Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks

Katzenstein, Peter J. Book Part — Published Version Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Katzenstein, Peter J. (2022) : Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks, In: Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed.): Uncertainty and Its Discontents: Worldviews in World Politics, ISBN 978-1-00-907099-7, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 279-352, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/270948 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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Katzenstein The task becomes not one of looking for some single thing, but managing ... multiple shifting perspectives, and negotiating ... between irreducibly different contexts. If one wants to call this a “world view” then I have no objection to that. Raymond Geuss (2020) 1 Why are scholars of world politics unable to recognize the importance of uncertainty in world politics? I argued in Chapter 1 that humanist Newtonian and hyper-humanist Post-Newtonian worldviews shape analytical perspectives on risk and uncertainty. Humanist Newtonianism is central to conventional analyses of world politics. With most students of world politics following, economics took the lead by viewing reality as timeless; it deployed the lens of probability and paid little attention to uncertainty. 2 Since much of twentieth-century economics has resembled, roughly speaking, the physics of the 1870s and 1880s, this is not surprising. 3 Post-Newtonianism takes uncertainty for granted and is conceptually better equipped to explore terrains of world politics marked by uncertainty. The worldview of the analyst makes a difference: worldviews inform basic understandings of world politics. Accepting the predictable/controlled and the unpredictable/uncontrollable as linked aspects of human experience, garden, park, and forest (or jungle) metaphors offer a convenient way to organize my discussion in this concluding chapter. Is the world neat or unkempt? We can make things look similar by failing to examine them closely. There exists a difference in intellectual styles between the mind of the French and the mind of the English. In understanding the laws of the natural (and we might add, the social) world, did God think like a French mathematician I thank Matthew Evangelista for his careful reading and invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this chapter; Richard Price for making me consider someof the normative implications of my argument; and Begüm Adalet, Peter Gourevitch, and Stephen Krasner for their general reactions. 1 Geuss 2020: 163. 2 Smolin 2013: 258–63. 3 Mirowski 1989. 279 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press or did she have the untidy mind of the English? 4 My answer is a resounding “both.”Leaving gods aside, Newtonian humanists imagine the world as a garden to be observed and controlled. Often, the garden fights back, revealing itself to be a jungle that is not tamed and might not be tamable. Hyper-humanist Post-Newtonians seek to understand the jungle as it is, well aware that this task is impossible due to the problem of radical uncertainty: not knowing what one does not know, one hence does not know what to include in a predictive model. My interest in uncertainty inclines to Post-Newtonianism, yet I remain tethered to visions of the garden in which I was raised. I thus find refuge in parks, which offer vistas to both garden and jungle. Section 10.1 explores gardens and forests; it summarizes the core arguments of Henry Nau and Prasenjit Duara (presented in Chapters 6 and 7); and investigates the garden of experiments and the forest of experimentation as different ways of operating under conditions of putatively controllable risk and acknowledged uncertainty. Section 10.2 considers parks as zones of contact between gardens and forests; inquires into the complementarities between worldviews; surveys Newtonian and Post-Newtonian workarounds; and addresses the role of values. The final section (10.3) discusses the arguments of Bentley Allan and Timothy Byrnes (in Chapters 8 and 9) and science and religion more broadly as the two reigning worldviews that help us navigate a world filled with uncertainties. 10.1 Garden and Forests, Experiments and Experimentation Drawing on a broad variety of literary and cultural sources, Robert Harrison meditates on humanity, nature, and society as he explores gardens and forests. 5 Harrison’s gardens embody care and cultivation as quintessentially human traits. Life without them is soulless and humanity loses its defining purpose. Harrison shows gardens of many different types and in many different places: real, mythical, historical, literary, monastic, republican, princely, and imperial. All of them are central to the care of mortal life and defend against the ever-threatening reign of inhumane, passive, stillborn sterility. Lack of care drove Eve, the first human planter (of the seeds of the forbidden pomegranate), and Adam 4 Cartwright 1999: 19. 5 I thank my colleagues and friends in Cornell’s Circle seminar, as well as Caryl Clark, Patchen Markell, and Divya Subramanian for directing me to some of the sources used in this section. I also would like to thank Roderick Floud for reading this section and offering helpful criticisms and suggestions. Unlike Munroe (2008:7–14) and others, I am not interested here in theorizing spatial and social relations. Harrison 1992; 2008. 280 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press out of God’s garden. Care, “in its self-transcending character, is an expansive projection of the intrinsic ecstasy of life.” 6 For gardeners, as for teachers, cultivation is not the same as creation. Planting seeds and nourishing life is what gardeners do and teachers aspire to do in the garden of young minds. For Harrison, as in Rome, forests are birth sites of city and civilization; of profane pagan worship resisting Christianity; of spiritual solitude and savagery; of chivalrous knights gone mad; of royal prerogatives for hunting; of outlaws pursuing justice; of lyric nostalgia and error-filled tradition; and of presumed national essences. What is true of forest ecosystems holds also for the entire biosphere of the earth: a complex and integrated system of relations. Humanity is part of a diverse web of jungle- or forest-like, planetary sprawling relations. The Greek word logos originally “means ‘relation.’Logos is that which binds, gathers or relates. It binds humans to nature in the mode of openness and difference.” 7 It is true that past civilizations have typically encroached on the wilderness of forests in the interest of economic efficiency. 8 Yet, it is also true that in most classical Indian texts jangal refers to dry lands that turned out to be suitable for agriculture. 9 Forests are about ever-changing relations. Metaphors that capture the awe-inspiring wilderness of forests and the tamed harmony of gardens express different worldviews. 10 Are gardeners and forest-dwellers occupying altogether different spaces? Are they experiencing a similar world differently? Or are they sharing some similar experiences in the world? These are old questions. Materialist and mechanistic Newtonian beliefs express a view of nature as lifeless matter, in motion and subject to universal laws. Vitalists and organicists saw instead an active nature filled with living entities and swarming matter much closer to the Post-Newtonian worldview of quantum mechanics and scientific cosmology. Mechanically interacting lifeless matter is more legible than a world teeming with always changing possibilities. Calvin, gardener extraordinaire, could not stand that “filthy dog”Lucretius and other vitalists who concealed the craftsmanship of an omniscient God that diligent astronomers, to Calvin’s great satisfaction, highlighted so well. 11 6 Harrison 2008: 33. 7 Harrison 2008: 200. 8 Skaria 1999:vi–vii. Modest elevations protected peasants in Southeast Asia and Europe alike from the powers of taxation and conscription by the urban centers of civilizations. 9 Skaria 1999: viii; Barton 2000: 557, 572–73. To complicate matters further, in contemporary Pakistan jangal refers to forest or jungle even though its etymological antecedent, the Sanskrit term jangala, referred to a man-made savanna. See Dove 1992: 231. 10 Cooper 2006. 11 Allan, Chapter 8. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 281 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Garden and forest metaphors capture experiences in and views of the world that reach deep and resonate profoundly. Forests often depict sites of solitude and resistance. In the Middle Ages, European peasants saw in forests a wilderness that differed starkly from their plowed fields. “Wood” and “wald”derive etymologically from “wild”: inhospitable domains of lawless unpredictability. 12 Forests were sites of contestations over power, authority, and identity in places as far apart as historical Germany and contemporary Southeast Asia. The introduction of modern forestry methods in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Prussia and Saxony exemplified the power of the modern state. Carefully planned seeding, planting, and cutting aimed at transforming wild forests into predictable and profitable enterprises –a metaphor for the modern state’s effort of making civil society fully legible. 13 It was precisely that legibility that made Ernst Jünger’sfictitious forester a militant loner and solitary elitist willing to fight the authoritarian and dictatorial tendencies of modern social and economic systems. 14 Between the 1950s and 1970s, insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare in Southeast Asia occurred in forested territories invariably referred to as jungles. Discursively, institutionally, and practically, these spaces became objects for military conquest and political incorporation into national societies. 15 By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the jungle had become a rainforest –a fragile ecosystem deserving of humankind’s collective, defensive mobilization. 16 In America the sequence was reversed. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Thoreau’sWalden became an introspective call for a return to simple authenticity and a declaration of independence from society. 17 By the first half of the twentieth century, Americans had come to think of jungles as grim landscapes, the realm of dangerous apes and violent peoples. In memories and imaginations, the characteristics of forests are not firmly fixed. England offers many examples of this fluidity. Shakespeare’s“sea-walled garden”was Edenic and set on the road to discovery and, eventually, world domination. Garden design changed dramatically from intimate medieval to expansive estate gardens, marked first by manicured, formal areas and later by more natural, though carefully planned, parks. 18 Kitchen gardens were common among all social strata; formal gardens with trimmed hedges and geometric arbors were only for elite households. Despite many attempts at imitation, eighteenth-century England had no Versailles, where “aesthetic displays of control over natural forces yielded stunning 12 Jackson 1984: 45. 13 Harrison 1992: 108, 115–23; Scott 1998:11–22. 14 Jünger 2013. 15 Peluso and Vandergeest 2011: 589. 16 Enright 2008: 556. 17 Cronon 1983. 18 Tigner 2012:1–2, 5; Hunt and Willis 1975:1–46. 282 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press visual effects ... In the microcosm of the garden, the tools of French landbased politics were revealed in all their glory.” 19 In contrast, London’s Vauxhall was an innovation. It evolved from a formal garden catering to an aristocratic clientele to a kaleidoscopic pleasure garden and vivacious capitalist enterprise offering a public space wherein people who otherwise would never encounter each other could mingle. 20 Reflecting the growing complexity of social identities, nineteenth-century England proliferated a variety of gardens: wild, cottage, formal, and various syntheses. 21 And with the spreading of the British empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, landscaping practices linked imperial centers and colonial outposts. 22 Botanical gardens became one of the domestic symbols of empire. 23 It was only fitting when a young Princess Elizabeth compared the British empire in 1946 to an “English garden”– not formal and forced, but natural and organic. 24 Garden and jungle or forest metaphors come up frequently in the sciences, the humanities, and the arts. Oxford mathematician Marcus Du Sautoy, for example, writes that “for any scientist the real challenge is not to stay within the secure garden of the known but venture out into wilds of the unknown.” 25 For Fields Medal winner Maryam Mirzakhami, “doing research ... is like being lost in a jungle and trying to use all the knowledge that you can gather to come up with some new tricks, and with some luck you might find a way out.” 26 Neuroscientists conceptualize the development of the synapses between brain neurons in garden terminology, as a process in which synapses are first exuberantly overproduced and subsequently “pruned.” 27 And in his discussion of different kinds of scientific fraud, Charles Babbage writes about the trimming of experimental data, “clipping off little bits here and there from those observations which differ most in excess from the mean.” 28 The Garden of Eden and other paradisal depictions of the Golden Age are the religious and classical mothers of European garden metaphors. Bereft of nature’s seasonal cycle –birth, life, and death –God’s garden lacked a defining sign of humanity. Did Eve perhaps take a bite from the forbidden fruit to find in nature’s cycle the humanity that remained inaccessible to her in the celestial realm? Exiled to the real world, she did not lose touch with the divine –for on earth, a gardener’s bottom is often pointing to heaven. In contrast to theological tracts, Hobbes’s state of nature did not allow for any Edenic discourse. 29 Eventually, however, 19 Mukerji 1997:2. 20 Dubois 2015; Coke and Borg 2011. 21 Helmreich 2008: 274. 22 Casid 2005; Herbert 2011; Barton 2000; Drayton 2000. 23 Tigner 2012: 159–94. 24 www.bbc.co.uk/archive/princesselizabeth/6602.shtml. 25 Du Sautoy 2016:8. 26 Carey 2014. 27 Neniskyte and Gross 2017. 28 Chevassus-au-Louis 2019:2. 29 Moloney 1997. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 283 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press the Hobbesian jungle, governed by Leviathan, was challenged by Proudhon’s anarchist utopia. 30 More than a century later, while advocating social coordination without the state, public choice theorists searched for their utopian “equilibrium in the jungle.” 31 In eighteenth-century music, the free fantasia occupied a jungle-like space combining composition with improvisation –“fragmentary, subjective, open-ended, it simultaneously resists interpretation and offers itself promiscuously to multiple readings.” 32 More generally, discourses of nature have been a major preoccupation for classical composers. Nature, natural settings, and outdoor spaces are recurrent opera themes. Many Baroque and later operas feature enchanting, bewitching, or seductive garden scenes. 33 Music composed by Mahler, Sibelius, Grieg, Bartok, and Copeland incorporate folklore traditions that have close connections to nature. 34 And in the twentieth century, Duke Ellington developed jungle jazz. Initially it was an exotic form of entertainment for white audiences frequenting Harlem’s Cotton Club in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1960s and 1970s, late in Ellington’s career, jungle became a self-conscious reclaiming of a diasporic history for African and African- American audiences. A generation later, as part of the rave scene, jungle became a genre of electronic music. In philosophy, theater, movies, and literature, gardens and forests are also persistent metaphors. Acknowledging its intrinsic value, philosopher Michael Smith advocates “letting the jungle in,”arguing that ethical concerns about the jungle and the environment more generally should not focus on the relative distance between moral objects and ourselves, but on a community of relationships that commands respect and care. 35 The French poet and playwright Antonin Artaud sought a radical break from the carefully scripted, grammatically correct language and its predictable order that modern audiences had rejected for their pretentious and unrealistic claim of France, and the French, as a well-tended garden. 36 He pleaded instead for the primacy of the body as a jungle where anarchic impulses could be acted out. The 1955 movie Blackboard Jungle stirred debate about its treatment of teenage violence in America’s inner-city schools. 37 For Werner Herzog, writer and director of the epic 1982 film Fitzcarraldo, the jungle was the attractive and yet repulsive epitome of excess. Rudyard Kipling’sThe Jungle Book offered a series of 30 Coyne 2003: 557–58. 31 Piccione and Rubinstein 2007. 32 Richards 2001: 15. 33 Hunter 1993. Haydn’s oratorios, Act IV of Mozart’sThe Marriage of Figaro, the middle acts of Wagner’sTristan, and Klingsor’s magic garden in Parsifal all draw on garden and jungle or forest metaphors. 34 Peattie 2015:8;Grimley 2006. 35 Smith 1991: 152. 36 Artaud 1958:74–83. 37 Stoever-Ackermann 2011. 284 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press animal fables set in the Indian jungle, where fantastically unpredictable events were set in motion. 38 And Upton Sinclair’sThe Jungle became a classic depiction of the raw capitalism of America’s meat-packing industry at the outset of the twentieth century. 39 The American West is also filled with jungle or forest and garden imagery. Nineteenth-century American landscape painting shaped popular imaginations by depicting the frontier west of the Mississippi as an idyllic, unspoiled land inhabited by “noble savages.” 40 The frontier’s most famous and persistent proponent, Jackson Turner, disagreed. The West was a meeting point of forest and garden, savagery and civilization. American democracy emerged from the forest as it regenerated from America’s forever moving frontier. 41 In the twentieth century, America’s pastoral dreams and imagination were transformed by the assault of an industrial machine that wreaked havoc inside the garden without destroying its mythical powers. Nick Carraway, the narrator in F. Scott Fitzgerald’sThe Great Gatsby, struggles emotionally with the “garden”and “wilderness”images of the New World. Gatsby impersonates the American Adam, and America exemplifies a “complex pastoralism”forged in history and through politics. 42 A century later, the experience with garden cities and the environmental necessity of lowering the carbon imprint of urban life points to a possible narrowing of the difference between machine and garden. 43 Some have gone so far as calling postwar Oakland an “industrial garden.” 44 The garden metaphor aptly captures Nau’sanalysisinChapter 6, just as the forest metaphor shines through much of Duara’s Chapter 7. Nau expresses a profound worry that high modernity may rob humanity of the ability to make individuals accountable for their choices. We risk, he argues, losing sight of the importance of the self-extending gardener’s care for and cultivation of the welfare of life nourishedinhumanity’s garden. Expressing a worldview that goes beyond humanist Newtonianism, Duara looks for civil society actors whose holistic cosmologies and religious resources may equip them to address the counterfinalities that are threatening the planet’svery existence in high modernity. 38 Kipling 1894. 39 Sinclair 1906. 40 Goetzmann and Goetzmann 1986. 41 Smith 1950: 251, 253. 42 Lewis 1955: 197; Marx 1964: 356–57, 363. 43 Hurley and Reynolds 2014: 77. 44 Self 2003: 23. The “jungle”of Japan’s chaotic cities conveys a dynamism lacking from planned cities in other parts of the world. Half a century later, a proposed design for Berlin’s new Humboldt Forum museum would conceal the façade of the restored historical Hohenzollern palace with lianas and plant a jungle on its roof. http://hybridspa celab.net/project/humboldt-jungle/. Accessed 03/12/20. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 285 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Nau pushes back against what he regards as relationalism’s attack on the Enlightenment values of rationality and individuality. 45 Following Max Weber, he contends that individual human beings, with their capacity for self-consciousness and reason, give meaning to the social and natural world. While reason is only one among several human faculties, it is the one that creates space for choice and hence accountability in human affairs. Relationalism, by contrast, accords greater influence to nonrational faculties –emotion, religion, intuition, habit –and diffuses the agency for change throughout a holistic universe that leaves little room for individual responsibility. In line with Dilthey and Weber, Nau argues that it is a mistake to model social science after natural science. The Newtonian worldview was never simply atomistic and disenchanted. It was inspired by a Christian (Protestant) worldview valuing individual human beings and a predictable cosmos. Weber secularized that view: human beings, not the divine, give meaning to life. For Nau, relationalists hold that the quantum world implies a universe of entanglement and nonlocality that dispenses with reasoning individuals and insists on the observed world as the only one we can know. For Nau, the individual and an objective universe do not disappear in quantum science or scientific cosmology. The investigator becomes more important than ever, but as an “outside” actor who asks the questions. And for Nau the objective world exists and remains the only basis for supporting or disproving quantum propositions. Because the world is holistic and is open to interpretations offered by all worldviews, Nau argues, relationalism has nothing to say about individual or collective ethical and moral responsibilities. It simply denies the human freedom to choose and be held responsible. What’s left are sciences that blend diverse values with localized (not universal) experimentation (trial and error) and are compatible but not commensurable, harmonious but not integral, and equivalent but not competitive. Multiple beliefs and realities cut or “smear”into one another like quantum waves. They blend and harmonize. But what if multiple worldviews do not harmonize? What if some worldviews condone slavery, genocide, discrimination against women (Islam in Saudi Arabia) or minorities (Uighurs in China), holy war against the infidel, and so on? Do we welcome those worldviews too, or consider them wrong only in their specific time but not in general (respecting quantum locality)? The Weberian worldview –the human capacity for individual agency, free 45 Chapter 6. 286 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press a better understanding of the scientific enterprise. Rather than imagining that a well-designed experiment can yield insights on widely generalized phenomena, it starts with the proposition that one well-designed and focused experiment can yield insights that, at best, another such experiment can build on. 74 Experiments are events; experimentation is a process. In practice, both the natural and the social sciences are based on trial and error. They are “multifaceted, epistemologically opportunistic”and not dogmatically associated with a particular philosophy. 75 But, in contrast with the practice of experiments, experimentation “disavows the notion ... that causality and its measurement can be fixed across time and place and that any occurrence can be isolated from its context.” 76 This is no small matter. In the analysis of world politics, Henry Kissinger, a realist here turned Post-Newtonian, holds that context is everything. 77 Stressing a profound similarity between the natural and the social sciences, experimentation is informed by a Post-Newtonian worldview. Albert Hirschman was a man of forests. He developed his very own Post-Newtonian social scientific approach. It was well attuned to making things work without searching for law-like generalizations, relying on any one “ism,”or touting any one “killer method.” 78 He was a heterodox economist with wide-ranging interests who disliked blueprint economics and its cookie-cutter application to any issue, including development economics. Opposed to any and all orthodoxies, he valued experimentation with new forms of practice and institutional arrangements. His belief in small-scale experimentation resonates with those who advocate experiments more generally. However, he rigorously opposed the temptation to argue that any lesson learned from small-scale experiments could be scaled up to larger settings marked by unknown yet surely different conditions. Learning by doing, listening rather than preaching, humility, and the capacity to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances were the hallmarks of his approach. He favored incoherence over coherence and pragmatism over plans. Simple approaches to complex problems were anathema to him, and so were overblown grand claims in the name of Science (with a capitalized S), often enunciated as part of a Newtonian worldview. Urbinati writes that “in a time in which ... nothing seemed to work without the predefined guidance of a weltanschauung, Albert persisted in living outside of and without any weltanschauung.” 79 Not quite. His disposition was 74 In this it resembles Weber’s suggestion of the usefulness of ideal types drawn from empirical research as abstract stepping stones for the next empirical inquiry. 75 Wight 2013: 340. 76 Adams 2020: 360. 77 Mead 2018. 78 Grabel 2017:29–54; Meldolesi 1995. 79 Urbinati 2015. See also the epigraph to Chapter 1. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 293 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Post-Newtonian. In a complex world filled with unknowable uncertainties, he opposed reductionist models, epistemic certainty, and the pretense of scientifically based authority over policy. Hirschman’s writings from the late 1950s did much to end the “big push, high development”theory of the 1940s and 1950s. 80 After half a century of obscurity, development economics has recently been swept up by the excitement of RCTs, which was both widely noted and criticized when it was recognized with the 2019 Nobel Prize for Economics. 81 Taken together with the macro approach of large-N statistical studies, this micro approach may undergird a new and better development economics. 82 But Hirschman would have presented both epistemic and ethical grounds for skepticism of the positivist RCT approach in general, and especially its dubious claim that microscopic experiments can lead to actionable knowledge about how to achieve largescale growth and development. He would likely have been repulsed by the power disparities between economic experts and vulnerable populations exposed to ethically dubious experiments. More likely, he would have welcomed the pragmatic learning-by-doing approach to development through an inclusive growth strategy, as illustrated by China since 1979. 83 Intellectual opportunism is central to experimentation. Searching out uniqueness and novelty requires taking advantage of spaces for innovation rather than relying on preconceived notions and plans. Deep knowledge of local contexts, awareness of sequential and cumulative changes that are not legible from quick visits of research sites made accessible by local gatekeepers, and suspicion of efforts to transplant observed local average treatment effects to unrelated and distant sites are hallmarks of an experimentation approach. Most importantly, it is the faith in and embrace of what is possible. 84 Experimentation is based on a worldview that acknowledges the existence of uncertainty, and incomplete, dispersed, partial, tacit, and limited knowledge. It is also marked by humility. Knowledge of the future is irreducibly uncertain and typically cannot be accessed by probabilistic thinking. For Hirschman, the need for predictability and the embrace of epistemic certainty and parsimony supporting general paradigms and laws was a serious neurosis that afflicted economics and other social sciences that were also grounded in Newtonianism. 85 His commitment to complexity was as unshakable as his commitment to intervention. Practical intervention always has unknowable effects that are set in motion by contending forces and a totality of circumstances that is 80 Hirschman 1958. 81 Reddy 2013; Dehejia 2016. 82 Grabel 2017:32–33. 83 Ang 2016. 84 Grabel 2017: 33. 85 Grabel 2017: 37. 294 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press unknown to the researcher or practitioner at the time the intervention is made. For Hirschman, the world is an open and complex system that is contingent, adaptive, and unknowable in many of its features. Shorn of the epistemic error of viewing the world as a simple, linear, decomposable, and analytically tractable system, Hirschman’s approach expressed the hope of exploiting unforeseen possibilities for improving it. 86 Hirschman’s“possibilism,”Ilene Grabel writes, “is grounded in faith in the demonstrated capacities of individuals, institutions, and societies to develop diverse, creative solutions to unforeseen challenges and development problems. Possibilism encapsulates the enduring bias for hope.” 87 Hirschman regarded a nonprojected, open future as a truly inalienable right for every person or nation. 88 As did Russian Nobel Prize–winning physicist and human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, who wrote in a letter from his exile in Gorky: “fortunately, the future is unpredictable and also –because of quantum effects –uncertain.” 89 As for the social sciences, in Hirschman’s view they often “consider it beneath their scientific dignity to deal with possibility until after it has become actual and can then at least be redefined as a probability.” 90 Convinced of the importance of uncertainty, he resolutely refused to cede possibilistic ground to probabilistic thinking. Playing off Adam Smith’s“invisible hand,”Hirschman’s“hiding hand”principle captures many of these observations. 91 The hiding hand recognizes ignorance as a precondition for rather than an obstacle to progress. In most domains, actors unavoidably are ignorant and make mistakes as they operate under conditions of uncertainty. This ignorance can be highly productive. Embarking on a project that seems manageable at the outset and then turns out to be fiendishly difficult, ignorance cultivates unknown capacities for innovation and adaptation. Hirschman’s hiding hand beneficially conceals those difficulties and thus frees previously untapped powers of creativity. Without our ignorance, we would not start projects and thus forego the possibility of learning and the creation of possibly long-term beneficial outcomes or effects. We stumble into progress rather than plan for it. Predictions based on laws of change are misleading, and predictive failures breed success. We can literally “fall from error into truth.” 92 Hirschman did not 86 Hirschman 1971. 87 Grabel 2017: 46. 88 Hirschman 1971: 30. 89 http://people.bu.edu/gorelik/AIP_Sakharov_Photo_Chrono/AIP_Sakharov_Photo_Chr onology.html. Accessed 09/30/20. 90 Hirschman 1980: xii. 91 Hirschman 1967; Gladwell 2013; Meldolesi 1995: 38, 118–20. 92 Hirschman 1967: 13, 20. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 295 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press believe that context-independent and timeless factors, such as economic fundamentals, determine the success or failure of our projects in the world. Instead, he acknowledged the importance of a norm-based, practical wisdom that embraces “possibilism”and humility as two of its guiding principles. How can experimentation be made workable in the analysis of world politics that relies heavily on survey experiments? In a paper indebted to quantum theorizing, Leonardo Orlando points to “elicitation”interviews as a research method that may bolster an experimentation approach. 93 It offers a way of probing consciousness and experience through “introspection”as an alternative to treating humans as responding to set questions in survey experiments. The elicitation method seeks to get around a wellestablished finding in psychology that shows reliable self-reporting to be impossible because mental processes cannot be accessed introspectively. 94 However, being unaware of a mental act does not mean we cannot access it with an interview method that differs from the conventional approach. Retroactive awareness can activate passive memory and the constant, involuntary memorization of lived experience that escapes our notice. 95 To access that awareness requires bypassing explanations as to why a subject did or did not do X and guiding the subject to her cognitive processes through the “elicitation interview method,”which leads the subject to share increasingly detailed elements of how past choice processes unfolded. Elicitation interviews rely on rigorous protocols that direct attention to the description of fine-grained elements of the evoked choice process while deflecting the subject’s attention from explanations and abstractions. 96 This method seeks to remedy our normal blindness to lived experience and avoids diving ever deeper into the trap of providing post-hoc reasons for past choices. 97 Decision points are productively conceptualized as choice processes that are inherently indeterminate. This method self-consciously foregoes the search for universal laws or generalizations. Beyond issues of methodology, how we think about the world has causal effects and will affect how we might want to change it. Hirschman’s possibilism sidesteps both the overconfidence that we can fix everything and the fatalism that nothing can be changed. Instead of 93 Orlando 2020: 468–471. I thank Dr. Orlando for reviewing the accuracy of this paragraph for me. 94 Orlando 2020: 469–70. 95 Orlando 2020: 470. 96 Orlando 2020: 470–71. 97 Orlando 2020: 472–74 disarms the criticisms of interpretive, retrospective, and unverifiable representational biases by quantizing introspection –that is, by linking minimally interpreted descriptions of decision processes to transversal structures operating like Schrödinger’s equations without depending on individual subjects or specific contexts. 296 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press epistemic certainty, he believed in the importance of path-dependent change, small steps, local contexts, unintended consequences, and adaptive learning. Above all, he prized experimentalism and improvisation as practices, along with slow reform-mongering that creates the possibility for substantial change. Conclusion. Informed by different worldviews, as we make our way in the world we typically are unaware of uncertainty or unwilling to acknowledge its existence. Experiments help us understand the risk-based world we seek to control on the basis of results gleaned either after manipulating conditions in a laboratory or performing smartly designed field or survey experiments. Experiments share in the hope of studying the effects of treatment assignments and then, perhaps, scaling up local results to offer general solutions to real-world problems. Experimentation has less lofty aspirations. It is based on the notion of learning by doing under always shifting conditions in a dynamically evolving world filled with uncertainties that resist law-like generalizations. Like risk and uncertainty, experiments and experimentation are two halves of one walnut. Bentley Allan concludes his chapter with an ecumenical argument for a processual social science that strives to generate general or middleground theories. The aim is not to create a catalogue of laws or mechanisms, supported by experiments. Rather, processual social science should offer an “agile base for an experimental approach to politics.” 98 This stance might help in orienting us to the uncertainties of the world, juggling several causal factors, observing trade-offs, and locating potential points of engagement: “By mapping the complexity of social worlds within legible frameworks, we can provide a flexible starting point for understanding and action without the dream of control.” 99 A similar sense of intellectual openness in an indeterminate world is also central to Milja Kurki’s capacious treatment of how to think about causation and Peter Galison’s detailed studies of the material culture of microphysics. Kurki seeks to free the concept of cause from the deterministic and mechanistic connotations that it has for many students of world politics and social theorists. 100 She probes a multiplicity of meanings that the concept of cause can have, so that we can appreciate the many 98 Chapter 8. 99 Chapter 8. A similar sense of intellectual openness in an indeterminate world is also central to Milja Kurki’s capacious treatment of how to think about causation and Peter Galison’s detailed studies of the material culture of microphysics. Kurki seeks to free the concept of cause from the deterministic and mechanistic connotations that it has for many students of world politics and social theorists. 100 Kurki 2008: 11–12. Clarke and Primo (2012) remind us repeatedly and helpfully that different models serve different purposes. In testing models “final cause”may therefore be as important, or more important, than “efficient cause.”Most scholars of world Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 297 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press nondeterministic senses in which causes can work. In doing so she embeds the Humean notion of efficient cause (observed regularity relations of patterned events) within Aristotle’s broader conceptual apparatus, which acknowledges three additional notions of cause: material (the passive potentiality of matter), formal (defining shapes or relations), and final (purposes that guide both rest and change). Kurki thus provides a rich and flexible understanding of causation that locates efficient causes in their relation to final causes and within the constitutive or causally enabling or constraining context understood in terms of material and formal causes. The task of analysis is not to isolate one kind of cause, but to focus on the complex concatenation of different types of causes, thus resisting the reductionist impetus to focus only on risk and thereby neglect uncertainty as a constitutive part of world politics. Focusing on what he calls zones of exchange, Galison warns against the barrenness of all dichotomies. 101 Here: positivism and science as a series of prescribed and rigorous rules for discovery, replication, verification, and confirmation, and theory-independent data offering an empirical form of knowledge drawn from raw experience. There: creative muddling through and adaptive learning catching emergent processes. What holds physics together, Galison argues, is not a single scientific apparatus or a veneer of rationality concealing the exertion of raw interests, but a patchwork of many things and practices. Instrument makers, theorists, and experimenters generate and operate in distinct cultures connected by trading zones and border regions that reveal how the whole of physics fits together. Communication is made possible by different pidgin and creole languages that pre-Einsteinians, Einsteinians, and post-Einsteinians fashion as they seek contingent, local forms of coordination among dynamically evolving material and epistemic traditions marked by different interpretive practices. This is where and how the whole of physics is worked out. It should be no surprise, then, that in the polycultural history of physics –and perhaps the social sciences and the analysis of world politics –the meanings of “experiments”and “experimentation”have politics are unaware of conceptions of cause that differ from and go beyond the concept of efficient cause. 101 She probes a multiplicity of meanings that the concept of cause can have, so that we can appreciate the many nondeterministic senses in which causes can work. In doing so she embeds the Humean notion of efficient cause (observed regularity relations of patterned events) within Aristotle’s broader conceptual apparatus, which acknowledges three additional notions of cause: material (the passive potentiality of matter), formal (defining shapes or relations), and final (purposes that guide both rest and change). Kurki thus provides a rich and flexible understanding of causation that locates efficient causes in their relation to final causes and within the constitutive or causally enabling or constraining context understood in terms of material and formal causes. The task of analysis is not 298 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press been unstable and contested for the last 350 years. This would not be a surprise for Harry Lipkin, a theoretical particle physicist. He writes that “the best physics I have known was done by experimenters who ignored theorists completely and used their own intuitions to explore new domains where no one had looked before.” 102 Expressed as the practice of experiments and experimentation in the history of physics, Newtonian and Post-Newtonian worldviews resonate with a long arc of intellectual history. Toulmin argues that for about 300 years, from the middle of the seventeenth century to the middle of the twentieth, philosophy focused on the general, the timeless, and the theoretical. Before and after, in its medieval and post-Wittgensteinian forms, it focused instead on the local, the timely, and the practical. 103 Montaingne and Descartes exemplify this difference, as reflected in “the practical modesty and the intellectual freedom of Renaissance humanism, and the theoretical ambitions and intellectual constraints of 17 th -century rationalism.” 104 For Toulmin, “cosmopolis”offers a comprehensive account of the world that binds things together in politico-theological as much as in scientific-explanatory terms. In the early eighteenth century, the cosmopolitical function of the Newtonian worldview counted for more than its explanatory function. 105 Today, Newtonianism’s cosmopolitical function has fallen silent. And it is largely forgotten that Newton was an accomplished experimentalist. Unaware, we now focus only on the explanatory presuppositions of Newtonianism’s worldview. Hirschman’s plea for experimentation reminds us of the existence of a different, Post-Newtonian alternative that acknowledges uncertainty as an irreducible aspect of world politics. 10.2 Inhabiting the Same Park? Complementarities, Workarounds, and Values Parks mix elements of forest and garden, sometimes in unexpected ways. Parks are designed to suppress the appearance of a garden’s artificiality, its rigid imposition of discipline and fixed borders. 106 Seventeenthcentury English gardens were highly artificial, walled environments. But as wilderness began its slow retreat from the English countryside, aesthetic preferences for fertile and cultivated scenery faded. Eighteenthcentury sensibilities and fashions ran toward irregular, asymmetrical, and “natural”forms of gardening. 107 In the second half of that century, 102 Quoted in Clarke and Primo 2012: 104. 103 Toulmin 1990: 36; Toulmin 1982: 12, 231. 104 Toulmin 1990: 42. 105 Toulmin 1990: 128, 132. 106 Zetzel 1989: 331. 107 Williamson 1995:1–4. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 299 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press picturesque perspectives on nature invited visitors to participate in park landscapes guided by their own imaginations and interpretative freedoms. Nature was not seen as an immutable thing that reflects either garden or forest. Parks emerged as a hybrid of both. In the words of Walpole, “the contiguous ground of the park without ... was to be harmonized with the lawn within; and the garden in its turn was to be set free from its prim regularity, that it might assort with the wilder country without.” 108 Parks were tended by livestock, not gardeners. Visually, gardens and parks began to resemble one another. Recessed methods of landscape design, such as the ha-ha, created a vertical barrier that cattle could not cross to enter the garden while preserving an uninterrupted view of the wider park landscape. Classical buildings, lakes, blocks of woodlands, or clumps of trees became widely accepted design elements of parks. And after parks were no longer treated as a habitat for deer, they became unfenced landscapes. Curvilinear and serpentine forms replaced linear plantings and geometric vistas. Appearing close to untreated nature, the visual simplicity of parks concealed a complex landscape design. Parks blurred the boundary between aesthetic and functional landscape, and between leisure and production. 109 English parks became models for Germany. One of the largest public parks in Europe, Munich’sEnglish Garden, dates back to the late eighteenth century. Many other German public gardens followed. Combining park and garden elements, Hamburg’s Stadtpark was created in the early twentieth century. 110 In an increasingly urban America, parks also offered a compromise between fast-paced city life and the more sedate countryside: “Machine and garden exist in a state of continual tension ... [the park] was, in short, a pastoral ‘middle’landscape in every sense of the term.” 111 One of America’s foremost landscape architects, Frederick Olmsted, argued that “the pastoral middle landscape was an appropriate compromise” between city and wilderness. 112 City parks were a place to reconstruct a way of life that had been lost. 113 Weaving together images of domesticated and wild nature, Garden and Forest was a weekly magazine in late nineteenth-century America that offered an integrative vision of city and nature. 114 America’s national parks offer a sharp contrast to such a peaceful vision. At the very moment that the frontier was vanishing, Americans sought to protect and celebrate the wilderness of the West as a symbol of its manifest destiny. But American ideas about wilderness changed over 108 Quoted in Williamson 1995:2. 109 Williamson 1995:75–78, 122–23. 110 Richards 2001: 10, 28–30. 111 Zetzel 1989: 291, 295. 112 Cranz 1982: 24. 113 Miller 1976: 181, 184. 114 Hou 2012. 300 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press time. The country’sfirst national park, Yellowstone, opened in 1872 to a delighted public who admired it mostly from afar. But by the end of the century, the wilderness of the national parks was linked indelibly to the Indian reservation policy, restricting Indians to isolated patches of land or assimilating native peoples into American society. In fact, it took decades to remove Indian populations from three of America’s iconic parks: Yosemite, Yellowstone, and Glacier. Yosemite, for example, was a largescale experiment of keeping “the animals in and the humans out.” 115 Wilderness preservation and native dispossession were two aspects of one complex process that stretched over more than half a century. Wilderness was not natural and empty but populated and shaped by native populations who thought of the wilderness as tame. 116 Depopulation became the precondition for creating a man-made, artificial wilderness. Massive acts of human violence and cruelty were thus indelibly stamped as constitutive elements of America’s national identity. Not so in Olmsted’s most important creation, New York’s Central Park. Designed together with Calvert Vaux, it was modelled on Birkenhead, one of England’sfirst public parks. Olmsted’s approach to landscaping self-consciously and deliberately differed in both style and scale from gardening. It reflected design principles that diverged greatly from those of the gardeners of his day. He avoided flower-bedding and specimen-planting of hybrids as they violated the character of a park’s natural surroundings. Letting things alone was central to Olmsted’s art – an almost impossible dictum for any gardener. 117 He infused a combination of the pastoral and the picturesque with his philosophy of unconscious recreation and the importance of contemplation. A deliberate, eye-level interplay of light and shadow was intended to convey a heightened sense of mystery. The thick planting style in some parts of Olmsted’s parks was borrowed from his encounter with the tropical jungles and forests he had wandered through while travelling in Central America in 1863. 118 “The result was a series of designs that combined richness and wildness of planting with unified composition.” 119 Olmsted’s reliance on picturesque landscapes broke with the geometrical and symmetrical designs of European gardens and parks that were laid out in a gardenesque style. Knowing that pure wilderness could not be recreated in urban settings, Olmsted opted instead for a compromise between pastoral transcendentalism and rural landscapes. 120 115 Schama 1995:7. 116 Spence 1999:4–5. 117 Howett 1998: 83. 118 Beveridge 1977:39–41. 119 Beveridge 1977: 43. 120 Taylor 1999: 436–38. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 301 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Olmsted’s efforts to build pastoral scenery into parks were belittled by John Muir and other wilderness enthusiasts who found his scenery too tame. Philosophically, Olmsted was antagonistic to the idea of wilderness, and specifically to the semi-Hobbesian state of nature reigning at the American frontier. He regarded that state as antithetical to “civilization” as he defined it, with reference to principles of cosmopolitan community, common culture, and genteel order. He saw beautiful landscapes created in public parks both as powerful instruments for a vibrant democracy and profound symbols of a civilized society. 121 Central Park followed an explicitly political logic and a design inspired by a dual vision of democracy and landscaped art tailored to plutocratic and polyglot New York. 122 It was a space understood in terms not only of ownership and management, but also of public use and inclusiveness –a kind of modern village commons set up, in Thomas Bender’s words, by a combination of Olmsted’s“sincere feeling for the less fortunate with a somewhat manipulative concern.” 123 Grounded in a stubborn democratic faith, Olmsted’s approach also reflected the logic of social control and a “profoundly conservative concept of reform.” 124 Complementarities of Newtonian and Post-Newtonian Worldviews. Faith in order helped define Olmsted’s vision of parks as a zone connecting gardens and forests. Similarly, Stuart Kauffman holds that nature’s evolution is partly governed by the laws of nature, yet moves partly outside and beyond them. 125 Haas and Nau appear to suggest that Newtonianism and Post- Newtonianism must be rivals. 126 The rhetorical strategy of their chapter conceals to the casual reader a possibility that they themselves suggest: Newtonianism and Post-Newtonianism may coexist in a complementary relationship with one another. “Lets assume,”Haas and Nau write, that the specific questions we are asking as investigators trigger the relationalist quantum world to yield the Weberian world ... That assumption is not inconsistent with the new relationalism and allows this Weberian analysis to proceed. After all, if Newtonian science is good enough for understanding tennis balls, but not quanta and galaxies (black holes), it may be good enough for the study of politics since the latter operates on the level of tennis balls not quanta or galaxies. 127 121 Lewis 1977: 388–89, 392–403. 122 Blackmar and Rosenzweig 1994: 113–14. 123 Quoted in Cranz 1982: 286. 124 Blodgett 1976: 870. For example, the Olmstedt-designed Morningside Park in Northern Manhattan eventually became an effective barrier separating the predominantly minority, poor neighborhood of West Harlem from the predominantly white, middle-class neighborhood of Morningside Heights. See Solecki and Welch (1995: 95) and Schaffer and Smith (1986: 358). 125 Kauffman 2008: 231–33, 287–88. 126 Chapter 2, this volume. 127 Chapter 2. 302 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press In complex systems, many group and individual behaviors and events are inherently unpredictable and seemingly erratic. Historical probabilities offer no reliable guide to a future that remains radically open. Complexity thus brings risk and uncertainty into one view. It opens a perspective on a world of emergent properties and regularities with a short half-life that leaves space for human inventiveness and low probability or totally unpredictable conjunctions. Pervasive chaos and disequilibria mark processes in the natural worlds of biology, geological patterning, climate, and other open systems. Creative evolution is its hallmark, not predetermined laws. System evolution can be tracked ex post; it is not predictable ex ante. In open systems with emergent properties, predictive capacity is limited by the time it takes a system to run through sufficient repetitions to record how things eventually map out. Human interactions make uncertainty an integral part of world politics for four separate reasons. 156 First, slowdowns on interstate highways without accidents and stampeding crowds with no apparent trigger point to unexpected results that are not related to human intentions; human interactions can produce “emergent”phenomena. Second, in the social world of incessant human interaction, probabilities are forever changing; social processes are often nonrepeating or “non-ergodic.”Third, human interactions are so complex that they elude attempts to anticipate correctly; the world is filled with “computational irreducibility.”Finally, the belief that we live only in a world of knowable, manageable risk is sheer fantasy; instead, often we live in a world marked by “radical uncertainty,”and the probability of some kinds of outcomes is simply unknowable. Complexity thus forces us to adopt an inherently humble approach to our understanding and conduct of world politics. 157 A second workaround that avoids breaking with a Newtonian worldview takes on the problem of uncertainty more directly, by circumventing the distinction between risk’s known probability distributions and uncertainty, where distributions are unknown. 158 What really matters is that all conditions of risk and uncertainty can be known only subjectively. A subjective probability is defined for situations in which one cannot know the correct probability which one should assign to the state of the 156 Bookstaber 2017; Kay and King 2020. 157 Bousquet and Geyer 2011:1;Kauffman 2008: 258. 158 Friedman 2019. I am very grateful for an extended email exchange with Jeffrey Friedman that helped clarify my thinking. Here, I am bypassing risk-based models that seek to integrate strategic uncertainty by including the possibility of ignorance about player preferences and beliefs. Such ignorance can yield suboptimal strategies. Uncertainty is thus reduced to a lack of information, in this case about the payoff matrix and attributes of one of the players. Common knowledge and common prior beliefs about the rules of the game are still assumed to exist. See Weinhardt 2017, 2020. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 309 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press world based on the information that is available. The quantification of subjective probabilities pushes back against the idea of a ‘correct’or ‘objective’probability assessment about the state of the world –say, a crisis in national security decision-making. 159 Only subjective assessments are possible. In this view, assessments of uncertainty are only considered to be “correct”in as far as they coherently reflect an actor’s personal beliefs given specific circumstances. Since ultimately everything rests on personal conviction, objective assessments of or correct answers about probability and uncertainty are unobtainable. But the ability to give well-structured and coherent assessments of judgments is not. 160 Although we cannot assess uncertainty in any objective fashion, we should exploit fully and consistently the subjective insights we do have. This requires distinguishing clearly between “assessments of probability (which reflect the chances that a statement is true) with assessments of confidence (which reflect the extent to which analysts believe they have a sound basis for drawing conclusions).” 161 Confidence depends on the reliability of available evidence, the range of reasonable opinion surrounding a judgment, and the susceptibility of a judgment to new information that might be forthcoming. 162 Put simply, confidence is analytic. 163 This is where Keynes makes his central contribution. After he had abandoned the effort of making a compelling case for objective probability that did not ultimately rest on personal convictions, and after years of speculating in financial markets, Keynes developed a broader conception of confidence. 164 Practical men and women, he reasoned, had no choice but to rely on “conventions, stories, rules of thumb, habits, and traditions in formulating our expectations and deciding how to act.” 165 All of these instill confidence as an essential ingredient of decision-making under uncertainty. Confidence is “a state of mind, a belief or feeling about the adequacy or otherwise of the knowledge base from which the forecasts of an inescapably uncertain future are derived.” 166 In financial markets, 159 Friedman 2019:51–52; Gillies 2000:55–58. 160 Bayesian statistics offers a more formal approach to subjective probabilities. Compared to a more flexible and integrative approach, in the area of national security studies its usefulness is currently restricted by very large calculative tasks that may exceed human intellectual capacities. But the humanism that inheres in the Newtonian worldview which supports subjective probability approaches is an unnecessary restriction. A Hyper-Humanist Post-Newtonian worldview could readily accommodate approaches in the field of Artificial Intelligence that manages very large calculative tasks with greater ease. 161 Friedman 2019: 23; see also 51, 57, 62, 63 fn37. 162 Friedman 2019:61–63. 163 Friedman 2019: 14, 58–63; Friedman and Zeckhauser 2018. 164 Friedman 2019: 59; Gillies 2000:25–52; Keynes 1937. 165 Skidelsky 2009: 87. See also Lawson 1986, 916. 166 Gerrard 1994: 332. 310 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Keynes did not see “analytic confidence”at work but rather “animal spirits ... of daring and ambitious entrepreneurs taking risks and placing bets in an environment characterized by uncertainty: that is by crucial unknowns and unknowables.” 167 Most scholarship on subjective probability assumes implicitly that accuracy is the only concern that influences a decision-maker’s choice. Yet in American foreign policy it is implausible to think that presidents care simply about predictive accuracy when they confront risk and uncertainty in international affairs. The widespread resistance of decisionmakers to rely only on probabilistic reasoning that Friedman reports in his book suggests as much. 168 Logic, cognition, and rigor are surely relevant. 169 But typically they work along with other factors, including individual or group emotions, religious and other beliefs, and social conventions. 170 Besides accuracy, all of these factors also are relevant for instilling the confidence that decision-makers have in their subjective beliefs. 171 In sum, as these workarounds illustrate, a Newtonian worldview can accommodate elements of a Post-Newtonian one. Scholars committed to a Newtonian worldview can introduce uncertainty into the analysis of world politics by drawing on complexity theory. And they can erase the distinction between uncertainty and risk by relying on a subjective probability approach. Both moves are workable. For reasons that remain opaque, however, both resist letting go of the conventional Newtonian worldview and making space for a broader range of insights into world 167 Kirshner 2009: 532. Friedman (2019: 59) calls Keynes’s argument “logically coherent” but with consequences that are “untenable for anyone who seeks to contribute to foreign policy debates.”Perhaps. Elsewhere (Friedman 2019: 193) he acknowledges the relevance of factors such as emotions, values, and organizational and other cultures that also shape the confidence of decision-makers. Until those factors are fully integrated into a comprehensive explication of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, for the practice of foreign policy the pessimistic skepticism of the many decision-makers that he is reporting in his book appears to me to be as tenable as Friedman’s optimistic rationalism. 168 Friedman 2019: 12, 96–98. 169 Friedman 2019: 12, 34, 49. 170 This argument assumes that various criticisms of subjective probability can overlap. And it accords greater importance to factors such as values and emotions that Friedman’s analysis of analytic confidence excludes, at least for now. See Friedman 2019:6–10, 192–95. 171 Friedman 2019: 12, 14–15. He concedes (pp. 67, 88) that the distinction between “mathematicians”and “poets”may make sense from organizational and cultural perspectives. This concession acknowledges the limits of the scope of analytic confidence that concerns Friedman’s analysis. More generally, Bayesian decision theory is not the only rational way to make decisions in all situations. Savage (1954: 16) restricted the application of his theory to “small worlds”that sidesteps the enormous cognitive challenge of evaluating all possible action paths in a “large world.”It is descriptive rather than prescriptive. See Binmore 2017: 260, 263–64. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 311 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press politics. Such broadening would have the advantage of taking more fully into account developments that have transformed the natural sciences during the last century and avoid extending the record of frequent and shocking failures of predictive accuracy in the Newtonian study of world politics. Stuart Kauffman writes that “scientists tend to live with philosophies of science that are decades out of date.” 172 In the case of the study of world politics, it has been more than a century. Early formal modelers in political science were drawn to nineteenth-century views of scientific theories: “The Received View, with its origins in classical mechanics, seemed a natural fit for scholars looking to put their young discipline on an equal footing with the ‘hard’sciences ... Soon after, philosophers abandoned the Received View as a description of scientific theories.” 173 Most students of world politics, however, have stuck with the received view and have thus failed to incorporate uncertainty as a constitutive part of world politics. 174 Post-Newtonian Terms of Coexistence: Individual Beliefs and Subjective Experience. Quantum mechanics works. 175 Compared to all other theories in physics, it has had the most spectacular success. Its understanding of the structure of matter is so powerful and precise that most contemporary technology rests on it. Physicists learn how to use quantum mechanics. But there exists no consensus about what they are talking about. As David Mermin argues, “there is an unprecedented gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables us so well to account for. We do not understand the meaning of this strange conceptual apparatus that each of us uses so effectively to deal with our world.” 176 In contrast to the theoretical workarounds of Newtonianism, Post-Newtonianism’s is philosophical. In the form of Quantum Bayesianism (or QBism), it restates the insights of quantum mechanics in a language congruent with subjective probability theory and consonant with Dilthey’s writings on worldviews. 177 QBism is a way of thinking about uncertainty, quantum mechanics, and 172 Kauffman 2008: 293. 173 Clarke and Primo 2012:65–66. 174 Wendt (2015: 154–73) discusses quantum decision theory as a serious alternative to a humanist substantialist analytical perspective grounded in the humanist Newtonian worldview that characterizes decision theories based on subjective probabilities. 175 I am grateful for the detailed comments that David Mermin made on this section. For an informative critical engagement of Qbism, see Mohrhoff 2014a, 2014b and 2019a, 2019b. 176 Mermin 2019:1. 177 Confounded by the weirdness of the quantum world that they can measure and manipulate without grasping its meanings, realist interpretations of quantum mechanics view quantum states as objective properties of the quantum system and thus disagree with QBism. For two sharply differing views, see Becker 2018:89–162, 289–94 and Baeyer 2016: 235–39. Mermin (2019:2,13–15) argues that the insights of QBism are relevant 312 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press the sciences generally. 178 For Mermin, “QBism is as big a break with 20 th -century ways of thinking about science as cubism was with 19 th - century ways of thinking about art.” 179 QBism grapples with the “weirdness”of central aspects of quantum physics. David Mermin has attempted to reduce the puzzles of quantum mechanics to just one: interpreting quantum probabilities. 180 Q stands for quantum and B for Bayesian. QBism offers a radically subjective interpretation of probability, stipulating that each actor makes bets and updates odds. 181 The question of probability goes to the heart of physics, “where everything had seemed to be regulated by firm laws that were universal and irrevocable.” 182 In QBist interpretations, all probabilities in quantum states are interpreted as the private beliefs of individuals. Based on past experience and following the rules of Bayesian probabilities, agents calculate the probability of what might happen next. Based on evolving experience that creates new information, agents update their prior beliefs to improve their predictions of future events. This process involves only the agent’s evolving experiences and beliefs through continuously updated information. Einstein refused to believe that God played dice: “If he had wanted to do this, then he would have done it quite thoroughly and not stopped with a plan for his gambling. In for a penny, in for a pound [Wenn schon, denn schon]. Then we wouldn’t have to search for laws at all.”Rüdiger Schack answers Einstein: “God has done it quite thoroughly. That’s the message of QBism. It is not a plan for his gambling, but for ours.” 183 In QBism, wave functions are the products of an individual’s experiences. Like other interpretations of quantum mechanics, QBism thinks of the wave function not as an objective entity but as a mathematical abstraction. Wave functions do not exist ‘out there in the real world.’ 184 also for puzzling, though less vexing, aspects of the classical world such as the problem of ‘Now’; for those instances he suggests the label CBism. 178 Mermin 2016: 232–48; Fuchs, Mermin and Schack 2014; Healey 2016. 179 Mermin 2016: 233. 180 Mermin 1998; McCall 2001; Fuchs and Schack 2009: 48. 181 Caves, Fuchs, and Schack 2002a, 2002b; Fuchs 2017; Mermin 2016: 232–48. There is a vast technical literature on these matters in physics that is inaccessible to me. Baeyer 2016, Timpson 2008, Bächtold 2008, Bacciagaluppi 2014, and Healey 2016, 2017 provide expositions and critical reviews; Bächtold and Healey develop the link to American pragmatism. 182 Rovelli 2016: 18. 183 Fuchs 2017: 20. 184 As Baeyer (2016: 131–43) argues, QBism is anti-realist. Because of “quantum weirdness”it wholeheartedly agrees with Carlo Rovelli (2017), no QBist by any means, that Reality is not what It Seems. And it disagrees with the thrust of Adam Becker’s (2018) What Is Real? And because QBism zeroes in on the personal experience of individual agents, it also differs from most Copenhagen interpretations: Objective for those interpreting Bohr as focusing only on the material aspects of measurement apparatuses, intersubjective for those interpreting Bohr as focusing also on the verbal or written Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 313 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Experience is an agent’s inner manifestation of what other interpretations take to be on the outside and call the collapse of the wave function. Experience “confers meaning by anticipating future information in relation to an organism’s evolving purposes through time. The effect of this appropriation of the future is to transform objective information into subjective meaning –and it is on the basis of the latter that people act.” 185 QBism focuses on beliefs and information and captures the idea that individual experience is intrinsically private and inaccessible to other observers. In QBism, nature’s deterministic laws do not exist. QBism postulates that “nature and its parts do what they want, and we as free-willed agents do what we can get away with. Quantum theory, on this account, is our best means yet for hitching a ride with the universe’s pervasive creativity and doing what we can to contribute to it.” 186 As is true also for Lee Smolin’s version of scientific cosmology, humans are part of a participatory rather than an inert universe. 187 In this view, the big bang at the origin of the universe is a continuing occurrence rather than an event that happened about 13.8 billion years ago. Billions and billions of elementary observer-participatory acts help constitute the shape of the universe but without determining it. 188 Acts of observation and participation cannot be separated. Quantum mechanics is not a description of the world, but a technique for navigating and operating in it. Laws and mechanisms are invented by observing scientists who are part of the natural and social world. They are developed as hypotheses, tested, and, over time, if confirmed by the private experiences of large numbers of individuals, they are crystallized into conventional wisdoms. 189 The source of the laws of nature “must be the books of human authors and not the original Book of Nature. What we end up with through this process is bound to be a thoroughly human and social construction, not a replica of the very laws that God wrote.” 190 The laws of nature are an accretion of dispersed, variegated human experiences. Ours is a Dappled World, as Nancy Cartwright argues. 191 For Leonard Savage it is “small.” 192 Classical physics works well in some domains; quantum physics in others. It is a patchwork of practices, each more or less successful in its more or less well-bounded domains. It is not experience that communications of measurement practices. See Mermin (2016: 241–44) and Barad (2007) for different interpretations of Bohr’s positions. 185 Wendt 2015: 141. See also Fierke 2017: 145, 147; Baeyer 2016: 187–95; Timpson 2008: 18. 186 Fuchs 2017: 20. 187 Baeyer 2016: 202–10. 188 Fuchs 2017:5–6. 189 Baeyer 2016: 196–201. 190 Cartwright 1999: 46. 191 Cartwright 1999:2;Daston 2019:24–25. 192 Savage 1954: 16; Binmore 2017: 260, 263–64. 314 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press yields to the world, as the classical model holds. It is the world that yields to experience –until the accumulation of experience changes. Laws of nature are never absolute, and always provisional. Shaped by the beliefs of scientists, we do not need to search for nature’s laws and mechanisms any further than the beliefs and experiences expressed in scientific theories and experimental practices. In brief, scientific practices in the classical model represent the natural and social world; in the quantum model, they coproduce that world. 193 QBism holds that self’s understanding of the world rests entirely on the experience gained over a lifetime. “When I sleep or die,”writes Oswald Spengler, “my world ends with me, but the world of the others remains. With every newborn child awakens also its world.” 194 It is self’s uncommunicable experience that matters –the individual “I”not the intersubjective “we.”It is “each of us”as a singular entity and not a collective “us.” 195 This is not to argue that the world exists only in the head of self. 196 The material from which self constructs a picture of its external world includes the effects that the world has on self’s experience in response to her measurement and argumentative practices. For self’s practices normally do not control how the world acts back. Self’s experience of other leads self to reason that other is very much like self, with its own private experiences. This is as firm a belief as any that self has. Self could not function in the world without it. Asked to assign a probability to this statement, self would choose p=1. 197 QBism’s subjectivity does not mean that the world exists only in the mind of the individual agent. Although self does not have any access to the private experience of other, a very important part of self’s private experience is the impact on self by other’s effort to communicate in speech or writing other’s personal experience. Through language and other forms of communication, different agents affect private perceptions and create a state of deep entanglement. 198 Communication makes it possible for agents to plausibly conclude that each of them has private experiences that are quite alike, though perhaps not identical to, their own. Bridging 193 Jasanoff 2004; Camic, Gross, and Lamont 2011. 194 Spengler 1965: 54. My translation. 195 Mermin 2016: 233 fn1, 238; Mermin 2019:5–6. 196 Becker 2018:25–27, 29–30, 48, 168, 234. 197 “Probablity-1 measures the intensity of a belief: supreme confidence: It does not imply the existence of a deterministic mechanism .. . That probability-1 assignments are personal judgements, like any other probability assignments, is essential to the coherence of QBism”(Mermin 2016: 244, 245, and 219–26). Alien to the conventional view of frequentist probability, Mermin insists that this interpretation is perfectly congruent with Hume’s views on induction: Mermin 2019:4–5, 7. 198 Fierke 2017: 151; Wendt 2015: 207–21; Mermin 2019:2–4, 6. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 315 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press the privacy of subjective individual experiences, they thus can arrive at common or intersubjective understandings of the outside world. Hence, QBism does not give any space to the reification of a common external world. Language enables self and other to share a portion of what each has experienced. And the effects of their measurement and argumentative practices constitute the world, external to each actor’s subjective beliefs. QBism is not a solipsistic theory that holds that each of us is free to make up our own private world. There exists, then, a world external to each agent. 199 This proposition is more useful and strongly confirmed by experience than any other empirical hypothesis. That, however, does not mean that the concepts of quantum mechanics correspond directly to features in the world. When we think that physicists “measure”the world we imply, conventionally, that as measuring agents they themselves are described by their theory of the external world rather than taking the measuring agent as a given (or primitive). The orthodox view makes the agent inert and passive when, arguably, she is active and engaged. QBism holds to a strongly subjective and active view of agency. Agents act on their personal experiences and beliefs and, based on their measurement practices of the world, they acquire wholly personal experiences. This does not mean that the theory is only about self and not about other. Anyone can use the theory and, in using it, each assures herself that beliefs about the consequences of their encounters with the world are consistent. Every action by self can be met by uncontrollable and unforeseen consequences from the world; “The objective world asserts itself unmistakably, unpredictably and uncontrollably in its immediate response to any of our interventions.” 200 When actors prod the external world, the world can and often does generate something new that no agent could have predicted. The core, then, is about the relationship between something that is both profoundly personal and profoundly relational. It is surprising how much of the discussion of knowledge and experience in quantum physics resonates with Dilthey’s writings. 201 Individual experience and belief are central for both. Dilthey’s insistence on the creative power of life as an engine of all human experience offers a humanist’s worldview not unlike QBism’s scientific one. If we view Dilthey as a QBist before QBism, the metaphorical description of Dilthey as the Newton of the humanities needs to be corrected. 202 For Dilthey, 199 Fuchs and Schack 2009:48–55. 200 Mermin 2019:8. 201 Mermin 2016: 165–66, 232–48; Wendt 2015:29–32, 141–43. 202 Rickman 1979:1. 316 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press I and world are given components in lived experience before questions of objectivity and representations are raised. ... to live is to be situated in a world prior to the split between theory and practice. The theoretical world of the natural sciences arises as an abstraction from this lived, practical context, and it is given mediately as a representational construct. 203 The conventional view of quantum mechanics may miss much of what QBism and Dilthey have to offer. 204 Dilthey’s theory of life is consonant with QBism. Both offer their theories “for the use of agents immersed in and interacting with the world.” 205 This is not to deny some important differences between the two. Dilthey rejects the empiricism that QBism embraces. And compared to QBism, he distinguishes less self-consciously between individual experiences and collective beliefs. 206 Equating science with Newtonian physics, Dilthey laid the groundwork for the venerable two-cultures view of science and humanities, or “hard”or “soft”versions of Kuhn’s paradigms. QBism and Smolin’s scientific cosmology suggest otherwise. Versions of the two-cultures paradigm are part of the human effort of meaning-making, with the world acting back on human intervention in more or less unpredictable ways. The abstract concepts of quantum physics, such as waves and particles, are human creations to make sense of specific personal experiences. They are not real. “For practical purposes,”as Mermin said, it does not matter if, like most physicists, I confer objective reality on the theoretical abstractions that enable me to calculate the likelihood of my subsequent experience. But for resolving certain conceptual puzzles ... it is essential not to reify what are fundamentally intellectual tools, and not to treat what is fundamentally subjective and personal as if it were objective and universal ... It can be hard to acknowledge that it is humanity all the way down, in all fields –even physical science. 207 Different points of departure for the humanities and the natural sciences thus meet at the same intersection as the human sciences overlap with the natural sciences. 208 For both Dilthey and QBism, knowing is not a spectator sport played at a distance by impartial and objective observers. Knowing is part of life. The knowing subject is not a self-aware, selfcontained, independently rational agent that comes to knowledge fully 203 Owensby 1994:32–33. 204 Fuchs and Schack 2009: 47. 205 Fuchs and Schack 2009: 48. 206 Dilthey thus runs afoul of the “shifty split”between quantum and classical that Bell identified and that Mermin (2016: 219–26, 239–40) discusses. 207 Mermin 2019: 15. Clarke’s and Primo’s (2012) view of models as objects expressing human purpose aims in the same direction. 208 Hodges 1944:34–35. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 317 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press formed. Instead, knowledge is a distributed practice that includes material and argumentative arrangements. Humans are part of the larger configuration of the world and its open-ended articulation. 209 For both QBism and Dilthey, knowing is not the playing of ideas in the mind of a Cartesian subject that stands outside and apart from the world the subject seeks to know. It is, rather, a practice of engagement with a world that is made explicable in terms of scientific theories, philosophical inquiries, artistic creations, and religious practices. QBism has restored the important role of senses in understanding nature. 210 Intellect seeks to understand the world as it really is, trying to discover its true essence. It focuses on the object of inquiry. Senses insist that they are indispensable for learning what nature tries to teach us. Humans are equipped with senses that convey the surfaces of things. “It is,”as Lorraine Daston writes, appearances all the way down ... The surfaces that nature presents so abundantly and incessantly to view are also ordered, in ways more obvious, more reliable, and more permanent than most artifacts. It is the natural appearances of day-in, dayout experience, not the natural depths revealed by electron microscopes and cyclotrons, which still shape some of our most sturdy intuitions about what an order can be. 211 Senses remind us of the role subjectivity plays in science generally. Specifically, they help account for Newtonianism’s enduring appeal. Modern physics had done away with senses and the subject –until the weirdness of quantum states prompted the articulation of QBism. Einstein established in 1905 that the observer’s frame of reference was indispensable for making sense of mechanics, thus eliminating the unvarnished objectivity of Newton’s absolute notions of time and space. The wave/particle duality in quantum mechanics staged another assault on objectivity. An electron is not a wave or a particle, but a hybrid revealing different properties, depending on the questions agents ask and the measurement and argumentative practices they engage in. Extending well beyond dispassionate reason, the questions scientists pose and the answers they offer are shaped by what William James called temperament. This includes the senses. Will, taste, emotions, and passion are all implicated in and contribute to scientific practice, just as they are present in all other human affairs. Temperament conditions our receptivity for heuristic and obfuscating concepts, confirmatory and disconfirming evidence, and illuminating and distracting methods of inquiry. 212 209 Barad 2007: 341–42, 379. 210 Baeyer 2016: 144–55. 211 Daston 2019:65–67. 212 Fuchs 2017:5–6. 318 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press a transcendental canopy. 238 Henry Nau argues as he does in Chapters 2 and 6 because of his deep commitment to individual choice and accountability; Milja Kurki in Chapter 3 because of her equally deep sense of care about the environment and ecological collapse. The intensity of the debates and disagreements during our meetings and in the different chapters was perhaps not as great as the two-generation split between climate change denier Donald Trump and climate change advocate Greta Thunberg. But it was qualitatively different from normal academic disagreements. Everybody felt and understood that the stakes under discussions were very high. For different worldviews lead to different expectations of what world orders are or might be feasible and what ethical considerations could or should come into play. Because humans are self-reflective, their practices are inextricably linked to their worldviews. And because values are baked very deeply into our scientific theories and religious beliefs, we may not be able to recognize them easily in our daily discourses and practices. But they exist nonetheless. 239 What is true of all metatheoretical discussions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology holds also for a praxis-shaping morality: it is always provisional and contestable. Political engagement of citizen practices and government policies matter no less than philosophical arguments, scientific discoveries, or religious beliefs. As part of worldviews, moral values and social purposes gain strength and salience, for “individuals cannot escape the moral language embedded in the social conventions which have previously constituted them as moral subjects.” 240 This is true also for an empirical theory of world politics that leans heavily on Newton and is indebted to Weber. While struggling with the difference between fact and value, Weber insisted on the mutual relevance of science, normative discourse, and human choice. Weber’s arguments sharpen our thinking rather than bridge the gaps between is and ought, means and ends. We can choose to accept basic values. Seeking to justify them, however, is a hopeless endeavor. There exists no ultimate rational foundation for our most basic values. One of the classical functions of theory is its practical efficacy, its formation of an orientation toward practical action. In the conduct of social science and international 238 Barnett, Chapter 5, this volume. 239 Monteiro and Ruby 2009; Bernstein 1976:61–62, 104, 110–11, 113–14; Adler 2019:2, 265–94. Operating at different levels of abstraction, Levine and Barder (2014) and Paipais (2017) make the same point in their critiques of how prominent realist and liberal international relations scholars and different philosophical schools of thought deal with issues of pluralism and difference. 240 Linklater 1998: 64. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 325 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press relations, this is often constrained by various barriers –theoretical, methodological, and otherwise –that create an intellectual and practical vacuum between theory and practice. Marked by their action-inducing features, worldviews do not give rise to such restrictions. They fill the void left by theory and methods. Take, for example, pressing environmental issues. Although many scholars of world politics worry about the environment, that concern is not yet reflected in their publications. Between 2011 and 2015, three leading IR journals published virtually no articles on conventionally understood, noncatastrophic environmental issues. 241 It is a safe assumption that catastrophic scenarios are a negligible proportion of these very small numbers. 242 Attended by scholars from all over the world, the 2015 annual meeting of the International Studies Association featured 1,250 panels; only one paper title referred explicitly to the Anthropocene. 243 And even though they ranked climate change as the most important issue facing the world, only 2.4 percent of about 4,000 international relations scholars listed the environment as their main area of research. 244 To the extent that the environment matters, however, debate expresses two different worldviews travelling under cornucopian-exemptionalist and catastrophic-ecological labels. A “cornucopian”position centers on core values such as economic growth and humankind’s justified mastery of nature. A “catastrophic”worldview questions the rightfulness of a manover-nature stance and foresees doom unless changes in individual and socially transformative values move us away from a materialist status-quo. Relatedly, an “exemptionalist”worldview insists that unique achievements in science and technology free humankind from ecological limitations that constrain other species. An “ecological”worldview holds instead that the human species is embedded in rather than emancipated from ecological constraints. 245 In Chapters 3 and 6, Kurki and Nau articulate these differences. Both positions ground themselves in the achievement of or aspiration for Enlightenment values understood in the singular, such as freedom, human rights, and economic prosperity. 246 Nau champions an abstract ethics to justify action on 241 0% in International Organization, 0.3% in International Studies Quarterly, and 1.6% in the European Journal of International Relations. It is a safe assumption that the catastrophic possibilities that Pelopidas (2020) focuses on are a tiny proportion of these very small numbers. Underdal 2017: 170. 242 Pelopidas 2020. 243 I thank Colin Chia for his assistance in generating these figures. See also Kelly 2019 244 Harrington 2016: 486–87. 245 Dake 1991: 64. 246 Nau (Chapter 6) and Duara (Chapter 7) differ in their recognition of Enlightenment thought. Nau talks about the Enlightenment in the singular; Duara calls attention to its different strands. It is very rare that the work of African philosophers Yacob and Amo is 326 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press universal grounds; Kurki advocates an intense practicality without offering answers to questions of public policy. Kurki challenges Nau’s claim that self-reflective experience makes humans stand apart from and above the environment and that humans operate in a Newtonian world of things against a background of empty space and linear time. It is that difference which animates the clash of two scientific worldviews and their different value commitments. Hirschman’s possibilism provides an opening for future explorations. 247 Possibilism does not reject the individual accountability standards that concern Haas and Nau in Chapter 2 and Nau in Chapter 6. And it embraces the social normativity of engaging the other in open dialogue that Kurki espouses in Chapter 3. Grove and Barnett (Chapters 4 and 5) develop variations of these normative stances. Exposure to different values and ways of being and viewing the world can contribute to an ecumenical outlook and the practical and ethical injunction for toleration that is at the heart of different Enlightenment traditions. As Duara shows in Chapter 7, with the world at the brink of planetary catastrophe, even in the absence of a clearly and rationally articulated path, it may be necessary to explore further the morality of possibilism. In Chapter 8 Bentley Allan historicizes nineteenth- and twentieth-century values such as “civilization”and “economic growth”as constituted by cosmological elements. Finally, without denying that faith can lead to value absolutism, Timothy Byrnes stresses in Chapter 9 that humble recognition of the uncertainty that accompanies faith can also engender an ecumenism grounded in empathy with and respect for other religious traditions. Considerations of values are the subject of metatheoretical debates in the analysis of world politics. 248 Such debates make the stability of any foundational commitments inescapably provisional and inherently contestable. 249 Chris Reus-Smit, for example, does not believe that “fundamental questions of epistemology and ontology –the stuff of metatheory –are resolvable in any final or absolute sense.” 250 This is not to deny that even though “debate with a view to resolution”is an unobtainable objective, “reflection with an eye to consequences”is not. 251 The Newtonian worldview that permeates ever acknowledged, even though they preceded and anticipated many of the European Enlightenment’s core tenets. Not grounded in notions of salvation (through science or religion) such non-European worldviews highlight alternatives, such as tearing and repairing, yielding different ethical and political arguments. Robbie Shilliam’s interventions in our discussions made this point several times. See also Herbjørnsrud 2017; Rutazibwa and Shilliam 2020; Trownsell et al. 2020. 247 I thank Richard Price for this line of thought. 248 Wendt 1991: 383. 249 Gunitsky 2019; Monteiro and Ruby 2009: 17, 25–26. 250 Reus-Smit 2013: 590, 594–95; Hamilton 2017; Levine and Barder 2014: 868–72. 251 Reus-Smit 2013: 605. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 327 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press the major paradigms of international relations has led to this bet: the best scientific knowledge can be gained by presupposing that the world is governed only by risk. 252 In contrast, Post-Newtonianism is more ready to acknowledge the constitutive role of uncertainty in world politics. This leads to inescapable conflicts that are both important and unresolvable. Newtonian and Post-Newtonian worldviews offer complementary ways for engaging with and navigating the world in never-ending, partly self-correcting processes of trial-and-error. Newtonianism has sidelined uncertainty as a constitutive feature of world politics. Too often, therefore, students of world politics are left speechless by stunning surprises. Creating a park out of garden and forest, and adopting Post- Newtonianism, not to the exclusion of Newtonianism, would help to account better for uncertainty as a central feature of world politics. 10.3 Science and Religion Parks exemplify the possibility of a meaningful coexistence of garden and forest, here science and religion –the most deeply anchored worldviews. On this point, Acquinas and Newton appear to have agreed. 253 People are drawn to science or religion, and sometimes to both at the same time, as they seek to navigate the uncertainties of their lives. But today, Mark Lilla argues, humankind is not well equipped to deal with uncertainty. We are an impatient lot, and we demand that god, science, or both satisfy our craving for knowledge about the future. We are not content when told that some kinds of knowledge are unobtainable and are drawn to those who, in the end, promise more than they can deliver. Priestesses then and pundits now eagerly offer to provide an unlimited supply of unobtainable knowledge. We have a hard time acknowledging uncertainty because it makes us come to terms with our vulnerability. We want to be on a power walk into the future “when in fact we are always just tapping our canes on the pavement in the fog.” 254 This is not surprising. Most occurrences in the world, philosopher Nancy Cartwright argues, are “subject to no law at all ... the claims to knowledge we can defend by our impressive scientific successes do not argue for a unified world of universal order, but rather for a dappled world of mottled objects.”The search for universal laws governing nature and society is a fool’s errand. Yet, the belief in the existence of universal laws embodied in a single scientific system of inquiry exists across all sciences: “The yearning for ‘the system’is a powerful one; the faith that our world must be rational 252 Jackson and Nexon 2013: 549; Wæver 1997. 253 Konyndyk 1995. 254 Lilla 2020. 328 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press and well-ordered through and through plays a role where only evidence should matter.” 255 And, in the field of international relations, that evidence points powerfully to the importance of uncertainty as an important aspect of global politics. As we slowly stumble through the fog, Michael Barnett writes in Chapter 5,we“blend the worldly and the heavenly.”Along the way we rely on worldviews to steady us as we seek to secure our anxious sense as fleeting beings in this world. The search for ontological security, like the politics of fear, seeks to eradicate uncertainty through fight-or-flight responses and their conservative or reactionary political consequences. But as Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen argue, it can also steady us as we try to cope with a more diffuse anxiety. 256 Such a disposition permits a broader range of political responses than the emotion of focused fear, including resistance, exploration, anticipation, and even excitement. Even though fear and anxiety may be difficult to sort out empirically, ontological insecurity avoidance differs from ontological security seeking. In either case, the experience of the fundamental contingency of being is mitigated by scientific and religious worldviews. Moving in a fear- and anxiety-inducing fog, science and numbers can acquire a semi-magical power. Even though we are their creators, we put an extraordinary faith in them as modern oracles of truth: “Numbers acquire their power the same way the gods acquire theirs –humans invest them with virtues they want their rulers to have ... Our numbers, like our gods, promise to govern us well ... We count to learn what’s happening in our world and to gain control over our lives.” 257 Confronted with uncertainty and chaos, science is a quintessentially human method of trying to control that chaos ... Adrift in the world, uncertain of the future, hostage to fate, but possessed of increasingly powerful tools for carving up pieces of the world and putting them under the microscope, is it any wonder that we increasingly turn to science when looking for deliverance from our human predicaments? ... We want the comfort of certainty. 258 Or we crave the comfort of religion. As conventionally used today, the concept of religion is barely 200 years old. Most communities had to invent new categories –such as shukyo in Japanese and zongjiao in Chinese –to describe a novel foreign phenomenon. They simply lacked indigenous categories that corresponded to the contemporary understanding of religion. Even ancient Greece lacked a single word that corresponded to the Latin religio. 259 Over time, religions have changed 255 Cartwright 1999:16–17. 256 Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020. 257 Stone 2020: 100–1, 178. 258 Klay 2020: 10. 259 Casanova 2012: 193; Byrnes, Chapter 9. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 329 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press from compact to complex symbolic systems and practices that tie humankind to the ultimate conditions of its existence. Established binaries such as sacred–profane, transcendent–mundane, and religious–secular do not really capture the multiplicities that this change has wrought. 260 Religious worldviews reflect, inform, and simplify more or less explicit understandings that individuals or groups share as they search for the meaning of being a very small part of a very large whole. 261 “The world’s great religions provide world views; but so does the scientific rationality that is emblematic of modernity.” 262 Religious and scientific worldviews can shift, sometimes gradually, sometimes quickly. The rise of Axial Age religions and the rise of modern science are two of the most notable shifts that humanity has experienced. The Axial Age witnessed powerful and independent cultural developments in China, India, Iran, Palestine, and Greece. This gave rise to the world’s great religions. At that pivotal moment, humankind moved from a less reflective to a self-reflexive striving for human agency, transcendence, criticism, self-determination, and, eventually, future-oriented progress. Around the year 1,000 the first wave of globalization was powered by a desire to spread religious beliefs and by religious conversions. The vast majority of today’s believers subscribe to one of the major religions that spread across the globe at that time. 263 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, scientific advances discovered new ideas about motion and matter in a universe governed by the laws of nature. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, geological and biological scientists transformed the understanding of time, development, and progress. In the twentieth century, quantum mechanics probed the infinite possibilities and uncertainties of the subatomic world while scientific cosmology developed new ways of thinking about the universe. Religion and science have evolved along plural and often contradictory lines. Today, the two provide foundations for worldviews that give meaning to the experience of being in a world marked by inescapable uncertainties. Religion. Though often unacknowledged, theology has retained an important influence in modernity. Gillespie argues that the hidden origins of modernity precede the Age of Enlightenment and are to be found in “the great metaphysical and theological struggle that marked the end of the medieval world”: the struggle between nominalism. with its insistence on nonteleological singularities accessed by biblical revelation or mystical experience, and scholasticism, with its belief in divinely created and revealed 260 Casanova 2012: 193, 200, 202. 261 Ossio 1997: 549; Hamilton 2018b: 377–78; Hamilton 2018a. 262 Goldstein and Keohane 1993:8. 263 Hansen 2020. 330 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press universals. 264 At stake in this struggle were questions about the nature of God and the nature of being rather than, as emerged subsequently, the process of human self-assertion and control. Modern science neither opposed nor displaced religion. Unwittingly, it became an extension of earlier theological debates. And this, Gillespie argues, has created a concealed theology of philosophical disagreements that has stretched throughout modernity down to the present. God does not disappear. His attributes and capacities are transferred to nature and man. In the shift from divine to natural law, disenchantment thus merges with re-enchantment. 265 Religious worldviews also remain deeply embedded in contemporary world politics in other ways, as Byrnes shows in Chapter 9. For example, they provide a hidden script about order in anarchy that lies at the center of realist theories of international relations. 266 As the founder of modern political science, Hobbes offers a “worldly application of a theological pattern.” 267 Existing in the state of nature, man is a believer in God and acknowledges his obligations under God’s law. These are real obligations rooted in real law, made and enforced by men on the basis of and legitimized by their worldviews. Just as God created the universe, so man can create the commonwealth and an international order, even if their sovereign is only imagined. In Bain’s reading, Hobbes is thus a theorist of interstate society rather than of international anarchy. 268 Contemporary realist theories of order are not strictly modern or secular; traces of medieval theological discourses can be discerned by those who choose to look. In our accounts of world politics, religion remains constitutive of how we think about the world. Nominalist theology remains embedded in modernist conceptions of sovereignty as immanent and necessary or imposed and contingent order. 269 In this view, religion lives on in the era of secular science and the study of world politics. “The core constituents of the Judeo-Christian world-view have traveled in a multiplicity of forms to make up the dominant ‘secular’cosmology characteristic of much of ‘western thinking’and ‘science’today ... the theological origin of the search for order, in our everyday discourse and indeed in science, is important to recognize”as a way to reason from natural phenomena or God as the first cause of the universe. 270 Today, the connections between religious, social, and political cosmologies typically are implicit, often contradictory, and always consequential. 271 264 Gillespie 2008: 12, 14. 265 McClure 2010. 266 Bain 2020. 267 Mitchell 1993: 78, quoted in Bain 2020: 129; Bain 2015. 268 Bain 2020: 130–31. 269 Bain 2020:9–10; Gillespie 2008. 270 Kurki 2020:26–27. 271 Kurki 2020:39–40, 67–68, 79–80; Kragh 2004: 12, 51. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 331 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press It follows, as Byrnes argues in Chapter 9, that religion and politics are not separate “variables”as Haas and Nau hold in Chapter 2, but coconstitutive ways of “being in”the world. Haas and Nau, Byrnes writes, want to insist that relational worldviews imply their own kinds of ... “Gods”that pose a threat to human freedom because we don’t really possess the capacity to truly know or resist their effects. But if a relational cosmology is grounded in faith or in the pursuit of what is “really real,”then the unknown itself is the basis of Truth and the human propensity to resistance is ultimately futile. We are, some religious worldviews might suggest, in the act of “becoming”through our relationships not only with each other, but also with that which we cannot measure, define or know through Newtonian scientific methods. In contrast to nondogmatic religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, which tolerate the uncertainties of forests and the foibles of divine personages, fundamentalist political projects of doctrinal religions wish to create orderly and predictable gardens. Cosmological uncertainty unleashes a yearning for clarity and the comforts of the promise of eternal life. But even dogmatic Catholicism, Byrnes argues, invites believers to more than conformity and oppression resting on unshakable ontological certainty. Communion with God requires acts of courageous faith. And “faith,”as Block says in Bergman’sSeventh Seal,“is a torment. It is like loving someone who is out there in the darkness but never appears, no matter how loudly you call.” 272 “Confronted with the inexplicable problem of suffering and in a state of profound unknowing,”Byrnes suggests, believers turn to Jesus “in a search for meaning within uncertainty and suffering. In this context then faith is the acceptance of uncertainty, not a search for comforting explanations that will dispel it.” 273 In the end, all religions require “the life-defining act of leaping, faithfully, into the unknown.” 274 Reflecting on Wittgenstein’s philosophical astonishment about the existence of the world, author John Kaag articulates a similar idea: “Philosophy is the activity of climbing a ladder, and once you reach the top, the ladder disappears.” 275 In its current global resurgence, religion is not an idiom of the discontented or the displaced. It is a set of ideas, values, practices, and traditions that shape many communities and their political struggles in all parts of the world. Often it is not religion per se but its various manifestations that matter politically, “as cognitive statements of truth, identificatory symbols, comprehensive ways of life, modes of voluntary association, moral and ethical obligations, vulnerable collective identities, and so forth.” What matters politically is not religion as such but “the multiple values 272 The Economist 2020: 68. 273 Byrnes, email sent to the author 04/12/2020. 274 Byrnes, Chapter 9. 275 Kaag 2020. 332 Peter J. Katzenstein https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press that particular dimensions of religion realize.” 276 Religious resurgence is not a “fundamentalist”or “anti-modernist”reaction to science and modernity. It is part of modernity and often a normative critique of developments that have failed to deliver on the promises of the Enlightenment project. Enlightenment expectations of the inevitable march of secularization and rationalization turn out to have been mistaken. As a legacy from the past and an adaptation to the present, religion continues to shape contemporary worldviews and world politics. In America’s social and political life, the “fourth great awakening”has made religion once again a vital force. The enlargement of the European Union toward the South and East has broadened the scope for human population flows, yet a growing stream of illegal migrants and refugees have made religion a vital concern in secular Europe. 277 Catholicism thrives in Africa, Protestantism in Latin America. Folk religions flower in East Asia, specifically China and Japan. And Islam is going through a global resurgence. Indeed, religious traditions all over the world are showing a great capacity to reinvent and reinvigorate themselves. Science. Allan argues in Chapter 8 that worldviews are local, temporary, and political stabilizations of cosmological elements. In contrast to ascetic Protestantism, “the world remained a great enchanted garden” for Asia’s popular religions, in the words of Weber. Concretizing further Weber’s historical account, Allan highlights the constitutive effects that two cosmological elements –materialism and object orientations –have had for modernist values of rationality and control and thus for the very basis of the contemporary science of world politics. In other works, Allan shows how economy and climate became in the twentieth century objects of governance that lent themselves to the exercise of control in a putatively law-governed yet highly unpredictable universe. 278 He also shows how the separation of object and subject creates in history the very basis for the concept of rationalization that Weber deploys. Referring to Shilliam’s discussion of the importance of Vodou (lwa) in the Haitian revolution, Allan concurs with Byrnes: the historical evolution of the conceptual apparatus of the modern natural and social sciences has created enormous barriers to reckon with the importance of religious worldviews. Furthermore, that apparatus simply cannot acknowledge that the lwa might have real agency in the world, and thereby misunderstands the way that cosmology forges action in ways that differ from Western concepts of modernity. 279 276 Laborde 2017:2. 277 Katzenstein 2006. 278 Allan 2017. 279 Allan, Chapter 8; Shilliam 2017; Byrnes, Chapter 9. Of Gardens, Forests, and Parks 333 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009070997.011 Published online by Cambridge University Press Although the scientific method buttresses a worldview that has acquired global significance in the last 400 years, different sciences can embody different worldviews. 280 A radical break in scientific worldviews occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Leading scientists put on a different “thinking-cap”that permitted them to leave behind an Aristotelian worldview that had been unassailable for centuries. 281 The ascendant scientific worldview replaced that of a well-ordered, hierarchical cosmos with visions of an “indefinite and even infinite universe.” 282 Over time, this scientific worldview increasingly supplanted the views embodied in the world’s major religions. For modern orders science became a secular equivalent to religion. Kuhn’s celebrated theory of scientific revolutions offers a good illustration. Central in the evolution of his thinking about science was the “Aristotle Experience”Kuhn had in the summer of 1947 in Harvard’s Kirkland Hall. Kuhn discovered for himself the fundamental difference between the Aristotelian and Newtonian views of the world. At one moment Aristotle seemed to be just a bad and ignorant physicist. 283 And then, suddenly, “the fragments in my head sorted themselves out in a new way, and fell into place together. My jaw dropped, for all at once Aristotle seemed a very good physicist indeed, but of a sort I’d never dreamed possible.” 284 Aristotle’s physics suddenly seemed plausible and it was no longer puzzling why his view of the world had been so widely shared for so many centuries. Throughout his life Kuhn reflected often on this revelatory experience. He writes that scientific“paradigms are constitutive not only of science but of nature ... in a scientific revolution, what we take to be nature must itself, in a sense, change.” 285 And he described scientific revolutions as “conversions”prompted more by transformative personal experiences or leaps of faith than reason, observation, and careful experimentation. 286 For those following Kuhn, different paradigms have “incommensurable ways of seeing the world and practicing science in it.” 287 Scientific revolutions can change the meaning of conventionally accepted concepts and thus reconfigure “the conceptual network through which scientists view the world.” 288 280 Becker 2018: 284. 281 Butterfield 1957:1–2. 282 Koyré 1957:2. 283 Weinberg 2015 writes that Aristotle was the first scientist to insist on the need for observation to check speculative theories. 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