Max Weber in the tropics: How global climate politics facilitates the bureaucratization of forestry in Indonesia

Lederer, Markus; Höhne, Chris Article — Published Version Max Weber in the tropics: How global climate politics facilitates the bureaucratization of forestry in Indonesia Regulation & Governance Provided in Cooperation with: John Wiley & Sons Suggested Citation: Lederer, Markus; Höhne, Chris (2021) : Max Weber in the tropics: How global climate politics facilitates the bureaucratization of forestry in Indonesia, Regulation & Governance, ISSN 1748-5991, John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd, Melbourne, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, pp. 133-151, https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12270 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230055 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Max Weber in the tropics: How global climate politics facilitates the bureaucratization of forestry in Indonesia Markus Lederer and Chris Höhne Institute of Political Science, Technical University of Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany Abstract Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is one of the most advanced global climate governance arrangements and we show that it contributes to the buildup of autonomous capacities and reliable procedures in areas of rather limited statehood. These partially unintended effects can be conceptualized as an increasing rational–legal bureaucratization, which has been initiated through both external and domestic actors as we illuminate in the case of Indonesia’s forestry sector in the period from 2007 until 2017. Our finding is that a bureaucratization of a new kind is increasingly strengthened in Indonesia’s forest despite enduring patterns of neopatrimonialism, emerging signs of new public management approaches, and the strengthening of functional equivalents such as community-based forest management. We thus claim that Max Weber’s perspective on the prospects and problems of rational–legal bureaucratization is still valuable, even when travelling to the tropics. Keywords: areas of limited statehood, climate governance, Max Weber, public administration, REDD+. 1. Introduction “Domination in everyday life is: administration” 1 (Weber (1920) 2013, §3) Global governance in the field of climate politics has unintended consequences in countries of the global South. We analyze the consequences of one specific policy instrument, labeled Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), as this is one of the most advanced governance arrangements that the international community has set up within the last decade. Initially, REDD+ was perceived as a rather simple mechanism that would allow developing countries to receive financial flows for avoiding deforestation from global carbon markets as a low-cost option to mitigate climate change (e.g. Eliasch 2008). This carbon-centered approach has evolved into an instrument that is conceived to bring on various co-benefits, such as biodiversity or livelihoods (VisserenHamakers et al. 2012), and to approach land-use issues within a landscape approach (Turnhout et al. 2017). But what impact will REDD+ have in the end besides hopefully protecting tropical forests? Our argument is that one of the most important and partially unintended side effects of REDD+ is, at least for now, a move toward an increasing Weberian rational–legal bureaucratization of tropical forestry. Of course, bureaucracies are nothing new in the tropics, and in some cases, these have been tremendously effective in fostering deforestation themselves. We claim, however, that the current globally induced trend toward bureaucratization is at least partially following a new rational–legal rationality to make jurisdictional REDD+ possible in the first place. It is thus often a new phenomenon in areas that have either hardly been governed at all or have been governed by neopatrimonial domination (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012), functional equivalents such as communitybased forest management (CBFM) (Ostrom 1990), or private governance through certification (Pattberg 2005). We claim that to understand such developments, there is still no better starting point than Max Weber’s observations that the institutional core of modernization and the modern state is the setup of legal–rational bureaucracies, potentially leading to effective and legitimate results in a functionally differentiated world. Correspondence: Chris Höhne, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Dolivostraße 15, D-64293 Darmstadt, Germany. Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Accepted for publication 5 July 2019. © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Regulation & Governance (2021) 15, 133–151 doi:10.1111/rego.12270 Bureaucracies are, for better or for worse, the dominant actor of public and private affairs in the modern world. This has not only been supported by Charles Tilly’s dictum that “[i]n one way or another, conquest entailed administration”(Tilly 1990, p. 20), which indicates that effective warfare and domination requires rulesetting, implementation, and effective financial management (see also Olson 1993). This claim is supported even by those analyzing nonhierarchical modes of steering like the use of market mechanisms, arguing that regulation through administrators is necessary for governance to be effective (e.g. Vogel 1996; Lederer 2012). Also the work on large business firms and on international nongovernmental organizations or multistakeholder partnerships has come to similar results (Beisheim et al. 2014; Seibel 2016, p. 52; Beisheim et al. 2018). Administrative structures also travel and we have, for example, seen a diffusion of specific polices (Holzinger & Knill 2005) or of institutional innovations, like the setup of autonomous regulatory agencies (LeviFaur & Jordana 2005). This has in many cases led to a rebureaucratization and restructuring of existing bureaucratic procedures often resulting in an “expansion in the regulatory capacities of the state”(Jordana et al. 2011, p. 1344), but also to local variation in the functioning of regulatory agencies in the global South (Dubash & Morgan 2012). Put in a nut-shell, contemporary governance implies the buildup and, in many cases, the locally adjusted transfer of administrative structures. After several decades of being neglected, Weber is currently much à la mode in neo-institutionalist scholarship (e.g. Fukuyama 2014) and even in the field of International Relations (Lebow 2017). But Weber’s insights are not much discussed within global environmental governance literature. Environmental scholarship has contributed strongly to institutionalist approaches, but it has been rather reluctant to focus on the state and what happens within public administrations (but see Hickmann et al. 2017; Höhne 2018; Höhne et al. 2018). Scholarship on forestry and REDD+ has not been completely blind to the role of public authorities. On the one hand, scholars rightly claim that “REDD will fail”because of “institutional constraints”(DeShazo et al. 2016, p. 86f) and the political economy and neopatrimonial structures in REDD+ host countries (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012). On the other hand, authors inspired by governmentality studies are taking the role of “administrative domains”much more serious than most mainstream approaches as titles like “Foucault in the Tropics”testify (Redfield 2005; Winkel 2012). Contributions in this tradition are often less Eurocentric than mainstream approaches, and they focus much more on how power is unfolding in these domains. They, for example, indicate that only through establishing bureaucratic domination can carbon stocks become manageable in the first place (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand 2006; Lövbrand & Stripple 2011). Finally, some forest policy experts have described the trend toward more government involvement (Giessen et al. 2016) or how power has shifted to specific actors within the bureaucracy (Wibowo & Giessen 2015). Similarly, the influence of multilevel politics on domestic institutions and the resulting neglect of local actors has more recently been highlighted (Di Gregorio et al. 2019) as has been the degree of institutionalization in various REDD+ host countries (Ochieng et al. 2018). We build on these insights and add a Weberian perspective to underline that the development of Weberian bureaucracies for REDD+ is at the beginning of a long process that might evolve into effective rational–legal state structures in areas where statehood is extremely limited (see Risse et al. 2018 for “limited statehood”). We thus make use of an analogy applying Weber’s categorization of bureaucratization –which is based on his insights derived from empirical material in 19th century Europe –on current developments in the global South. Although analogies are highly common in the historical and social sciences (e.g. the “analogy of the tragedy of the commons”), they are often criticized by positivists as being unscientific (e.g. King et al. 1994, pp. 212–213). However, we argue that analogies allow us to generate relevant knowledge when we are confronted with new material (Gentner et al. 1997, p. 4) and in cases in which one wants to explain strategies leading to major policy change (Khong 1992; Cornelissen et al. 2011, p. 10; Lederer & Kreuter 2018). Furthermore, every theoretical concept or categorization has been derived from geographically and historically contingent circumstances, and must be carefully applied when being used under other geographical or temporal conditions (see, for example, the discussion on contingent generalization as opposed to nomothetic laws in Pouliot 2007, p. 379). Hence, taking up Weber’s typology and letting it “travel”makes us partially guilty of a certain degree of Eurocentrism, but we are not making a deterministic and linear-evolutionary argument in the line of modernization theory that claims that a country like Indonesia will without doubt bureaucratize its forests in a Weberian rational–legal fashion. © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd134 M. Lederer and C. Höhne Max Weber in the tropics Methodologically, our paper does not aim for either positivist explanation and prediction (e.g. King et al. 1994), nor for an exclusive interpretivist approach, which “seeks to explain events in terms of actors’understandings of their own contexts”(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012, p. 52). We, instead, try to contribute to contingent generalizations (in terms of time frame, cultural location, and issue topic) based on ideal-type categories and therefore engage in abductive reasoning (Pouliot 2007; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012, p. 28, 94, 113). In an iterative process and enlightened through both theory and field work, we have engaged in several adjustments of our theoretical lenses. Empirically, we primarily make use of 41 expert interviews with government officials, donors, NGO activists, business actors, and scientists (see Appendix), which provided us with a great variety of insider perspectives. Those interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017 in Indonesia. Indonesia represents a critical case for efforts to reduce deforestation (for further explanations, see further in this article). We both triangulated those expert insights, where possible, among each other (e.g. insights by government official with insights by NGO activist) as well as with analysis from policy documents and secondary sources. We promised anonymity and therefore only indicate what kind of background the interviewee has in order to substantiate the arguments. We undertook a systematic content analysis on all primary and secondary sources based on our categories derived from Weberian rational–legal bureaucratization, new public management, neopatrimonialism, and governance by functional equivalence and investigated the period from 2007 until 2017. To advance our argumentation, the paper proceeds in four steps: First, we describe Weber’s work on bureaucratization and distinguish his perspective from alternative forms of governing. Second, we discuss the evolution of REDD+ and show that substantial changes have been made, which now increasingly dominate the overall approach. Third, we focus on current REDD+ bureaucratization on the domestic level, focusing on Indonesia as a critical case. The country is so important because it holds the third largest tropical rainforest in the world and faces some of the highest deforestation rates globally, making Indonesia the fifth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter of the world and attracting numerous donors to engage with the country (Climate Watch 2019). Indonesia is also of special interest, as its forests have been exploited through informal networks of businesses, national politicians, and bureaucrats during the Suharto era, while after democratization and decentralization in 1998/1999, this practice has been shifted to the districts that legally or illegally continued to exploit forests through neopatrimonial practices (Ribot et al. 2006). If we can observe an increasing rational–legal, autonomous, and rule-bound bureaucratic domination in such a country (Von Soest et al. 2011), then we might be able to derive some more general conclusions for the group of REDD+ countries in total. Finally, the last section summarizes our findings on the increasing Weberian bureaucratization, resonating Weber’s own criticism of modernization, and we close by taking up contemporary institutionalist insights that might allow us to move beyond this impasse, reflect upon the normative change that will be needed to shift from exploitation to conservation, and indicate future research areas scrutinizing emerging hybrids of Weberian bureaucratization and nonWestern forms of governance. 2. Max Weber and the rise of modernity Max Weber’s interest in bureaucracies as the “mechanism that transforms public authority into concrete and visible social action”(Steffek 2017, p. 119) was historical, sociological, and practical. Weber famously described three ideal types (Mayntz 1965; Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §2) of legitimate domination (“legitime Herrschaft”): charisma, tradition, and legal–rationality. We are interested in the latter category and distinguish two indicators of Weberian legal–rational bureaucratization: First, Weberian legal–rational bureaucratization is based on the establishment of autonomous capacity, which is strongly linked to a state with a bureaucratic apparatus and technical expertise (the famous “Anstaltsstaat” 2 ) (Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §4, p. 459). Administrations must be autonomous from clientelism and personal rule with the specialized bureaucrats acting impersonally, independently, nonarbitrarily, and based on technical expertise. For this to be possible, bureaucrats must be selected in a meritocratic fashion and their salary and pension must be high enough to make an independent living (Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §4; (1922) 2005, Ch. 1 Bürokratismus, A650f). In such a state, administrations are hierarchically ordered, functionally differentiated, and eligible to political control. Second, bureaucrats must work in highly formalized ways, setting formal rules relying on administrative law. In Weber’s own words “bureaucratic-monocratic © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 135 Max Weber in the tropics M. Lederer and C. Höhne administration based on files and records”is, from a technical perspective, the most efficient and rational form of domination (Weber (1920) 2013, Ch. 3, §5). Reliable legal procedures are, thus, our second indicator. Weberian bureaucratization in terms of regulating ever more domains of public and private live 3 through bureaucracies with autonomous capacity and reliable procedures is the extension of technical state power in a legal–rational way and not simply the “illegitimate extension of the power of bureaucrats”(Olsen 2005, p. 3). Weber was quite aware that the evolution of such structures might come at the price of potentially oppressive routines, blind specialization, and bureaucracies that generate a life of their own (Weber (1922) 2005, Ch. 1 Bürokratismus, A 662, 669). Bureaucratization is, however, a necessary condition for mass democracies to exist (Weber (1922) 2005, Ch. 1 Bürokratismus, A 667), and is a pars pro toto for the processes of modernization, rationalization, and the development of capitalism within the Western world (Breuer 1994). Bureaucracies rationalize domination in the industrial age and the bureaucrats must give reasons for decisions made, generating general trust so that impersonal markets (Steffek 2017), but also development can evolve (Evans & Rauch 1999). When analyzing Weberian legal–rational bureaucratization, we must keep in mind three potential alternatives, also in order to avoid too much of a Eurocentric and universal Weberian reading: First, rational–legal bureaucratization à la Weber must be distinguished from traditional domination and its subtype of patrimonialism, which is characterized by “all power relations between ruler and ruled […being…] personal relations [without any] differentiation between the private and the public realm”(Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 105). Since the 1970s, scholars have observed a shift from patrimonialism toward neopatrimonial structures with proponents of a hard version of neopatrimonialism claiming that bureaucracies are often only a “façade”behind which clientelistic structures prevail (see Olivier de Sardan 2014 for the distinction between the hard and soft version of neopatrimonialism). However, proponents of the soft version of neopatrimonialism underline that “two role systems or logics [of patrimonialism and rational legality] exist next to each other [and…] permeate each other”(Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 105). Hence, these authors partially move beyond Weber and define neopatrimonialism in distinction from patrimonialism as being built on “the claim to legal–rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’stateness [as] [f] ormal structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed”(Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 105). Thus, much of the criticism of neopatrimonialism is actually with regard to patrimonialism as scholars equate both concepts and thereby contribute to a “misreading of Weber”on patrimonialism who stressed that also patrimonial relations have some form of checks and balances (Pitcher et al. 2009, p. 125). We are thus in line with those critics that have pointed out that neopatrimonialism “can be used to describe different styles of exercising authority […] and social practices within states” (Mkandawire 2015, p. 564), and build on the argument that there has so far been “no study that investigates thoroughly whether a form of domination […] is actually neo-patrimonial or is better described another way” (Erdmann 2013, pp. 61–62). In a nutshell, despite its weaknesses in terms of definition, delineation, and operationalization, the concept of neopatrimonialism is still a useful heuristic to investigate the “interaction between formal institutions and informal behaviour and/or institutions in politics”(Erdmann 2013, p. 68). Second, in the last decades, bureaucratic rulings were also regarded as harmful public intervention where nonstate actors were better suited to do the job (Olsen 2005, p. 6). Empirically, scholars have shown that nonstate actors, for example, transnational companies, can, under certain conditions, become functional equivalents for providing various governance services (Hönke & Thauer 2014; Börzel & Deitelhoff 2018). Börzel and Risse (2016) also stress that local nonstate institutions can foster a minimum of generalized trust that allows the provision and upscaling of governance. We thus find various functional equivalents providing a shadow of hierarchy (Lake 2014). Particularly forestry has been a prime example of “governing the commons”(Ostrom 1990) through collective action institutions such as CBFM. Third, over the last decades, new public management and getting the “price right”were recommended as more important than building up bureaucracies (in the field of development, see Hönke & Lederer 2013, pp. 780–781; for public administration, see Seibel 2016, p. 154f). New public management approaches have promoted the shift toward goal-oriented actions by bureaucracies based on entrepreneurial practices and performance management and claimed that this would increase their efficiency and effectiveness (Parker & Bradley 2000, p. 131). They, furthermore, advocated the establishment of various small and autonomous agencies for performance improvements (Pollitt et al. 2001). The disillusionment with these approaches and the dismal record of structural adjustment programs led contemporary scholarship to a much more nuanced perspective, and even the © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd136 M. Lederer and C. Höhne Max Weber in the tropics multilateral institutions are now aware of the need for capable administrations (e.g. World Bank 2002). Contemporary scholarship is thus much more nuanced, but also stressing distinct features of the regulatory state in the global South, such as pressure by transnational actors, the importance of distributional issues involving societal stakeholders, and limited domestic state capacities (Dubash & Morgan 2012). When it comes to the specific role of public administrations and institutionalist scholarship, Max Weber has, however, again become a standard reference (Seibel 2016). We will keep these three alternative ways of ruling in mind when scrutinizing whether rational–legal bureaucratization has been advanced in our case study by REDD+. Before, we, however, provide a short overview of the evolution of forest governance and REDD+ on the global level to understand how this international mechanism came into being and how it travels to the nation-states. 3. REDD+: From a transaction cost approach to institutional strengthening Forest reserves in the global South were nationalized under colonial rule despite previous ongoing forms of informal forest management by local communities (Arts 2014, p. 18). After decolonialization, forests were largely owned by central governments (Andersson et al. 2006, p. 576, 578), which have been accused of being bad managers of their forests by exploiting resources, accepting corruption, and lacking enforcement. Being confronted with pressures by stakeholders and fiscal deficits, central governments have initiated market approaches, CBFM, and forestry decentralization since the 1980s (Agrawal 2012, p. 314; Arts 2014, p. 18), moving partly away from Weber (Krott et al. 2014, p. 34). For example, CBFM is a functional equivalent to domination through forest administrations and is characterized by the assignment of property or management rights over forests to local communities (Andersson et al. 2006, p. 578), who have been perceived as being better equipped to manage forests effectively and sustainably. Specific design principles, such as clear resource boundaries, participation of local users in decisionmaking, local rules, monitoring and sanctioning of compliance, and conflict management are increasing the likelihood of better CBFM governance (Ostrom 1990; Arts 2014, p. 18). However, these design principles have been criticized for being so narrow that they would not apply in most forest–agricultural frontier areas with high deforestation (Wunder 2010, p. 335). Indeed, when other land uses provided higher benefits, local user groups have also opted for forest conversion (Tacconi 2007, p. 342, 343; Wunder 2010, p. 335). Deforestation rates are still high in most of the tropics, and the international community has started to engage the problem through the new governance arrangement REDD+. The origins of REDD+ date back to the 2005 UNFCCC conference (COP) in Montreal (Pistorius 2012), when the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, proposed to reduce GHG emissions and protect tropical forests through results-based payment (Angelsen & McNeill 2012). In the beginning, highly optimistic projections were made that tropical forests could be saved with minimal transaction costs (Eliasch 2008). Thus, institutional aspects did not play much of a role. However, it soon turned out that the implementation of REDD+ projects was not only much more expansive than previously thought due to relatively high opportunity costs (IDEAcarbon 2011), but also that the politics of national forestry have to be taken into account much more (Brockhaus et al. 2017). Several scholars have indicated that the political economy of forestry has not been well thought of in the general idea of REDD+. This is especially problematic in cases of neopatrimonial governments and bureaucracies in which vested interests by clientelistic networks of public and private actors are sticking to natural resource extraction (Karsenty & Ongolo 2012, p. 38, 44). Scholars have, therefore, claimed that we need to focus on the institutional settings in REDD+ host countries, where crosssectoral coordination, multilevel governance, and “professional as well as financial capacity in forest administrations”are most often not adequate (Korhonen-Kurki et al. 2014, p. 173). This resulted in a debate whether REDD+ leads to a recentralization of forestry (Larson & Ribot 2009; Phelps et al. 2010; Hickmann et al. 2017), and it shows that the domestic political-administrative system has to be taken much more seriously than previously thought (Höhne et al. 2018). This also becomes visible when one looks at international REDD+ expenditures. Korhonen-Kouki et al., (2014) have shown that the issue of institutional strengthening receives the second highest proportion of financial aid, and this is also what we would expect considering that almost all REDD+ countries are at the preparation stage and not yet receiving results-based payments. It underscores that those who claim that REDD+ is facing huge “institutional constraints”(Karsenty & Ongolo 2012) have a very valid point. © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 137 Max Weber in the tropics M. Lederer and C. Höhne A second characteristic of contemporary REDD+ politics is that it is driven by a variety of actors, such as public authorities at different sectoral departments and governmental levels, various biand multilateral donors, nonprofit actors, and private corporations who are trying to regulate it. Both domestic actors and external actors thereby follow formal/explicit and informal/implicit purposes in international cooperation activities (for a categorization of formal and informal interests of donors, see e.g. Rahman & Giessen 2017; of domestic bureaucracies see Sahide et al. 2016a). From 2008 onward, international organizations have set up new programs to prepare countries for REDD+, such as UN-REDD, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), and the World Bank’s Forest Investment Program (FIP). FCPF, FIP, and UN-REDD build upon the bureaucratic structure, the material resources, and the knowledgeable personal of its international carrier organizations, such as World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO (Rosendal & Andresen 2011, p. 1908, 1909). These institutions have introduced bureaucratic routines to manage REDD+ and have engaged with domestic governments on this basis when they applied for funds and technical support. The FCPF, for example, keeps a public scorecard showing the overall procedural process of its engagement with partner countries, which follows the Weberian rationale. It further justifies its actions through various forms of communication (FCPF 2018). These multilateral funds and bilateral donors like Norway engage in the proliferation of UNFCCC’s REDD+ norms and rules as well as their own additional standards to countries of the global South in order to prepare the ground for large-scale global REDD+ implementation (see UNFCCC Secretariat 2016 for COP decisions on REDD+). For example, UN-REDD is checking the progress of its participating 23 countries, which received US$ 87 million in total, against UNFCCC’s REDD+ Warsaw Framework of 2013 (UN-REDD 2016, pp. 1–2, 19). The FCPF also requires its members to streamline its forest governance and its Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) procedures based on various frameworks, templates, and guidelines (FCPF 2017). By end of 2016, it had allocated US$ 148 million for REDD+ readiness preparation in 39 countries (FCPF 2016, p. 16, 33). Other topics of engagement have been the recognition of free, prior and informed consent by local communities and indigenous people. By advancing these issues in participating REDD+ nations, these programs and facilities contribute to an increasing Weberian bureaucratization of tropical forest areas. How this plays out at the domestic level can be seen in our case study of Indonesia, in which we apply the two indicators of autonomous capacity and reliable procedures, but also indicate where different developments with regard to neopatrimonialism, new public management, and governance by functional equivalents occur. 4. Domestic bureaucratization facilitated through REDD+: The case of Indonesia “The development of modern forms of organization in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. This is true of church and state, of armies, political parties, economic enterprises, interest group”(Weber (1922) 2005, p. 223) and of the world’s tropical forests… Indonesia is a presidential republic with a three-tier political system (including provinces and districts) that was decentralized through the Regional Governance Law of 1999. The country hosts the third largest tropical forests in the world, but its high rates of deforestation make it also the world’sfifth largest GHG emitter (Climate Watch 2019), resulting in the decline of the forest cover from 65 to 50 percent from 1990 to 2015 (World Bank 2016). The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 determines that land and their natural resources shall be under state control. The Forestry Law of 1967 then defined three quarters of Indonesia’s territory (i.e. 143 million ha) as “state forest”(Brockhaus et al. 2012; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 534), which in the following decades were exploited by neopatrimonial networks of politicians, bureaucrats, and business actors (Ribot et al. 2006). During President Suharto’s authoritarian regime of “New Order”(1966–1998), decisionmaking on forestry was centralized in Jakarta (Ardiansyah et al. 2015, p. 4); being largely under the control of the Ministry of Forestry (Brockhaus et al. 2012, p. 32) and the neopatrimonial network around President Suharto’s family and friends based on a government regulation in 1970, while illegal logging occurred locally as well (Dauvergne 1998, p. 16; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, pp. 534–535). From 1967 until 1982, the national focus was on the export of raw logs, followed by industrial processing of plywood and sawn timber until 1990, leading to an increasing engagement in pulp and paper processing since the mid-1990s (Brockhaus et al. 2012, p. 32). The expansion of palm oil © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd138 M. Lederer and C. Höhne Max Weber in the tropics plantations beginning in the mid-1980s then also contributed to tremendous deforestation (Dauvergne 1998, p. 15). After democratization in 1998, districts were granted the authority to manage their forest resources by the decentralization law of 1999, which led to extensive legal and illegal logging driven by district governments and their neopatrimonial networks (Ardiansyah et al. 2015, p. 6–8). Hence, rent-seeking by an economic oligarchy and collusive governments and bureaucracies has continued after democratization in a more decentralized way (Brockhaus et al. 2012, p. 32; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 532, 538). Due to an inconsistent national legal framework, local deforestation occurred under conditions in which “the distinction between legal and illegal became increasingly blurred”(Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 536). As a response to that, the central government has increasingly recentralized forestry since 2002, with local (il)legal logging continuing anyhow (Barr et al. 2006, p. 88; Indrarto et al. 2012; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 536). Furthermore, since the 2000s, we can see a shift toward more governance engagement by NGOs and market-based certificates such as FSC as well as (incentivebased) bilateral and multilateral cooperation to fight illegal logging (in the case of EU’s FLEGT) and to additionally reduce legal logging (in the case of REDD+) (Luttrell et al. 2011, p. 1; Obidzinski & Kusters 2015, p. 531). With the 2007 COP held in Bali and the leadership of the then President Yudhoyono (in power from 2004 to 2014) (Höhne 2018), climate policies started to gain momentum in Indonesia, which was supported in the forest sector by donors’financial and technical assistance for preparing REDD+ in the country (Ardiansyah et al. 2015, p. 13). Norway pledged up to US$ 1 billion for verified emission reductions and signed a Letter of Intent with Indonesia in May 2010, comprising the measures to be adopted by the Indonesian government to receive 20 percent of the money for preparation activities and the rest for verified emission reductions (Luttrell et al. 2014, pp. 67–68). Indonesia also started to engage with multilateral REDD+ donors like FCPF, FIP, and UN-REDD. Following decisions made on REDD+ related standards within the UNFCCC, these donors worked together with the Indonesian government to advance Weberian bureaucratization as autonomous capacity was raised and reliable procedures were introduced. 4.1. Autonomous capacity: Establishing new institutions and units REDD+ promoters have worked on strengthening autonomous capacities through various means. We focus on the establishment of REDD+ institutions and the setting up of Forest Management Units (FMUs) as subnational forest administrations as these are paradigmatic examples of how not only new institutions but also a new mode of administrating were introduced. 4.1.1. The establishment of REDD institutions When REDD+ emerged internationally in the UNFCCC, the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry was known for its vested interests in forest exploitation and what Weber would have called its “sultanistic,”highly clientelistic, practices besides lower levels of formalized practices (Indrarto et al. 2012, p. 21; Resosudarmo et al. 2013, p. 81; Anderson et al. 2015, p. 272). This has partially changed due to two interrelated processes. On the one hand, a small group of people in the ministry considered REDD+ as an opportunity to reform forest governance and to shift the focus to conservation in the run up to the Bali COP in 2007. They developed a report on REDD+ (GIBI-22082017; GI-NI-06102017, see Annex), but “were struggling in the ministry as most people thought timber [production] is [the] most important thing”(GI-NI-06102017), and ministers regarded climate change as very peripheral. On the other hand, outside actors brought in a new dynamic, which was used by the President’sOffice for a forest governance reform agenda. Following the negotiations of the President’sOffice and the National Council on Climate Change (DNPI) with the Norwegian government, President Yudhoyono signed the Letter of Intent on the REDD+ partnership with Norway in 2010. Based on that agreement the President established the REDD+ Task Force in 2010 and replaced it by the REDD+ Agency in 2013 as an organization with an autonomous capacity working on REDD+ issues (Agung et al. 2014, p. 755; Resosudarmo et al. 2013, pp. 77, 79–80). Many Indonesian proponents in the President’soffice wanted to directly influence the process, regarded REDD+ as a cross-sectoral approach on natural resources and did not have much confidence in the Ministry of Forestry due to its enduring neopatrimonial structures with forest exploitation businesses and focus on forest exploitation (Anderson et al. 2015, p. 269; Bibby 2016). The belief of proponents of the extra-governmental REDD+ Task Force/Agency was that it will provide change from outside of the Ministry of Forestry on forest governance (DI- © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 139 Max Weber in the tropics M. Lederer and C. Höhne 15082017; GI-DI-08082017; GI-BI-22082017; Rakhman & Sekarsari 2015; Kaisa et al. 2017, p. 67), which was regarded as one of the “most corrupt ministries”(GI-DI-08082017; see also Anderson et al. 2015, p. 269). The REDD+ Task Force was created within the President’sOffice to prepare the ground for the establishment of the REDD+ Agency. It was staffed with officers from governmental organizations, such as the Ministries of Forestry, Environment, Finance, and National Planning and from the Land Agency. The REDD+ Task Force/Agency was supported by consultants and directly coordinated by the head of the President’s office (GI-DI-08082017; GI-08082017; Lang 2012b). Both institutions reinforced the REDD+ and forest governance autonomous capacities on the national level. The REDD+ Task Force/Agency used its position in the President’sOffice to advance REDD+ related issues nationally by developing the national REDD+ strategy, starting an initiative to develop a one-map that includes all tenure claims in Indonesia, and preparing a forest moratorium on new forest concession among others (GI-08082017; Anderson et al. 2015, p. 269). The REDD+ Agency was, furthermore, meant to challenge and reform all laws on natural resources, such as forestry, agriculture, and mining, through the development of an umbrella Natural Resource Development Law. REDD+ was, hence, seen as an opportunity to reform forest and land use governance (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force 2012, pp. 6, 17–18; Bae et al. 2014, p. 1348; GI-BI-22082017), and to receive external funding for it (Lang 2012b). The establishment of the REDD+ Agency, however, was only partially following the classical Weberian notions of a bureaucracy as two central differences indicate. First, it was set up outside of the line Ministry of Forestry (Resosudarmo et al. 2013, p. 80). It was planned to work for 5–7 years (GI-DI-08082017), and was not accountable to the forestry minister, but to the President (Sari 2014). Both Norway and its president and his staff wanted to circumvent the Ministry of Forestry and to break down neopatrimonial practices. Based on new public management ideas of a goal-oriented, flexible, business-like organization and with the direct backing of the president, the REDD+ Task Force/Agency was able to determine the national agenda and to trigger various national initiatives. However, this new public management-like organizational setup contributed to an institutional turf war on REDD+ between the REDD+ Task Force/Agency,theMinistry of Forestry and the Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS) that weakened the advancement of REDD+ (Resosudarmo et al. 2013; Agung et al. 2014). In the process, the Ministry of Forestry made sure that the powers of the REDD+ Agency were limited (GI-08082017); resisted the forestry reform process of the REDD+ Task Force/Agency (Kaisa et al. 2017, p. 67); ignored all REDD+ related issues, which were also not liked by big private actors; and continued to allow the provision of permits, which all indicate enduring influence of neopatrimonial structures (GI-BI-22082017; GI-DI-21082017; GI-NI-06102017). The president allowed this development and did not push the minister, as he needed political support for his broader agenda (GI-BI-22082017). Thus, the REDD+ Task Force did not issue the REDD+ Strategy in 2012 as presidential decree as it feared a watering down by the Ministry of Forestry in the process of interministerial consultations and only published it as a Task Force document to share its ideas with the public (GI08082017). The REDD+ Agency, hence, lacked a bureaucratic home and faced problems, such as the lack of an autonomous budget, and missing influences on ministerial decrees and implementation when it came to shifting issues from the agenda to the policy decision or even implementation phase, making it dependent on the cooperation with the Ministry of Forestry, which still represented business interests (GI-DI-08082017; GI-05082016; RI08082016; DI-10082016; DI-16082016; Kaisa et al. 2017, p. 67). Second, it was only partly staffed by government bureaucrats, but mostly by experts from the civil society, which also resembles the envisioned organizational culture of new public management. This approach helped in the collaboration with NGOs, which had been ignored by the Ministry of Forestry (NI-16082017; NI-02082016; Kaisa et al. 2017, p. 67). And while they brought in important expert knowledge and a strong motivation to shake up the entire forest governance sector, they also lacked bureaucratic knowledge, which hampered their coordination with line ministries (GI-05082016; RI-08082016; DI-10082016; DI-16082016). Only in the beginning of 2015, the newly appointed President Joko Widodo curbed the institutional turf war at the national level by dissolving the REDD+ Agency and integrating its task into the new Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Anderson et al. 2016, p. 33). The new president had a lean bureaucracy agenda and abandoned extragovernmental agencies in other policy fields as well. He is, thus, less oriented toward new public management, which might support increasing Weberian bureaucratization through the implementation of the REDD+ reform agenda in the ministry (RI-01082016; RI-08082016). Within the new DG Climate of the new © 2019 The Authors. 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Wunder S (2010) Forest Decentralization for REDD? A Response to Sandbrook et al. Oryx 44, 335–337. A. APPENDIX A1. Interviewees DI-01082016: Donor interviewee, 1 August 2016 RI-01082016: Research Interviewee, 1 August 2016 NI-02082016: NGO interviewee, 2 August 2016 DI-03082016: Donor interviewee, 3 August 2016 GI-05082016: Government Interviewee, 5 August 2016 RI-08082016: Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016 DI-10082016: Donor Interviewee, 10 August 2016 NI-15082016: NGO Interviewee, 15 August 2016 DI-16082016: Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016 © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd150 M. Lederer and C. Höhne Max Weber in the tropics GI-07082017: Government interviewee, 7 August 2017 GI-DI-08082017: Ex-government, donor interviewee, 8 August 2017 GI-08082017: Ex-government interviewee, 8 August 2017 GI-NI-08082017: Ex-government, NGO interviewee, 8 August 2017 BI-09082017: Business interviewee, 9 August 2017 GI-DI-09082017: Ex-government, donor interviewee, 9 August 2017 NI-09082017: NGO interviewee, 9 August 2017 NI-1-10082017, NGO interviewee, 10 August 2017 NI-2-10082017: NGO interviewee, 10 August 2017 DI-11082017: Donor interviewee, 11 August 2017 RI-12082016: Research Interviewee, 12 August 2016 DI-1-14082017: Donor interviewee, 14 August 2017 DI-2-14082017: Donor interviewee, 14 August 2017 DI-15082017: Donor interviewee, 15 August 2017 NI-16082017: NGO interviewee, 16 August 2017 GI-1-16082017: Government interviewee, 16 August 2017 GI-2-16082017: Government interviewee, 16 August 2017 GI-3-16082017: Government Interviewee, 16 August 2017 GI-DI-21082017: Ex-government, donor interviewee, 21 August 2017 DI-21082017: Donor interviewee, 21 August 2017 GI-BI-22082017: Ex-government, business interviewee, 22 August 2017 GI-RI-23082017: Government and research interviewee, 23 August 2017 RI-24082017: Research interviewee, 24 August 2017 GI-BI-31082017: Ex-government, business interviewee, 31 August 2017 SGI-15092017: Subnational government interviewee, Central Kalimantan, 15 September 2017 BI-19092017: Business interviewee, 19 September 2017 DI-22092017: Donor interviewee, 22 September 2017 SGI-25092017: Subnational government interviewee, East Kalimantan, 25 September 2017 NI-1-02102017: NGO interviewee, 2 October 2017 NI-2-02102017: NGO interviewee, 2 October 2017 GI-06102017: Government interviewee, 6 October 2017 GI-NI-06102017: Ex-government, NGO interviewee, 6 October 2017 © 2019 The Authors. Regulation & Governance Published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd 151 Max Weber in the tropics M. Lederer and C. Höhne