, the European Communities Studies Association Switzerland in 2023 and 2024, the Swiss Political Science Association in 2024 and 2025, the biannual conference of the Swiss Network of International Studies in 2023, and the research colloquium of the political science department at the University of St.Gallen for their insightful feedback and suggestions. For detailed comments, we thank Arusyak Aleksanyan, James Davis, Timon Forster, Alexander Maltsev, Maryna Rabinovych, Dominik Rehbaum, Frank Schimmelfennig, Karina Shyrokykh, Hannah Smidt, and Natasha Wunsch. Our sincere thanks go to Tomohiro Bisang, Sofiia Klymenko, Maja Mandic, and Mathilde Morin for their excellent research assistance, and to Danyl Denysenko and Ragnar Weilandt for their valuable contributions to earlier versions of this study. We also gratefully acknowledge the generous support of Othmar Karas (former Vice-President of the European Parliament), as well as Alberto Domini and Ilona von Bethlenfalvy from the European Commission. Finally, we would like to thank the Athens Technology Center, particularly Adam Doulgerakis and Manolis Paterakis, for accommodating our special requests regarding the survey application, and Marina Braem for her outstanding work on the Q-sorting explainer video that was embedded in our EU practitioners survey https://youtu.be/P2NmxqHpt8g. Page | 5 List of Tables Table 1: Top 20 Statements Differentiating Meta-Perception Clusters .......................................................... 15 Table 2: Diplomatic practices of democracy support ...................................................................................... 17 Table 3: Regression results (imputed data set) ............................................................................................... 18 Table A: Professional and sociodemographic background ............................................................................. 21 Table B Grouped statements on EU external images ...................................................................................... 22 Table C1: Evaluation of clustering methods .................................................................................................... 26 Table C2: Confusion matrix of the two-class system random forest ............................................................. 27 Table C3: Cluster comparisons across demographic variables ....................................................................... 27 Table E1: Regression results (listwise deletion) .............................................................................................. 30 Table E2: Robustness of Cluster 2-effect across imputed datasets ................................................................ 30 Page | 6 List of Figures Figure 1: Results of the final spectral method use .......................................................................................... 14 Figure C1: Results of the final spectral method used to cluster traits ............................................................ 26 Figure C2: Top 20 Most important statements for cluster prediction ............................................................ 27 Page | 7 List of acronyms and abbreviations DV Dependent Variable ENCs Eastern Neighborhood countries EP European Parliament EU European Union IMF International Monetary Fund IR International Relations KMO Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterium MICE Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations OLS Ordinary Least Squares PCA Principal Component Analysis PMM Predictive Mean Matching UMAP Uniform Manifold Approximation and Projection Page | 8 Introduction The European Union (EU) has long envisioned itself as a global champion of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, projecting an identity of ‘normative power’ that underpins its foreign policy and international engagement (Manners, 2002). This self-image is reflected in key policy documents, such as the European Democracy Action Plan in 2020 (European Commission, 2020) and the Defence of Democracy package in 2023 (European Commission, 2023), both framing the EU as a ‘force for good’ and a committed promoter of democracy worldwide. Central to this vision is the EU’s aspiration to be viewed as a legitimate and credible actor, with influence largely rooted in soft power and the appeal of its values (Nye, 2004). Yet, historical examples highlight a disconnect between the self-perception and external image: In Tunisia, post-2011 EU democracy promotion was criticized for neglecting local visions and priorities (Pace, 2014), while in the Eastern Neighborhood, elements of the EU’s agenda have been dismissed by local elites as neoimperialist (Delcour & Wolczuk, 2013). Empirical studies support that the EU’s positive self-image is not necessarily shared by political elites outside Europe (Chaban & Holland, 2007; Elgström et al., 2007; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007; Schlipphak & Treib, 2017, p. 590). This disconnect raises a critical question: How do EU officials and representatives from key institutions (‘EU representatives’) perceive the EU’s external image, and how do these perceptions influence the democracy promotion instruments they prefer to be used towards partner countries? To address this question, we take the empirical literature on how the EU is perceived abroad as our starting point and explore how EU representatives’ own views of the EU’s external image might shape their democracy promotion preferences. Research depicts a complex, often critical picture: While the EU is sometimes portrayed as a normative power, many political elites outside the Union see its actions as selfinterested, inconsistent, or lacking political influence (Larsen, 2014). Recent scholarship has begun moving from largely descriptive accounts toward more explanatory analyses of EU external perceptions (e.g., Lucarelli, 2014), but much of this work still focuses on how such perceptions are formed rather than on their policy consequences.1 Yet persistent foreign skepticism can undermine EU initiatives, leading to resistance, strained relations, and limited policy uptake, and thus weaken the Union’s ability to promote and defend democracy (Smith, 2011; 2014, p. 209). It is reasonable to assume that EU representatives are aware of these perceptions and may adapt their policy actions to maximize influence. In line with research on organizational learning and internal socialization in international institutions (Checkel, 2005), such adaptations may reflect how practitioners internalize feedback from external audiences and translate it into behavioral adjustment within the EU’s diplomatic apparatus. We theorize how EU representatives’ perceptions of the EU’s external image shape their preferred diplomatic instruments, reviving early International Relations (IR) research on the role of perceptions and beliefs in foreign policy decision-making (Jervis, 1976). Specifically, we examine how EU officials’ views of how the Union is perceived abroad inform the types of instruments they consider appropriate for democracy promotion, treating these preferences as indicators of broader orientations toward diplomatic action. We conceptualize these views as meta-perceptions, that is, second-order perceptions of how one is seen by others (Mead, 1934), and use this as an analytical lens to assess how perceived reputational standing influences foreign policy preferences. Pioneers of cognitive and psychological approaches in IR argued that foreign policy is shaped not only by objective conditions but also by subjective interpretations of international realities, calling for attention to decision-makers’ psychological and operational environments. These “apperceived environmental factors” (Sprout & Sprout, 1957, p. 310) or, more simply, “images” (Boulding, 1959, p. 120; Holsti, 1970; Jervis, 1976) shape expectations about threats, opportunities, and legitimacy, and often diverge from how others actually view the external actor in question. Foreign policy is thus guided not merely by material interests or strategic 1 Notable exceptions in the fields of climate and environmental diplomacy show that perceived external expectations can constrain EU effectiveness (Torney, 2014) or undermine policy coherence when internal and external images diverge (Delreux & Keukeleire, 2021). Page | 9 goals, but also by what decision-makers believe to be true about the international environment and, crucially, about themselves. This view is supported by research showing that foreign policy is enacted through the everyday work of practitioners, embedded in shared routines, professional contexts, and socially meaningful interactions (Adler & Pouliot, 2011; Neumann, 2012; Sending et al., 2015). We build on these insights to argue that foreign policy preferences are shaped by practitioners’ perceptions and meta-perceptions of how their policy actions are viewed by others. Empirically, we focus on EU practitioners engaged in the Eastern Neighborhood, including officials from key EU institutions, members of the European Parliament involved in interparliamentary delegations for the region, and staff of EU civilian and military missions in partner countries. The Eastern Neighborhood combines a generally favorable view of the EU —with no colonial history and elites who often regard it as a desirable partner in modernization, reform, and integration— with persistent skepticism about its normative consistency, political asymmetry, and decision-making speed (Bengtsson & Elgström, 2012, p. 99; Larsen, 2014, p. 904). This mix of receptiveness and critique exposes EU representatives to both recognition and challenge, making it a revealing setting for examining how perceptions of the EU’s image shape preferences for democracy promotion. We use a modified version of Q-methodology, combined with an original quantitative survey, to identify clusters of shared meta-perceptions among EU representatives and examine how these relate to their preferred democracy promotion tools. Originally developed in psychology to systematically map the structure of subjectivity (Brewer, 2000; Brown, 2008; Stephenson, 1935), Q-methodology is uniquely suited to capturing and contrasting individuals’ viewpoints, revealing patterns of agreement and divergence that may underpin common practices. By focusing on the foreign policy tools EU representatives prefer for promoting democracy, we shift the analytical lens from high-level policy formulation to the ground-level perspectives of those directly engaged in advancing and supporting democracy promotion, including diplomats, public servants, and parliamentarians involved in external relations (cf. Cooper et al., 2013, p. 2). This enables us to ask whether shared meta-perceptions of the EU’s external image contribute to the emergence of “communities of practice” (Bicchi, 2018, pp. 9–10) in which actors converge around similar understandings of what instruments are appropriate and legitimate for democracy promotion. Our analysis supports the core claim that EU officials’ policy preferences are shaped not only by strategic goals or normative ideals, but also by how they believe the EU is perceived externally. These metaperceptions influence which democracy promotion instruments they consider legitimate and effective. Specifically, officials who perceive the EU as lacking in strategic coherence or normative legitimacy tend to express less support for confrontational democracy promotion instruments. Applied to foreign policymaking, our findings suggest that meta-perceptions can have a constraining effect on foreign policy preferences. The paper thus makes three key contributions. Theoretically, it reintroduces the concept of meta-perceptions into the study of foreign policy, showing how they operate as a reflexive mechanism in preference formation. Methodologically, it demonstrates the value of Q-methodology, combined with survey data, for systematically mapping subjective understandings among policy practitioners. Empirically, it provides rare evidence from EU representatives themselves, offering a practitioner-level perspective on the link between perceived external image and democracy promotion preferences. The rest of the article proceeds as follows: we first develop the theoretical framework and hypotheses before we present our data and methodology, with a particular focus on the construction of our key interdependent and the outcome variables. The empirical analysis follows, leading to a discussion of implications for both EU foreign policy and the broader IR literature on perceptions and policy preferences. Overall, this paper adds the perceptual and practical perspectives of “those agents involved in the quotidian unfolding” (Pouliot, 2010, p. 1) of democracy promotion. It advances our understanding of how the EU’s foreign policy is shaped not only by external realities but by practitioners’ beliefs about how the Union is seen, adding a missing perceptual dimension to debates on the EU’s ability to promote democracy in a contested international environment. Page | 16 multilateral diplomacy (13), all core expressions of ‘what the EU does’ in normative terms. Respondents also underscore the EU’s capacity to deliver tangible outcomes, including the provision of humanitarian aid (24), the creation of market opportunities (30), and its political stabilizing role in partner regions (27). Regarding ‘how the EU acts’, Cluster 1 members value the Union’s readiness for genuine dialogue with Eastern Neighbourhood countries (3), cultural sensitivity (4), and engagement in conflict mediation (39), suggesting a perception of the EU as a respectful, cooperative, and proactive interlocutor. Finally, moderate agreement with statements on the EU’s assertiveness vis-à-vis major powers (42) and leadership strength (33) reflects confidence in its institutional stature (i.e. ‘who the EU is’). Taken together, these perceptions portray the EU as a principled, capable, and trustworthy external power, whose legitimacy derives from both its normative commitments and its ability to foster stability and shared prosperity. This image is closely aligned with the Union’s self-conception as a normative power. Cluster 2, by contrast, reflects a skeptical and critical assessment of how the EU is perceived externally. Respondents in this group systematically reject statements portraying the EU as a credible or constructive force (e.g., its support for civil society (36), respect for religious freedom (17), and commitment to multilateralism (13)), revealing deep reservations about what the EU does in normative terms. They are likewise unconvinced of what the EU achieves, expressing disagreement that the EU provides humanitarian aid effectively (24), fosters welfare and peace through free trade (16), or contributes to regional stability (27). Negative evaluations also extend to how the EU acts: respondents deny that the EU engages in proper dialogue (3), respects local cultures (4), or mediates conflicts constructively (39). Even statements concerning the EU’s institutional strength and leadership (42, 33) elicit little confidence. More generally, Cluster 2 members disagree that the EU serves as a role model for regional cooperation (22), is attractive for neighbors to join (29), or acts fairly and responsibly in using its market power (20), pursuing coherent enlargement (34), or considering migration concerns (21). Taken together, these views portray the EU as a weak, inconsistent, and unfair external actor, whose perceived deficits in credibility, coherence, and relevance undermine its legitimacy as a normative power. Overall, these clusters are mirror images and capture structured differences in how EU representatives believe the Union is perceived externally. Crucially, these meta-perceptions are not merely abstract beliefs but likely influence how officials interpret the external environment and what specific instruments they prefer in the EU’s democracy support efforts. We use them to explain variation in policy preferences through multivariate regression analysis. Dependent variable. Preferred democracy promotion instruments Our dependent variable (DV) captures respondents’ preferences for democracy promotion instruments, i.e., the tools they believe the EU should employ to advance its external objectives, particularly the support of democracy abroad. Drawing on established typologies of EU foreign policy tools (Burnell, 2000; Kotzian et al., 2011; Smith, 2014), respondents were asked to evaluate 14 instruments commonly used in EU external action. These include both traditional mechanisms (e.g., aid, election observation, sanctions) and EU-specific instruments (e.g., visa facilitation incentives, association or membership prospects). Instruments related to military deployment or peacekeeping were excluded due to their limited relevance for democracy promotion (Kotzian et al., 2011). Rather than examining individual instruments in isolation, we conceptualize respondents’ preferences in terms of broader modes of diplomatic engagement. To improve construct validity and distinguish personal preferences from professional routines or institutional constraints, we complemented this main evaluative question with two additional items (Fowler, 2013): one asking which instruments respondents personally use in their work, and another probing how they typically experience interactions with interlocutors in the ENCs (see Appendix D). This multi-item design helps isolate individual preference structures from organizational practices and positional effects, ensuring that our measure reflects underlying attitudinal orientations rather than context-specific role behavior. To identify underlying dimensions in respondents’ preferences, we conducted a principal component analysis PCA: using the principal function from the psych package, extracting two factors with oblimin rotation and computing factor scores. The analysis yielded two correlated components (r = .46) that together capture the dominant logics of EU democracy promotion. The first factor reflects preferences for engagementand Page | 17 incentive-based instruments, which involve direct interaction with partner-country interlocutors, typically through cooperation, negotiation, or conditional offers (e.g., the provision or suspension of financial and technical assistance and membership prospects). The second factor captures preferences for declaratory and unilateral signaling instruments, which the EU can employ without reciprocal engagement, most notably public statements. The sampling adequacy of the model was high (KMO = .91), and item communalities (averaged .98). Instruments were assigned to a component if they loaded ≥ .50 on one factor and < .40 on the other. Table 2 provides the factor loadings for each instrument. The first factor explains 62 percent of the total variance, and the second factor explains 38 percent. This empirically derived distinction resonates with broader discussions in the literature that differentiate between instruments designed to incentivize democratic reform and those used to signal disapproval or exert leverage (Burnell, 2000; Kotzian et al., 2011; Smith, 2014). In line with these contributions, our analysis captures variation not in the substance of policy objectives but in the modes of engagement through which the EU seeks to advance them, ranging from negotiated and conditional interaction to declaratory signaling and unilateral expression. Each factor serves as a separate outcome variable in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. We use the resulting factor scores as the dependent variables in subsequent multivariate analyses that examine how respondents’ meta-perceptions of the EU’s external image relate to their preferences for different types of diplomatic instruments. Table 2: Diplomatic practices of democracy support Instrument 1: Engagement & incentives 2: Declaratory and unilateral signaling Declarations/statements expressing the EU’s position (condemnation, concern, or support) 0.04 0.88 Election monitoring 0.65 0.25 Financial and technical assistance as an incentive for reform 0.82 -0.05 High-level visits 0.87 -0.10 Sponsoring thematic conferences -0.09 0.90 Support of other international organizations, notably UN agencies 0.57 0.26 Incentive of visa facilitations or promise of such 0.19 0.68 Prospect of EU membership and associated intermediate steps 0.72 0.15 Diplomatic sanctions, including suspending high-level contacts or withdrawing technical experts 0.78 -0.08 Note. Factor loadings from PCA (N = 59); sampling adequacy: KMO = .91; average item communality = .98. Loadings > 0.50 indicate instruments’ primary association with the respective factors, highlighted in bold. Empirical Analysis. The effect of meta-perceptions on preferences for democracy promotion How do EU representatives’ meta-perceptions of the Union’s external image shape their preferences for specific diplomatic instruments? In particular, does a more confident, principled view of how the EU is perceived externally correspond to stronger support for declaratory and unilateral signaling instruments, Page | 18 while more skeptical perceptions encourage reliance on engagementand incentive-based tools? More broadly, do groups of EU representatives who share similar understandings of how the EU is viewed by its eastern partners also display shared preferences for certain modes of diplomatic engagement, suggesting the presence of distinct, perception-driven orientations in the practice of EU foreign policy? Specifically, we estimate two separate multiple linear regression models using ordinary least squares (OLS): one for preferences toward engagementand incentive-based instruments and one for preferences toward declaratory and unilateral signaling instruments, which represent the two empirically derived dimensions of our dependent variable. The key explanatory variable is cluster membership derived from the Qmethodology analysis, capturing respondents’ shared meta-perceptions of how the EU is viewed externally. To account for potential ideological influences, we include respondents’ economic and cultural orientations as control variables. Following Hooghe et al. (2002), economic views are measured on a continuum from support for state intervention (‘left’) to support for free-market policies (‘right’), while cultural views range from liberal positions emphasizing personal freedoms and equal rights to conservative positions emphasizing traditional values and social order. To address missing data in the instrument-use preferences of EU officials, crucial for accurate factor identification, we employed multiple imputation using the Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) approach (Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). Specifically, we applied the Predictive Mean Matching (PMM) method via the mice package in R, generating eight imputed datasets (m = 8) with a fixed random seed for reproducibility. This procedure preserves multivariate relationships by drawing from the observed data distribution. For each imputed dataset, we conducted a PCA, as outlined above, and added the resulting factor scores to the original dataset for further analysis. We then estimated linear regression models for each imputed dataset, modeling engagementand incentive-based and declaratory and unilateral signaling outcomes as functions of the meta-perception clusters variable. The cluster coefficient in the signaling model reached statistical significance in seven of the eight imputations, as well as under listwise deletion (see Appendix E), indicating strong consistency in the cluster effect across imputed datasets. Table 3: Regression results (imputed data set) Engagement & incentives Declaratory & unilateral signaling Intercept 0.179 (0.398) 0.288 (0.392) Cluster 2 (Ref. = Cluster 1) -0.292 (0.291) -0.611* (0.287) Economic views (more to the right) -0.176 (0.131) -0.073 (0.130) Cultural views (more conservative) 0.224 (0.121) 0.138 (0.119) R2 0.105 0.137 R2 Adj. 0.054 0.087 AIC 163.5 161.9 RMSE 0.95 0.94 Note: Ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, based on the first imputed dataset (m = 8, see Appendix E). Significance levels: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. N = 59. The regression analysis provides clear support for our theoretical expectation that EU representatives’ metaperceptions of how the Union is viewed externally shape their diplomatic preferences. Officials who belong to the cluster portraying the EU as a weak, inconsistent, and unfair external actor (Cluster 2) show significantly lower support for declaratory and unilateral signaling instruments (Factor 2). This suggests that when officials believe the EU’s reputation is fragile or contested, they are reluctant to endorse visible, onesided forms of communication that could risk reinforcing negative impressions. By contrast, preferences for engagementand incentive-based instruments (Factor 1) remain remarkably stable across perception Page | 19 clusters, indicating a broad consensus that more cooperative, engagement-oriented approaches represent appropriate tools for democracy promotion, regardless of how the EU is perceived abroad. Importantly, these patterns are not driven by ideological predispositions. Neither respondents’ economic nor cultural orientations significantly predict their preferences for either type of instrument, underscoring that the observed variation is linked not to left–right worldviews but to perceptual beliefs about the EU’s external image. Taken together, the findings highlight a perception-driven dynamic in EU foreign policy: officials’ understandings of how the EU is seen abroad subtly shape their sense of what constitutes appropriate diplomatic behavior. Meta-perceptions thus operate below the level of formal mandates or ideological commitments, influencing everyday decision-making in ways that reflect shared professional judgments about credibility, legitimacy, and the risks of reputational damage. This empirical relationship between perceived external image and diplomatic preferences underscores the importance of meta-perceptions as a cognitive lens through which foreign policy is interpreted and enacted. The EU’s external image, whether understood as a source of reputational capital or as a liability, appears to shape not only how its representatives understand their context, but also what instruments they prefer to act within it. Conclusion This study examined how EU representatives’ meta-perceptions (i.e. beliefs about how the Union is viewed abroad) shape their preferences for democracy promotion in the Eastern Neighborhood. While classic research in International Relations has long argued that perceptions and beliefs influence foreign policy behavior, systematic empirical evidence has remained scarce. By leveraging a novel survey design that combines Q-sorting with targeted questions on instrument preferences, this study provides an empirical test of how subjective understandings translate into concrete policy orientations among EU practitioners. Empirically, our analysis shows that EU representatives who believe the Union is seen as weak, inconsistent, or normatively unreliable are significantly less likely to support declaratory and unilateral signaling instruments (e.g., public statements or condemnations), while preferences for engagementand incentivebased instruments remain stable across perception clusters. This pattern suggests that reputational concerns primarily temper the use of visible, one-sided diplomacy, whereas engagement-oriented tools (e.g., technical assistance, high-level visits, or membership incentives) retain broad legitimacy. The Eastern Neighborhood provides an especially revealing setting for this dynamic: it combines receptiveness to EU influence with persistent skepticism about its coherence and credibility, making it possible to observe how metaperceptions shape preferences even under relatively favorable conditions. The fact that reputational caution emerges here implies that such restraint may be even stronger in more adversarial environments. Theoretically, the study advances a mechanism specifying how second-order beliefs about the EU’s external image act as microfoundations of diplomatic behavior. Meta-perceptions shape what officials consider credible, legitimate, and effective forms of engagement, constraining certain tools while normalizing others. In doing so, the study builds on early insights in IR that foreign policy is guided less by objective realities than by decision-makers’ perceptions and beliefs about how they are seen by others (Boulding, 1959; Holsti, 1970; Jervis, 1976). It further extends contemporary debates on how internal beliefs, learning processes, and reputational concerns structure institutional behavior (Checkel, 2005; Nelson, 2014), offering micro-level evidence of these mechanisms within the EU’s external action. Methodologically, the paper contributes a novel measurement approach: by combining an updated version of Q-sorting, survey data on instrument preferences, and predictive validation, it demonstrates how subjective viewpoints can be systematically mapped onto behavioral orientations. This approach allows for an empirical exploration of what earlier theories of cognition and perception in foreign policy could only posit. Practically, the findings imply that internalized negative images can quietly narrow the EU’s perceived repertoire of legitimate instruments, potentially constraining its diplomatic flexibility and effectiveness. Future research could test whether these dynamics hold in other regions or policy domains, and whether practitioners’ meta-perceptions align or diverge from their own understandings of the EU’s identity. Page | 20 Comparing these internal beliefs with external perceptions would illuminate how (mis)alignments shape legitimacy, credibility, and ultimately the Union’s ability to act abroad. By showing that EU representatives’ beliefs about how the Union is seen externally structure their preferred diplomatic tools, this study provides rare empirical evidence for a long-standing theoretical claim: that foreign policy behavior is filtered through the lens of perception. It thus reaffirms the value of perceptionbased approaches and offers a new empirical pathway for studying the cognitive foundations of international engagement. Page | 21 Appendices A. Distribution of respondents Table A: Professional and sociodemographic background Characteristic “population” “sample” response rate Institution Commission 174 (32%) 27 (46%) 15.52% EEAS 110 (20%) 9 (15%) 8.18% Parliament 244 (44%) 9 (15%) 3.69% Council 25 (5%) 14 (24%) 56.00% Seniority Senior Executive Leadership 49 (9%) 6 (10%) 12.25% Upper Management 174 (32%) 8 (14%) 4.60% Specialized and Senior Expert Role 72 (13%) 15 (13%) 20.83% Professional Role 154 (28%) 17 (29%) 11.03% Support and Junior Role 16 (3%) 7 (12%) 43.75% Entry-Level Role 2 (0%) 0 (0%) 0.00% Member of the EP 86 (16%) 4 (7%) 4.65% Prefer not to say 2 (3%) Gender Female 221 (40%) 23 (39%) 10.41% Male 332 (60%) 35 (59%) 10.54% Prefer not to say 1 (2%) Age Mean Age 47 49 N total 553 59 10.67% Note: Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) don’t really map neatly onto the standard administrative staff seniority hierarchy, because they’re elected political office-holders, not career officials or civil servants. We therefore keep them separate. Page | 22 B. Key independent variable: Perception of EU external images Table B Grouped statements on EU external images No. Positive Formulation Negative Formulation Sources How the EU acts (e.g., respectfulness, responsiveness, engagement) 1 The EU treats its eastern neighbours with respect The EU treats its eastern neighbours with disrespect Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 105; Elgström et al. 2007: 962; Lucarelli 2014: 10. 2 The EU actively seeks understanding with its eastern neighbours The EU shows little interest in reaching an understanding Chaban et al. 2014: 441; Elgström et al. 2007: 956; Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010: 171; Chaban & Elgström 2021; Chaban, Miskimmon, et al. 2019; Sabatovych et al. 2019; Barcevicius et al. 2015. 3 The EU manages to engage in proper dialogue with its eastern neighbours The EU fails to engage in proper dialogue with its eastern neighbours Elgström et al. 2007: 962; Pace 2010: 9. 4 The EU respects the cultures of its eastern neighbours The EU disregards the cultures of its eastern neighbours Delcour & Wolczuk 2021; Arynov 2022a; Arynov 2022b. 5 It is easier to talk to the EU than to other external actors It is harder to talk to the EU than to other external actors Arynov 2018; Bremberg & Borg 2021 ; Chaban et al. 2014: 442; Larsen 2014: 7; Elgström et al. 2007: 962. 9 The EU operates efficiently The EU is too bureaucratic Bekenova & Collins 2019; Bachmann 2013; Barcevicius et al. 2015; Chaban et al. 2006: 252–253; Schlipphak & Treib 2017: 4; Elgström et al. 2007: 961; Lucarelli 2014: 6. 11 The EU acts in the interests of its eastern neighbours The EU prioritizes its own interests over those of its eastern neighbours Bachmann 2013; Sabatovych et al. 2019; Arynov 2022b. 20 The EU uses its market power responsibly The EU abuses its market power Chaban et al. 2014: 440; Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 104; Larsen 2014: 7; Elgström et al. 2007: 954. 21 The EU takes its eastern neighbours’ concerns about migration seriously The EU is ignoring its eastern neighbours’ concerns about migration Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 99. 39 The EU takes the initiative in mediating or resolving conflicts The EU leaves the initiative in mediating or resolving conflicts to others Chaban, Elgström, et al. 2019. 41 The EU reacts consistently to violations of international law The EU is inconsistent in its response to violations of international law Larsen 2014: 7; Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007: 451; Elgström et al. 2007: 960. Page | 23 No. Positive Formulation Negative Formulation Sources What the EU does (e.g., policy goals, normative commitments) 10 The EU acts consistently with its principles and values The EU acts inconsistently with its principles and values Sabatovych et al. 2019; Delcour & Wolczuk 2021; Sicurelli 2015; Müller & Zahda 2018. 12 The EU credibly promotes human rights, rule of law, democracy, and good governance The EU’s promotion of human rights, rule of law, democracy, and good governance lacks credibility Simionov et al. 2021; Müller & Zahda 2018; Su & Yeh 2018; Arynov 2022b; Barcevicius et al. 2015:; Delcour & Wolczuk 2021; Chaban et al. 2014: 439; Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 98; Larsen 2014: 7; Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007: 451; Elgström et al. 2007: 956. 13 The EU credibly promotes multilateralism and diplomacy The EU’s promotion of multilateralism and diplomacy lacks credibility Larsen 2014: 7; Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007: 451; Elgström et al. 2007: 960; Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010: 174. 15 The EU’s engagement against climate change is credible The EU’s engagement against climate change lacks credibility Sicurelli 2015; Chaban et al. 2014: 441; Larsen 2014: 7; Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007: 451; Elgström et al. 2007: 956; Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010: 175. 16 The EU credibly promotes free trade to alleviate poverty and to foster peace The EU’s promotion of free trade to alleviate poverty and to foster peace lacks credibility Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 103; Larsen 2014: 7; Elgström et al. 2007: 958; Pace 2010: 12; Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010: 171. 17 The EU respects the freedom of religion The EU disrespects the freedom of religion Fioramonti & Lucarelli 2008: 7; Furia & Lucas 2006: 590. 18 Natural resources have a minimal impact on the EU’s relationship with its eastern neighbours The EU policy is primarily motivated by the natural resources of its eastern neighbours Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 100. 19 Agreed objectives remain unaffected by geopolitical considerations Geopolitical considerations take precedence over agreed objectives Hadfield and Lightfood 2021; Youngs 2004; Crombois 2019; Winn and Gänzle 2023. 34 EU enlargement policy is consistent, coherent, and fair EU enlargement policy is inconsistent, incoherent, and unfair Arynov 2018; Arynov 2022b. 32 EU aid is distributed fairly EU aid is unfairly distributed Delcour & Wolczuk 2021. 36 The EU credibly supports civil society organisations The EU’s support of civil society organisations lacks credibility Barcevicius et al. 2015; Delcour & Wolczuk 2021; Arynov 2022b:; Chaban et al. 2013: 439. 37 EU conditionality attached to financial aid interferes in domestic affairs EU conditionality attached to financial aid respects domestic affairs Barcevicius et al. 2015; Völkel 2014. 40 The EU sufficiently protects respect for territorial integrity The EU’s protection of respect for territorial integrity is inadequate Johansson-Nogués, et al. 2020; Sjursen 2017. Page | 24 No. Positive Formulation Negative Formulation Sources What the EU achieves e.g., effectiveness and external outcomes: 14 The EU effectively employs economic sanctions to promote compliance with international norms The EU’s use of economic sanctions fails to achieve the desired results Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 99– 100; Larsen 2014: 7; Elgström et al. 2007: 955; Schlipphak & Treib 2017: 4. 23 EU development aid effectively combats corruption EU development aid increases corruption Delcour & Wolczuk 2021. 24 The EU provides appropriate humanitarian aid e.g. in the event of natural catastrophes The EU provides insufficient humanitarian aid e.g. in the event of natural catastrophes Fawn et al. 2022:; Arynov 2022b:; Chaban et al. 2014: 439; Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 104; Larsen 2014: 7; Elgström et al. 2007: 962; Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010: 17 25 The EU is an important actor in building peace The EU plays no role in building peace Stivachtis et al. 2013; Chandler 2013; Richmond et al. 2013. 26 EU investment in infrastructure effectively contributes to development in its eastern neighbours EU investment in infrastructure hinders development in its eastern neighbours Chaban et al. 2014: 439. 27 The EU is politically stabilising its eastern neighbours The EU is politically destabilising its eastern neighbours Chaban et al. 2014: 439. 30 The EU offers opportunities to expand into new markets for its eastern neighbours The EU restricts opportunities for its eastern neighbours to expand into new markets Korosteleva 2011; Bohle 2021. 31 The EU effectively implements its strategy to achieve gender equality The EU fails to effectively implement its strategy to achieve gender equality Lombardo 2003. 35 The EU delivers what it promises The EU only talks and does not act Chaban et al. 2017; Zhang 2020. 38 National sovereignty is being promoted by the EU’s neighbourhood policy National sovereignty is being eroded by the EU’s neighbourhood policy Andretta & Doerr 2007; Larsen 2014: 905; Schlipphak & Treib 2017. Page | 25 No. Positive Formulation Negative Formulation Sources Who the EU is (e.g., identity, coherence, and autonomy) 6 The EU acts autonomously from its member states The EU is fully bound by the decisions of its member states Serban & Harutyunyan 2021. 7 The EU effectively balances the power of its member states The EU is overshadowed by its powerful member states Serban & Harutyunyan 2021. 8 The EU acts autonomously from other international actors The EU fails to act autonomously from other international actors Bachmann 2013; Chaban et al. 2014: 441; Chaban, Elgström, et al. 2006: 256; Pace 2010 : 9; Portela 2010: 152–153; Zhang 2010: 171. 22 The EU is a role model for regional cooperation The EU is no role model for regional cooperation Bachmann 2013; Arynov 2022b; Chaban & Elgström 2021; Bengtsson & Elgström 2012: 103; Larsen 2014: 9; Elgström et al. 2007: 955; Lucarelli & Fioramonti 2010: 172; Lucarelli 2007: 264. 28 The EU is highly visible in its eastern neighbours The EU is hardly visible in its eastern neighbours Chaban & Elgström 2021; Aivazyan & Petrova 2018. 29 The EU is an attractive model that its eastern neighbours want to join For the eastern neighbours, the EU is an unattractive model that they do not want to join Arynov 2022b; Kølvraa 2017; Korosteleva 2011. 33 The EU is led by strong personalities The EU lacks leading personalities Esch & Swinkels 2015; Foreign Analysis 2024. 42 EU stands up to major powers such as China and Russia The EU is showing weakness in the face of major powers such as China and Russia Chaban et al. 2017; Zhang 2020. 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