DIGITAL TOOLS FOR MONITORING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN UKRAINE UNDER MARTIAL LAW

Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10111 DIGITAL TOOLS FOR MONITORING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN UKRAINE UNDER MARTIAL LAW OLEKSANDR HRYHORIEV1, LIUDMYLA PAVLOVA2, OLENA KARCHEVSKA3, GANNA MALKINA4, ALINA VOICHUK5 1Postgraduate Student, Private Higher Educational Establishment «European University», Department of Information, Library, Archival Affairs and Socio-Political and Humanitarian Discipline, Ukraine 2Associate Professor, Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University, Faculty of Law, Department of Economic Law and Socio-Political Discipline, Ukraine 3Associate Professor, Volodymyr Dahl East Ukrainian National University, Faculty of Law, Department of Economic Law and Socio-Political Disciplines, Ukraine 4Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Political Sciences, Ukraine 5Assistant, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Political Sciences, Ukraine E-mail: 1oleksandrlawen[email protected]m, [email protected], [email protected], 4gannamalkin[email protected]om, [email protected] ABSTRACT Relevance of the research The relevance of the study is determined by the need to ensure electoral integrity, traceability, and trust in digital voting procedures under martial law and an increased level of cyber threats. Aim of the research The aim of the research is the formalization of a digital voting framework to ensure transparency and electoral integrity under martial law through the integration of legal, technical, and organizational solutions. Research methods The research employed the following methods: structural-functional analysis, comparative law, typology and cluster grouping, technological classification and ranking, cross-validation functional modelling, Unified Modelling Language (UML) modelling. Obtained results The study formalizes a framework for digital will expression relevant to martial law restrictions. Structuralfunctional analysis and comparative law identified critical threats (security, regulatory, cognitive), while cross-validation modelling identified digital technologies with maximum compensatory potential (blockchain, e-/i-Voting, audit trail). The proposed UML architecture provides multi-level authentication, traceable verification, and civic oversight, which guarantees electoral integrity and regulatory validity in times of crisis. Academic novelty of the research The academic novelty of the study is the stratification of electoral threats under martial law and the formalization of a framework for digital expression of will, which integrates multi-factor authentication, blockchain storage, traceological audit, and citizen oversight, ensuring the stability of procedures, the legitimacy of results, and the autonomy of subjects of will declaration. Prospects for further research Prospects for further research include launching a controlled pilot project to implement a digital will declaration framework in a limited jurisdiction with subsequent validation of its operational stability, regulatory compatibility, and behavioural integrativity. Based on the results of the testing, it is appropriate to develop adaptive optimization modules aimed at increasing cyber resilience, minimizing transactional load, and ensuring institutional scalability. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10112 Keywords: Digital Suffrage Framework, Blockchain Voting Architecture, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), End-to-End Verifiability (E2EV), Smart Contracts, Legal Compliance Modelling, Civic Audit Infrastructure. 1. INTRODUCTION The transformation of electoral processes by digital technologies attaches strategic importance to the problem of preserving electoral integrity, especially under martial law, which generates extraordinary risks of political destabilization, cognitive manipulation, and legitimization erosion. Digital will declaration requires not only technological modernization, but also an institutional redesign of the architecture of trust that integrates the principles of transparency, subject verifiability, regulatory compliance and operational resistance. The relevance of this research is determined by the need for a unified framework capable of reducing security, legal, and techno-social threats through formalized stratification of electoral infrastructure elements. In view of the growing use of decentralized technologies (blockchain, smart contracts, multi-factor authentication) and increasing demands for civic oversight, there is a need for a systematic conceptualization of such approaches to ensure democratic legitimacy during crisis regimes of statehood. The aim of the study is to formalize a conceptual framework for digital will declaration, capable of ensuring electoral integrity, transparency, and subject responsibility in extraordinary political circumstances, in particular under martial law, by integrating legal, technological, and organizational solutions into a single architectural model. Research objectives:  Perform a structural-functional decomposition of the electoral process with identification of vulnerabilities of components to security, regulatory, and cognitive threats.  Perform a comparative law assessment of compliance with international standards (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), CDL-AD opinions) by comparing with cases of electoral distortions.  Build a typological cluster model of threats to electoral infrastructure with a hierarchy by risk categories.  Conduct a classification and ranking of digital monitoring technologies according to the criteria of verifiability, tamperresistance, scalability, and legal compliance.  Develop a functional cross-validation matrix of compliance of technological solutions with threat types based on their compensatory potential.  Formalize the synthesized framework of digital will expression using UML diagrams for visualization of architecture, interactions and behavioural scenarios in a crisis context. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW Key Terms: Electoral integrity – a systemic condition ensuring legality, transparency, verifiability, and resistance of electoral procedures to manipulation or coercion, aligned with international democratic standards (ICCPR, ECHR, OSCE). Electoral sovereignty – the state’s capacity to independently organize elections and safeguard citizens’ right to vote under extraordinary political or security circumstances. Digital enfranchisement – the use of electronic and online platforms (e-Voting, i-Voting) to expand accessibility, inclusiveness, and participation of citizens, including displaced populations. Blockchain registers – distributed ledger infrastructures that guarantee tamper-resistance, immutability, and cryptographic verifiability of electoral transactions. Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) – a statistical post-election procedure designed to verify electoral outcomes with minimal sampling, ensuring evidence-based confidence in results. Civic audit – participatory monitoring by citizens and NGOs through digital platforms, providing oversight, anomaly detection, and additional transparency. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10113 Resilience of electoral infrastructure – the capacity of electoral systems to maintain operational validity, legal legitimacy, and functional continuity under multi-vector threats (security, legal, informational, legitimacy). The organization of electoral processes under martial law and the implementation of digital monitoring tools remain isolated research areas. The lack of integrated approaches to digital verification of electoral procedures under emergency legal regimes indicates a methodological vacuum and necessitates a comprehensive analysis. In particular, authors [1] identified a structural problem, who demonstrated the dominance of the executive vertical and parliamentary institutional subjectivity, which complicates the implementation of electoral sovereignty under martial law. Despite the partial erosion of parliamentary functionality and trust, the established stable model of intergovernmental interaction creates the prerequisites for a limited but potentially manageable restoration of electoral procedures under martial law. Researchers [2] found the same institutional deformation, stating that the electoral process was controlled by the bureaucratic military system under latent martial law, as well as political and institutional instability. The dominance of undemocratic actors caused the institutional encapsulation of electoral procedures and the systemic desubstantialization of electoral legitimacy. The destruction of state institutions is also found in the results of authors [3], who determined that the organization of the electoral process underwent functional destabilization and loss of procedural neutrality under martial law and nationalist polarization. The escalation of conflict between elites stimulated the instrumentalization of electoral mechanisms for political revanchism and delegitimization of democratic competition. At the same time, researcher [4] proved that the organization of the electoral process lost its institutional autonomy in the conditions of political polarization and martial law, becoming an object of forceful usurpation pressure. The militarization of state administration led to the suspension of electoral legitimation and the establishment of an antidemocratic emergency regime. Authors [5] pointed to the main problem, proving that the organization of the electoral process under martial law required constant electoral securitization and preventive neutralization of risks at all stages of the electoral cycle. The functioning of electoral procedures was ensured through the operational involution of force agents in the protection of electoral infrastructure and subjects to the electoral process. At the same time, the scientometric horizon demonstrates the development of digital technologies for monitoring electoral processes. In particular, Researchers [6] showed that the Election Transparency technology functioned as a digital monitoring tool with a log-oriented architecture that provided public registration, decentralized storage, and collaborative verification of electoral data. The use of transparency logs increased the traceability of electoral events, minimized the risks of manipulation, reduced the costs of post-election audit and re-validation of results. Authors [7] proposed a similar solution. They proved that the Smart Voting System, built on a combination of machine learning (ML), computer vision and blockchain-based registration, acted as a cyber-physical monitoring module with automated detection, validation, and traceology of electoral actions. The integration of multimodal authentication, adaptive accessibility, and cryptographic non-repudiation ensured the integrity, inclusiveness and operational stability of the electoral process at the level of local electoral centres. Researchers [8] investigated a separate tool in detail, demonstrating that blockchain-based monitoring tools provided decentralized validation, cryptographic invariance, and biometric identification of subjects of will declaration. The implementation of non-repudiation mechanisms and a distributed registry increased electoral traceability and resilience to institutional compromise. Authors [9] demonstrated the effectiveness of comprehensive supporting solutions . They proved that integrated ICT monitoring tools built on multifactor authentication, encryption, and real-time provided electoral validation, transparent aggregation of results, and public traceability. The use of a webbased architecture with analytical visualization increased transparency, reducing the risks of fraud and counting delays. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10114 However, there are problems with the use of new technologies. In particular, authors [10] found that digital election monitoring tools increased transparency and accountability, but remained vulnerable to cyberinterference, algorithmic opportunism and digital stratification in the context of a state of emergency. Limited regulatory congruence and a lack of techno-ethical verification reduced their effectiveness as mechanisms of electoral accountability. The generalization of the reviewed publications indicates a structural dichotomy in the academic field. On the one hand, studies on the organization of the electoral process under martial law are distinguished, which recorded the dominance of the executive vertical, the functional erosion of parliamentary subjectivity, the securitization of electoral procedures, and the institutional encapsulation of will declaration. On the other hand, a cluster of studies on the implementation of digital monitoring tools (blockchain, log-oriented systems, non-repudiation protocols, biometric validation, cryptographic traceology, real-time aggregation) that increase procedural transparency, aggregate invariance, and operational stability of electoral systems in stable political and legal conditions is outlined. At the same time, there are no studies that integrate these vectors and demonstrate the possibility of using digital monitoring infrastructure to ensure electoral legitimacy in terms of military securitization. Such methodological asymmetry between the technological monitoring infrastructure and the legal regime of securitization of the electoral sphere justifies both the epistemological novelty and the applied relevance of this study. 3. METHODS 3.1. Research design. The study was conducted according to a phased scheme - Figure 1. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10115 Figure 1. Phased research design Source: developed by the authors 3.2. Methods. The study applied a number of complementary methods for a comprehensive risk assessment and modelling of the digital framework for will declaration under martial law: 1. Structural-functional analysis was used to decompose the electoral process into key components (authentication, administration, verification) and assess their vulnerability to security, regulatory and cognitive threats. 2. Comparative law was employed to compare international norms (ICCPR, ECHR, CDL- Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10116 AD) with identified cases of electoral distortions, which allowed for the verification of the degree of violation of basic standards of democratic will declaration. 3. Typologization and clustering was used to build a hierarchical model of threats with a division into security, information, procedural, socio-legal, and legitimation categories (Table 3), which ensured semantic consistency of subsequent cross-validation. 4. Technological classification and ranking was used to evaluate digital monitoring solutions according to the parameters of verifiability, tamperresistance, scalability, and legal compliance (Table 4), which allowed to identify tools with the highest compensatory potential. 5. The cross-validation functional modelling was used to build a matrix of relevance of technologies to threat types (Table 5) in order to compare the functional capabilities of tools with risk profiles. 6. UML modelling (component, sequence, and precedent diagrams) was used to formalize the synthesized framework of digital will declaration (Figures 2–4), which provided visualization of the architecture, interaction logic, and behavioural scenarios of subjects in a crisis environment. These methods provided systematic stratification of threats, empirical validation of countermeasure tools, and the construction of a normatively oriented digital architecture with high institutional interoperability. 3.3. Sample. A systematic identification of digital technologies used to monitor electoral processes in the public, procedural, and institutional dimensions was carried out as part of the sampling. Particular attention was paid to the mechanisms of application of digital tools, the legal regulation of their use, as well as judicial practice that reveals legal conflicts in the context of electoral transparency, legitimacy, and cybersecurity (Table 1). Table 1. Sample of digital technologies for monitoring the electoral process Technology Description and mechanism of application Legal regulation Court conflict / precedent Academic research Log-oriented transparency logs Cryptographically secure public transaction log architecture with collaborative verification and traceology Draft General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU, 2016); OSCE/ODIHR (2010) recommendations for open monitoring — Dommett, Luke & Gordon [11] Blockchain platforms (non repudiation) Distributed vote register with digital signatures, consensus transaction validation, data invariance E-IDAS Regulation-EU (2014); Estonian Election Act (2005, Estonia) from mix-net tally — Ohize et al. [12] Biometric identification Voter verification via fingerprints, facial recognition at the entrance and during vote registration GDPR (EU, 2016); Malaysia PDPA (2010) Case law: Rideout v. Gardner (2016, USA, First Circuit struck bans on ballot selfies) Omoze, Omaji & Edegbe [13] Mob-apps for ballot selfies Ballot photo for crowd voting transparency via social media State laws (NY 1890; Michigan ban lifted 2019) Silberberg v. BOE (2017, USA) — confirmation of registration ban Stojanoski & Vukovich [14] Computer Vision + ML Analysis Automated ballot counting, anomaly detection, NIST SP 800-207 (USA, 2021) — Zero Trust; — Usharani [15] Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10117 Technology Description and mechanism of application Legal regulation Court conflict / precedent Academic research statistical forensics Verified Voting Standards (USA, 2018) Multi-factor authentication 2FA + crypto token for access to electronic voting e-IDAS (2014, EU); NIST SP 800-63B (2017, USA ) — Vedantam, et al. [16] Real-time dashboards Real-time visualization of results, open data access Freedom of Information Act (USA, 1967+); Open Data Act (EU, 2019) — Kargbo & Turay [17] Citizen-reporting platforms (Uchaguzi, FAFEN) Crowdsourcing of violation reports, GPS metadata, photos Kenya Election Observers Act (2013); Pakistan ECP regulations (2017) — Bhanye & Shayamunda [18] Post-election audit (RLAs) Selective verification of results with VVPAT or paper ballots RLA legislation (USA, 2010-til now) — Koza [19] e-voting / i-Voting (Estonia) Online voting with end-to-end verifiability, mix-net tally Estonian Internet Voting Act (2005); OSCE/ODIHR recommendations (2007, 2011) Client hacking incident with programmer sparks legal proceedings and credibility assessment 2011 2019 Marouan, et al. [20] Electronic voting machines Computers without paper trails Help America Vote Act (2002, USA); Verified Voting Standards Shelby Advocates v. SAVE (2020, Tennessee) — the court recognized the vulnerability of computers Alown, Kiraz & Bingol, [21] Federal election observers (digital + analogue) Ground and digital monitoring by observers Voting Rights Act (1965, USA) Missouri v. DOJ (2024) – states’ objections to digital/federal watchdogs Wagner [22] Source: developed by the authors The sample analysis (Table 1) proves that modern digital technologies (cryptographic journals, blockchain, biometrics, AI, dashboards, citizenreporting) have the potential for electoral verification and traceology. However, their integration into the electoral process in the legal field is still limited by the lack of specialized norms and clear judicial precedents. This determines the relevance of research aimed at adapting digital tools to the emergency or war. 3.4. Instruments. PlantUML [23] was used as an ontological modelling tool to visualize the component architecture of a synthetic framework for digital will declaration. Its use provided the formalization of structural and functional dependencies between agents, transaction modules, and verification subsystems in the form of UML diagrams (Class, Component, Sequence, Deployment). PlantUML ensured traceability, machine readability and semantic coherence of the model thanks to its declarative notation and compatibility with CI/CD. 4. RESULTS Under martial law, electoral processes are subject to multi-vector influence of risk factors that Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10118 cause functional destabilization of the will declaration mechanisms. The systematic analysis of threats and legal distortions was carried out for a sample of challenges, which includes institutional, legal, security, informational, and cognitive components relevant to the violation of electoral sovereignty in the conditions of an emergency legal regime ‒ Table 2. Table 2. Analysis of threats to the electoral process under martial law Challenge name Threats to the will declaration process Violation of legal norms Political consequences Historical precedents Suspension of electoral procedures Cancellation or postponement of the electoral cycle, violation of the principle of the election interval ICCPR (1966), Art. 25(b); Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice (2002), Principle 6 Delegitimization of mandates, erosion of constitutional legitimacy Mali, 2020; Burkina Faso, 2022 Militarization of electoral administration Institutional replacement of the Central Election Commission (CEC) by executive and power agencies Venice Commission, CDLAD(2002)023rev Usurpation of election administration, reduction of civilian control Egypt, 2013; Thailand, 2014 Securitization of electoral infrastructure Direct involvement of armed forces in the protection of polling stations, risk of violent pressure Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (2002), §4 Shift towards authoritarian proceduralization, imitation of electorality Belarus, 2020; Iran, 2009 Threat to the lives of voters and administrators Forced refusal to participate, creation of existential danger GDPR (1948), Art. 3; Geneva Conventions (1949) Erosion of mass participation, destruction of voter subjectivity Iraq, 2005; Syria, 2012 Information destabilization Systemic manipulation of voters’ cognitive attitudes, spread of disinformation OSCE, Copenhagen Document (1990), §7.8 Violation of the principle of conscious will, delegitimization of the campaign Росія, 2022; Філіппіни, 2022 Restrictions on IDP participation Territorial inaccessibility of the electoral procedure, loss of electoral rights UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), §22; ECHR, Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 Systemic exclusion of marginalized groups Syria, 2012; Congo, 2006 Media censorship Limitations of independent information, monopolization of electoral discourse ECHR, Art. 10; UNESCO Declaration (1991) Erosion of the public sphere, demobilization of critical electorates Turkey, 2016; Russia, 2022 Lack of international monitoring Lack of external verification of the electoral process UN Declaration on Democratic Elections (2005), §3 Loss of external legitimacy, nonrecognition of results Belarus, 2020; Russia, 2022 Intimidation of process participants Psychological coercion, threat of violence, repressive influence on the will declaration OSCE, Copenhagen Document (1990), §7.7 Self-reduction effect of participation, establishment of informal authoritarianism Afghanistan, 2009; Venezuela, 2018 Legal indetermination of election status Lack of clear regulation of elections under martial law Venice Commission, CDLAD(2007)012 Regulatory delegitimization of results, legal nullity of the Cameroon, 2018; Libya, 2021 Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10119 Challenge name Threats to the will declaration process Violation of legal norms Political consequences Historical precedents process Source: developed by the authors The analysis of the identified challenges (Table 2) demonstrates the complex destruction of the electoral process under martial law, which is manifested through institutional inversion of administration, legal indeterminacy of procedures, securitization of infrastructure, cognitive manipulation, and erosion of basic guarantees of will declaration. Documented violations of international standards (ICCPR, ECHR, OSCE documents, Venice Commission) correlate with historical cases of loss of legitimacy, which confirms the need for formalized legal stratification of electoral activity under emergency regimes. The next stage of the study involved a systematic typologization and hierarchical ranking of the identified challenges to the electoral process under martial law. A classification by threat type (security, regulatory and procedural, informational, socio-legal, legitimacy) was applied, taking into account the destructive potential for institutional stability, subject participation, and normative validity of the electoral cycle - Table 3. Table 3. Hierarchical ranking (by threat level) and typology of challenges to the electoral process under martial law Challenge name Threat type Description of damage and political consequences Threat to the lives of voters and administrators Security Creation of existential threat, mass demobilization of the electorate Securitization of electoral infrastructure Security Forcible control over the procedure, escalation of forced will declaration Intimidation of process participants Security Repressive atmosphere, reduction of participation, delegitimization of democracy Suspension of electoral procedures Regulatory and procedural Violation of the principle of interval, rupture of the mandate legitimacy cyclicality Militarization of electoral administration Regulatory and procedural Usurpation of administration, elimination of institutional autonomy Legal indetermination of election status Regulatory and procedural Lack of regulatory certainty, annulment of results Information destabilization Informational Disorientation of the electorate, violation of the voter’s cognitive autonomy Media censorship Informational Erosion of public space, violation of the right to information Restrictions on IDP participation Socio-legal Territorial segregation, exclusion of groups from the electoral process Lack of international monitoring Legitimacy Loss of external trust, undermining of the recognition of results Source: developed by the authors The hierarchical typology of electoral challenges under martial law (Table 3) demonstrates the dominance of security threats that violate the principles of non-discrimination, free will, and the voter’s subjective autonomy. The security priority in the destructiveness scale is accompanied by regulatory and procedural indeterminacy and information destabilization, which together pose the risk of systemic delegitimization of the electoral process. The next stage of the study was the systematization of digital technologies for monitoring the electoral process by type of functional purpose and conditional effectiveness. The classification was based on evidence, cyber resilience, interoperability, scalability and regulatory compliance, taking into account the principles of electoral verification and transparency - Table 4. Table 4. Hierarchical ranking (by level of conditional effectiveness) and typologization of digital technologies for monitoring electoral processes (under normal conditions) Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology 15th December 2025. Vol.103. No.23 © Little Lion Scientific ISSN: 1992-8645 www.jatit.org E-ISSN: 1817-3195 10126 key difference of the proposed framework is its ability to reduce systemic risks caused by legal uncertainty and security turbulence of martial law by integrating multi-factor authentication, audit trail, civic oversight, and UML-stratified modularity as a political and institutional tool for stabilizing the electoral process. 6. LIMITATIONS A limitation of the study is the lack of empirical validation of the synthesized framework in a real electoral cycle, which does not allow assessing its operational stability, techno-legal interoperability, and behavioural acceptability by the subjects of will expression. The study also does not cover modelling of scenarios for responding to contingent cyber threats and does not include a formalized assessment of the level of regulatory compliance in a crossborder context. 7. RECOMMENDATIONS It is recommended to initiate a pilot controlled project of implementation of the digital will framework in a limited administrative environment in order to assess its functional stability, regulatory compliance, and behavioural adaptability. Based on the results of the testing, it is appropriate to develop optimization solutions aimed at increasing resistance to threats, reducing operational workload and ensuring institutional scalability. 8. CONCLUSION In the context of martial law, the electoral process is subject to systemic destruction due to the combined effect of security, regulatory and procedural, informational and legitimization threats that violate the principles of interval, voluntariness, and non-discrimination of will declaration. The conducted hierarchical typologization of risks has shown the priority of security factors (existential threat, securitization, intimidation), which destabilize the functional subjectivity of the voter, delegitimize administrative procedures, and induce normative indeterminacy of results. Cross-validation analysis of digital technologies has shown that the maximum potential for reducing identified threats is demonstrated by the combination of e-Voting/i-Voting, blockchain-based registries, and crowdsourcing monitoring due to their scalable verifiability, tamper-resistance, participatory oversight, and regulatory adaptability. The synthesized framework of digital will expression, modelled in the form of an ontological architecture, provides end-to-end traceability, decentralized authentication and institutionalized auditability, forming a technologically and normatively valid infrastructure for holding elections in times of crisis. Academic novelty of the study. This study if the first time to provide a systematic stratification of electoral threats in the context of martial law with a formalized typology of their destructive potential in relation to subject autonomy, procedural validity, and legitimacy of will declaration. An ontologically formalized framework for digital will declaration is proposed with the integration of elements of multifactor authentication, cryptographic storage, traceological audit, and citizen oversight, which ensures the resistance of the electoral infrastructure to multi-vector crisis influences. Practical significance of the research results. The developed framework can be implemented as a model of adaptive electoral administration under the emergency legal regime, in particular through the institutionalization of e-Voting/i-Voting with support for blockchain fixation and civic audit. 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