The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think?

ZOiS REPORT THE DISPLACED UKRAINIANS: WHO ARE THEY, AND WHAT DO THEY THINK? No. 1 / 2017 · March 2017 Gwendolyn Sasse ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 2 Content 02 ___ Executive summary 03 ___ Introduction: Who are the displaced Ukrainians? 05 ___ What do the displaced Ukrainians think? 05 ______ Intention to stay and personal networks 08 ______ Jobs and income 10 ______ Shifts in identities 14 ______ Views on the war and conflict-resolution 15 ______ Political and economic attitudes 17 ___ Conclusion 17 ___ Imprint Executive summary A survey conducted by ZOiS in November and December 2016 provides the first comparative data on the attitudes and identities of the people displaced by the war in Eastern Ukraine both within Ukraine and to Russia. The main results from this survey are: – The majority of the internally and externally displaced intends to stay where they are currently based. – The vast majority of the internally and externally displaced had family members or friends living in the locations where they are currently based, and they remain in close contact with family members and friends in the war zone. – A higher share of the displaced in Russia reports being in full-time employment; the mean income of the displaced in Russia is significantly higher than that of the internally displaced who report greater reliance on state support. – The effect of war and displacement on personal identities has been mixed: an increased identification as “Ukrainian” or “Russian” is counterbalanced by an increase in mixed identities (“both Ukrainian and Russian”). ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 3 – The displaced are a politically interested group – about 40 percent in Russia and 20 percent in Ukraine report that they are more interested in politics now than three years ago. – The political cleavage between the two groups of the displaced is most pronounced with regard to the status of occupied territories. Two thirds of the displaced in Russia see them as a part of Russia (with or without a special autonomy status), whereas for about 96 percent of the displaced in Ukraine they are an integral part of Ukraine (a third envisages a special autonomy status). – 45 percent of the displaced inside Ukraine are against Ukraine’s EU membership (and 84 percent of the displaced in Russia). Introduction: Who are the displaced Ukrainians?1 Three years after the onset of the war in the Donbas, the number of the war dead in Ukraine is now approaching 10,000. The Minsk I and II agreements resulting from the Normandy negotiations (Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia) have contained but not stopped the fighting. One group severely affected by the war remains hidden from view: the displaced, internally and externally. By summer 2016 the Ukrainian Ministry for Social Policy had registered close to 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDPs) inside Ukraine (http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/351907.html). Since 2015 Ukraine has been among the ten countries with the largest IDP population worldwide (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons_en). Moreover, about another one million have fled from the conflict zone to the Russian Federation (http:// reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Ukraine%20Operational%20Update%20-%20December%202016.pdf). Through their displacement, these individuals fall outside standard opinion polls, they do not figure in international media reports (and hardly 1 The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Alice Lackner who helped with the data analysis and prepared the charts. ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 4 figure in the Ukrainian and Russian media), and in policy circles they are primarily seen as a social policy or humanitarian aid issue. The overall number, territorial spread, and their extreme experiences make the displaced a constituency that the Ukrainian and Russian national and local governments – as well as the West more generally – need to take into account. The displaced are politicized, though not one cohesive political or social force. Many remain dependent on state or family support, while remaining in close contact with the areas and people they left behind. They are also an extreme case to test how the experience of war shapes attitudes and identities. The newly founded Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) in Berlin has just conducted the first two-part survey of IDPs in Ukraine (n = 1000) and those who fled to Russia (n = 1000). The ZOiS poll was conducted between 1 and 18 December 2016 among both registered displaced persons and persons who provide for themselves and their families independently without registering their status.2 The survey of IDPs covered six oblasts in Ukraine: those with the highest concentration of registered IDPs, namely Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblast (jointly accounting for 60 percent of the sample), Dnipro oblast as a further region bordering the conflict, Kyiv city, Kyiv oblast, and Lviv oblast as an example of a western oblast known to have attracted a significant number of refugees. The quota sampling was based on official data on the location and socio-demographic profile of the IDPs (the majority is middle-aged, two thirds are women, see below).3 The ZOiS survey among the displaced in Russia covered Moscow city and eleven western and central oblasts with known concentrations of the displaced.4 In the absence of information on the displaced in Russia, the quotas were aligned with the IDP sample. A priori there is no reason to believe that the profile of the internally and externally displaced should vary significantly.5 2 The ratio of these two groups in the sample was: 90 percent of registered IDPs and 10 percent of non-registered IDPs. The survey was conducted in the following locations: organized IDP accommodation (halls of residence, camps, hostels, modular dwellings, etc.); settings where IDPs concentrate (e. g. NGOs, official agencies, banks); private homes of non-registered IDPs. All non-registered individuals were contacted using the referral method, with a registered IDP usually serving as the first contact person. 3 According to official published data 62 percent of the IDPs are women and 38 percent men. In terms of the age groups, the breakdown for the whole of Ukraine is reported as follows: 15 – 24 years of age: 7.8 percent; 25 – 29: 14.3 percent; 30 – 34: 18.8 percent; 35 – 44: 29.9 percent; 45 – 54: 23 percent; 55+: 6.2 percent (http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/ UNHCR%20Ukraine%20Operational%20Update%20-%20December%202016.pdf;http:// voxukraine.org/2016/06/30/velyke-pereselennya-skilky-naspravdi-v-ukraini-vpo-ua/) The actual distribution by region is not known; therefore, the ZOiS survey applied the quota to the overall sample. 4 Moscow city, Belgorodskaya oblast’, Vladimirskaya oblast’, Voronezhskaya oblast’, Kaluzhskaya oblast’, Krasnodarskyi krai, Nizhegorodskaya oblast’, Orlovskaya oblast’, Rostovskaya oblast’, Samarskaya oblast’, Tul’skaya oblast’, Ul’yanovskaya oblast’. The ratio between registered and unregistered refugees in the Russia sample is 56 percent to 44 percent, reflecting the rate of camp closures and the more difficult access to the displaced in organized accommodation. 5 The widening of the regional catchment area and the necessary re-allocation of interviews across regions in response to access difficulties have resulted in a slight oversampling of the younger cohort of the displaced in Russia compared to the quotas based on Ukrainian IDP data. ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 5 What do the displaced Ukrainians think? Intention to stay and personal networks One finding that might come as a surprise to the Ukrainian and Russian authorities is that the majority of the displaced intend to stay where they are based at the moment – more so in Russia (about 80 percent), but also in Ukraine (about 65 percent). Personal networks have been an important factor in shaping the resettlement: according to the ZOiS survey about 70 percent of the displaced in Russia and 60 percent of the displaced in Ukraine had family or friends in the locations they moved to. These ties provide, at least in parts, a source of practical and emotional support and thereby facilitate a degree of integration. FIGURES 1 + 2 FIGURE 1 Are you planning to stay here now? Source: ZOiS 64.9 81.5 35.1 18.5 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No Ukraine: n=756 ; Russia: n=763 Are you planning to stay here now? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia FIGURE 2 Did you have family members / friends living here before you arrived? 59.3 68.7 40.7 31.3 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No Ukraine: n=978 ; Russia: n=991 Did you have family members/friends living here before you arrived? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia Source: ZOiS Displaced in Ukraine (n = 756) Displaced in Russia (n = 763) Displaced in Ukraine (n = 978) Displaced in Russia (n = 991) ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 6 The survey also reveals the many strong ties the displaced in both Russia and Ukraine retain with family members and friends in both the occupied territories and the rest of the Donbas. Two thirds of displaced Russians have relatives or friends in the areas controlled by Kyiv; and just under 90 percent have relatives or friends in the occupied territories. Among the IDPs in Ukraine, two thirds have friends or relatives in the occupied territories and the government-controlled Donbas respectively. About half of the displaced in Russia and Ukraine are in daily or weekly contact with relatives or friends in the occupied territories. Thus, the fact that the density of contacts with the places and people left behind, seems to make an actual return appear less urgent and – due to first-hand reports about the situation on the ground – less appealing. FIGURES 3 + 4 19.5 9.3 33.7 32.8 36.8 42.0 7.8 9.9 2.1 6.0 0 10 20 30 40 Percent Every day 1−2 a week 1−2 a month 1−2 a year Not at all Ukraine: n=665 ; Russia: n=647 How often are you in touch with your friends/family in Donbas? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia 20.2 10.3 30.8 36.8 35.9 40.8 8.7 9.4 4.5 2.8 0 10 20 30 40 Percent Every day 1−2 a week 1−2 a month 1−2 a year Not at all Ukraine: n=738 ; Russia: n=868 How often are you in touch with your friends/family in DNR/LNR? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia FIGURE 3 How often are you in touch with your friends / family in Donbas? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 4 How often are you in touch with your friends / family in DNL / LNR? Displaced in Ukraine (n = 665) Displaced in Russia (n = 647) Displaced in Ukraine (n = 738) Displaced in Russia (n = 868) ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 7 Overall, about 40 percent of IDPs in Ukraine have friends or relatives living or working in Russia (and about 16 percent in other post-Soviet states). This density of interpersonal linkages made going to Russia a feasible perspective in the first place. It is also bound to guard against Ukrainian-Russian frontlines in personal relations. By comparison, the internally displaced have much more limited personal links to EU Member States (about 13 percent) and North America (about 7 percent). In this regard they are similar to the displaced in Russia of whom about 11 percent and 5 percent respectively report having family members or close friends based in the EU and North America. Thus, onward migration to the West is a more distant prospect, at least at present. FIGURES 5 – 12 FIGURE 5 Ukraine: Do you have family / friends in Russia? FIGURE 7 Ukraine: Do you have family / friends in the EU? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 6 Ukraine: Do you have family / friends in other FSU countries? FIGURE 8 Ukraine: Do you have family / friends in USA or Canada? 38.0 62.0 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=981 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in Russia? 16.1 83.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=975 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 13.1 86.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=980 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in the EU? 7.0 93.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=978 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? 38.0 62.0 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=981 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in Russia? 16.1 83.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=975 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 13.1 86.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=980 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in the EU? 7.0 93.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=978 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? 38.0 62.0 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=981 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in Russia? 16.1 83.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=975 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 13.1 86.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=980 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in the EU? 7.0 93.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=978 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? 38.0 62.0 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=981 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in Russia? 16.1 83.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=975 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 13.1 86.9 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=980 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in the EU? 7.0 93.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=978 Ukraine Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? n = 981 n = 980 n = 975 n = 978 ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 8 Jobs and income The self-reported current mean income is higher among the displaced in Russia (€ 470 or $ 500 per month) compared to that of the IDPs (about € 160 or $ 170 per month). Average salaries have fluctuated significantly in Russia and Ukraine in recent years, but the mean income of the displaced in Russia roughly equals the average wage, whereas the mean income of the IDPs falls below the average salary in Ukraine. The discrepancy in the income levels of the displaced is, at least in part, linked to the fact that over 70 percent of the displaced in Russia report a full-time work status, compared to 46 percent of IDPs in Ukraine. Conversely, about 15 percent of the internally displaced describe themselves as “temporarily out of work” or “looking for work”, compared to only about 2 percent of the displaced in FIGURE 9 Russia: Do you have family / friends in Russia? FIGURE 11 Russia: Do you have family / friends in the EU? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS FIGURE 10 Russia: Do you have family / friends in other FSU countries? FIGURE 12 Russia: Do you have family / friends in USA or Canada? 87.4 12.6 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=1000 Russia Do you have family/friends in Russia? 37.1 62.9 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=995 Russia Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 10.9 89.1 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=987 Russia Do you have family/friends in the EU? 5.4 94.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=992 Russia Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? 87.4 12.6 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=1000 Russia Do you have family/friends in Russia? 37.1 62.9 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=995 Russia Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 10.9 89.1 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=987 Russia Do you have family/friends in the EU? 5.4 94.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=992 Russia Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? 87.4 12.6 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=1000 Russia Do you have family/friends in Russia? 37.1 62.9 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=995 Russia Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 10.9 89.1 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=987 Russia Do you have family/friends in the EU? 5.4 94.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=992 Russia Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? 87.4 12.6 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No n=1000 Russia Do you have family/friends in Russia? 37.1 62.9 0 20 40 60 Percent Yes No n=995 Russia Do you have family/friends in other FSU countries? 10.9 89.1 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=987 Russia Do you have family/friends in the EU? 5.4 94.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 Percent Yes No n=992 Russia Do you have family/friends in USA or Canada? n = 1000 n = 987 n = 995 n = 992 ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 9 Russia. FIGURE 13 The share of non-working pensioners, those not working for health reasons, and those in charge of care duties in the family is higher among the displaced in Ukraine, – these groups are by definition less mobile, less inclined to move further afield and probably less risk-averse when it comes to giving up the state support they are accustomed to, even if it is limited and in decline. Only 14 percent of the respondents in Russia declare that they are receiving state support, compared to 66 percent in Ukraine. FIGURE 14 According to the ZOIS survey, the majority of the displaced in 1.8 7.8 15.0 2.85.1 2.6 7.1 1.1 3.3 2.4 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.6 6.5 10.6 12.4 70.1 45.5 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Other Temporarily no work Care for family Pensioner No work/health reasons Student School/Voc. training Unpaid leave Paid leave (other) Maternity leave Part−time Full−time Ukraine: n=997 ; Russia: n=997 Which answer best describes your main employment status at this time? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia 65.8 13.8 34.2 86.2 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No Ukraine: n=964 ; Russia: n=972 Do you currently receive financial state support? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia FIGURE 13 Which answer best describes your main employment status at this time? FIGURE 14 Do you currently receive financial state support? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Displaced in Ukraine (n = 997) Displaced in Russia (n = 997) Displaced in Ukraine (n = 964) Displaced in Russia (n = 972) ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 16 both groups. This very general question, which typically features in opinion polls, does not allow for a detailed analysis, including the respondents’ understanding of democracy, but it serves as a baseline indicator. In this case it suggests that the political preferences of the displaced irrespective of their current location are unlikely to have diverged much on this issue prior to displacement and that there has been little scope for re-socialization in their new locations. There is a marked difference in the trust the displaced have in “their” political leaders: an overwhelming majority of over 90 percent of the respondents in Russia “generally” or “rather” trust the Russian president – a sharp contrast to only about a third of the IDPs in Ukraine trusting the Ukrainian president. The key here is not the contrast in trust levels as such, but the fact that the displaced reflect the general mood around them. As for the IDPs, their trust in the Ukrainian president is, in fact, still relatively high compared to that of the overall Ukrainian population. The responses show that those who left Ukraine for Russia have rather quickly assimilated into the Russian mainstream, either out of conviction or out of fear that a different answer might pose a problem for them. FIGURES 24 + 25 While the small share of those displaced to Russia supporting Ukraine’s EU membership (17 percent) fits a similar pattern, the fact that 45 percent of the internally displaced are against EU membership may be more surprising. Current disappointment with the EU’s inability to change the situation, a perceived link between displacement and the Euromaidan, and an association of the EU with closer links with the even more unpopular NATO may jointly explain this result. FIGURE 26 41.5 68.4 29.0 27.8 25.5 3.5 4.0 0.3 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general Ukraine: n=877 ; Russia: n=952 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia 77.2 0.9 17.8 3.2 4.2 39.1 0.8 56.7 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Do not trust at all Rather do not trust Rather trust Trust in general Ukraine: n=887 ; Russia: n=963 How much trust do you have in the Russian President? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia FIGURE 24 How much trust do you have in the Ukrainian President? FIGURE 25 How much trust do you have in the Russian President? Source: ZOiS Source: ZOiS Displaced in Ukraine (n = 877) Displaced in Russia (n = 952) Displaced in Ukraine (n = 887) Displaced in Russia (n = 963) ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 17 Conclusion A resolution to the conflict seems far off, and the displaced are likely to stay where they are, not least because the majority has family and friends close by. The displaced will become an issue of political and socio-economic integration, even more so for Ukraine than for Russia, judging by the survey results that show that the displaced in Russia are comparatively better integrated into the Russian job market. The displaced are a politically aware constituency that neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian political leadership can afford to ignore. For the time being, the internally and externally displaced maintain frequent links to relatives and friends in the conflict zone, though these personal linkages seem to mitigate against rather than strengthen the wish to return. The survey has highlighted both an increased salience of ethnic identities (“ethnic Ukrainian” and “ethnic Russian”) resulting from the experience of war and displacement, but also the continued significance of mixed identities, defined either in general terms (“both Ukrainian and Russian”) or more specifically as dual ethnic or bilingual identities. If even those who have experienced something as extreme as displacement convey mixed identities, these identities are even more likely to characterize the population of Eastern Ukraine at large. Ukrainian politicians have to keep this reality in mind if they want to reconsolidate the Ukrainian state from within. 55.1 16.5 44.9 83.5 0 20 40 60 80 Percent Yes No Ukraine: n=795 ; Russia: n=838 Should Ukraine join the EU? Displaced in Ukraine Displaced in Russia FIGURE 26 Should Ukraine join the EU? Source: ZOiS Imprint Author Gwendolyn Sasse Published by © Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Address Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS) gGmbH Mohrenstraße 60 10117 Berlin [email protected] www.zois-berlin.de Citation Sasse, Gwendolyn: The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think?, ZOiS Report 1 / 2017, (https:// www.zoisberlin.de/fileadmin/ media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ ZOiS_Report_1_2017.pdf) ISSN 2512-7233 Layout Yuko Stier Displaced in Ukraine (n = 887) Displaced in Russia (n = 963) ZOiS Report 1/2017 The Displaced Ukrainians: Who are they, and what do they think? 18