Testing and Evaluation Infrastructure for the European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI) Initiative

TESTING AND EVALUATION INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE EUROPEAN QUANTUM COMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE (EUROQCI) INITIATIVE TOPIC ID: CNECT/2023/OP/0032 3rd Hellas QCI Training Event, Heraklion (Crete), September 4th, 2024 Hannes Hübel (AIT Austrian Institute of Technology) NOSTRADAMUS PROJECT PRESENTATION Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Commission. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them. Introduction and General Overview 3 NOSTRADAMUS OBJECTIVE “It is the goal of this Consortium to describe the blueprint for a Testing & Validation Infrastructure in order to enable the evaluation and certification of QKD devices and related technologies, as well as to implement and operate a prototypical testbed facility to offer initial evaluation services which are mandatory for the accreditation from a European security authority.” FULL PARTNERS Deutsche Telekom Global Business Solutions Belgium NV/SA (DTGBS, including Deutsche Telekom Security GmbH and Deutsche Telekom Technik GmbH) AIT Austrian Institute of Technology GmbH (AIT) Thales SIX GTS France (TSGF, including Thales Alenia Space France and Thales Belgium) Blueprint for a Testing & Validation Infrastructure –Public – – CNECT/2023/OP/0032 4 Implementation security Protocol implementation: Settings were not random (0,1,0,1,0,1,0…) Physical implementation: Different settings (bases, bits) produced different sounds →side-channel attack First experimental implementation of QKD –Public – – CNECT/2023/OP/0032 First QKD implementation in 1989 5 NOSTRADAMUS APPROACH Partners part of PETRUS team, led by DT –26 NatQCI and 6 Industry projects Use cases providers in the IRIS² SpaceQCI context and QKD companies alliances to align with what the market (will) expect State of the art scientific entities under AIT supervision to implement and validate the functional tests and attacks Metrology companies to help establish whether the tests can be part of an ISO17025 lab Licensed ITSEF from DE and FR (DT and Thales) to build the security baseline and the evaluation lab. Technology transfer experts for the delivery of the lab and the associated trainings in the Hosting Entity. Widely diversified consortium for a holistic view WP1: Prioritisation WP2&3: Setting the Test Protocols WP4: Testbed Implementation WP5: Transfer v1 at hosting entity WP4: Preliminary Service PHASE 1 2024 … OVER 4 PHASES FROM 2024 -2027 WP1: Prioritisation WP2&3: Setting the Test Protocols WP4: Testbed Implementation WP5: Transfer final WP4: Preliminary Service PHASE 4 2027 EUROQCI COOKBOOK –Public – – CNECT/2023/OP/0032 Methodology and Prioritisation Approach Nostradamus Vulnerability Analysis –Public – – CNECT/2023/OP/0032 7 Construct matrix of all published ▪Side Channel Attacks ▪Counter Measures Insight ▪Some counter measures help against several attacks ▪Some attacks can be countered by several counter measures Results ▪6 general side-channel attacks against DV and CV QKD Systems ▪6 side-channel attacks against CV QKD Systems ▪34 side-channel attacks against DV QKD Systems ▪11 vulnerabilities ▪98 counter-measures in literature 1 2 3 4 a X X b X c X d X e X f X X g X Counter Measures Side Channel Attack Nostradamus three steps for priority setting –Public – – CNECT/2023/OP/0032 8 1. Step ▪No consideration of side-channel attacks against Entangled or MDI QKD Systems 2. Step ▪No consideration of side-channel attacks not relevant for EU27 systems 3. Step ▪Expert discussion on feasibility of implementing the sidechannel, of feasibility to implement the countermeasures and the sufficiency to implement the counter measures 1 2 3 4 a X X b X c X d X e X f X X g X Counter Measures Side Channel Attack Nostradamus Prioritization Approach Attack Feasibility ▪Demonstrated the attack has been implemented in the past ▪Viable all the components necessary to implement the attack are currently possible ▪Speculative at least one of the components necessary to implement the attack is currently unavailable ▪Theoretical for at least some part of the attack it is unclear what physical components are necessary to implement it Sufficiency of Counter Measures ▪Closes side-channel sufficient to avoid attack success ▪Impedes attack co-dependent with additional counter measure, e.g health monitoring ▪Unknown efficiency counter measure proposed in literature ▪Shown insufficient CM proposed in literature but already shown not to help –Public – – CNECT/2023/OP/0032 9