'Working with humanitarians is a nightmare': Dynamics surrounding locally led peacebuilding in Somalia

Barter, Dustin Research Report 'Working with humanitarians is a nightmare': Dynamics surrounding locally led peacebuilding in Somalia ODI Report Provided in Cooperation with: ODI Global, London Suggested Citation: Barter, Dustin (2024) : 'Working with humanitarians is a nightmare': Dynamics surrounding locally led peacebuilding in Somalia, ODI Report, ODI, London, https://odi.org/en/publications/working-with-humanitarians-is-a-nightmare-dynamicssurrounding-locally-led-peacebuilding-in-somalia/ This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/314366 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ‘Working with humanitarians is a nightmare’ Dynamics surrounding locally led peacebuilding in Somalia Dustin Barter August 2024 Report Readers are encouraged to reproduce material for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. Foronline use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI or our partners. This work is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. How to cite: Barter, D. (2024) ‘Working with humanitarians is a nightmare’: dynamics surrounding locally led peacebuilding in Somalia. London: ODI (www.odi.org/en/publications/working-withhumanitarians-is-a-nightmare-dynamics-surrounding-locally-led-peacebuilding-in-somalia). Cover photo: Dustin Barter Acknowledgements The author would like to thank everyone involved throughout the research process, particularly the many interviewees who shared their time and thoughts. Particular thanks to Surer Mohammed, Robin Mydlak, Mohammed Yarrow, Edward Laws, Maegan Rodricks and Kathryn Nwajiaku-Dahou for their instrumental support. About this publication This publication was possible with support from Ireland’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The content in this report in no way reflects the views of the Department and are solely the responsibility of the author. About the authors ORCID numbers are given where available. Please click on the ID icon next to an author’s name in order to access their ORCID listing. Dustin BarterID is a Senior Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI. Contents Acknowledgements / i Acronyms / iii Executive summary / 1 1 Introduction / 3 2 Context positive: unprecedented progress despite challenges / 5 2.1 A stabilising state and improving governance / 5 2.2 Debt relief potentially transformative / 6 2.3 Major progress against al-Shabab / 6 2.4 Normalising international relations: East Africa Community ascension and arms embargo lifted / 6 2.5 Natural resource exploration and potential benefits / 7 3 Context negative: drivers of instability persist / 8 3.1 Al-Shabab is resilient and biding its time / 8 3.2 Risks associated with the ATMIS drawdown / 9 3.3 Major flashpoint: MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland / 9 3.4 Geopolitics and international meddling / 10 3.5 Clan-based conflict and severe tensions in Sool and Sanaag / 10 3.6 Mass displacement and humanitarian needs / 10 4 The political economy of aid in Somalia / 12 5 The state of peacebuilding in Somalia / 15 6 Key enablers and barriers to locally led peacebuilding / 18 6.1 Enablers / 18 6.2 Barriers / 19 6.3 Good donor practice: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation / 20 6.4 Locally led good practice: the Road to Sustainable Peace and Nexus consortia / 21 6.5 Individual organisation good practice / 22 7 Recommendations for international aid actors / 23 7.1 Programmatic approaches / 23 7.2 Specific programmatic options / 24 7.3 Advocacy and influencing / 24 References / 26 Acronyms ATMIS African Union Transition Mission in Somalia CPD Center for Peace and Democracy EAC East African Community FGS Federal Government of Somalia FMS Federal Member State GDP gross domestic product HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Country HRP Humanitarian Response Plan IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IMF International Monetary Fund INGO international non-governmental organisation IOM International Organization for Migration MoU Memorandum of Understanding PBF Peacebuilding Fund RSP Road to Sustainable Peace SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SHF Somalia Humanitarian Fund SNA Somalia National Army SSF Somalia Stability Fund SSWC Save Somali Women and Children UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations US United States USAID United States Agency for International Development 1ODI Report Executive summary Somalia is currently at one of many historical crossroads, where international aid actors can play an important role in supporting locally led peacebuilding and improved state functioning. The country’s most significant positive developments in recent years include relative stabilisation and improving governance, billions of dollars in debt relief, ascension to the East Africa Community (EAC), liberation of significant swathes of territory from al-Shabab and the lifting of an arms embargo in place since the early 1990s. The counter-argument is that people in need of humanitarian assistance and people displaced remain persistently high at 6.9 and 3.4 million respectively (USAID, 2024), insecurity remains acute, progress against al-Shabab is tenuous, a Somaliland–Ethiopia port deal could derail recent progress, climatic shocks are the new norm and corruption remains widespread. The country is highly aid-dependent through a system dominated by international actors. Relationships between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMSs) are fractious. This paper examines these dynamics and the implications for international aid with practical recommendations on how it can best support locally led peacebuilding, which is underpinned by improved engagement with national and sub-national state structures. Chapters 1 to 4 elucidate Somalia’s macro political economy and conflict dynamics, which is critical for embedding the ensuing analysis related to locally led peacebuilding in chapters 5 to 7, including a wide range of recommendations for different actors seeking to support peacebuilding. This structure is intended to foreground the importance of macro-level factors and their influence across the country. Any effort to support or implement peacebuilding must engage with these dynamics, rather than operate in a silo. Overall, the paper focuses on systems related to, rather than the granular details of, peacebuilding. This is because many Somali actors are astute at peacebuilding and conflict resolution, but the impediments they face are structural rather than technical. Main findings • The scale and volatility of humanitarian aid to Somalia has created a political economy of aid that is antithetical to locally led peacebuilding and conflict resolution. It has created many vested interests related to aid capture and severely disrupts local civil society actors’ efforts to achieve long-term impact, amongst other deleterious impacts. • There are unique opportunities to support locally led peacebuilding considering the recent contextual improvements, but international aid actors must increase their trust-building with Somali peace actors and their informed risk tolerance. • International actors continue to dominate the aid sector, but there are significant examples of locally led action, including peacebuilding and conflict resolution. The Road to Sustainable Peace (RSP) and Nexus consortia are notable examples, alongside numerous individual Somali actors. Their success is grounded in years of trust building with donors and other international aid actors. 2ODI Report • Long-term, consistent and flexible funding flows are critical for peacebuilding, as well as for humanitarian and development action, but they remain the anomaly rather than the norm. • Most international aid actors continue to neglect financial engagement and collaboration with the FGS and other state authorities, which undermines aid coherence and the sustainability of impact. • Peacebuilding is regularly compartmentalised rather than integrated into strategies and implementation, which undermines coherence amongst all aid actors, while exacerbating governance challenges. 3ODI Report 1 Introduction 1 The term ‘aid’ is used to refer to peace, humanitarian and development sectors, but does not imply a benign, nor purely altruistic relationship. International aid actors refers to donors, United Nations’ agencies, INGOs and similar actors. Peace-making is a long-term process […] [it] will need to make a long-term commitment of people and resources. Approaches to peacemaking in Somalia reveal the dangers of trying to impose an outside solution to the Somali conflict. (Bradbury, 1994: 3–4) The above quote from a seminal conflict analysis rings as true today as when it was written over 30 years ago. It also sets the scene for the ensuing analysis, not just about the importance of long-term and locally led approaches to peacebuilding, but also the repeated inadequacies of international engagement in Somalia that have contributed to significant inertia. As 2024 unfolds, the country continues to achieve significant stabilisation and governance progress, yet major challenges persist, especially insecurity and largescale humanitarian needs. Along with the quote used in the title of this paper, one international non-governmental organisation (INGO) interviewee summed up the tensions as follows: International dominance is still a key problem; aid contractors are doing mega budgets with no grassroots connection. Peacebuilding is essentially trust-building, but mass aid influxes continue to aggravate many longterm relationships. This paper examines the state of locally led peacebuilding in Somalia within the broader political economy and conflict dynamics of the country. It is intended to inform international aid actors1 and their political engagement with Somalia, with the intention of identifying how such actors can better support locally led peacebuilding through systems thinking. A deliberate effort was made to shape the recommendations in line with Somalia’s unique contextual nuances, which have major implications for international engagement, particularly in areas relating to peacebuilding. To enhance uptake, the analysis seeks to be informative yet concise, pursuing a balance between breadth and depth. Consequently, it explores significant tensions and divergences related to the current context in Somalia, from burgeoning optimism to a sense of acute fragility. Such discrepancy relates to a multitude of dynamics that can be interpreted differently. This paper suggests that careful attention be paid to how international engagement interacts with this context, where any support for locally led peacebuilding must be a long-term yet flexible commitment. It must also seek to work with national and sub-national authorities, rather than in parallel, as is too often the case. The ensuing analysis is based on a wide-ranging literature review, synthesised with 22 key informant interviews and focus group discussions that involved a total of 13 women and 15 men, plus a moderated dialogue involving three Somali experts in early 2024. It also draws on the author’s more than five years of working closely with Somali civil society actors and over a decade with international aid actors, 10 ODI Report It is worth noting, however, that Somaliland has long sought international recognition for which it contends it has a considerable foundation. The MoU can be viewed as antagonistic, but it is also reflective of a long-held Somaliland ambition. Although the issue of recognition remains contentious, one interviewee suggested that the international community has taken Somaliland’s peace and stability for granted, without sufficient support. The MoU is illustrative of how the status quo can be quickly usurped, as was also the case with armed conflict in the contested border areas between Somaliland and Puntland in recent years. 3.4 Geopolitics and international meddling Beyond Ethiopia’s influence, geopolitical dynamics have had major impacts on Somalia for many years, as international actors’ competition for influence disrupts stabilisation efforts. Although no country is immune to geopolitical influences, the impact is more severe in contexts of fragile state formation, like Somalia. Historically, the United States (US) has had extensive military, political and economic engagement in the country, from its ‘war on terror’ and extensive drone strikes to recent debt relief. The US engagement has often courted controversy, not just for the direct impacts, but also because its in-country presence is widely seen as a recruiting tool for al-Shabab (see Khalif, 2024). Over the past decade, however, geopolitical contestation between Türkiye and the Gulf states, while bringing some benefits such as investment and military support, has further complicated state stabilisation. The UAE was making significant inroads in Somaliland, while Türkiye and Qatar were more heavily involved in South-Central Somalia. Towards the end of Farmaajo’s presidency, the UAE was also strengthening its presence in South-Central. This was upended by the 2024 military and economic deals between Türkiye and the FGS (Soylu, 2024). Beyond geopolitical competition, violent conflict in Somalia (and the Horn) is also driven by livestock demand in the Gulf, as predatory and extractive capital disregards local needs and social structures (Duffield and Stockton, 2023). 3.5 Clan-based conflict and severe tensions in Sool and Sanaag Clan-based conflict also remains significant across much of Somalia. The regions of Sool and Sanaag, at the contested border between Somaliland and Puntland, have seen some of the most intense inter-clan violence. This peaked in early 2023 around the town of Lasanod when Somaliland forces violently suppressed dissent, leading to over 100 people being killed and 600 injured (Amnesty International, 2023). Affected clans in the region are calling for their own breakaway state, to be part of Somalia (RLI, 2023). They have been courted by the FGS and denounced by Somaliland. This series of events is indicative of the potential for clan-based tensions to rupture into violence, especially as never-ending droughts drive displacement and competition over scarce resources, such as grazing land and water (Foua etal., 2023). However, conflict is typically mediated and resolved locally, avoiding the large-scale violence seen in Ethiopia and Sudan. This is owing to community leaders’ and clan elders’ efforts, which many interviewees highlighted as a critical resource for locally led peacebuilding. 3.6 Mass displacement and humanitarian needs When discussing conflict dynamics in Somalia during interviews, the scale and persistence of humanitarian need were generally not raised, despite 6.9 million people requiring humanitarian 11 ODI Report assistance and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) equating to a large portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), typically 10–25%. Climatic shocks are the new norm and are proving devastating. Multiple interviewees explained that they were focused on conflict dynamics, with humanitarian needs of less concern, although the humanitarian system was widely seen as disruptive. Mass displacement, however, was seen as both a result and often a driver of conflict, particularly over land in urban settings. The scale of displacement, at 3.4 million people internally displaced as of early 2024 (USAID, 2024), is a critical cross-cutting issue. It is driving rapid urbanisation, where displaced people are typically some of the most vulnerable, particularly minority and marginalised clans, and women. Ultimately, the sheer scale of displacement and humanitarian response have created a detrimental political economy of aid across Somalia. 12 ODI Report 4 The political economy of aid in Somalia By channelling billions of dollars into the country, the aid economy has profound impacts across all facets of life, undermining governance progress, creating many vested interests and encouraging short-termism. All of this negatively impacts the long-term trust-building and strategic thinking that underpin effective peacebuilding. The political economy of aid has evolved in response to decadeslong armed conflict and extensive humanitarian need in Somalia. This chapter captures some of these dynamics and emphasises the scale of the challenge, particularly in relation to humanitarian financing. The aid economy must be addressed to ensure a more conducive environment for locally led peacebuilding. This inadequate aid economy is arguably best illustrated through the immense scale and volatility of annual HRPs and related funding, which offer a clear year-to-year comparison. Table 1 is demonstrative, where 2017 and 2022 involved significantly scaled-up responses to droughtinduced crises. Drought persisted in 2023, but was punctuated by floods that affected 2.5 million people (OCHA, 2023). Humanitarian funding, however, halved. Although the HRPs do not capture development and peacebuilding funding, the scale and volatility of funding impact the entirety of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. In contrast, international development assistance has been relatively stable at around US$300-400 million per annum over the past four years, according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2024a) – both smaller and more consistent than humanitarian funding. Table 1 Scale and fluctuations of humanitarian aid to Somalia HRP funding flows 2016 ($ billions) 2017 ($ billions) 2022 ($ billions) 2023 ($ billions) GDP 7.4 8.3 10.4 10.7 (est.) HRP request 0.9 1.5 2.3 2.6 HRP funded 0.7 1.3 2.3 1.2 Sources: OCHA, 2023; World Bank, 2024b Note: HRP – Humanitarian Response Plan 13 ODI Report The scale and modalities of humanitarian aid to Somalia have created a multitude of dynamics in the country that are antithetical to peacebuilding. Firstly, the scale of humanitarian aid has made it one of the biggest industries and employers in Somalia. Consequently, it has created a wide range of vested interests, where there is significant competition for control over aid flows. Actors face pressure to secure aid for their clan, which heightens competition and contributes to the neglect of minority and marginalised clans. It has also been suggested that political arrangements benefit from the permanent precarity of displaced populations, as it brings in aid funding (Jaspars et al., 2023). This aid economy has attracted widespread criticism for perpetuating Somalia’s aid dependence, from macro-level rent-seeking to camp gatekeepers that take a commission from displaced people’s assistance (Thomas and Majid, 2023). ‘Diversion of aid is systemic and widespread’ (Hailey et al., 2023: 4), yet humanitarian assistance remains essential for averting famine. The availability of aid also influences displacement patterns, as people pursue available support. This has accelerated urbanisation, with displaced people relegated to the urban periphery (Gist Research, 2022). The consequences of humanitarian aid, however, extend beyond issues of dependence. The vast fluctuations in humanitarian aid to Somalia run contrary to effective approaches for peacebuilding and reconciliation. As the figures in Table 1 illustrate, humanitarian aid volumes can halve or double from one year to the next, often with short, unpredictable timeframes. While this reflects responsiveness to the volatility of humanitarian need and has mitigated food security crises, it has deleterious impacts. Firstly, the scale of funding crowds out peace and development activities, encouraging shorttermism – namely addressing and prioritising immediate needs rather than long-term structures that drive and perpetuate these needs. Secondly, short-termism contributes to bad practices, as different actors end up having to spend funds expediently rather than thoughtfully. International aid actors then often force local actors into compromised positions of needing to spend quickly rather than being able to implement coherently. Finally, the fluctuations in funding undermine longer-term peacebuilding efforts. For example, staff at Somali organisations are poached by international aid actors, creating institutional instability. Such dynamics were reported across interviews, with interviewees providing numerous anecdotes of large-scale humanitarian funding disrupting peacebuilding efforts. Although smaller in scale, development and governance initiatives further complicate the political economy of aid in Somalia. Long-running resilience programmes, such as the Somalia Resilience Program (SomReP) and Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRICS), are generally positively regarded for their impact, but are minuscule in comparison to broader humanitarian programming. They are also perceived as ‘INGO clubs’ by many Somali civil society actors, owing to INGOs receiving the bulk of funding and dominating decision-making processes. On the government side, the World Bank has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into the FGS in recent years, which has tested the state’s absorption capacity. While being necessary to achieve benchmarks for debt relief, the large volume of funding has, to a degree, compounded the difficulties associated with humanitarian funding. On the one hand, millions of people are caught in perpetual crisis, but on the other, many actors are profiting significantly from incoming aid. Despite years of critiques of the aid system in Somalia, improvements have not been forthcoming to any significant degree; the 14 ODI Report system remains oriented to the short term, and often complicates rather than improves locally led peacebuilding. Before shifting to focus specifically on peacebuilding, it’s also important to emphasise the continued dominance of United Nations (UN) agencies and INGOs within the aid sector in Somalia. This outsized influence persists, despite a multitude of Somali civil society actors calling for ‘justice to an unjust system’ (Ali, 2016). The earlier criticisms relating to aid capture are also valid for UN agencies and INGOs, where they operate through a competitive and expansionist mindset that is antithetical to the localisation – let alone decolonisation – of aid. The Somalia Humanitarian Fund (SHF), which consistently channels over 50% of funding directly to Somali organisations, is often held up as a positive example. Zooming out, however, the SHF only makes up a tiny part of humanitarian funding in Somalia. Local and national organisations continue to receive under 3% in direct funding (Barter and Sumlut, 2023). Such international dominance must be addressed as an urgent systemic problem. A focus on only micro-level peacebuilding initiatives will struggle against a system that is often disempowering for local actors. 15 ODI Report 5 The state of peacebuilding in Somalia 3 Somaliland appears deprioritised, likely owing to relative stability and less al-Shabab influence in its territory. Violent conflict, however, is present, including scores of deaths in Sool and Sanaag, where tensions remain high. As one interviewee explained, Somaliland’s relative peace is problematically taken for granted by the international community. Considering the many dynamics outlined in the preceding chapters, peacebuilding and conflict resolution remain as pertinent as ever across multiple axes in Somalia. This chapter provides a brief mapping of different levels of peacebuilding, before examining key barriers and enablers to locally led peacebuilding. The mapping is by no means all-inclusive, but is intended to give a sense of different mechanisms and efforts to support peacebuilding. It will be followed with some examples of good practice that are particularly informative for how international aid actors might want to better support locally led peacebuilding in Somalia. This chapter also looks at how various issues in the preceding sections play out in practice. At the federal level, international actors are directing extensive funding towards stabilisation (and securitisation), centred on contributing to the degradation of al-Shabab, while improving relationships between the FGS and FMSs.3 This includes extensive diplomatic engagement, alongside the pre-eminent vehicle for financial and technical support, the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF). Since its launch in 2012, the SSF was intended as a flexible and responsive vehicle for supporting peacebuilding efforts (Laws, 2018). In its third iteration, the SSF focuses significantly on political settlements, democratisation and related areas, rather than grassroots peacebuilding. It also produces extensive, high-quality research. SSF staff are respected as being highly attuned and connected to the nuances across Somalia. According to one interviewee, ‘the SSF is much better than the big private contractors that USAID funds, but it’s difficult to connect big programmes down to local levels’. Another interviewee suggested the SSF was not particularly agile, citing an example of slow adaptation to a rapidly developing crisis, while the SSF also faced competition from UN agencies seeking to assert their authority. Such dynamics are again illustrative of the problems associated with international actors dominating the aid sector in Somalia. Like the humanitarian system, competition between international actors is prevalent in the peacebuilding space in Somalia, leading to domestic actors often being crowded out. The UN supports peacebuilding in multiple ways, such as through the global Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), which transferred over US$1 billion to Somalia initiatives between 2008 and 2021. It addresses various issues such as elections and securitysector reform (PBF, 2024). In 2023, the longstanding Somalia Multi-Partner Trust Fund was re-launched as the Somalia Joint Fund, which aims for an annual budget of US$60 million, although with a cross-nexus focus (UN, 2023b). Individual UN agencies, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), are also engaged in community-level peacebuilding. IOM programming that brings conflicting communities together and matches their contributions for peace and development projects was positively regarded by multiple interviewees. It is important to note that the World Bank, although focused 16 ODI Report more broadly on governance and economic development, also has a major influence on state functioning and the economy, and therefore on peacebuilding. This is particularly owing to the volume of financing it provides; for the World Bank’s 2024–2028 Country Partnership Framework, it has secured commitments for US$2.3 billion in international development assistance. Like humanitarian funding, this represents a significant portion of GDP (World Bank, 2024b). At more localised levels, there is a wide range of peacebuilding initiatives underway in Somalia. Peacebuilding INGOs, such as Interpeace and Saferworld, have had decades of engagement in Somalia, alongside more nexus-oriented actors like Oxfam (which commissioned the conflict analysis quoted at the beginning of this paper). The latter, specifically Oxfam Novib (Netherlands), has a long history of supporting civil society development in Somalia, with a significant focus on peacebuilding. This included long-term, flexible funding that was critical for the establishment of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Adeso, the Elman Peace and Human Rights Centre, the Somali Women’s Study Centre, NAGAAD and Candlelight (Mydlak, 2019). The prominence of these organisations many years later, many of which are women-led and committed to women’s empowerment, is reflective of the value in sustained, agile commitments to civil society strengthening. Despite the extensive presence of international aid actors, the bulk of direct community-level peacebuilding is by Somali civil society actors and communities. The peacebuilding sector has a burgeoning number of NGOs, such as the highly regarded Centre for Peace and Democracy (CPD), Life and Peace Institute, and Puntland Development and Research Center, focused specifically on peacebuilding. Other actors, such as Adeso and Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC), are multi-mandate, with both organisations widely respected for their work on women’s empowerment. Despite being at the coalface of peacebuilding and facing the most acute security risks, these organisations are beholden to wildly fluctuating budgets and minimal institutional support, including for security, while being marginalised from key decision-making processes. International support for localisation is often out of necessity, due to inaccessibility, rather than in support of endogenous civil society development (Barter and Sumlut, 2023). Aside from the NGO sector, it is also important to note that communities often self-initiate peacebuilding and resolve conflicts without external support. They are also the first responders, since community leaders, particularly elders, meet to address conflicts. Their effectiveness is a key resource that is often overlooked and is also why violence in Somalia is typically sporadic and fluid, rather than at the scales seen in Ethiopia or Sudan, according to many interviewees. Preventing and mitigating inter-clan conflicts takes considerable time to ensure trust is built, such as through joint community development projects, dialogues and other initiatives. However, injections of funding to NGOs and communities in short timeframes can prove disruptive. As all interviewees reiterated, peacebuilding requires long-term, thoughtful support, yet such an approach is often lacking in Somalia. Instead, the aid economy and its major, but inconsistent, injection of resources can often prove counterproductive to many communitybased initiatives. As some interviewees highlighted, clan leaders and elders are typically 17 ODI Report adept at resolving conflicts, but funding can range from being too rigid to being a distraction, thus proving disruptive to local initiatives. Other peacebuilding initiatives seek to address conflict dynamics specifically related to al-Shabab, but multiple interviewees highlighted the difficulty in accessing newly liberated areas. This was typically due to risk aversion and/or severe security concerns. Such a dynamic was common across interviews, as the FGS sought aid actors to provide aid and services in newly liberated areas to demonstrate the benefits of ousting al-Shabab. One interviewee explained that their organisation wanted to conduct activities in such areas, but they were then prevented by the consortium lead who determined security protocols. In more successful instances, a diversity of approaches to peacebuilding are being deployed, such as using health and basic services for entry points, while there is an increasing focus on integrating environment and climate change issues into peacebuilding. Attention is also increasingly paid to addressing trauma and the importance of reforming inequitable UN practices as they continue to have outsized influence over aid flows and practices in Somalia compared to domestic actors (GPPAC, 2022). Addressing gender inequalities and minority clan marginalisation was raised during interviews, but the bulk of peacebuilding appears focused on engaging men, such as clan elders. However, various organisations, such as NAGAAD in Somaliland and SSWC in Somalia, have sought to elevate the role of women in peacebuilding. A consistent theme amongst interviewees was the need for international actors to better align peacebuilding funding and initiatives with the state’s governance efforts at national and sub-national levels. The roles and impact of the African Union (AU) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were also elucidated throughout data collection, but they were considered less significant than the other actors and dynamics already outlined. The AU was considered important, particularly owing to its deployment of military forces through ATMIS. Its importance related to securitisation and stability rather than a significant role in peacebuilding. The presence of foreign troops was widely considered necessary, albeit perpetuating the problems associated with international intervention in Somalia. IGAD, on the other hand, was viewed as an important institution for promoting regional cooperation and development, but not particularly significant or influential in relation to peacebuilding in Somalia. The scale of violence in Ethiopia and Sudan were seen as absorbing IGAD’s attention and energy, alongside Sudan suspending its membership in January 2024. Interviewees were definitive that international aid actors should focus on engaging and supporting Somali national and sub-national actors, both state and civil society. 18 ODI Report 6 Key enablers and barriers to locally led peacebuilding This chapter examines the key enablers and barriers to locally led peacebuilding in Somalia, while emphasising that any international support must be attuned to the many political and contextual nuances explored in previous chapters. As such, many of the enablers and barriers are reflective of and responsive to Somalia’s problematic aid economy, while shifting the paper’s analysis to a more implementation and programmatic focus. Although grounded in a diversity of literature, the analysis is centred upon key themes that arose during interviews, of which there was significant commonality, despite the diversity of interviewees. Most of the enablers and barriers are already widely known, indicating that the aid system in Somalia, like in many contexts, struggles with inertia and/or is beholden to aid systems that are antithetical to supporting locally led peacebuilding. While many geopolitical influences and the resilience of al-Shabab remain perpetually difficult to address, there is plenty of scope to improve the scaffolding of international support for locally led peacebuilding. Rather than focus on the granular specifics of peacebuilding, which many Somali actors are highly experienced in implementing, this chapter focuses primarily on structural enablers and barriers. In many ways, addressing these systemic issues is about international actors reducing their interference, while enhancing respect for the agency and autonomy of Somali actors. 6.1 Enablers • Long-term support/funding. This was universally seen as critical to supporting locally led peacebuilding, which requires trust-building between actors at different levels. Predictable funding also enables organisations to better recruit and retain staff that then improves programme coherency. • Flexible funding. Bottom-up/communityled approaches were widely seen as the most effective, and these benefitted from flexible funding. This enables communities to steer initiatives towards their needs through genuinely participatory approaches, while allowing civil society actors to respond to sporadic or emerging violent conflict. • Success based on trust. The importance of trust translates across levels, from donors to civil society actors to communities. When donors (including UN and INGOs) trust the actors they are funding, those actors feel better able to deliver and innovate, as there is less pressure. Trust takes time to build and requires commitment from international actors. • Equitable partnerships. Local actors emphasised the importance of partnerships that were as equitable as possible, from decision-making to implementation. Subcontracting relationships were regarded as not just inappropriate, but also undermining peacebuilding objectives, as they contributed to short-term approaches and undermined trustbuilding. In contrast, long-standing partnerships with allies, based on solidarity, were highly valued by Somali civil society actors. 19 ODI Report • Integrated approaches. Locally led peacebuilding works best when integrated with broader development and humanitarian activities to ensure any material benefits connect rather than divide population groups. This is also important when donors fund predominantly humanitarian organisations with requirements that they consider peacebuilding dynamics or at minimum become more conflictsensitive. Integration also means addressing governance dynamics and engaging the state. • Commitment to localisation. Such a commitment, whether for donors, UN or INGO funding intermediaries, can be a critical enabler for locally led approaches. Incentives and approaches can be adjusted to support localisation, but if the underlying commitment is lacking, progress often remains stalled. 6.2 Barriers • Humanitarian funding. The scale and volatility of humanitarian funding poses one of the most significant barriers to locally led peacebuilding, as consistently highlighted throughout this report. It crowds out peacebuilding initiatives, exacerbates an inadequate aid economy and undermines the stability of Somali civil society actors. In contrast, development funding is more amenable to peacebuilding through integrated programming, but continues to be undermined by volatile humanitarian financing. • Projectisation of aid. This creates both shortterm and inflexible aid, which contributes to ineffectual and even damaging peacebuilding processes. It also disincentivises holistic and systematic approaches to peacebuilding, as actors divert attention to resource mobilisation that may not align with their strategies. • International actors’ dominance. This pervades the entire aid sector in Somalia, creating counterproductive competition amongst actors. Local actors are crowded out and/or forced to accept problematic funding modalities. International actors then compete for local partners, while these local actors are marginalised from decision-making processes. International actors also poach staff, which continues to undermine the institutional strength and coherency of local actors. • Lack of trust. This is prevalent across the aid sector in Somalia, owing particularly to major issues of aid diversion and misuse over the years. It must be noted that international aid actors rarely take responsibility for the inefficient ways in which they often channel high volumes of funding in short timeframes. The lack of trust is exacerbated because: (a) UN and INGOs dominate access to donors, which is critical for trust building; and (b) donors rarely, if ever, visit insecure locations, where important peacebuilding work occurs by local actors. Such visits build trust. • Funding misaligned with political events. Funding cycles typically exist in isolation, despite consistency of funding being essential during key moments, such as elections. If funding ceases at an inopportune time, such as just prior to an election, it can have wide-ranging negative impacts on peacebuilding. • Disproportionate funding to pooled funds. Although such funding can be comparatively accessible for local actors, they often provide relatively short-term funding and limited long-term partnership building. Pooled funds can crowd out longer-term funding to other intermediaries, such as INGOs, some of which may have deeper commitments to locally led peacebuilding. • Democratisation prioritised over peace. Such a prioritisation means that long-term peacebuilding efforts can be disrupted, as donors push for democratisation before peace and stability are sufficiently secured. 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