Capturing economic and social value from hydrocarbon gas flaring and venting: evaluation of the issues

Romsom, Etienne; McPhail, Kathryn Working Paper Capturing economic and social value from hydrocarbon gas flaring and venting: evaluation of the issues WIDER Working Paper, No. 2021/5 Provided in Cooperation with: United Nations University (UNU), World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) Suggested Citation: Romsom, Etienne; McPhail, Kathryn (2021) : Capturing economic and social value from hydrocarbon gas flaring and venting: evaluation of the issues, WIDER Working Paper, No. 2021/5, ISBN 978-92-9256-939-6, The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki, https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2021/939-6 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/229406 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo/ WIDER Working Paper 2021/5 Capturing economic and social value from hydrocarbon gas flaring and venting: evaluation of the issues Etienne Romsom and Kathryn McPhail* January 2021 * Both authors: EnergyCC, Singapore, [email protected], www.energycc.com This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project Extractives for development (E4D)—risks and opportunities, which is part of the Domestic Revenue Mobilization programme. The programme is financed through specific contributions by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2021 / Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO Information and requests: [email protected] ISSN 1798-7237 ISBN 978-92-9256-939-6 https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2021/939-6 Typescript prepared by Mary Lukkonen. The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency—providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research. The Institute is funded through income from an endowment fund with additional contributions to its work programme from Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as well as earmarked contributions for specific projects from a variety of donors. Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or the United Nations University, nor the programme/project donors. Abstract: Atmospheric emissions urgently need to reduce for natural gas to fulfill its potential role in the energy transition to achieve the Paris Agreement on climate change. This paper establishes the magnitude and trends of flaring and venting in oil and gas operations, as well as their emissions and impact on air quality, health, and climate. While global flaring and venting comprise 7.5 per cent of natural gas produced, their combined impact on health and climate (in terms of Social Cost of Atmospheric Release) accounts for 54 per cent. Many low- and middle-income countries are economically dependent on oil and gas production. Most premature deaths from air pollution in 2016 were in developing countries. Most natural gas losses and emissions are avoidable. If all natural gas flared and vented globally is captured and brought to market, it could supply annually more than the total South and Central America gas consumption, plus all of Africa’s power needs. If 75 per cent of these volumes are captured, it provides an additional natural gas sales value of US$36 billion per annum (assuming an average gas price of US$4/MMBtu). Key words: energy transition, gas, health, climate, air quality JEL classification: Q3, Q4, Q5 Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Tony Addison and Alan Roe for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this paper. Notes: This study is complemented by another WIDER Working Paper written by the same authors (Romsom and McPhail 2021): ‘Capturing Economic and Social Value from Hydrocarbon Gas Flaring and Venting: Solutions and Actions’. It investigates, evaluates, and proposes solutions and actions designed to reduce flaring and venting. Abbreviations and units are at the end of the paper. 1 1 Introduction A large number of low- and middle-income countries are dependent on oil and gas production. In 2014, 48 countries had oil and gas exports greater than 30 per cent of their total merchandise exports (Addison and Roe 2018). Of these, 29 countries were either low- or middle-income countries. In 2018, 13 low- and lower-middle-income countries received more than 20 per cent of export revenues from oil and gas. For Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, and Yemen, oil and gas accounts for more than 50 per cent of exports (Ericsson and Löf 2020). There are opportunities for low- and middle-income countries dependent on oil and gas production to capture significant benefits from natural gas flaring and venting. Satellite data since 2005 show that 85 per cent of total gas flared is in developing countries. The volume of gas routinely flared is large, estimated to be circa 145 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, which is approximately 4 per cent of global gas production. Capturing and processing the gas associated with the exploitation of upstream hydrocarbon resources significantly reduces negative social impact and could provide additional revenues that can be used to support achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs). Our paper will show that the opportunity revenue value from capturing and utilizing upstream flared and vented natural gas in 2019 was US$48 billion, based on an assumed US$4/MMBtu gas price (see Table 13). However, this is a fraction of the estimated social cost impact. There are substantial societal benefits from policies that prevent routine flaring and venting, reducing emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), organic carbon, and black carbon (BC), as noted in the report of the highlevel commission on carbon prices (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition 2017): Various co-benefits—for instance, lower air pollution, improved health, higher energy security, and lower expenditures—increase the value of reducing GHG emissions for the society. Some of these co-benefits have a direct financial translation (such as savings from reduced fuel use) while others (such as better health or the preservation of biodiversity) cannot be directly and consensually assigned a monetary value. Moreover, there are second-order impacts, including the freeing of public resources for alternative uses, and positive macroeconomic impacts (such as growth and higher employment) associated with climate-related investments. The co-benefits of mitigation can be substantial and are therefore often an important element in analyses by policy makers. In addition to reducing deliberate emissions, further benefits can be obtained from policies and actions that reduce other ‘fugitive’ emissions (i.e. leakages) of natural gas. The socio-economic benefits from reducing natural gas pollutants include the impact of air quality and climate on health, aerosols-induced impact on regional climate, and global climate impact. Technical solutions exist for the upstream industry to capture, process, and utilize the wasted natural gas and obtain financial-economic benefits in addition to the socio-economic benefits. This study aims to provide an overview of the causes of natural gas flaring and venting in oil and gas operations and the impediments to reducing these. Gas flaring and venting is a highly significant issue in the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources because of its impact in terms of energy wastage, air quality, BC emissions, and climate change. Solutions exist to capture, process, and utilize natural gas in oil and gas processes. Nevertheless, across the world, significant volumes of unprocessed natural gas continue to be flared or vented for commercial reasons. 2 Most of the global gas flaring occurs when associated gas, a by-product of upstream oil exploration and production, has insufficient economic value to be processed and transported to market. Pipeline infrastructure may be lacking to transport the gas, gas markets may be locally absent, or the economic value of the gas may be less than its processing and transportation costs. Even in cases where no viable proposition can be made for economic exploitation of the associated gas, proven solutions exist to avoid these unnecessary emissions into the environment. In such situations, it is often possible to process the associated gas and reinject this into the oil-producing reservoir to optimize oil recovery. Although gas reinjection is not always possible, it is a quite common, if underutilized, technique, as according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), of the 4,306 bcm of gas produced in 2014, 455 bcm (10.6 per cent) were reinjected and 144 bcm (3.3 per cent) flared (World Bank 2020). Limitations in the application of gas reinjection as a standard methodology to avoid natural gas flaring and venting The benefits of gas reinjection into oil reservoirs are multiple: • Gas reinjection as voidage replacement in oil reservoirs provides reservoir pressure maintenance. The arrest of reservoir pressure decline is needed to maintain well flow rates and to overcome the back pressure caused by the weight of the fluids in producing wellbores. • Gas reinjection can provide an improved macroscopic sweep of the reservoir, whereby oil is swept towards the producing wells and a higher oil recovery factor is obtained. • Recycled natural gas is partially absorbed by the oil in the reservoir, improving its fluid characteristics (e.g., lower viscosity) to flow in the reservoirs towards the producing wells, leaving less residual oil trapped, i.e. an improvement of microscopic reservoir sweep. • Gas reinjection can counterbalance aquifer ingress into the oil reservoir, particularly when this would lead to lower oil recovery and well-lift problems. • Gas reinjection can contribute to a well offtake strategy, whereby excess gas is produced above the reservoir gas-oil ratio, thereby providing additional lift in the wellbore, avoiding the cost for deploying artificial lift to keep the oil wells flowing. Consequently, gas reinjection not only can provide a mechanism for gas disposal, it can also result in higher oil recovery efficiency. However, not all oil reservoirs are suitable for gas reinjection, and in some situations a short circuit can occur between gas-injection wells and oil-producing wells, impairing oil recovery. In other oil reservoirs, a strong aquifer may counteract the beneficial impact of gas reinjection and cause lower oil recovery efficiency. In these cases, a more prudent approach than flaring or venting of the associated gas is to dispose the produced gas into a designated disposal reservoir that has been assessed and confirmed to be able to hold the gas volumes without leaking or spilling over into other reservoir structures or potable aquifers. Significant technical understanding exists on how to select and manage gas disposal reservoirs. This same approach is also a key methodology for carbon capture and storage. Produced gas can also be reinjected into commercial gas storage reservoirs, often depleted gas reservoirs, to manage seasonal swings in demand and to conserve gas for operational and strategic reasons. Furthermore, there are additional opportunities for gas utilization within upstream oil field operations, such as gas lift, engine fuel, and local power generation. Another important source of upstream natural gas flaring occurs in remote gas exploration well testing. Before investments can be made to develop new gas reservoirs, it is essential to get early information on the size and deliverability (flow rates) of the reservoir. It is for this reason that exploration wells are being drilled and brought on stream for long-term production testing. For large and remote gas reservoirs, exploration well tests can last for many months while flaring the gas under high flow rates. Although these exploration gas flaring durations are typically less than continuous flaring of associated gas during the field life of oil production, the amount of gas flared per time unit for a gas well test can be a factor of one thousand or more than for a producing oil well. Although it is theoretically possible to reinject the produced gas in the gas reservoir, this would interfere with the objectives of the deliverability test. In offshore or coastal situations, an 3 alternative solution to exploration well test gas flaring is the use of floating liquefied natural gas (floating LNG or FLNG) to capture the gas and its economic value. In 2010, International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a comprehensive analysis (Daniel et al. 2010) on the tax treatment of oil, gas, and minerals to ensure that resource endowments set countries on a path of sustained and robust prosperity. It stated that gas flaring is ‘universally discouraged and should be dealt with via regulation’. This emphasis was reiterated in a 2019 World Bank publication (Huurdeman and Rozhkova 2019): ‘natural gas flaring international best practice is to ban and fine gas flaring, except in specific circumstances. Angola, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda have adopted this approach’. Despite this recognition of international good practice and the existence of technical solutions to avoid wasteful emissions from unwanted natural gas into the atmosphere, about 8 per cent of global gas production is estimated to be flared, vented, or leaked. The considerations to flare are often based on commercial criteria rather than technical arguments. An example that illustrates this point is a recent case where the Texas regulator approved the application from oil company Exco Resources to flare gas, despite its oil field already being connected to a gas-gathering system. The owner of the gas gathering, Williams, was willing to take the gas and raised the objection against gas flaring, considering ‘flaring is waste’ if a company has pipeline access. The ruling by the Texas Railroad Commission (Rassenfoss 2019) made clear its view that: • ‘Flaring is a critical part of the well construction process and it is important companies be able to continue to use this tool’; • ‘anytime there is a negative cost—you do not get as much (money) as you get otherwise—you can flare’; • If the commission blocked production of oil it would prevent burning of gas worth a fraction as much as the oil production lost. The essence in this case is the definition of ‘waste’. The Texas Railroad Commission opted for defining ‘waste’ as anything that does not optimize economic value, rather than the broader view that ‘waste’1 is an avoidable negative impact on the environment. In a subsequent section, we will review the status of gas flaring and venting in the United States and in other countries in more detail. It is worth noting that the perception that associated natural gas is ‘waste’ when the means for economic development are not readily available is shared by many producers and regulators globally. When externalities are not priced in, a distorted view of ‘waste’ results. The consequence, as can be readily observed globally, is that valuable energy resources go up in smoke rather than being preserved because there is momentarily no financial economic return to utilize it. With gas providing 23.6 per cent of global primary energy demand, versus 32.7 per cent to oil, it is no longer viable to hold the point of view that gas is a waste product. It is long overdue that industry and regulators adopt policies and regulations that state: To vent or flare routinely to produce is an unacceptable oil and gas industry practice. There are certain situations that may necessitate emergency flaring or venting. For example, to protect human life and equipment, a process upset may trigger a gas blowdown scenario to avoid a fire or explosion. Such cases of emergency flaring are infrequent and of short duration. They 1 According to Lexico.com, ‘waste’ is: ‘1) an act or instance of using or expending something carelessly, extravagantly, or to no purpose; 2) material that is not wanted; the unusable remains or by-products of something’. Herein lies part of the problem, when associated natural gas in oil production is seen as a waste stream to be disposed of. 4 contribute, therefore, less to global emissions than routine flaring in upstream and downstream operations. Initiatives are underway to stop routine flaring. One of these is the Global Gas Flaring Reduction (GGFR) Partnership, led by World Bank Group. We will investigate and evaluate such programmes in more detail in the second WIDER paper that complements this paper. Section 2 provides a definition of ‘flaring’ and identifies the different types and causes of this. Section 3 provides a similar definition and analysis of ‘venting’. Section 4 discusses the different definitions of ‘fugitive emissions’ and the uncertainty in assessment and measurement. Section 5 sets out the scale and trends over time of global flaring and venting. Section 6 combines different data sets and establishes an integrated assessment of natural gas flared and vented that includes the amounts and damages of chemicals released in the atmosphere. Section 7 delivers a consistent representation of the social impact of these atmospheric releases because different emissions affect climate, air quality, health, and the environment differently. Section 8 introduces solutions to overcome impediments that hinder utilization of associated gas. Section 9 concludes. 2 What is flaring? The importance of well-operated flares • Natural gas flaring in the oil and natural gas industry is defined as the controlled combustion of natural gas for operational, safety, or economic reasons. • A well-operated flare can achieve a 98 per cent destruction efficiency of natural gas by thermal oxidization (i.e. 98 per cent of hydrocarbons destroyed). • Many natural gas flares fail to meet this operational target and produce a range of chemicals, such as nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur oxides (SOX), VOCs, and BC, that are toxic and affect air quality, as well as have a negative impact on the climate. • There is increasing concern that flare systems are inadequately monitored and that flare combustion processes cause chemical emissions much higher than estimated by regulators. Natural gas flaring in the oil and natural gas industry is defined as the controlled combustion of natural gas for operational, safety, or economic reasons. Natural gas flaring occurs for operational reasons; for example (US Department of Energy 2019): • during drilling to dispose of gas influx into the wellbore; • during exploration well testing to determine well deliverability and minimum connected reservoir volumes; • during production well testing to stabilize flow and clean up the well before fluids are routed through production facilities; • during flow diversion from regular process equipment in situations of production upsets, maintenance operations, and/or emergency pressure relief; • during regular operations to dispose of small volumes of waste gas, such as from gas evaporation from oil storage tanks; • during regular operations as pilot flame for instantaneous ignition of any diverted gas flows. In addition, flaring also occurs for economic reasons: • during operations, in situations when oil production facilities are available, but where gas processing infrastructure is under construction or not yet operable; 5 • during production to avoid impairment of hydrocarbon recovery from shutting in wells while processing facilities are temporarily unavailable; • during operations, in situations where oil can be produced but there is no opportunity to bring the associated gas to market; • during operations, when technical solutions exist to process and capture the gas and bring it to market, but when this is less economic, then flaring and the associated gas is seen as a waste product. Flares are cost-effective and useful safety devices in operations as they can dispose of sudden releases of large amounts of gas, even if gas flows are intermittent or highly variable. Flare systems (EPA 2016a) typically cost US$10,000 to US$3 million, depending on size and degree of sophistication (EPA 2019). The importance of operating flares well This paper details the significant pollution and social costs that result from flares that do not fully combust their feed gas. Flare volumes can vary from almost zero to 1.4 Bcf/d of gas, and commercially available flare burner tips range from 2.5-cm to 2.3-m diameter. A well-operated flare can achieve a VOC destruction efficiency of 98 per cent (equating to a combustion efficiency, i.e. full conversion into CO2, of 96.5 per cent) (EPA 2012). However, flares are not suitable for halogenated compounds.2 If the heat content of the gas exceeds 300 Btu/scf, flares can sustain combustion without auxiliary fuel. Flares create combustion at high temperatures in the range 500–1,100 oC and are very concentrated. These characteristics of concentration and temperature profile allow remote-sensing technologies to identify gas flares and differentiate these from other heat sources, such as wildfires. This enables remote monitoring of individual gas flares by satellite. Flares do not pose a safety concern for high concentration of organics in the feed because they use an open combustion process, significantly reducing the risk for an explosive environment. Flares are generally elevated to create distance between the open flame and to disperse products from the combustion. Flare combustion quality depends on flame temperature, combustion residence time, turbulent mixing of gases and air flow, and presence of any heavy elements (e.g., liquids) in the feed. If the airflow is insufficient or irregular, smoking, flickering, and soot forming (BC) can occur and the combustion process will be incomplete, creating other organic compounds such as aldehydes and acids. Primary air is added to the gas before the mixture enters the flame. The volume of oxygen needed to ensure a clean burn depends on gas composition and increases from a factor of 9.6 for methane to 38.3 for pentane (EPA 2018). In addition to insufficient oxygen, smoking occurs when crosswinds reduce the effective flare height and therefore the temperature of the flare combustion zone. The presence of liquids in the gas stream also will deteriorate the combustion process. Most flare systems have a knock-out vessel to remove liquid content. If liquids enter the flare, they can cause sprays of burning chemicals, smoking, and/or extinguishing of the flame. Concern is growing that flare systems are inadequately monitored and that flare combustion processes cause chemical emissions orders of magnitude higher than estimated by regulators. Instead of process measurements and emissions monitoring, industry and regulators often rely on decades-old formulas for estimating pollution from flaring (Hasemyer 2016) that do not cover super-emitter flares. 2 A halogenated compound is a VOC onto which a halogen (e.g., fluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine) is attached. Streams containing high concentrations of halogens or sulphur containing compounds are not usually flared because of corrosion of the flare tip and formation of secondary pollutants (e.g., sulphur dioxide [SO2]). If these vent types are to be controlled by combustion, thermal incineration followed by scrubbing to remove the acid gases is the preferred method (Stone et al. 1992). 6 3 What is venting? Venting is harder to detect and has larger impact on the climate than flaring • Natural gas venting in the oil and natural gas industry is defined as the direct release of natural gas into the atmosphere, creating emissions of methane as well as other components in the gas. • Venting happens regularly in oil and gas operations to avoid pressure build-ups and when vapour recovery technologies are uneconomic. • Methane emissions have a much larger radiative forcing impact on climate than CO2. Therefore, welloperated gas flaring is preferred over venting. • Emissions from venting are harder to detect than gas flaring. Venting is the direct release of natural gas into the atmosphere. Venting of natural gas not only releases methane but also any other chemical components that are in the gas. Natural gas venting occurs for operational reasons, for example (US Department of Energy 2019): • during routing liquid unloading of low-pressure gas wells; • during flow diversion from regular process equipment in situations of production upsets and/or emergency pressure relief; • during blowdown of process equipment in situations of production upsets and/or emergency pressure relief; • during maintenance operations, to bleed off gas pressure from devices and control equipment; • during regular operations to avoid pressure build-up from evaporation of liquid hydrocarbons in processing and storage facilities without vapour recovery systems; • during regular operations as routine emissions from flash tanks, dehydration columns, amine units, etc.; • during regular operations as routine emissions from loading and unloading of liquid hydrocarbons for transport; • during boil off during LNG transportation and LNG storage, as part of the cooling process. Venting should only occur for small volumes where it is not possible or reasonable to install vapour recovery or flare systems. Venting of hydrocarbons in large volumes could cause gas explosion risks. Furthermore, the climate impact from venting a certain volume of hydrocarbons is significantly higher than from flaring that same volume, as described in the following section. There is no valid reason to routinely vent associated gas as a waste product stream in oil production operations. The points raised above why routine flaring can occur for commercial reasons are invalid for venting. If flaring to produce is bad, venting to produce is worse. Nevertheless, operators that wish to dodge emission regulations may resort to venting as a waste disposal mechanism because gas flares are easy to spot and gas vents are harder to trace. However, (satellite) technology to identify sources of methane venting has improved significantly in recent years. 13 The top three emitters, unchanged in their standing since 1994, have grown their fugitive emissions much faster the rest of the world combined, i.e. twice as much since 2004 and one-and-a-half times as much since 1994 (in terms of MtCO2e), representing 40 per cent and 37 per cent of global fugitive emissions growth, respectively. Figure 5: Comparison of countries with large fugitive emissions and those with large oil production Note: countries listed in order of declining crude oil production volumes. Source: authors’ illustration based on data from World Resources Institute CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2017) and IEA (2020a). Of the 16 largest fugitive emissions countries in 2014, 11 were also in the global top 15 oilproducing countries5 (see Figure 5). The other five largest emitting countries (and their rankings in global oil production) were: Uzbekistan (ranked 53rd), Libya (30th), Ukraine (55th), Indonesia (25th), and India (ranked 22nd). However, there are also large oil-producing countries with relatively low fugitive emissions, such as those shown in Table 2. This demonstrates that it is possible to have large oil production without having large fugitive emissions. The argument that fugitive emissions are necessary and inevitable to produce oil is therefore flawed. 5 In Table 1 and in Figure 5, we have shown the 28 countries of the European Union as a single entity. Top 16 fugitive emission country Lower fugitive emission country 14 Table 2: Large oil-producing countries with relatively low fugitive emissions and flaring volumes Country 2014 oil production (Mtoe) 2014 global oil producer ranking 2014 fugitive emissions (MtCO2e) 2014 global fugitive emissions ranking 2014 flaring volume (bcm) 2014 global flaring ranking Saudi Arabia 553 1 8 44 1.9 19 United Arab Emirates 171 6 23 24 0.9 29 Mexico 145 11 36 20 4.9 8 Brazil 121 12 10 39 1.5 22 Norway 85 15 1 74 - - Kazakhstan 84 16 36 21 3.9 9 Qatar 78 17 3 50 1.3 26 Note: Mtoe=million tonnes of oil equivalent. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from World Resources Institute CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2017) and IEA (2020a). When we look at flaring as a subset of fugitive emissions, we see again a very consistent picture: of the 16 countries with the largest fugitive emissions in 2014, 10 were also in the global top 16 oil-flaring countries (see Figure 6). Between 2013 and 2019, the global annual volume flared increased by 7.5 per cent, from 139.6 bcm to 150 bcm. The top five flaring countries in 2019 were responsible for 50 per cent of the globally flared volumes during 2013–19 (54 per cent in 2019). During the years, there has been very little variability in the ranking order of the top flaring countries: 1) Russia, 2) Iraq, 3) US, 4) Iran, and 5) Venezuela.6 Since 2016, the United States has doubled its flaring under its growing shale developments. Under economic sanctions, Iran significantly reduced flaring (20 per cent) in 2019 (see Table 3 for details). 6 In 2019, the United States displaced Iran for third place. Algeria is a close contender for fifth place (and had fifth position in 2018). 15 Figure 6: Comparison of countries with large fugitive emissions and those with large flaring Note: countries listed in order of declining flaring volumes. Source: authors’ illustration based on data from World Resources Institute CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2017) and IEA (2020a). As shown in Figure 7, the five largest flaring countries grew their annual flare volumes fastest, with a total increase in volumes from 62.8 bcm to 81.7 bcm, an increase of 30 per cent between 2013 and 2019. Remarkably, the ‘rest of the world’ countries outside the flaring top 30 have been able to reduce their flaring volumes by 35 per cent in the same period, from 13.1 bcm to 8.5 bcm. This is especially noteworthy as the flaring top five have some of the most developed and mature oil and gas infrastructure. The argument that routine flaring occurs mainly in the early production phase to allow gas infrastructure development to catch up is not substantiated by the data. Consistent with our views on fugitive emissions, we can similarly conclude that large oil production can occur with relatively low flaring, as illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 8. Flaring is therefore not a necessary evil associated with the production of oil. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Norway, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE have relatively low flaring in view of the size of their oil production. Top 16 fugitive emission country Lower fugitive emission country 16 Table 3: Top 30 countries with largest flaring volumes in 2019 7 Note: increases from 2018 to 2019 in red; GGFR countries plus Saudi Arabia (Saudi Aramco) in green. The amount of gas flared in 2019 was the largest since 2009 (GGFR 2020). Source: authors’ calculations based on data from GGFR (2020). 7 Each cubic meter of natural gas produces circa 2.3 kg of CO2e emissions under full combustion (see Appendix A). The 2016 global flaring volume of 147.6 Bcm is equivalent to 340 MtCO2e. Hence, the 2017 reduction in gas flaring of nearly 5 per cent equates to an emissions reduction of 16 MtCO2e. However, in 2018 and 2019, flaring volumes increased again, increasing emissions to 345 MtCO2e in 2019 (assuming full combustion). 17 Figure 7: Large natural gas flaring countries appear to have disproportionally grown their flare emissions, while small flaring countries have reduced their flaring Source: authors’ illustration based on data from GGFR (2020). Figure 8: Comparison of countries with large oil production and those with large flaring volumes Note: countries listed in order of declining flaring volumes. Source: authors’ illustration based on data from World Resources Institute CAIT Climate Data Explorer (2017) and IEA (2020a). 18 In 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Global Gas Flare Reduction (GGFR) partnership was launched by Norway and the World Bank. The first priority was to work with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the U.S. Department of Commerce to fill measurement gaps by producing the first flaring estimates based on satellite observations for 60 countries. In 2015, a further initiative was launched by the World Bank, Norway, and other parties to stop routine flaring by 2030. An increasing number of countries, companies, and organizations have pledged their support since then. Despite urgency for material progress on this initiative, efforts to date have made insufficient impact on global flare reduction. However, in the period 1996–2010, the industry was able to reduce global flaring volumes by almost 17 per cent; Russia and Nigeria are noteworthy in their reduction of gas flaring. An explanation for this is the development of gas markets and the growth of LNG in these years (Romsom and McPhail 2020). LNG has been a key technology in bringing remote stranded gas to markets and in growing new markets for gas. Although the global use of gas (and LNG in particular) has continued to grow rapidly since, this has not resulted in a further decline in gas flaring (Figure 9). The assumption that flaring is necessary to grow oil production to meet demand is not borne from the evidence. From 1996 to 2010, global oil production grew from 69.5 mbopd to 83.4 mbopd (+20 per cent), whilst global flaring reduced in the same period by 16.7 per cent. Consequently, flaring intensity decreased from 6.52 m3/bbl in 1996 to 4.15 m3/bbl in 2017, a reduction of 36.4 per cent. Since 2017, this rose again to 4.32 m3/bbl in 2019 (see Figure 10). Flaring intensity is often hailed as a success in flare-reduction efforts. However, this measure is only relevant when comparing the relative flaring performance of assets, companies, and countries. Regarding the impact of flaring, only absolute measures, such as cumulative volumes flared and/or vented, are relevant. This is because our resource base and our environment have absolute, instead of relative, limits and constraints. Figure 9: The gas flaring reduction trend during 2005–10 Source: authors’ illustration based on data from GGFR (2020). 19 Figure 10: Flaring intensity during 1996–2019 Source: authors’ illustration based on data from GGFR (2020) and BP (2020). When evaluating flaring and crude oil production trends from individual countries during 2005– 17, we observe a marked variation in individual country trends (see Figure 11 and Table 4). This further illustrates that oil production growth does not have to imply an increase in gas flaring. Table 4: Individual country trends in oil production and flaring (in bold countries in Figure 11) Top 21 Flaring Countries During 2005–17 Oil Decrease Oil Stable Oil Increase Flaring Decrease Nigeria Uzbekistan Angola China Kuwait Russia Kazakhstan Qatar Flaring Stable Libya Indonesia Malaysia Oman Saudi Arabia Canada Flaring Increase Venezuela Algeria Mexico Iran Egypt USA Iraq Source: authors’ calculations based on data from GGFR (2020) and IEA (2020a). 20 Figure 11: Individual country trends in oil production and flaring during 2005–19 Source: authors’ illustration based on data from GGFR (2020) and IEA (2020a). 21 6 Impact of hydrocarbon flaring and venting Flaring and venting each have their own specific emissions impacts and affect climate, health, and the environment differently • There is considerable uncertainty in the assessment of fugitive emissions. Emissions data are sparse, and uncertainty ranges are large. This has consequences on the transparency in polluting sources, pollutants emitted, and the impacts thereof. • Progress in remote-sensing technologies using satellite data, as well as in modelling of transport and impact assessments, are important developments to reduce these uncertainties. • Flaring and venting each have their specific emissions impacts and affect climate and the environment differently. • Different data resources use different variables for emissions (e.g., natural gas, CO2, methane, CO2- equivalent), different quantities (e.g., volume, mass, energy), and different units (e.g., ton, tonne, kg, lb). This makes data comparison and data integration difficult. • Most impact assessments for natural gas flaring and venting focus on CO2 and methane emissions and their impacts on climate in terms of US$/tonne CO2e. • In addition to CO2 and methane, large amounts of strong pollutants on health and climate, such as VOCs, organic carbon, NOX and SOX, carbon monoxide (CO), ammonia (NH3), hydrogen sulphide (H2S), and BC, are emitted when natural gas flares are not designed or operated properly. • In absence of published integrated impact assessments that combine climate, air quality, and health impacts for the wide range of pollutants emitted during flaring and venting, the authors adopted Shindell’s SCAR methodology, presented in this paper. Having evaluated the scale and trends in global flaring and venting in the previous section of this paper, we will now discuss the impact of these oil and gas activities in terms of emissions. As described earlier, there is considerable uncertainty in the determination of fugitive emissions. The data are sparse, and there is a widespread between individual estimates, as illustrated in Figure 1. Progress in remote-sensing technologies using satellite data, as well as in modelling of transport and impact assessments, are important developments to reduce these uncertainties in terms of completeness, accuracy, and consistency of emission measurements. Flaring and venting each have their specific emissions impacts and affect climate and the environment differently. While all flaring is deliberate, methane and other emissions have the additional complexity that these can be deliberate or accidental (e.g., leaks). Emissions that are part of process streams are easier to eliminate by diverting these to other uses. Methane emitted from oil and gas operations in 2019 comprised 81.5 million tonnes (138 million tonnes of natural gas), and this contributed some 60 per cent of the total methane emitted from the energy sector and 6 per cent of GHG emissions from the global energy sector (IEA 2020c).8 The combined amount of natural gas flared and vented has stayed relatively constant during 2000– 19.9 However, the contribution of gas flared decreased from 58 per cent in 2000 to 49 per cent in 2019. In this period, natural gas flaring reduced in absolute amounts by 13 mtpa, while natural gas venting emissions increased by 32 mtpa (19 mtpa of which is methane) (see Figure 12). 8 However, since 2017, both flaring and methane emissions are on the rise. 9 The IEA 2019 estimate for global methane emissions is 81.5 mtpa, an increase of 2.5 Mt since 2019 (+3.2 per cent). Upstream oil emits 46.5 per cent, upstream gas 34.5 per cent, and downstream gas 19 per cent (IEA 2020b). 22 Figure 12: Flaring and venting from oil and gas operations during 2000–19 Note: methane mtpa emissions as per IEA have been converted to natural gas mtpa using methane density and raw gas properties described in Appendix A. Source: authors’ illustration based on data from GGFR (2020) and IEA (2020c). Figure 13: CO2-equivalent emissions from flaring and venting in oil and gas operations during 2000–19 Note: for flaring, a 100 per cent combustion efficiency has been assumed; for venting, only methane emissions (as per IEA) have been counted, split into a 100-year time horizon and the incremental impact from assuming a 20-year time horizon. Source: authors’ illustration based on data from GGFR (2020) and IEA (2020c). 29 Figure 16: Precipitation trend in 2017, with reduced rainfall in global areas where BC concentrations are highest Note: expressed in the Palmer Drought Severity Index. Source: reproduced from NOAA Climate.gov (Scott and Lindsey 2018); labelled circles are the authors’ addition. As noted above, while there has been significant additional research on the climate impact of BC and the importance of particle size distributions since the Ramanathan and Carmichael (2008) publication, there has been less analysis of the impact of hydrocarbon flaring and venting on human health. The World Health Organization (WHO) finds that air pollution, defined as PM—including black carbon (BC), ozone (O3), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and sulphur dioxide (SO2)—is the leading environmental health risk that humans face. When small particulate matter is inhaled, it penetrates deeply into the lungs. One in eight premature deaths is caused by air pollution, largely a result of increased mortality from stroke, heart disease, lung disease, and cancers. This is particularly significant for people living in low- and middle-income countries. Of the 4.2 million premature deaths in 2016, 91 per cent occurred in low- and middle-income countries. The most affected are the WHO South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions. In follow-up work, we intend to further prioritize the eradication flares on their likelihood of causing disproportionate harm in terms of health to local populations. In the next section of this paper, we discuss the impact from natural gas flaring, venting, and leakages based on a social cost model approach (see also Appendix B). The social cost methodology enables the consistent integration of various types of damages from atmospheric emissions, including their impact on climate change, health impacts from climate change, health impacts from chemical toxicity, and regional aerosols-induced hydrologic cycle changes (i.e. changes in regional rainfall). 30 7 The socio-economic impact of gas flaring and venting in oil and gas activities The 7 per cent of natural gas flared and vented globally causes half of all damages from natural gas • Most impact assessments for natural gas flaring and venting focus on CO2 and methane emissions and their impact on climate in terms of US$/tonne CO2e. • On a per-unit volume basis, methane emissions from venting have much larger negative climate and health impacts than CO2 from flaring. • The impact pathways for methane and other chemicals released by venting and flaring are inherently different from CO2 and so are their damage functions. Using CO2e as a proxy to calculate social costs for other atmospheric releases underestimates its impact, particularly if it has toxicity to health. • The social cost of flaring increases significantly when the quality of the flaring process does not meet its 98 per cent destruction efficiency target, i.e. because of poor design and/or operations. • Contributions from unstable and super-emitter flares need to be included in impact assessments of flaring on air pollution and climate. • Recent assessment models integrate social impact assessments of air quality and climate. Shindell’s model includes four social cost elements of atmospheric releases (SCAR): o the impact of air quality (i.e. pollutant composition) on health; o the impact of climate on health; o the aerosols-induced impact on the regional climate; o the global climate impact. • A fifth element in the socio-economic assessment of flaring and venting is the opportunity cost to capture, process, and utilize the wasted natural gas and obtain financial-economic benefits. • Shindell’s SCAR estimates (in US$/ton per emitted chemical) are in range with other social cost assessments, except for: o NOX, for which Shindell SCAR exceeded the uncertainty range of other assessments; o VOC, for which Shindell does not provide a SCAR estimate; o NOX and VOC, for which SCAR estimates were chosen that are averages from a range of studies. • Our assessment confirms that the SCAR of flaring and venting significantly exceeds the value of natural gas expressed in gas price. This is not a surprise outcome: the EPA 2016 climate social cost of methane US$1,460/ton ($2019) equates to a value of US$17.42/MMBtu versus a 2019 (Henry Hub) natural gas price of US$2.57/MMBtu. • With the updated Shindell social cost criteria, the estimated SCAR for US upstream gas flared and vented is US$75/MMBtu, while the SCAR for marketed gas is US$5.29/MMBtu, comprised of downstream fugitive emissions (US$0.36/MMBtu) and full combustion (US$4.93/MMBtu). • While US natural gas emission intensity in 2017 is 3.7 per cent of produced gas, global emissions are more than double this amount at 7.6 per cent. (US flaring increased significantly in 2018 and 2019.) o US split: 1.1 per cent upstream flaring, 2.1 per cent upstream venting, 0.5 per cent downstream venting; o global split: 3.7 per cent upstream flaring, 3.1 per cent upstream venting, 0.7 per cent downstream venting. • The estimated global SCAR of natural gas flared and vented is US$956 billion per annum, exceeding the US$812 billion SCAR of the 92.5 per cent gas marketed and effectively combusted and that has a sales value of approximately US$655 billion (at an assumed global gas price of US$4/MMBtu). • The 6.8 per cent of global natural gas flared and vented in oil and gas operations (excluding downstream gas) causes 49 per cent of the total SCAR of global natural gas produced and used. 31 • If 75 per cent of the global upstream gas flared and vented could be captured and brought to market, it presents a US$36 billion of additional annual sales (at an average gas price of US$4/MMBtu). • Despite large uncertainties in SCAR estimates, the quantification of the social cost of flaring and venting on climate and health clearly demonstrate the imperative to reduce these emissions. • Permissive legislation and regulator practices of routinely issuing permits that condone large cumulative volumes of flaring and venting are not acceptable in light of the damages caused. The emissions from natural gas flaring and venting have a diverse socio-economic impact at local, national, and global scale. As the Stiglitz, Stern 2017 commission report on carbon prices noted (Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition 2017): ‘assigning a financial value to both emitted and avoided volumes of CO2 emissions helps reveal the hidden risks and opportunities in a company’s operations and supply chain.15 This is particularly relevant for companies that have to navigate an array of carbon-pricing regulations because their operations span multiple countries’. Furthermore, investors are increasingly demanding comprehensive climate disclosure as funds with an environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) mandate increase in size and scope. In this section we aim to provide an overview of the direct and indirect costs and other consequences on society. The discussions on how to evaluate the social cost of carbon (SC-CO2) illustrate the complexities of this evaluation process (CarbonBrief 2017). Cost evaluations vary based on different technical (climate) models, different economic assumptions (such as discount rate), and scope (national impact or global impact). Furthermore, each technical model itself has a large uncertainty range based on the uncertainties in input parameters and in the calculation process itself. Despite the wide ranges in assumptions and outcomes, policy makers16 should not shy away from defining costs for atmospheric releases (AR) as a policy instrument, regardless of the current scientific accuracy behind the numbers. Policy makers can choose a number within the range of values provided by scientists and, over time, adjust these valuations when new information becomes available. This is a better approach than not using the social cost approach as a policy instrument because of political choices and/or difficulties in choosing the ‘right’ number.17 A common issue, acknowledged by scientists and regulators, is that most of the modelling exercises to calculate the social costs of carbon focus on a subset of risks and do not include other potential vitally important impacts of carbon emissions that affect a combination of climate, health, and the economy. Moreover, studies on the social cost of carbon have focused on CO2 as the dominant source of emissions and convert other types of releases, such as methane, into an equivalent volume of CO2. However, the impact pathways for these chemicals are inherently different from CO2 and so are their damage functions. Using CO2 as a proxy to calculate social costs for other atmospheric releases underestimates their impact, particularly if they have toxicity to health. Increasingly, the importance for improved social cost estimates for specific atmospheric releases 15 It further noted that ‘the introduction of performance-based… GHG-intensity standards can approach or exceed the efficiency and effectiveness of carbon pricing’. 16 For example, in France, the UK, and the US, the social cost of carbon is used for policy appraisal and evaluation of public investments, with a provision for updating as the knowledge of science and economics improves with time. 17 The politicization of science is well illustrated in changes in social cost assessments that can follow a change in government. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has chosen to no longer value the cost of VOCs, despite earlier assessments in 2006 and despite clear continued recognition, even by EPA, that VOCs are harmful. Similar changes of ‘policy-driving science’ are highlighted in comments on EPA’s reassessment of the cost of methane from oil and gas operations by the Institute for Policy Integrity (2019). See also Office of Management and Budget (2006). 32 is being recognized. However, to date, few studies exist on assessments of the social cost for methane, the second-largest source of climate change after CO2. Another development in the assessment of SCAR is that certain governments only wish to account for the impact in their own country, even if their releases are border crossing. Advances in transportation modelling and observations from satellites increasingly demonstrate the wideranging impact of atmospheric releases across geographies. Assessment methodologies that exclude impacts across borders obviously underestimate the social cost. A study by Ricke et al. (2018) concludes that if countries were to price their own carbon emissions at their own country social cost of carbon (CSCC), approximately only 5 per cent of the global climate externality would be internalized (Ricke et al. 2018). Moreover, this approach is short-sighted, as their impacts on other countries ultimately find their way back through, for example, increased global supply chain costs or lower growth of export markets. Climate change disproportionally impacts on the poorest and most vulnerable. In 2019, the IPCC issued a Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC to expand the scope of its work to include sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty (Rogelj et al. 2018). Consistent with other studies, Ricke found that the international distribution of SCC is inequitable. This does not mean that climate change does not impact richer countries also substantially. Countries that incur large fractions of the global social cost of carbon (GSCC) consistently include India, China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. While the US emits about 15 per cent of global emissions, its share of GSCC is 12 per cent. For China, which emits some 31 per cent, its share of GSCC is 6 per cent. Some countries, such as Russia (contributing a 6 per cent share of emissions), are due to receive a net benefit from GSCC. Countries that are disproportionally strongly negatively impacted relative to their share of emissions are India (6 per cent emissions versus 21 per cent GSCC), Saudi Arabia (2 per cent emissions versus 11.5 per cent GSCC), and Brazil (1.5 per cent emissions versus 6 per cent GSCC). Integrated assessment models (IAMs) that combine the economic costs from a range of impacts in a consistent methodology are preferred over selecting impacts from individual studies. Examples of IAMs for the evaluation of SC-CO2 are DICE, FUND, and PAGE.18 Most of the IAMs’ scope is on assessing the linkages between climate models and their economic impact. Recently, IAMs are expanding to also include health impacts from the toxicity of AR compounds. This is a very welcomed development, as these efforts build the bridge between climate change impact and air quality impact from AR in a consistent methodology. However, this expansion of IAM scope also results in even further increased uncertainty envelopes. Given this wide range of impacts, in our assessment of the Social Cost of Atmospheric Releases (SCAR), we have chosen to draw upon the methodology of Drew T. Shindell (2015). In his work, Shindell integrates the economic impact from global climate change, regional aerosols-induced hydrologic cycle changes, health impacts from climate changes, and health impacts from air quality into a single model. The model specifies the SCAR in terms of damages per short ton in 2007 US$ for a wide range of pollutants, including: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), HFC-134a (a hydrofluorocarbon refrigerant with chemical formula 1,1,1,2-Tetrafluoroethane), BC, SO2, CO, OC, NOX, and NH3. Apart from HFC-134a, estimates for US emissions for each of these chemical compounds were provided in Section 6. We are therefore now in a position to assess the SCAR from US flaring and venting and use this information to scale this outcome to global levels. As part of the evaluation process, we have reviewed Shindell’s SCAR assessment against a range of other studies to verify if Shindell’s 18 DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model), FUND (Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution model), and PAGE (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect model). See CarbonBrief (2017). 33 numbers are in range. With the exception of NOX, for which Shindell provides a high value ($81,600/ton 2019 US$) that is out of range, we have chosen the average of a range of assessments, including Shindell’s, that is US$16,064/ton (2019 US$). Shindell does not provide a SCAR for VOCs. Hence, we have taken the average of the range of EPA (2006) and European Commission DG Environment (2002, 2005) estimates. See Appendix B for details on ranges of SCAR estimates. As part of our assessment, we have selected a discount rate of 3 per cent for the SCAR evaluation. For discussion on the topic of selecting a discount rate for social cost evaluation, we refer to the overview provided by the earlier reference to CarbonBrief (2017) and other literature. A discount rate of 3 per cent is often used as a mid-range evaluation that balances the arguments for and against using a lower discount rate (e.g., 1.4 per cent) or higher discount rate (e.g., 5 per cent or even higher 7 per cent).19 Table 8: Social impact in 2019 US$ per short ton of atmospheric releases by pollutant Impact in 2019 US$/ton CO 2 CH 4 BC SO 2 CO OC N 2 O HFC- 134a NO X NH 3 VOC Climate 39 1,105 24,295 -1,701 109 -3,401 11,176 43,731 -267 -463 Regional climate aerosols 0 0 31,583 5,345 0 10,568 0 0 425 1,458 Climate-health 55 3,401 182,21 1 6,924 316 13,362 29,154 133,62 1 36 1,822 Composition-health 0 814 75,314 40,086 292 61,952 0 0 15,870 26,724 Median 20 total estimate 102 5,588 327,97 9 51,019 765 82,602 44,945 194,35 8 16,064 30,368 2,563 Note: climate-health addresses climate impact on air quality and on vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue. Composition-health accounts for toxicity impact on health. Scattering and absorbing aerosols induce stronger regional hydrologic cycle changes than well-mixed GHGs, thus impacting stronger regional changes in precipitation than temperature changes alone. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Shindell (2015), converted from 2007 US$ to 2019 US$ based on US GDP implicit price deflator https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDPDEF#0. NOX and VOC estimates are based on averages from multiple assessments. See Appendix B. 19 Economic discounting is a calculation mechanism to value future benefits and costs in today’s money. A high discount rate preferentially values short-term impacts over long-term impacts, while a low discount rate reduces the discounting of long-term impacts. From a business investment perspective, some argue that climate-related investments should provide a higher rate of return than the market, thereby promoting a high discount rate. Others argue that climate and health impacts are by nature longer term, and a high discount rate would wrongly value a life today much higher than being alive in the future. A discount rate of 3 per cent is in the ‘acceptable range’ of most countries, institutions, and economists. 20 Statistical damage functions tend to have a tail of low probability but high impact realizations. In such situations, the median (i.e. middle score) of a ranked data set is generally considered the better representative of the central position within the data set, as it is less affected by outliers and skewed data than the mean (i.e. statistical average). For most statistical populations, the median of the sum is not the same as the sum of the median. 34 Figure 17: Impact categories’ contributions to Shindell social cost for atmospheric releases Note: individual chemicals of atmospheric releases are presented along the x-axis, while the y-axis shows for each of these chemicals the four contributing categories of damage. Aerosol contributions to atmospheric releases, such as BC, have highly significant damages in terms of cost per ton, with health cost impacts exceeding climate cost impacts. This is true for a range of discount rates, including 1 per cent and 5 per cent (not shown here). Source: authors’ illustration based on data from Shindell (2015), corrected for NOx and VOC added. Table 9: Social impact in 2019 US$ for atmospheric releases by the US oil and gas industry in 2017 SCAR of US in 2017 Total CO 2 CH 4 BC SO 2 CO OC N 2 O NO X NH 3 VOC F&V emissions (kton) 38,411 24,295 10,050 14.456 123.97 689.67 6.247 0.0183 685.51 2.867 2,544 F&V SCAR ($ mln) 88,367 2,479 56,156 4,741 6,325 528 518 0.82 11,012 87 6,520 NG flaring ($ mln) 25,963 2,479 4,741 6,325 528 518 0.82 11,012 359 NG venting ($ mln) 62,404 56,156 87 6,161 NG marketed ($ mln) 189,35 4 175,64 9 13,705 NG produced ($ mln) 277,72 1 178,12 8 69,861 4,741 6,325 528 518 0.82 11,012 87 6,520 Note: NEI data for US oil and gas industry does not provide emissions data for HFC-134a. NG=natural gas, F&V=flared and vented. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Shindell (2015), EPA (2017), IEA (2020c), and GGFR (2020). See Appendix B for further details. 35 Figure 18: SCAR for flaring and venting of natural gas in the US in 2017 based on Shindell social cost for atmospheric releases Note: individual chemicals of atmospheric releases are presented along the x-axis, while the y-axis shows for each of these chemicals the four contributing categories of damage. Source: authors’ illustration based on data from Shindell (2015), corrected for NOx and VOC added. Table 10: SCAR breakdown for the US oil and gas industry in 2017 SCAR of US natural gas in 2017 Total $ mln CO 2 CH 4 BC SO 2 CO OC N 2 O NO X NH 3 VOC Flaring & venting 88,367 2.81% 63.55% 5.37% 7.16% 0.60% 0.59% 0.00% 12.46% 0.10% 7.38% Flaring 25,963 9.55% 18.26% 24.36% 2.03% 2.00% 0.00% 42.41% 1.38% Venting 62,404 89.99% 0.14% 9.87% NG marketed 189,35 4 92.76% 7.24% NG F&V & used 277,72 1 64.14% 25.16% 1.71% 2.28% 0.19% 0.19% 0.00% 3.97% 0.03% 2.35% Note: the rows show SCAR breakdown percentages for each category of release. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Shindell (2015), EPA (2017), IEA (2020c), and GGFR (2020). Of the total SCAR US$88.4 billion caused by US oil and gas industry flaring and venting in 2017, flaring accounted for US$26.0 billion (29.4 per cent) and venting for US$62.4 billion (70.6 per cent). For venting, methane and VOC emissions account for 90 per cent and 10 per cent of SCAR 36 contributions, respectively.21 For flaring, SCAR is distributed across a greater variety of chemicals, particularly NOX, SO2, BC, and CO2. The emission estimates for US marketed natural gas (i.e. not flared or vented in upstream operations) include downstream gas methane venting of 2.45 million short tons and 1,721 million short tons of CO2. Table 11 provides a breakdown of US natural gas utilization and emissions. Total gas flared and vented is 3.7 per cent of natural gas produced, of which 1.13 per cent is flared and 2.57 per cent is vented, the latter in upstream (2.07 per cent) and downstream gas (0.5 per cent) operations, respectively. Table 11: SCAR intensity for the US oil and gas industry in 2017 US natural gas in 2017 Volume (bcm) % of produced natural gas SCAR ($ billion) Share of SCAR (%) SCAR intensity ($/m3) Upstream flaring 9.50 1.13% 25.96 9.3% 2.73 Upstream venting 17.43 2.07% 62.40 22.5% 3.58 Upstream flaring & venting 26.93 3.20% 88.37 31.8% 3.28 Marketed gas vented 4.25 0.5% 13.70 4.9% 3.22 Marketed gas combusted 812 96.3% 175.65 63.3% 0.22 Marketed gas vented & combusted 816 96.8% 189.35 68.2% 0.23 Produced gas 843 100% 277.72 100% 0.33 Note: upstream venting has a higher SCAR intensity than downstream venting because of the presence of VOCs in upstream natural gas. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Shindell (2015), EPA (2017), IEA (2020c), and GGFR (2020). The SCAR intensity of upstream venting (in US$/m3) is a factor almost 16 times higher than the emissions for downstream gas. For flaring, the SCAR intensity is a factor 12 times higher. In 2017, the estimated 3.2 per cent of natural gas flared and vented in oil and gas operations (excluding downstream gas) contributed 32 per cent of the total SCAR of US natural gas. Furthermore, in 2019, US natural gas production grew to 1,025 bcm (up 21.6 per cent from 843 bcm in 2017), while natural gas flaring grew disproportionally from 9.5 bcm in 2017 to 17.3 bcm (up 82 per cent). Consequently, in these two years, US flaring grew from 1.1 per cent of produced gas volume to 1.7 per cent, adding an additional US$21.3 billion of SCAR. The SCAR of marketed natural gas increased in this same period by US$41.9 billion, raising US annual oil and gas emissions (including downstream utilization) from US$278 billion to US$341 billion (+23 per cent). Another way to assess the economic impact of flaring and venting is to compare the SCAR estimates with market prices for natural gas. Gas prices vary with market geographies and over 21 Other alkanes, in particular ethane and propane, can account for an additional 3 mol per cent (downstream gas) to 9 mol per cent (upstream conditioned gas) of atmospheric release under venting. Their contributions have not been included in the SCAR assessment here. 37 time. In the United States, because of excess production of associated natural gas from shale oil, upstream gas prices have been trading in a low-priced range US$2–6/MMBtu during the last 10 years. In Asia, natural gas prices have ranged typically US$10–18/MMBtu in this period but recently much lower, even to US$2/MMBtu, because of global oversupply of LNG. A reasonable long-term range for global gas prices under normal market situations is therefore US$4– 12/MMBtu. These natural gas market prices provide an interesting reference point for evaluating the SCAR estimates in Table 12. The SCAR US$5.31 for marketed natural gas in the United States exceeded market prices in 2017 at ~$3/MMBtu, by a factor of almost 2. This implies that even under more controlled conditions in downstream natural gas, where gas compositions, rates, and combustion processes are stable and optimized, the social cost of natural gas significantly exceeds its price. When we include the additional volumes flared and vented in oil and upstream gas operations, the SCAR for produced natural gas increases to US$7.53/MMBtu. However, if we wish to price in the SCAR from flaring and venting in the volume of gas that remains, i.e. the natural gas marketed, the social cost breakeven gas price would have to increase by US$2.47,22 from US$5.31 to US$7.78/MMBtu.23 Table 12: SCAR expressed in US$/MMBtu, for the US oil and gas industry in 2017 SCAR of US natural gas in 2017 $ / MMBtu CO 2 CH 4 BC SO 2 CO OC N 2 O NO X NH 3 VOC Flaring and venting 74.85 2.10 47.57 4.02 5.36 0.45 0.44 0.00 9.33 0.07 5.52 Flaring 62.31 5.95 11.38 15.18 1.27 1.24 0.00 26.43 0.86 Venting 81.65 73.47 0.11 8.06 NG marketed 5.29 4.93 0.38 NG F&V & combusted 7.51 4.82 1.89 0.13 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.18 Note: upstream venting SCAR is US$81.85/MMBtu, while downstream venting is US$73.47/MMBtu because of the additional VOCs in the upstream gas content. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Shindell (2015), EPA (2017), IEA (2020c), and GGFR (2020). The SCAR intensity values presented in Table 11, now shown in bold in Table 13, can be used to scale up the data derived from US oil and gas operations to a global level. For example, in 2019, global natural gas production was 4,058 bcm, of which 150 bcm (3.7 per cent) was flared24 and 126 bcm (3.1 per cent) was vented in upstream operations. A further 29 bcm (0.72 per cent) was vented in downstream gas operations.25 Therefore, 7.5 per cent of the produced gas was unutilized and lost as emissions. 22 Another way of looking at these price/cost evaluations is that the 2017 US gas price of US$3/MMBtu just about pays for the social cost of the 3 per cent of natural gas flared and vented but not much else (investments, processing and transportation, and the social cost from burning are the remaining 97 per cent). 23 The total social cost of US$278.5 billion divided by 816 Bcm, i.e. the volume of gas marketed, and then converted into US$/MMBtu based on a gross heating value (GHV) of 1.242 MMBtu/kcf (see Appendix A). 24 Note that we have assumed the same emission factors for global flaring as those in the United States. This implies that we have not taken account for super-emitter sources of flaring or venting globally. A 1 per cent prevalence of flares that emit 100 times the emission factors assumed, i.e. well within the range observed, would double global flare emissions. 25 The methane emissions data from IEA (2020c) has been converted to natural gas volumes using a methane density of 0.668 kg/m3 and a methane mol per cent of 78.32 per cent. 38 Table 13: SCAR and economic (opportunity) value for global oil and gas industry in 2019 Global natural gas in 2019 SCAR intensity ($/m3) Volume (bcm) % of produced natural gas SCAR (US$billions) Share of SCAR (%) Sales value at gas price: US$4/MMBtu (US$billions) Upstream flaring 2.73 150 3.70% 410 23.2% 26.2 Upstream venting 3.58 126 3.11% 452 25.5% 22.0 Total upstream flaring & venting 3.12 276 6.80% 862 48.7% 48.2 Marketed gas vented 3.22 29 0.72% 94 5.3% 5.1 Marketed gas combusted 0.22 3,753 92.5% 812 45.9% 655 Total marketed gas vented & combusted 0.24 3,782 93.2% 906 51.3% 660 Produced gas 0.44 4,058 100% 1,768 100% 708 Total flared & vented gas 3.13 305 7.53% 956 54.1% 53.3 Note: the economic values shown in green shading are opportunity values, i.e. economic value that could partly be recovered in the absence of flaring and venting. The opportunity value would need to be adjusted for processing and transportation cost of the incremental gas volumes monetized. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Shindell (2015), EPA (2017), IEA (2020c), and GGFR (2020). The social cost in 2019 for global volumes of natural gas flared and vented is estimated at US$956 billion. The combustion of the remaining 92.5 per cent of global natural gas produced that was marketed adds a further US$812 billion in social cost. In 2019, the estimated 6.8 per cent of natural gas flared and vented in oil and gas operations (excluding downstream gas) contributed 49 per cent of the total SCAR of global natural gas produced. 45 Russia as notable examples. Between 1994 and 2014, overall volumes of fugitive emissions, which include gas flaring, increased. Nevertheless, there are also regions and countries that significantly reduced fugitive emissions, including the EU (-44 per cent), Nigeria (-28 per cent), and Ukraine (-11 per cent). Trends in gas flaring over time show that although there is overlap between large oil-producing countries, countries with high fugitive emissions, and top flaring countries, there are also a number of countries that managed to reduce flaring, even while increasing oil production. Countries such as Angola, China, Kuwait, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Qatar were able to increase oil production or keep it stable while, at the same time, reduce gas flaring. Saudi Arabia and Canada similarly increased oil production while keeping gas flaring stable. Norway, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia have relatively low flaring in view of the size of their oil production. It is also possible to have large oil production without having large fugitive emissions (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Brazil). Flaring is not necessarily linked to the stage of oil development, to increasing oil production, or to the overall size of oil production. In the period 2013–19, the ‘rest of the world’ countries outside the flaring top 30 countries reduced their flaring volumes by 35 per cent. The argument that routine flaring occurs mainly in the early production phase to allow gas infrastructure development to catch up is often not substantiated by the data. This is especially noteworthy, as it is the top five flaring countries that have some of the most developed and mature oil and gas infrastructure. A second paper that is linked to this set of topics further addresses the integrated framework (‘Diamond Model’) to end routine flaring and venting. This model combines four elements: 1) improved measurement of vent and flare gas production and emissions, 2) accountability, transparency, and reporting of gas production and emissions, 3) small-scale gas development and monetization technologies, and 4) regulation and fiscal measures. 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Change Res., 2(1). https://doi.org/10.3724/SP.J.1248.2011.00023 50 Abbreviations and units AR Atmospheric release bbl barrel (1 bbl is 0.159 m3) BC black carbon bcm billion (= one thousand million) cubic meter Btu British thermal unit—measure of the energy content in fuel (1 Btu = 1.06 J) BTXS benzene, toluene, xylene, and styrene CH4 methane CNG compressed natural gas CO carbon monoxide CO2 carbon dioxide CO2e carbon dioxide equivalent CSCC country social cost of carbon DICE Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model (IAM) ECA emission control area EIA US Energy Information Administration EMA Singapore Energy Market Authority EPA US Environmental Protection Agency ESG environmental, social, and corporate governance EU European Union FLNG floating LNG (liquefaction facility) F&V flaring and venting FUND Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution model (IAM) GGFR Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, led by World Bank Group GHG greenhouse gas (such as carbon dioxide, methane, and others) GHV gross heating value GSCC global social cost of carbon GWP Global warming potential (relative to carbon dioxide) HAP Hazardous Air Pollutants 51 HFC-134a a hydrofluorocarbon refrigerant with chemical formula 1,1,1,2-Tetrafluoroethane H2O water H2S hydrogen sulfide IAM integrated assessment models (to calculate the impact of climate change) IMF International Monetary Fund IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change J Joule, measure of the energy (1J = 1N × 1m) K Kelvin, a measure for absolute temperature Kg kilogram, SI unit of mass LNG liquefied natural gas m meter, SI unit of distance m3 cubic meter mbopd million barrels of oil per day Mln million mm millimeter (one-thousandth of a meter) MMBtu million British Thermal Units—measure of the energy content in fuel (1 BTU = 1.06 J) Mt megatonne (Mt), a unit of mass equal to one billion kilograms (109 kg) MtCO2e megatonne of CO2 equivalent (emissions) Mtoe million tonnes of oil equivalent mtpa million tonne per annum N Newton, SI unit of force (1N = 1Kg m/s2) NASA US National Aeronautics and Space Administration NEI National Emissions Inventory NG natural gas NH3 ammonia NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOx chemical compounds made from elemental nitrogen and oxygen NO2 nitrogen dioxide OC organic carbon (partially oxidized VOCs) OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 52 O3 ozone PAGE Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect model (IAM) PAH poly-aromatic hydrocarbons (constituents of black carbon) PM particulate matter s second, SI unit of time SCAR social cost of atmospheric releases SCC social cost of carbon scf standard cubic foot SC-CO2 social cost of carbon dioxide SDG Sustainable Development Goal (as defined by the United Nations) SOx chemical compounds made from elemental sulphur and oxygen SO2 sulphur dioxide UN United Nations US$ United States dollar VOC volatile organic compound W Watt, SI unit of power (1W = 1J/1s) W m-2 s measure for radiative forcing (the intensity of global warming) WHO World Health Organization °C degree Celsius, unit of temperature °F degree Fahrenheit, unit of temperature 53 Appendix A Calculation of CO2 emissions from unprocessed natural gas Table A1: Approximate natural gas conversion factors (for 1000 Btu/cf gas) Note: for example, to convert from 1 Gigajoules to MMBtu, multiply by 0.9478 Source:reproduced from https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/energy-sources-distribution/natural-gas/natural-gas- primer/5641#conversion. Synopsys 1 Bcm of gas produces under a perfect (100 per cent) burn: • 35.3 million MMBtu (1000 Btu/scf) • 0.51 million tonne of Carbon • 1.868 million tonne of CO2 • 2.32 million tonne of CO2 (raw feed gas 1242 Btu/scf) • 2.09 million tonne of CO2 (conditioned fuel gas 1121 Btu/scf) Calculation 1) With a perfect (100 per cent) burn, natural pipeline gas produces 14.43 kg carbon per MMBtu26 2) Assume normalized calorific value of 1000 Btu / scf ∧ 1 m3 = 35.31 scf  3) 1 MMBtu = 28.32 m3 1+3  14.43 kg carbon per 28.32 m3  4) 1 m3 produces 0.5095 kg carbon 5) Molecular weight of carbon = 12, of CO2 = 12+16+16 = 44 6) 4+5  1 m3 of 1000 Btu/scf gas produces 44/12 x 0.5095 = 1.868 kg of CO2 26 EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gases-equivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references 54 Unprocessed natural gas generally has higher calorific value than pipeline gas, due to heavier carbon elements contained in the gas (see table below). The raw feed gas gross calorific value is calculated27 to be 46.27 MJ / m3. 7) 46.27 MJ / m3 x 0.001 x 0.9478 = 0.0439 MMBtu / m3 = 43855 Btu / m3  8) ∧ 1 m3 = 35.31 scf  1242 Btu / scf 6+8  1 m3 of raw feed gas (1242 Btu / scf) produces 1.868 x 1.242 = 2.32 kg of CO2 , assuming a perfect (100%) burn. Note: Conditioning the raw feed gas into fuel gas (Table A2) changes the calorific value of the gas from 1242 Btu / scf to 1121 Btu / scf (41.75 MJ / m3), and therefore 1 m3 of conditioned fuel gas produces 2.09 kg of CO2 under a perfect burn. Table A2: Natural gas data for a drilling rig site in Texas Composition (mol %) Raw Feed Gas (Methane Number: 50) (Propane Knock Index: 24.6) (Weight: 0.888 Kg/m3)28 Conditioned Fuel Gas (Methane Number: 69) (Propane Knock Index: 8.3) (Weight: 0.779 Kg/m3) Methane (C1) 78.32 87.95 Ethane (C2) 11.48 7.21 Propane (C3) 4.35 2.129 Butanes (C4) 2.71 0.992 Pentanes (C5) 0.91 0.29 N-Hexanes (C6) 0.13 0.04 Hydrogen Sulfide (H 2 S) 0.003 0.002 Carbon Dioxide (CO 2 ) 1.97 1.29 Nitrogen (N 2 ) 0.08 0.12 Water 0.060 0.001 Source: authors’ construction. Gas composition by: https://www.mtrinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/NG08- MTR-Power-Gen-NG-2015.pdf ; methane number and PKI by Wärtsilä calculator: https://www.wartsila.com/marine/build/gas-solutions/methane-number-calculator. 27 See https://www.unitrove.com/engineering/tools/gas/natural-gas-calorific-value 28 Weight is calculated at NTP (Normal Temperature and Pressure) conditions, defined as 20 oC and 1 atm. https://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/gas-density-d_158.html 61 Executive Order 12866: Application of the Methodology to Estimate the Social Cost of Methane and the Social Cost of Nitrous Oxide”, 2016; https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016- 12/documents/addendum_to_sc-ghg_tsd_august_2016.pdf EPA, “Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources”, Federal Register, Vol81, 40 CFR PART 60, 2016; https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016- 06-03/pdf/2016-11971.pdf Alan J. Krupnick, Justine Huetteman, and Arthur G. Fraas, “EPA’s 2016 Methane Rule Should It Stay or Should It Go?”, Resources For the Future (RFF), May 2018; https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF20Rpt20EPA20methane.pdf On VOC “2006 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities”; https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/2006_cb/200 6_cb_final_report.pdf On Global Warming Potential (GWP) Forster, P., V. Ramaswamy, P. Artaxo, T. Berntsen, R. Betts, D.W. Fahey, J. Haywood, J. Lean, D.C. Lowe, G. Myhre, J. Nganga, R. Prinn, G. Raga, M. Schulz and R. Van Dorland: “Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing”, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-mental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, USA.