Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Behavior in an Evolutionary Learning Model Using a Genetic Algorithm

Ferraz, Vinícius; Pitz, Thomas Article — Published Version Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Behavior in an Evolutionary Learning Model Using a Genetic Algorithm Computational Economics Provided in Cooperation with: Springer Nature Suggested Citation: Ferraz, Vinícius; Pitz, Thomas (2022) : Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Behavior in an Evolutionary Learning Model Using a Genetic Algorithm, Computational Economics, ISSN 1572-9974, Springer US, New York, NY, Vol. 63, Iss. 2, pp. 437-475, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-022-10348-1 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/318627 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Vol.:(0123456789) Computational Economics (2024) 63:437–475 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-022-10348-1 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inan Evolutionary Learning Model Using aGenetic Algorithm ViníciusFerraz1 · ThomasPitz2 Accepted: 17 November 2022 / Published online: 14 December 2022 © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract This study presents an experimental approach to strategic behavior and economic learning by integrating game theory and Genetic Algorithms in a novel heuristicbased simulation model. Inspired by strategic scenarios that change over time, we propose a model where games can change based on agents’ behavior. The goal is to document the model design and examine how strategic behavior impacts the evolution of optimal outcomes in various choice scenarios. For diversity, 144 unique 2×2 games and three different strategy selection criteria were used: Nash equilibrium, Hurwicz rule, and a random selection technique. The originality of this study is that the introduced evolutionary algorithm changes the games based on their overall outcome rather than changing the strategies or player-specific traits. The results indicated optimal player scenarios for both The Nash equilibrium and Hurwicz rules, the first being the best-performing strategy. The random selection method failed to converge to optimal values in most of the selected populations, acting as a control feature and reinforcing the need for strategic behavior in evolutionary learning. Two further observations were recorded. First, games were frequently transformed so agents could coordinate their strategies to create stable optimal equilibria. Second, we observed the evolution of game populations into groups of fewer (repeating) isomorphic games with strong preceding game characteristics. Keywords Game theory· Simulation· Genetic algorithms· Economic learning· Artificial intelligence JEL Classification C02· C63· C73 * Vinícius Ferraz visfer[email protected] Thomas Pitz [email protected] 1 Alfred-Weber Institute forEconomics, University ofHeidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany 2 Faculty ofSociety andEconomics, Rhine-Waal University ofApplied Sciences, Kleve, Germany 438 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 1 Introduction Our world is constantly going through systemic transformations. Technological and scientific advancements, in combination with changes in economic, political, sociological, and other factors, result in new decision contexts in which strategic interaction occurs. By analyzing such situations, one can observe the ever-arising need for individuals to update their beliefs and adapt to the new informational and strategic structures. As an example, Freedman (1998, 2017) reported the example of socioeconomic and political transformations occasioned by the development of technology and communication structures, resulting in changes in how nations engage in warfare conflict. When making decisions, economic agents will act according to their interests, as well as the action of other agents and information available in the given scenarios, as outlined by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). As stated by Axelrod (1997), one can understand the properties of complex social and economic systems by applying simulations. The nature of human interaction is often modeled and analyzed in computational models of society, which introduce autonomous agents that interact with one another and the environment into which they are placed according to predefined rules (Billari etal., 2006). Adding dynamics to models of strategic interaction, social learning, and the evolutionary process are often simulated by introducing evolutionary biology concepts, as outlined by Gintis (2000). This evolutionary approach introduces the notion of predefined strategies that are repeatedly applied in an evolutionary process, operating dynamically on the distribution of behavior (Weibull, 1997). Game theory models describe strategic scenarios and behavior (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). In game theory, political or socioeconomic conflicts or crises are often modeled in a strategic form by matrix games or in an extensive form by game trees. One often restricts oneself to a fixed game that does not change significantly over time. Prominent examples are the analysis of the Cold War as a Prisoner Dilemma (Plous, 1993) or the Cuba crisis as a Chicken Game (Russell, 1959). In reality, however, it is observable that the strategic character of conflicts or crises changes over time. A crisis modeled as a Prisoner Dilemma can intensify into a Chicken Game with higher conflict potential or transform into a less conflictual Stag Hunt (Skyrms, 2004) or Harmony Game (Bruns, 2010). Therefore, it would be appropriate to describe these strategic changes by transforming the original game into a new game. In empirical settings, fundamental behavioral changes are observed when making decisions that can affect not only the strategic behavior of the agents involved but also environmental conditions and individual preferences. Heckathorn (1996) documented the transformation of games with dynamic interaction, where changes in decision-influencing factors changed the whole structure of the initial game. Similarly, Simpson (2004) empirically demonstrated how behavioral factors, such as social preferences, can transform one game into another (see also Hayashi etal. (1999); Kollock (1998)). 439 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… Motivated by this fact, in the present paper, we introduce a novel heuristic procedure that describes these changes in strategic interaction scenarios with Genetic Algorithms, a search procedure inspired by the process of biological evolution (Holland, 1992; Goldberg & Holland, 1988). Genetic Algorithms have been employed in economics-based problems since their introduction and are regarded as a powerful tool for finding optimal solutions over complex search spaces (Schmertmann, 1996), as well as a method that shows remarkable results for the simulation of decision behavior that is in line with empirical observations in similar research frameworks (Arifovic & Ledyard, 2012; Lensberg & Schenk-Hoppé, 2021; Manson, 2006). Given a pool of 2×2 strategic-form games, the games, represented as binary sequences, are transformed by a Genetic Algorithm depending on the players’ experience with the games in the pool. In each round, after making decisions, the game is evaluated based on the players’ payoffs. This process determines the probability of staying in the pool, or being replaced by another new game created via crossover and mutation. We describe the dynamics of the game pools related to the different types of strategy selection rules adopted by the players, establishing the notion of strategic behavior for the agents. The populations are defined based on two rules for aggregating sets of games. The first rule is based on topological proximity, using the periodic table of 2×2 games concept introduced by (Robinson & Goforth, 2005); the second rule clusters games by similar characteristics, based on the families categorization introduced in Bruns (2010, 2015a). The introduced model focuses on analyzing the impact of strategic behavior in this evolutionary learning process, where games are allowed to change over time and the performance of different decision rules. We aimed to document the implementation, testing, and assessing different decision-making rules and their influence on dynamic game populations. For a comprehensive analysis, the simulation model described here analyzes 144 unique types of 2×2 games and three distinct strategy selection rules: Nash equilibrium, Hurwicz rule, and a Random selection method. The goal is to outline how strategic behavior affects the transformation of dynamic decision-making scenarios by pairing different strategy selection rules with distinct populations of 2×2 games. The analysis of the simulation results focused on convergence speed (optimal utility levels reached) using different combinations as a performance measure, as the encoding of strategies and convergence process are seemingly interconnected (Dawid & Kopel, 1998). We have also documented the findings derived from the simulation process, including the consistent transformation of games and behavioral traits highlighted during the process.1 1 The documented source code, data, and resources used in this paper are published in the CoMSES Library. The material is available to download at: https:// doi. org/ 10. 25937/ smg0- 0t92. 440 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 2 Evolutionary Computation Overview Evolutionary computation methods arose from taking inspiration from biological mechanisms to design and implement computer-based problem-solving systems (Spears etal., 1993). This collection of methods allowed the creation of evolving and adaptive solutions to complex problems, especially the ones that impose challenges to traditional algorithms, such as randomness, chaotic disturbances, and complex non-linear dynamics, as outlined by Fogel (2000). The family of evolutionary algorithms contains several different methods, each with its particularities, but all of them share a connection with biological evolution. Among the most known methods in the literature are Genetic Algorithms (Holland, 1992), Genetic Programming (Koza etal., 1992), Differential Evolution (Storn & Price, 1997), Evolution Strategies (Rechenberg, 1978) and Evolutionary Programming (Fogel, 1998). For an overview of each of these methods, see Slowik and Kwasnicka (2020). The literature discussion that follows next outlines applications of some of these methods in similar contexts, highlighting the elements that led to adopting a Genetic Algorithm as an appropriate method to simulate the dynamic transformations of games over time. 2.1 Evolutionary Models: Applications forLearning, Strategic Interaction, andOptimization As Camerer (2003) outlined, some aspects of learning are sometimes overlooked by economic theory. If perfect information and rationality are assumed, the equilibrium point will always be known from the beginning, and people will only modify the equilibrium if information changes. Moreover, Camerer and Weigelt (1988) emphasized the importance of achieving better outcomes in experimental games, especially when dealing with scenarios having potentially inefficient equilibrium outcomes, such as trust games, public goods games, beauty contests, and others. Consequently, well-formulated economic learning theories are crucial in providing predictive power, coherence, and concomitantly revealing new insights (Camerer, 2011). The multidisciplinary combination of game theory and genetic programming has grown in several distinct fields, from economics and sociology to computer science and natural sciences such as biology. Evolutionary game dynamics provide comprehensive frameworks for studying interaction, learning, and evolution (Roca etal., 2009). In addition, in contrast with the neoclassic assumption of perfect rationality, economic models of learning provide the possibility to study agents as they learn and update their beliefs since the application of an evolutionary model assumes that strategies can change over time (Baddeley, 2018). According to Axelrod etal. (1987), individuals cannot thoroughly analyze the situation and calculate optimal strategies when interacting in complex environments. Alternatively, strategies are updated and based on achieved results, highlighting how a Genetic Algorithm can be particularly adept as a learning mechanism for creating effective strategies. The given approach serves as an inspiration for the analysis performed in this article. The following are some of the relevant constructs. 441 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… Holland and Miller (1991) stresses that the employment of artificial adaptive agents in economic theory can help us understand real-world economic issues by enabling the free exploration of system dynamics under controlled conditions and the opportunity to check several unfolding behavioral patterns. Furthermore, Dawid (1999) argued that the decentralized structure of Genetic Algorithms, which naturally resembles a group of interacting economic agents, is well-suited to simulate the behavior of economic systems. Isaac (2008) provided an introductory overview of an agent-based model using Genetic Algorithms in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, reporting variations in the payoff structures that create new player types, introducing an interaction between payoff cardinality and players’ attributes. Pitz etal. (2005); Chmura etal. (2007) presented a novel simulation model for analyzing action patterns in social systems mainly based on the concepts of Genetic Algorithms and the Theory of Action Trees (Goldman, 1971). They explained how the emergence and disappearance of actions could be described with a uniform algorithm, succeeding in endogenously eliciting comprehensive changes in the agents’ behavior. Manson (2006) documented experiments exploring the concept of bounded rationality, stating that Genetic Algorithms are an appropriate tool to model actors that are not perfectly rational, that is, addressing characteristics of human decision-making such as cognitive limits, learning, and innovation. Similarly, the algorithm for optimization problems reported by Yang (2017) build on a similar conceptual framework. Their main idea is a game theory-inspired evolutionary model that updates the strategy sets by replacing individuals of the population with better-performing offspring generated by replication or belief learning operators, creating a model that outperforms four other algorithms often used for similar purposes. Pereira etal. (2020) also introduced a constrained optimization model that explored two ideas, the first being a Genetic Algorithm with social interactions (for diversification of solutions in the selection process). The second model consisted of game-based crossovers (tournament simulations for more diverse offspring). The presented construct demonstrated robust performance when compared to traditional methods in the engineering design optimization process. Continuing on the topic of optimization. Savin and Egbetokun (2016) formulated an agent-based model of innovation networks with endogenic absorption capacity, where dynamic cooperation for knowledge can occur between different agents, represented as firms, with different knowledge positions. In their simulation model, the authors applied a Differential Evolution algorithm to find optimal investment budget decisions regarding tradeoffs between cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. Their findings demonstrate that networks generated with the model display small-world properties, which tend to be efficient structures for knowledge distribution. Another interesting observation is that firms with higher absorptive capacity tend to be better positioned within their networks, ultimately demonstrating that their ability to learn drives network performance effects. With a similar objective to this paper, Savin etal. (2018) introduced a metaheuristic approach for solving non-linear dynamic games, proposing a method that allows the analysis of more realistic strategic scenarios. The method can solve the 442 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 standard version of the introduced game, like other traditional techniques, and solve non-standard extensions of the problem (inequality constraint and asymmetry in penalties) by identifying optimal equilibrium strategies, both cooperative and noncooperative. The proposed procedure combines Differential Evolution (for individual optimal strategies) and Approximation of a Nash Equilibrium. The set consists of a three-player macroeconomic game between two groups of countries exercising fiscal policy and one joint central bank. The results shed light on a more realistic analysis of strategic scenarios for policy insights and finding optimal strategies, contrasting with traditional methods. In further developments on the Differential Evolution method application, Savin and Blueschke (2016) introduced a model to solve optimal control problems, addressing the limitations of classical methods in specific situations. The model’s performance demonstrated a superior optimization of expected outcomes, strengthening the claim that heuristic methods are well-suited to navigate complex search spaces and find good approximations to global optima. Blueschke etal. (2020) later extended on this subject by introducing a novel Differential Evolution-based method for solving optimal control problems with passive learning. This learning method models the observation of the world’s current state and employs new information to improve the system’s general knowledge. The proposed approach does not imply the modification of the original problems and provides more robust results regarding the learning process. Bullard and Duffy (1998) documented a macroeconomics experiment using a Genetic Algorithms-based learning model to simulate the behavior, outlining that a population of artificial agents can coordinate depending on the information structures they are inserted into, as chaotic and complex structures tend to hinder coordination. Another related framework was developed by Gooding (2014), who formulated a simulation model for capturing evolutionary trends observed in society, such as wealth aggregation, inequality, and climate change. Where experimental data verify changes in actions, surroundings, and decision-making, such social trends remain resilient and difficult to alter, according to the study, offering insights into how to impact social development. Macedo etal. (2020) applied a Genetic Algorithm to optimize trading strategies, which outperformed the analyzed market indicators by employing a more comprehensive search space than traditional methods. In a similar context, Glynatsi etal. (2018) used an evolutionary game theoretic model in the ecology field to examine the interaction between poachers and wildlife. The model analysis reported how the devaluation of rhino horns would likely lead to higher poaching activity and that such an approach was only practical when combined with disincentives, intending to contribute to informing debates on the issue with scientific facts. Arifovic and Ledyard (2011) introduced an evolutionary learning model with relatively good performance at matching the behavior of agents engaged in repeated strategic interactions when the behavior converges to a Nash equilibrium state. The authors state that most games do not require sophisticated strategies, except for the case of coordination games, which reduces the model’s performance. Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) later reinforced the predictive power of evolutionary learning methods by introducing a comprehensive model able to generate data quantitatively similar to the empirical values, focused on the contribution mechanism of a public goods game. Price (1997) 443 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… also reported a good performance from Genetic Algorithms in searching for equilibria in standard games from industrial organization theory, such as Bertrand and Cournot competition scenarios. Koza etal. (1992); Koza (1994) provided an early framework for Genetic Programming that introduced the notions of learning by modeling agents and their learning behavior over time. The author defines adaptive learning as the process of changing the structure of a potential solution. Hence, it performs better in its environment, where positive changes are rewarded and negative changes are discouraged by the underlying fitness function. Similarly, Chen etal. (2005) introduced a comprehensive game theory and Genetic Algorithms framework that approach several topics present in this research, such as coordination, adaptive learning, and equilibrium selection. The authors compared the behavior of computational agents to human subjects. They concluded that the behavior was remarkably similar in the applied experiment, supporting the idea of Genetic Algorithms as a credible tool to model human behavior. Lensberg and Schenk-Hoppé (2021) studied the process of learning in one-shot multiple 2×2 games, where the agents never only see each game once and should learn to find optimal strategies based on information acquired across games. The author proposes a solution concept based on multiple artificial agents that learned how to play the games through Genetic Algorithms. The proposed theoretical model is reported to perform well, in line with intuition and empirical evidence. Other interesting applications of the combination of Genetic Algorithms and game theory described in published literature include practitioners in other distinct and diverse fields, such as engineering (Périaux etal., 2001), energy (Castillo & Dorao, 2012, 2013; Mohamed & Koivo, 2011), communications (Kusyk etal., 2011), land usage (Liu etal., 2015), biology (Hamblin & Hurd, 2007) and ecology (Hamblin, 2013). In summary, the literature suggests that Genetic Algorithms are an appropriate model for adaptive learning and optimizing strategic decisions. It performs well in problems of strategic interaction models (such as ours) while incorporating behavioral traits that are close to empirical findings in experiments with human behavior. Genetic algorithms suit our objective since they allow us to manipulate binary sequences under imposed constraints. In this case, one can transform the numerical structure of game elements so that essential characteristics are taken into account, as well as the outcomes of the decisions performed by the agents, expressed by the fitness function generated by different strategy selection rules. In this way, repeated decisions of the agents can influence the transformation of the games to directions that are consistent with the agents’ behavior, providing us the necessary building blocks to simulate a situation where games can transform and analyze how the behavior of the agents influences these transformations. 3 Game‑Theoretical Features This article adopted the standard representation of strategic-form games as a model of simultaneous interaction between two agents, denoted by a 2×2 matrix. This form encompasses the following elements: the (two) players, who 444 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 are the parties making the decisions; the strategies that can be selected by each player (two for each) and the payoffs being the rewards received as a function of the chosen strategy (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953; Robinson & Goforth, 2005). The strategic representation of games focuses on static analyses while overlooking dynamic aspects such as the order of the players’ moves, changes in the moves, and the informational structure. This approach suggests the strategies that are more likely to be used by each player or alternatively recommend to players which strategies to choose in similar scenarios (Maschler etal., 2013). In Robinson and Goforth (2005) ’s notation, the players in the context of this article are named after how the strategy profiles are organized, with the player ROW’s strategies displayed in the rows of the matrix and player COL’s strategies in the columns, respectively. The adopted classes of 2×2 strategic-form games were based on the “periodic table” categorization provided in Robinson and Goforth (2005), which formally connects all ordinal rank games with distinct player preferences since swaps topologically linked the games in adjoining payoffs. The space of 2×2 is infinite, though as we were only interested in ordinal preference relations, we can concentrate on classes of isomorphic games, where for each class, we can choose one representation of the form {1, 2, 3, 4}×{1, 2, 3, 4} . Respectively, as Robinson and Goforth (2005) have demonstrated, there are 576 ways to arrange two sequences of four numbers in a bi-matrix scheme. The ordinal structure of a game does not change by switching rows, columns, or both simultaneously; the 576 games can be reduced by a factor of 4 to 144. For a broader representation of strategic scenarios, all 144 unique classes of games - including a wide range of well-known applied game theory situations such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken game, Stag Hunt, Battle of Sexes, and several others - are included in the simulation model. In complement to the periodic table approach, Bruns (2010) further categorized the games by similarity in Layers, which outlines topological proximity, and Families, which groups similar games (based on equilibria and payoff structures, see Table1). The games were split into populations following both grouping rules, as the scheme described in Fig.1 and Table1. Fig. 1 Representation of the game families and layers in the periodic table of 2×2 games (Bruns, 2010, 2011, 2015a, b) 451 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… 4.3.1 Selection andReplacement Selection is a crucial factor for directing the search process toward better individuals. According to Rowe (2015); Reeves and Rowe (2002), the fitness function assigns positive scores to well-performing games in the search space. To avoid early convergence, we opted for a non-deterministic approach, meaning that all individuals are considered with a certain probability during the selection process. Based on the experiments with distinct methods, we adopted the fitness proportionate selection, where the probability of a game g being selected is based on its performance against the rest of the population: f(g) F . Where f is the game’s fitness scores and F is the total fitness of the current population (aggregated). The applied replacement method was based on the Inverse Selection criterion (Rowe, 2015), which links directly to the fitness function and the previously described selection method. The standard replacement rate chosen for the algorithm was 1. Since the population size remained constant, another game required removal whenever a new game was added to the current population. This rule made the poorer performing solutions more likely to be replaced than the better ones since the fitness determined the probability of being replaced. 4.3.2 Reproduction: Crossover andMutation The chosen reproduction method was a single-point crossover (Holland, 1992; Lucasius & Kateman, 1993) that chooses a random index position within the individual’s binary structure, and the parts of the two parents were exchanged at this point - generating a new individual, or offspring, as demonstrated in Fig.5. The idea was to recombine building blocks (schemes) on different strings. The crossover operator ensured that new individuals inherited the parents’ characteristics, likely to be high performers among the population. As the next step, the mutation operator introduced a probability of changing one bit within the binary structure of an offspring game at a given generation. As illustrated in Fig.5 (Right-hand side), if mutation takes place, one random bit will be Fig. 5 Crossover and Mutation Operators Example 452 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 selected within the offspring game’s (generated via crossover) binary string, with a uniform probability distribution over the possible 16 bits. The selected bit element is then flipped, from 1 to 0, or 0 to 1, generating a new game with new attributes, potentially not present in the parents’ original gene pools. This step ensures the diversity of characteristics in the population and the possibility of generating more diverse games while avoiding fixation in determined sets of characteristics. 4.3.3 Evolutionary Loop The outlined steps are iterated through multiple generations. The populations of games and their fitness scores were the main object of analysis for accessing the algorithm’s properties and effects. The final data output consisted of a population of games with the same length as the initial set, outlining the effects of N generations of simulated natural selection, breeding, and mutation. Consequently, such generations directed the population to a convergence process towards an optimal point expected to become constant when first reached, meaning that the algorithm found an optimal solution for the problem. As a recap, the model applied the following steps: 1. Initialization of a pre-filtered population of 2×2 strategic form games 2. Implementation of the strategy selection methods outlined previously 3. Calculation of the fitness for each individual (game) in the population, based on the strategies performance (fitness proportionate selection). 4. Execute the genetic operators: selection, crossover, and probably mutation within selected individuals in order to create a new game from the selected games. 5. Insert the offspring back into the population, replacing a game by inverse selection. 6. Return to step 2 and iterate this process until the termination criterion is satisfied One important remark is that we employed a unified termination criterion for simplicity and experimental purposes at 10000 generations. Theoretically, the algorithm would have served its purpose when the entire game population reached the maximum fitness level (global optimum). We have recorded and documented the generation number in which all populations reach an optimal point as a measure of performance (speed of convergence) in Table3. The shared termination threshold allowed straightforward comparisons of the datasets and the observation of the stability of equilibrium states over more extended periods. Similarly, for the mutation rate, we have applied a unified parameter value at 1% . The mutation rate affects the evolutionary process and speed of convergence. Since we analyzed several different combinations of populations and strategy selection rules, we kept a constant parameter for simplicity and comparability. However, we encourage practitioners to find optimal mutation rates for individual problems in optimization-based tasks through parameter fitting or experimentation. We have performed a few tests with different mutation rates in terms of convergence. An example of such tests is found in Appendix D. 453 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… Apart from the termination criterion situation described above, the simulation model comes with a range of other distinct parameters to be defined by the practitioner. Table2 summarizes the methods and parameters applied in this experiment. 5 Simulation Results This study’s concept of strategic behavior in decision-making was represented by variations of both the Nash equilibrium and the Hurwicz Rule strategy selectors. Alternatively, the absence of any strategic behavior was simulated by allowing the agents to select random strategies from the available options utilized as a control feature. The analysis of the experiment findings focused primarily on studying the effect of strategic behavior during the evolutionary learning process. We quantified the influence of strategic behavior as the ability and speed of converging to optimal outcomes for an entire population, expressed by the individual utility levels. We applied the variations of the strategy selection methods into a range of different game pools, intending to assess this performance and also judging by the ability to transform the initial scenarios, which might be anything between pure conflict and harmony. In addition to the utility convergence and strategies performance, the analysis of the simulation outcomes revealed two other interesting points, the coordination patterns in strategy selection by the agents and the transformation of the diverse game pools into sets of repeated games. Each of these points was explored more in-depth hereunder. 5.1 Utility Convergence The simulation results indicated that the model mostly evolved in conformity with the reported literature and the expected development in accordance with the selfmaximizing applied behavioral patterns. The evolutionary process drove the players into creating better outcomes throughout the learning generations, individually, by changing the structure of the games they were inserted into. The overall tendency was that once an optimal strategy was found, there were no incentives Table 2 Summary: algorithmic parameters adopted in the model execution Parameter Value Short description Distinct populations 11 Populations restricted according to layers and families logic Strategy selectors 3 Nash equilibrium, Hurwicz rule and Random Selection rule FPS Fitness Proportionate Selection (roulette wheel) Crossover points 1 Random point where the binary string is divided and recombined Mutation rate 1% Probability of mutation taking place Replacement rate 1 Number of games replaced by the offspring in each generation Termination 10000 Maximum number of generations (iterations) allowed 454 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 for the participants to deviate. Over time, successful tactics were generally replicated, resulting in an evolutionary equilibrium, as described in Riechmann (1998); Reschke etal. (2001); Riechmann (2002). When the equilibrium was disturbed by the stochastic mechanisms in place, the players tended to evolve again toward an optimal strategy. Only the rounds with the Nash and Hurwicz strategy selectors get the aforementioned results. The Random approach produced fuzzier and unordered payoffs, which were usually non-optimal. The analysis of the utility development, that is, the payoffs gained as results of strategies selected, was plotted in Figs.6, 7 and 8, for each of the populations and strategy selectors. Each plot’s data divides into two combined plots displaying the utility development for each generic player type, ROW, and COL. The Y axes show the average utility levels for the whole population in each generation (X axes), using different colors for each population. Each figure shows the results for each of the strategy selector types, being Fig.6 for the Nash equilibrium-based methods, Fig.7 Fig. 6 Utility Development—Nash equilibrium Strategies 455 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… Fig. 7 Utility Development—Hurwicz rule Strategies 456 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 for the variations of the Hurwicz rule, and Fig.8 for the completely random method. The populations are further divided into plots using the layers and family groups described earlier. The evolutionary process gradually increased the individual utility to optimal values. The agents proceeded to select strategies that maximized the individual payoffs to maximize the overall outcomes of the games themselves, as defined by the fitness function. In this manner, the equilibrium became stable when all games in the given population achieved optimal payoffs. The selected strategies tended to persist and resist other invading strategies, as also observed by Friedman (1991). The charts displayed similar convergence curves in most cases. Due to the stochastic mechanisms inherent to Genetic Algorithms, some games in the population may have lost an optimal pair of strategies during the evolutionary process. Nevertheless, the subsequent generations quickly adapted to the optimal strategies again. Similar effects of genetic experiments are observed in Riechmann (1998, 2001, 2002), where the learning process was given in two states: (1) the movement of populations towards a stable state, denominated behavioral stability and (2), once such state has been reached, the learning process presents a near-equilibrium dynamic of getting out of the evolutionarily stable state and returning there again. We observed similar trends in the equilibrium states observed in our results. When looking at the Nash equilibrium runs (Fig.6), one can observe that in all game pools, the Nash strategies could drive the convergence to the optimal utility values. Interestingly, the population that took the longest to achieve the equilibrium was Layer 2 (left side), which contained the most Biased games, mixed with Unfair, Second Best and Prison games. Similarly, when compared to the population containing all Biased games (right side), they also displayed a lower convergence time, even when compared with games having initially inferior strategies. Analysis inferences Fig. 8 Utility Development—Random Strategies 457 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… from the random Nash equilibrium strategy selection, apart from the inferior performance to the payoff maximizing version (as expected), include the fact that the more diverse pools (layers division) presented a better performance than the pools with all similar games together (families division). In this case, the pools with Biased, Unfair, and Prison games displayed a significantly higher convergence time. Following data analyses of the populations using the Hurwicz rule, the equilibrium state was reached at similar speeds (see Fig.7) compared to the Nash equilibrium runs. According to the simulation results, the layers-based families presented similar effects as before, with Layers 1and 2 being slower than the others in some cases. There was a more distinct evolutionary pattern in the families-based populations until reaching stability. The Second Best and Prison families demonstrated a much noisier and longer process to reach equilibrium when considering the optimistic and, even more so, the pessimistic approaches. The random pools displayed an interesting control feature, exhibiting a noisier process, with marked lower populations that could not converge to the evolutionary stability, even after ten thousand iterations, for both layers- and families-based populations (Fig.8). This lack of convergence properties is an essential contrast to the other runs, implying that the presence of strategic behavior highly influenced the evolutionary process itself. Even with a model tailored to favor individual payoffs, it was insufficient to drive the equilibrium state. 5.2 Strategies Performance This section analyses the strategy selectors’ performance in terms of convergence speed to optimal values. Table3 summarizes the speed of convergence results, that is, the number of generations it took for the entire population to reach maximum fitness scores. The payoff dominant Nash equilibrium strategy displays the best overall performance, followed by the Hurwicz rule with 𝛼=0.5 , which alternates between the maximin and maximax strategies according to the game structures. In the third place, we have the Hurwicz rule with 𝛼=1 , or maximax (optimistic), followed by the Nash equilibrium with random equilibrium selection, and the Hurwicz rule with Table 3 Rank of strategies performance in each of the distinct populations Population NE: pdom eq. NE: rand eq. HR α =0 HR α =0 . 5HR α =1 Random deliaf712293737104363desaiB deliaf981610994107cilcyC deliaf458921888061259nosirP deliaf945455841310135tseBdnoceS deliaf85532372834611riafnU deliaf10433721niW-niW deliaf194149416226138021L deliaf006287190227918282L 1023193183213L 24861729132341865534L Entire Space 701 653 742709 612failed Average 254 988 1332 356904 n.a. Min 12333391n.a. Max 828 4382888114944549n.a. Std. Deviation 283 13492658424 1456 n.a. Rank (avg.) 145236 458 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 𝛼=0 , or maximin (pessimistic). As denoted in the previous chapter, one can notice the lack of convergence for the random strategy selection method. In most cases, the random selection failed to converge within the allowed time, reinforcing the influence of strategic behavior simulation in the process. Upon analyzing the game pools separately, we observed that pools with a higher number of conflict and non-optimal types of games, such as Biased, Unfair, Second- Best and Prison, affect the speed of convergence as well, requiring more iterations in order to reach optimized fitness values. Although the games will be transformed in every case and eventually converge to optimal scenarios when in the presence of strategic behavior, the available population characteristics directly influence how the games will transform in the next generations. The charts in Fig. 9 demonstrate the utility development for both players by adopting each strategy selector and variations used in the simulation model, aggregated by average across all populations. Here it is easy to understand this rank and compare the random method against the others. The performance of the strategies varied on a game basis; a complete overview of each combination of game pool and strategy selector is presented in Appendix A. Fig. 9 Strategies Performance—Consolidated 459 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… 5.3 Evolutionary Stability: Coordination Following our game structure, each agent could select between two strategies, generically denominated as Strategy1 and Strategy2. Additionally, for the Nash equilibrium-based pools, mixed strategies were allowed. The frequency of selected strategies based on a random sample of populations is presented in Fig.10. One can notice that the evolutionary stability, in terms of utility, is reflected directly in the stability of the strategies adopted by each player. This observed trend was in line with the examples detailed in Weibull (1997); Hines (1987). Furthermore, most displayed a symmetric plot, especially after reaching equilibrium. The literature suggests that in equilibrium situations, the players coordinate their strategies. For each strategy one of the players adopts, there is a strategy that is always the best response, giving no incentives for the players to deviate from this equilibrium state by selecting another strategy. This allows the equilibrium state to persist throughout the generations (see Fig.10). In addition, due to their inferior outcomes, mixed strategies have been eliminated early in the evolutionary process. Figure10 displays a random sample of six strategy selectors and game pool combinations. The complete overview of the frequency of the selected strategies in all pools is presented in Appendix B. Fig. 10 Evolutionary Stability—Sample Pools (percentage of strategies used in each round) 460 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 5.4 Transformation ofGames We started with a game pool containing the following equilibrium structure: one pure Nash equilibrium ( 75% of the games), one completely mixed Nash equilibrium ( 12.5% of the games), and two pure and mixed (one or infinitely many) Nash equilibrium ( 12.5% of the games). Table4, depicts the resulting equilibria structure, depending on the strategy selection method, of the new games generated by the evolutionary process, considering the games in the last period of the simulation rounds. Games with completely mixed Nash equilibria have been eliminated during the evolutionary process, making all new games with at least one pure Nash equilibrium. The symmetry in the payoff structures was only sometimes present. A highlighted finding was the existence of an optimal equilibrium cell (4,4), where both players attained the maximum payoffs by playing that strategy, as in the Win-Win (harmonious) game family. The analysis of the results uncovered another interesting fact. Most games transformed and replicated one-selves, reducing the number of unique games in the final populations, where successful games appeared repeatedly. There was no restriction to how the game may change, except for the rules defining the periodic table of 2×2 games (Robinson & Goforth, 2005). Even when the payoff symmetry was broken, both players had an optimal equilibrium state, which tended to survive across generations. The games were changed in such a way that they retained (in the majority of cases) the strategy choices, and payoff yield stabilized according to the characteristics of the initial populations and the decision rules applied. In this case, the games were specifically optimized to create favorable decision scenarios for both players. This point is visualized in Fig.11, which contains a random sample of pools plotting the count of unique games in each of the denoted populations. This reduction pattern was equivalent across every population and strategy selector. The model yielded populations with few different games, repeatedly occurring within the same pool. The complete overview of the count of games in all pools is found in appendix C. 5.5 Comparison withReinforcement Learning Reinforcement Learning is a broadly applied concept in the economics literature, especially when it comes to game theory and situations of strategic interaction, as a model of the human learning process, as it is regarded as an alternative method to this paper for modeling learning behavior. A popular version of the Table 4 Frequencies of the equilibrium structure for games in the final populations, compared to the initial pools Equilibrium Structure Initial Pools Hurwicz Pools Nash PoolsRandom Pools 1 pure 75.0% 74.8% 48.7% 0.0% 1 completely mixed 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2 pure (and mixed) 12.5% 25.2% 51.3% 100.0% %0.001latoT 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 467 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… Complete overview of the strategies selection frequency for the Random Pools in Fig.17. Fig. 15 Evolutionary stability—Nash pools Fig. 16 Evolutionary stability—Hurwicz pools 468 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 Appendix C: Complete Diagram ofGames Transformation Figure18 displays the overview of the count of unique games across generations in all pools, for all strategy selectors. Fig. 17 Evolutionary stability—Random pools 469 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… Appendix D: Mutation Rate Tests Figure19 summarizes the tests performed with mutation rates using the Payoff Dominant Nash Equilibrium strategy selector, which is the highest performing and most robust of our rules, applied in the whole pool of 144 games. Fig. 18 Count of unique games in pool across generations—All pools 470 V.Ferraz, T.Pitz 1 3 Appendix E: Reinforcement Learning Algorithm The reinforcement learning algorithm applied for a comparison with the Genetic Algorithms was based on Erev and Roth (1998) ’s model and in the formulation presented in Camerer and Hua Ho (1999); Moffatt (2020), which introduced the concept of attractions A j i , as weights attached to strategies. Initial attractions Aj i (0 ) can be given values to assume a degree of previous experience from the agents with the game (having to be estimated by the practitioner), or they can be neutral by setting default values to 0. The generalized model has two main components. First, the attractions’ update function at time t Aj i (t ) , given as: where 𝜋i(si(t),s−i(t)) is the player i’s payoff in round t (scalar-valued function) and I is the indication function, taking the value of 1 if the statement is true and 0 otherwise. This means that in reinforcement learning, a player’s attraction to a strategy can only increase if that strategy is chosen. 𝜙 indicates the speed at which past payoffs are forgotten. 𝜙=0 would indicate that only the most recent payoff is remembered. 𝜙=1 would indicate that all past payoffs have equal weights in the current decision. The second component is the transformation of attraction into choice probabilities via logistic transformation, given as: Where Pj i (t+1 ) is the probability of player i playing strategy j in round t and mi is the number of strategies player i has. The parameter λ defines the sensitivity to attractions; attractions are irrelevant if λ=0 , and attractions are important if λ is (E1) A i j (t)=𝜙A j i (t−1)+I(s j i ,si(t))𝜋i(s j i ,s−i(t)) , (E2) P j i(t+1)= eλA j i(t) ∑ mi k=1 eλAk j(t) Fig. 19 Mutation rate tests—Payoff-Dominant Nash Eq. applied on the complete pool of games 471 1 3 Analyzing theImpact ofStrategic Behavior inanEvolutionary… large. The choice probabilities are then used as means of selecting strategies in each round. Funding Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL. This project received no external funding Data Availibility The source code and dataset examples generated and analyzed in this paper are available to download via the CoMSES platform at: https:// doi. org/ 10. 25937/ smg0- 0t92. Declaration Conflict of interest All authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest Ethical Approval This paper does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. 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