Sino-Russo-Iranian Tech Cooperation as Threat for the EU: Systemic Approach

Sino-Russo-Iranian Tech Cooperation as Threat for the EU: Systemic Approach by Malgorzata Abassy and Weronika Krupa June 2025 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The strategic convergence between Russia, Iran, and China poses a growing systemic threat to the European Union. Despite differing regional agendas, these three powers are increasingly aligned in key areas such as cybersecurity, military technology transfers, intelligence cooperation, and disinformation campaigns. Their coordinated efforts undermine the EU’s critical infrastructure, weaken its strategic autonomy, and erode trust in democratic institutions by targeting sectors such as energy, finance, healthcare, and electoral integrity. Although the EU has implemented sanctions and reinforced its cybersecurity framework, it continues to address these actors largely in isolation, failing to recognize the cumulative security impact of their trilateral cooperation. Particular vulnerabilities include the transfer of advanced knowledge and dual-use technologies via academic and industrial partnerships with China, the use of hybrid warfare tactics by Iran—including cyberattacks and propaganda—and Russia’s ongoing infiltration of European digital networks and information ecosystems. To address this, the EU must adopt a coherent, forward-looking strategy that moves beyond fragmented responses. This entails the establishment of a centralized threat assessment hub coordinating intelligence from Member States, the restriction of academic and technological partnerships with high-risk third countries, the reinforcement of cyber resilience through joint infrastructure protection drills with NATO, and the creation of a targeted investment mechanism to reduce dependency on foreign critical technologies. These concrete instruments, when integrated, can strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities, reduce strategic dependencies, and safeguard its democratic and technological sovereignty. Sino-RussianIranian Cooperation Military Technology Transfers Cybersecurity Disinformation Intelligence Cooperation Keywords https://doi.org/10.31175/eh4s.3c7e 1 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS The EU should adopt a coherent strategy to counter foreign interference, especially considering threats originating from China, Russia and Iran. 2 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 The EU should implement the European Parliament’s recommendations on protecting democratic processes from disinformation, fake news and external influence. It is imperative to strengthen the EU’s cyber defense systems, boost resources to counter cyberespionage by China, Russia and Iran and deepen its cooperation with NATO on critical infrastructure protection. The balance between cooperation and protection must be upheld, especially in light of the academic and cultural cooperation with countries such as China. 3 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 Introduction The growing cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran in the fields of cybersecurity and intelligence represents a systemic threat to the stability and security of the European Union. Although these three states differ in their geopolitical priorities, they converge around a shared strategic objective: to weaken the European Union by destabilizing it across multiple domains, ranging from military pressure to technological interference. This trilateral alignment is underpinned by several key mechanisms, including the exchange of intelligence, the transfer of advanced technologies, coordinated cyberattacks, and mutual political and technological support. China, in particular, provides Russia and Iran with dual-use technologies—such as semiconductors, surveillance systems, and software employed in intelligence operations—thereby acting as a technological enabler for their subversive agendas. Joint efforts extend to the realm of information warfare, notably disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining democratic institutions within the EU and eroding the political and social cohesion of its member states. While Russia plays a leading role in launching cyberat - tacks and penetrating Western institutions, Iran contributes through both cyber capabilities and ideological amplification, particularly via proxy networks and targeted disinformation. 4 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 disinformation. China, meanwhile, facilitates systemic disruption through long-term knowledge and technology extraction, and by enabling the operational capacity of its partners through advanced infrastructure. Thus, each actor contributes differently: Russia leads tactical cyber aggression, Iran amplifies narratives and supports militant proxies, and China sustains the strategic backbone through access, innovation, and industrial leverage. Although the EU has acknowledged some of these risks, significant blind spots remain—particularly in areas of academic, technological, and economic cooperation—where mechanisms of infil - tration often go unnoticed. These blind spots are systematically exploited, not only through espionage and disinformation, but also through legitimate-seeming collaborations in science, trade, and infrastructure. Against this backdrop, the coordinated actions of Russia, Iran, and China constitute one of the most pressing challenges to European security, necessitating a comprehensive and unified response. Evidence and dimensions of the tripartite cooperation Cybersecurity: Russia, Iran, and China – Cooperation and Threats to the European Union An analysis of available sources indicates that the cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China stems from a shared strategic calculus. Each of these states views the European Union as a geopolitical adversary and a structural barrier to the realization of their respective ambitions on the international stage. In recent years, trilateral cooperation in the cyber domain has intensified. Russia, Iran, and China have been exchanging cyber technologies, conducting joint hacking operations, coordinating ransomware attacks, and launching disinformation campaigns targeting strategic sectors of the EU economy. This section examines the mechanisms of this cooperation in order to identify the key threats and their implications for Europe’s digital security. Russia, Iran, and China are actively developing joint cyberattack strategies. In January 2025, Iran and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that includes provisions for cybersecurity collaboration. This agreement focuses on coordinated efforts to counter the misuse of information and communication technologies and to manage national internet segments, thereby expanding state control over the digital space [1] . Meanwhile, China and Russia have deepened their cybersecurity partnership by aligning their technical capacities and legal frameworks. Their goal is to promote a new cyber order based on state sovereignty and collective security, positioning themselves as leaders in the global digital arena [2] . The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has consistently identified Russia, China, and Iran as persistent cyber threats. According to the 2025 Threat Assessment Report, these states possess both the technical capabilities and political intent to launch operations targeting critical infrastructure and democratic institutions. The 2025 5 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 Threat Assessment highlights these nations’ capabilities and willingness to launch cyber operations that could disrupt U.S. national security [3] . Iran has implemented Russian techniques to mask cybercrime and is using China’s digital surveillance model to create its own sanctions evasion and surveillance systems [4] . Between 2021 and 2024, cyberattacks by Iranian hackers increased by 40%, with the majority targeting EU state institutions and the financial sector. China, in turn, provides Russia and Iran with advanced espionage technologies and tools that are used to attack European critical infrastructure systems [5] . In 2022, Chinese surveillance systems enabled the infiltration of European telecommunications networks and financial services. In addition, Russia and China regularly launch cyberattacks on the European energy, financial and transport sectors [6] . In 2023, more than 60% of cyberattacks against EU institutions originated from entities linked to Russian and Chinese cybercriminal groups. One of the most destructive attacks was the infection of the power system in Central Europe, which led to many hours of power outages [7] . Iran also plays a key role in the development of cybercrime in the EU. In 2022, Iranian hackers launched 140 ransomware attacks on organizations in the EU, generating financial losses of more than €1.2 billion. These attacks mainly affected the health, banking, and transportation sectors, and were designed to encrypt data and extort ransom [8] . Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies cooperate intensively in the areas of cyberespionage, data interception and infiltration of EU information systems [9] . In 2023, 25% of detected data breaches in the EU resulted from actions sponsored by third countries, mainly China and Russia. Iran provides hacking tools to take over administrative accounts in European organizations [10] . One of the examples is the 2023 operation in which Iranian hackers used forged security certificates to gain access to EU banking systems, causing the data of 4 million users to be leaked. In addition to the hacking attacks, Russia, Iran and China are conducting coordinated disinformation campaigns to further destabilize Europe [11] . In 2022, more than 500 disinformation campaigns were detected that aimed to undermine EU citizens’ trust in their governments and international institutions. In 2023, a media campaign was organized to spread information about alleged “secret agreements” between EU governments and pharmaceutical corporations [12] . In conclusion, Russia, Iran, and China are not only exchanging technologies to facilitate cybercrime but are also executing coordinated digital operations that directly threaten the European Union. The greatest danger lies in the proliferation of ransomware, cyberespionage, and disinformation activities—tools deliberately used to destabilize the EU economy and disrupt societal cohesion by undermining trust in public institutions and critical sectors such as healthcare. Knowledge and Technology Transfer: Cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China and the Threats to the European Union The transfer of knowledge and technology between Russia, Iran, and China constitutes a key pillar of their joint strategy to enhance geopolitical influence and mitigate the impact of 6 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 Russia and Iran have been developing intensive academic and research cooperation for years. Between 2017 and 2019, more than 35,000 Chinese students studied in Russia, and more than 20,000 Russians studied in China [16] . This figures, while notable, remain significantly lower than Chinese student populations in countries such as the United States (over 350,000 during the same period) and in Germany (over 35,000 annually), highlighting the strategic—not commercial—dimension of these cooperation. Exchange programs include fields such as artificial intelligence, cryptography, and advanced information systems, which can have both civilian and military applications. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization University and BRICS University, these countries fund research on cybersecurity, quantum engineering and military systems [17] . While presented as academic partnerships, they serve as mechanisms for the transfer of strategic knowledge that may be leveraged in hybrid warfare. For the European Union, such cooperation poses a growing threat, as it facilitates the accumulation and circulation of sensitive expertise among actors known to challenge the international rulesbased order. The integration of academic infrastructure into broader geopolitical strategies risks undermining Europe’s technological edge and security architecture. The European Union finds itself at the center of global technological competition. In 2023, as many as 25% of cyberattacks on academic institutions in the EU were aimed at stealing Western sanctions. This cooperation operates through formal state partnerships as well as informal and opaque channels—including “private” actors, front companies, and academic institutions—often routed through jurisdictions such as Hong Kong to mask state involvement. China, for example, has provided Russia with critical components such as microelectronics and processors essential for the production of missiles and precision-guided munitions. In exchange, Russia has shared advanced military technologies with China, including submarine and stealth capabilities. Similarly, Iran has supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, potentially receiving sensitive technological assistance in exchange [13] . The consequences of this strategic partnership are particularly severe for the European Union, which academic, research, and industrial institutions are not only targeted directly, but are often exploited through seemingly legitimate joint projects. The European Parliament has explicitly ac - knowledged that foreign interference and espionage activities have intensified within EU academic institutions, with China, Russia, and Iran identified as primary perpetrators. [14] Due to the strategic value of their advanced scientific research and technological innovation, these institutions have become prime targets for foreign intelligence activities. The European Parliament has acknowledged that EU universities are being targeted by foreign interference and espionage, notably from China, Russia, or Iran. These actions calling for concrete actions such as stricter eligibility criteria for EU-funded research projects, the creation of a centralized risk assessment mechanism, enhanced background checks for foreign-affiliated researchers, and stronger enforcement of export controls in sensitive technological domains. Despite warnings from MI5 about potential espionage threats, several British universities have continued collaborations with Chinese institutions linked to the defense sector [15] . 7 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 Transfer of Military and Industrial Technologies A key pillar of strategic cooperation between Russia, Iran, and China is the transfer of military and dual-use industrial technologies. China has supplied Russia with 90% of imported microelectronics components, which are crucial for the Russian defense industry [19] . In addition, China has provided Russia with parts for missile systems and drones, helping to modernize its military equipment [20] . Iran also plays a significant role in the Russian defense industry, providing Moscow with more than 4,600 Shahed drones that have been used on the Ukrainian front [21] . In return, Russia provides Iran with radar systems, combat aircraft, and air defense technologies [22] . In addition, Iran and Russia have started building a drone factory in Tatarstan, which is expected to produce 6,000 drones by 2025 [23] . Not only the military sector, but also the industrial sector is the subject of intensive cooperation. China has increased its share of the Russian machinery and machine tool market from 13% in 2017 to 90% in 2023 [24] . This dependency allows Russia to evade Western sanctions and keep military production high. Iran and Russia are also working on payment systems that bypass SWIFT, allowing them to trade in rubles and riyals [25]. Such mechanisms weaken the effectiveness of EU sanctions, increasing the economic self-sufficiency of these countries. Sino-Iranian support for Russia After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cooperation on the sharing of military and industrial technologies between Russia, China and Iran has become a key element of the Kremlin’s survival strategy, which has come under Western sanctions. Iran provides Russia with drones, China supports the modernization of the Russian defense industry, and Moscow returns the favor by providing advanced military technologies to partners. As a result, the threat to both the stability of the region and European security is increasing [26]. China is the most important supplier of electronic components to the Russian defense industry. In 2023, 90% of the microelectronics imported by Russia came from China, which was crucial for the modernization of its armed forces [27] . China also supplies ball bearings, machine tools, and precision machinery, which are essential for the production of tanks and combat aircraft [28] . In addition, Russia and China are developing cooperation in the production of combat drones. In the first half of 2023, Chinese companies provided Russia with drones worth $14.5 million. Although Beijing officially denies reports that it directly supports the Russian military, an analysis of import statistics indicates that military equipment arrives in Moscow through intermediary companies in Hong Kong [29] . Iran, in turn, plays a key role in supplying Russia with combat drones. Since 2022, Moscow has received at least 4600 Shahed-136 drones, which have been used to attack Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure [30] . In 2024, Iran quantum engineering and artificial intelligence research [18]. The leakage of such technologies may result in a significant increase in the military potential of Russia, Iran and China, which in the long run will weaken the strategic advantage of the West. 8 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 The transfer of military technology between Russia, Iran and China poses a serious threat to the European Union. In 2023, Russia used Chinese components to modernize more than 200 tanks and produce modern fire control systems. This enhancement of Russia’s offensive capabilities risks escalating conflicts in Eastern Europe and further deteriorating the security situation in Ukraine. Iran, in turn, may utilize newly acquired technologies to threaten European maritime infrastructure in the Mediterranean and to advance its missile program—developments that raise significant concerns for both the EU and NATO. In January 2025, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted the “Prophet Muhammad” naval exercise in the Persian Gulf. The exercise featured the deployment of has also supplied Russia with 400 Fateh-110 ballistic missiles, capable of striking targets at distances of up to 700 kilometers (approximately 435 miles). In an effort to reduce dependence on external suppliers, Russia and Iran have jointly initiated the construction of a drone production facility in Tatarstan, with a projected output of 6,000 drones annually by 2025. These new industrial facilities are expected to enable Moscow to sustain its military operations in Ukraine, while simultaneously enhancing Iran’s capacity to expand arms exports to other countries in the Middle East. Moscow, however, is not merely a beneficiary in this partnership; in exchange for drones and missiles, it provides Iran with advanced radar systems, combat aircraft, and sophisticated air defense technologies. Iran received Russian attack helicopters, radars and fighter planes, which significantly increased its defense capabilities [31] . In 2023, Iran assisted Russia in constructing a drone production facility in Yelabuga, located in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone, with the aim of producing approximately 6,000 Shahed-136 drones by mid-2025. The facility is intended to ensure a continuous supply of drones for Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, while simultaneously enhancing Iran’s capacity to increase arms exports to other Middle Eastern countries [32]. Given Tehran’s ambitions to become a dominant power in Central Asia, strengthening its military potential should not be underestimated. Iran views the region as a strategically vital sphere of influence. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Tehran considers much of Central Asia to be part of its “near abroad”—a space where it seeks to assert both cultural and strategic presence. This perspective drives Tehran’s efforts to establish a stronger presence in the area [33]. Russia, in turn, shares its expertise in the modernization of drones and missile systems, enabling Iran to improve its indigenous technological capabilities. As a result, Tehran is not only reinforcing its own defense posture, but also expanding its ability to export modern weapons systems to partners such as Syria and the Yemeni Houthis. China also benefits from this trilateral exchange. It continues to gain access to advanced Russian military technologies, particularly in the areas of aircraft engines and missile systems. Notably, more than 40% of China’s current fighter jet fleet still relies on Russian engines [34]. While Beijing has taken steps to reduce this dependency, including efforts to develop its own advanced propulsion technologies, it remains unable to achieve full self-sufficiency in this sector [35]. 15 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 While official documents acknowledge Iran’s activities in cyberspace, its military partnerships, and its provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Russia, the corresponding EU countermeasures remain fragmented and insufficient. However, the most fundamental weakness is the lack of a unified recognition of the coordinated threat posed by the trilateral cooperation itself. Although the EU acknowledges interactions among Russia, Iran, and China, it continues to address them primarily in bilateral or isolated terms. Consequently, there is no comprehensive EU policy framework that accounts for the cumulative and systemic impact of their strategic alignment on European security. Recommendations To effectively address the complex and evolving threats posed by foreign interference—particularly from the People’s Republic of China—the European Union must adopt a coherent and forward-looking strategy. Such a strategy should integrate existing policy instruments, promote institutional alignment, and enhance coordination among Member States and EU bodies. The following recommendations outline concrete measures aimed at strengthening the Union’s resilience against disinformation, espionage, and other forms of hybrid interference. First, the European Union should take active steps to counter foreign interference by implementing the recommendations and initiatives outlined in the various European Parliament resolutions concerning interference in democratic processes within the EU, including dis - information. Second, the European Union should pursue a more coordinated and strategic approach to the protection of critical infrastructure at the EU level, particularly in response to growing risks associated with Chinese influence. This includes limiting external control, countering hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, surveillance of the Chinese diaspora, and espionage operations originating from and taking place within the EU. This approach must prioritize security considerations over purely economic interests and involve close cooperation with international partners to promote a global, open, stable, and secure cyberspace. To that end, the EU should increase resources allocated to both EU institutions and Member States for defending against cyberespionage conducted by the People’s Republic of China and formally call on China to cease such activities. Furthermore, the EU should enhance cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners to reduce the risk of espionage and interference in critical infrastructure—particularly assets with military relevance. Finally, Key EU institutions—such as the European Commission and its executive agencies managing Horizon Europe and other research frameworks—should be urged to halt funding and collaboration with Chinese companies involved in sectors of critical and strategic importance, including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 16 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 Finally, the European Union should ensure a unified and coherent approach to cultural and academic cooperation with China, with safeguards in place to prevent undue influence stemming from Chinese financial involvement. This includes investigating the current state of research cooperation between EU and Chinese institutions to ensure that such partnerships are not being exploited as channels of foreign interference by the People’s Republic of China. While the EU should continue to monitor allegations that Confucius Institutes have been used to disseminate propaganda and restrict academic freedom, greater emphasis must be placed on addressing broader and more impactful channels of influence—such as state-sponsored partnerships with major research institutions, technology transfer through joint ventures, and covert operations involving Chinese enterprises embedded within critical infrastructure sectors. In addition, ongoing scrutiny should focus on how Chinese state-linked actors may exert indirect influence over research agendas, funding streams, and self-censorship practices within European higher education institutions—particularly in areas related to sensitive topics such as human rights and technological cooperation. Enhanced transparency around partnerships and funding sources remains crucial to safeguarding academic integrity. Conclusion The trilateral alignment of Russia, Iran, and China presents a multifaceted and evolving threat to the European Union’s security, stability, and strategic autonomy. While these actors pursue distinct national agendas, their overlapping interests—whether in the realm of cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, military cooperation, or economic leverage—create a cumulative destabilizing effect. Russia remains the primary source of direct military aggression and tactical cyberattacks; Iran reinforces destabilization through proxy networks and ideological amplification; and China plays a critical role by facilitating technological advancement, strategic infiltration, and economic entanglement. The European Union’s response has developed across several dimensions: reinforcing cybersecurity and counterintelligence, strengthening its cooperation with NATO and like-minded partners, rethinking its approach to foreign influence in critical sectors, and supporting Ukraine as a frontline of defense against systemic aggression. However, gaps remain—notably in balancing economic interests with security imperatives, ensuring resilience against sophisticated hybrid tactics, and maintaining unity among Member States in the face of complex external pressures. Going forward, the EU must continue to sharpen its threat perception, streamline its policy instruments, and foster a culture of strategic foresight. Only a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, acknowledging the distinct yet complementary roles of Russia, Iran, and China, can safeguard Europe’s democratic institutions, technological sovereignty, and geopolitical stability. semiconductors, and cybersecurity. Recent reviews have shown that several Chinese entities have participated in EU-funded projects despite growing security concerns. [74] 17 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 [1] See, Antoniuk, D. “Iran and Russia deepen cyber ties with new agreement”, The Record, https://therecord.media/russia-iran-cyber-ties-agreement, last accessed 24.04.2025. [2] See, AnuPriya. “China and Russia Strengthen Cybersecurity” CyberPress, 2024. https:// cyberpress.org/china-and-russia-strengthen-cybersecurity/, last accessed 24.04.2025. 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Chatham House, 2024.https:// www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2024-12/can-europe-stop-quartetchaos, last accessed 24.04.2025. [7] See, “Iran-based Cyber Actors Enabling Ransomware Attacks on US Organizations”, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), 2024, https://www.cisa. gov/sites/default/files/2024-08/aa24-241a-iran-based-cyber-actors-enabling-ransomware-attacks-on-us-organizations_0.pdf, last accessed 24.04.2025. [8] See, Lavrova, D. “Iran’s cybersecurity threatscape for 2021-H1 2024”, Positive Technologies, 2024, https://global.ptsecurity.com/analytics/iran-s-cybersecurity-threatscape-for-2021-h1-2024, last accessed 24.04.2025. 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[13] See, “Moscow Beholden to Beijing in Anti-Western Axis, Says Nato Chief” The Times, 2024. https://www.thetimes.com/world/article/china-russia-iran-north-korea-nato-chiefjens-stoltenberg-kjz8z3rvr, last accessed 24.04.2025. [14] See, “Resolution of 1 June 2023 on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (2022/2075(INI)) [P9_TA(2023)0219]”, European Parliament, 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-20230219_EN.html, last accessed 09.05.2025. 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[18] See, Guan, G. “Thirty Years of China–Russia Strategic Relations: Achievements, Characteristics and Prospects” China International Strategy Review, 2022. https://link.springer. com/article/10.1007/s42533-022-00101-6, last accessed 24.04.2025. [19] See, Rooke, J. “China’s Strategic Complicity and the Hidden Engine Behind Russia’s War Effort” NATO Association of Canada, 2024. https://natoassociation.ca/special-report-chinas-strategic-complicity-and-the-hidden-engine-behind-russias-war-effort/, last accessed 24.04.2025. [20] See, Rooke, J. “China’s Strategic Complicity and the Hidden Engine Behind Russia’s War Effort” NATO Association of Canada, 2024. https://natoassociation.ca/special-report-chinas-strategic-complicity-and-the-hidden-engine-behind-russias-war-effort/, last accessed 24.04.2025. [21] See, Bergmann, M.; Snegovaya, M.; Dolbaia, T. and Fenton, N. “Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea, last accessed 24.04.2025. 19 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/8 [24] See, Rooke, J. “China’s Strategic Complicity and the Hidden Engine Behind Russia’s War Effort” NATO Association of Canada, 2024. https://natoassociation.ca/special-report-chinas-strategic-complicity-and-the-hidden-engine-behind-russias-war-effort/, last accessed 24.04.2025. [25] See, Bergmann, M.; Snegovaya, M.; Dolbaia, T. and Fenton, N. “Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea “Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea, last accessed 24.04.2025. [26] See, Sytas, A. “China Aids Russian Drone Production with Smuggled Western Parts, Says Estonia”, Reuters, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-aids-russian-droneproduction-with-smuggled-western-parts-says-estonia-2025-02-12, accessed 24.04.2025. [27] See, Bergmann, M.; Snegovaya, M.; Dolbaia, T. and Fenton, N. “Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea, last accessed 24.04.2025. [28] See, Bergmann, M.; Snegovaya, M.; Dolbaia, T. and Fenton, N. “Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea, last accessed 24.04.2025. [29] See, Bergmann, M.; Snegovaya, M.; Dolbaia, T. and Fenton, N. “Collaboration for a Price: Russian Military-Technical Cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/collaboration-price-russian-military-technical-cooperation-china-iran-and-north-korea, last accessed 24.04.2025. 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