Energy, Capital as Power and World Order

Di Muzio, Tim Book Part — Accepted Manuscript (Postprint) Energy, Capital as Power and World Order Provided in Cooperation with: The Bichler & Nitzan Archives Suggested Citation: Di Muzio, Tim (2016) : Energy, Capital as Power and World Order, In: Cafruny, Alan Talani, Simona Martin, Gonzalo Pozo (Ed.): The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., New York, NY, pp. 267-287, http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/490/ This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/157988 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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(eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Critical International Political Economy, DOI10.1057/978-1-137-50018-2_14 14 Until late, the subject of energy and its importance for capitalism and the constitution and reconstitution of world order has been sorely overlooked in the international political economy (IPE) literature. Indeed, only two of the major textbooks in IPE have chapters on energy (Di Muzio and Ovadia 2016). This is also true of the literature known as classical political economy. With few exceptions, the main questions that animated the classics such as the origins of the wealth of nations and the distribution of wealth are somehow disconnected from the production and consumption of energy. Marginal exceptions granted, there is little acknowledgement that the last three centuries of uneven and combined “progress” and “development” have anything to do with the exploitation of coal, oil and natural gas. However, if recent scholarship is any indication, this appears to be changing both within IPE and within other academic fields such as geography, sociology and environmental studies. In this emergent literature, we can find an argument that energy should not be treated as auxiliary to our analysis of the global political economy but essential to understanding and interpreting its emergence, transformations and future trajectories (Di Muzio 2015). Since fossil fuels make up an overwhelming share of global energy production and consumption (see Fig.14.1) I will mainly concentrate of non-renewable fossil fuels and [AU2] Energy, Capital asPower andWorld Order TimDi Muzio [AU1] T. Di Muzio (*) International Relations and Political Economy, University of Wollongong Australia, Wollongong, NSW, Australia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 aim to provide a critical political economy approach to energy, capitalism and world order by using the capital as power perspective. This is certainly not the only approach that we could take, but it is the one I find most revealing and convincing. To make this argument, I have divided the article in the following way. First, I concisely survey why energy is important for our theorizations of the global political economy as well as for understanding the practices of everyday life. With this background information in place, I briefly review how mainstream and critical accounts have approached the question of energy and the global political economy and demonstrate how the capital as power approach is distinctive for its focus on capitalization and social reproduction. In the second section, I will consider the power of the oil and gas firms in shaping and reshaping social reproduction and how there are strong indicators to suggest that renewable forms of energy cannot presently—and likely never will—replace fossil fuels and perpetuate energy intensive modes of living centuries into the future. Moreover, because of the entrenched power of oil and gas firms and their connection with affluent social reproduction, transitioning to less carbon intensive modes of social reproduction are being stalled. I conclude the article by discussing the relationship between energy, violence and world order. 41% 17% 10% 18% 13% 3% Total Final Energy Consumpon 2011 Oil Natural Gas Coal/Peat Electricity Biofuels and Waste Other Fig. 14.1 Total final energy consumption, 2011 268 T. Di Muzio 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 A Brief Excursus onEnergy Though often taken for granted in daily life, if we take energy seriously, the global political economy is at base a solar economy whereby humans have come to monetize energy and natural resources in hierarchical domestic and international relationships. Without the energy of the sun and the conversion of radiant energy into chemical energy carried out by plants and algae through the process of photosynthesis, life on earth would be impossible. Oil, coal and natural gas—can be considered “buried sunshine”, or chemical stores of energy that, through heat and pressure over millennia, have accumulated in variegated reservoirs internationally (Crosby 2006). These fossil fuels are ultimately derived from the energy of the sun and are understood to be nonrenewable on a human scale. But what is energy and what is at stake in taking it seriously? Natural scientists may debate the precise definition of “energy” but most would agree that it can be conceptualized as the capacity to do work (Smil 1994, 2006). What this suggests is that political economies with more energy have a greater potential to do work on the natural environment and transform their conditions of existence—albeit within a network of power relations and historical constraints and enablers. Indeed, countries that are considered “advanced economies” or “highly developed” political communities will show very high energy consumption figures while those considered as lesser or least developed countries will show very low energy consumption figures. Figure14.2 charts the total primary energy consumption of three least developed countries recognized by the World Bank. [AU3] 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 1980 1985 1990 1995200020052010 Hai Chad Mali Fig. 14.2 Total primary energy consumption, LDCs, quadrillion btus, 1980–2012 [AU4] 14 Energy, Capital asPower andWorld Order 269 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 All three countries are consuming very low amounts of energy and do not even approach one quadrillion British thermal units. This disparity in energy access and therefore productive ability becomes apparent when considering Fig.14.3 which charts energy consumption from three internationally recognized “developed” countries. The difference in the orders of magnitude is unmistakable. Fig.14.4 also contrasts the energy use per capita between the two groups of countries. Thus on an aggregate and per capita basis, developed countries simply consume in order of magnitude more energy than least developed countries. What these charts strongly suggest is that one of the things at stake in taking energy seriously for critical IPE scholars is the recognition that radically uneven consumption and access to energy should be a key factor in explaining the persistence of poverty and “underdevelopment”. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) noted: Energy services are a crucial input to the primary development challenge of providing adequate food, shelter, clothing, water, sanitation, medical care, schooling, and access to information. Thus energy is one dimension or determinant of poverty and development, but it is vital … lack of access to energy contributes to poverty and deprivation and can contribute to economic decline. (2000: 44) But the connection between access to affordable energy and development is not the only thing at stake in taking energy seriously. Four additional concerns can be highlighted before we move on to discuss how mainstream 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 20 40 60 80 10 0 120 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 USA, le Canada, right Japan, right Fig. 14.3 Total primary energy consumption, quadrillion btus, 1980–2012 [AU5] 270 T. Di Muzio 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 and critical scholarships have approached the global political economy of energy. First, for energy to be useful, it must be converted into another form. However, energy conversion is never a straightforward process as some energy is always lost in the transformation and not all energy can be converted easily. Second, the ratio of energy returned on the energy invested or what is known as ERoEI, is a crucial indicator of how much energy needs to be consumed or invested in return for a specific amount of energy received. A declining ERoEI is worrisome in an energy dependent economy because it suggests that it is becoming more difficult and expensive for firms to harness energy resources. Third, the global combustion of fossil fuels is the leading cause of global climate change and if companies and consumers continue to monetize and combust the world’s remaining stores, the climate future generations inherit will be radically changed. As the former head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, James Hansen and his colleagues warned “burning all fossil fuels would threaten the biological health and survival of humanity, making policies that rely substantially on adaptation inadequate” (James Hansen etal. 2013: 25). In sum, the ongoing social reproduction of high-energy lifestyles is effectively destroying the biosphere for future generations, the consequences of which will be experienced unevenly across the global population (Kempf 2008; Di Muzio 2015a). Last, from an evolutionary perspective, we could also make the argument that over time, certain human communities—for one reason or another—have become more proficient at capturing and converting energy for the social reproduction of energy intensive modes of living. But critical political economists cannot stop at this level of conceptualization and must understand the production and consumption of energy within the context of historical and shifting power relations. [AU6] Hai, 67Chad, 7 Mali, 15 USA, 6501 Japan, 3177 Canada, 6519 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 Fig. 14.4 Energy consumption per capita, 2010. Source: UNDATA 14 Energy, Capital asPower andWorld Order 271 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 Mainstream andCritical Approaches In IR/IPE there are two mainstream approaches to energy: (neo)realist and neolilberal institutionalism and a variegated critical approach mainly informed by the Marxist tradition.1 All have something to offer the debates in IPE but the mainstream approaches are fairly narrow-minded and insufficiently critical while the Marxist approach has serious flaws insofar as it rests on the labour theory of value. Speaking broadly, most realists fetishize the state and conceive of it as though it was a unitary actor operating in an anarchical system. Because there is no world government to hold states in check, realists argue that statesmen and women must do their best to protect the nation’s security. Having access to fossil fuels—and energy more generally—in this framework is useful only insofar as it can help maximize the power and security of the state as a whole. In this state-centric approach there is very little analysis of who exactly benefits from war and fossil fuel dependence or why energy consumption is so uneven. Most realists lump energy/ oil under ‘material capabilities’ (as do some critical scholars, e.g. Cox 1987) and assume that the amount or quality of these capabilities are linked with international power or the lack of it. However, because “material capabilities” are never conceptually unpacked, access to fossil fuels is treated just like access to any other strategic commodity. Others are more explicit and focus on how international power is underwritten by access to fossil fuels (particularly oil) and investigate how energy and international conflicts are related in past, present and the likely future (e.g. Colgan 2013a and b; Elhefnawy 2008; Friedrichs 2013; Klare 2002, 2004, 2009; Sprio 1999; Stoddard 2013; Stokes and Raphael 2010). The approach of neoliberal institutionalism is generally concerned with how agents other than the state can help promote transnational cooperation and overcome international anarchy—largely by rules, institutions and market mechanisms (Colgan etal. 2012; Goldthau and Witte 2013; Ikenberry 1986; Keohane 1978; Keohane and Victor 2013). In general, most neoliberal institutionalists take capitalism for granted and demonstrate very little awareness of how the magnitude of capital accumulation and its greater universalization is historically tethered to the exploitation of non-renewable fossil fuels. Indeed, the neoliberal institutionalist approach is far more interested in problem solving than it is in understanding how the present world order emerged. Moreover, the liberal tradition tends to have a progressive understanding of history that anticipates continued economic growth and 1 A useful summary is found in (Hancock and Vivoda 2014). [AU7] 272 T. Di Muzio 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 human betterment (Di Muzio 2011; Jahn 2013). This is despite the fact that there are very real physical limitations to perpetual economic growth (Fix 2014). From a critical point of view, Marxists fare much better than their mainstream counterparts. Marx was certainly aware of humanity’s inseparable tie with nature. However, in his scientific account of capitalism, he treated labour as the sole source of value and relegated the major energy source of his time— coal—to an “auxiliary” in production. From this point, energy remained a key blind spot for Marxism until the oil price shocks of the 1970s. The work of (Debeir etal. 1991) underscored the importance of energy for Marxist political economy but their work was virtually ignored until late. With few exceptions (Bromley 1991; Nore and Turner 1980), it was not until the oil price spike of 2000, the “war on terror” and murmurs about peak oil that Marxist attention resurfaced on questions related to energy, political economy and international power and imperialism. I cannot do justice to the richness of these works here and they are certainly more critical and insightful than the mainstream approaches (e.g. Altvater 2007; Bromley 1991, 2005; Podobnik 2006). However, with some nuance, what they all share in common is the view that capitalism is a mode of production and (implicitly or explicitly) that labour power is the sole source of value and that labour time can somehow explain prices and accumulation (the transformation problem). As I see it there are at least two problems with this position, (1) for the most part it is only concerned with production and therefore misses wider societal aspects of power and how they impact upon accumulation and; (2) it is far more likely that corporate power and control over production shapes prices and accumulation rather than labour time values. For these reasons I use what is arguably the more critical approach of capital as power. The capital as power approach differs in a number of important ways from the perspectives we have only briefly discussed (Nitzan and Bichler 2009; Di Muzio 2014). First, capitalism is conceived not as a mode of production between workers and capitalists but as a mode of power between owners or capitalists and non-owners. The primary act of owners is the capitalization of income-generating assets with the goal to accumulate more money at a faster pace than rivals attempting to do the same. The dominant actor is understood to be the corporation or firm and those with the highest levels of capitalization are theorized as “dominant capital” or those firms with the power to shape and reshape social reproduction more effectively than firms with smaller capitalization. Accumulation in this framework is measured by how much the value of an owner’s capitalization rises over time with the level of capitalization largely contingent on the earnings firms are able to generate. [AU8] 14 Energy, Capital asPower andWorld Order 273 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 From the point of view of the capital as power approach, earnings are not simply a matter of producing commodities for the market and the exploitation of workers. Earnings are a matter of a firm’s ability to exert material, cultural and ideological power of an entire social field and the more successful they are in doing so the greater their differential earnings will be relative to rival accumulators in the corporate universe. For this reason, capital is not theorized as “capital goods” as in the neoclassical approach nor is it understood to be ‘dead labour’ as in the Marxist approach. Instead, capital is theorized as commodified differential power. What this means is that when investors or owners hold or purchase claims to income-generating assets, they are effectively capitalizing the power of a corporation to shape and reshape the terrain of social reproduction. Briefly, social reproduction can be understood as the way in which any society produces, consumes and reproduces its lifestyles and livelihoods, how it understands them and how it justifies these practices both ideologically, legally and by an apparatus of force and punishment (e.g. military, prisons, detention camps). What this suggests is that the state or government apparatus can never be dislocated or disentangled from the process of accumulation. There are two main ways in which the state and capital are intimately connected. First, most governments in the world have a “national” debt that is owned by private capitalists and who receive interest payments on their securities from the tax and fine revenues generated by governments. In other words, the state or government apparatus is itself a capitalized entity. Second, the market for government debt or perhaps more simply, the bond market, is the heart of global finance because it provides a benchmark rate of return for capitalists to assess or evaluate their investment priorities. Insofar as interest rates remain positive, it provides owners with a guaranteed return on investment. For these reasons the capital as power approach does not theorize the state and market or the state and corporation as practically or ideologically separate. Instead, political and corporate power have always been fundamentally entangled, albeit in a variety of ways we cannot fully discuss in this brief chapter. But while all these points may be intelligible to readers, it remains for us to highlight how the capital as power perspective is a critical approach to political economy. First, the accumulation of money is not based on individual productivity or the contributions one makes to society but rooted in the institution of ownership and ownership largely originated in past violence, access to political power and legal fiction. Second, private ownership of income-generating assets implies both exclusion and the sabotage or damage of society and human creativity. There are two types of sabotage: general and specific. General sabotage implies that all firms must engage in some degree of incapacitation in trying to accumulate differentially. Specific 274 T. Di Muzio 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 their citizens may find it highly desirable to embark upon a path towards highenergy intensive living as the Chinese, Indians and Brazilians have recently done. Indeed, not only have these three countries seen accelerated growth in the last 20 years, but also increased energy consumption, altering the world energy order (de Graaff 2012). Realizing these expectations in material form is now leading to greater carbon energy path dependence in more countries. For instance, as a collective, non-OECD countries are now the primary consumers of total final energy consumption, a trend only recently broken (BP Statistical Review 2014). Third, the temptation to monetize the remaining economically exploitable fossil fuels on the planet may be too great. Most traders and investors envision a time when demand will finally outstrip supply and prices will skyrocket to unforeseen levels. If this happens, one can bet that both the earnings and capitalization of the oil and gas (and likely coal) firms will also skyrocket. A few stand to gain immense amounts of money by monetizing the destruction of the world’s biosphere. Last, at the moment there are no large-scale energy alternatives and any post-carbon society is likely to have to form new social relations, new methods of production, logic and thought, new ways of governing and new indicators to govern social reproduction. It may be the case that it is simply easier to follow on the same ruinous course and hope that market forces will somehow sort out a reasonable future. Either way, this will be a Herculean task not made any easier the more societies and governments delay actively transitioning to a low carbon energy regime. There are certainly spaces of hope to point to but at the moment, they are largely marginal. A final consideration from the perspective of critical IPE is the relationship between carbon energy, violence and world order. Energy, Violence andWorld Order Before the transition to settled agriculture and animal husbandry, most anthropologists argue that our hunting and gathering ancestors were relatively egalitarian (Boehm 2001). This is not to project some utopia back into the ancient past but to recognize that with the rise of settled agriculture and cities, the social division of labour became more diversified and considerably more hierarchical, with a dominant caste typically appropriating social surpluses where the first major civilizations arose. Coinciding with this transition was the eternal recurrence of slavery and other forms of labour servitude. Though forms of slavery and servitude certainly differed historically and geographically, what they all have in common is that a minority of very powerful people used their slaves and servants as human energy converters to support 14 Energy, Capital asPower andWorld Order 281 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 their own affluent social reproduction. As late as 1772, the British agricultural writer Arthur Young (1741–1820) estimated that of a world population of 775 million, only 33 million could be categorized as in any way “free”. The remainder, some 742 million existed in countless forms of servitude to the 4.3% of the world’s population living as privileged dominators (Nikiforuk 2012: 12). One of the most violent and devastating examples of this search for exploitable human energy was the centuries-long transatlantic slave trade with an estimated 12 million people forcibly removed from their ancestral homes in Africa and transported to the “New World” where they would work under brutal conditions for the differential accumulation of the plantocracy (Blackburn 2010: 3). Though illegal slavery and various forms of labour servitude persist, there is some reason to suggest that with the revolution in fossil fuel energy and the mass introduction of machines, space could be opened up for slavery’s abolition (Bales 2012; Mouhot 2011; Nikiforuk 2012). Though there were precursors, a comprehensive treaty to ban the international slave trade was not realized until 1890 and it was only in 1926 when a ban on slavery itself was initiated. But the interconnections between the apparatus of violence used to capture and socially reproduce “New World” slavery and the wealth and unequal power of the European-led world order it helped create and recreate is also mirrored in the present global energy order of fossil fuels—with oil by far the most important of the three majors. Fossil fuels have always been connected with international violence and imperial power and can be traced to the rise of the first military-industrial complexes in the USA and Europe. By the 20th century, the two powers that created the most powerful means of destruction on earth—the USA and Soviet Union—were both awash in domestic oil. While there is much to say about this, we must restrict ourselves to a few comments here. The first comment is to realize that after World War I, the first mechanized or total war, virtually all military and governing officials realized that oil was essential to “modern warfare and industrial life” (Lewis 1921: 357; Yergin 1991). Difficulties in obtaining oil meant certain defeat as was also reinforced in the slaughter of World War II when Germany and Japan’s quest for oil faltered and the Allies drifted to victory on a sea of US oil (Friedrichs 2010; Hayward 1995). The second comment is that while the Soviet Union enlarged its sphere of influence after World War II and used its domestic oil to industrialize, build up its means of destruction and for strategic international purposes, it was the USA and the international oil companies that largely organized the international oil order. Many believe that this order is currently changing but I think it is safe to argue that the fount and matrix of the global oil order was and remains US military might and the US dollar, the numéraire for virtually all oil sales 282 T. Di Muzio 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 not to mention other major commodities (de Graaff 2012). However, oil is not like any other commodity. As the war veteran Stan Goff argued: “Oil is not a normal commodity. No other commodity has five US navy battle groups patrolling the sea lanes to secure it” (cited in Clark 2005: 33). But while the US armed forces may be conceived as a global protection racket for “US” interests, from the capital as power perspective, we move away from methodological nationalism and consider how energy conflicts may actually benefit particular groups while causing great harm to many. From a critical political economy perspective, Nitzan and Bichler (1995, 2002, 2006; see also Bichler and Nitzan 2004, 2014) have done the most to shed light on how energy conflicts relate to the differential profitability of the leading oil firms. Readers are strongly encouraged to consult their works as I can only highlight one of their most important insights here: the fact that—with only one exception—every time that the differential earnings of the leading oil and gas companies trailed the average returns of the Fortune 500 companies, there were subsequent conflicts in the Middle East that restored the differential profitability of the oil and gas majors.5 Readers can consider for themselves whether this relationship is merely a coincidence or a pattern based on the oil and gas companies using their power and influence to shape government policy and encourage conflict to boost their earnings. While we may never know for certain without greater investigation, there can be little doubt that the relationship exists. A quick glance at Figure14.5 already suggests that the “war on terror” was immensely profitable for the oil and gas industry as a whole. Figure14.7 shows the increase in overall capitalization of the oil and gas industry listed on the FT Global 500 from the start of the “war on terror” and charts this with the yearly share price of ExxonMobil and Chevron, the two US oil and gas majors. ExxonMobil’s capitalization increased by 136% while Chevron trailed a bit behind at 122%. Not a bad return for the dominant owners invested in oil and gas throughout the “war on terror” when we consider that the S&P 500 index provided only a 7% return to investors over the course of the war. There is little question that more spade work must be done to investigate the links between violence in the Middle East and US Grand Strategy as it pertains to energy and the future of world order. There is also much work to be done on the shifting global energy order and how this is connected to differential accumulation. 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Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 14 Energy, Capital asPower andWorld Order 287 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 Author Queries Chapter No.: 14 14 Queries Details Required Author’s Response AU1 Please check if author name and affiliation are okay. AU2 Please specify “a or b” for Di Muzio (2015). AU3 Please check if identified head levels are okay. AU4 Expand LDC in full. AU5 According to the text this Figure is for the developed countries, so explain this in the caption to distinguish from Figure 14.2? AU6 The citations “James Hansen et al. 2013, Nikiforuk 2012, UNDP (2000)” are not listed in the reference list. Please check and provide the details or delete the citations. AU7 Stoddard (2015) has been changed to Stoddard (2013) as per reference list. Please check if okay. AU8 Fix (2015) has been changed to Fix (2014) as per reference list. Please check if okay. AU9 Change OK and intended meaning retained? AU10 Change OK as the abbreviation in the text is in capitals? AU11 There is reference to a Figure 14.7 in this chapter but there is no Figure 14.7 listed here. Please include caption for Figure 14.7. AU12 Please specify “a or b” for IEA (2014). AU13 There is no caption for Figure 14.7 in this chapter. Please provide. Or rather do you mean Figure 14.6 instead here? AU14 Reference “Di Muzio and Robbins (2015)” is not cited in the text. Please check.