Morality Management and Situation Ethics: Metatheory and Practice

Jacko, Jan Franciszek Book Morality Management and Situation Ethics: Metatheory and Practice Routledge Studies in Business Ethics Provided in Cooperation with: Taylor & Francis Group Suggested Citation: Jacko, Jan Franciszek (2025) : Morality Management and Situation Ethics: Metatheory and Practice, Routledge Studies in Business Ethics, ISBN 978-1-040-16593-5, Routledge, Oxford, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003250623 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/312732 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ MORALITY MANAGEMENT AND SITUATION ETHICS MORALITY MANAGEMENT AND SITUATION ETHICS METATHEORY AND PRACTICE Jan Franciszek Jacko Routledge Studies in Business Ethics Morality Management and Situation Ethics This book presents the philosophical assumptions of situation ethics to show the practice of morality management that follows from them. This research comprises theoretical and applied aspects: It is an investigation into metaethics that encompasses strategic and quality management problems. With the example of situation ethics, the book illustrates the role of philosophical investigations and solutions in management theory and practice. It will be of interest to researchers, academics and advanced students in the fields of business and management studies, ethics, quality management and philosophy. Furthermore, this book may be useful for senior executives and politicians charged with negotiating complicated moral quandaries and overseeing the implementation of ethical policies in their organisations and communities. Jan Franciszek Jacko is an Associate Professor at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. His research interests are rational choice theory, business ethics and applied philosophy. Business ethics is a site of contestation, both in theory and practice. For some it serves as a salve for the worst effects of capitalism, giving businesses the means to self-regulate away from entrenched tendencies of malfeasance and exploitation. For others business ethics is a more personal matter, concerning the way that individuals can effectively wade through the moral quagmires that characterise so many dimensions of business life. Business ethics has also been conceived of as a fig leaf, designed to allow businessas-usual to continue while covering over the less savoury practices so as to create an appearance of righteousness. Across these and other approaches, what remains critical is to ensure that the ethics of business is the subject of incisive questioning, critical research, and diverse theoretical development. It is through such scholarly inquiry that the increasingly powerful purview of corporations and business activity can be interrogated, understood and, ultimately, reformulated. This series contributes to that goal by publishing the latest research and thinking across the broad terrain that characterises business ethics. The series welcomes contributions in areas including: corporate social responsibility; critical approaches to business ethics; ethics and corporate governance; ethics and diversity; feminist ethics; globalization and business ethics; philosophical traditions of business ethics; postcolonialism and the ethics of business; production and supply chain ethics; resistance, political activism and ethics; sustainability, environmentalism and climate change; the ethics of corporate misconduct; the politics of business ethics; and worker’s rights. 23. Approaches to Corporate Social Responsibility Knowledge, Values, and Actions Edited by Stefan Markovic, Adam Lindgreen, Nikolina Koporcic, and Milena Micevski 24. Morality Management and Situation Ethics Metatheory and Practice Jan Franciszek Jacko Routledge Studies in Business Ethics Morality Management and Situation Ethics Metatheory and Practice Jan Franciszek Jacko First published 2025 by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 and by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2025 Jan Franciszek Jacko The right of Jan Franciszek Jacko to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis. com, has been made available under a Creative Commons AttributionNon Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license. Any third party material in this book is not included in the OA Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. Please direct any permissions enquiries to the original rightsholder. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Jacko, Jan F., author. Title: Morality management and situation ethics : metatheory and practice / Jan Franciszek Jacko. Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2025. | Series: Routledge studies in business ethics | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2024028705 | ISBN 9781032168531 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032168555 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003250623 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Situation ethics. | Metaethics. | Management--Moral and ethical aspects. Classification: LCC BJ1031 .J325 2025 | DDC 170--dc23/eng/20240823 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2024028705 ISBN: 978-1-032-16853-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-16855-5 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-25062-3 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003250623 Typeset in Galliard by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd. To my Mother Contents Acknowledgements x Foreword xi Introduction 1 1 Goals and Methods 3 2 The Problem: Morality Management Paradox 4 3 The Subject Matter and Its State of Research 5 I Preliminary Concepts 13 4 Metaphysical Realism versus Subjectivism in Metaethics 13 5 Epistemological Realism versus Subjectivism in Metaethics 13 6 Normative Relativism versus Normative AntiRelativism (Absolutism) in Metaethics 15 7 Normative Generalism versus Particularism in Metaethics 16 8 Rational Decisions 16 9 Goods, Values and Their Hierarchies 18 10 The Adjective Moral 20 11 Morality 21 12 Managing Moral Preferences 23 II Three Projects of Morality 28 13 The Project of Legalism 28 14 The Project of Antinomianism 33 15 The Project of Situation Ethics 35 xiv Foreword capacity to choose nonbeing seems to be the ultimate root of freedom. We find this, for instance, in the story of the philosophical suicide of Jules Lequier. If we follow the logic of the argument of Jan Jacko, we see that the engagement of freedom with the world is not devoid of presuppositions.2 Namely, we are always situated in being, and we take a stand in front of and within a situation that precedes us. We are born from a mother and with the contribution of a father. We exist in a system of social cooperation without which or out of which we could not act and survive. Morality Manager presupposes this state of affairs. Morality presupposes the insertion of the individual within society. This does not mean, however, that the question of the decision between being and not being and of the material content of the act of self-engagement is devoid of philosophical interest. It pertains, however, to another domain of philosophy: not to morality management but to the foundations of morals or pure ethics if we distinguish ethics as an a priori science from morality management as the science that regulates the concrete and particular exercise of the moral choices in a given historical context. Perhaps this issue will be dealt with in the next book by Jan Jacko. Rocco Buttiglione Notes 1 This argumentative strategy presupposes being as a value but the restrictive paradigm of morality it adopts (morality as the normative system that allows an institution or a community to exist and to flourish) makes it unnecessary to take into account the objection of David Hume that from an “is” statement no “ought” statement can be derived. An interesting answer to Hume’s problem can however be derived from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s discovery of the “value response”: the ought statement is not derived from the is statement but is phenomenologically given together with the is statement in the immediate human experience. We never experiment beings as neutral. The neutrality is an effect of the abstraction. Beings are immediately charged with a value perception. 2 This remark does not oppose the requirement of unbiased approach that the German idealistic philosophy called Voraussetzungslösigkeit. DOI: 10.4324/9781003250623-1 This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Introduction Morality management and managing morality do not have any canonical definition yet. In this book, these terms (abbreviated as “MM”) mean the purposeful shaping (preserving or changing) of people’s moral preferences (see Section 12). Applied sciences have rapidly accumulated growing information on this practice. This descriptive and know-how knowledge is increasingly asymmetric towards the awareness of MM goals. The normative question remains problematic as it was in ancient times. One way of framing this question is as follows: Which value preferences should be promoted and supported in the process of MM? Its answer is more pressing than ever due to the recent development of AI, big data technologies and electronic communication media, which provide unprecedented and unprecedentedly effective social engineering tools to manage human preferences. This study addresses this question in the context of situation ethics (situationism), a philosophical concept that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s of the 20th century. Although situation ethics is not a popular term today, the situationist approach to MM is still interesting because it addresses people’s moral knowledge limits, which our generation faces. Namely, the sciences and technology provide effective tools for managing morality without providing answers to the above question. Without an answer, these instruments are as useless and risky as medicines without knowledge of the ailments they can cure and their side effects. The situation of MM is dramatic when people do something they do not fully understand, and there is something very important to lose or gain. However, as situationists (proponents of situation ethics) show, this situation is not tragic because there are analytical and phenomenological methods of philosophy to investigate and weigh normative assumptions that specify the directions of MM. These premises specify the nature of goods or values and their hierarchy. Situation ethics does not offer a simple answer to the above question. They propose a methodology to set MM goals by investigating the rationale for divergent and competing normative assumptions and accounting for 2 Morality Management and Situation Ethics the relevant circumstances for action. This approach may be a novelty in this management research, which marginalises philosophical theory behind solutions. Situationists do not use the term morality management or managing morality. However, these thinkers thematise the ideas and practices of MM by showing how they emerge from philosophical (ontological, epistemological and normative) premises.1 Situation ethics proposes the MM method, which commences with a philosophical exploration of normative premises. According to situationists, such philosophical investigation is the most secure point of departure for establishing MM goals. Without this foundation, they might be randomly selected or blindfolded according to stereotypes or arbitrary wishes. Philosophical methods cannot present proof, but they can enable agents to weigh the rationale for various options and make rational choices about normative assumptions. Situation ethics shows how know-how questions presume logically prior know-why answers. Situationists discuss normative assumptions that explain and determine solutions to moral problems. In this way, situationism pertains to the metaethics of ethical approaches. This ethics proposes a method to select normative assumptions for practice. Situationists do not prejudice what MM practices are right or wrong. However, situation ethics demands that they be consistent with the agent’s intentions and best available knowledge. Situationists require that people who manage morality (morality managers) investigate their normative premises. Without this investigation, these managers risk that their action destroys what they want or should attain. Situationists warn that failing to examine the normative rationale behind actions renders such actions highly risky, potentially ineffective or inefficient. As situationists have shown, implicit normative assumptions may determine the practical meaning of moral norms, rules and postulates. Situationists demand that MM’s ideas and doctrines disclose their normative assumptions. Suppose they are hidden behind the nice wrapping of political advertisements. In that case, the MM process may take the form of manipulation, in which the nice-sounding MM postulates have a different meaning in practice than in how they are presented. Situationists identify the normative assumptions of various MM theories and practices to present discrepancies between their premises and outcomes. These thinkers require MM practices consistent with their assumptions, which may be explicit or implicit in MM’s actions, strategies and tactics. When a practice differs from its premises, one should change the practice or modify the premises to make them compatible with the practice, as situationists suggest. Introduction 3 Consequently, the situationist approach to MM focuses on relationships between normative assumptions and MM’s practices. These relationships are both logical and practical. From a logical perspective, situation ethics show mutual logical inferences between the assumptions and divergent codes of moral conduct. Its applied (practical) concerns involve how normative assumptions programme the directions and methods of the MM. Situation ethics focuses on peculiar metaethical know-why issues related to selecting normative assumptions concerning the capacity to explain data and solve problems. It primarily concerns managing thoughts and ideas that programme the goals and practices of the MM. This investigation aspect is relatively rare in the literature; however, as situationists show, it is necessary because ethical theories without metaethical investigation are uncritical and groundless. 1 Goals and Methods This study presents and discusses the situationist approach to MM. Consequently, the metatheories of MM and their relationships with MM are central to this investigation. It is a conceptual and primarily metaethical enquiry.2 The aims of this study are theoretical and practical (applied). The theoretical aim is to present normative assumptions of divergent metatheories of MM according to situation ethics. In this respect, the book is philosophical. It addresses the philosophical problems of MM. The applied goal is to demonstrate the possibilities of applying situation ethics in MM and the risks associated with it. Abductive reasoning (from conclusions to premises) led to the theoretical goal of this study. This investigation began with the projects of morality and the practices of MM according to legalism, antinomianism and situationism to arrive at their most fundamental normative premises. The analytical methods and deductive reasoning led towards the applied goal of this study, highlighting the practical implications of the normative premises. When discussing their impact on practice, this investigation aligns with a phenomenological method to show how they shape the intentions and attitudes of agents who adopt these premises. Consequently, the applied aim is to present the role of normative assumptions in the practice of MM. This study addresses business and management ethics, strategic management and quality concerns by demonstrating how normative assumptions affect MM. However, the applied problems, case studies and historical examples play only illustrative roles in investigating situationism. This monograph marginally deals with typical issues of business and management ethics handbooks, such as questions about equality, discrimination 4 Morality Management and Situation Ethics or workplace safety issues because this book is not about applied ethics. It is a study in the metaethics of MM. This book consists of the following seven chapters: Chapter I describes the methodology and defines the key concepts of the study. Chapter II presents the situationist typology of MM projects. Chapter III shows the situationist typology of MM metatheories and their normative assumptions. Chapter IV presents the situationist typology of MM tactics. This study adopted a critical approach to situation ethics. After demonstrating its advantages, this book provides a thorough risk critique of the situationism method in Chapters V and VI. Chapter V presents ambiguities in situation ethics and the metaethical questions that situationists raise without answering. The hazards of these ambiguities are presented in Chapter VI. Chapter VII offers solutions that situation ethics suggests but does not make explicit. These conclusions provide further perspectives for investigating metaethics in MM, which conclusions embrace. This study is the first instalment of a trilogy on MM. Two more sequels are planned: one will present the philosophical investigation of situation ethics, and the other will present the full spectrum of MM metatheories, extending beyond the typology offered by situation ethics. 2 The Problem: Morality Management Paradox Situationists highlight the paradox,3 which is a practical contradiction between respect for moral duties and an attempt to modify them. It occurs in the process of MM, when people intend to change morality morally. This intention is paradoxical because if one wants to change moral duties, one cannot respect them; by modifying them, one acts against them. This practical contradiction is the MM paradox. Situationists present it with examples of legalism and antinomianism without naming this practical contradiction a paradox. As situationists have shown, according to legalism, a moral code (a set of moral norms and rules) specifies moral duties. From this perspective, changing moral norms and rules aims to create something impossible and immoral. This is impossible because, according to legalism, no human preference can alter moral duties. Each attempt to alter moral norms and rules is immoral because it denies moral duties. Therefore, according to legalism, someone respecting moral duties should respect moral standards rather than question them (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 26–37, Section 16). As situationists suggest, the position of legalism is itself paradoxical (against common sense) when actions accordant to some moral code contradict moral duty – when they harm people or generate injustice. As situationists notice, these situations expose the agent to a moral duty to disrespect, abandon or redesign the code (Fletcher, 1966b; Robinson, 1963). Introduction 5 Antinomians (proponents of antinomianism) offer a solution to MM paradox by assuming radical normative relativism in metaethics and a distinction between private and public morality (see Section 17). From this perspective, private morality is a source of moral duties. This consists of individuals’ moral preferences. Public morality is a code of moral conduct imposed on individuals. In this view, public morality does not specify moral duties. This position sets the goal of the MM as managing public morality according to the private morality of morality managers. As Fletcher shows, the antinomian solution is also against common sense (paradoxical), given the broad consensus that managerial decisions, including acts of MM, require some moral justification beyond the perspective of private value preferences. Consequently, agents (who manage morality) should respect some moral norms and rules (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 22–26). Therefore, by solving the MM paradox, antinomianism generates another paradox, which states that there must be nothing morally wrong when people impose their private morality on others—for instance, when malevolent people, according to their private value preferences, introduce socially destructive ideas into public morality. Situationists solve the MM paradox by suggesting a distinction between normative and descriptive morality (see Section 11.1). Normative morality comprises the moral principle of love and its requirements, which are moral duties. Descriptive morality is people’s moral preferences and codes of moral conduct based on these preferences. According to situation ethics, the goal of MM is to accommodate descriptive morality to meet the requirements of normative morality. 3 The Subject Matter and Its State of Research The subject matter of this study comprised several aspects. It is about the situationist approach to MM, and the normative assumptions of MM. This study also addresses the paradox of MM that situation ethics pinpoints. Consequently, this object is fourfold: situation ethics, the MM, its normative assumptions and the MM paradox. 3.1 Situation Ethics In this study, the terms situationism and situation ethics are synonymous.4 They refer to the stream of ethics and its ideas, which became popular after World War II. One should distinguish the movement of situation ethics from its ideas, which was an intellectual rebellion in the 1960s and the 1970s against laws, institutions and controls. This uprising was expressed in philosophical and theological writings and literary works that presented the experience of feeling lost in the world of the 6 Morality Management and Situation Ethics legal structures of the state and religious communities. However, these writings have not yet been composed of theories. In the 1950s and the 1960s, situation ethics sparked a wave of criticism. In response, situationists refined their primary ideas. They offered a theory known today as situation ethics (Cox, 1968; Dimmock & Fisher, 2017, pp. 79–89; Ebikaboere, 2012; Gustafson, 1965, pp. 171–172; McCormick, 1982, pp. 74–77; Poppi, 1957, pp. 26–56; Rosik, 1986). This theory is the subject matter of this study. Richard McCormick and James M. Gustafson consider three thinkers to be the most representative of situation ethics Joseph F. Fletcher, Douglas A. Rhymes and John A. Robinson (Gustafson, 1965, p. 172; McCormick, 1966, pp. 612–613; McCormick, 1982, pp. 74–75). When relating to situationists in this book, these thinkers’ ideas are the main point of reference. However, this book also discusses the thoughts of other situationists, such as Paul Lehmann and Paul Ramsey.5 There is no claim of coherence among situationist conceptions. Their positions differ at certain points and evolve accordingly. Nevertheless, these thinkers share common ideas that define situation ethics. For instance, situationists criticise ethical legalism; warn against radical relativism in ethics; stress the individuality and uniqueness of each person, situation and moral duty; demand that moral agents follow the principle of love; pay more attention to human needs than to any law6; and base decisions on a sincere recognition of concrete situations and circumstances. In his book Situation Ethics (1966b), Fletcher outlined the common philosophical background of these ideas through four presuppositions (pragmatism, relativism, positivism, and personalism). His formula of these assumptions is considered “the clearest statement of situation ethics” (Lutzer, 1972, p. 16), and the literature on situationism identifies the theory of situation ethics by these premises (Daniel, 2009; Dimmock & Fisher, 2017, pp. 79–89; Ebikaboere, 2012). This study follows this suggestion and presents a situationist metatheory based on these four presuppositions. Critical studies formulated five canonical arguments against situation ethics: it (a) is ambiguous (Connery, 1954; Dimmock & Fisher, 2017, pp. 79–89; Hildebrand & Hildebrand, 1966; Lutzer, 1972), (b) does not sufficiently specify the principle of love to make it applicable to practice (Childress, 1992; Daniel, 2009; De George, 1986, p. 428; DeMartino Swyhart, 1979; Dimmock & Fisher, 2017, pp. 79–89; McCormick, 1966, 1982; Styczeń, 1973), (c) is self-contradictory, (d) is inadequate to moral experience and (e) is risky in practice (Hildebrand & Hildebrand, 1966; Styczeń, 1973). Some authors discreetly defend situation ethics against the accusations mentioned above by demonstrating its possible refinement by combining it with broader theories of Introduction 7 philosophy (Childress, 1992; Doris, 1998; Harris, 2002; Price, 1985), theology (Ebikaboere, 2012; Tuttle, 2002), psychology (Stoudenmire, 1976, p. 299) and virtue ethics (Harris, 2002, 2002; Kamtekar, 2004a; Merritt, 2000). After the 1980s, debates on situation ethics gradually ceased. However, extensive literature exists on the application and impact of situation ethics on modern theories and practices. Besides the publications of situationists, few systematic monographs are dedicated to situation ethics (Ebikaboere, 2012; Hildebrand & Hildebrand, 1966; Lutzer, 1972; Pieniążek, 2008; Rosik, 1986). Many studies have reviewed the publications of situationists (Bantjes, 1980; Barnard, 1980; Bass, 1955; Cory, 1975; Davis, 1980; Elkind, 1971; Foster, 1955; Gurak, 1975; Kirkendall, 1974; Kolbe, 1968; Milosh & Littell, 1973; Shryock, 1955; Smith, 1967; Swyhart, 1980; Westberg, 1955; Zetterberg, 1956). Although the historical stream of situationism belongs to the past, and the name of situation ethics is neither well known nor do its proponents dominate contemporary ethics, many publications show that the ideas of situation ethics are alive in contemporary times. For example, some management concepts incorporate situationist decision-making methods (Harris, 2002). Some empirical management investigations follow the situationist distinction between antinomian, legalist and situationist decision-making methods (Gillmore & Hunter, 1974). Thinkers present applications of situation ethics in management (Barnett, Bass, & Brown, 1994; Brigley, 1995; Forsyth, 1992; Gillmore & Hunter, 1974; Ramsey, Marshall, Johnston, & Deeter-Schmelz, 2007; Tansey, Brown, Hyman & Dawson, 1994), managing crises of values (Frederick, 1982, p. 96), moral education of professionals (Brady, 1999, pp. 313–314), and counselling (Houts, 1974). Some publications have presented the impact of situation ethics on contemporary bioethics (Childress, 1992; Daly, 1987; Houts, 1974; Jonsen et al., 1993; Koop, 1990; Monday, Esq, & Pearce, 2018; Shelton, 1978; Smith, 1967, 2020), moral theology (Szostek, 1989), the ethics of law (Pieniążek, 2008; Shelton, 1978) and administrative (Laverty, 1989, pp. 377–378) or management ethics (Merritt, 2000; Upton, 2009). Although situation ethics includes a thorough analysis of MM, situationists do not name this process. It remains nameless and, therefore, is implicit in their texts. This is probably why the MM’s situationist idea goes unnoticed in the literature on situationism. Although some authors have indicated the impact of situationism on morality (Connery, 1954; Dimmock & Fisher, 2017, pp. 79–89; Hildebrand & Hildebrand, 1966; Lutzer, 1972), no study has presented the situationist approach to MM. This monograph aims to fill this gap in research on situationism. 8 Morality Management and Situation Ethics As Section 3.2 shows newer and more refined conceptions of MM exist. However, the situationist concept of MM is worth investigating for several reasons. a Situation ethics investigates the spectrum of normative assumptions that specify MM’s various projects and tactics. This metaethical approach is still unique to the managerial literature. b Situationists ground their idea of MM in philosophical investigations, which is rare in the subject-related literature on MM. Most approaches to MM concentrate on its practice and only marginally discuss the rationale for its philosophical assumptions behind the practice. c Situationists show how philosophical theories are instruments of MM. Situation ethics offers an exciting idea for MM through philosophising. d Situationism exemplifies the peculiar luck of some ideas that become influential despite their ambiguities and contradictions. This luck warrants further investigation. e Finally, situation ethics thematises the MM paradox (see Section 2). This topic appears to be under-researched or possibly unexplored, although it is not definitive that no studies exist. Situation ethics emerged in the context of theological disputes in Christianity. However, Ramsey (following the recommendations of William K. Frankena) summarises the Christian influence on situation ethics with the sole normative assumption that love is the intrinsic value (Ramsey, 1967, pp. 1–3). For Fletcher, the position of agapism is a philosophical theory independent of any theological or religious context (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 14–15, 154-159). Accordingly, this study focuses on the philosophical contents of situation ethics without diminishing the importance of situationists’ theological problems and religious inspirations. 3.2 Morality Management Until now, the idea of MM has evolved over centuries under divergent names. For example, Niccolò Machiavelli outlined the idea of moral education in his conception of effective governance, in which agents with power (kings and princes) manage their subjects’ preferences using persuasion or coercion (Benner, 2009; Cosans & Reina, 2018). Friedrich Nietzsche (1989) revisited this idea in his conception of master-slave dependencies. Marxist theories demonstrate economic mechanisms that explain how social classes can shape people’s moral preferences through ideology to achieve political or economic goals (John Morgan, 2005; Rengger, 2008). Modern authors unanimously emphasise changes in organisational morality and warn against leaving this process out of investigation (Goodpaster & Matthews, 1982; McMahon, 1981; Sridhar & Camburn, 1993). Introduction 9 Approaches to MM focus on descriptions, applications, explanations and evaluations. Descriptive studies present the practices of MM in states (Chakraborty, 2009; Henricson, 2016, pp. 95–112) and other organisations (Kucharski, 2016; Maclagan, 1998, pp. 137–185; Rossouw & Vuuren, 2003; Ruiz Palomino et al., 2011). Applied psychology and sociology offer numerous tools to shape value preferences of people (Cialdini, 2007; Coons & Weber, 2014; Leary, 2022). Explanatory studies elaborate on the mechanisms of the MM. For example, Michel Foucault showed a mutual interdependence between power and knowledge. He showed that those who control knowledge can exert power, including shaping societal norms, ethics and morals. Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory explores how technology and social systems shape and limit human value preferences. Cass R. Sunstein’s work on behavioural economics examines how governments and institutions can influence decision-making and societal preferences without coercion (Sunstein, 2016, 2020). Yuval Noah Harari investigates the impact of technology and social engineering on human values and ethics (Harari, 2016, 2018). Explanatory studies observe tensions between private and public morality and question the preferences that should be privileged in the MM process (George, 2000; Hendry, 2004; Medina, 2010; Svara, 2015; Swanson, 1992). Normative approaches set goals for MM and evaluate their practices. For example, Robert P. George maintained that organisations should introduce respect for moral principles into public morality. In his opinion, they should play a legitimate role in preserving the moral ecology of the cultural environment in which people make morally significant choices (George, 1995). Plato, Aristotle, and some representatives of virtue ethics suggest that the main goal of MM is to shape virtues (MacIntyre, 2007). Ethical utilitarianism presents this goal in the utilitarian optimisation principle of the greatest possible good. Various approaches suggest MM (without using the term morality management) as a remedy against egoism, distrust and irresponsibility, which can reduce the inefficiency of an organisation’s performance (Bugdol, 2013; Maclagan, 1998) or burnout (Schaufeli, Maslach, & Tadeusz Marek, 1996). Some normative studies on MM are critical. For example, moral paternalism7 has recently faced intense discussion (Begon, 2016; Groll, 2012; Salvat, 2008). Barak Medina and Eyal Zamir criticise legal paternalism in MM, which limits individuals’ autonomy in deciding moral preferences (Zamir & Medina, 2010). The authors seek a compromise between paternalism and freedom. Medina argues that MM decisions should promote common-sense morality (Medina, 2010, pp. 77–78). Luciano Floridi proposes the tactics of tolerant paternalism in MM, which protects some principal social values “while still safeguarding toleration and respect for individual preferences, including the desire not to be implicitly forced into a position and fostering the development of a more critical understanding of one’s own choices” 16 Morality Management and Situation Ethics moral duties are universal. Some thinkers support this thesis by observing common-value preferences across cultures and conflicting groups (Carchidi, 2020; Graham et al., 2012; Hauser, 2006; Kukathas, 2008; Mikhail, 2007). A more profound version of universal relativism takes the point of departure in analysing a priori preconditions for intentions to show that rational acts require respecting some moral duties. For example, Kant presents this reasoning in his conception of the categorical imperative. This stance leads to normative anti-relativism in metaethics (Gowans, 2012; Hill, 2007; Tatarkiewicz, 1919, p. 22; Westacott, 2012). Normative relativism and absolutism are not metaphysical views (although they may follow from or lead to some metaphysical stances). Consequently, in metaethics, normative relativism should be distinguished from metaphysical relativism, which refers to the relational nature of values and goods. For example, Fletcher declared metaphysical relativism in metaethics. In his view, values and duties “consist in an interaction of mind and environment” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 58). This metaphysical remark does not prejudice whether he takes the position of normative relativism or anti-relativism. 7 Normative Generalism versus Particularism in Metaethics According to the position of ethical particularism in metaethics, moral duties are unique in each situation. Consequently, there are no universal moral norms and rules. This stance has significant implications in practice: “Moral particularism, at its most trenchant, is the claim that there are no defensible moral principles, that moral thought does not consist in the application of moral principles to cases, and that the morally perfect person should not be conceived as the person of principle” (Dancy, 2013). The opposite stance is the position of ethical generalism (universalism) in metaethics. In this view, all or some moral duties, norms and rules are universal, or a rational agent should consider them universal. Consequently, “Ethical generalism is the view that the rationality of moral thought and judgement depends on a suitable provision of moral principles” (Dancy, 2013). Situationists take the middle position between ethical generalism and particularism. They opt for universalism by claiming that the principle of love is universal. However, situation ethics presents particularism by postulating that the concrete moral imperative to love may be unique and irreducible to any general norms or rules. 8 Rational Decisions In this study, the term rational attitude3 means a disposition (inclination) of the agent to make rational decisions, and the word rational agent signifies a person who makes rational decisions or adopts a rational attitude Preliminary Concepts 17 when making decisions. The term rational decision can have several meanings in this study. It can designate (a) methodologically, (b) instrumentally or (c) value-rational decisions. 8.1 Methodological Rationality According to Tadeusz Kotarbiński, methodologically rational decisions are (x) consistent with the available knowledge, (y) motivated by rational beliefs and (z) aimed at efficient action: (x) A methodologically rational agent (who makes rational decisions) investigates the reasons for decisions and accommodates decisions to available knowledge.4 Consequently, methodologically rational decisions respect epistemic reasons.5 Methodologically irrational agents (who make methodologically irrational decisions) neglect their knowledge in their decision-making. For example, they can ignore information on the risk or relevant circumstances of their actions (Kotarbiński, 1973, p. 123). (y) The assertion of rational beliefs is symmetric to their rationale. A methodologically rational agent is more certain of better-justified beliefs and less sure of worse-justified beliefs. She abandons self-contradictory beliefs and the beliefs which contradict her knowledge. For example, she is more certain of more probable predictions than less probable ones. Decisions are methodologically irrational when they are not motivated by rational beliefs. A methodologically irrational agent can maintain beliefs regardless of their justification. For example, she can be more certain of less probable than of more probable predictions or maintain their beliefs when knowing that they are false (Bortolotti, 2010; Jacko, 2016a; Pagin, 2014). (z) The methodologically rational agent considers all available means and chooses the means that give the best chances for effective and efficient action. They are effective when they reach their goal and efficient (economic) when effective with minimal costs (Dennis, 2012; Hey, 1993). Weber specifies condition (z) by distinguishing two aspects of a rational decision: its instrumental and value rationality. He demonstrated that these aspects are inseparable and complementary (Callahan, 2007; Kalberg, 1980; Kim, 2007; Kronman, 1983; Oakes, 2003; Peukert, 2004; Weber, 1985, p. 565; 2002). 8.2 Instrumental Rationality According to Weber, instrumentally rational (Ger. zweckrational – aim-rational) decisions adopt effective means of attaining their aims (Weber 1985, s. 565). An instrumentally rational agent chooses means that, according to her 18 Morality Management and Situation Ethics best knowledge, will produce the desired effect (will be effective). Instrumentally rational agents must be methodologically rational because they adopt available knowledge to choose the means and predict the consequences, probability, chances and risks of their actions (Oakes, 2003, pp. 38–39). 8.3 Value Rationality Weber calls decisions value-rational (Ger. wertrational) when they are coherent with agents’ value preferences (Weber, 1985, s. 565). He shows that value-rational agents crystallise their value preferences into a hierarchical system of preferences and act according to this hierarchy. In this hierarchy, some values are more important than others. Value-rational decisions can sacrifice lower values to attain higher ones when necessary. Value-irrational decisions do the opposite: they sacrifice some higher value to attain a lower value or destroy values without any significant reason. Value-rational agents may differ in their preferences and hierarchies of subjective values (Kim, 2012; Kronman, 1983; Minner, 2020; Oakes, 2003; Peukert, 2004). Jean-Paul Sartre names value rationality of decisions authenticity. They are consistent with the existential commitment, which is the decision to specify the value hierarchy of the agent (see Section 17.2). Situationists specify benevolence in terms of the value rationality or authenticity of decisions. They refer to these as self-sincerity and honesty. In their view, benevolent agents admit honestly to their value systems and make decisions accordingly (Robinson, 1963). 9 Goods, Values and Their Hierarchies Situationists interchangeably use the words good and value, meaning their subjective sense. In this meaning, they denote value preferences or something (for example, an entity, its property, aim, ideal, relation) that someone appreciates. In this terminological convention, the term hierarchy of values refers to a system of value preferences for a person or group (Hansson & Grüne-Yanoff, 2018). This subjective definition is compatible with the premises of metaphysical subjectivism and normative relativism in metaethics. However, when situationists specify value of love, they adopt a position of normative absolutism and introduce an objective sense of the terms good and value. In this meaning, they denote something precious and independent of human preferences. In this context, the term hierarchy of values has an objective meaning and refers to the value preferences that each rational agent should adopt. This definition is compatible with normative absolutism. In this study, I use word value to denote subjective meaning and reserve the term good for contexts in which normative anti-relativism is presented. Preliminary Concepts 19 9.1 The Principal Good The hierarchy of values has some top. It is the most precious or appreciated good or value. It can be referred to as the principal value, principal good, moral principle or the principle of morality. Situationists call this (Lat.) summum bonum (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 31, 43, 129). Under the assumption of normative relativism, something becomes the principal value due to value preference. Consequently, the value hierarchy is the product of the value preferences of certain entities (individuals, groups or organisations) that most appreciate the principal good, which is at the top of this value system. According to theories of normative absolutism, the principal good is most precious regardless of human preference. Consequently, according to normative absolutism, there is some intersubjective hierarchy of goods, and the principal good is atop this hierarchy, which each rational agent should adopt. Pluralistic value concepts (e.g. Plato’s metatheory or George Moore and Hastings Rashdall’s ideal utilitarianism) encompass divergent types of principal goods. Monist metatheories of ethics specify one type of principal good: For instance, Aristotle (and the ethics of eudemonism initiated by him) identifies the principal good with human development, the fulfilment (eudaimonia, εὐδαιμονία in Greek) of the most precious possibilities of humans, which are capacities to understand reality and create social bonds of friendship (Brink, 2014; Crisp, 2016; Kraut, 2016). Some personalist conceptions make normative assumptions about every person’s intrinsic value (dignity), which is the principal good (Williams and Bengtsson, 2016; Sen, 1990). Ethical liberalism in metaethics assumes that the principal good is the freedom of each individual (Kelly, 2005). Some of these concepts specify the principal good in terms of fundamental human rights or the requirements of justice, which specify the preconditions for respecting the principal good (Brems, 2001; Keys & Burke, 2013; Sen, 1990, 2017). Situationists assume goodwill (love) is the principal good (Fletcher, 1966a). 9.2 Intrinsic – Extrinsic The terms intrinsic and extrinsic can have several meanings in metaethics (Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2015; Zimmerman, 2001, 2019): a An intrinsic good or value is precious regardless of whether someone appreciates it. Value is extrinsic when it is precious because and insofar as someone (an individual or a group) appreciates it. b The disjunction between intrinsic and extrinsic values can specify the locus of these values. Intrinsic values are the properties in and of beings, and extrinsic values are outside the being in human perception or intention. 20 Morality Management and Situation Ethics c The principal good is called intrinsic. Extrinsic values are not the principal good. d Goods or values are intrinsic when a principal good cannot exist in their absence. For example, human existence is a prerequisite for freedom. Consequently, when freedom is considered a principal value, human existence is intrinsically good. e Situations use intrinsic to designate value as precious in all circumstances. Extrinsic values are precious in some situations but not in all. f The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic can also indicate the difference between autotelic and instrumental values (see Section 9.3). In this study, intrinsic and extrinsic have meaning (a). However, situationists can use these terms for all meanings mentioned above in divergent contexts. 9.3 Autotelic – Instrumental According to Weber, instrumental values are appreciated because of their (utility) function – because and insofar as they are conducive to other (autotelic and instrumental) values. In contrast, autotelic (intrinsic, Ger. Eigenwerte) values are appreciated regardless of this function (Kim, 2012; Oakes, 2003; Weber, 1985, pp. 51, 565; Zimmerman, 2001, 2019). Conceptions of normative absolutism and relativism differ in their idea of autotelic value. According to normative relativism, human preferences specify autotelic values. In normative absolutism, the principal good(s) and other intrinsic goods are autotelic, regardless of human preferences. 10 The Adjective Moral In the normative meaning, the adjective moral means positive and immoral means negative value (anti-value) of human acts (decisions or actions). It is the positive moral value of morally good decisions or morally right actions; immoral designates morally bad decisions and morally wrong actions. Moral goodness and badness are qualities of decision’s intention, whereas moral rightness and wrongness are qualities of action which is the outcome of the decision. In this sense, decisions and actions are moral when they respect and contribute to the principal good. They were considered immoral in this normative sense when they disrespected or destroyed it. Moral norms specify relationships between the principal good and human acts (see Section 11.2). Consequently, moral acts deserve a positive evaluation, and immoral acts deserve a negative evaluation according to moral norms. Adjective moral may also have a descriptive (value-neutral) meaning, denoting something related to the moral principle (i.e., something morally Preliminary Concepts 21 relevant). In this sense, the term moral is the opposite of amoral or morally neutral. For example, a physics theory is morally neutral, as it is not about a principal good. In this meaning, the adjective moral does not imply that its designate is moral in the normative sense. This term can refer to morally good or bad, right or wrong preferences, codes, evaluations, stereotypes, decisions, intentions, and actions. In this book, the adjective moral has descriptive meaning. Consequently, the term moral preferences in Section 12.1 means any preference that relates to the principal good. Norms, rules and codes of conduct are considered moral (see Section 11.2) when they are about respecting or disrespecting moral principle(s). In contrast, for example, norms and rules of praxeology or economics are morally neutral when they do not relate to the principal good. 11 Morality This study distinguishes morality from ethics. Ethics include knowledge, reflection and the theory of morality. Morality is a subject of ethics and ethical research. 11.1 Descriptive and Normative Morality In the literature, descriptive morality can encompass a wide spectrum of phenomena. It can be: a Moral preferences of individuals and groups. b Moral codes that express or outline moral preferences, as specified above. c The practices of evaluation according to a moral code. d Individual or social stereotypes (of thinking, feelings and acting) about moral principle(s), including motives for moral preferences in ideas or ideals. In this sense, descriptive morality embraces the culture of societies and the organisational culture of institutions. e Morally relevant decisions, intentions, actions and consequences. f Any direct cause or motif of moral preferences. In this book, morality without adjectives means descriptive morality in the meaning in (a). The term normative morality denotes the normative meaning of morality, which means a pattern for or ideal of morality (“Morality,” n.d.). It can be some moral code: “In its normative sense, morality may be defined as a code of conduct that would be accepted by all rational people under certain idealised conditions. In simpler terms, ‘morality’ is the set of correct moral 22 Morality Management and Situation Ethics principles, which, though they probably will never be universally adopted, ought to be adopted.” (Gert, 2012) Stances of normative relativism and absolutism divergently specify normative morality. According to normative relativism, each morality begins with some moral preferences (of individuals, groups and organisations) concerning the principal value and its requirements. In this view, there can be divergent normative moralities specified by people’s moral preferences about the principal value and its requirements. In the view of normative absolutism, principles of normative morality do not depend on human preferences. For example, according to Aristotle, normative morality comprises requirements of human eudaimonia. For St. Thomas Aquinas, normative morality comprises requirements of natural law. In the view of Kant, morality is based on a priori (i.e., independent of experience) conditions of action that are in accordance with the requirements of practical reason, and proponents of personalism may specify normative morality in terms of requirements of human dignity and fundamental human rights. 11.2 Moral Norms, Rules and Codes Moral norms and rules translate the principle of morality into action language. Moral rules are directives and procedures that specify the conditions for respecting or promoting the principal good. Moral norms are criteria for evaluating acts’ compliance with the moral principle. These tools are used for moral judgement. Situationists distinguish between general and universal norms and rules. General ones have a general meaning but may have exceptions. Universal norms and rules are valid for each situation. For example, the rule One should not still, or the norm Theft is morally reprehensible, has a general meaning. However, as situationists maintain, they are not universal because they may have exceptions and may not apply to situations where stilling is morally permissible. In this text, the term code of moral conduct or moral code refers to a system of (logically ordered sets) moral norms and rules. They specify standards for intentions, decisions, actions and evaluations. However, not every code is moral (in the descriptive meaning of moral). For example, the norms and rules of grammar are not moral when they do not (implicitly or explicitly) refer to moral principle(s).6 11.3 Private and Public Morality In this study public morality means codes of moral conduct and value preferences imposed on society (by force, coercion, persuasion, law or police Preliminary Concepts 23 work or social pressure), in contrast to private morality, which consists of value preferences and moral codes of individuals (Hampshire, 1978; Medina, 2010; Swanson, 1992). In this definition convention, public morality embraces moral standards enforced in society and applied to public life, including the media and conduct in public places (Saha, 2010, p. 35). In contrast, private morality can be defined as the moral value preferences and codes put forth by individuals in their private sphere (Hampshire, 1978; Medina, 2010). 12 Managing Moral Preferences 12.1 Moral Preferences Preferences are intentions, decisions, emotions or mental attitudes (involving thinking, deciding and acting) that favour something over something else. Preference is the greater liking or inclination towards one alternative over another. Some preferences are between values. These are value preferences. Not all preferences are value preferences. For example, if the client prefers one car over another, this inclination is a preference but not a value preference. However, when she appreciates a car’s safety rather than its aesthetic appeal, this concerns values and is the value preference. Some value preferences relate to the principal good(s). In these preferences, agents decide that something is or is not at the top of their hierarchy of values or take a stance on this good by affirming its superior worth directly or indirectly. Such value preferences are called moral in this study. They take place, for example, when someone considers something the principal good or adheres to norms, rules or duties by believing they safeguard respect for moral principle(s). According to a longstanding distinction in psychology, preferences can be explicit or implicit. Agents know and declare their explicit preferences. Implicit preferences guide agents’ decisions; however, they are unaware of or hide their preferences. Implicit preferences are remarkable only through action. Therefore, subjective hierarchies of values can also be explicit or explicit (Cunningham & Quidt, 2016; Ogunnaike et al., 2010). 12.2 Morality Management One can manage preferences without managing value preferences. For example, a seller reduces the price of a product to make it more attractive to customers. When consumers prefer this product, they act according to their value preferences (presuming that a lower price is better than a higher price in their value system). Therefore, price reduction manages preferences but not customer value preferences. 24 Morality Management and Situation Ethics One can also manage preferences via managing value preferences. In this case, a seller can run an advertising campaign to change the buyer’s value system, expecting it to motivate their purchase decisions. For example, the pharmaceutical company fosters an appreciation for health to increase sales of its products. In this case, the advertisement campaign aims to motivate people to modify their value preferences (so that they start appreciating their health). In this study, value management means managing value preferences (in economic contexts, this term may have different meanings). It occurs when some actions sustain or change people’s preferences about values. This process may be unintentional. For example, creators of some advertisement campaigns may not intend to affect people’s value preferences, but when this effect occurs, they change. It may also happen when the effect is intended but does not occur. For example, when some advertisement is to change the value preferences but turns ineffective in attaining this goal. It is an example of ineffective value management. Usually, it is impossible to identify intentional value management when managers do not express their intentions. However, the attributive interpretation method allows us to explain actions regarding supposed intentions. Moral preferences are those value preferences that concern a supreme good (e.g. recognizing something as such a good, defining the conditions for respecting it, and the ways to achieve it). MM involves managing these preferences. MM is a type of value management, but not each case of value management is MM. For example, when marketing activities lead customers to appreciate the aesthetics of a car more than before, it does not necessarily qualify as MM. Managing value preferences becomes MM when imparted or intended to moral preferences. For example, an advertising campaign that seeks to evoke customers’ feelings that having an attractive car contributes to their fundamental values or the principal good(s). Across history, there have been numerous noteworthy occurrences of intended or unintended MM. For example: • In the West, the social respect for fundamental equality and dignity of all humans was originally initiated by Christianity and fostered by social revolutions and the civil rights movements. • The Enlightenment Era, which spanned the 17th and 18th centuries, provoked departing from some traditional value systems. • The Industrial Revolution, which occurred throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, resulted in modifications to valuing labour and its legislation. • The environmental movements contributed to recognising nature as an intrinsic value, reinforcing how people rank and engage with the natural world. Preliminary Concepts 25 In many cases it may be impossible to distinguish MM from other cases of value management. However, one can suppose and investigate the impact of change in the hierarchy of values on the perception of principal value. For example: • Cosmetic surgery: Ad campaigns, particularly those in the early stages of some treatments, sometimes gloss over potential health hazards in favour of the beauty and attractiveness of the outcomes. • Tanning salons and sunscreen: Despite the well-known dangers of excessive UV exposure, tanning advertisements in the 1970s and the 1980s emphasised the attractiveness of bronzed skin, convincing many people to place a tanned appearance above health protection. • Gear for extreme sports: Companies may emphasise the cooling factor of extreme sports, sometimes by marginalising necessary safety measures. 12.3 Managerial Functions MM can be specified regarding managerial functions defined by Henri Fayol if they relate to moral preferences. These are planning (designing), organising, commanding (motivating), coordinating and controlling outcomes and processes.7 By adopting this typology in MM, one can define it as planning (designing) the morality project and its implementation in terms of organising actions and structures, commanding (motivating) people to accept and follow the project, coordinating and controlling the process of project performance. Situation ethics presents a framework for planning morality. It primarily comprises a morality design. This managerial function involves designing a morality project, which is moral preferences and the moral code the MM should foster and promote. For example, one can plan MM in education by defining the moral preferences that teaching should foster or planning MM through the media may involve deciding the moral preferences that media coverage should advertise. In addition to morality design, morality planning can include the formulation of tactics to promote and implement morality projects. In this function, actions can be programmed, their sequence and priority established, and procedures defined. Planning morality may consist of specifying policies for respecting and promoting the code of conduct, scheduling (deciding on a time sequence for program steps) and budgeting (allocating resources) for implementing the plan. Organising morality involves coordinating social structures, institutions and interactions between people to promote morality projects. This function allocates activities and resources. The motivation function of MM aims to adjust the decisions and preferences of individuals and groups in the project. For example, in legislation, 32 Morality Management and Situation Ethics deductive casuistry, where decisions and criteria of moral judgement follow from some general norms and rules or a code of moral conduct (Robinson, 1964, pp. 40–41). Consequently, legalistic moral assessments come down to controlling the compliance of actions with some norms and rules of the law (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 27, 76). The situationist critique of the legalistic method culminates in examples of moral dilemma cases, which this method cannot solve because the law contradicts itself when applied to a given situation. For example, the law requires the protection of human life. However, in some situations, one cannot save one person’s life without sacrificing another, or it is impossible to save human life without lying (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 123–125). In this case, the legalistic method would suppose inaction, as any action is against legalistic obedience and correctness. However, Fletcher maintains that inaction creates an illusory feeling of good conscience because inaction also violates moral norms of the moral law in such situations.2 As situationists notice, when the deductive legalistic decision-making method does not offer solutions, it requires a justification for decisions in legal provisions and permission from some authority. If a legalist cannot find some solutions in the law, she looks for some interpretation. As the law rarely applies to situations without some aid of interpretation, the practice of legalism perpetually requires some interpreting authorities. The argument (Lat.) ad auctoritatem is decisive in this decision-making method. Consequently, legalists cannot solve simple problems without the aid of authorities, even when common sense is sufficient to know right and wrong (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 20–21, 98–99). There are managerial hazards of the deductive approach of legalism that are worthy of mentioning because they impact the process of morality management (MM) when morality managers apply the legalistic method: • Strict adherence to laws in some organisations can inhibit the adoption of new solutions. In effect of the legalistic approach, innovative novelties may be neglected or rejected in favour of adhering to traditional solutions. • A rigid strategy may leave opportunities on the table that a more flexible, situation-specific strategy might seize. • Legalistic decision-making may generate a deficiency in adaptability: Strict adherence to predetermined guidelines can limit one’s capacity to adjust to unforeseen events or circumstances. • Over time, legalists may become unduly reliant on rules, which may impair their capacity for critical thought or the use of judgement in situations when rules are ambiguous. Three Projects of Morality 33 • The legalistic method may lead to decisional paralysis because relying too much on rules can cause delays, especially if such rules are unclear, contradictory, or do not apply well to a particular situation. • Continually employing obsolete or ineffective procedures might result from relying on established regulations without regular examination and revisions. • Following the letter of the law can delay rapid response to emergencies. For example, suppose a procurement process requires approval from multiple levels. In that case, it can delay the delivery of critical supplies in an emergency. 14 The Project of Antinomianism Fletcher sees the antinomianism project of morality as the opposite of legalism. As the method of decision-making, antinomianism is the approach with which one enters into a decision-making situation armed with no principles or maxims whatsoever, to say nothing of rules. In every ‘existential moment’ or ‘unique’ situation, it declares that one must rely upon the situation itself, there and then, to provide its ethical solution. (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 22) Fletcher illustrates this method with the practices in some streams of early Christian libertinism or Gnosticism (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 22–23). A form of this thinking in the times of situationism may be some anarchist and hippie movements in the 1960s and 1970s. 14.1 Practical Subjectivism and Relativism As Fletcher maintains, antinomians (agents who follow the antinomian method of decision-making) refuse “to admit to any generally valid principles at all, nothing even ordinarily valid, to say nothing of universal laws” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 25). This method follows the normative assumption that the moral order does not morally bind people (Robinson, 1964, p. 21). According to this method, decisions should be “random, unpredictable, erratic, quite anomalous,” as Fletcher maintains (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 23). Situationists briefly discuss antinomianism in contrast to their critique against legalism. Their critiques of the antinomian method focus on practical subjectivism in decision-making and practical relativism in moral assessment. Practical subjectivism consists of acting according to arbitrary preferences. Practical relativism is the method of moral evaluation based on arbitrary preferences (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 44). 34 Morality Management and Situation Ethics 14.2 Social Hazards and Egoism Situationists maintain that the antinomian decision-making method leads to anarchism in private and social practice.3 Situationists may agree with anarchism when it means civil disobedience against unjust laws.4 However, situationists deny anarchism, which generates chaos, cultural degeneration and the destruction of social bonds (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 44, 100; Robinson, 1964, pp. 12, 21). As situationists suppose, the antinomian method forces moral agents to appreciate their freedom above everything else. Therefore, as Robinson writes, love cannot motivate the antinomian (who follows the antinomian decision-making method) because she uses persons to satisfy her freedom, according to this method (Robinson, 1964, pp. 12, 21). Fetcher maintains that this premise puts a premium on the attitude of egoism, according to the maxim “my first and last consideration is myself” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 109). Consequently, antinomianism envisions a society where individuals and groups strive to realise their own freedom by imposing it on others, leading to social conflict and the domination of the most effective individuals or groups. 14.3 Some Advantages However, the antinomian method has some advantages which situationists appreciate but marginalise in presenting antinomianism. These benefits are, for example, as follows: • Adapting to any situation without preconceptions or rules fosters creativity. Relying on the circumstances can encourage a greater reliance on instinct or intuition, sometimes leading to fitting unconventional solutions. • Entering a situation without preconceived notions makes it possible to be more receptive to new ideas and points of view. • Without rigid rules or principles, there is a low risk of developing an ideological or dogmatic commitment, which can hinder good decision-making. This decision-making method ensures that ethics are always relevant to the context, which may vary from scenario to scenario. • Relying on the circumstances themselves for direction ensures direct engagement with the circumstances. It fosters a thorough understanding of their intricacies. • This method enables faster and more effective responses to rapidly changing situations than legalism, which requires actions according to some rules. Three Projects of Morality 35 15 The Project of Situation Ethics Fletcher sums up the situationist method of decision-making as follows: The situationist enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems. Just the same, he is prepared in any situation to compromise or set them aside … if love seems better served by doing so. (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 26) Various decisions can exemplify the situationist method. For example: • Doctors may give an experimental drug to a terminally ill patient, even if it is against the accepted practice, if they believe it will save her life. • Even if it goes against professional norms, an individual may expose unethical actions within an organisation if it is necessary for protecting the public’s safety or well-being. • Throughout history, people have decided to break the law to pursue a higher moral purpose because they believe justice and love are more important than respecting some norms. Legalists may see situationists as interpreting the law too loosely. Typical legalistic allegations include non-compliance with legal regulations, generally accepted codes and constitutions or against the legalistically understood rule of law. Antinomians, on the other hand, may find situationism too legalistic and too respectful of the laws and social systems of control. Fletcher believes this method takes advantage of legalism and antinomianism and minimises the risks mentioned in the former two sections. Like legalists, situationists want to respect the laws and learn from moral traditions, which store the experience and wisdom of the communities. Like antinomians, situationists foster autonomy of human freedom and conscience by focusing the decision-maker’s attention on decision-making situations. Contrary to legalism, this method prevents judgements from being rigidly constrained by one-size-fits-all rules. Instead, it allows them to adapt to each circumstance’s particular nuances. This approach considers both general moral principles and the requirements of the given circumstance, resulting in more rounded conclusions. Rather than relying on established norms, decision-makers are encouraged by this method to think critically about the optimal course of action. This stance requires respecting the spirit of the law more than its letter, where the spirit means the principal good and intrinsic values that the law is to protect and promote. 36 Morality Management and Situation Ethics In contrast to antinomianism, the situationist method leads to compassionate and humane outcomes by emphasising love as a guiding principle. People and organisations that follow this method must develop their understanding of what is ethical by routinely re-evaluating and reflecting on actions considering established principles and current circumstances. According to the situationist decision-making method, one uses the law to solve problems. Situationists do not marginalise the law. They aim to interpret and change it following its spirit to fit reality best. According to situation ethics, MM is to foster love in society. Although Fletcher denies any ontological interpretation of virtue (Fletcher, 1970), the situationist approach to MM follows the tradition of virtue ethics, accentuating moral education’s role in MM (Frankena, 1973). In the situationist view, MM aims to create a society of virtuous citizens. 15.1 Agape. Benevolent Decision-Making For Fletcher, love means agape or agapeic love. Fletcher distinguishes this love from emotions that may have love’s name. In his view, agape is goodwill – the will aiming at the good of people (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 103–119) according to the optimisation principle of utilitarian ethics. According to this principle, benevolent (morally good) decisions aim at the greatest possible good of the greatest possible number of people (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 95; Fletcher, 1967, pp. 19, 56). As Fletcher stresses, love is neither egoistic nor altruistic (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 107). Loving decisions search for compromising interests of all people, including the interests of the decision-maker (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 110–114). Love is not an emotion or feeling for him (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 103, 105). It is primarily the will – goodwill, which is rational, which works “in partnership with reason” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 69). Situationists specify the rationality of love by the requirement of prudence and responsibility. 15.2 Prudent Decision-Making For Aristotle, prudence is a moral virtue involving practical wisdom and the ability to reasonably judge what is morally right and advantageous in particular situations. This virtue is intellectual ability and moral discernment, which synthesises intuition, knowledge and life experience to determine the optimal course of action in concrete circumstances (Uhr, 2015). According to Fletcher, prudence is not a virtue. It is a “careful calculation” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 88), recognising existing or potential good in concrete situations and finding the best way to protect or promote this good. It is a practical consideration in determining the means to attain the goal of love. Three Projects of Morality 37 Prudent decisions are methodologically rational (Section 8.1), using available knowledge. General knowledge embraces data from sciences and moral traditions. Concrete knowledge is about the circumstances of the decisions (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 87–88). Prudence can also mean a capacity for intuitional moral knowledge and choice (see Section 24). 15.3 Responsible Decision-Making In the context of situationist texts, the term “responsibility” takes on different meanings. Each of these meanings influences understanding individual actions and decisions in different ethical and moral contexts. 15.3.1 Motivation Responsibility can mean motivation, which is the quality of responsible decisions. Fletcher defines this quality in line with utilitarian ethics: Responsible decisions prefer solutions that best meet the optimisation principle (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 114–119). Responsible decisions are motivated by their chances and risks. Responsible agents (who make responsible decision) predict and scale them according to their best available knowledge and choose the course of action that gives the best chances and minimises risks. In contrast, irresponsible decisions may involve introducing risky innovations without testing their impact on society. However, as Fletcher notices, responsibility may require the courage to permit risks when inaction or a delay in deciding carries a greater risk (Fletcher, 1966b. pp. 83–84). 15.3.2 Moral Duty Responsibility is also a moral duty to make responsible decisions. In this respect, people are responsible for making socially useful choices based on their best available knowledge and understanding. This duty involves considering and minimising potential harm to others and maximising the positive impact of decisions. In this meaning of responsibility, individuals and organisations have the moral obligation of responsible decision-making. 15.3.3 Moral Responsibility The duty of moral responsibility generates moral responsibility of agents in terms of their responsibility for the consequences of their actions. This responsibility occurs when agents hold responsibility for something in terms 38 Morality Management and Situation Ethics of their merit or guilt for the effects of their actions. In this meaning of responsibility, individuals and organisations are responsible for caring for and promoting the welfare of those affected by their decisions. 15.3.4 Conscientiousness Fletcher also specifies the internal responsibility of decisions. In this respect, agents ensure their motives are genuinely loving and compassionate. A crucial aspect of this responsibility is the care for intentions behind one’s actions – this responsibility is typical of examining conscience. Fletcher names this responsibility conscientiousness (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 27; 1967, p. 8). When defining it, Fletcher draws on the works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and the philosophy of dialogue. In this approach, responsibility is seen as relational and dialogic, representing a response of love towards persons. This responsibility should be guided by the well-being of people and the best available knowledge about what benefits them (Fletcher, 1967). 15.3.5 Taking Responsibility Responsibility can also mean taking responsibility for someone or something. Fletcher specifies this responsibility as care in terms of caring for people (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 87–89). However, he also specifies taking responsibility as courage. As all decisions are risky – they can cause unpredicted bad side effects – Fletcher defines taking responsibility as courage to permit them (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 84). Fletcher maintains that responsible decision-makers should profit from the community’s wisdom in the written and unwritten law. However, he denies universally valid criteria to evaluate the consequences of actions. Accordingly, responsible agents should first investigate and then decide on these criteria. Fletcher postulates that in the moment of decision-making, “the responsible self in the situation decides whether the Sophia can serve love there” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 33). According to him, this evaluation should be responsible – considering the consequences of respecting or disrespecting them (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 82, 135–137). Therefore, in his view, a responsible decision-maker evaluates the social utility of moral norms and rules in each decision-making moment. She must take responsibility for adopting some law and for breaking it. Consequently, Fletcher postulates taking responsibility for the evaluation criteria. In this respect, responsibility means that the agent grants herself the competence to choose the criteria for evaluating consequences. Fletcher maintains that this responsibility is unavoidable in the situationist method, as it follows from personal autonomy and freedom Three Projects of Morality 39 in decision-making. However, he notices that some agents may abuse this privilege by making arbitrary moral preferences out of their moral ignorance or malevolence.5 Notes 1 “Classical pacifism … holds the use of violence to be always wrong regardless of the situation. This is a legalism, even though many pacifists would be unhappy to think of it as such. The subtlety here is this: the pacifist knows that if, as in the ‘just war’ doctrine, it is possible that some wars are just and some are not…” (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 83–84). 2 Fletcher indicates various examples of situations where moral actions according to some moral norms must violate other norms of the law. For example: “Alexander Miller interviewed some of the French maquis after World War II, about their experiences in the resistance struggle. (It is a famous passage in his Renewal of Man.) They had lived on lies (forged passports, ration cards, I.D. cards, etc.), by theft of food and supplies, by killing occupation officers and collaborators, sometimes even killing one of their own members in danger of arrest and exposing their whole conspiracy. He asked if everything, then, is permissible? Their reply was clear and crucial. ‘Yes, everything is permitted – and everything is forbidden.’ Miller’s comment was that ‘if killing and lying are to be used it must be under the most urgent pressure of social necessity, and with a profound sense of guilt that no better way can be presently found.’ We should change his ‘guilt’ to sorrow, since such tragic situations are a cause for regret, but not for remorse” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 124). 3 “While legalists are preoccupied with law and its stipulations, the Gnostics are so flatly opposed to law – even in principle – that their moral decisions are random, unpredictable, erratic, quite anomalous. Making moral decisions is a matter of spontaneity; it is literally unprincipled, purely ad hoc and casual. They follow no forecastable course from one situation to another. They are, exactly, anarchic – i.e., without a rule. They are not only “unbound by the chains of law” but actually sheer extemporizers, impromptu and intellectually irresponsible. They not only cast the old Torah aside; they even cease to think seriously and care-fully about the demands of love as it has been shown in Christ, the love norm itself. The baby goes out with the bath water!” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 23). 4 “We ought not to hesitate to break a law that is in all conscience unjust, that is to say, unloving. Perhaps also we should before or pari passu do what we can to get it reinterpreted in the courts or thrown out on some ground such as constitutionality, using legislative machinery to correct it. But neither the state nor its laws is boss for the situationist; when there is a conflict, he decides for the higher law of love. He has to weigh immediate and remote consequences as well as local and broader interests, but if the scales go against law, so does he” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 101). 5 “A noteworthy complaint is that situation ethics presumes more ability to know the facts and weigh them than most people can muster. It is true that all of us are limited in how much we know about things and how competent we are to evaluate even what little we know or think we know. … But in his more immediate situation, he must make his own decisions and should. If it is true that one’s 40 Morality Management and Situation Ethics opinions are no better than his facts, then situation ethics puts a high premium on our knowing what’s what when we act. We are always free and often well advised to call in expert and professional advice if we choose to call upon it. But if the law cuts down our range of free initiative and personal responsibility by doing our thinking for us, we are so much the less for it as persons. Law easily undermines political freedom (democracy) and personal freedom (grace)” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 84). DOI: 10.4324/9781003250623-4 This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Three Metatheories of Morality Management 16 Metatheories of Legalism Fletcher presents two metatheories characteristic of legalism: theories of natural and scriptural laws. According to the former theory, humans by their nature aim to achieve a certain goal (happiness, fulfilment), which is the principal good of each person. In this perspective, morally good intentions align with and morally right actions contribute to this goal. Morally bad decisions and actions are not compatible with this objective. In this view one can notice some preconditions for accomplishing happiness. They specify the law that is in the human nature (natural law). Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas initiated this metatheory. According to theories of scriptural laws (which are called scripturalism in this book), values manifest through interference with the will of certain authorities, who posit the moral law by their decisions. In this perspective, the moral value of decisions depends on their adherence to this authority’s will. Religious scripturalists point to the Divine Authority of God, while areligious scripturalists point to human authority (of an individual, group or organisation) that designs the positive law (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 47; Fletcher, 1970, pp. 121–137; Robinson, 1970, pp. 7–18). 16.1 Deontological Ethics: Obedience Instead of Benevolence Deontological ethics posit that some actions are morally obligatory, permissible or forbidden based on principles and duties inherent to the action rather than the outcomes they produce. This approach contrasts with consequentialist theories, which evaluate actions regarding their outcomes. Situationists maintain that legalist ethics is deontological, where general moral norms and rules dictate morally good and bad or right and wrong actions and their moral evaluations. In this view, “there are a great many actions that would be wrong … no matter what good consequences are expected to follow …” (Fletcher, 1988, p. 120). As situationists notice, Immanuel III 48 Morality Management and Situation Ethics such as Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. However, these thinkers distinguish between morally right and wrong existential choices. In their view, only the existential commitments to love are morally good. In practice, this position requires acting out of love and aiming for love in others (Fletcher, 1967, p. 56). Fletcher asserts that love is precious “regardless of the context” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 60) and independent of human appreciation (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 57–68). As Fletcher puts it, “… Nothing is intrinsically good, but the highest good, the summum bonum, the end or purpose of all ends – love” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 129). Situationists label this position as agapism. This stance presents normative absolutism regarding love. In this view, all other values are instrumental. They are precious only when they contribute to love. As Fletcher maintains, “Everything, please note … whatever it is – might be sold for love’s sake if the situation calls for it” (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 33, 121). According to this stance, the universal duty of love does not determine any universally valid norms and rules, as the content of concrete moral duties depends on the unique situation of decision-making and the decisionmaker’s preferences. Fletchers summarises this by stating, “… there are no universals of any kind. Only love is objective value, only love is universal” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 64). 18.2.2 The Essence of Love: Sharing Intention According to Fletcher, no symptoms of loving intentions would allow individuals to recognise loving intentions and actions in extraspection. In his view, moral judgments are only possible through introspection. He states that “Every man must decide for himself according to his own estimate of conditions and consequences, and no one can decide for him or impugn the decision to which he comes” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 37). Fletcher warns against defining love. He maintains that “Love like good itself is axiomatic and ostensive, categorical, like blue or sour or anything else that simply is what it is, a ‘primary’ not definable in terms of something else” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 47). Fletcher presents love in terms of the Aristotelian friendship: It is a decision – the will of good for another person. In contrast to Stagirite’s idea, according to situationist positivism (see Section 18.4), each person defines love through their existential commitment. According to this view, love has no universal symptoms or preconditions. The only remarkable symptom of love is the sharing intention, which is the will of the principal good for others, which is love according to situation ethics. This definition of love is formal and circular. It is formal because situation ethics specifies the structure of love’s intentions without determining Three Metatheories of Morality Management 49 its intentional object. It is circular because its definiendum (“love”) belongs to its definiens. However, according to Fletcher, this formality and circularity of definition are right because they embrace divergent conceptions of the principal good. Fletcher asserts that regardless of whether benevolent agents assume love or any other value (human personality, personhood, well-being, dignity or happiness) to be the principal good, they make similar decisions because they intend to share this good with others. This sharing intention is the essence of love, as he shows (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 96). 18.3 Utilitarianism In situationist literature, the term relativism can designate the utilitarian notion of value and moral duty. According to this conception, moral imperatives are relative to the value of the consequences of respecting them. 18.3.1 Optimisation Principle Utilitarian ethics presents the stance of consequentialism (teleologism) in metaethics. In this view, “… whether an action is morally right or wrong has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances” (Zimmerman, 2019). From this perspective, morally good decisions strive for, and morally right actions promote “the greatest good for the greatest number (of people)” (Fletcher, 1988, pp. 138–139). When saying terms like useful or harmful, situationists consider social utility (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 107–110). According to situation ethics, love is the intention (decision or preference) to enhance the well-being of all humans (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 79, 103, 107, 109) adhering to the utilitarian principle of “the greatest amount of neighbour welfare for the largest number of neighbours possible” as outlined by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 95; Fletcher, 1967, pp. 8, 53). However, situationists replace the utilitarians’ “pleasure principle” with agape (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 95). Consequently, the optimisation principle of situation ethics requires pursuing the greatest possible love in the universe – “the greatest amount of agape for the greatest number of neighbors possible.” (Fletcher, 1967, p. 56) Fletcher observes that the optimisation principle may seem cruel when it requires sacrificing individuals and minorities, if it is indispensable, to protect “the greatest good for the greatest number of people.” However, he maintains that “calculation is not cruel” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 114). He presents various examples of dilemmas (invariants of the trolley dilemma), 50 Morality Management and Situation Ethics prioritising the good for the “greatest possible number,” even if it entails harm to a smaller amount of people (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 114–119). 18.3.2 Rule Utilitarianism In selecting codes of moral conduct in MM, Fletcher suggests the method of rule utilitarianism,4 which involves evaluating and selecting moral rules and norms based on the consequences of their implementation. The preference is for the most useful moral norms, rules and codes. Situationists task MM with predicting the social consequences of implementing codes of moral conduct and selecting the code that best motivates agents to make morally good and sound decisions. They argue that this code should primarily specify the decision-making method instead of codifying actions as morally right or wrong in the legalistic style. Following the act utilitarianism in the MM process involves predicting and evaluating the social consequences of implementing a moral code to select the most socially useful code for society, according to the utilitarian optimisation principle. Situationists observe that some moral prohibitions are well-grounded in human experience. However, according to situation ethics, even the most fundamental moral prohibitions may have exceptions in atypical situations (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 26–31; Robinson, 1970, pp. 15–16). As Ramsey notices, empirical investigation of the past allows us to formulate summary rules specifying the statistical probability that some actions violate the principle of love. However, he notices that these rules are fallible in predicting future consequences, emphasising that each agent must investigate their suitability in new situations (Ramsey, 1966, p. 192). 18.4 Positivism In outlining situationist positivism, Fletcher alludes to Sartre’s idea of existential commitment, labelling it “our choice of our summum bonum” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 43), which is the highest good (value) in the hierarchy of values adopted by the entity and the most important aim in life. According to Fletcher, this choice determines agents’ value preferences and comprehension of values. In situationism, this stance encompasses three premises: normative, metaphysical and epistemological decisionism in metaethics. 18.4.1 Normative Decisionism In situation ethics, relativism can denote the assumption or normative relativism that values are precious because someone appreciates them. The normative decisionism presumes that something “…is a value because somebody decided it was worth something” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 59). Three Metatheories of Morality Management 51 Consequently, values become precious when someone appreciates, wants or aims to achieve them by an existential commitment, which is a decision. This relativism is moderate, as situation ethics assert that love is precious regardless of human preferences. 18.4.2 Metaphysical Subjectivism in Metaethics Situation ethics adopts the existential ontology, where decisions are the source of moral meaning of reality, leading to metaphysical subjectivism. In this view, values are purely intentional objects and lack inherent reality. It is the stance of metaphysical subjectivism in metaethics. As Fletcher states, “There are no ‘values’ at all; there are only things (material or nonmaterial) which happen to be valued by persons …” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 58). In this view, decisions create values by specifying purely intentional objects for decisional intentions of wanting, aiming for, or appreciating something. 18.4.3 Epistemological Decisionism According to situationist positivism, moral knowledge arises from decisions. Emotions only mediate the understanding of existential commitment (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 106). The reason’s function is to discover the most effective means to achieve the goals set by the will (Fletcher, 1988, p. 34). In this view, the reason is a function of freedom – a tendency of freedom not to contradict itself. In this view, human reason can recognise facts as well as their causal and logical links between statements or norms. However, it lacks knowledge about moral imperatives without a decision that presents something as a value or an end worthy of attaining. Thus, human reason can only deduce imperatives from normative premises elected by existential commitment. Consequently, reason alone can find facts and instrumental values by identifying the most effective means to achieve a given end, but reason does not establish any moral aims of action. According to Fletcher, value preferences are arbitrary, arising from arbitrary decisions of existential commitment: “Value choices are made, and normative standards are embraced in a fashion every bit as arbitrary and absurd as the leap of faith” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 48). According to him, value choices (existential commitments) are self-justifying, similar to the choice to love is self-justifying, according to Bernard of Clairvaux’s statement, “Amo quia amo (I love because I love)” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 47). No reasoning or knowledge can prove a value preference (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 47–49) because there is no logical method to justify or falsify existential commitments (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 49). They can be “vindicated” by reductive reasoning showing their compatibility with knowledge, experience or a theory. However, Fletcher stresses 52 Morality Management and Situation Ethics that the existential choice logically precedes any theory, which takes place expost – logically after the existential choice is already valid (made). 18.5 Personalism As Fletcher states, “the bias of [the situationist] … ethical standpoint … is probably best pin-pointed as personalist” (Fletcher, 1979, p. XVIII). In their personalism, situationists draw on Kant’s conception of the categorical imperative and the existentialist notion of human existence (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 50–52). Situationist personalism comprises the following two assumptions: (a) Human personality serves as the primary means of understanding values, and (b) human beings (their personality and freedom) are the highest good (Fletcher, 1979, p. XVIII). Situation ethics presents their personalism by suggesting respecting people by protecting and fostering their love. Consequently, the theory of human nature and well-being is marginalised. Situationists assert that morally right actions should contribute to “human personality” (Robinson, 1964, p. 12) or “well-being” (Fletcher, 1970, p. 2). Fletcher provides examples of well-being, such as human “health, survival, growth, joy, social interest, self-realisation, and so on” (Fletcher, 1988, p. 30). However, situationists do not investigate these requirements by emphasising that all the characteristics of human existence are instrumental values when “they happen to contribute to some good other than themselves” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 129). In this view, love is the only intrinsic and autotelic value that specifies the good of persons – human well-being in the strict sense. Consequently, the situationist postulation of personalism narrows to agapism – the requirement to protect and foster love in people. This narrowing is remarkable in the situationist conception of moral rightness. According to situationists, this value of actions encompasses the utility of their consequences. As situation ethics denies any intrinsic value of the consequences, except for the value of love, the optimisation principle translates into the imperative of optimising love in the universe. 18.6 Pragmatism Fletcher selectively alludes to American pragmatism, introducing the pragmatic concept of meaning and theory of the truth into situation ethics (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 40–43). 18.6.1 Theory of Meaning and Objectives of Ethics According to pragmatism, theories derive meaning from their outcomes – the actions of their adherents and the resulting consequences (Hookway, 2013). Three Metatheories of Morality Management 53 Fletcher embraces this idea. He observes no significant difference in ethical theories when motivating people to make similar decisions (Fletcher, 1970, p. 2). Situation ethics adopts a “practical or success posture” of pragmatism (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 42) by marginalising theoretical problems and prioritising applied (pragmatic) ethical objectives. The theoretical goals include defining and explaining some (objective or subjective) reality and justifying statements or norms. The pragmatic goal is to evoke some expected outcomes regarding actions from the theory’s followers. Fletcher considers these pragmatic objectives to be the primary goal of any ethics, leasing to morally good decisions, morally right actions and socially useful practices. Consequently, situation ethics is an ideology that serves as MM’s tool (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 41–42). 18.6.2 Ideologies According to Fletcher, situation ethics adopts the pragmatic method of choosing among competitive ideologies (ideas, conceptions, theories, codes of moral conduct, theories that he collectively refers to as “ideology”). Fletcher summarises this method in the following way: When beliefs or non-empirical opinions, neither of them being falsifiable, contradict or clash with each other, the only possible way to choose between them morally is in terms of their consequences if they are followed out logically in practice. The one which results in greater good for people is the correct one. (Fletcher, 1988, pp. 138–139) Consequently, situationists propose evaluating ideologies based on their consequences. However, to evaluate the consequences, one must apply some criteria belonging to a certain ideology. Here, the method of rule utilitarianism comes full circle under the pragmatic definition of truth: To evaluate an ideology, it is necessary to evaluate its outcomes. To evaluate them, one needs some criteria (ideology) that also need evaluation. To evaluate them, it is necessary to evaluate their outcomes according to some criteria (ideology) and so on. 18.6.3 Truth Markers With pragmatism, Fletcher posits that the validity of ideas and theories lies in their success. He defines it in terms of “satisfaction” according to John Dewey, “expediency” according to William James and “what works” according to F. C. S. Schiller. Consequently, in the situationist literature, the term truth does not have the classical meaning of epistemological truth 54 Morality Management and Situation Ethics (according to the correspondence definition specified by Aristotle or Alfred Tarski). For Fletcher, truth denotes the utility of ideologies in providing satisfaction, expediency and functionality to people. This function serves as the indicator (marker) of truth (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 41–42). Situationists assert that socially useful ideologies gain popularity over time and, thereby, become (pragmatically) true. People abandon socially harmful and useless ideologies because they do not satisfy people. Consequently, situationists contend that the popularity of ideologies is the decisive marker of their truth (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 43; Rhymes, 1966; Robinson, 1964, p. 14). Accordingly, true theories express the dominant value preferences or be persuasive enough to become popular (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 47). Situation ethics is without the answer to the question of whether socially harmful ideologies are (pragmatically) true when they are popular. Notes 1 I have translated engagement (French) as existential commitment or existential choice. 2 “Our obligation is relative to the situation, but obligation in the situation is absolute. We are only obliged to tell the truth, for example, if the situation calls for it; if a murderer asks us his victim’s whereabouts, our duty might be to lie” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 27). 3 “To be relative, of course, means to be relative to something. To be ‘absolutely relative’ (an uneasy combination of terms) is to be inchoate, random, unpredictable, unjudgeable, meaningless, amoral – rather in the antinomian mode. There must be an absolute or norm of some kind if there is to be any true relativity. This is the central fact in the normative relativism of a situation ethic. It is not anarchic (i.e., without an arche, an ordering principle). In Christian situationism the ultimate criterion is, as we shall be seeing, ‘agapeic love.’ It relativizes the absolute, it does not absolutize the relative!” (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 44–45). 4 According to rule utilitarianism “A moral rule is justified if its inclusion into our moral code would create more utility than other possible rules (or no rule at all)” (Nathanson, n.d.). DOI: 10.4324/9781003250623-5 This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Three Tactics of Morality Management 19 The Tactics of Legalism Situationists present legalism as morality management (MM) tactics of codifying morally right actions and anticipating that obedience to codes of moral conduct (laws) will produce benevolent actions. Situationists argue that this tactic builds legalists’ social authority but does not always result in benevolent actions. Situation ethics present three obstacles to this tactic: First, respect for the principle of morality (love or any other principal value, like God, happiness or human dignity) is not fully codifiable. Second, the complexity and variability of reality prevent any code of morality from embracing all situations and moral dilemmas. Third, respecting moral principles requires freedom and creativity, elements restricted by the legalistic decision-making method. 19.1 The Method of Codification Any practice of legalism begins with codifying actions through legislation or casuistry. Although situationists recognise the utility of codes of conduct in preventing risks and harmonising social actions,1 they deny the possibility and need to codify everything. They maintain that codification is useful only when it offers better solutions than common sense, rendering codification unnecessary in other cases (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 19–21). As situationists notice, in complex or atypical situations, the moral agent must sometimes independently and creatively find the best solutions. Overly detailed codification of morality can hinder the development of a sense of responsibility in people for the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, excessive codification poses the risk of abuse of power as codifiers may insert their own interests behind detailed norms and rules. 19.2 The Goal of Obedience Situationists warn against confusing the means with the goal of MM. According to situation ethics, MM should promote morally good and IV 56 Morality Management and Situation Ethics right decisions, with the laws serving as the means to this end. However, bad legalism substitutes the end of MM by its means. Consequently, legalistic MM aims to evoke obedience to the laws, relying on this obedience to generate or account for benevolence. This tactic is utopian as Section 19.5 shows. The distinction between the means and end of MM involves nuances and subtle shifts of accents in legalist theories or narrations. However, these nuances and accents are decisive for practice of MM: Situationists stress the significance of determining whether a legalist considers respect for the law as a precondition or goal of moral action. In good legalism, the accent is on the principal good. In this approach, lawgivers and interpreters constantly investigate laws to accommodate them to the requirements of the principal good. In bad legalism, the emphasis is on obedience. In this approach, morality managers spare all effort in accommodating the perceptions of the principal good to satisfy some ideology. 19.3 Management by Prejudice Situationists debunk assumptions of legalism as prejudices that legalistic MM uses to foster the authority of morality managers in social perception. These premises are superstitions because, as situationists argue, they contradict evidence and prima facie moral experience. These prejudices are about perfect laws, infallible traditions and authorities. 19.3.1 Perfect Laws As situationists notice, converting the law into action necessitates interpretation and heuristics according to the premises that belong to the spirit of the law, which specify the values that the law is to protect and foster. Hence, any understanding of the law necessitates surpassing its literal wording (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 47; Fletcher, 1970, pp. 121–137; Robinson, 1970, pp. 7–18). Situationists observe that proponents of scripturalism employ respect for laws by propagating the belief that they apply to reality without any dose of interpretation. As situationists maintain, propagating this belief may be a trick in which agents hide their interpreting role under the guise of presenting the law to a wider audience. Proponents of natural law may also use this tactic when presenting one of some optional interpretations of natural law as unquestionable natural law itself. However, authors (also sympathising with the natural law theory) have already criticised this misinterpretation (Finnis, 1979; Fried, 1964; George, 1992; Murphy, 2001). Three Tactics of Morality Management 57 19.3.2 Infallible Traditions The situationists’ central criticisms of legalism focus on the legalist faith in the infallibility of legal solutions, a belief shaken by examples of unjust and socially harmful laws, when they become outdated. As situationists notice, laws may require changes. Nevertheless, legalism impedes such changes. The radical position of scripturalism denies any changes in laws, while moderate scripturalists allow evolutionary changes under the requirement of their coherence with the existing laws. According to this interpretation of the rule of law, any changes of laws must adhere to the applicable actual laws. According to situation ethics, the rule of law primarily requires compliance with the spirit of the law, which encompasses values the laws should protect (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 18).2 Situationists maintain that in some exceptional situations, legal systems may not permit significant changes when the laws or their institutions are fundamentally unjust. In such situations, situationists propose “civil disobedience” to these laws and institutions (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 101–102). Situationists consider these situations exceptional, stressing that MM should foster respect to moral and legal traditions, especially by teaching to leverage the wisdom stored in them for prudent and responsible decision-making. 19.3.3 Infallible Authorities Some views of legalism presume the infallibility of moral authorities (who interpret the law and present its meaning to the public). As situationists maintain, this assumption is false, as any interpretation “stands always in the presence of the interpreter who is fallible” (Gustafson, 1963, p. 23). Section 19.5 further presents and criticises this superstition. 19.4 Substitutive Solutions Situationists observe that the legalistic MM centred on obedience shifts the attention of society and morality managers away from important moral issues, focusing on marginal or fake moral problems. Morality managers may do it on purpose. Then, they introduce substitutive topics, red hearings diversity tactics to diverse public opinion from their inaction or failure in problem-solving. Situationists do not name this trick and do not present its case studies. However, their critiques of legalism allow some of these variants to be specified. The tactic of substitutive solutions entails presenting a solution to a secondary problem (problem B) as if it were the solution to the primary problem (problem A). Problem B, which is easier to solve, has some similarities to the more difficult problem A. The trick lies in portraying the solution to B as the solution to A. 64 Morality Management and Situation Ethics Consequently, the antinomian idea of MM offers something else as it promises. It is supposed to foster human liberty. However, it limits civil liberties by requiring that morality managers impose their views against other people’s freedom. 20.2 Antinomian Fanaticism When Sartre characterises existential commitments as arbitrary, he signifies the core existentialist concept that human life has any predetermined essence or intrinsic significance that prescribes objectives or principles. In his view, individuals must autonomously select their ideals and trajectories in life, devoid of any moral compass external to their decisions. From an external perspective, this decision may seem arbitrary due to the lack of predetermined significance or moral absolutes. Nevertheless, the term arbitrary in this context does not suggest any form of negligence or capriciousness in making decisions. Nevertheless, as some critics notice, Sartre does not present any way of grounding existential commitment in knowledge, which means that moral (authentic) agents may remain insensitive to rational argumentation concerning their goals as specified by existential commitment (Aku, 2012; Bronner, 2021; Crowell, 2004; Ray, 2012; Sealey, 2012). According to this interpretation, situationists present the antinomian decision-making method as irresponsible, as it requires agents to make existential commitment regardless of the knowledge they have or can possess. Even if they are methodologically rational in selecting the means of their actions, they must be methodologically irrational in setting their goals, as these goals follow from their existential commitment, which is arbitrary. Agents who act this way should remain insensitive to reasons for and against these goals under the premise that they must remain arbitrary. Consequently, as Fletcher notices, their decisions can be “random, unpredictable, erratic, quite anomalous” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 23). When this way of decision-making becomes a permanent in a person, it perfectly meets the characteristics of fanaticism (Levesque, 2018). However, the antinomian fanaticism is untypical, as fanatics usually follow some external authority. Antinomianism requires that agents adhere to their arbitrary goals blindfolded. 20.3 The Primacy of Power As situationists suggest, the ethics of antinomianism does not specify any moral limit for actions besides the requirement of authenticity. The only external limitation of activities is the resistance of reality. Consequently, when a morality manager sets some MM goals according to her existential commitment, she has the moral obligation to use any effective means to attain them. It can be coercion and manipulation. These tools may become more Three Tactics of Morality Management 65 extreme than legalism allows, as antinomianism does not require respect for the law or any other moral norms external to the agent’s will. Efficacy is the only criterion and test for selecting actions’ means in this view. Consequently, according to the logic of antinomianism, the power becomes also the decisive factor for selecting morality managers: Entities compete to manage morality. The strongest and the most influential individual, group or organisation wins this competition, becoming the morality manager by the power of facts. Her arbitrary will specifies the goals of MM. Here, the reason of power substitutes the power of reason in MM. 21 The Tactic of Situationism Situationists share the antinomian respect for individual freedom. However, situation ethics sets the principal value in love. In this view, MM should protect and promote love in the universe. However, situationists distance themselves from forcing this motivation through legal regulations or sanctions. Situationists present the tactics for reaching this goal without force and coercion. 21.1 The Optimisation Principle and Rule Utilitarianism Situationists do not draw a clear boundary between morality and law. Consequently, in the writings of situation ethics, the term law may refer to written laws, unwritten or customary moral standards reflecting the moral beliefs of a community. According to situationism, the spirit of the law should be utilitarian. In this view, one should design and execute legal and moral laws in a socially useful way. This tactic follows rule-utilitarianism. In this view, MM should design and implement the most socially useful code of conduct, adhering to the utilitarian optimisation principle of aiming at the “greatest good of the greatest number” of people (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 95–96). Consequently, situation ethics fosters the adoption of socially useful laws.4 Situationists emphasise that morality managers should not change law and morality without significant reason. They should respect the moral and legal traditions when they remain socially useful, abolishing norms and rules that are socially harmful (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 99–102; Robinson, 1963, pp. 118–119). According to situationism, citizens should control the decisions of morality managers. People should respect the law but have a moral obligation to disobey it when it is unjust and socially harmful. As Fletcher puts it, “We have a moral obligation to obey civil law, for order’s sake; and we have a moral obligation to be situational (even disobeying the law) for love’s sake” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 101). 66 Morality Management and Situation Ethics 21.2 Principled Relativism As Fletcher maintains, the theory or name of the principal good holds marginal significance in the practice of MM because the true meaning of moral theories lies in the practice of their followers. He assumes that benevolent agents make similar decisions regardless of whether the name of the principal good is personhood, human dignity, happiness or love. Namely, they are benevolent because they intend to share this good with others. He names this sharing intention love or agapeic love. According to him, MM should encourage agents to make benevolent decisions without censoring their comprehension of the principal good (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 96). Fletcher suggests that MM should promote a dose of relativism, which consists of avoiding generalisations: “The situationist avoids words like ‘never’ and ‘perfect’ and ‘complete’ as he avoids the plaque, as he avoids absolutely” (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 43–44). This relativism is the shift “from a hierarchy of values, ranged in some supposedly ‘given’ and permanent order of bad or better, to a fluid spectrum of values” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 44). Fletcher maintains that some principal good should remain central to the ethical narratives of MM. However, this good should be general enough to embrace divergent views. He proposes defining this good as love. Consequently, MM should teach society to consider all moral norms and rules conditionally, depending on how they “serve love” (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 33). Fletcher names this tactic principled relativism (see Section 18.2). 21.3 Didactic Paternalism Situationists do not deny moral (personal or institutional) authorities. On the contrary, situationists often take the role of morality teachers, and some writings of situation ethics present the style of ex-cathedra preaching ethics rather than question-asking or discussing divergent moral views (Gustafson & Johnson, 1989). However, situationists stress that the role of moral authorities is primarily inspirational. Situationists propose a new approach to authorities that reduces their role to case studies and inspiration for investigations: The modern history of the arts and sciences, and of the technologies that undergird them, makes it plain that they no longer bow down to nor cut their cloth to authoritarian principles. Their lifeline is no more handed down in advance or dropped from above by “revelation” or majesty. Men have turned to inductive and experimental methods of approach, working by trial and error, appealing to experience to Three Tactics of Morality Management 67 validate their tentative and loosely held generalisations. It has worked with unprecedented success as a strategy or method of inquiry and growth. Psychology, for example, got its start and growth this way. The same is true in many other sectors of the growing edge of the human enterprise. Now, at last, ethics and moral inquiry are doing it too. This is the new turn in the history of Christian ethics. This is the temper of clinical, case-centred, situational “concretion” – to use Bonhoeffer’s word. (Fletcher, 1966b, p. 158) Situation ethics presents the educational role of MM in narration that presents past actions to motivate agents to make moral decisions. This narration is called neocasuistry or neocasuistics. In contrast to classical casuistry, neocasuistry does not present any pattern for action but serves as a motivational role. It is a didactic tool motivating people to take moral actions by illustrating the attractiveness of benevolent decisions and the dreadfulness of malevolent decisions (Gustafson, 1971, pp. 177–185). Consequently, situation ethics proposes MM as moral education that does not violate human autonomy. In this view, methods of MM should make values attractive for decision-makers – without coercion and deception. Although situation ethics does not present any examples of this practice, one can imagine practices that meet the above requirements of situationist moral education. Their examples are presented in Sections 21.4 and 21.5, concluding this chapter. 21.4 Making Values Accessible According to situation ethics, coercion and punishment should be the last methods of MM when other methods do not work. In this view, one should first make values attractive to people. Therefore, primarily, one should facilitate possibilities by enhancing accessibility to ethical options. For example, consider MM promoting respect for ecology: The legalistic approach to ecology may consist of prohibiting and enforcing measures, such as imposing high taxes on environmentally unfriendly cars (including those with older or diesel engines) and banning their entry into city centres. In contrast, the situationist approach would seek to find a solution to make sustainable cars more attractive and affordable to drivers or to organise public transport infrastructure in a more attractive way than using cars. 21.5 Making Values Attractive. Rational Persuasion In this study, rational persuasion means to influence without coercion and deception. Situationists, by criticising legalistic methods of moral education, 68 Morality Management and Situation Ethics suggest that MM should use only such persuasion. Although the situationists did not develop methods of this persuasion, they have already been formulated. This section presents exemplary tactics of rational persuasion, which fit the situationist idea of MM. 21.5.1 Knowledge to Make Moral Preferences When people lack the information needed to make a rational choice, MM may provide them with this knowledge. MM can help people understand and accept the full consequences of their choices by highlighting indirect and long-term effects. MM can play this role by various methods, such as educational campaigns or workshops, which raise awareness about further consequences of human activities or the implications of their choices. For example: • One can implement a health promotion initiative by disseminating empirical data regarding the advantages of a well-rounded diet and the hazards associated with bad eating practices. This approach upholds individuals’ liberty while equipping them with information to make wellinformed choices on their dietary habits. • One can organise workshops and provide materials to enlighten the general public on prudent expenditure, saving and investment methodologies. This approach upholds the autonomy of individuals in making financial decisions while equipping them with resources and information that may steer them towards adopting more conscientious financial behaviours. • One can organise seminars and workshops for educators and parents, emphasising the significance of digital literacy in contemporary society and its integration with the overarching objective of holistic education. 21.5.2 Raising Self-Awareness Situation ethics and psychoanalysis developed at the same time. Although direct connections between these schools are not reflected in their writings, these lines of thought share some common ideas of motivation functions, which psychoanalysis used in therapy and situation ethics may use in MM (Bardecki, 1957). As Erich Fromm, Karl Gustav Jung and Karen Horney show, therapeutic methods may facilitate developing awareness of the meaning of value preferences. Similarly, situationists assign the didactic role to ethics, starting from what is known and leading to the discovery of preconditions for values and implications of value preferences. Socrates originally specified these didactic roles. In his view, the elenctic methods cure agents of inconsistent beliefs, and maieutic methods help Three Tactics of Morality Management 69 agents to make independent discoveries, which in moral matters may concern consequences of value preferences that agents originally did not accept. For example: • People appreciate their safety but are reluctant to respect other people’s fundamental rights in some respects. In this case, MM may show how fostering mutual respect between people is reasonable because it safeguards their safety. • Society members find no appeal to respecting the lives of some groups. However, members of this society highly appreciate their life. In the process of MM, one can show how universally respecting the fundamental right to life safeguards the life of each member of society. • A society appreciates peace but does not respect cultural diversities. MM may show how respecting a common set of fundamental human rights can assist diverse cultures and societies to coexist peacefully. 21.5.3 Strengthening Moral Motivation MM can strengthen moral motivation without changing it. For example: • One can enhance dedication to upholding moral principles by fostering activities that prompt individuals to contemplate their value preferences and invent new possibilities by aligning with these preferences. Educational campaigns and participating in workshops or courses focused on ethical thought and decision-making might assist individuals in harmonising their everyday behaviours with their moral principles. For example, an awareness campaign focused on responsible innovation can educate the community on successful social responsibility practices for individuals who already prioritise this. • Cultivating environments that promote and foster the manifestation of value preferences may entail establishing platforms, forums or communities where individuals with similar preferences can exchange ideas and cooperate on ethical endeavours. For instance, educational institutions or organisations can create clubs or committees promoting social responsibility. These groups would offer assistance and resources for initiatives that align with these principles. In some circumstances, these initiatives can generate manipulation. However, one can prevent it by applying some tactics. For example: • Transparency: Initiatives can provide explicit details regarding their aims, techniques and the sources of their information. One should ensure that participants comprehensively understand the purpose and context of the 70 Morality Management and Situation Ethics campaign or workshop in which they are involved. Transparency is a precaution against concealed motives that may seek to manipulate the participants. • Voluntary participation: Initiatives that permit individuals to freely select their level of involvement uphold the participant’s autonomy, avoiding coercive methods that could alter their moral inclination. • Critical engagement: Encouraging critical engagement ensures that individuals are not merely receiving knowledge passively but actively encouraged to question, analyse and interact with the material. This critical perspective enables individuals to develop their well-informed viewpoints instead of being influenced by possibly manipulative speech. • Freedom of speech: Promoting interactive conversation instead of onesided information sharing cultivates an atmosphere prioritising exchanging ideas, thoughtful contemplation and mutual regard. Individuals can delve into ethical intricacies by engaging in discourse while retaining their autonomy and ability to engage in reasoning. Notes 1 Although situationists do not investigate these cases, they are worth mentioning as they depict the utility of codification in minimising risks: • Pilots and crew strictly adhere to specific operational protocols and checklists for ordinary flights and emergencies. The key to safety is to follow these rules. • The legalistic approach creates a precise framework for accountability. If everyone plays by the rules, it will be easier to identify when and where deviations occur, making it easier to hold people or organisations accountable for their actions. • Strong safety standards in some sectors, including pharmaceutics, chemical manufacture, nuclear energy and construction, must be strictly followed. • Following defined standards and guidelines enables decision-makers to reduce the impact of subjective judgements, feelings or arbitrary variables, fostering fairer decisions in circumstances where objectivity is important. • In some companies or bureaucracies, precise, codified rules expedite decisionmaking by enabling decision-makers to refer to the established rules, resulting in quicker decisions without extensive consideration of each circumstance. 2 Situationists do not present an in-depth analysis of the legalist conception of the rule of law. However, there is literature that expands on this topic in a way that aligns with the argumentation of situationists, without referring to situationism (Dyzenhaus, 2008, 2021; Raz, 1970; Sen, 2010). 3 According to the position of normative egoism, “I morally ought to perform some action if and only if, and because, performing that action maximizes my self-interest” (Shaver, 2019). Ethical egoism “…holds that one is always to do what will promote his own greatest good ─ that an act or rule of action is right if and only if it promotes at least as great a balance of good over evil for him in the long run as any alternative would, and wrong if it does not” (Frankena, 1973b, p. 14). Three Tactics of Morality Management 71 4 “Situation ethics welcomes law for love's sake sometimes, all depending. This is why anarchism is a fallacious social idealism and why Tolstoy was wrong. It recognizes the need for love but fails to see the need for order. It sees the importance of voluntary order but is too myopic toward the reality of sin to see the need for a loving use of force to protect the innocent and to make ‘rights’ practicable …. We ought not to hesitate to break a law that is in all conscience unjust, that is to say, unloving. Perhaps also we should before or pari passu do what we can to get it reinterpreted in the courts or thrown out on some ground such as constitutionality, using legislative machinery to correct it. But neither the state nor its laws is boss for the situationist; when there is a conflict, he decides for the higher law of love. He has to weigh immediate and remote consequences as well as local and broader interests, but if the scales go against law, so does he” (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 100–101). DOI: 10.4324/9781003250623-6 This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Metaethical Dilemmas This chapter reverts to the morality management (MM) paradox (presented in the Introduction) by addressing questions that situation ethics provokes but does not directly formulate and answer. These questions are the following: Whose interests should MM foster? (Section 22), What goods and values should MM promote? (Section 23), What are the sources of moral knowledge? (Section 24), Whose preferences set values? (Section 26), What are the goals and methods of MM? (Sections 25, 27 and 28) and Who should manage morality? (Section 29). 22 The Metaethical Dilemma of Economics. Stakeholders of Morality? According to the optimisation principle of situation ethics, MM should foster the most socially useful code of moral conduct. To operationalise this principle, one must answer the question: Whose benefit constitutes social utility? This question addresses stakeholders of morality and MM. This section presents three canonical responses to this question from the perspectives of ethical egoism, universalism and individualism. 22.1 Ethical Egoism According to descriptive egoism, many or all agents act out egoistic motives – they primarily foster their own (individual egoism) or their group’s (group egoism) interests and place them above those of others. This stance should be distinguished from normative (ethical) egoism, which specifies the moral duty to act out egoistic motives (Hutchinson, 2001; Shaver, 1999, 2019; Tullberg, 2006). In this view, answers to the question about the stakeholders of morality must be relative: As individuals and groups compete to foster their interests, they consider themselves stakeholders of MM. Consequently, egoists consider themselves the main stakeholders of MM as they expect any change of V Metaethical Dilemmas 73 morality fostered to benefit them. Moore and Kant outline a canonical philosophical critique of this stance, while managerial investigations show that it may justify injustice and discrimination (Hill, 2007, 2007; Hutchinson, 2001; Kant, 2010; Moore, 1903; Reath, 2012; Shaver, 1999, 2019; Tullberg, 2006). Situationists do not discuss the moderate theories of rational egoism, which presume that rational egoists foster social interests through rational decisions. Critics of this position show that rational egoists may act socially destructively for a long period and have no egoistic reason to change the course of their actions (McMahon, 1981; Sen, 2017; Stiglitz, 2003). Situationists do not oppose egoism to altruism. They believe a certain amount of self-love is required to love others. However, self-love without loving others is immoral in this view. According to situation ethics, love embraces all persons, including its subject. In this view, all people are stakeholders of MM; the agent should take care of her love and intend to optimise love in others – in the universe. In this way, situation ethics takes the stance of ethical universalism. 22.2 Ethical Universalism It can be assumed that all people are stakeholders in MM. This approach can be explained by the stance of universalism in ethics: […] Ethical universalism, or what is usually called utilitarianism, takes the position that the ultimate end is the greatest general good -- that an act or rule of action is right if and only if it is, or probably is, the position that the ultimate end is the greatest general good - that an act or rule of action is right if and only if it is, or probably is, conducive to at least as great a balance of good over evil in the universe as a whole as an alternative would be, yet wrong if it is not, and obligatory if it is or probably is conducive to the greatest possible balance of good over evil in the universe. (Frankena, 1973, pp. 15–16) According to this stance, all humankind, both present and future, is the stakeholder of morality. In this view, individual interests should be subordinated to the common good, understood as the sum of the interests of all people. Critics of this stance notice that many individuals or groups’ interests compete with those of others; thus, satisfying the interests of all implies prioritising the interests of majorities and marginalising the interests of some. Therefore, this stance can justify discrimination against individuals and minorities if it is profitable for the majority (Dworkin, 1990; Fleurbaey, 2014, 2016; Shaver, 1999, 2019). 80 Morality Management and Situation Ethics should promote respect for these values and foster preferences that contribute to intrinsic values in practice. For example, if human freedom, dignity or well-being is the principal value, MM should primarily promote appreciation for this value. The main advantage of normative absolutism (anti-relativism) in metaethics are as follows: • This stance opens the perspective for investigating intersubjective criteria for evaluations. • This stance offers a set of values that can serve as an ethical framework in MM. • This premise can guarantee the safeguarding of fundamental human rights and values, such as dignity, freedom and well-being, notwithstanding utilitarian concerns. • The stance of normative absolutism fosters a sense of responsibility and accountability among morality managers towards societal and ethical obligations by upholding unwavering values. However, limits of knowledge expose this stance to some risks: • Normative absolutism may foster imposing universal principles against local traditions in the process of MM. • One can abuse this metatheory to impose some arbitrary views under the guise of normative absolutism, presenting them as undisputable without adequate reason. This practice can generate superstitions. • Determining which values are principal and intrinsic is contentious, resulting in controversies within and between groups. • Rigorous adherence to rigid principles may impede changes. • This attitude may lead to oversimplifying intricate ethical problems that necessitate nuanced, context-specific resolutions. Divergent theories that adopt normative anti-relativism consider the above risks. Some authors present it as the framework for investigation that is opposed to bad legalism, fanaticism or ideological imperialism in ethics (Chroust & Osborn, 1942; MacIntyre, 1985, 2007; Uhr, 2015). 23.3.2 Normative Relativism? According to normative relativism, respect for values means respecting some value preferences. In this view, MM is influencing some people’s value preferences according to the value preferences of other people, who are considered authorities for some reason. In this practice, the appeal to authority (Lat. argumentum ad auctoritatem) plays a crucial role. This authority can Metaethical Dilemmas 81 be the whole society, its elite, individual or organisation, as Section 26 will show. The main advantages of this stance in MM are as follows: • Normative relativism offers effective methods to identify evaluation criteria in human preferences. For example, one can investigate them through interviews, questionnaires and surveys. • This stance may foster tolerance and diversity in considering and respecting divergent value preferences of societies and organisations. • By recognising the significance of individual and collective preferences, this stance promotes a comprehensive approach to including stakeholders’ preferences in MM. • Normative relativism may foster open discussion and contemplation regarding divergent moral preferences. However, this stance also poses some risks for MM, which are as follows: • The lack of universally accepted principles can result in moral uncertainty, complicating the establishment of consistent ethical rules for action. • Implementing this stance may intensify tensions between various groups’ values, making it more difficult to reach a consensus. • Multiple ethical frameworks might complicate the decision-making process. • Prioritising individual or group preferences may impede the ability to hold morality managers responsible for adhering to universally accepted ethical principles. Normative relativism, not less than normative absolutism, is at risk of bad legalism. Under relativism, this risk is higher as the ultimate stance of evaluation is in the value preferences of some authority. This stance may impede ethical investigation by fostering obedience, when opinions of a value creator are presented as beyond discussion. 23.3.3 The Pragmatic Balance? Situation ethics presents a conundrum between normative absolutism and relativism. According to situationist utilitarianism, one should weigh theories’ benefits, drawbacks and risks to select the least hazardous and most advantageous ideologies that specify intrinsic values. However, this method cannot operate without an idea of intrinsic goods. Consequently, the choice between normative absolutism and relativism logically precedes the teleological method. Situationists marginalise the ontological issue about intrinsic goods by claiming that humans have sources of knowledge that are sufficient to know 82 Morality Management and Situation Ethics what is right and wrong. The following section presents these sources of knowledge. 24 Epistemological Dilemmas. Sources of Moral Knowledge? 24.1 Act-intuitionism? According to Fletcher, moral knowledge about intrinsic values is intuitive. Intuition in this text refers to the act and capacity to gather or synthesise information into new information without reasoning. Some thinkers (including G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross and Michael Huemer) presume that intuition is reliable or the only source of fundamental moral knowledge. This assumption constitutes the stance of ethical intuitionism. Phenomenology presents the possibility of methodically using this source of knowledge in ethical investigation, which explores moral experience.1 One should distinguish moral intuition (discovering moral principles) as presented above from act-intuition in finding moral solutions without reasoning. Situationists name this intuition prudence and insight into moral imperatives (Fletcher, 1966b, pp. 143, 158; Fletcher, 1979, pp. 222–225; Gustafson, 1965, p. 184; Rhymes, 1966, p. 173). According to situation ethics, people find moral solutions guided solely by act-intuition. This stance is called act-intuitionism in this text. Intuitionism may be either elitarian or egalitarian. According to moral elitism, some people have greater act-intuition than others. Moral experts have developed this intuition at a high level, while non-experts are deprived of it or have not sufficiently developed it. In this view, there may be a continuous difference between moral ignorance (lack of moral intuition) and perfect moral competence (of moral experts). In the elitarian version of this stance, there are limits to communicating moral experts’ decisions to those deprived of moral intuition. In this view, non-experts cannot fully understand the intuitive rationale behind experts’ moral evaluations or decisions. Consequently, non-experts must sometimes or even always agree or disagree with moral experts blindly – without understanding their intuitive moral views. According to ethical egalitarianism, each person is a moral expert or at least has sufficient moral intuition to know what is right and wrong. However, disagreements among benevolent people regarding moral matters falsify this stance. To explain this disagreement, proponents of this position must either presume ethical elitism or assume that contradictory moral judgements are equally true. In the latter case, ethical egalitarianism must presume that each person has a unique perspective of moral perception, which has its moral truth that may contradict the truth from another perspective. Metaethical Dilemmas 83 Consequently, if situationists presume no extra-intuitive sources of moral knowledge, this stance may foster two opposite practices, which range from extreme tolerance to intolerance. An egalitarian stance accounts for the assumption that everybody is right in their moral opinions (extreme tolerance). Proponents of the elitist version of this stance should maintain that only moral experts and people who agree with them are right, which leads to intolerance in discussing moral matters. One can avoid these extremes by presuming that moral rightness or wrongness has symptoms known to non-experts and via non-intuitive knowledge. In this view, experts may have the best moral intuition but other people may have enough common sense to notice when moral authorities commit gross errors – for example, when they preach nonsense, become entangled in contradictions or their actions destroy principal good. For example, Józef Maria Bocheński shows how one can investigate the liability of moral authorities instead of trusting them blindly (Bocheński, 1965a; Brożek, 2013). In this view, non-experts can know prerequisites and symptoms of love. Based on this knowledge, one can assess, without the use of intuition, whether the actions of an authority promote love or contribute to its destruction. However, situationists deny any extra-intuitive sources of moral evaluation. Consequently, moral authorities must be trusted or distrusted blindly in this view. This consequence leads towards the decisionistic interpretation of situationist act-intuitionism, which the following section presents. 24.2 Decisionism? Theories of moral intuition typically presume normative absolutism and epistemological realism in metaethics, which is the premise that agents can know moral values and duties, which do not depend on human preferences. However, situationist positivism presents the stance of normative relativism and epistemological subjectivism in metaethics, which presumes that moral knowledge is about mental acts. According to this stance, decisions create the intentional object of act-intuition (moral values and duties). Thus, act-intuition is awareness of existential commitment and its compatibility or incompatibility with a particular decision. In this view, act-intuition is about the authenticity or inauthenticity of decision-making. This stance introduces arbitrariness into MM. Section 30 further discusses this view. 25 Control Dilemmas The MM of normative absolutism and relativism may foster similar moral preferences and solutions. Some conceptions combine these stances in a not-classifiable way according to the dichotomy between these 84 Morality Management and Situation Ethics assumptions. For example, Amartya Sen’s conception of justice combines normative absolutism and relativism (Sen, 1990, 2010). Nevertheless, the differences between the stances of normative absolutism and relativism may become remarkable in the controlling function of MM, especially if something goes wrong. For example, imagine the following situation: Authorities in some societies promote practices that violate fundamental human rights. However, these practices eventually garner approval in society. There are historical cases of the above situation. For example: • Slavery: In antiquity and modern times, the slavery system gained widespread social acceptance, not only among moral authorities but even among enslaved persons. Thus, some morality managers argued that this system was right. • Child labour: In some developing countries, child labour is a successful business practice acceptable to local authorities and society. • Usury: Financial organisations can exploit disadvantaged populations through predatory lending practices. These highly profitable practices are accepted or even encouraged by moral authorities in cultures that value consumerism. Let us assume that proponents of normative absolutism and relativism respect the same fundamental human rights and define their requirements similarly. Still, these stances divergently identify the problem in the above situation. For normative absolutists, the problem is on the side of reality, which is unjust regardless of human opinion and preference. For proponents of normative relativism, a situation is wrong because it contradicts some human value preferences. In this view, the problem lies in the relationship between the human will and reality. It may seem a slight ontological difference in defining values as inherent (intrinsic) or external (extrinsic) to reality. Nevertheless, it is an applied difference. Because these stances divergently identify the locus of a problem, they offer divergent methodologies for solutions. For example, when evaluating usury, proponents of normative absolutism and relativism may investigate the requirements of justice. Suppose these thinkers follow the method of consequentialism; they consider the utility of these practices to distinguish predatory usury from morally acceptable financial assistance between entities (e.g. by specifying the upper limit of the permitted loan and borrowers’ responsibility to repay the loan). Metaethical Dilemmas 85 In making the difference between predatory usury and acceptable financial assistance, proponents of normative absolutism would search for some intersubjective criteria that do not depend on human preferences. These criteria may embrace context-dependent, subjective, cultural and legal aspects of the problem. The solution of normative relativism may be similar, but of divergent operational meaning. In this case, MM should aim to manage the situation according to the preferences of some authorities. This solution begins with identifying them. Here, the appeal to authority plays a crucial role. These authorities may diverge in the different versions of this stance. In normative individualism, the evaluator considers herself to be this authority. In collectivism, the evaluation must presume the opinions of certain groups. In the view of elitism, authorities are individuals or minorities whose opinion is decisive. For example, normative relativists can presume that this authority is the local group. In this case, if the local community or authorities appreciate the situation, one should presume it is right, according to normative relativism. If one presumes that some external group is the authority, then their opinion accounts for the evaluation. For example, when one evaluates the situation according to the opinion of some experts or legal provisions. 26 Value Creators? The Dilemma within Normative Relativism This section presents the relativistic interpretation of situation ethics. Under this premise, intrinsic values depend on human preferences. The stance of normative relativism requires answering the question of whose preferences define the intrinsic values. The agents who do so are called value creators in this book. They do not create anything real by creating values. They create values by determining the social patterns of right perceptions of intrinsic values. This section presents candidates for the position of value creators. 26.1 Each Person? Ethical Egoism According to the position of individual normative relativism (typical to antinomianism), each agent sets intrinsic values by her moral preferences – she is a value creator for herself. In this view, each agent has her perspective on moral perception, which determines what intrinsic are and what the rank of these values is. This stance is compatible with individualistic ethical egoism, as presented in Section 22.1. In this view, each agent should consider herself the value creator. If morality managers present this view, they manage morality according to their personal moral preferences. 86 Morality Management and Situation Ethics 26.2 All Individuals? Normative Egalitarianism The appreciation for the freedom of individuals may lead to normative egalitarianism. In this view, all people or members of society are value creators, and MM’s job is to act according to their preferences. This stance is compatible with ethical universalism, as presented in Section 22.2. From this perspective, morality managers in MM should foster preferences of all members of a group or organisation. Critics of this stance argue that it is impossible to simultaneously satisfy the preferences of all people. Thus, MM must favour some preferences and counteract others, which may lead to discrimination against minorities and individuals whose moral preferences are marginalised or neglected (Dworkin, 1990; Fleurbaey, 2014, 2016; Shaver, 1999, 2019). 26.3 Elites? Normative Elitism According to normative absolutism, some experts may know the preconditions for love and how best to implement love in social practice. This conception on moral experts should be distinguished from normative elitism, which presumes with normative relativism that some humans (individuals or groups) create intrinsic values by preferring them. In this view, value preferences are correct when they adhere to the value preferences of some elite of value creators. It is usually a group, but a single person can be the elite in this sense. Situationist pragmatism proposes a peculiar competence that value creators should possess. Namely, situation ethics presumes that popularity is the marker of truth. From this perspective, success (defined as popularity) makes ideologies true. This stance posits that a standpoint’s ethical validity or endorsement depends from the impact and control specific persons, groups or organisations have in moulding public sentiment. Consequently, according to situationist pragmatism, entities with persuasive power (the most influential individual, group or organisational agents) are value creators because their preferences have the best chance to influence the rest of society. It is that individual or group that is sufficiently influential to make its ideas popular. Consequently, this stance can lead to considering the power of influence as the decisive reason to consider someone or a group as a moral elite or value creator. 26.4 Individualism versus Pragmatism The ontology of situation ethics is existential and individualistic. It is hardly compossible with the collectivistic, egalitarian or elitarian postulate that a morality manager should abandon her existential commitment to respect Metaethical Dilemmas 87 someone else’s will. This ontological background presents no moral reason for morality managers to foster others’ moral preferences beyond their compatibility with her existential commitment, which can happen in three cases discussed in this section. They are as follows: a Alliances: A morality manager represents a group with preferences similar to hers. In this case, the morality manager considers this group a value creator because she agrees with the group’s collective moral preferences. b Opportunism: A morality manager modifies her moral preferences for pragmatic reasons. c Influence: A morality manager influences value creators to accommodate their preferences to her own. 26.4.1 Alliances? Sartre (in his later writings) outlined alliances in the process of MM through his idea of solidarity with people with compatible existential commitments. The pragmatic reason for this action is that an individual is too weak to introduce her value preferences to the public. Accordingly, a group is more powerful than its members (Anderson, 2002; Boileau, n.d.; Bronner, 2021; Flynn, 2013; Sealey, 2012). In this scenario, the morality manager consolidates with a group and considers it a collective value creator because this group presents her moral views and gives her impact power to impose her existential commitment on the society. 26.4.2 Obedience? The concept of value creators is normative in normative relativism. In this view, value creators cannot be wrong about moral matters because their moral preferences set the criteria for any moral assessment. Consequently, acting against them is immoral by definition. Accordingly, one can interpret situationist pragmatism opportunistically, as it presumes that successful ideologies are right due to their popularity. From this perspective, morality managers should adopt and foster the most popular views or the moral views of the most influential social agents. 26.4.3 Ex-Post Pragmatic Validation Morality managers can influence value creators. In this scenario, they originally disagreed with some stance but eventually accepted it, validating the new moral standards. Therefore, according to situationist pragmatism, some moral preferences and initiatives may receive ex-post validation in the 88 Morality Management and Situation Ethics future preferences of value creators. Note the following examples, assuming that society is the collective value creator: • Assume the government introduced some innovations against the will of society; however, after the effects of these solutions become apparent, society begins to appreciate them. • Initially, resistance may emerge due to the perceived economic burden of medical innovations. However, environmental quality and public health improvements lead to widespread support. • Radical social reforms such as the abolition of slavery and the extension of voting rights have gained widespread acceptance over time. In ex-post validation, the morality manager takes the initiative to specify moral standards. She may pretend to respect the will of some value creators but takes their role in deciding the moral standards. Consequently, according to situationist pragmatism, morality managers start playing the role of value creators on the pragmatic condition that their initiatives are successful. Under situationist pragmatism, successful persuasion ex-post validates actions of MM, as the success and popularity of ideas are decisive markers of their truth. Consequently, in this view, the process of MM is a game of power in which divergent players attempt to manage morality and those who happen to be successful become temporary value creators. The stance of situationist pragmatism may present this game as a perpetual reinterpretation and recreation of normative morality. The pragmatic stance requires a method of control to curb the abuse of power. One such method may be systemic power division. This strategy requires adherence to legal regulations and rigorous assessment criteria in divergent political systems. Situationist pragmatism also requires respect for the law. Therefore, this stance should go hand-in-hand with a dose of good legalism, which requires players to respect the game’s rules. 26.5 Dilemmas of Pragmatic Morality Managers Imagine a situation in which the preferences of value creators are so fundamentally wrong and socially destructive that a morality manager cannot authentically abandon her voice of conscience. This situation presents the MM paradox of normative relativism. This view presumes that value creators cannot be wrong in their moral preferences because they set the standard for correct moral preferences. To avoid this paradox, a morality manager can presume that these value creators: a are not value creators, b are right, and she is wrong in moral evaluation, c are right but are inconsistent. Metaethical Dilemmas 89 These options specify divergent MM tactics. In case (a), morality managers should rebel against those who pretend to be value creators or their morally wrong beliefs. For example, in their critique of bad legalism, situationists suggest abandoning morally wrong authorities and disobeying unjust legal systems. In case (b), morality managers blindfolded distrust their conscience and trust the preferences of value creators. This solution can lead to bad legalism and fanatic authoritarianism, which situationists criticise. However, this scenario is thinkable under situationist pragmatism, which may require morality managers to adhere to the most influential groups’ views. The typical situation of MM occurs in situation (c), in which value creators are inconsistent – when their preferences deny their other preferences or facts. In this case, morality managers should persuade value creators to avoid inconsistencies and contradictions in the therapeutic functions of MM, which Section 21.5 presented. This scenario can also lead to ex-post validation, as presented in Section 26.4.3, where morality managers take on the role of value creators. 27 The Goal of Morality Management. Love or Success? Success refers to two characteristics of an action: efficacy and efficiency. Actions are effective when they reach their goals. Efficiency is achieving the best possible outcome with minimal losses and resource expenditure. Situation ethics sets the goal of MM in its success. However, this ethic proposes two divergent conceptions of success depending on whether one assumes normative absolutism or relativism. According to normative absolutism, success and failure are a matter of fact. When MM’s goal is love, the efficacy of MM is its function of protecting and promoting love, while efficiency is the optimal efficacy according to the situationist interpretation of the utilitarian optimisation principle – the greatest possible love to the greatest possible number. In this view, protecting and fostering love focuses on its preconditions, as love cannot exist without them, and MM cannot directly cause love. The metatheories of normative absolutism may specify additional requirements for efficiency of MM. For example, Aristotle’s concept of eudaemonia, or the flourishing of human potential, requires understanding human nature and its best possibilities. This perspective aligns with natural law, as outlined by Thomas Aquinas. Here, the preconditions for human existence and development are intrinsic goods that MM should protect and foster, while their promotion accounts for the efficiency of MM (Aristotle, 2002; Jayapalan, 1999; Kraut, 2002, 2016). Analogously, some proponents of fundamental human rights presume that they define the efficiency of actions. In this view, MM should foster respect for these rights (Brems, 2001; Keys & Burke, 2013; Sen, 1990, 2017). 96 Morality Management and Situation Ethics intuition (it should consider all available knowledge). However, intuition is the last stance when evaluating consequences, according to situation ethics. This solution poses the danger of arbitrary evaluations, as this stance presents no extra-intuitive and intersubjective method to control intuition (see Section 24.1). 31.3 Normative Decisionism The situationist stance of epistemological decisionism presents act-intuition as a decision (see Section 18.4). In this view, at some stage of the investigation, the agent decides the value of consequences. This decision cuts short the endless pondering of consequences. However, the stance of decisionism does not minimise the risk of arbitrariness. This position only canonises this hazard. According to this interpretation, individuals establish values at every juncture. Although this solution provides an escape from the risk of teleological scrupulosity, it redirects the decision-making method towards antinomianism, where the final assessment regarding intrinsic values reflects the arbitrary value preferences of the agent or some value creators. In the latter case, situationist decisionism may adopt normative egalitarianism, elitism or pragmatism (see Section 26). In these options, the risk of teleological scrupulosity can emerge when the agent is unsure about who the value creators are (see Section 26) and whether the final calculus of consequences will satisfy their preferences. 32 Fanaticism? This section presents a potential conjunction between scepticism and fanaticism in situation ethics, where scepticism as a stance is canonised and presented as true and indisputable. Situationists do not advocate this stance but promote it indirectly under the premises of normative relativism and pragmatism, as this section argues. 32.1 Normative Perspectivism Intuitionistic and decisionistic interpretations of situational epistemology presume epistemological perspectivism. In this view, moral judgements occur from the perspective of moral perception and are unrelated to any intersubjective goods or values. Depending on the version of this stance, this perspective may be individual, collective, private or specified by the opinion of some authority (value creator). Perspectivism can be descriptive when it states that people have a perspective on moral perception. However, this stance becomes normative under Some Moral Hazards 97 the assumption of normative relativism. In this view, human preferences set intrinsic values. This stance’s individualistic (antinomian) version requires agents to believe that their authentic decisions or act-intuitions are automatically or magically true or morally right only because they authentically originate from their existential commitment to love. Collective versions of this stance presume that some collective will creates values. In the elitist version of this position, it is the decisions of authority that bring values into existence. This position can lead to extreme tolerance, respecting the diversity of moral decisions and ideals, including the most destructive and absurd. However, this stance can also lead to extreme intolerance, meaning that agents could disrespect any view, except their own or that of some authority. 32.2 Moral Fanaticism? Moral fanaticism refers to the attitude and practice of marginalising or denying available moral knowledge when making moral preferences. Situationists try to counteract moral fanaticism by demanding respect for knowledge. However, situationism does not offer a method that allows the principle of love to be operationalised in decision-making, thereby requiring the evaluation of moral norms and rules at each moment of decision-making or adhering to value creators blindfolded. Consequently, situationist perspectivism presents discussions on moral matters as ideological conflicts of arbitrary moral preferences. In this view, value preferences are arbitrary and thereof – indisputable. This stance presents the ground for various beliefs and practices that may be called fanaticism. 32.3 Aspects of Fanaticism The term fanaticism has many meanings. In this study, the term denotes a methodologically irrational attitude (as specified in Section 8.1) that leads to assertions, decisions or actions that go against the available knowledge (Levesque, 2018; Toscano, 2017). Fanaticism can occur in various contexts. For example, in management, agents experiencing hubris syndrome are under the illusion that the power they possess or the responsibility they carry guarantees the infallibility of their preferences (Owen, 2008). The contexts of fanaticism may include the following: • Corporate leadership: Executives or managers may exhibit overconfidence due to their experience and position within a corporation. • Political leadership: Elected officials or government leaders may exercise their perceived authority to make choices without contemplating the consequences or obtaining advice from specialists in pertinent domains. 98 Morality Management and Situation Ethics • Medical practice: Physicians or healthcare administrators may display an overconfidence bias by neglecting to seek secondary opinions or review fresh research when making diagnoses or treatment decisions, presuming that their experience alone is adequate. • Legal professions: Lawyers or judges in the legal field may succumb to overconfidence bias, mistakenly believing that their legal experience grants them a comprehensive understanding of intricate issues. • Academic research: Scholars or researchers may become entrenched in their theories or methodologies, neglecting to critically assess alternate perspectives or developing information that contradicts their preconceived notions. • Parenthood: Parents may believe that they know what is best for their babies without gathering knowledge or seeking outside advice. Usually, fanaticism refers to excessive, irrational zeal or uncritical enthusiasm, especially concerning beliefs or ideologies. However, fanatics can also be irrationally zealous about denying knowledge data. Fanaticism can generate exaggerated indifference towards information and values, producing paradoxical forms of fanatic scepticism (agnosticism). In this case, fanatics lack genuine interest in the truth, presuming that endorsing some viewpoints, a particular authority, or adhering to an ideology renders it unnecessary to scrutinise their rationale. In this study, methodologically irrational beliefs are referred to as prejudices or superstitions. The fanaticism of these beliefs lies in how they are held, rather than their content. True statements may become superstitions when people fanatically adhere to them. In this case, the agent believes in them without any interest in their justification. However, fanatic beliefs are usually self-contradictory or against common sense and available knowledge (Bocheński, 1987). For example, Popper (1962, 2002) noted that scientific hypotheses might gain biased assent. His approach inspired a historical reflection, showing how uncritically held views (that might be true or not) hinder scientific development (Kuhn, 2012) and generate fruitless ideological disputes in science (Latour, 1987). Superstitions consist of irrational beliefs that deny the knowledge of the agent or available knowledge. Fanatical perceptions are methodologically irrational assertions against fundamental logic rules and evidence. Fanatic attitudes may embrace indifference to available knowledge, leading to abstaining from investigating the rationale underlying beliefs (Bortolotti, 2010). Fanatical perception can embrace divergent mental attitudes. For example, ideological thinking is thoughtlessly following an ideology, superstitious attitudes consist of fear or inferiority to testing beliefs, and tribal Some Moral Hazards 99 perceptions deny the humanity of some people solely because they do not share certain beliefs or belong to a group (Vyse, 2000). People with fanatical attitudes tend to dismiss or disregard any evidence or reasoning that goes against their views or may react to sound reasoning with aggression, which may increase proportionally with the fitness of the arguments. Fanaticism can motivate individuals or groups to feel firmly that their stance is superior, unquestionable and immune to criticism, disregarding alternative viewpoints and the wider consequences of their acts (Bortolotti, 2010; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Haidt, 2012). Fanatical agents may embrace inferiority against people who do not agree with their superstitions, question them or investigate their rationale (Bortolotti, 2010). Methodologically irrational assertions are sources of fanaticism. As Sartre notes, this assertion plays a central role in self-denial (bad faith) because it denies something the agent asserts (Anderson, 2002; Heter, 2006; Santoni, 2010; Sartre, 1956). This denial may involve the belief that one perceives something that is not perceived, as exemplified in Christian Andersen’s fairytale The Emperor’s New Clothes. However, these assertions typically involve individuals not acknowledging what they know. Suppose that an agent has a sensual perception. She cannot rationally deny such a perception. She can doubt whether she is interpreting it correctly. However, denying the perception is self-denying, as its denial presumes that the perception has already occurred. Analogous denial can occur in any perception. For example, a fanatic can deny her moral experience. Fanatic beliefs typically involve violating the rules of logic in interpreting raw data from immediate experience. In such a case, the fanatic may be aware that the rules of logic offer reliable methods for understanding her experiences. However, she (in wishful thinking) may prefer to violate them in order to achieve a desired conclusion (Bortolotti, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016). Given these characteristics, one should distinguish between strong moral convictions and fanaticism. Fanaticism is the dearth of receptiveness to knowledge and alternative perspectives, as well as a readiness to enforce moral beliefs on others against their freedom, available knowledge, evidence and common sense. Thus, deep faith may not be fanatical when it is open to arguments seeking the truth in a respectful dialogue with others (Arendt, 1951; Mill, 1859; Popper, 1945, 1947). 32.4 Fanatic Paternalism Moral paternalism is a belief and practice. As a belief, it is the assumption that one is permitted to impose moral standards on society against the will of its members when it is profitable for them. The practice of moral 100 Morality Management and Situation Ethics paternalism consists of an influence process between the paternalising and paternalising parties. Paternalising parties intend to safeguard the interests of the paternalised ones by imposing specific moral standards. Situationists propose didactic paternalism in educating people, aiming to motivate them (without coercion) to make morally good and right decisions (see Section 21.3). In this view, MM should motivate people to make responsible, prudent and benevolent decisions without coercion or compulsion. As situationists suggest, educating people in moral decision-making should encompass more than simply teaching a predefined set of values or ideas. It should also involve providing them with the necessary abilities to critically examine, analyse and comprehend the intricate nature of moral dilemmas and evaluate the opinions of moral authorities. This paternalism does not exclude manipulation (see Section 28). Suppose that each individual is the creator of value for herself. Consequently, any type of paternalism is morally wrong. Situationists present this line of argumentation when criticising legalist authoritarianism. However, this supposition allows for the opposite interpretation, where individuals should influence each other’s moral preferences when they deeply believe it is good for others. In this case, paternalism is morally permissible and, moreover, is the requirement of love. Situationists present this view. Under the relativistic interpretation of situation ethics, the moral rightness of value preferences consists of their consistency with the value preference of a moral authority (i.e. a value creator). In this view, the idea of value creators is normative because they create the standards of correct value preferences that morally bind individuals by moral duty. When investigating the authority of value creators, one can consider their education, prudence or position within the organisation if they are formal authorities. However, situation ethics does not present any intersubjective method to determine whether these entities’ value preferences are correct. Consequently, according to this view, value preferences can be correct or incorrect (right or wrong) only regarding the value preferences of some other value creator. In this view, to control the correctness of value creators’ value preferences, one must assess their coherence with the value preferences of other value creators. In turn, we can control their value preferences by confronting them with other value creators’ preferences, and so on. This reasoning is either endless or circular. (Korsgaard, 1996; MacIntyre, 2007; Nagel, 1989) Situationist pragmatism may suggest a method to escape the vicious circle or infinite justifications of authority by assuming that the most popular views are correct and most influential entities are value creators for the Some Moral Hazards 101 society. However, this standard of moral justification has the potential for various pitfalls: • Justifying injustice: Various morally wrong ideas and unjust social practices have remained popular for long periods throughout history. Thus, situationist pragmatism would justify these ideas and practices if they reach the pragmatic goal of popularity. • Fake authorities: Within this framework, it is possible for power or popularity to unjustly take on the function of epistemic authority over moral matters. • Power delusion: This stance may lead to power delusions if the influential power of the authorities is confused with their moral correctness. In this scenario, those in positions of power or influence authority are assumed to possess greater moral understanding or expertise through their achievements or sway. Consequently, the situationist idea of didactic paternalism must become fanatical when the reason of power (of influence) substitutes the power of reason in moral argumentation. Situation ethics challenges legalism’s fanatical authoritarianism. However, this theory mirrors this fanaticism by dismissing structured control methods. This overconfidence overlooks the necessity for a methodology to minimise the above moral hazards. 32.5 Appeal to Ignorance? Any stance can become fanatical when adopted fanatically. The stance of scepticism can also be fanatical when meeting the characteristics presented in Section 32.3. Fanatical scepticism is an oxymoron, as sceptical research refrains from assuming a definite position and aims at criticising prejudices. However, this term refers to real practices that originate in sceptical research but lead to radical positions of the sceptical stance. Arthur Schopenhauer notes various fallacies that may lead to or justify fanaticism, where some logical error substitutes the search for truth (Schopenhauer, 2019). The typical fallacy that sceptical researchers challenge is the error of deriving knowledge or certainty from ignorance. This error is named (Lat.) argumentum ad ignorantiam or appeal to ignorance in reasoning. The misconception rests on the paradoxical assumption that ignorance is the knowledge of something (Walton, 1996). This fallacy occurs in two typical cases: a A proposition is asserted to be false because it has no proof. b The lack of evidence for a claim serves as evidence for its counterthesis. 102 Morality Management and Situation Ethics Versions of this fallacy represent various reasonings that the following structure can adopt: If X has no proof, X is certainly false, and its opposite (the negation of X) is certainly true. Situationists do not formulate the appeal to ignorance in one sentence. However, they sequentially build their argument against the intentional prerequisites for love according to the following schema: They have no proof; therefore, love has no preconditions. Situationists do not directly attack the intentional preconditions for love. These thinkers question the universal prohibitions that operationalise the idea of the preconditions. In this case, the above formula is as follows: One cannot prove universal prohibitions; therefore, they are not universal. This reasoning has some invariants in situation ethics. Here are some examples where X designates the thesis that these prohibitions are universal (valid in all situations), and ¬X signifies the counterthesis (that they are not universal): a There is cultural diversity and disagreement regarding universal prohibitions. Therefore, one cannot justify them through a social consensus. Therefore ¬X. b There are exceptions to applying universal moral norms and rules in a morally right way in situations of moral dilemma. Therefore, one cannot justify them by enumerative induction. Therefore ¬X. c In some situations, adhering to these prohibitions is less profitable than breaking them. Therefore, one cannot justify them by consequentialism (showing their social utility). Therefore, ¬X. These premises of the above reasonings (a–c) are true but do not justify thesis ¬X. Argument a would be a sound reason for ¬X, assuming that a broad or full consensus is a typical or necessary marker of true statements. However, this assumption is false. There is rarely universal agreement on statements requiring high expertise, as exemplified by disagreements regarding heliocentrism before modern times. Situationists exemplify argument b through moral dilemmas in which one cannot simultaneously satisfy all preconditions for love. For example, in situations where respecting human freedom means risking human life, whereas by rescuing human life, one disrespects human freedom. In such situations, one must break one prohibition to respect another prohibition. However, argument b does not shake the assumption about universal prohibitions but only shows that in some situations, they cannot be simultaneously respected. Moreover, as the theory of double effect shows, these prohibitions apply to solutions to these dilemmas (Anscombe, 1982; Dworkin, 1990; Hills, 2003; McIntyre, 2014). Some Moral Hazards 103 Argument c entails a hasty generalisation (extrapolation) when situationists present atypical situations and presume that they are typical. Atypical situations are exceptions, and exceptions do not constitute a rule. 32.6 Fundamentalist Antifundamentalism? Situationism converges with the antifundamentalist movement in ethics; i.e. through sceptical research, it undermines the possibility of identifying unchanging moral norms and rules. The situationist critique of legalism concerns a variant of this position called fundamentalism. However, divergent types of fundamentalism and antifundamentalism must be distinguished to identify the situationist approach. The discussion of fundamentalism and antifundamentalism in ethics highlights the complex conflict between unwavering ideals and the need for flexibility and receptiveness. Fundamentalism is characterised by a steadfast belief in specific ideas, manifested in two main forms: rational (methodological) and irrational (fanatical). Rational fundamentalism uses a methodical technique to select basic research principles in science or ethics. This method is dedicated to research and discussion, a willingness to accept criticism and the development of ethical ideas based on the most solid foundations available (see Section 39.2). In contrast, fanatical fundamentalism demonstrates methodological irrationality by selecting principles without foundation in research and logical reasoning. This approach weakens the basis of ethical thinking and deviates from the quest for truth and comprehension of ethical discussions. Antifundamentalism promotes a flexible ethical approach that does not uncritically adhere to conventional doctrines. Situation ethics joins this antifundamentalist movement in critiquing legalism. Antifundamentalism, similar to fundamentalism, ranges from research to obsessive rigidity. Rational antifundamentalism is associated with sceptical research. It involves research, dialogue and the exploration of ethical perspectives. Fanatical antifundamentalism is dogmatic, imitating the inflexibility it aims to combat by suppressing differing views and claiming the moral superiority of the sceptical stance above other views. This stance involves the outright rejection of applicable universal principles and general knowledge. By prioritising novelty to negate established ethical thought, antifundamentalism risks creating a vacuum in which critical ethical insights are lost or undervalued (Haidt, 2012). Although situation ethics presumes the principle of love, this research presents fanatical antifundamentalism in ignoring the intentional prerequisites for love and denying universal prohibitions, which can provide 104 Morality Management and Situation Ethics a normative minimum for this ethics. Situationists tend to present all views as bad legalism when they advocate for universal moral norms and rules. 32.7 Intolerant Tolerance? The concept of tolerance, championed by Enlightenment thinkers, was fundamentally rooted in the aspiration to mitigate conflicts and wars sparked by divergent beliefs, particularly those about religion, which elude definitive human comprehension. This idea posited tolerance as a passive virtue and a proactive strategy for cultivating peace and understanding amidst the diverse beliefs that transcend the bounds of empirical verification. However, this noble pursuit encounters a paradoxical challenge when confronted with fanatical antifundamentalism. Popper (1945, 1947), for example, presents the paradoxical practices of intolerant tolerance, offering examples of views classified as intolerant solely because they present fundamentals of thinking or morality. Situation ethics, which puts tolerance on a pedestal of social priorities, generates the risk of intolerance when morality managers take situationist normative perspectivism seriously and silence any views that search for the fundaments of tolerance in some universal moral norms or rules. In ethical investigations, this practice can take the form of self-censorship when researchers deny or ignore their research data, which opposes the sceptical stance (Bracken, 1994; Duignan, 1995; Kersch, 2003; Lukianoff, 2014; Magee, 2002). Situationists present this practice when marginalising the intentional preconditions for love, probably out of fear of their normative conclusions. 33 Powergaming? Effective MM requires some degree of power. Power is necessary for effectively implementing the persuasive and organisational functions of MM. Therefore, regardless of their existential commitment, morality managers should obtain and maintain a modicum of power to manage morality if they are to do it effectively. Power refers to the capacity for effective action. This can include the powers of coercion or persuasion. However, situation ethics prioritises the power of persuasion, as this ethics is against coercion, while situationist pragmatism sets success as the goal of ethics. According to situation ethics, the power of persuasion is MM’s means rather than its aim. However, as this section argues, the reason for power may substitute the power of reason in ethical disputes when success is considered the main goal of ethics. This situation is named powergaming in this study. Some Moral Hazards 105 The psychology of role-playing games specifies a situation called powergaming, in which the strategic sub-goal of gaining an advantage over other players absorbs the players’ attention so much that the means become the main goal in the perception of players.2 Powergaming may occur in various situations; for example, when the conditions for enjoying life consume the attention of a person to a degree that they never have the time to enjoy life. This situation can occur in politics and business when agents sincerely declare noble goals but are more concerned with obtaining power rather than achieving said goals. In these cases, the means substitute the goals of action. For example: • Corporate strategy: Executives may perpetually prioritise enhancing the organisation’s position to guarantee operational efficiency and postpone other goals for an undefined future. • Corporate social responsibility: A manager might agree with the principles of corporate social responsibility but continuously delay integrating these practices into business operations, perpetually prioritising gaining power. Systemic powergaming takes place when the rules of a game make powergaming the best strategy (Bowman, 2010; Burak & Parker, 2017; Jacko, 2018a; Juul, 2003; Sicart, 2005, 2011; Tekinbas & Zimmerman, 2003). Life situations can be examples of such games. For example: • Justice: Some organisations may declare their goal of fostering justice, but their internal rules gratify players who violate the standards of justice. • Efficiency evaluation: Henry Mintzberg (1982) highlights the risk of imposing only quantitative measures of efficiency in organisations. As he shows, these measures prioritise the profits of organisations and marginalise social values that are not quantitatively measurable. • Corporate governance: Organisations declare their goal of fostering social well-being and security. However, their gratification system and diffusion of responsibility may allow managers to prioritise short-term profit maximisation, which is risky for society in the long term. This situation can promote the practice of manipulating the system by prioritising tactics that increase stock prices in the immediate term, even if they are risky in the long term to the interests of stakeholders. For example, the 2008 global financial crisis exemplifies this moral hazard, as banks engaged in risky lending and investment practices driven by incentive structures that rewarded short-term profits. These actions contributed to the housing bubble and financial instability, with banks and employees benefiting from immediate gains without 112 Morality Management and Situation Ethics • Focus on moral autonomy: Situation ethics acknowledges and upholds individuals’ moral autonomy in decision-making, acknowledging their ability to make ethical judgements based on their best knowledge and evaluation of the situation. • Capacity to resolve conflicts: Situation ethics offers a method to resolve moral conflicts or legal contradictions by prioritising the solutions that maximise love and social utility. This method can be particularly advantageous in intricate ethical environments where numerous values are jeopardised. • Adaptability: As societal norms and values change, situation ethics enables moral reasoning’s proper adaptation to the cultural and situational context of MM. Although situation ethics has these positive qualities, Chapter VI elucidates the main hazard in applied MM: adopting the metatheory of situation ethics to justify arbitrariness, fanaticism, manipulation, egoism and powergaming in MM. The evaluation of these risks is a matter of value preferences and normative assumptions that this study takes from situation ethics, which argues for the evaluation of moral theories in terms of their social utility. Organisations that oversee ethical conduct have long engaged in practices that minimise the risks mentioned above. These practices can be described as follows: • Ethical guidelines: Organisations can formulate and respect some principal values that provide a framework for decision-making. However, they should be adaptable to the requirements of the situation. • Checks and balances: Morality managers could introduce checks and balances into their decision-making process, which would presuppose the existence of criteria for evaluating MM’s outcomes. This process could involve ethical review boards, stakeholder consultations and mechanisms to investigate MM’s consequences. • Harm prevention: Although flexibility is important, MM decision-makers should establish procedures to prevent harm. • Monitoring and ethical auditing: Regularly monitoring the outcomes of decisions and conducting ethical audits helps identify unexpected consequences of MM and allows for course correction when necessary. By implementing these tactics, organisations can utilise the advantages of situation ethics, such as flexibility and contextual awareness, to mitigate the aforementioned hazards. However, under the metatheory of situationism, these practices can remain vulnerable to the problem of arbitrariness, which they are supposed to prevent. Consequently, a meticulous refinement of the normative assumptions underlying situation ethics is required to substantiate these methods. Some Perspectives for Research on Morality Management 113 37 Stakeholders of Morality 37.1 A Dose of Normative Absolutism As Section 23 argues, morality managers must make a metaethical choice between fostering the value preferences of some value creators and protecting intrinsic values – i.e. those that are precious regardless of human preferences. Although these options are not exclusive, this choice is unavoidable in MM whenever the authorities deny or ignore intrinsic values. Suppose that value creators accept some forms of discrimination. For example, there have been points in history when the authorities have commonly accepted slavery and considered it good for society and the enslaved. In this case, some methodology is needed to determine whether value creators are correct. Without this methodology, any social movement against discrimination may easily turn into another form of discrimination when groups fluctuate in their positions as value creators and perpetually foster discrimination against other groups. In this case, any political struggle is viewed as a clash of interests and preferences, discretely introducing another form of discrimination according to the tactics of implicit goals specified in Section 35.2. Actions intended to dismantle existing power structures and inequalities might inadvertently establish new ones, thereby perpetuating cycles of exclusion and marginalisation, albeit under new guises. This outcome is particularly concerning in movements and efforts in which vigilance against such possibilities is not maintained. For example, revolutions typically aim to introduce justice; however, in the process of implementing revolutionary reforms, such as land redistribution and social reorganisation, new forms of discrimination and oppression may emerge (Patterson, 1991). Suppose that love is the principal good and is understood as the will to do good to others, as situationists presume. Formulating anti-discrimination ethics in this context necessitates specifying certain requirements for love that are not a matter of human preference. In this case, situationist research should investigate human nature to understand what is good for people and the intentional prerequisites for love. This requires a dose of normative anti-relativism, which must not be a philosophically formulated stance or extensive codification. This implies the assumption or belief that some principal values are precious regardless of human preferences. The following section presents the metaphysical framework for such research. This position is named normative individualism in this chapter. 37.2 Normative Individualism Economic metatheories attempt to minimise the risk of discrimination by postulating standards of efficiency that embrace individuals’ (including minorities) interests. For example, Vilfredo Pareto’s (2014) allocative 114 Morality Management and Situation Ethics efficiency principle introduces this idea of efficiency into economic calculation. This efficiency occurs when at least one person improves and no one worsens. However, few or no actions satisfy this principle. By promoting the interests of one individual or group, one always acts against the interests of another when it concerns competitive goods; by giving such goods to some people, one deprives others of the opportunity to have them. Moreover, in situations of injustice, efficiency standards may engender injustice. Amartya Sen identifies this as follows: An economy can be optimal in [the Pareto] sense even when some people are rolling in luxury, and others are near starvation as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into the pleasures of the rich. … In short, a society or an economy can be Paretooptimal and still be perfectly disgusting. (Sen, 2017, pp. 68–69) Kaldor-Hick’s efficiency test aims to make Pareto’s principle applicable to real situations. This requires that those who are made better off compensate those who are made worse off and recreate a Pareto-efficient outcome. This standard requires intervention politics when those who profit do not want to recreate efficient situations. However, Kaldor-Hick’s efficiency test cannot work without presuming intersubjective measures of profits and losses. Otherwise, they remain bound to arbitrary opinions (Wight, 2017). If all standards of justice were merely a product of human preferences, the differentiation between justice and injustice is a clash of competing preferences. Otherwise, one should assume that the preferences should meet some standards to be just. This stance requires a dose of anti-relativism, which involves searching for fundamentals of justice that are not a product of human preferences. For example, Aristotle provides this dose of antirelativism by specifying standards of distributive and corrective justice. Sen (1992) describes this dose via the capability approach, which focuses on providing individuals with equal opportunities. These stances can conceptualise their metaphysical principles of justice in the idea of some principal good, which is not only good for persons (which persons can possess) but also good of persons (that enrich human existence), and presume that standards of justice should promote and protect the principal good in each person (Sen, 1990; Wight, 2015; Williams & Bengtsson, 2016). In this view, each person (as opposed to everyone) is a stakeholder in MM. This position presumes that morality managers should design morality guidelines that best foster the principal good of each person. I call this position normative individualism. Some Perspectives for Research on Morality Management 115 This perspective is open to divergent ontological and epistemological interpretations. For example, Aristotle (and the ethics of eudaemonism, initiated by him) identifies the principal good with human development – the fulfilment (eudaemonia) of the most precious possibilities of humans, i.e. their capacity to understand reality and create bonds of friendship (Brink, 2014; Crisp, 2016; Kraut, 2016). Ethical liberalism in metaethics assumes that the principal good is the individual’s freedom (Kelly, 2005). Some personalist conceptions make normative assumptions about every person’s intrinsic value (dignity), which translates into fundamental human rights in the language of practice (Brems, 2001; Keys & Burke, 2013; Sen, 1990; Williams & Bengtsson, 2016). Situation ethics presents the principal good as love and presents it to be the principle of justice. Normative individualism accentuates the individuality of persons, which presumes a dose of deontological theory into the teleological method. In this view, the consequences account for evaluating actions but actions destructive to the principal good are wrong (inefficient) regardless of their consequences and any calculation of profit (Sen, 1990; Wight, 2017; Williams & Bengtsson, 2016). In normative individualism, the decisive moral reason against discrimination is that it deprives individuals of access to the principal good. If the principal good is love, as situationists maintain, discrimination is morally wrong, primarily because it corrupts the intentional prerequisites for love. 37.3 The Common Good Economics traditionally centres on competitive products, wherein each individual’s consumption directly diminishes said good’s availability for others, thereby resulting in resource competition. This idea serves as the foundation for numerous economic theories and models, emphasising the concept of goods that become inaccessible to others once they have been acquired by one party. Nevertheless, not all goods are competitive. The common good is one example. It is the principal good of each person. Aristotle originally outlined this idea of the common good. For the Stagirite, the common good is happiness, which is the fulfilment of a person’s best possibilities. As he shows, it is not something that people have in common, such as a property. The common good comprises what they are in common. Providing this good to others increases it for the donor. Whenever this goodness appears in one person, everyone benefits; by protecting it in one person, one protects it for each person (Brink, 2014; Crisp, 2016; Kraut, 2016). The idea of the common good can have divergent interpretations depending on the philosophical context. Thomas Aquinas and Thomists outline this 116 Morality Management and Situation Ethics idea from the perspective of natural law (Finnis, 1979). Proponents of personalism may define the common good in terms of human dignity and fundamental human rights (Gueye, 2011). Liberal ethics specifies the common good in terms of the preconditions for human freedom (Chappell, 2009; Schroeder, 2012; Zimmerman, 2001). Situationists assume that goodwill (love) is the principal good in everyone. Respect for the common good has various names: solidarity (Aku, 2012; Buttiglione, 2012), compassion (Nussbaum, 2013) or rational compassion (Bloom, 2016). Although the idea of the common good is not a conceptual monolith, it presents the direction of MM, which is as follows: MM is not expected to satisfy all interests, which are usually competitive and irreconcilable. This fosters the value preferences that best protect and promote the common good. 38 Intrinsic Goods According to the situationist approach, the common good is love, and intrinsic values are instances of love that are understood as peculiar intentions and decisions. Situationists propose a teleological method that involves assessing the value of actions and solutions in terms of their function of promoting love in relationships. This method cannot work without identifying probability of these values in the future-oriented MM. This section presents an abductive reasoning that can support the teleological method of situation ethics in predicting the consequences of MM in terms of protecting and promoting love.1 38.1 Abductive Reasoning According to situation ethics, love is the intention and action aimed at human well-being. From this perspective, the capacity to love is the most precious potentiality of human beings. This potential has preconditions. For example, one cannot love without existence, freedom and access to information. They are essential human needs which compose human well-being as they are preconditions for the human capacity to love. Situationists are right that predictions about love are uncertain, as symptoms of love may occur without the intentions of love. One states them via abductive (stating a phenomenon’s consequences to presume its existence) reasoning. In this reasoning, one notices some typical symptoms of love and presupposes that intentions of love cause them. This reasoning is fallible as other causes can cause these symptoms. Consequently, this reasoning may not suffice to evaluate actions morally. However, this reasoning gains some knowledge about the probability of love occurrence. This method can identify tendencies – typical symptoms of Some Perspectives for Research on Morality Management 117 love and circumstances that favour or hinder the creation of various types of relationships, including relationships of love. As situationists point out, this method should take into account the circumstances which may determine atypicality and exceptions. There is a disproportion in the level of predictability that an action has and does not have the intention of love based on its outcomes. In the former case, the reasoning is highly uncertain as one can easily imitate love without having the intention of love. For example, legalistic motivations may not be loving, although they may foster some preconditions for love, as situationists show. The more certain (but still fallible) reasoning emerges when the preconditions for love are absent. For example, when someone tortures people, it is highly implausible that she loves them when no extraordinary conditions occur. In some untypical situations, one may cause pain with benevolent intention, for example, when human health requires a painful medical procedure. Case analysis may facilitate the identification of these extraordinary circumstances. However, without such circumstances, some types of actions are indicative of the absence of love. The same reasoning applies to investigating consequences on a broader scale, which MM deals with. For example, one can presume with a high probability that fostering preconditions for love in the processes of MM fosters and that counteracting these preconditions is not conducive to love. Consequently, MM can use the abductive method to set good practices, which increase the probability of love. However, situationists have reversed these rules and exceptions. Situationists consider ordinary and typical case exceptions. From this perspective, each situation is extraordinary. Therefore, situationists reject probabilistic knowledge’s utility for MM. This stance leads to the treatment of moral standards as highly suspicious in every case. 38.2 Codes of Moral Conduct There is a disparity between the symptoms of and preconditions for love. The symptoms of love may emerge without love. Therefore, the reasoning from symptoms to intentions of love is burdened by a high degree of uncertainty. Symptoms of love such as affectionate gestures or emotional attachment can occur without love being present. However, the preconditions for love allow for a higher degree of certainty in knowing what intentions and actions contradict love. The same applies to moral codes. Suppose that some moral codes and their implementation coincided with the increased mutual respect between citizens in societies in the past. This historical knowledge does not assure us that this pattern will remain true 118 Morality Management and Situation Ethics in the future, as a minor contextual peculiarity may engender a situation in which a practice that was good in the past is wrong in the present. However, suppose moral codes destroy the preconditions for love (e.g. moral codes require or permit the violation of human rights to freedom, life or information access). In this case, they are highly likely to be destructive to love in interhuman relationships. Investigating the preconditions of love must not lead to the legalistic practice of codifying love. Such research could embrace the peculiarity and divergence of cultural codes that specify love relationships and situational circumstances. However, the case analysis of concrete situations should not divert researchers’ attention from the preconditions for love that these cases exemplify. Therefore, researchers should be open to the possibility that some local norms and rules are so destructive to social bonds that they should be classified as unloving regardless of the circumstances and intentions of value creators. 38.3 Research on Intrinsic Values Situationists rightly warn morality managers against fostering moral norms and rules without first investigating their social utility. Thus, the situationist critique of bad legalism is ever relevant. However, MM should not take this warning in the antinomian way that situationists criticise, fighting against all moral norms, rules and regulations. To minimise the risks of fanaticism specified in Section 32, MM should focus on fostering respect for the prerequisites of love and then devise methods to avoid bad practices of marginalising them. This tactic requires morality managers to first identify the prerequisites for love through rigorous and unbiased research. Only then can the teleological methods of MM have the data to investigate the social utility of moral norms and rules in their role of fostering love. In each case, the research should embrace the study of cultural context to minimise the risk of biased stereotypes. Case studies can help identify prerequisites and symptoms of love. This has the potential to provide valuable insights into the probabilistic understanding of the concretisations of prerequisites for love in given cultural context. Consequently, morality managers should investigate the past practices of MM and conduct empirical research that allows for predicting (with some probability and without certainty) whether a specific solution of MM will foster or hinder the prerequisites of love. Scientific investigations can accompany MM in search for the best method to safeguard the preconditions for love. This research should investigate the consequences of the solutions offered by MM. In addition to empirical knowledge, phenomenological studies may provide insights into broader patterns and variations highlighted in cultural anthropology. Some Perspectives for Research on Morality Management 119 As the preconditions of love may gain interpretation and concretisation in specific sets of socio-cultural circumstances, the study of the usefulness of norms and rules of conduct should take these circumstances into account. The interpretation data should be controlled to minimise the risk of overinterpretation and biased extrapolation. Therefore, one should avoid extrapolating the stereotypes of one culture to interpret meaning in another. Within this framework, social and legal systems can be examined to assess the influence of different degrees of liberty on social connections and affection. This involves comparing societies with varying levels of personal freedom and analysing their effects on social connections and collectivity. For example, one can apply empirical psychology and statistical methods to investigate how standards regarding courtship and marriage relate to the quality of relationships in terms of satisfying preconditions for love. This approach may also be useful in future-oriented MM by investigating whether the projects of morality have a good chance to foster respect for these preconditions. Situationists are right in asserting that moral norms and rules can only judge the external outlook of actions, while intentions may significantly differ from their expressions. Therefore, moral norms and rules should be carefully used when judging intentions. However, situationists are wrong in assuming that knowledge of the prerequisites for love is useless in designing morality and controlling MM. 39 Designing and Controlling Morality As situationists notice, love is a free stance and one cannot directly cause it in another person. If love is a self-determination of the will, it can emerge or disappear without determination. There is no efficient causality between the codes of moral conduct and the intentions of love. Consequently, the preconditions for love are necessary but insufficient for love to occur. These prerequisites do not predestine anyone to love – they only facilitate the possibility of love. MM, which protects and fosters love in people, cannot do so directly. Forcing people to love one another is counterproductive. MM can only protect and foster the prerequisites for love. In defining this task, one may draw upon Aristotle’s recommendations. Aristotle noticed the role of the state in facilitating the circumstances that protect and promote friendship at the microand macro-levels of social bonds. The Stagirite observed that the state cannot impose friendships, as these cannot be forced. Nevertheless, he held that it is incumbent on the government to establish the circumstances that foster and sustain friendships within intimate interpersonal connections and wider societal networks. The state’s function encompasses the establishment of legal frameworks, institutions and societal conventions that foster trust, collaboration and reciprocity 120 Morality Management and Situation Ethics among individuals within a society. The state enhances the overall well-being and stability of society by creating a favourable atmosphere for friendship. Furthermore, Aristotle emphasised the significance of friendship as a means of attaining shared objectives and augmenting the overall standard of living for all of society. Hence, although the state lacks the authority to enforce friendship, it assumes a pivotal function in fostering the circumstances required for friendships to thrive (Aristotle, 2002; Kraut, 2002; Swanson, 1992). Therefore, it is challenging for MM to design a moral code that fosters love (friendship) between people. However, MM can design such circumstances that provide the best chances for love to occur. 39.1 Normative Morality and Universal Prohibitions Situationists presume that normative morality consists of unique imperatives of love. While this is true, it is not the whole truth, as these imperatives are concretised through intentional prerequisites for love (see Section 23.2). Traditionally, the preconditions for love have been identified by universal prohibitions, which specify the characteristics of decisions that cannot be benevolent (i.e. loving) because they deny the intentional prerequisites for love. Situationists are right to posit that universal prohibitions enrol moral dilemmas, where one cannot respect all prohibitions that apply to the situation. However, moral dilemmas may falsify universal prohibitions only under the assumption of practical idealism, which is the belief that one can perfectly meet all the requirements of love in each situation. Practical realism is the stance that acknowledges situations in which one cannot uphold all intrinsic values and therefore must sacrifice some to protect others. Consequently, Fletcher is right to point out that, in some cases, one must violate some prohibitions in moral dilemmas. However, this observation only describes the peculiarity of these situations and does not falsify universal prohibitions. The reason for universal prohibitions is not that one can always meet them perfectly. The reason is that these prohibitions specify intentional prerequisites for love. As the theory of double effect shows, the main purpose of universal prohibitions is protecting the principal good rather than imposing their literal meaning. For example, the prohibition “do not kill” means that murder is not the right way of problem-solving or loving people. This prohibition may apply differently both daily and during wars. Consequently, situationists are right in criticising bad legalism for ignoring the affirmative sense (of protecting intrinsic values) of prohibitions and presenting only their literal meaning (in impugning some types of action). For example, some interpreters of Kant show that his position about lying is misleading without taking into account the fundamental value of truthfulness, which relates to human dignity in his theory. In this interpretation, the meaning of the prohibition against lying is affirmative and goes beyond its literal Some Perspectives for Research on Morality Management 121 sense. It regards truthfulness in communication, which may not necessitate answering all questions, satisfying the curiosity of whoever poses the question or telling the whole truth one knows. To explain the positive meaning of this prohibition, one must take into account the complex nature of communication and language, which allows for the deceptive use of logically true sentences and telling the truth using metaphors (Kucharski, 2014; Varden, 2010). Situationists are right in stressing the cultural aspects of language when formulating moral norms and rules. However, situationists are wrong in maintaining that refuting universal prohibitions is necessary for fostering love. On the contrary, fittingly formulated prohibitions can help operationalise the principle of love and, this way, specify some general directions of MM. Moreover, these prohibitions may play a vital role in educating people about the intentional prerequisites of love. As situationists correctly notice, universal prohibitions are fallible when evaluating intentions and actions. However, these norms and rules can serve as working criteria for evaluating social tendencies. For example, adhering to some prohibitions may be essential for preventing the dehumanisation and mistreatment of individuals or groups, which can occur under zealous regimes or ideologies that reject these core moral principles (Nussbaum, 2001, 2013). Respect for accepted norms and rules can strengthen social unity and encourage cooperation among individuals from divergent moral backgrounds (Sen, 2010). Rational communication requires respect for agreed-upon language rules that help people understand each other. Norms and rules can help people understand the outcomes of their actions and develop a sense of responsibility and empathy towards others (Habermas, 1984, 1990). Prohibitions should be fitting in that they minimise the risk of ignoring cultural and situational circumstances of action in practice. Consequently, legal systems incorporate special standards that provide exceptions for legal conduct. However, these exceptions have reason in some universal norms or rules, which hierarchise the applicability of prohibitions in practice, which the principle of double effect standardises. For example: • Necessity: Some legal doctrines grant people the authority to violate the law when it is imperative to avert substantial harm. An example is entering a building without permission to save someone from a fire. Although this action is typically considered as trespassing or causing property damage, it can be legally justified based on necessity. The reason for this exception is in the general norm to protect human life. • Self-defence: Legislation frequently allows individuals to employ justifiable force to protect themselves or others from harm, even if such actions are ordinarily unlawful. For instance, employing physical coercion against an assailant may be deemed legal if it is indispensable for protecting oneself. The reason for this type of exception is the general norm 128 Morality Management and Situation Ethics to the concrete relationship and situations. Consequently, situation ethics can preserve its appreciation for the creativity of human freedom and the uniqueness of situations without presuming the radical stance that the agent creates all requirements of love by its existential commitment. In this interpretation, existential commitment is the source of moral obligations. However, only when it is searching and respecting some truth that is not a product of this commitment. Various theories present the idea of methodologically rational existential commitment. For example, Kant used a priori analysis to specify the moral principle of the categorical imperative, which is the prerequisite for rational value preferences in his view (Dean, 2006; Dorrien, 2020; Hill, 2007, 2014; Kant, 2010; Reath, 2012). Some analytical philosophers show how ethical principles can be selected in a methodologically rational way as grounded in moral experience (Kotarbiński, 1958; Szostek, 1971; Woleński, 2006). Metatheories do not need to presume any sources of knowledge about values to postulate that value choices can be methodologically rational or irrational. For example, David Hume and Adam Smith present the universal dimensions of rational emotions (sentiments) to specify the conditions for moral decisions (Cohon, 2018; Hume, 1739; Morris & Brown, 2016). The idea of methodologically rational value preferences does not have to represent the naturalistic fallacy (first noted by David Hume). This stance does not assume that methodologically rational existential commitments (expressed in ought to statements) logically follow from knowledge about facts (expressed in is statements). The requirement for the methodological rationality of value preferences refers to the reasoning, in which value preferences should not contradict available knowledge. Moreover, as some thinkers have argued, existential commitments present gradual compatibility or incompatibility with available knowledge. Consequently, methodologically and value-rational agents abandon existential commitments that are in contradiction with and prefer commitments that are best compatible with available knowledge, with their life or moral experience, for example (Kotarbiński, 1958; Szostek, 2016; Woleński, 2006). This requirement contradicts the radical stance of scepticism, which requires the abandonment of beliefs that do not have proof (see Section 32.5). According to the ideal of methodologically rational value preferences, morality managers should research the principal good and make decisions according to their best knowledge. 41.3 Applied Conjunction Between Normative Relativism and Absolutism This study has highlighted numerous differences between normative relativism and absolutism in the understanding of MM. However, these divergences tend to diminish in rationalist variants of these positions. From Some Perspectives for Research on Morality Management 129 this perspective, morality managers investigate normative assumptions and prefer those that are most compatible with the available knowledge. Their investigation can adopt all reliable (scientific, analytical and phenomenological) methods of investigation. The premise of normative absolutism requires that the value preferences of existential commitment reflect intrinsic values that are precious and independent of human evaluation. Using this approach, one can investigate and discuss value choices in terms of their compatibility with the available knowledge (Brandt, 1967, pp. 75–76; Garnett, 1944; Gowans, 2012; Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Jarvie, 1983; Joyce, 2015; Rorty, 1991; Swoyer, 2014). Some phenomenologists show how moral experience can provide a common ground for discussing moral issues when rooted in a shared moral experience (Lévinas, 1996; Zank & Braiterman, 2014). However, under the assumption of normative relativism, the requirement for methodological rationality regarding moral preferences may be similar in practice. Although these theories deny any values that are precious regardless of human preferences, these stances also may postulate the adoption of moral preferences to the available knowledge. Proponents of the rationalistic wings of normative relativism and antirelativism advocate for critical thinking, respect for logic, open-mindedness and dedication to reasoned communication among people and collectives when engaging with moral dilemmas, instead of unquestioningly adhering to tradition or authority. Consequently, they require MM to focus on shaping methodologically rational attitudes in society (Habermas, 1984, 1990; Nussbaum, 2011, 2013; Sartre, 2004; Sunstein, 2009). Notes 1 Abductive reasoning (from facts to their causes) in the context of probabilistic frameworks entails determining the best feasible explanation for a set of observed occurrences. In probabilistic terms, this entails assessing the likelihood of hypotheses based on available evidence and picking the hypothesis with the highest probability (Douven, 2021; Ghahramani, 2015; Hájek, 2012; Josephson & Josephson, 1994; Lake et al., 2017; Sutton & Barto, 2018). 2 Spaemann presents several meanings of fundamentalism (Spaemann, n.d., Wer ist ein Fundamentalist?): 1 Historical meaning: Originally, the term referred to certain Protestant groups in the United States in the early 20th century. These groups adhered to a literal interpretation of the Bible and rejected scientific theories such as evolution, insisting on a traditional and conservative approach to Christian doctrine. 2 Fundamentalism as a reformation movement: Spaemann notes that the Reformation itself initially had a fundamentalist character, seeking to return to the “foundations” of the Christian faith. The motto “sola scriptura” (scripture alone) encapsulated this return to the original biblical sources as the sole authority in Christianity. Situationists name this stance Scripturalism. 130 Morality Management and Situation Ethics 3 Fundamentalism as a pejorative label: In contemporary usage, “fundamentalist” often serves as a derogatory term to discredit groups perceived as unable to adapt to the modern world, intolerant of differing views and desiring simplicity and conformity in a complex world. 4 Fundamentalism as a prerequisite for tolerance: Spaemann argues that holding deep religious convictions and adhering to the foundations of one’s faith does not necessarily equate with intolerance. He emphasises the possibility of maintaining strong religious beliefs while being open to scientific understanding and diverse perspectives. 5 Fundamentalism as a synonym for orthodoxy: The text also suggests that if fundamentalism is understood as a synonym for orthodoxy and adherence to the core principles of Christianity, it could be seen in a positive light. DOI: 10.4324/9781003250623-9 This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Concluding Remarks The study assumes a distinction between ethics and morality management (MM). Ethics is the investigation of what is morally good and right, while MM is an activity that aims to protect and promote what is good and right. Situation ethics identifies ethics with MM, presenting ethics as MM through philosophising. In this approach, ethical theses and theories are considered true in the pragmatic sense – when they produce socially useful effects. This study presents the metatheory of this approach. Some central ethical issues are marginal for MM, and some marginal ethical problems become essential for MM. For example, the practice of morally evaluating human actions is marginal in MM; it focuses on tendencies and probabilities in fostering desirable decisions. However, the issue of intrinsic goods is central to ethics and MM. Situation ethics identifies these goods with love. This study distinguishes between the intentional prerequisites for benevolence (love) and the objectives of love itself. This distinction becomes particularly evident when comparing the objectives of law with those of MM. The task of legal systems (in the utilitarian approach adopted by situationists) is to protect intrinsic values while promoting social security and well-being. For example, legal systems can be designed to protect human freedom, rationality and life, prevent harm and ensure justice, all of which are considered core or principal values. In contrast, the task of MM is to foster respect for these intrinsic values within a community or society. Therefore, MM does not merely protect intrinsic values themselves but aims to shape attitudes and social standards in a way that encourages individuals and groups to recognise, respect and uphold these values in their everyday lives. MM is about creating an environment where the importance of intrinsic values is acknowledged and integrated into the fabric of social interaction and decision-making. This monograph is about the metatheory (metaethics) of MM from the perspective of situation ethics. Consequently, this investigation did not propose any specific theory of MM, and applied MM problems appear only 132 Morality Management and Situation Ethics marginally as illustrations within this monograph. These are limitations determined by the goal of this investigation. However, this study goes beyond this perspective to discuss some fundamental problems of MM. The most important general findings about MM are as follows: This study: a Presents the prerequisites of benevolence, which any MM should promote and protect, b Discusses the role of universal prohibitions in safeguarding MM from arbitrariness, fanaticism and manipulation, c Presents, within the framework of situation ethics, a tactic to avoid bad legalism in MM. As love cannot be directly caused, one should not expect a moral code to automatically evoke love in people. The task of MM is different: It is to create a normative niche that provides the best chances for love to occur. Since normative regulations are unavoidable in the social sphere, the primary task of MM is to avoid and counteract regulations and practices that threaten the intentional prerequisites for love. This task is negative in the sense that it involves abstaining from and protecting society from practices and normative regulations that are destructive to these prerequisites. If these prerequisites are respect for human freedom, reason and life, MM should protect and foster them. However, this does not mean that MM should be reduced to a persuasion or legal campaign for these prerequisites. Rather, the job of MM is to create the niche mentioned above, which requires considering a more complex reality than just a simple cause-effect relationship between persuasion or legal restrictions and their immediate result. This study, in line with situation ethics, warns against simplistic and legalistic views that reduce the planning function of MM to commands and prohibitions in the hope that they will suffice to change social reality in the expected direction. This study recognises that manipulation and repression are counterproductive in achieving the above goal of MM. Love is a free stance with intentional preconditions. Violating them is destructive to this objective. Therefore, the means of MM can be rational persuasion (or tolerant paternalism). However, this may not lead to the desired effect when society is uninterested in changing its egoistic lifestyle or when the structures of organisations (including states) foster powergaming (see Section 33). The role of MM is broader, potentially requiring the redesign of organisational structures to achieve its goal. For example, to foster the freedom of workers in some organisations, MM can suggest reducing the number of hierarchical layers if it does not hinder the organisation’s efficiency. However, the role of MM is usually more modest and consists of counteracting changes in the organisation that pose a threat to the intentional prerequisites for benevolence as specified in Section 23.2. Concluding Remarks 133 As the study argues, MM does not need to multiply universal prohibitions to protect and promote benevolence in society. There should be neither more nor fewer normative regulations than necessary. The most important thing is that they are attuned to the intentional reality of love (its intentional preconditions) and the context in which they operate. This requires constant philosophical and scientific research to design a code of moral conduct that best promotes the prerequisites for benevolence. This monograph takes a critical look at situation ethics, highlighting the significance of precise normative assumptions in ethical theory and practice. The study provides a detailed analysis of the issues faced by ambiguous normative premises of situation ethics, urging for a more deliberate and honest engagement with the ethical foundations of MM. By discussing pitfalls of situation ethics, this study advocates for a renewed commitment to ethical clarity and operationalisation of concepts. The monograph’s examination into situation ethics reveals the complicated dance between the model of reality and practice, emphasising the necessity of fitting normative assumptions in directing MM’s goals and moral boundaries. It emphasises the importance of morality managers being aware of their normative beliefs in order to effectively appraise opportunities and dangers effectively, hence avoiding implicit value prioritisation, which can lead to inadvertent moral manipulations. Detailed research reveals that the lack of transparency in these assumptions might cloud MM’s actions, resulting in counterproductive solutions that lead to practices against their original intentions. This study advocates for the articulation of normative principles in order to establish a foundational conversation and negotiation towards moral consensus in public morality. The investigation calls into question the radical stance of normative relativism and absolutism, emphasising the dangers of limiting the discussion to some assumptions that are presented as indisputable, which could unintentionally foster arbitrariness, moral fanaticism and prejudices. This monograph calls for research and a dialogic approach in MM, demanding a more reflective research and engagement with the fundamental premises of moral theories. This study highlights the heuristic utility of situation ethics in guiding persons across the enormous landscape of ethical theories. However, the study cautions against the dangers of situation ethics, emphasising the need for a more consistent framework to operationalise the intentional requirements for benevolence. As this study demonstrates, situation ethics’ most significant applied contributions are in promoting metaethical education and transparency. Metaethical education is morality managers’ training that promotes understanding and sensitivity to ethical principles. This education may involve investigating diverse ethical ideas, emphasising critical thinking and 134 Morality Management and Situation Ethics developing a reflective attitude to ethics. Metaethical transparency is the culture of communicating normative assumptions behind solutions and debating their explanations. This openness provides for different perspectives and minimises the chance of making decisions based on limited or selfserving interpretations. The monograph argues for the operationalisation of moral principles to the level required to guide ethical decision-making while avoiding the traps of over-generalisation and oversimplification. It emphasises the need to create and uphold universal prohibitions that define the boundaries of moral conduct, avoiding the dangers of bad legalism. The monograph advocates for further research into the intentional preconditions for benevolence (love) in a way that respects the complexities of moral quandaries, cultural and situational contexts while facilitating rational debate. Future studies should look into alternative ethical frameworks that answer the monograph’s critiques, notably in terms of operationalising ethical principles. Perhaps the most sound part of situation ethics is its critique of bad legalism. This critique is ever actual when morality managers hastily generalise some moral observations or impose their arbitrary moral views on others. It would be valuable to apply the situationist critique to other instances of bad legalism beyond those theoretical frameworks discussed by situationists. The monograph concludes with a call to ethical action, pushing individuals and society to delve deeper into studying the ethical grounds of their decisions. 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