Greening the Red Giant: China's Quest for a Sustainable Future

Greening the Red Giant: China’s Quest for a Sustainable Future by Anja Senz July 2025 ABSTRACT China is facing significant environmental and climate challenges. Its current development is characterised by increasing coal use, energy-intensive technology growth, and limited transparency regarding climate policy progress. As the world’s leading emitter, China has a substantial global carbon footprint. The Chinese development in the field of climate action is often portrayed too optimistically in Europe, overlooking many of China’s domestic constraints and systemic challenges. A lack of reliable and transparent data with regard to China’s actual environmental and climate policy progress complicates assessments and fact-based policy-making. Europe should adopt a cautious and strategically calibrated approach towards China with regard to climate cooperation, engaging selectively only in areas where cooperation clearly aligns with European interest, without abandoning its own global climate responsibilities. China Climate Change Environmental Policy Green Technology CO₂ Emissions Climate Transformation Renewable Energy Keywords https://doi.org/10.31175/eh4s.5294 1 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 2 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 Introduction Since the 1980s, China has undergone rapid economic development, which gradually integrated the country into the global market and was accompanied by enormous environmental degradation. Large-scale infrastructure projects, forced industrialization and resource extraction, urbanization, and intensified agricultural production have had a significant impact on the ecosystem. As a result, China consistently ranks low in international environmental indices, such as the Environmental Performance Index of the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, [1] although some areas like air pollution appear to be slowly improving in recent years. As the world’s largest CO₂ emitter, the country also makes a substantial contribution to climate change. Despite investments in renewable energy, coal consumption in China remains high and is increasing in absolute terms. Furthermore, economic growth continues to take precedence over ecological considerations. The state-driven emphasis on digitalization and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence is – aside from its social and ethical implications – very resourceand energy-intensive. At the international level, China is not only the largest emitter of green-house gases but also leaves a significant carbon footprint through its trade and investments. China’s per capita greenhouse gas emissions currently amount to approximately 9 tons. This corresponds to almost 30 percent of the globally emitted greenhouse gases. [2] Between 1990 and 2021, the country’s emissions increased by an average of 4.7 percent. 85.5 percent of Climate stripes of China: Professor Ed Hawkins (University of Reading) https://showyourstripes.info/s/asia/china/all China’s greenhouse gas emissions are carbon dioxide (CO₂) and 8.3 percent are methane (CH₄); 3.9 percent are nitrous oxide (N₂O). Since 2006, China’s five-year plans have set the goal of reducing harmful greenhouse gas emissions and promoting renewable energy. 3 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 Development of Chinese CO₂ emissions Although China rejected binding climate protection measures at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, it began changing its position and presenting itself as an international pioneer in climate protection in subsequent years. At the beginning of the 2000s, Chinese leaders promoted the concept of “common but differentiated responsibility”, which asserts that developing countries should prioritise economic development. As industrialised countries had been emitting greenhouse gases for a longer time, they were responsible for leading the way in climate protection and supporting developing countries through technology transfer and environmental funds. [3] Already under international pressure due to its high emissions, China emphasized its position by forming coalitions with other countries: first the “Group of 77”, then the “BASIC” (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), and finally the “Like-Minded Developing Countries”. [4] At the 2013 climate negotiations in Warsaw (COP19), China nonetheless agreed to the framework of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), committing to self-determined national measures for emissions reduction. In 2015, it set national targets through 2030, which were updated in 2020. These include raising the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 25%, reducing carbon intensity — CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP — by more than 65% from 2005 levels, and increasing forest stock by 6 billion cubic meters compared to 2005. [5] However, China’s shift is only partly driven by climate ambitions; more crucial is its strategic interest in leading emerging markets for “green technologies” [6] such as renewables, lithium-ion batteries, and electric vehicles. The relationship between economic development and environmental degradation has been discussed internationally for many years under the theoretical framework of the “environmental Kuznets curve”. According to this approach, environmental damage initially increases with economic growth as production and consumption expand, but then falls again once a certain level of per capita income is reached, as societies begin to invest in environmental protection and clean technologies. However, due to the large number of influencing factors, it is difficult to determine the exact gross domestic product (GDP) per capita value at which the trend reverses. Studies on China also show that, after the aforementioned increase and subsequent decrease in environmental degradation, it can increase again due to rebound effects. [7] Therefore, the assumption of positive environmental effects through progressive economic development and growing prosperity is not clearly verifiable. Another consideration focuses on the decoupling of economic growth from CO₂ emissions. Thus, GDP can continue to grow while emissions decrease or at least do not increase further. This decoupling can be achieved, for example, through expanding renewable energy sources, improving energy efficiency, and developing “green technologies”. China, as the following descriptions will show, has implemented many of these measures. However, contrary to the public discourse, it is unlikely that China has already reached its CO₂ peak. [8] Nevertheless, studies conclude that relative decoupling of emissions from GDP can be observed in China, i.e. emissions are growing more slowly than GDP. However, there are significant regional differences regarding the dependence of economic development on available fossil fuels [9] , and China’s current economic challenges complicate assessments even more. [10] The country is undergoing a long-term restructuring of its economic model, shifting from cheap mass production to sectors characterized by advanced technology, innovation capacity, and sustainability. Additionally, new import-export structures are evolving in terms of volumes and partner countries. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions with the United States present further challenges. The resulting slowdown in economic growth therefore makes it difficult to clearly assess the long-term development of greenhouse gas emissions. 4 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 Fig. 1: Development of GDP per capita in PR China (2023) Source: World Bank: People’s Republic of China - Data Commons. Available online at https://datacommons.org/place/country/CHN?hl=de, checked on 6/24/2025. Fig. 2: CO₂ Emissions per capita in PR China (2023) Source: World Bank: People’s Republic of China - Data Commons. Available online at https://datacommons.org/place/country/CHN?hl=de, checked on 6/24/2025. 5 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 In conclusion, it is clear that there is a correlation between economic growth and CO₂ emissions (see Figures 1 and 2) and it is not evident that an improvement is occurring. Only in the mid-2010s, CO₂ emissions temporarily levelled off to some extent, due to changes in the economic structure, some progress in energy efficiency and investments in renewable energies. Examples of this include the closure or modernisation of old, inefficient coal-fired power plants and steelworks, an anti-corruption campaign that limited local industrial production, and a fall in CO₂-intensive cement production. However, these effects were temporary and not indicative of far-reaching decarbonisation, as the data from subsequent years (2018 onwards) demonstrates. China’s vulnerabilities Possible effects of climate change have been discussed in China already for over two decades and dealt with in national climate reports and the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The country is affected by rising temperatures, droughts and, in its southern parts by floods and storms. China’s densely populated and economically important coastal agglomerations, where around a third of China’s gross domestic product is generated, are particularly at risk. According to calculations, China’s economic output could shrink significantly by 2050 due to the effects of climate change. [11] Depending on the assumed impact, conservative estimates suggest a loss of between 2% and 10% of GDP. However, environmental stress is not a new phenomenon in China, and a distinction must be made between challenges caused by natural environmental conditions and anthropogenic problems. The arable land has long been in an unfavourable ratio to the population size, and it has significantly shrunk due to economic development. Between 2013 and 2019, the arable land decreased by 5%, and more than a third of the remaining land is now affected by degradation, acidification, and salinization. The ancient industrial regions in Northeast China and the industrial centres along the Yangtze and Pearl River Delta have long been subjected to China is the fourth largest territorial state in the world at 9.6 million square kilometres in size. The country’s area spans across multiple climate zones with significant elevation variations, a 14,500-kilometer-long coastline, and inhospitable regions such as high mountain landscapes and deserts, which cover about two-thirds of the land. With an estimated population of 1.41 billion people, it is the most populous country in the world after India (1.45 billion). Some 90 percent of the population resides in the eastern parts of the country, in regions that historically had fertile farmland and abundant rainfall. These areas are characterized by intensive agricultural use and high population density. The rapid economic development of the last four decades primarily took place along the east coast, with its provinces thriving and strongly integrated into the global market, while the western regions are less populated, less developed, and therefore economically less advanced in comparison. Overall, however, the nature-induced challenges across China have intensified due to industrial development, urbanization, and changing consumption patterns. 6 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 In addition to the soil, the air and water in China are also heavily polluted. In the mid-2000s, China’s environmental authority first pointed out that environmental degradation could cancel out the positive effects of economic growth, as the costs were almost equal to the value of annual economic growth. [15] The effects of climate change are already being felt in many regions of China as the graphic below shows. Forecasts predict that temperature rises in China will exceed the global average, extreme weather events will increase significantly, and risks will be unevenly distributed regionally. As in other regions of the world, low-income populations in China will be particularly hard hit because they generally live in areas with poorer infrastructure and lack the resources to prepare themselves. [16] the impacts of acid rain, chemical pollution from agriculture, industry, and mining, as well as inadequate waste management. However, efforts to control and reduce these issues have shown progress, with a declining trend in soil contamination over the years. [12] The annual rate of loss of arable land has accelerated, increasing from 6 million mu in 1957-1996 to over 11 million mu between 2009 and 2019. [13] To maximize yields on the remaining lands, fertilizer application has been intensified. By 2018, it was 6.4 times higher than in 1978, yet the resulting grain yield in 2018 was only 2.2 times that of 1978. Both the loss of productivity and adherence to the officially defined “red line” of 120 million hectares — the minimum area of cultivated land deemed essential for food security — are regularly monitored by the government, [14] as pressure to convert available land for further economic development remains high. Fig. 3: Development of Climate Change Vulnerability in Chinese provinces Source: Li, Qin; Zhu, Lei; Shi, Xunpeng (2024): Measuring regions’ vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in China: An application of hybrid assessment approach. In Sustainable Development 32 (4), pp. 3115–3132. 7 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 Nevertheless, the Notre-Dame Global Adaptation Initiative Index (ND-GAIN), that rates 192 countries based on their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and their adaptation readiness, sees China as having a low vulnerability and good level of preparedness. The economic resources and infrastructure of the country are key factors in this assessment, including coastal protection measures to safeguard land and ports from rising sea levels and typhoons, transportation systems to maintain supply chains during extreme events, and energy systems to ensure socio-economic stability. These enhance China’s resilience to climate change. [17] Environmental policy and administration Until the mid of the 1970s, China had no environmental administration and therefore no systematic approach to addressing environmental issues. Although environmental protection offices emerged at the beginning of the reform and opening-up period in the 1980s, they were unable to act effectively due to their weak position within political structures and their poor financial and technical resources. However, by the mid-1990s, around 2,200 environmental monitoring stations existed. The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) finally received its own budget in 2007. Previously, it had been financed by fines levied for industrial pollution, among other things. This meant that it was ultimately financially dependent on environmental offences. In 2008, the agency (SEPA) was upgraded to a ministry, which was then reorganised in 2018 as the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE). Relatively independently of environmental governance, China had a National Coordination Group for Climate Change (NCGCC) that organised its participation in climate negotiation processes. Key state actors in the field of climate change today include the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, which has been responsible for the national adaptation strategy since 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). However, there is a vast array of other actors – state-owned enterprises, provinces, and cities – with diverse interests that operate within a complex matrix of vertical and horizontal governmental competencies. This reflects the economic and social dynamics that unfolded following the transition from a planned to a market economy in 1978. Liberalisation and decentralisation – i.e. the transfer of responsibilities to subordinate levels of government – granted lower levels of government greater decision-making autonomy. The local authorities were given a certain degree of autonomy, with the aim of facilitating economic development that was tailored to the specific conditions of each locality. Although the overarching priorities and growth targets were set by the political leadership, there was a clear allocation of responsibility for local development to the cadres at the local level. Indeed, these measures successfully stimulated economic dynamism, but also led to local self-will and promoted a certain degree of administrative fragmentation. Concurrently, enforcing policies, laws and minimum standards on a nationwide scale became more challenging. The current political leadership has been countering 8 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 A key element in the management of local cadres was the “Cadre Performance Evaluation System”, which initially defined growth targets as career-relevant in the 2000s. However, it has since been modified to encompass environmental targets as well. Research has indicated that this measure has the capacity to exert a favourable influence on the development of local CO2 emissions, provided that there is enhancement in the effectiveness of environmental management over the entire term of office of a cadre. This would imply that implementation of measures is not confined to those that appear opportune in the short term, and that environmental protection is factored into the enhancement of the location’s attractiveness for investment. [18] With regard to the legal framework, the Environmental Protection Law originally enacted in 1989 was revised in 2015. Among other changes, it introduced mandatory environmental information disclosure and expanded the authority to impose fines on polluting enterprises. [19] According to Chinese lawyers who represent companies facing such accusations, these provisions have been enforced with increasing rigor in recent years. In addition, the 2018 Environmental Impact Assessment Law requires that potential ecological consequences of construction projects be evaluated and approved in advance. A constitutional amendment in 2018 elevated the importance of environmental protection by assigning the State Council responsibility for “directing and managing […] ecological conservation” (Art. 89). However, neither an individual right to environmental protection nor a corresponding state duty is enshrined in the constitution. In contrast to the rights-based and court-centred models of liberal constitutional states, it can be concluded that China’s constitutional framework primarily considers environmental protection to be the state’s responsibility. [20] As shown above, the field of environmental and climate protection in China has been characterised by continuous bureaucratic restructuring. While the party-state experimented with various regulatory approaches and market mechanisms during the Reform and Opening period (1978–2012), ecological issues have been increasingly subject to party discipline since 2013, a period characterised by a personalised concentration of power. [21] For many decades, environmental and climate protection were not significant factors for political career and job promotion opportunities, as economic considerations and local protectionism dominated. The centralization of the last decade now coordinates environmental issues more strongly at the national level and enforces environmental standards more rigidly. However, this simultaneously reduces the former embedding of environmental bureaus in the respective local administrations and inhibits exchanges at the provincial, municipal, and county levels that would enable locally acceptable compromises between ecological and socio-economic concerns to be found. Environmental and climate discourse in China “Ecological civilisation” has become a central term in the ideological repertoire of the Chinese leadership since the 18th Party Congress in 2012. It is meanwhile integrated into the state’s 15 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 As shown above, however, China has made some progress in environmental and climate protection in recent years. It has invested in renewable energy and “green technologies”, promoted the decarbonisation of industry, and set targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving climate neutrality. Environmental legislation has been tightened, and guidelines are being enforced more stringently. The CO₂ intensity per unit of GDP has decreased. China’s modestly improved environmental performance in recent years, combined with the global search for viable pathways to ecological transformation, has sparked an international debate over the merits of authoritarian environmental governance. One side, drawing on examples from China and East Asia, argues that “authoritarian environmentalism” represents a plausible alternative to democratic models by enabling the swift and centrally coordinated implementation of necessary. [36] The opposing view criticizes China’s eco-authoritarianism as overly top-down, metrics-driven, and technologically focused, suggesting that it primarily serves as a tool for population control. From this perspective, concerns are raised about the long-term sustainability of such an approach to environmental and climate protection, due to its lack of public participation, transparency, and accountability. Many harsh climate measures — business closures, winter heating bans, the simple relocation of polluting companies from cities to rural areas, and large-scale monitoring of local waste separation as part of the enforcement of environmental standards — annoy the people and turn them against the goals of environmental and climate protection. Better results could be achieved if citizen-led environmental initiatives and projects acted as partners with government environmental protection measures. [37] Another strand of the debate concludes that there are no generalisable differences in environmental balance or capability between democratic and authoritarian developmental states in East Asia. [38] From this perspective, the concept of “developmentalism”, a technocratic and growth-oriented approach intended to solve current and future problems, is significant. A focus on unconditional further economic growth coupled with innovation, which is intended to develop or secure competitiveness and at the same time serves legitimacy, leads to investments in “green technologies”. Therefore, business-friendly East Asian governments contribute to environmental policy improvements, regardless of the political system. From this perspective, the “authoritarian advantage” assumed in the above debate can be called into question. world trade from the 2000s onwards, coupled with increasing Chinese foreign investment, ultimately resulted in the country becoming an exporter of environmental problems. As the largest CO₂ emitter and a major industrialized country, China is an indispensable player in global climate policy. However, significant transparency deficits, considerable regional variations in implementation within China, the ongoing high relevance of coal-based electricity, the increasing export of Chinese CO₂ emissions through foreign investment and the relocation of production facilities, as well as China’s strategic economic behaviour, require 16 EuroHub4Sino Policy Paper 2025/11 The findings outlined above provide the foundation for the following policy recommendations for Europe: • Require transparency: An independent review of China’s emissions and environmental data should be a prerequisite for closer cooperation. • Cautious cooperation: Cooperation should be linked to verifiable progress and clearly serve European interests. • Strive for autonomy: European capabilities should be developed to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains (with regard to “green technologies”). • Ensure fair competition: Instruments such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) should be employed to prevent market distortion. • Remain unfazed by greenwashing and the “green paradox”: China’s portrayal of itself as an investor in “green technologies” and a “climate leader” should be viewed with scepticism to avoid giving too much attention to Chinese national status man - agement in relation to genuine progresses in decarbonisation. a cautious and vigilant EU stance. 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The project “European Hub for Contemporary China (EuroHub4Sino)” has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 101131737. Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the authors) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or European Research Executive Agency (REA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.