Science and Technology Agreements in the Toolbox of Science Diplomacy: Effective Instruments or Insignificant Add-ons?

Rüffin, Nicolas Working Paper Science and Technology Agreements in the Toolbox of Science Diplomacy: Effective Instruments or Insignificant Add-ons? EL-CSID Working Paper, No. 6 Provided in Cooperation with: WZB Berlin Social Science Center Suggested Citation: Rüffin, Nicolas (2017) : Science and Technology Agreements in the Toolbox of Science Diplomacy: Effective Instruments or Insignificant Add-ons?, EL-CSID Working Paper, No. 6, Institute for European Studies, Brussels, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.891198 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/232022 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) Issue 2017/6 • September 2017 This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 693799 as part of the “European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy” (EL-CSID) project. The paper reflects only the author’s view, and the Research Executive Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. Case Study Science and technology agreements in the toolbox of science diplomacy: Effective instruments or insignificant add-ons? Nicolas Rüffin, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany With the cooperation of Ulrich Schreiterer, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 2 Content Summary 3 Introduction 4 Method 5 Results 7 Quantitative Data 7 Qualitative Data 9 Discussion 10 Outlook for research and practice 13 Bibliography 15 About the authors 16 Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 3 Summary • Both practitioners and scholars tend to regard Science and Technology Agreements (STA) to be important, prominent, and highly effective tools for science diplomacy (SD). Yet it is far from clear whether they form an integral part of strategic approaches toward SD or mostly remain rather erratic adhoc agreements with more probably vague or even insignificant roles. Since we know but little about the development of STA over time, it is very difficult to get data and a valid picture on what is going on there at all and what impact STA might have. • Based on a working definition of STA, we conducted a quantitative study to map the STA that six countries (DK, FR, DE, CH, UK, U.S.) and the European Union have signed between 1961 and 2016. In addition, through a range of expert interviews, we tried to capture practitioners’ views on the role and workings of STA in the realms of international science policy and SD in particular. • What we see is a large increase in the number of concluded STA over time. While some of the countries in our sample made extensive use of STA, others were more hesitant or even reluctant to do so. Still, we witness a strong integration of G20-states in a network of bilateral STA. To illustrate the highly diverse uses and importance of STA, we present four cases of negotiations that point to their limited strategic use. From our expert interviews, we could differentiate between four types of views or opinions with regard to the uses of STA. • If we view STA in their respective political context, some apparently erratic provisions turn into meaningful strategic instruments. Overall, STA may carry different meanings to different stakeholders engaged in the negotiations; this is why they always serve as boundary objects. • For future research, it would be worthwhile to look into the interconnections, or interplays, between STA and other tools of SD on the one hand and contextual variables like geopolitical shifts and organisational backgrounds that shape negotiations and appraisal of STA on the other. Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 4 Introduction In the wake of increasing global competition and challenges, science and technology (S&T) issues gain more and more attention in international relations and foreign policy. Eager for enhancing their S&T capabilities and international position, national governments, research organisations, foundations and companies engage Diplomacy for Science to stimulate and bolster global research collaborations and internationalisation. In addition, science has come to be seen as means to foster diplomatic relations between nations, following the idea of Science for Diplomacy (Royal Society, 2010). Consequently, numerous countries are now engaging in what they consider Science Diplomacy (SD). However, the means and ends of their activities differ widely not just between countries but also compared to other stakeholders and players in that field (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). While some governments focus on improving research excellence, business opportunities, and innovation, others like the U.S. leverage SD to sustain and enhance international relations and their international standing. Similarly, other stakeholders seize widely different means to pursue their objectives. Science and Technology Agreements (STA) are often regarded convenient tools to serve strategic SD objectives. For example, Van Langenhove (2017) counts STA among effective instruments of SD like S&T advisory boards, science counsellors deployed at embassies, or the opening of national research funding schemes to partners from abroad. In this view, STA are policy instruments whose well-defined means, resources and objectives make a clear difference to more general approaches or programs in the toolbox of SD. The literature on STA supports the view that they have become a flexible device of SD that may serve very different ends at the same time. Dolan (2012), for instance, studied the STA that the U.S. government had entered, starting with an agreement with Japan in 1961. She identified four drivers for concluding STA: Transforming diplomatic relations, promoting public diplomacy, highlighting cooperation on the occasion of an official state visit, and protecting U.S. National Security. According to her, the conclusion of all current U.S.-STA can be traced back to different configurations of these four motives, what she demonstrated with several case studies. In a report to the Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission (EC), Fikkers and Horvat (2014) pulled up 11 additional reasons for signing STA that address different aspects of the research and innovation process, such as facilitating mobility of human capital or to get access to research infrastructures and new markets. Overall, the authors distinguished a narrow set of S&T-relat- ed objectives from a broader, fuzzier perspective on STA which also includes issues that are more related to the Science for Diplomacy side of SD. In particular, they tried to pinpoint the effectiveness of STA by a comparative analysis of 103 agreements; however, the heterogeneity of STA and diverging modes of evaluation and review procedures make it difficult to come up with sound outcomes, let alone a clear picture. Rather, the report suggests that–despite positive effects in individual cases–signing such agreements may even happen merely accidentally, lacking clear strategy and goals.1 Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 5 In spite of such, after all, rather favourable general appraisals of STA, a few pieces are missing in the puzzle. In particular, we see three major shortcomings: • The actual understandings, and uses, of STA differ as much as the definitions of, and approaches to SD. In particular, this holds true for their implementation and outcomes. It is always national governments that negotiate these agreements with one another. But apart from that we notice a great variety of types of contracts, treaties, and memoranda of understanding between all kinds of entities: National governments, individual ministries, provinces and states, funding institutions, research organisations, and universities all maintain their own network of collaborations. Partly, these are formalised by way of some kind of STA, but mostly, they are just informal. • So far, literature has paid but little attention to the development and diffusion of STA over time. If STA were an operational tool for SD, however, we should be able to observe their diffusion occurring in lockstep with the expansion of SD activities in general. In a similar vein, we might presume there is a close correlation between the conclusion of STA and general trends in international relations. • The great heterogeneity of STA across different cases, topics and stakeholders cast doubts on the claim that they are an essential part of each SD toolbox. While aims, motives, and drivers more often than not remain obscure, sometimes STA seem to hamper, or even contradict, a general SD agenda. In this case study, we tried to tackle these shortcomings in the following way: • To avoid the risk of not seeing the wood for the trees, first we settled for a working definition of STA as basis for a coherent analysis of STA as tools of SD. • To amend recent studies on STA, we looked into their development over time. In addition, we linked the gist of STA with geopolitical trends so that we might be able to identify cases in which they clearly serve as a part of SD initiatives. Last but not least, we tried to map the diffusion of STA all across the globe. • To tell if STA might be valuable tools for SD, we picked up on the views of practitioners in the field of SD who are familiar with different aspects and matters of SD. Ultimately, we hope we could shed some new lights on both the general development of STA over time and their handling by SD experts. Method The landscape of STA is highly diverse: There are many different types of agreements in place between different actors in the field of S&T. To get a common base for our analysis, we looked for a working definition of the specific type of STA we wanted to investigate in more detail. In order to get there, we first narrowed down our sample according to the rationale of our case study. As we wanted to analyse the role of STA in national SD toolboxes, we dismissed all agreements between non-state actors or memoranda of understanding that lack a legally binding character. STA on interministerial or province-level were Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 6 left out as well because they do not necessarily follow, or reflect, governmental strategies. Likewise, we did not survey agreements that were negotiated on a multilateral basis such as, for instance, big science projects like ITER or the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. While we are aware of the fact that matters of science and/ or technology may also be part of economic or cultural agreements due to national pathdependencies or idiosyncrasies, we are positive that these types of agreement tend to affect, and cope with, scientific collaboration in a rather indirect manner only. For example, free-trade agreements like CETA or TPP may easily impact scientific collaboration in that they set rules of investment and regulations for travelling. However, they are not genuinely designed to serve and shape S&T affairs or policies. Hence, we instead focused on agreements explicitly geared toward matters of scientific interaction and importance between the concluding partners. For the sake of simplicity, we based our study on the following working definition: “STA are all agreements concluded in the name of the respective governments of two countries in a legally binding form (so called ‘umbrella agreements’).” This definition refers to formal elements (legal status, types of actors, bilateral activity) rather than the content of such agreements. As a matter of fact, however, most agreements qualifying for becoming part of our study were largely similar both in their features and content. Umbrella agreements of the kind we wanted to examine tend to be highly formalised (cf. Fikkers & Horvart, 2014). Instead of studying contents, we took it to be more interesting and fruitful to focus on the spread of STA across the globe, patterns and networks, and on their appraisal by practitioners in the field of SD. For our analysis, we chose a group of six countries as a core: Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the U.S. In addition, we researched STA concluded by the European Union. All countries in the sample are engaged in SD for quite some time already, which makes it easier to monitor long term developments. While all of these countries command a strong science sector, their respective science systems differ widely in terms of available resources, ways of governance, and operating procedures. This allows us to track differences or isomorphic tendencies in the use of STA as an instrument of SD. We included the European Union to examine whether it reproduces patterns of engagement that are similar to those its member states pursue. Our case study rests on both quantitative and qualitative analyses. For the investigation on the development of STA over time, we searched governmental databases and homepages for treaties and agreements that matched our working definition. Looking at the time between 1961 and 2016, we not just matched but extended the period Dolan (2012) had used in her study. In general, we tried to retrieve the original texts of the agreements. Where this was not possible, we relied on secondary sources to find out the exact dates that the STA were concluded. If possible, we also recorded the date of ratification. The retrieved information was analysed in sum as well as separately for each country over time. The data was searched for patterns of diffusion Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 7 with regard to similar partner countries or geopolitical events. To assess the value practitioners attribute to STA as instruments of SD, we gathered qualitative data from semi-structured expert interviews with representatives from the countries of our sample and the EC. The respective interviews took place in the second half of 2016 and the first half of 2017. Among the 38 interviewees were policy makers from ministries, representatives from research institutions, funding organisations, and science counsellors deployed at embassies. Results Quantitative Data Our research findings indicate a steady increase of the number of concluded STA over time, a large diversity of involved states, and specific patterns of activity in some countries. In general, we see the development of a global network of STA over time (see Figure 1). Figure 1: Concluded STA by members of the core group (blue: core group members; green: partners with four or more STA; purple: partners with three or less STA) On a global scale, the core group has concluded ever more STA from 1961 onwards (see Figure 2). Even if one takes into consideration potential shortcomings and missing values in our desktop-research, the increase is remarkable. Figure 2: Number of STA concluded by the different countries (cumulated over time) However, we also notice that the frequency of the use, as well as the number of STA differ widely across the sample (see Table 1). The U.S., for instance, concluded 58 agreements during the period under consideration while Denmark concluded just one. Though this was framed as memorandum of understanding, unlike several other memoranda of understanding it fits into our definition of STA. We will get back to this particular result in the analysis of the qualitative data. Table 1: Number of recorded agreements between 1961 and 2016 per country The EU began to negotiate STA not until 1994. Since then it has concluded 19 agreements, Denmark France Germany Switzerland UK U.S. EU Number of agreements 118 44 23 12 58 19 Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 8 most of them with countries that other members of the core group already had contracted. In terms of diffusion, Switzerland, the UK, and Germany were among the early adopters of STA while the U.S. and France started using them more frequently only later on. The relative frequency of STA for the UK and France has diminished over time while the U.S. made increased use of the instrument. In our sample, we found a great diversity of collaborating parties. 83 countries were partners in at least one STA. In terms of geographic coverage, the Americas, Europe, and Asia account for the majority of signed STA. In particular, a group of states that is roughly identical with the G20 has developed a network of STA amongst each other. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and some other states like Argentina and Tunisia are focal points of interest for the members of the core group (see Figure 3). Africa represents the continent least covered by bilateral agreements of the core group. Figure 3: Top 10 partner countries overall (X-axis: Name of country, Y-axis: Number of agreements concluded between members of the core group and the respective country) At first sight, core group members seem to resort to STA in erratic patterns across time; only the U.S. has steadily expanded the range of this instrument since the late 1990s. Still, some of the STA seem to match, and fit in, broader strategic or geopolitical patterns; in particular, this applies to four cases. South Africa after 1995 The number of STA between the countries of the core group and South Africa has remarkably grown. Until 1995, none of the former carried an STA with South Africa. After 1995, this changed abruptly with Germany, the U.S., the UK (1995), and the EU (1996), signing STA. This clearly correlates with the process of ending apartheid in South Africa during the first half of the 1990s and the desirable reintegration of the country into world politics. Germany and Eastern Europe During the 1980s the Federal Republic of Germany concluded numerous agreements with various states in Eastern Europe. Starting with an STA with the Soviet Union in 1986, agreements with Hungary (1987), Bulgaria (1988), and Poland (1989) followed suit, the latter ironically just one day after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This engagement with Eastern Europe continued with an STA with Czechoslovakia from 1990 and Moldova from 1994. It is pretty obvious that these STA were not fuelled by scientific objectives in the first place but by efforts to ease tensions between Western and (former) Eastern Bloc states and to put inter-state relations on a new basis. Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 15 proaches that we touched upon in our interview analysis (see Table 2). Sociologically speaking, variables like organisational and national identity heavily impact the style of how STA are negotiated and what they cover in more than one way. National and organisational idiosyncrasies like differences in the division of labour, tasks and procedures, or between epistemic communities more often than not affect the formation of STA. Micro-analyses could illuminate these facets of STA way better and more informative than our case study. It may also be worthwhile to tap into the research on the negotiations of international agreements, for instance from the economic area (e.g. Crump, 2017). At least we need to know much more about how different variables play into, and influence, the uses of STA in international science policy in general and SD in particular. By engaging in this line of research, scholars would render a valuable service to practitioners and help them enhance the use of STA as an instrument of SD. Footnotes 1 The report states that „EU Member States on the other hand, follow a different strategy. They sign STI agreements with a myriad of third countries, often because of ad-hoc reasons or because of historical ties.” (Fikkers & Horvart, 2014, p. 41) It remains a mystery to us, how “ad-hoc reasons” and “strategy” could possibly match. 2 See, for example, the signing ceremony between the U.S. and Serbia in 2010, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=LUnBQvTUd7g , last access 18.08.2017. 3 This rests, of course, on the assumption that organisational support for such interactions is needed at all. 4 See for example the debate on the assessment of research output, excellence, and performance: San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment, http://www. ascb.org/dora/; Leiden Manifesto for Research Metrics, http://www.leidenmanifesto.org/. 5 Even though, contextual factors might explain a great deal of the large typological variance, we agree with the literature that quite many STA are concluded on an adhoc basis. Bibliography Crump, L. (2017). Cooperation and Closure in Bilateral Trade Negotiations (Global Cooperation Research Paper 17). Duisburg: Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research. Dolan, B. M. (2012). Science and Technology Agreements as Tools for Science Diplomacy: A U.S. Case Study. Science & Diplomacy 1(4), http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/ article/2012/science-and-technology-agreements-tools-for- science-diplomacy (last access 31.07.2017). Elzinga, A. (2009). Geopolitics, science and internationalism during and after IGY. Boletín Antártico Chileno 28, 71–81. Fikkers, D. J., & Horvat, M. (2014). Basic Principles for effective International Science, Tech-nology and Innovation Agreements. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Flink, T., & Schreiterer, U. (2010). Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: toward a typology of national approaches. Science and Public Policy, 37(9), 665–677. Grimes, R. W., & McNulty, C. (2016). The Newton Fund: Science and Innovation for Development and Diplomacy. Science & Diplomacy 5(4), http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/ files/the_newton_fund_0.pdf (last access 30.07.2017). Royal Society (2010). New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy: Navigating the Changing Balance of Power. London: Science Policy Centre, The Royal Society. Star, S. L. (2010). This is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a Concept. Science, Technology, & Human Values 35(5), 601–617. Van Langenhove, L. (2017). Tools for an EU Science Diplomacy. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Working paper The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 16 About the authors About EL-CSID EL-CSID stands for European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy. This research project analyses the relevance of cultural, science and innovation diplomacy for the EU’s external relations. The project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 programme and runs from March 2016 to February 2019. For more information about the project, visit www.el-csid.eu Nicolas Rüffin is Research Fellow of the President's Project Group at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He joined the WZB in 2016, after receiving a master’s degree in science studies from the Humboldt-University in Berlin, and a bachelor’s degree in business psychology from the University of Bochum. Before moving to Berlin, he had worked as Program Manager at Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, a joint initiative of companies and foundations for the advancement of education, science, and innovation in Germany. His research mainly focuses on issues of international science policy, international scientific collaboration and competition, and science diplomacy. Dr. Ulrich Schreiterer is Senior Researcher with the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. After reading sociology, history and modern literature in Marburg, Bielefeld, and at the LSE, he graduated and later gained a PhD in sociology from Bielefeld University. Prior to joining the WZB in 2008, he had been a senior research scholar on international higher education and lecturer in Sociology at Yale University since 2003. Before that, he had worked in different capacities at the Rector’s office in Bielefeld, the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) and the Center for Higher Education (CHE), a subsidiary of the Bertelsmann Foundation. His main research fields are higher education development and governance, institutional features of science policy, and the rationales and workings of global research collaboration.