Replication material for paper "Böhmelt (2016): The importance of conflict characteristics for the diffusion of international mediation. Journal of Peace Research. DOI: 10.1177/0022343316628827"

Dataset: ICB1 Codebook for ICB1 - International Crisis Behavior Project System-Level Dataset – July 2010 ICPSR Study #9286 – Version 10.0 Principal Investigators: Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld This dataset (ICB1) comprises the system level data of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. The data span the period 1918-2007, with data on 455 international crises. For an extensive discussion of the system level data, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000. See also ICBOnline at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb Control Variables Control Variable: 1 Name: ICB1 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR PROJECT - SYSTEM LEVEL DATASET Control Variable: 2 Name: CRISNO SEQUENCE NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS Data were collected on one case descriptor and 81 variables for each international crisis. The case descriptor is the following: Descriptive Variable: 1 Name: CRISNAME NAME OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS ICB List of States in the International System, 1918-2003 The three-letter actor codes and the three-digit identification numbers for states in the system correspond to those presented by Gleditsch and Ward, and are almost identical to the codes in the Correlates of War Project. See Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward (1999). “Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816,” International Interactions 25: 393-413. CODE NAME NUMBER NAME (ACTOR) (CRACID) Afghanistan AFG 700 Albania ALB 339 Algeria ALG 615 Andorra AND 232 Angola ANG 540 Antigua & Barbuda AAB 058 Argentina ARG 160 Armenia ARM 371 Australia AUL 900 Austria AUS 305 Azerbaijan AZE 373 Bahamas BHM 031 Bahrain BAH 692 Bangladesh BNG 771 Barbados BAR 053 Belarus BLR 370 Belgium BEL 211 Belize BLZ 080 Benin (Dahomey) BEN 434 Bhutan BHU 760 Bolivia BOL 145 Bosnia BOS 346 Botswana BOT 571 Brazil BRA 140 Brunei BRU 835 Bulgaria BUL 355 Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) BFO 439 Burma (see Myanmar) Burundi BUI 516 Cambodia CAM 811 Cameroon CAO 471 Canada CAN 020 Cape Verde CAP 402 Central African Republic CEN 482 Chad CHA 483 Chile CHL 155 China CHN 710 China-Taiwan-Formosa CODE NAME NUMBER NAME (ACTOR) (CRACID) (see Taiwan) Colombia COL 100 Comoros COM 581 Congo Brazzaville CON 484 Congo, Democratic Republic of (Congo Kinshasa) (Zaire) DRC 490 Costa Rica COS 094 Cote D’Ivoire CDI 437 Croatia CRO 344 Cuba CUB 040 Cyprus CYP 352 Czech Republic CZR 316 Czechoslovakia CZE 315 Dahomey (see Benin) Denmark DEN 390 Djibouti (Somalia Fr.) DJI 522 Dominica DMA 054 Dominican Republic DOM 042 Ecuador ECU 130 Egypt (UAR) EGY 651 El Salvador SAL 092 Equatorial Guinea EQG 411 Eritrea ERI 531 Estonia EST 366 Ethiopia ETH 530 Federated States of Micronesia FSM 987 Fiji FIJ 950 Finland FIN 375 France FRN 220 Vichy France VFR 219 French West Africa FWA 480 Gabon GAB 481 Gambia GAM 420 Georgia GRG 372 Germany (Prussia) GMY 255 German Democratic Republic (East Germany) GDR 265 Germany (German Federal Republic) (West Germany) GFR 260 Ghana GHA 452 Great Britain (see United Kingdom) Greece GRC 350 Grenada GRN 055 CODE NAME NUMBER NAME (ACTOR) (CRACID) Guatemala GUA 090 Guinea GUI 438 Guinea Bissau GNB 404 Guyana GUY 110 Haiti HAI 041 Hijaz (Hejaz) HIJ 671 Honduras HON 091 Hungary HUN 310 Iceland ICE 395 India IND 750 Indonesia INS 850 Iran IRN 630 Iraq IRQ 645 Ireland (Eire) IRE 205 Israel ISR 666 Italy ITA 325 Ivory Coast (see Cote D’Ivoire) Jamaica JAM 051 Japan JPN 740 Jordan JOR 663 Kazakhstan KZK 705 Kenya KEN 501 Korea KOR 730 North Korea (People’s Republic of Korea) PRK 731 South Korea (Republic of Korea) ROK 732 Kuwait KUW 690 Kyrgyz Republic KYR 703 Laos LAO 812 Latvia LAT 367 Lebanon LEB 660 Lesotho LES 570 Liberia LBR 450 Libya LIB 620 Liechtenstein LIE 223 Lithuania LIT 368 Luxemberg LUX 212 Macedonia MAC 343 Madagascar (Malagasy Republic) MAG 580 Malawi MAW 553 Malaysia MAL 820 Maldives MAD 781 Mali MLI 432 Malta MLT 338 CODE NAME NUMBER NAME (ACTOR) (CRACID) Marshall Islands MSI 983 Mauritania MAA 435 Mauritius MAS 590 Mexico MEX 070 Moldova MLD 359 Monaco MNC 221 Mongolia MON 712 Morocco MOR 600 Mozambique MZM 541 Myanmar (Burma) MYA 775 Najd (Nejd) NAJ 672 Namibia (South West Africa) NAM 565 Nepal NEP 790 Netherlands NTH 210 New Zealand NEW 920 Nicaragua NIC 093 Niger NIR 436 Nigeria NIG 475 Norway NOR 385 Oman OMA 698 Pakistan PAK 770 Palau PAL 986 Panama PAN 095 Papua and New Guinea PNG 910 Paraguay PAR 150 Peru PER 135 Philippines PHI 840 Poland POL 290 Portugal POR 235 Qatar QAT 694 Rhodesia (see Zimbabwe) Rumania RUM 360 Russia (Soviet Union) RUS 365 Rwanda RWA 517 San Marino SNM 331 Sao Tome-Principe STP 403 Saudi Arabia SAU 670 Senegal SEN 433 Serbia (see Yugoslavia) Seychelles SEY 591 Sierra Leone SIE 451 Singapore SIN 830 Slovakia SLO 317 Slovenia SLV 349 Solomons SOL 940 Somalia SOM 520 Somalia Fr. CODE NAME NUMBER NAME (ACTOR) (CRACID) (see Djibouti) South Africa SAF 560 South West Africa (see Namibia) Spain SPN 230 Spanish Sahara (see Western Sahara) Sri Lanka (Ceylon) SRI 780 St. Kitts-Nevis SKN 060 St. Lucia SLU 056 St. Vincent & The Grenadines SVG 057 Sudan SUD 625 Surinam SUR 115 Swaziland SWA 572 Sweden SWD 380 Switzerland SWZ 225 Syria SYR 652 Taiwan (China-TaiwanFormosa) TAW 713 Tajikistan TAJ 702 Tanzania TAZ 510 Thailand THI 800 Tibet TBT 711 Togo TOG 461 Trinidad & Tobago TRI 052 Tunisia TUN 616 Turkey TUR 640 Turkmenistan TKM 701 Uganda UGA 500 Ukraine UKR 369 Upper Volta (see Burkina Faso) United Arab Emirates UAE 696 United Kingdom (Great Britain) UKG 200 USA USA 002 USSR (see Russia) Uruguay URU 165 Uzbekistan UZB 704 Vanuatu VAN 935 Venezuela VEN 101 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North Vietnam) DRV 816 Vietnam, Republic of (South Vietnam) RVN 817 CODE NAME NUMBER NAME (ACTOR) (CRACID) Western Sahara (Spanish Sahara) SPA 605 Western Samoa WSM 990 Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) (North Yemen) YEM 678 Yemen, People’s Republic of (South Yemen) YPR 680 Yugoslavia (Serbia) YUG 345 Zambia ZAM 551 Zanzibar ZAN 511 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) ZIM 552 ICB1 VARIABLES - TABLE OF CONTENTS I. CRISIS DIMENSIONS # Name 1 Breakpoint (Trigger) to International Crisis (BREAK) 2 Triggering Entity of International Crisis (TRIGENT) 3 Date of Perception of Crisis Breakpoint (TRIGDATE) 4 Date of Crisis Termination (TERMDATE) 5 Duration of International Crisis (BREXIT) 6 Gravity of Value Threatened (GRAVCR) 7 Crisis Management Technique (CRISMG) 8 Centrality of Violence (CENVIOSY) 9 Intensity of Violence (SEVVIOSY) 10 Violence (VIOL) 11 Timing of Violence (TIMVIO) 12 Intra-War Crisis (IWCMB) 13 Number of Involved Actors (NOACTR) 14 Great Power Involvement in Crisis (GPINV) 15 Great Power Activity as Third Party (GPINVTP) 16 Effectiveness of Great Power Activity as Third Party (GPEFCTTP) 17 Most Effective Great Power Activity as Third Party (GPEFACTP) 18 Great Power Activity as Third Party and Pace of Abatement (GPPACETP) 19 Superpower Involvement in Crisis (POWINV) 20 Content of U.S. Activity (USINV) 21 Effectiveness of U.S. Activity (USEFCT) 22 Most Effective U.S. Activity (USEFAC) 23 U.S. Activity and Pace of Abatement (USPACE) 24 U.S. as Actor or Third Party (USACTOR) 25 Content of USSR Activity (SUINV) 26 Effectiveness of USSR Activity (SUEFCT) 27 Most Effective USSR Activity (SUEFAC) 28 USSR Activity and Pace of Abatement (SUPACE) 29 USSR as Actor or Third Party (SUACTOR) 30 Source of Global Organization Involvement (SOGLACT) 31 Global Organization Organ Most Active in Crisis (GLOBORG) 32 Content of Global Organization Involvement (GLOBACTM) 33 Effectiveness of Global Organization Involvement (GLOBEFCT) 34 Most Effective Global Organization Organ (GLOBEFOR) 35 Most Effective Global Organization Involvement (GLOBEFAC) 36 Global Organization Activity and Pace of Abatement (GLOBPACE) 37 Source of Regional/Security Organization Involvement (SORACT) Variable: 7 Name: CRISMG CRISIS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE A variety of crisis management techniques is used to cope with crises. This variable identifies the primary technique used in an international crisis. The crisis management technique selected for the international crisis as a whole is the highest technique used by any actor along a scale from pacific techniques to violence. Hence the user should refer to the treatment of this variable (CRISMG) in the Codebook for the Actor Level Dataset. Values and Illustrations (1) Negotiation - formal, informal, bilateral, multilateral, international, diplomatic exchange (In the Poland Liberalization Crisis between Poland and the USSR in October 1956, negotiations took place between the parties attending the Polish Plenum). (2) Adjudication or arbitration (3) Mediation - by global or regional organization, ally, or alliance personnel (In the Rann of Kutch Crisis of 1965 between India and Pakistan, both parties agreed to mediation by Britain). (4) Multiple not including violence - (In the Shatt-al-Arab I Crisis of 1959-60, Iran placed its troops on full alert, moved troops to the Iraqi border, and engaged in negotiation, the latter ultimately leading to resolution of the crisis). (5) Non-military pressure -e.g., withholding of promised economic aid (In the Iran-Oil Concession Crisis of 1944, Soviet non-military pressure was decisive in prompting concessions from Iran). (6) Non-violent military - physical acts (maneuvers, redisposition of forces); verbal acts (oral and written statements by authorized leaders threatening to use violence) (Yugoslavia placed its forces on alert and conducted military maneuvers, in response to a Soviet ultimatum threatening military invasion, in the Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia Crisis of 1949). (7) Multiple including violence - (In the 1951-52 Suez Canal Crisis, Britain reinforced its forces in Egypt and engaged in serious clashes with Egyptian troops; it also prohibited the export of arms to Egypt). (8) Violence - (The U.S. and South Korea attempted to manage the 1950 Korean War I Crisis by full-scale military action). Variable: 8 Name: CENVIOSY CENTRALITY OF VIOLENCE For those international crises in which violence was employed as a primary crisis management technique, this variable identifies the centrality of that violence, i.e., the relative importance which decision makers attached to violence in order to obtain their goals. This variable identifies the most extensive use of violence as a crisis management technique by any of the crisis actors. The user should refer to the treatment of this variable (CENVIO) in the codebook for the Actor-Level Dataset. Values and Illustrations (1) No violence (2) Minor violence - violence occurred but played a minor role relative to other, non-violent crisis management techniques (During the Uganda/Tanzania I Crisis of 1971 Ugandan Air Force jets bombed a Tanzanian military camp allegedly used for training anti-Amin forces). (3) Violence important - violence was important, but was supported by other crisis management techniques (In the Ogaden I Crisis of 1964 Ethiopia responded to a Somali attack on a frontier post with military resistance, together with a declaration of a state of emergency, a call for a meeting of the OAU, and a protest to the USSR Charge d'Affaires in Addis Ababa). (4) Violence preeminent (Violence was the preeminent crisis management technique in the Korean War crises of 1950-53). Variable: 9 Name: SEVVIOSY INTENSITY OF VIOLENCE For those international crises in which violence was employed as a primary crisis management technique, this variable identifies the most intense use of violence as a primary crisis management technique by any of the crisis actors. The user should refer to the treatment of this variable (SEVVIO) in the codebook of the Actor-Level Dataset. Values and Illustrations (1) No violence (2) Minor clashes - (between troops of the Warsaw Pact and Czech forces in the Prague Spring Crisis of 1968). (3) Serious clashes - (between India and Pakistan forces in 1965 Rann of Kutch Crisis) (4) Full-scale war - (a Japanese attack and Chinese counter-attack at the Marco Polo Bridge in early July 1937, the initial moves in the long Sino-Japanese war (1937-45)). Variable: 10 Name: VIOL VIOLENCE This variable identifies the extent of violence in an international crisis as a whole, regardless of its use or non-use by a specific actor as a crisis management technique. Values and Illustrations (1) No violence (Cienfuegos Submarine Base Crisis 1970). (2) Minor clashes (Amur River 1937). (3) Serious clashes (Taiwan Strait I, 1954-55). (4) Full-scale war (Bangladesh, 1971). Variable: 11 Name: TIMVIO TIMING OF VIOLENCE This variable indicates the point at which violence (if any) occurred in an international crisis. It refers to violence in general, not necessarily to violence as a crisis management technique (see CENVIOSY and SEVVIOSY above). Values and Illustrations (1) Violence did not occur - (On 10 April 1973 Israel placed its forces on full alert, anticipating an attack by Egyptian forces. An attack did not occur then, and the Israel Mobilization Crisis subsided in late June of that year). (2) Violence prior to the crisis period - (Violence between the French and Vietminh forces had been going on for seven years prior to the crisis over Dien Bien Phu which began on 13 March 1954). (3) Violence triggered the crisis period - (The Bay of Pigs Crisis was triggered on 15 April 1961 by the bombing of Cuban military and civilian centers by U.S.-supplied B-26 aircraft). (4) Violence subsequent to initiation of the crisis period - (In a crisis over the Chinese Eastern Railway, which began on 13 July 1929, violence between Soviet and Chinese troops broke out on 12 August with the Soviet occupation of three strategic towns in north China). Variable: 12 Name: IWCMB INTRA-WAR CRISIS Intra-war crisis is an attribute of an international crisis as a whole; that is, it is characterized by an increase in the intensity of disruptive interaction and incipient change within the structure of an international system. It differs from all other international crises only in the setting in which it occurs, that is, during an ongoing war. An international crisis is identified as an IWC when three conditions obtain: (1) the crisis must begin during a war; that is, the crisis is an integral part of an ongoing war; if the crisis begins before a war erupts or if the crisis begins simultaneously with the outbreak of a war, it is identified as a nonIWC; (2) at least one of the principal adversaries is a continuing actor in that war; and (3) it is an inter-state war, not a civil or purely guerrilla war. The term, initiation of a war – see (2) below – means that the crisis and war began simultaneously. If a war occurs at any time after the eruption of an international crisis, the crisis cannot be coded (2); many crises lead to war, but leading to war at any time later is not synonymous with the initiation of war. While such cases are non-IWCs – they are coded (1) – they cannot be coded (2), initiation of a war, unless crisis and war occurred simultaneously. Not every incident or battle during every war was designated an IWC; only "turning point" environmental changes were included in the dataset. The counterpart IWC at the actor-level is a situation in which an environmental change, during a war, generates a perceived threat to basic values, an awareness of finite time to respond and a perceived adverse change in one's military capabilities or the military balance. Hence the user should refer to the more elaborate treatment of this variable (IWC) in the codebook for the Actor Level Dataset. Values and Illustrations (1) Not an intra-war crisis. (2) Initiation of a war (not an intra-war crisis) - (the outbreak of the first Korean War crisis occurred when North Korean forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950). (3) Entry of a major actor into an ongoing war - (a World War II crisis in the Middle East (Middle East Campaign) occurred in 1941 with the entry of German and Italian forces into that region). (4) Perceived high probability that a major power will enter a war - (Israel's intra-war crisis in November 1956 arose from the Soviet threat to intervene in the Suez Nationalization-War). (5) Perceived high probability that a major power will exit from a war - (in the Christmas Bombing Crisis of 1972, South Vietnam learned of agreements reached between the U.S. and North Vietnam, perceived as signaling the exit of the U.S. from the war). (6) Technological escalation of a war - any introduction of new weapons in a war (German aerial bombing of the U.K., between 10 July and 15 September 1940, constituted the Battle of Britain intra-war crisis). (7) Major non-technological escalation - invasion, major battle (the North Vietnam spring offensive, in March 1972, initiating the Vietnam-Ports Mining intra-war crisis). (8) Defeat in a significant battle - (an intra-war crisis in World War II was triggered by the Soviet defeat of the German Army at Stalingrad). (9) Internal deterioration leading to reduced capability to wage war - economic strength, political stability, social cohesion (Hungarian leaders' perception that German troops were about to invade triggered an IWC in March 1944). (10) Other Variable: 13 Name: NOACTR NUMBER OF INVOLVED ACTORS How many states were perceived by the crisis actors to be involved in an international crisis, including the crisis actors themselves? Where objective evidence existed of substantial involvement without an articulated perception by a crisis actor, these states were included as involved actors. Substantial involvement refers to any one of the following types of activity: direct military; semimilitary; covert; economic; and political other than mere statements of approval or disapproval by officials. This variable is aggregated from the actor-level data (excluding overlaps). Variable: 14 Name: GPINV GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS This scale assesses combined great power involvement in a crisis for the 1918-1945 period. Low involvement includes verbal, political and economic acts. High involvement includes covert, semi-military, and direct military acts. Values and Illustrations (1) Post-1945 case (2) More than two powers low or no involvement (Most of the great powers remained aloof from the Leticia Crisis between Columbia and Peru in 1932-33). (3) One or more powers high involvement, the others low or no involvement (Germany was highly involved in the Czech Annexation Crisis of 1939 while the other great powers did not participate or were marginally involved). (4) One or two powers as crisis actors, the others low or no involvement (Japan was a crisis actor in the Mukden Incident of 1931-32 while three of the other great powers were politically involved). (5) One or two powers as crisis actors, the others high, low or no involvement (Britain and France were crisis actors in the Remilitarization of the Rhineland Crisis in 1936, while Germany was highly involved). (6) More than two powers as crisis actors, the other low or no involvement (Britain, France and Germany were crisis actors in the Czech May Crisis of 1938). (7) More than two powers as crisis actors, the other high, low or no involvement (Britain, France, Japan and the Soviet Union were crisis actors in the 1939 crisis leading to World War II, while the other great powers manifested varying degrees of involvement). Variable: 15 Name: GPINVTP CONTENT OF GREAT POWER ACTIVITY AS THIRD PARTIES This variable assesses great power activity as third parties in crises for the 1918-1939 period. Activity is defined as any substantive verbal or physical act. When great powers were themselves crisis actors, they were excluded. If more than one form of great power activity occurred, the most intense was identified. The small number of international crises during the multipolar period (1918-39) did not justify a separate variable for each of the great powers - France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., the U.S. and the USSR (World War II cases were excluded). Therefore, these data have been collapsed such that the highest level of activity exhibited by any great power in a crisis was taken as the value for the entire crisis. Coding of this variable was based upon the coding for individual actor-cases. Hence the user should refer to the treatment of these variables in the codebook of the Actor Level Dataset (ICB2). Values and Illustrations (1) Post-1939 case (2) Great powers not active - (None of the great powers was involved in the Bulgaria/Turkey Crises of March and August 1935). (3) Low-level great power activity - political activity, including statements of approval or disapproval by authorized government officials; economic involvement, e.g., financial aid, or the withholding of aid from an actor; and propaganda involvement (There was low-level activity by France and Italy in the crisis over the assassination of Yugoslavia's King Alexander, from 9 October to 10 December 1934). (4) Great power covert or semi-military activity - covert activity, e.g., support for antigovernment forces; and military aid or advisors, without participation in actual fighting (Italy rushed troops to the border with Austria in the July 1934 Austria Putsch Crisis). (5) Great power direct military activity - dispatch of troops, aerial bombing of targets or naval assistance to a party in a war (France intervened in the 1919 Hungarian War Crisis by issuing ultimatums to Budapest demanding its withdrawal from Slovakia). Variable: 16 Name: GPEFCTTP EFFECTIVENESS OF GREAT POWER ACTIVITY AS THIRD PARTY This variable assesses the effectiveness of great power activity in abating crises. Effectiveness is understood in terms of preventing hostilities or otherwise contributing to the termination of an international crisis. This assessment refers to the role of the great powers from the first breakpoint (trigger) to the final exitpoint (termination) of an international crisis. The small number of international crises during the multipolar period (1918-39) did not justify a separate breakdown for each of the great powers. Therefore an entire case is coded as the highest level of effectiveness exhibited by any of the great powers. Values and Illustrations (1) Post-1939 case (2) No great power activity (3) Great power activity escalated the crisis - (The USSR supplied China with military equipment during the Marco Polo Bridge Crisis of 1937-38). (4) Great power activity did not contribute to crisis abatement -(In the Mukden Incident Crisis of 1931-32, the U.S. confined its action to nonrecognition of Manchukuo). (5) Great power activity contributed marginally to crisis abatement - great power activity was not a major factor (In the Shantung Crisis of 1927-29, although a U.S. offer of good offices was declined, the U.S. consul in Tsinan reportedly helped to wind down the hostilities). (6) Great power activity had an important impact on crisis abatement - important impact, along with the actions of other international entities (The U.K. played a high-profile role in resolving the Rhenish Rebellion Crisis of 1920 between France and Germany). (7) Great power activity was the single most important contributor to crisis abatement (British mediation efforts during the 1932 Shanghai Crisis between China and Japan). Variable: 17 Name: GPEFACTP MOST EFFECTIVE GREAT POWER ACTIVITY AS THIRD PARTY This variable identifies the most effective type of activity engaged in by the great powers in those crises in which such activity was deemed to have been effective in crisis abatement. The cases coded for this variable are those in which great power activity was identified as the most important, an important, or a marginal contributor to crisis abatement. The small number of international crises during the multipolar period (1918-39) did not justify a separate breakdown for each of the great powers. Therefore these data are collapsed so as to identify the activity associated with the most effective great power in a crisis. Values and Illustrations (1) Post-1939 case (2) Great power not involved or ineffective (3) Effective low-level great power activity - political, economic and propaganda activity (U.S. mediation, together with that of Costa Rica and Venezuela, during the Postage Stamp Crisis of 1937 between Nicaragua and Honduras, prevented armed hostilities between the parties). (4) Effective great power covert and semi-military activity - (During the Saudi-Yemen War of 1933-34 the dispatch of British, French and Italian warships to the area had the effect of halting a Saudi advance). (5) Effective great power military activity - (German military activity in the Baltic Independence Crisis of 1918-20). Variable: 18 Name: GPPACETP GREAT POWER ACTIVITY AS THIRD PARTY AND PACE OF ABATEMENT This variable assesses the impact of great power activity on the timing of crisis abatement. The small number of international crises during the multipolar period (1918-39) did not justify a separate breakdown for each of the great powers. Therefore an entire case was coded as the highest value exhibited by any of the great powers. Values and Illustrations (1) Post-1939 case (2) No great power activity (There was no great power activity in the Bulgaria/Turkey I Crisis of 1935). (3) Great power activity delayed termination (The U.K. provided military aid to the Greeks in the Greece/Turkey War I Crisis of 1920, thereby prolonging the duration of the crisis). (4) Great power activity had no effect on the timing of termination (Great power activity in the Anschluss Crisis of 1938 had no effect on crisis termination). (5) Great power activity contributed to more rapid termination (Major power activity -- France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. -- contributed to the termination of the Aaland Islands Crisis of 192021). Variable: 19 Name: POWINV US AND USSR/RUSSIA JOINT INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS This variable assesses combined U.S. and USSR (or Russia after 1991) involvement in crises for the post-World War II period. The U.S. and the USSR were superpowers from 1945-1989. Thereafter, the U.S. was the sole superpower. However, we continue to code joint U.S. and USSR (later Russian) involvement in crises because Russia remained, by virtue of its nuclear stockpile, the second power in the global system. Low level includes verbal, political and economic acts. High involvement includes covert, semi-military, and direct military acts. This variable replaces SPINVMB in earlier releases of the ICB datasets. Values and Illustrations (1) Pre-end World War II case (2) Both powers low or no involvement (The U.S. was politically involved in, and the USSR/Russia remained aloof from, the Punjab War Scare between India and Pakistan in 1951). (3) One power high involvement, the other power low or no involvement (The USSR engaged in direct military activity in the Catalina Affair in 1952, shooting down a Swedish flying boat, with U.S. involvement limited to verbal criticism of the Soviet act). (4) One power a crisis actor, the other power low or no involvement (The U.S. was a crisis actor in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954-55, supporting Taiwan, while USSR activity was confined to political support for the PRC). Name: SUACTOR Location: Record 2, Column 29 USSR/RUSSIA AS ACTOR OR THIRD PARTY This variable differentiates between cases in which the USSR/Russia was an actor in the crisis, and those in which it functioned as a third party. Values (1) USSR/Russia not an actor in crisis (2) USSR/Russia actor in crisis Variable: 30 Name: SOGLACT SOURCE OF GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT This variable addresses the basic question: which party(ies) (if any) approached the League or Nations/United Nations during a crisis? The initial request may have occurred prior to the crisis period (i.e., from the first breakpoint (trigger) to the last exitpoint (termination)). Values and Illustrations (0) Global organization not in existence (1918-10 January 1920) (1) Global organization not approached. (2) Crisis actor(s) (In the Mukden Incident Crisis, China appealed to the League of Nations following a Japanese invasion on 18 September 1931). (3) Third party - non-crisis actor or actor involved in a crisis, other than a superpower (In the Moroccan March Crisis of 1975/76, Spain appealed to the UN for action). (4) United States (The U.S. requested a Security Council meeting during the Gulf of Tonkin Crisis of August 1964). (5) Soviet Union (The USSR called for a UN Security Council Resolution on OAS sanctions during the crisis between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic in 1960). (6) Initiated by global organization (During the crisis resulting from the invasion of Laos by North Vietnam in 1971, UN Secretary-General U Thant appealed for negotiation). (7) Multiple (Gulf of Syrte I, 1981). Variable: 31 Name: GLOBORG GLOBAL ORGANIZATION ORGAN MOST ACTIVE IN CRISIS Which organ of the global organization was the most active in a crisis? Where more than one organ was very active, perhaps during different stages of a crisis, the highest organ was chosen, according to the ranking below. Values and Illustrations (0) GO not in existence (1918-10 Jan. 1920) (1) No global organization activity (2) General/other global organization activity - no data about specific involvement or through a specific organ, or sub-organs subject to the (General) Assembly, specialized agencies such as UNESCO (In the Punjab War Scare Crisis of 1951 between India and Pakistan, the UN Representative for Kashmir was in the area and had discussions with Indian and Pakistani officials). (3) Secretary-General (During the Cambodia/Thailand Crisis of 1958-59 UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold appointed a retired Swiss diplomat as a mediator). (4) (General) Assembly (During the Suez Nationalization-War Crisis, July-November 1956, the UN General Assembly voted to send an emergency military force to the region). (5) (Security) Council (on 27 June 1980, the Security Council passed a resolution condemning South Africa's attack on Angola's Southern provinces in the Operation Smokeshell Crisis). Variable: 32 Name: GLOBACTM CONTENT OF GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT This variable identifies the content of global organization involvement during the course of an international crisis. Values and Illustrations (0) GO not in existence (1918-10 Jan. 1920) (1) No global organization involvement (2) Discussion without resolution (During the crisis which resulted from the Israeli retaliatory raid on the Jordanian village of Karameh in March 1968, the UN Security Council discussed the matter but failed to pass a resolution). (3) Fact-finding (UN Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche visited Yemen on a fact-finding mission in the Yemen War I Crisis in 1963). (4) Good offices - minimal involvement in both the content and process of resolving a dispute (In the Mayaguez Crisis between the U.S. and Cambodia in May 1975 the UN Secretary-General offered his good offices to settle the dispute). (5) Condemnation - includes an implied or explicit demand to desist, a request for member aid to the victim of hostile activity (UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali condemned Israel on 28 July 1993 during the Operation Accountability Crisis). (6) Call for action by adversaries - includes call for cease-fire, withdrawal, negotiation, member action to facilitate termination (The UN Security Council censured South Africa for its military operation in Angola in the Operation Askari Crisis of 1983). (7) Mediation - includes proposing a solution, offering advice, and conciliation of differences (Secretary-General Waldheim's mediation efforts in the Moroccan March Crisis of 1975 contributed substantially to crisis abatement). (8) Arbitration - formal binding settlement by arbitral body (The League Council, in January 1937, placed Alexandretta under Syrian control and drafted a Statute of Fundamental Law of the Sanjak). (9) Sanctions (The League of Nations adopted a resolution to maintain an arms embargo against Paraguay and to lift it from Bolivia, on 16 January 1935 during the second Chaco Crisis). (10) Observer group (During the Lebanon/Iraq Crisis of 1958 the Security Council adopted a resolution dispatching an observer group to Lebanon to ensure that there was no infiltration across its border). (11) Authorization of military force by members – cases in which the organization authorized the use of force by member states to enforce a resolution but did not commit organization forces (On November 1990, at US urging, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, authorizing the “use (of) all necessary means” by member-states to secure Iraq’s compliance with all its earlier resolutions). (12) Emergency military forces (In July 1960 the Security Council passed a resolution establishing a UN emergency military force for the Congo in the Congo: Katanga Crisis). (13) General-other Variable: 33 Name: GLOBEFCT EFFECTIVENESS OF GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT This variable assesses the effectiveness of global organization (GO) activity in abating international crises. Effectiveness is understood in terms of preventing hostilities, or otherwise contributing to the termination of a crisis. This assessment refers to the role of the GO from the first breakpoint to the final exitpoint of an international crisis. Values and Illustrations (0) GO not in existence (1918-10 Jan. 1920) (1) No global organization activity (2) Global organization involvement escalated crisis (The dispatch of a UN Observer Group to Lebanon in 1958 exacerbated that crisis and delayed its termination, since the group was too small to cover the entire border area). (3) Global organization involvement did not contribute to crisis abatement (The UN Security Council became involved in the 1945-47 Indonesia Independence I Crisis but its activity did not contribute to the resolution of that crisis). (4) Global organization involvement contributed marginally to crisis abatement (During the War of Attrition Crisis in 1969-70, UN Observer Forces and Big Four talks under UN auspices contributed marginally to crisis abatement). (5) Global organization involvement had an important impact on crisis abatement (The active participation of the UN Secretary-General (and the U.S. Government) in the West Irian Crisis of 1961-62 had an important impact on crisis abatement). (6) Global organization involvement was the single most important contributor to crisis abatement (The Caprivi Strip Crisis in 1971 terminated when the UN Security Council passed a resolution condemning South Africa and calling on it to respect the sovereignty of Zambia). Variable: 34 Name: GLOBEFOR MOST EFFECTIVE GLOBAL ORGANIZATION ORGAN This variable addresses those crises in which global organization involvement was deemed to have been effective in crisis abatement. Specifically, it identifies the organs that were coded as marginally effective, important, or most important in terms of crisis abatement, as reported in GLOBEFCT above. Values and Illustrations (0) GO not in existence (1918-10 Jan. 1920) (1) No global organization involvement (2) GO ineffective (3) Secretary-General (During the Burundi-Rwanda Crisis of 1963-64 the UN Secretary-General appointed a Representative to investigate the refugee problem). (4) (General) Assembly (In the Suez Nationalization-War Crisis of 1956-57 the General Assembly decided to send an emergency military force to the region). (5) (Security) Council (In the Cyprus III Crisis of 1974-75, the Security Council arranged and supervised cease-fires and facilitated talks among the parties to the crisis). (6) Other Variable: 35 Name: GLOBEFAC MOST EFFECTIVE GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT This variable addresses those crises in which global organization involvement was deemed to have had a positive effect on crisis abatement. It identifies the specific actions which were coded as marginally effective, important and most important in terms of crisis abatement, that is, positive effect as reported in the effectiveness variable (GLOBEFCT above). Values (for illustrations, see GLOBACTM above) (0) GO not in existence (1918-10 Jan. 1920) (1) No global organization involvement (2) GO involvement ineffective (3) Discussion without resolution (4) Fact-finding (5) Good offices (6) Condemnation (7) Call for action by adversaries (8) Mediation (9) Arbitration (10) Sanction (11) Observer group (12) Authorization of military force by members (13) Emergency military force (14) General-other Variable: 36 Name: GLOBPACE GLOBAL ORGANIZATION ACTIVITY AND PACE OF ABATEMENT This variable assesses the impact of global organization activity on the timing of crisis abatement. Values and Illustrations (0) GO not in existence (1918-10 Jan. 1920) (1) No global organization activity (The UN was not involved in the Mocoron Incident Crisis of 1957 between Honduras and Nicaragua). (2) GO activity delayed termination (UN activity delayed termination of the Guatemala Crisis of 1953-54 involving Guatemala, Honduras and the USA). (3) GO activity had no effect on the timing of termination (UN activity had no impact on the timing of termination of the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis of 1982 between the U.K. and Argentina). (4) GO activity contributed to more rapid termination (UN activity contributed to the more rapid termination of Lebanon's Litani Operation Crisis of 1978). Variable: 37 Name: SORACT SOURCE OF REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT The following seven variables refer to the activity and effectiveness of regional/security organizations (RSOs) in international crises. Since RSO involvement was virtually non-existent prior to 1945, the data reported here pertain only to the post-World War II period. The first variable addresses the following question: which party(ies) (if any) approached a regional/security organization during a crisis? (The initial approach may have occurred prior to the first breakpoint of the crisis period.) Values and Illustrations (0) RSO not in existence (1) RSO no approached (2) Crisis actor(s) (In January 1955 Costa Rica appealed to the OAS in an international crisis triggered by the arrival of Costa Rican rebels in Nicaragua via Venezuela). (3) Third party - non-crisis actor or actor involved in a crisis, other than superpower (In the Guinea Crisis of 1970 Ethiopia, Egypt, Libya and Sudan called for action by the OAU, which ultimately passed a resolution condemning Portugal and demanding reparations for Guinea). (4) U.S. (In the Nam Tha Offensive II Crisis of 1962 the U.S. initiated action by SEATO forces). (5) USSR (In the Ussuri River Crisis of 1969 the Warsaw Treaty Organization met at the request of the USSR). (6) Initiation by regional/security organization (In the Berlin Deadline Crisis of 1957-58 NATO initiated action). (7) Multiple Variable: 38 Name: REGORG REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION MOST ACTIVE IN CRISIS Which regional/security organization was most active in a crisis, regardless of form, substance or alignment? Values and Illustrations (0) RSO no in existence (1) No RSO involvement (2) League of Arab States (During the Palestine Partition-Israeli Independence Crisis of 1947-49 the Arab League announced the decisions to keep Palestine as an Arab state and to set up an army of volunteers). (3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (In the Syria/Turkey Border Crisis of 1957, NATO's commander issued a warning to the USSR concerning its intentions regarding Turkey). (4) Organization of American States (During the Mocoron Incident Crisis of April-May 1957 between Honduras and Nicaragua, an OAS investigating committee succeeded in getting both parties to sign a cease-fire). (5) Organization of African Unity (In the Kenya/Somalia Crisis of 1963-64, the OAU Council of Ministers passed a resolution calling for steps to settle the dispute). (6) Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (During the Vietcong Attack Crisis of 1961, SEATO military advisors met and issues a communique). (7) Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968 during the Prague Spring Crisis). (8) CENTO (9) Council of Europe (10) Other (11) Multiple Variable: 39 Name: REGACTMB CONTENT OF REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT This variable identifies the content of regional/security organization activity during the course of a crisis. Values and Illustrations (0) RSO not in existence (1) No RSO involvement (2) Discussion without resolution (During the West Irian I Crisis the NATO Council met in December 1957 but took no action). (3) Fact-finding (In the Dominican Republic/Haiti Crisis of 1963 an OAS fact-finding mission shuttled between the two countries in an attempt at de-escalation). (4) Good offices (The President of the Union Africaine et Malgache offered his good offices in the settlement of a territorial dispute between Niger and Dahomey in 1963-64). (5) Condemnation (In the crisis resulting from the assassination attempt on the Venezuelan President in 1960 the OAS passed a resolution condemning the Government of the Dominican Republic). (6) Call for action (During the Indonesian Independence III Crisis of 1948-49 the Arab League passed a resolution calling for Dutch acceptance of a cease-fire). (7) Mediation (In the Black September Crisis of 1970 the Arab League played a mediating role in producing a cease-fire between Jordan and Syria). (8) Arbitration (The OAS arbitrated the dispute between Honduras and El Salvador in the Football War of 1969). (9) Sanctions (In the Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia Crisis of 1949, the COMECON imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia). (10) Observer group (The League of Arab States adopted a resolution to supervise the implementation of a cease-fire between North and South Yemen in 1979). (11) Emergency military force (In the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965 an OAS Resolution called for the dispatch of an Inter-American Peace Force to the Dominican Republic). (12) Multiple activity (In the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961 Khrushchev's demand for a settlement of the Berlin problem elicited NATO consultations and WTO endorsement). (13) General-other Variable: 40 Name: ROEFCT EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT This variable assesses the effectiveness of regional/security organization activity in abating an international crisis. Effectiveness is understood in terms of preventing hostilities, or otherwise contributing to the termination of a crisis. This assessment refers to the role of the RSO from the first breakpoint to the final exitpoint of an international crisis. Values and Illustrations (0) RSO no in existence (1) No RSO activity (2) RSO involvement escalated the crisis (Warsaw Treaty Organization military exercises at the height of the Prague Spring Crisis of 1968 exacerbated that crisis). (3) RSO involvement did not contribute to crisis abatement (A joint OAU/Arab League effort to abate the 1975-76 Moroccan March Crisis did not have any effect on that crisis). (4) RSO involvement contributed marginally to crisis abatement (The passage of an OAU resolution calling for a settlement of the Kenya/Somalia Crisis of 1963-64 contributed marginally to crisis abatement). (5) RSO involvement had an important impact on crisis abatement (During the Dominican Republic/Haiti Crisis of 1963, OAS activity, including shuttle diplomacy between the two states and a report, had an important impact on crisis abatement). (6) RSO involvement was the single most important contributor to crisis abatement (The OAS Council played a critical role in abating the second Costa Rica/Nicaragua Crisis in 1955, including the sending of observers to the area). Variable: 41 Variable: 50 Name: HETERO HETEROGENEITY Heterogeneity among adversarial actors is measured by the number of attribute differences between the most heterogeneous pair of adversaries within an international crisis. The attributes are military capability, political regime, economic development, and culture (belief system, ideology, language). Values and Illustrations (1) None (The adversaries in the 1959-60 crises ensuing from Cuba-inspired invasions of several Caribbean and Central American states were all small powers, with underdeveloped economies, authoritarian regimes and the inheritance of Spanish-American culture). (2) One attribute (There was only one attribute difference between India and Pakistan in their postpartition crises; the former was primarily influenced by Hindu culture, the latter by Islam). (3) Two attributes (In the 1947 Marshall Plan Crisis there were adversary difference in two attributes: political - Western democracy versus Soviet communism; and military - a small power versus a superpower). (4) Three attributes (In the Trieste II Crisis of 1953 Italy and Yugoslavia differed on all but one attribute of heterogeneity: an economically developed versus a developing economy; a Western democratic versus a Communist political regime; and cultural differences embracing language, religion and history. Both states were middle powers militarily). (5) All four attributes (In the 1956-57 Suez Nationalization-War Crisis the U.K. and France were major powers in global terms, while Egypt was a small power. The former were economically advanced, the latter had a poor developing economy. The adversaries also differed in political regime and in culture). Variable: 51 Name: ISSUES ISSUES This variable was coded according to the principal issue-area for the crisis actors (military- security, political-diplomatic, economic-developmental, and cultural-status), and any change during a crisis. Values and Illustrations (1) One issue other than military-security (In the Panama Flag crisis of 1964, the issues included sovereignty and U.S. payments to Panama). (2) Two issues other than military-security (Turkey's status in the Middle East was undermined by France's cession of the port of Alexandretta to Syria in 1936). (3) Military-security issue alone (In the Ogaden I Crisis of 1964 Ethiopia and Somalia focused their attention exclusively on that territory). (4) Two issues, including military-security (In the 1967 Cyprus II Crisis both territory and influence in the eastern Mediterranean were issues between Greece and Turkey). (5) Three or more issues (Austria's status as an independent state was challenged when members of the Austrian Nazi Party assassinated Chancellor Dollfuss in 1934; the danger of a German takeover of Austria created a military-security crisis for Czechoslovakia and a political-diplomatic crisis for Italy). Variable: 52 Name: CHACTS CHANGE IN ACTORS Change in actors comprises regime change, whether in orientation or type, and more basic structural shifts for one or more independent states as a result of an international crisis. If 5 years have not elapsed between the trigger date and the date of the coding of the case, code the case (9). Values and Illustrations (1) No change (Ogaden I 1964). (2) Change in regime orientation (regime change in Lebanon, following the Lebanon War 1982). (3) Change in regime type (from Marxism to democratic in Grenada, after the Invasion of Grenada 1983). (4) Creation/preservation/elimination of one or more state actors (the creation of Israel, as a result of the Palestine Partition-Israel Independence Crisis 1947-49). (5) Interim case - case was not the final (or most recent) crisis between a set of adversaries (Chad/Libya VII 1986). (9) Missing or recent case (5 years). Variable: 53 Name: CHALL CHANGE IN ALLIANCE CONFIGURATION This variable refers to a shift in the structure or pattern of alliances as a result of an international crisis. If 5 years have not elapsed between the trigger date and the date of the coding of the case, code the case (9). Values and Illustrations (1) No change in alliance configuration (Sino-Vietnam Clashes 1984). (2) Increase/decrease of cohesiveness within an existing alliance (Ogaden II 1977-78). (3) Entry/exit of actor(s) into/from a formal or informal alliance (Azerbaijan 1945-46). (4) Formation/elimination of an alliance (Libya/Malta Oil Dispute 1980). (5) Interim case (see CHACTS - Variable 52 - above). (9) Missing or recent case (5 years). Variable: 54 Name: POWCH CHANGE IN DISTRIBUTION OF POWER This variable refers to change in the number of power centers and/or the hierarchy of power. If 5 years have not elapsed between the trigger date and the date of the coding of the case, code the case (9). Values and Illustrations (1) No change in relative power among adversaries (Gulf of Syrte I 1981). (2) Change in relative power of adversarial crisis actors (Kenya/Somalia 1963-64). (3) Change in ranking of states among the five most powerful within the dominant system or a subsystem (Formation of the United Arab Republic 1958). (4) Change in composition of states at the apex of the power pyramid (Palestine Partition/Israel Independence 1947-49). (5) Interim case (see CHACTS - Variable 52 - above). (9) Missing or recent case (5 years). Variable: 55 Name: RUGACH CHANGE IN RULES OF THE GAME This variable refers to those norms derived from law, custom morality or self-interest that serve as guidelines for legitimate behavior by the actors of a system. These rules may be informal or formally codified. If 5 years have not elapsed between the trigger date and the date of the coding of the case, code the case (9). Values and Illustrations (1) No change in rules of the game (Falklands/Malvinas War 1982). (2) Decline in consensus (Iraq Nuclear Reactor 1981). (3) Breakdown in consensus (Raid on Angola 1979). (4) Creation/elimination of codified or tacit rules of the game (al-Biqa Missiles I 1981). (5) Interim case (See CHACTS - Variable 52 - above). (9) Missing or recent case (5 years). PART II - CONTROLS Variable: 56 Name: GEOG GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF CRISIS International crises were grouped into regions according to where they took place. Values (9) Central Asia (11) East Asia (12) South-east Asia (13) South Asia (15) Middle East (20) West Africa (21) North Africa (22) East Africa (23) Southern Africa (24) Central Africa (30) Euro-Asia (31) East Europe (32) Central Europe (33) West Europe (34) North Europe (35) Southern Europe (41) North America (42) Central America (43) South America (51) Australasia Variable: 57 Name: GEOGREL GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF PRINCIPAL ADVERSARIES Variables (1) Contiguous (Thailand and Burma, the adversaries in the 1992 Sleeping Dog Hill Crisis, shared a common border). (2) Near neighbors (Iraq and Israel, the adversaries in the Iraq Nuclear Reactor Crisis of 1981, were near neighbors). (3) Distant (Turkey and the U.K. were distant adversaries in the Chanak Crisis of 1922). Variable: 58 Name: PERIOD POLARITY Each international crisis was coded according to the polarity structure of the global system at the time of the crisis. Values and Illustrations (1) Multipolarity: 1918-1939 (Munich 1938). (2) World War II: 1939-1945 (Battle of Britain 1940). (3) Bipolarity: 1945-1962 (Cuba Missiles 1962). (4) Polycentrism: 1963-1989 (Bangledesh 1971). (5) Unipolarity: 1990- (North Korea Nuclear Crisis 1993-94). Variable: 59 Name: SYSLEVSY SYSTEM LEVEL This variable identifies the system level at which an international crisis occurred. Values (1) Subsystem (Chaco I 1928-29). (2) Mainly subsystem (Angola 1975-76). (3) Mainly dominant system (Ussuri River 1969). (4) Dominant system (Berlin Blockade 1948-49). Variable: 60 Name: PROTRAC PROTRACTED CONFLICT Protracted conflict refers to conflict situations of extended duration, fluctuating interaction, spillover of hostility into all aspects of relations, strong forces tending to restore equilibrium, and indefinite continuation. Values and Illustrations (1) Non-protracted conflict (The Ussuri River Crisis between the USSR and China, 1969). (2) Non-long-war protracted conflict (The Cyprus II Crisis of 1967, involving Turkey, Greece and Cyprus). (3) Long-war protracted conflict (The Basra-Kharg Island Crisis of 1984, which occurred during the Iran-Iraq War, involving Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia). Variable: 61 Name: PCID PROTRACTED CONFLICT CODE NUMBER Each actor case is identified by a protracted conflict number, according to the values below. Africa PC Number (1) Angola (2) Chad/Libya (3) Ethiopia/Somalia (4) Rhodesia (5) Western Sahara (35) DRC (Zaire)-Rwanda Americas PC Number (6) Costa Rica/Nicaragua (7) Ecuador/Peru (8) Honduras/Nicaragua Asia PC Number (9) Afghanistan/Pakistan (10) China/Japan (11) China/Vietnam (12) India/Pakistan (13) Indochina (14) Indonesia (15) Korea (34) North Korea Nuclear Europe PC Number (16) Czechoslovakia/Germany (17) Finland/Russia (18) France/Germany (19) Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia (20) Lithuania/Poland (21) Poland/Russia (33) Yugoslavia (36) Georgia/Russia Middle East PC Number (23) Arab/Israel (24) Iran/Iraq (25) Iraq/Kuwait (26) Yemen Multiregional PC Number (27) East/West (28) Greece/Turkey (29) Iran/USSR (30) Taiwan Strait (31) World War II (32) Iraq Regime (40) Africa non-protracted conflicts (41) Americas non-protracted conflicts (42) Asia non-protracted conflicts (43) Europe non-protracted conflicts (44) Middle East non-protracted conflicts Variable: 62 Name: POWDISSY POWER DISCREPANCY This variable refers to the capability gap between adversaries in an international crisis, whether individual states or coalitions. Capability is measured by six components: size of population, GNP, alliance relationships vis-a-vis major powers, territorial size, military capability, and nuclear capability. The extent of power discrepancy in a crisis ranges from none, when all adversaries are at the same level of capability (e.g., Rwanda-Burundi Crisis 1964), to maximal discrepancy, when the principal adversaries are a superpower and a small power (e.g., Mayaguez Crisis 1975 between the U.S. and Cambodia). Variable: 63 Name: ETHNIC ETHNICITY RELATED CRISIS This variable assesses ethnicity in terms of the presence or absence of an ethnic component in a crisis. The basic coding for this variable is reported in D. Carment, AThe International Politics of Ethnic Conflicts,@ Ph.D. Diss. McGill University, Montreal 1993. Coding for a number of cases has been revised, and new codes for the cases beyond 1989 have been added. Values and Illustrations (1) Secessionist conflict - one or more ethnic groups seek a reduction of control or autonomy from a central authority (Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Pushtunistan I Crisis of 1949-50). (2) Irredentist conflict - a claim to the territory of an entity -- usually an independent state -- wherein an ethnic in-group is in a numerical minority (Burkina Faso and Mali in their 1985-86 border crisis). (3) Non-ethnic conflict (The U.K. and Iceland in Cod War I 1973). Coding Information: Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Indicates whether any facilitative forms of mediation were used. Facilitative forms of mediation include any of the following actions (adapted from Jacob Bercovitch 1997, “Mediation in International Conflict,” in I.W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace). Facilitation: 1. Made contact with parties 2. Gained the trust and confidence of the parties 3. Arranged for interactions between the parties 4. Identified underlying issues and interests 5. Clarified the situation 6. Supplied missing information 7. Transmitted messages between parties 8. Fact-finding 9. Offered positive evaluations 10. Allowed the interests of all parties to be discussed Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) No facilitative mediation occurred (3) Facilitative mediation (9) Cannot be determined, missing data Variable 76: MEDFORM WAS FORMULATIVE MEDIATION USED Variable Description: Was a formulative style of mediation used? Coding Information: Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Indicates whether any formulative forms of mediation were used. Formulation mediation includes any of the following (adapted from Jacob Bercovitch 1997, “Mediation in International Conflict,” in I.W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace). Formulation: 11. Controlled the pace and formality of the meetings 12. Controlled the physical environment 13. Ensured the privacy of mediation 14. Highlighted common interests 15. Controlled timing 16. Helped devise a framework for an acceptable outcome 17. Helped parties save face 18. Kept the process focused on the issues 19. Made substantive suggestions and proposals 20. Suggested concessions parties could make Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) No formulative mediation occurred (3) Formulative mediation (9) Cannot be determined, missing data Variable 77: MEDMANIP WAS MANIPULATIVE MEDIATION USED Variable Description: Was a manipulative style of mediation used? Coding Information: Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Indicates whether any manipulative forms of mediation were used. Manipulative forms include any of the following (adapted from Jacob Bercovitch 1997, “Mediation in International Conflict,” in I.W. Zartman and J.L. Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace). Manipulative: 21. Kept parties at the table 22. Changed parties’ expectations 23. Took responsibility for concessions 24. Made parties aware of the costs of non-agreement 25. Supplied and filtered information 26. Helped negotiators to undo a commitment 27. Rewarded concessions made by the parties 28. Pressed the parties to show flexibility 29. Promised resources 30. Threatened withdrawal of resources 31. Offered to verify compliance with the agreement 32. Added incentives 33. Threatened punishments 34. Threatened to withdraw mediation Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) No manipulative mediation occurred (3) Manipulative mediation (9) Cannot be determined, missing data Variable 78: MEDSTYLE HIGHEST MEDIATION STYLE USED Variable Description: What was the highest mediation style used in the crisis, based on the coding of Variables 75, 76, and 77? Coding Information: Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Highest is coded on a scale from facilitation through formulation to manipulation. Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) Facilitation (3) Formulation (4) Manipulation (9) Cannot be determined, missing data Variable 79: MEDSTEFCT WHICH MEDIATION STYLE MOST EFFECTIVE Variable Description: Which style of mediation had the greatest effect on the outcome of the crisis? Coding Information: Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) Facilitative (3) Formulative (4) Manipulative (5) Mediation ineffective (9) Cannot be determined, missing data Variable 80: MEDEFCT EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDIATION Variable Description: What was the effectiveness of mediation on crisis abatement? Coding Information: This variable assesses the effectiveness of mediation on crisis abatement. Effectiveness is understood here in terms of easing tensions or otherwise contributing to the termination of the crisis. Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) No effect (3) Had effect, crisis escalated (4) Had effect, marginal decrease in tensions (5) Had effect, mediation was important factor in easing tensions (6) Had effect, mediation was the most important factor in easing tensions (9) Cannot be determined, missing data Variable 81: MEDPACE MEDIATION EFFECT ON PACE OF CRISIS ABATEMENT Variable Description: What was the impact of mediation on the pace of crisis abatement? Coding Information: This variable assesses the impact of mediation on the pace of crisis abatement. Coded for the primary mediator identified in Variable 69. Values: (1) No mediation, or not supplied, or not accepted (2) Delayed termination of crisis (3) No effect on pace (4) Contributed to more rapid termination of crisis (9) Cannot be determined, missing data