Migration and Public Expenditure: the Host Country Point of view
Abstract
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Basevi, Giorgio; Tarozzi, Alessandro Working Paper Migration and Public Expenditure: the Host Country Point of view Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, No. 288 Provided in Cooperation with: University of Bologna, Department of Economics Suggested Citation: Basevi, Giorgio; Tarozzi, Alessandro (1997) : Migration and Public Expenditure: the Host Country Point of view, Quaderni - Working Paper DSE, No. 288, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna, https://doi.org/10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5022 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159131 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Migration and public expenditure: the host country point of view Giorgio Basevi Alessandro Tarozzi Department of Economics, University of Bologna
Introduction footnote The flows of migration from neighbouring countries into the European Union have,since its inception,been more relevant than those of internal migration. Thus, labour movements from relatively less industrialized countries of the EU —such as Italy in the 50’s—towards the relatively more advanced ones —such as France and Germany—quickly vanished after the European Community was established among the initial six members.Later,migration from Portugal and Spain towards the richer EU countries was again greatly reduced,when those countries,as Italy and Greece before them,also became members of the Community. Migration flows from Turkey,onthe other hand,were slowed down only by specific restrictions, particularly in Germany,and will probably be no longer relevant once the customs union between the EU and Turkey is completed.In the meantime, migrants from Southern Mediterranean,Eastern European,and other extra-EU countries keep pressing at the EU borders. The recent flow of illegal immigrants from Albania,particularly into Italy and Greece,is only the latest and more dramatised example of alarger and continuing phenomenon. Thus the issue of labour migration,as well as its legal or illegal aspects,is strictly intertwined —both theoretically and empirically—with the issue of economic integration, particularly when this takes place among countries that are relatively more advanced than their neighbours. In this paper,as an attempt at exploring some theoretical basis of these phenomena,we consider acountry into which immigration takes place exogenously. footnote The model used to describe its economy is based on overlapping generations.People go through two periods in their life.During the first period they work,consume and save,in order to afford consumption also in the second period,when they will no longer work. The government taxes labour income in order to finance public expenditure,which takes the form of transfers to retired workers. footnote Thus government expenditures may be interpreted as apension scheme based on the ”pay as you go”system.Workers are both natives of the country,and immigrants.Without attaching any particular value judgment to it,we make the assumption that the government of the host country,in optimising its behaviour,takes into account only the utility of indigenous residents. footnote We assume that the exogenous rate of immigration is higher than the rate of growth of native population.Also,we assume that,relative to aprevious situation when the pension scheme was put in place,the rate of growth of indigenous population has fallen below the rate of interest. Thus promises of a ”pay as you go”pension scheme can no longer be kept,and anew scheme based on capitalisation becomes superior.In such asituation,immigration is beneficial,in the sense that the government is able to keep the promises based on the ”pay as you go”pension scheme,by drawing on the higher demographic fertility of the immigrant population. Immigrants come and work in the host country either legally or illegally.Besides exploring the viability of the old pension scheme through immigration,we are interested in endogenising the share of total immigrants that come in legally,and in explaining the decision by legal immigrants to retire in the host country,or to return to their country of origin after their working period.We analyse two fiscal means through which the government of the host country can influence these decisions.They are the rate of labour income taxation,and the share of pension that the government will transfer to legal immigrants,in case they decide to return home,rather than remain in the host country,after retirement. In Section 2we present the structure of the basic model.Section 3examines how the government can maximise the welfare of its natives by using fiscal instruments,that are related to the income of immigrants during both the working and the retirement periods of their life. Section 4presents the conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis,and indicates directions for further research.
The model In order to make welfare comparisons of alternative situations we take the point of view of the country into which immigration flows,i.e.the host country. The following function specifies the utility of consumers, footnote as they work in period t and retire in period t+1: Ut=ct,t Jct,t+1 1?J # The economy produces only one good,according to the following production function: Yt=Kt KLt 1?K # Resident population footnote at time t(i.e.Rt)is made up of native workers (Nt,t),native retired people (Nt?1,t),newly immigrated workers (Mt,t),and retired guest workers (Mt?1,t): Rt=ÝNt,t+Mt,tÞ+ÝNt?1,t+Mt?1,tÞ=Lt,t+Nt?1,t+Mt?1,t # where Lt,t¯Nt,t+Mt,tis total labour force at time t.We assume that native people do not migrate,so that: Nt,t=Nt?1,tÝ1+nÞ # where nis the given constant rate of growth of native population.Total immigrants (Mt,t)may reside and work legally (M #t,t)or illegally (M *t,t)in the host country: Mt,t¯M #t,t+M *t,t # For simplicity we assume that both flows of immigration —legal and illegal—grow at the same rate m,so that: Mt,t=Mt?1,t?1Ý1+mÞ # and that: Mt?1,t=M #t?1,t=NM #t?1,t?1 # where Nis the share of young legal immigrants that decide to remain in the host country after retirement.Note that in ( ref: delta ) we have implicitely assumed that all illegal immigrants must return to their country of origin after retirement. The rate of immigration mis exogenous.The government of the host country provides public expenditure in the form of transfers paid to retired people,financed by taxation of labour incomes. Thus the government budget constraint is: ÝNt?1,t+NM #t?1,t?1Þgt+Ý1?NÞM #t?1,t?1Sgt=bgtL #t # where L #t=Nt,t+M #t,t=Lt,t?M *t,t is the legal labour force,and where gtis the basic per capita government transfer in real terms,b is the rate of labour income taxation,and gtis the real wage.Note that in ( ref: gbudget1 ) we have assumed that labour taxes are levied only on legal labour income,and that the same applies to government transfers.We have also assumed that legal immigrants returning to their country of origin after retirement receive only apart (0²S²1)of the basic transfer paid to all other (both native and immigrated)retired residents.Collecting terms in ( ref: gbudget1 ) we get:
áNt?1,t+ßN+SÝ1?NÞàM #t?1,t?1âgt=bgtL #t # Consumers face different budget constraints,according to their status: a)if they are natives, or legal immigrants that decide to retire in the host country: ptct,t+pt+1ct,t+1=Ý1?bÞgtpt+pt+1gt+1 # b)if they are legal immigrants that decide to retire in their original country: ptc#t,t+pt+1c#t,t+1=Ý1?bÞgtpt+pt+1Sgt+1 # c)if they are illegal immigrants: ptc *t,t+pt+1c *t,t+1=Ý1?eÞgtpt # where eis the rate of ”taxation”that criminal organisations collect on illegal labour income to help them enter and work in the country illegally.As afirst step,we assume that e=b. footnote We shall also assume that this tax is paid to foreign criminal organizations,whose members do not consume or save anything in the form of the host country product. Thus the tax revenue to criminal organisations is acomplete loss of national product. footnote Total residents’consumption at time tis Ct=ct,tÝNt,t+NM #t,tÞ+c#t,tÝ1?NÞM #t,t+c *t,tM *t,t+ +ct?1,tÝNt?1,t+NM #t?1,t?1Þ # where the first three terms on the right hand side correspond to consumption by working residents (natives, legal and illegal immigrants),while the last term correspond to consumption by retired (native and immigrated)residents.Notice that this implies that international trade is only of an inter-temporal nature,i.e.it is assumed to be made up only of aflow of exports of the host country product,which is transferred by the government to those immigrants that decide to return in their country of origin after retirement. footnote Thus astructural trade surplus must be balanced by astructural international transfer of income. Optimisation by producers implies that the two factors of production are paid their marginal productivities: rt+1=Kkt K?1 gt=Ý1?KÞkt K # where rt+1is the rate of return to capital,equal to the interest rate,from period tto period t+1, and kt¯Kt/Lt¯Kt/ÝNt,t+M #t,t+M *t,tÞ # Optimisation by consumers —natives, legal and illegal immigrants—determines per capita consumption in the two periods: ct,t=JÝ1?bÞgt+pt+1 ptgt+1 c#t,t=JÝ1?bÞgt+pt+1 ptSgt+1 c *t,t=JÝ1?bÞgt #
ct,t+1=Ý1+rt+1ÞÝ1?JÞ Ý1?bÞgt+pt+1 ptgt+1 c#t,t+1=Ý1+rt+1ÞÝ1?JÞ Ý1?bÞgt+pt+1 ptSgt+1 c *t,t+1=Ý1+rt+1ÞÝ1?JÞÝ1?bÞgt # Total capital accumulation results from domestic saving.We assume that the country builds its own capital stock by costless moulding of the consumption good into physical capital,and that it does so only on the basis of its own saving (by nationals,legal and illegal immigrants),without borrowing from abroad. Thus Kt+1=Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞgt?Jpt+1 ptgt+1ÝNt,t+NM #t,tÞ+ +Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞgt?Jpt+1 ptSgt+1Ý1?NÞM #t,t+ +Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞgtM *t,t # Note that,in deriving ( ref: indcons2 ),we have used the intertemporal equilibrium condition 1+rt+1=pt pt+1 # In ( ref: capital ) we have also assumed that capital is wholly consumed by retired workers,who leave no bequests to the young generation. footnote In order to compare different situations,we refer only to the utility derived from consumption by native residents.In other words,we assume that the welfare of immigrants is of relatively minor concern to the government of the host country. footnote Focusing on the utility function of native residents,we can see that,for given band g,it depends univocally on gt,and therefore on the capital/labour ratio kt. Thus we need to make explicit the determinants of per-worker stock of capital.From ( ref: capital )this is equal to: kt+1=Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞgt?Jpt+1 ptgt+1ÝNt,t+NM #t,tÞ Nt+1,t+1+M #t+1,t+1+M *t+1,t+1 + +Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞgt?Jpt+1 ptSgt+1Ý1?NÞM #t,t Nt+1,t+1+M #t+1,t+1+M *t+1,t+1 + +Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞgtM *t,t Nt+1,t+1+M #t+1,t+1+M *t+1,t+1 # Note that,from the government budget constraint ( ref: gbudget1 ),we have: gt=bgtL #t Nt?1,t+ßN+SÝ1?NÞàM #t?1,t?1 # Leading forward ( ref: gt )by one period,substituting the expression for gt+1,and dividing numerator and demominator by Nt,twe get: footnote gt+1=bÝ1?KÞkt+1 KÝ1+nÞ+M #0 N0Ý1+mÞÝ1+m 1+nÞt 1+ßN+SÝ1?NÞàM #0 N0Ý1+m 1+nÞt Assuming m>nand taking the limit for t¸K,we get the steady state value:
gM D=bÝ1?KÞÝkM DÞKÝ1+mÞ N+SÝ1?NÞ # where the Dand the index Mdenote the value of avariable in steady states with migration. Similarly,dividing by Nt,tboth numerator and denominator in ( ref: smallk ),we get: kt+1=Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞÝ1?KÞkt K?Jpt+1 ptgt+1Ý1+NQ #tÞ 1+n+Ý1+mÞQ #t+Ý1+mÞQ *t + +Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞÝ1?KÞkt K?Jpt+1 ptSgt+1Ý1?NÞQ #t 1+n+Ý1+mÞQ #t+Ý1+mÞQ *t + +Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞÝ1?KÞkt KQ *t 1+n+Ý1+mÞQ #t+Ý1+mÞQ *t # where Q #t¯M #0 N0Ý1+m 1+nÞt;and Q *t¯M *0 N0Ý1+m 1+nÞt For t¸K( ref: smallk2 )becomes: kM D=Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞÝ1?KÞÝkM DÞK 1+m?JgM DM #0pt+1 ptßN+SÝ1?NÞà Ý1+mÞÝM #0+M *0Þ and defining W #¯M #0 M #0+M *0;and W *¯M *0 M #0+M *0 =1?W # we have: kM D=Ý1?JÞÝ1?bÞÝ1?KÞÝkM DÞK?JW #gM Dpt+1 ptßN+SÝ1?NÞà 1+m Substituting for gM Dfrom ( ref: gm1 ) we get kM D=Ý1?KÞÝkM DÞKÝ1?JÞÝ1?bÞ?JbW #Ý1+mÞpt+1 pt 1+m # We assume that the rate of growth of native population,n,is lower than r. Thus a ”pay as you go”pension scheme —possibly based on ahigher native rate of growth that has steadily decreased—is no longer viable and has become inferior to one based on capitalisation,if the country is demographically isolated from the rest of the world.However,as demographic growth in other countries,and immigration from them,are assumed to be higher,the government should control the financing of its pension transfers so as to make m=r>n.By so doing it maximises the intergenerational welfare of natives with a ”pay aas you go”pension scheme. In order to reach this situation,the government will have to select the appropriate labour tax rate b=bDthat is enough to finance such ascheme under the golden rule m=r. Thus, making use of the equation pt+1 pt=1 1+rD=1 1+m # and solving ( ref: kstar1 )for the steady state level of kM D,we obtain:
kM D=Ý1?KÞÝ1?J+JbDÝ1?W #Þ?bDÞ 1+m 1 1?K # It follows that the steady state level of the real wage is: gM D=Ý1?KÞÝ1?KÞÝ1?J+JbDÝ1?W #Þ?bDÞ 1+m K 1?K # so that gM D=bDÝ1?KÞÝ1+mÞ N+SÝ1?NÞ Ý1?KÞÝ1?J+JbDÝ1?W #Þ?bDÞ 1+m K 1?K # Controlling the status of immigrants through fiscal policy The optimal level of income taxation We have assumed that the government sets b=bDso as to maximise intergenerational welfare,for agiven rate of growth mof total immigration.However,the utility attained by residents with migration,depends on the share of legal immigrants that decide to repatriate after retirement,and on the share of immigrants that are illegal.In fact these shares determine the capital stock and the wage rate of the economy. Thus, overall there are two fiscal instruments,S and b,through which the government can try to maximise the level of utility of its nationals in the presence of migration.From ( ref: utility )and ( ref: c1budget ) we have: UMt =JJßÝ1+rt+1ÞÝ1?JÞà1?JÝ1?bÞgt+pt+1 ptgt+1 Making use of ( ref: grule ),this becomes: UMt =JJßÝ1+mÞÝ1?JÞà1?JÝ1?bDÞgt+1 1+mgt+1 Substituting the steady state values of gM Dand gM Dfrom ( ref: omegam )and ( ref: gm2 ) we get: UM D=AM1?bD+bD N+SÝ1?NÞ Ý1?KÞß1?J?bDÝ1?W *JÞà 1+m K 1?K # where AM¯Ý1?KÞJJßÝ1?JÞÝ1+mÞà1?J # Since UM Dand bDare at their optimal level,we must have: 0=/UM D /bb=bD =AMK 1+mß1?JW *à6 61?bD+bD N+SÝ1?NÞ Ý1?KÞß1?J?bDÝ1?W *JÞà 1+m 2K?1 1?K+ +AM1?1 N+SÝ1?NÞ Ý1?KÞß1?J?bDÝ1?W *JÞà 1+m K 1?K from which we get:
bD=K+Ý1?JÞÝ1?KÞ ß1?JW *à?K 1?ßN+SÝ1?NÞà # Note that,for given S<1, the optimal rate of labour income taxation in ( ref: taustar )is lower the higher is the share Nof immigrants that decide to remain in the host country after retirement, and the higher is the ratio S.Moreover it is higher the larger is the share W *=1?W #of immigration which is illegal.While the last result appears intuitive,the first two may seem puzzling.Further analysis is required. The optimal level of transfer to non-resident immigrants Considering again equation ( ref: Um ),we can see that UM Dis anegative function of S.It follows that,for given Nand b,the value of Sthat maximises the nationals’utility would be S=0. In other words,if the quota 1?Nof legal immigrants that decide to retire in their home country is exogenous,it is clear that the government of the host country,since it cares only about its nationals’utility (or rather,its permanent residents’utility), should minimise the amount of transfer paid to immigrants that retire in their country of origin. Such apolicy,in the situation described by our model,it would be tantamount to confiscating their pension credit. The choice to retire in the home country Assume,however,that the quota 1?Nof legal immigrants that retire in their home country is apositive function of the share Sof the basic transfer,to which they are entitled if they return home.In other words,let us assume that N=fÝSÞwith fv<0 # Let us also assume that the share of illegal immigrants is adecreasing function of b.In fact illegal immigrants are supposed not to have other choice than going back to their country of origin after retirement,obviously without any transfer from the host country government.As they pay ”taxes”like legal immigrants —in the sense that they get the same net real wage—, but get no transfer when retired in their home country,their incentive to be legal rather than illegal is primarily anegative function of b, footnote which for them corresponds to apure loss of income. Thus we assume: W *=jÝbÞwith jv<0 # From ( ref: Um ) we have: UM D=AM1?bD+bD N+SÝ1?NÞ Ý1?KÞß1?J?bDÝ1?W *JÞà 1+m K 1?K =FM1?bD+bD N+SÝ1?NÞß1?J?bDÝ1?W *JÞàK 1?K # where FM¯AM1?K 1+m K 1?K # Substituting ( ref: deltaf )and ( ref: muf ) we get: UM D=FM1?bD+bD fÝSÞ+SÝ1?fÝSÞÞß1?J?bDÝ1?jÝbDÞJÞàK 1?K # Let us specifically assume that: