Citizen-Centric Governance Indicators: Measuring and Monitoring Governance by Listening to the People and Not the Interest Groups

Ivanyna, Maksym; Shah, Anwar Working Paper Citizen-Centric Governance Indicators: Measuring and Monitoring Governance by Listening to the People and Not the Interest Groups Economics Discussion Papers, No. 2009-27 Provided in Cooperation with: Kiel Institute for the World Economy – Leibniz Center for Research on Global Economic Challenges Suggested Citation: Ivanyna, Maksym; Shah, Anwar (2009) : Citizen-Centric Governance Indicators: Measuring and Monitoring Governance by Listening to the People and Not the Interest Groups, Economics Discussion Papers, No. 2009-27, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/27508 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en Discussion Paper Nr. 2009-27 | June 2, 2009 | http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2009-27 Citizen-Centric Governance Indicators: Measuring and Monitoring Governance by Listening to the People and Not the Interest Groups Maksym Ivanyna and Anwar Shah Regensburg University, Germany; World Bank, Washington, DC Abstract Governance indicators are now widely used as tools for conducting development dialogue, allocating external assistance and influencing foreign direct investment. This paper argues that available governance indicators are not suitable for these purposes as they do not conceptualize governance and fail to capture how citizens perceive the governance environment and outcomes in their countries. This paper attempts to fill this void by conceptualizing governance and implementing a uniform and consistent framework for measuring governance quality across countries and over time based upon citizens’ evaluations. JEL: H10, H11, H83, I31, O10 Keywords: Citizen-centric governance indicators; rule of law; fair governance; service delivery; quality of life; trust in government; government oversight; public opinion Correspondence Anwar Shah, Public Sector Governance, World Bank Institute, Room J4-141, World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20433, United States; e-mail: [email protected] The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and should not be attributed to World Bank and its Executive Directors. Authors are grateful to the participants of Advanced Academic Update ”Governance Indicators and Assessments—Impact and Future Trends” (Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Netherlands, January 21–22, 2009), Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics Research Workshop (Bayreuth, Germany, January 22–23, 2009) for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Comments are welcome. © Author(s) 2009. Licensed under a Creative Commons License - Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Germany Economics Discussion Paper 1 1 Introduction Since the publication of pioneering work on measuring governance quality by Huther and Shah (1998), there has been a proliferation of composite worldwide governance indicators purporting to measure various aspects of governance quality. The growth of these indicators have been spurned by generous support by the development assistance community especially multilateral development finance agencies and infinite appetite of media and the academic community for governance assessments and country rankings. Governance indicators are now being used as tools for conducting development dialogue, allocating external assistance and influencing foreign direct investment. Each new indicator series are now released with great fanfare from major industrial country capitals and the popular press uses these indicators to name and shame individual countries for any adverse change in rank order over time or across countries. The development assistance community is increasingly using these indicators in making critical judgments on development assistance. The World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) allocation - a window of subsidized lending to the developing world and the United States Agency for International Development’s Millennium Challenge Account uses various governance indicators as criteria for allocating external assistance. At the same time, some of the recent findings of these indicators have also led to much controversy and acrimony and thereby contributing to complicating the dialogue on development effectiveness.1In view of the influential nature of these indicators and potential to do harm if judgments embodied in these indicators are biased and erroneous, it is imperative that they capture critical dimensions of the quality of governance and all countries are evaluated using uniform and reasonably objective assessment criteria. Do the existing indicators meet this test? While the literature on this subject is woefully inadequate and thin, four widely used indicators namely the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs), Overseas Development Institute’s World Governance Assessments (WGAs), Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Indexes of African Governnace (IIAGs) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s African Governance Report Indicators (AGRIs) - all lack a conceptual framework on governance, lack of citizen-based evaluations and time and country assessment inconsistencies to make their rankings suspect. A number of recent papers have been especially critical of WGIs for lacking ”concept” ( implying lack of clarity in conceptualization) and ”construct” ( implying lack of clarity in measurement ) validity, sample bias (mostly interest group views), lack of transparency and time inconsistency of definitions and measurements (see Arndt, 2008, Arndt and Oman, 2006, Kurtz and Schrank, 2007, Iqbal and Shah, 2008, Langbein and Knack, 2008, Schrank and Kurtz, 2008, Thomas, 2006). One of the most important limitation common to all available composite indexes of governance is that they fail to capture how citizens perceive the governance environment and outcomes in their own countries. For governance assessments to be useful for policy purposes, they must conceptualize governance and provide uniform and consistent criteria for measuring gov1See Iqbal and Shah (2008) for examples of indefensible country ranking by one of the more widely used indicators www.economics-ejournal.org 2Economics Discussion Paper ernance across countries and over time. Foremost concerns for such measurement should be citizens’ evaluation of governance environment and outcomes in their own countries supplemented of course by objective indicators of the same. For development assistance purposes, these indicators could be supplemented by experts-based evaluations. There is some work available on objective indicators as done by the Doing Business indicators of the World Bank and on experts-based evaluations as done for the Global Integrity Index. The most important void in our knowledge is how citizens view governance environment and outcomes in their countries. This paper takes a first step to fill that void. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses conceptual issues in measuring governance, specifies a citizen-centric conceptual framework on measuring governance quality. Section 3 presents an empirical framework, data sources and aggregation techniques. Section 4 presents preliminary results. In Section 5 we discuss the robustness of our results, as well as the contributions and limitations of the empirical approach. A concluding section outlines future research agenda. 2 Conceptualizing and measuring governance quality in a comparative context Governance is a fuzzy yet fashionable buzzword and its use in the literature has exploded in recent years. Dixit (2008) notes that there were only 4 citations in EconLit in the period 1970-1979 compared to 15455 in the most recent period of 2000-2007 and currently Google lists more than 152000 pages of this literature. According to American Heritage, Random House and Merriam Webster dictionaries, governance is equated with government and is defined as the ”exercise of authority and control” or ”a method or system of government and management” or ”the act, process or power of governing”. Huther and Shah (1998) defined governance as ”a multi-faceted concept encompassing all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a state. The quality of governance is thus determined by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed by its citizens” (p.2). The World Bank Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) Strategy (World Bank, 2007) defines it as ”the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide goods and services” (p.3). For our current purpose, none of the above definitions with the sole exception by Huther and Shah, is helpful in serving as an operational guide to carry out a comparative review of quality of governance across countries or even of one country over time. This is because of their singular focus on the processes/institutions which do not lend themselves to easy or fair comparability across countries and sometimes not even within one country without conducting deeper analytical studies. There can be little disagreement that same processes and institutions can lead to divergent governance outcomes just as dissimilar processes could yield similar outcomes in two different countries. For example, anti-corruption agencies in countries with fair governance helps curtail corruption but in countries with poor governance prove either to be ineffective or worse a tool for corrupt practices and victimization (Shah, www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 3 2007). As another example, budget secrecy prior to its presentation to the parliament is just as important under parliamentary form of government as in Canada, UK, India, New Zealand, as open and participatory budget determination process is to presidential form of government as in the USA. There can be little disagreement that both types of processes have the potential to advance public interest but may succeed or fail in different country circumstances. During the past two decades, we have also seen that single party dominant political systems in China, Malaysia and Singapore have shown dramatic results in improving governance outcomes whereas pluralistic party systems have also shown positive results in other countries such as Brazil and India. Similarly monarchy has shown positive results in UK but unwelcome results in Nepal. Even similar electoral processes do not always lead to representative democracy and may instead yield aristocracy (elite capture) in some countries and corrupt oligarchies in others. In fact, Aristotle’s main argument for elections was based upon the premise that these would produce aristocracy, a form of government he considered superior to median voter rule (see Azfar, 2008). Andrews argues that such ”good governance picture of effective government ... constitutes a threat, promoting isomorphism, institutional dualism and ”flailing states” and imposing an inappropriate model of government that ”kicks away the ladder” today’s effective government climbed to reach their current state.”(p.2) In any case, such comparisons of processes and institutions out of their context are almost always ideologically driven and value laden and could not be acceptable as unbiased professional (scientific) judgments. This also explains that while citizens of Bangladesh, China, India and Malaysia over the last decade have experienced remarkable improvement in governance outcomes, available primary indicators fail to capture these accomplishments due to their focus on processes at the neglect of outcomes. Even for the world as a whole, the information revolution by letting the sun shine on government operations, has brought about dramatic improvements in government accountability, but the WGIs with their on one-size-fit all vision of the world, have consistently failed to notice or recognize such a mega change. These indicators rank China in the lowest percentile on voice and accountability but according to the former Auditor General of Canada, China has the most effective public accounts committee anywhere which has a track record of holding government to account for malfeasance (Dye, 2007). Furthermore local governments in China have relatively much larger role in public service provision than most countries. Local governments below the provincial level account for about 54% of consolidated public expenditures in China compared to about 4% in India and about 27% in OECD countries (see Shah and Shah, 2006). Thus having the decision making closer to people, directly elected local governments, and party oversight of local government performance - all work to create a system of voice and accountability that is quite unique to China and not easily comparable to other countries (see Qiao and Shah, 2006). China has also demonstrated superior government effectiveness through its unique and unparalleled success in alleviating poverty and improving the quality of life of its citizens over the past two decades. About two decades ago, China had about 35% of its population below poverty level compared to less than 2% in 2006 (see Shah and Shen, 2007). In conclusions comparisons of governance institutions requires deeper analytical work through in-depth comparative studies rather than aggregate indiwww.economics-ejournal.org 4Economics Discussion Paper cators. Such indicators are more usefully used to compare governance outcomes and complementary analytical studies of institutions and process can be used to explain varying outcomes. Of course, governance outcomes also assume commonly shared values but it is relatively less problematic than one-size fit-all prescriptions on processes. To have meaningful governance comparisons across countries and over time, one needs to have concepts which are somewhat invariant to time and place and are focused on citizens’ evaluations rather than interest groups’ views. To this end, we define governance as an exercise of authority and control to preserve and protect public interest and enhance the quality of life enjoyed by citizens. Note that this definition encompasses both the governance environment (quality of institutions and processes) as well as governance outcomes. 2.1 Towards a simple framework for assessing country governance quality Considering a neo-institutional perspective, various orders of government (agents) are created to serve, preserve, protect and promote public interest based upon the values and expectations of the citizens of a state (principals). Underlying assumption is that there is a widely shared notion of the public interest. In return, governments are given coercive powers to carry out their mandates. A stylized view of this public interest can be characterized by four dimensions of governance outcomes. •Responsive Governance. The fundamental task of governing is to promote and pursue collective interest while respecting formal (rule of law) and informal norms. This is done by government creating an enabling environment to do the right things - that is it promotes and delivers services consistent with citizen preferences. Further, the government carries out only the tasks that it is authorized to do that is it follows the compact authorized by citizens at large. •Fair (equitable) Governance. For peace, order and good government, the government mediates conflicting interests, is focused on consensus building and inclusiveness and ensures a sense of participation by all and protection of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged members of the society. •Responsible Governance. The government does it right i.e. governmental authority is carried out following due process with integrity (absence of corruption), with fiscal prudence, with concern for providing the best value for money and with a view to earning trust of the people. •Accountable Governance. Citizens can hold the government to account for all its actions. This requires that the government lets sunshine in on its operations and works to strengthen voice and exit options for principals. It also means that government truly respects the role of countervailing formal and informal institutions of accountability in governance. Given the focus on governance outcomes, Table 1 presents some preliminary ideas for discussion on how to operationalize these concepts in individual country assessments. www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 5 Table 1: Governance outcomes and relevant considerations Governance outcome Relevant considerations Responsive governance •public services consistent with citizen preferences; •direct possibly interactive democracy; •safety of life, liberty and property; •peace, order, rule of law; •freedom of choice and expression; •improvements in economic and social outcomes; •improvements in quantity, quality and access of public services; •improvements in quality of life; Fair governance •fulfillment of citizens’ values and expectations in relation to participation, social justice, and due process; •access of the poor, minorities and disadvantaged groups to basic public services; •non-discriminatory laws and enforcement; •egalitarian income distribution; •equal opportunity for all; Responsible governance •open, transparent and prudent economic, fiscal and financial management; •working better and costing less; •ensuring integrity of its operations; •earning trust; •managing risks; •competitive service delivery; •focus on results; Accountable governance •justice-able rights and due process; •access to justice, information; •judicial integrity and independence; •effective legislature and civil society oversight; •recall of officials and rollbacks of program possible; •effective limits to government intervention; •effective restraints to special interest capture. Source: Shah (2008) www.economics-ejournal.org 6Economics Discussion Paper The above simple framework captures most aspects of governance outcomes especially those relevant for development policy dialogue and can serve as a useful starting point for a consensus framework to be developed. In any event, there can be little disagreement that one cannot embark on measuring governance quality without first defining and defending an appropriate framework that measures governance - a point also emphasized by Thomas (2006) and the European Commission (see Nardo et al., 2005). Once a consensus framework is developed then one needs to focus on only a few key indicators that represent citizens’ evaluations and could be measurable with some degree of confidence in most countries of the world and could be defended for their transparency and reasonable degree of comparability and objectivity (see Andrews and Shah, 2005 for details and relevant indicators of an approach that emphasizes citizen-centric governance and Shah and Shah, 2006 for citizen-centered local governance and relevant indicators.) . Having an enormous number of indicators which could not be scrutinized, is nothing but a distinct disadvantage for a measure that aims for wider acceptance and confidence. Implementation of the above framework requires a worldwide survey with uniform questionnaire honing on the four dimensions of governance identified above across countries. Given that such a survey is not available and costly to commission, in the following section, we take a pragmatic approach based upon available survey data to develop rough indexes of governance quality. 3 Citizen-centric governance: Empirical framework Following Table 1, public interest is characterized by four dimensions of governance outcomes - responsive governance, fair governance, responsible governance, and accountable governance. Each of these categories is split further on sub-categories in order to characterize a concrete governance outcome (such as improvements in quality of life, safety, peace, etc.) Public opinion survey, with the questions assigned to each subcategory, should be used for the assessment of governance. The procedure of the assessment consists of the two main steps. First, data source - the raw data from inter-country public opinion survey - is chosen. The responses on questions in the survey, which characterize governance outcomes, are recorded. Second, the responses are aggregated in order to achieve governance index for each country from the sample. In what follows, we consider both steps in detail. 3.1 Data Reliable, comprehensive and consistent through time and space source of data is essential for qualitative estimation of citizen-centric governance indicators (CGIs). With an additional requirement of being publicly accessible and, preferably, free of charge, such data source hardly exists at present. There is a database of governancerelated questions included into different surveys across the world (Governance Surveys Database published by the World Bank). In principle, each of these questions www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 7 could be included into our estimation (questions taken separately from different polls) if the data is available. However, as the experiments in the construction of surveys suggest (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, for examples), even the small difference in the formulation of a question (assigned to the same sub-criterion) or the sequence of questions in a survey may bring significant discrepancies in the responses for the same country and same sub-criterion. Therefore, we decided to use only one data source, which covers sufficient amount of countries. Effectively it means, that almost the same questionnaire is used in all participating countries. The principal data source for our further analysis is the World Values Survey (WVS) project, conducted by WVS Association (see WVS, 2008). Table A2 shows its characteristics in comparison with other potential data sources. WVS provides an acceptable compromise of consistency and coverage for showing an initial picture of citizen-centric governance indicators. On the one hand, WVS publishes quite outdated information (with the time lag of 2-3 years after actual survey was taken), and only a few questions from this survey are relevant for our purposes (since the survey is about cultural values, not governance). On the other hand, WVS provides quite comprehensive geographical coverage (97 countries with all major economies included) combined with acceptable time coverage and questionnaire. The coding (which is used further in text and in the dataset) and questions assigned to each sub-criterion of governance are presented in the Table A1 of Appendix. As one can see, for a few sub-criteria, specified in the Table 1 of the paper, no survey questions are available. This is a drawback of WVS, as this survey was not constructed to evaluate governance. However, each governance outcome has a sufficient representation by questions in order to get reasonable estimates. Based on the data from WVS (questions from the Table A1 of Appendix), as well as from the other freely available data sources (AFR, ASB, TI GCB - see Table A2 for notation), a unique dataset was constructed, which can be used for the evaluation of citizen-centric governance indicators by any researcher. 421994 people’s responses (256152 of them by WVS) on 74 different questions (20 from WVS) are recorded in this dataset. 125 countries are covered, 97 of them by WVS. The records in the dataset can be sorted by the gender, income, education of a respondent, as well as by the sub national administrative unit of his/her residency. For the reasons explained above our main estimation procedure is based on 3 waves of the World Values Surveys depending on the year when the surveys were taken. Wave 1 includes countries surveyed from 1994 to 1998, wave 2 - from 1999 to 2004, and wave 3 - from 2004 to 2008. In addition to questions from WVS, in the wave 3 we also use one question about corruption from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (see TI, 2005). As an alternative to the WVS, we apply additional data sources in our estimation of citizen-centric governance indicators. In particular, in this paper we report the results when using Gallup World Poll data points, which are available freely from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (see WBI, 2008).24 questions from GWP are used in WGI. While this coverage is quite limited, yet it allows us to estimate 3 governance outcomes for a wide range of countries. 2Gallup World Poll, described in the Table A2, is itself very expensive (28 thousands US Dollars per year), and therefore cannot be used as a base for a rigorous, replicable research www.economics-ejournal.org 14 Economics Discussion Paper of Responsive Governance (till the ”happiness” point on the X-axis). When it comes to the questions about Responsive and Accountable Governance (confidence in parliament, government, press, TV, courts) the curve steeps down. The curve of the East Asian countries, while mostly above the world’s average, rises above the curve of EU-15 only in trust-related dimensions. Similar properties (though with somewhat lower averages) have the curves of Middle East and African countries (the curves are not depicted in the figure to keep at least some tractability). The curve of Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) is always below East Asian curve, as well as the world’s average. Particularly low (relative to others) citizens of CEE countries evaluate their confidence in police (”safety” on X-axis) and respect for human rights in their respective countries (”human rights” on the X-axis). The fact that people in the East Asia, Middle East and Africa trust their governments more than the people in developed countries of Western Europe and North America may not only reflect the overall public satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with governance outcomes. In depressed countries, it may also be the result of people’s fear to disclose their true opinion about government. Alternatively, when mass media in a country are controlled by the government, people in this country may be indoctrinated to believe and trust those on the top. In the Section 5.2 we analyze these possible effects and their magnitude for the countries from our sample. 4.2 Intertemporal comparison The consistent through time questionnaires of the WVS and repeated surveys during three waves allow us to assess the progress of the governance in certain countries. In particular, citizens of 41 country were surveyed both during the first wave of WVS (1994-98) and during the second wave (1999-2004). Surveys both from the second wave and the third wave (2005-2008) are available for 33 countries. In the Table 3 we report the countries, which achieved the biggest progress in each governance outcome (both from Wave 1 to Wave 2, and from Wave 2 to Wave 3). Not surprisingly, the list is dominated by the developing and the countries in transition - of 110 positions (10 governance outcomes plus CGIs themselves) only 14 are taken by developed countries (Spain and Germany between waves 1 and 2, and Japan between waves 2 and 3). These numbers clearly reflect the fact of life level increase and stable economic growth in certain parts of the world. Especially it concerns the speedy economic recovery of CEE countries after the horrible post-communist ”hangover” of the 90s. The most commonly mentioned countries are Nigeria, Venezuela, Latvia, Bangladesh, Moldova between waves 1 and 2, and Turkey, Russian Federation, Jordan, India and South Africa between waves 2 and 3. The governance in the world (over the sample of countries surveyed by WVS) statistically significantly (at the level of less than 1%) increased from wave 1 to wave 2 (see Figure 5) - in contrast to the WGI’s world of unchanging governance quality, - but practically did not change from wave 2 to wave 3. As it can be seen from the figure the main driver of the growth in world’s quality of governance was increasing (in practically all regions) satisfaction of the citizens with their financial situation. This trend was kept from wave 2 to wave 3 as well, but the overall www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 15 Table 3: CGI (WVS): top performers by the progress in time Governance outcome Top-performers: Wave 1 to Wave 2 Top-performers: Wave 2 to Wave 3 Total CGI Nigeria, Germany, Venezuela, Latvia, Finland Turkey, Russian Federation, Jordan, South Africa, India Responsive governance safety of life, order, rule of law Macedonia, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Venezuela, Latvia India, Morocco, Japan, China, Korea improvements in economic and social outcomes Venezuela, Moldova, Spain, Nigeria, Argentina Turkey, Jordan, Argentina, Korea, South Africa improvements in quality of life: general Estonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Venezuela, Slovenia Turkey, Jordan, Russian Federation Ukraine, Moldova improvements in quality of life: health Nigeria, South Africa, Mexico, Bangladesh, BiH Moldova, Jordan, Argentina, Indonesia, Morocco peace Bangladesh, Latvia, India, New Zealand, Macedonia Bulgaria, Italy, South Africa, Chile, Mexico Responsible governance earning trust: executive branch Venezuela, Nigeria, New Zealand, Spain, Albania Turkey, Iraq, South Africa, Argentina, Korea earning trust: legislative branch Nigeria, New Zealand, Venezuela, Spain, Germany Morocco, Turkey, South Africa, Korea, India Accountable governance access to information, independent mass media - press Bangladesh, Germany, Slovenia, Sweden, India Bulgaria, Morocco, Vietnam, Jordan, India access to information, independent mass media - television Albania, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Venezuela Morocco, Iraq, Vietnam, Jordan, Egypt judicial integrity and independence Macedonia, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Venezuela, Latvia India, Japan, Morocco, China, Turkey Note: Top performers - in each governance outcome (as defined in the Table A1) 5 countries with the biggest mean difference between corresponding waves www.economics-ejournal.org 16 Economics Discussion Paper Note: Progress in time for some governance outcomes and CGI in 4 regions. First 2 columns for each outcome compare wave 1 and wave 2 over common sample of countries, columns 3 and 4 compare wave 2 and wave 3 over common sample of countries. Governance outcomes included are: ”satisfaction with financial situation in the household”, ”peace” (confidence in the army), ”confidence in government”, and ”confidence in courts”. The regions: World - all countries in the samples, EU-15 - European Union members before the extension of 2004, CEE countries - Central and Eastern European Countries, East Asia - East Asian countries. Figure 5: CGI (WVS) waves 1-3: progress over time by regions www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 17 Note: left side - Germany, survey of 2006; right side - Italy, survey of 2006. The scale is common to both countries. Figure 6: Subnational CGI (WVS): examples progress was apparently mitigated by the fall of confidence in governments, courts, army, etc. in developing and countries in transition (though CEE countries still ended up progressing from wave 2 to wave 3). 4.3 Subnational CGIs Our estimation procedure as well as dataset collected allows us to extend citizencentric governance indicators from countries to their subnational units. The idea is to aggregate the citizens’ responses not over the whole country, but over it’s jurisdictions. For the Wave 3 of WVS there are 1121 of them in the sample - usually the second tier of a country’s administrative structure (in some countries - groups of second tier jurisdictions). The examples of some countries are given in the Figure 6. On the left we depict Germany, and on the right - Italy. Both countries were surveyed in 2006. In Germany rich industrial lands3of Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Saarland together with independent cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin are the most satisfied with their governments. At the same time, the scores are much lower in the poorer eastern part of the country - only in Sachsen-Anhalt citizen’s gave their government more than 0.55 (the score of the land is 0.56). Surprising are the average scores received by the governments of rich southern states - Baden-W¨urtemberg and Bayern. The relative correspondence between richness of a jurisdiction and it’s govern3L¨ander in German - second tier jurisdictions in the country www.economics-ejournal.org 18 Economics Discussion Paper ment’s score is also kept in Italy. Most regions of the rich country’s North score more than 0.55. At the same time, most of the poorer South - with the exception of Abruzzo, Molise, and Basilicata regions - is below 0.55. Subnational CGIs is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to assess governance at less aggregate than the country level. Analyzing these may prove to be helpful in empirical research on decentralization and governance, decentralization and welfare, difference between capital and non-capital regions, industrialized and rural regions, etc. 5 Robustness Combination of survey data with the simple aggregation procedure raises quite a few questions about the validity and reliability of our results. In this section we are trying to resolve some of them. First, we provide some arguments in favor of our aggregation procedure and overall analysis of the data. Second, we give a critical assessment of the data we have available. 5.1 Alternative aggregation techniques Transparency, simplicity and possibility to tailor the assessment procedure for one’s research agenda are the main reasons behind adopting our aggregation procedure - taking weighted averages of citizens’ responses. Besides, some questions are relatively more important and comprehensive for assessing governance, which cannot be detected by mechanized data mining algorithms. In addition, many of our findings and conclusions concern directly separate governance outcomes (responses on a separate question), which does not depend on aggregation procedure. Nevertheless, we use alternative aggregation techniques to test the robustness of our results. In particular, we apply uniform weights to our data, as well as we use averaging over percentile rankings (the way it is done in the Doing Business project - Djankov, 2007). Naturally, both methods produce slightly different rankings comparing to our main methodology. In particular, European countries lose some positions and East Asian countries gain - the result of increased reliance on the governance outcomes, which are related to trust and confidence in governmental institutions. However, only 11 of 51 countries in case of uniform weights (10 out of 51 in case of averaged percentile rankings) significantly change their standing (according to classification provided in the Figure 1, wave 3 - when country changes one of three categories). 5.2 Adjusting the data In our estimation we use survey data from countries around the world, and the public opinion in a country - especially about the issues related to the government - might be influenced by factors, which we would definitely like to account for. One of the factors is so-called ”intimidation” effect, when people are afraid to express their true - negative - opinion about their government, because they think they could be punished for that. Another factor, frequently mentioned in the literature, www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 19 is the ”indoctrination” effect, when mass media in a country praise the government so much, that it has a significant positive impact on public opinion. Another factor is the degree of citizen activism and perceived role of government in a country. In particular, Norris (1999) argues about the emergence in the 70s in developed countries of the class of so called ”critical citizens” - people, who were becoming more and more critical and demanding towards their governments despite their obvious successes. Taking into account 3 factors mentioned above (”intimidation”, ”indoctrination”, ”critical citizenship”) we conclude that in general a response on a question about governance outcome of an individual might be affected not only by the quality of governance in a country. The true model can be rewritten in the following way: sijk =αik +βkgi+γikintij +ηikindij +µikcr citik +ǫijk,(4) where similarly to the notation from Section , sijk is a response of an individual j in a country ion a question k,giis the quality of governance in a country i, , and ǫijk is a citizen-, countryand question-specific error. intij, indij, cr citij are the degrees of intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship of an individual jin a country i.γik, ηik and µik - depending on country and question - are the coefficients of our interest. The estimation of γik, ηik and µik is not possible from the model above, since we do not observe governance gi(this is in fact what we are trying to assess). However, the problem can be resolved if we note, that for some questions (governance outcomes) there are no effects of intimidation, indoctrination or critical citizenship, and for some there are. For instance, when an individual is asked about the satisfaction with her/his health, it is likely that she/he will not be intimidated to say true. At the same time, questions like ”Do you have confidence in your government?” are most probably subject to all above mentioned effects. Therefore, by taking the difference between the answers on these questions we can get rid of the governance on the right-hand side while intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship effects remain. The estimation model than become: diffij =1 K1 K1 X k=1 sijk−1 K2−K1 K2 X k=K1+1 sijk =α′ i+γiintij +µiindij +ηicr citij +ǫ′ ij,(5) where sijk, k = 1, .., K1are the citizens’ answers on the questions, which are exposed to the biasing effects (intimidation, indoctrination, critical citizenship), sijk, k = K1+ 1, .., K2are the answers on the questions with no role for above mentioned effects. Therefore, the left-hand side of our model is the difference between the averages of the two groups of questions (governance outcomes). Assuming that these groups of governance outcomes explain governance to the same degree (average βk’s are the same) we get rid of the quality of governance in the right-hand side, and can test for γik, ηik and µik directly. After taking into account these effects the www.economics-ejournal.org 20 Economics Discussion Paper estimator for the quality of governance can then be expressed as: gi=1 Ni Ni X j=1 K X k=1 wksijk − K X k=1 wk 1 Ni Ni X j=1 (γiintij +µiindij +ηicr citij) (6) giis now the weighted average of people’s responses (the formula we adopted in the main body of the paper) less the effects of intimidation, indoctrination and critical citizenship - averaged over all residents of a country surveyed and multiplied by the weight of the questions in the survey, which are exposed to these effects. We assume the following questions (governance outcomes) to be independent from the bias effects: •How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (improvements in economic and social outcomes) •All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (improvements in quality of life: general) •All in all, how would you describe your state of health today? (health) •How serious you consider poor water quality, air quality, sewage and sanitation to be here in your own community? (environment) •Taking all things together would you say you are [happy, unhappy]? (happiness) On the opposite, the following questions (governance outcomes) are assumed to be exposed to bias effects: •How much confidence do you have in government? (trust: executive branch) •How much confidence do you have in parliament? (trust: legislative branch) •How much confidence do you have in press? (trust: press) •How much confidence do you have in television? (trust: television) •How much confidence do you have in courts? (trust: courts) 5.2.1 Testing for the intimidation, indoctrination and ”critical citizenship” effects We use 2 types of estimation procedures to extract γi, ηiand µieffects of intimidation, indoctrination and ”critical citizenship” in a country i. First, we test for indoctrination (ηi) on an individual level, since there can hardly be any proxy for biasedness of mass-media (indoctrination) on a country-level. On a contrary, it is hard to come up with the proxies for personal intimidation and ”critical citizenship” (this effect was in fact defined only for countries as a whole). That is why we use country-level regressions to identify these effects. www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 21 As the proxy for indoctrination we take the frequency, with which an individual exposes heror himself to media - TV and press. Specifically, we use questions ”Did you watch TV during the last week?” and ”Did you read newspapers last week?” from the World Values Survey. The more people watch TV or read newspaper the more they are exposed to possible indoctrination (or excessive criticism of massmedia). The exact estimation model then becomes: diffij =α′ i+η1itvij +η2ipressij +θidemogrij +ǫ′ ij,(7) where tvij, pressij are the dummies for watching TV and reading newspapers last week (as it was posed in the questions of the survey), demogrij is a set of individual demographic variables (we take respondent’s education, income, age, marital status, political activism - participation in demonstrations, boycotts, signing petitions). We report the results in the Table 4. The main conclusion from it is that even though developing countries, especially those in Middle East and East Asia, seem to be indoctrinated, the mass media bias is also present in many developed countries - Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, France. This might be the outcome not of state monopoly (or dictate) on mass media, but of too optimistic or patriotic news coverage in these countries. The magnitude of the indoctrination effect ranges from 0.02 (except for Ukraine and Rwanda, where those who watch TV are actually more critical towards the government) to 0.12, which combined with on average 75% of respondents watching TV or reading newspaper, may lead for some countries to a decrease in our estimates of governance by 0.005-0.03 points.4 Intimidation and ”critical citizenship” effects are estimated on a country level. Specifically, as a proxy for the intimidation level in a country we use the average score of the country in the ”Freedom in the World” ranking - an annual publication of the Freedom House, where political and civil rights of the citizens are assessed. As for the ”critical citizenship” effect, we follow Pippa Norris (Norris, 1999) in her definition of a ”critical citizen”, and define the country to be in the stage of ”critical citizenship” if it had been classified ”free” by the Freedom House for at least ten years before the survey was conducted (long period of stable democracy), and the GDP per capita in this country (taken from IMF) was more than 10 thousands US dollars (wealthy population). Most OECD countries together with Slovenia and Chile enter the group. The estimation model than becomes: diffi=α+γfreedomi+µcr citi+θdemogri+ǫi,(8) where freedomiis an index of Freedom House, cr citiis the ”critical citizenship” dummy defined above, and demogriis a set of demographical country-specific variables (average level of education, share of married population, share of males, average age). The estimation results are presented in the Table 5. As one can see from the table, both freedom of the county and its being in the stage of ”critical citizenship” are highly statistically significant in explaining biases on responses on trust-related questions in the WVS surveys. The directions of the effects are what would be intu4Note that our estimates of governance are assessed on a scale from 0 to 1. www.economics-ejournal.org 22 Economics Discussion Paper Table 4: Mass media bias in public opinion Media bias, magnitude (η1i, η2i)TV Press 0.08 - 0.12 Japan, Mexico, India, Slovenia, Cyprus, Ethiopia Thailand, Cyprus 0.04 - 0.08 Sweden, Switzerland, Brazil, Turkey, Peru, Moldova, Indonesia, Vietnam, Serbia, Egypt, Andorra, Burkina Faso, Zambia, France Jordan, Malaysia 0.02-0.04 China USA, Mexico, Brazil, Romania, Egypt ≈0 Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Republic of Korea, Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom -0.08 - -0.02 Ukraine, Rwanda Indonesia Note: First column - ranges for point OLS estimates are reported. For each range, only the countries, for which coefficients are different from 0 at a significance level less than 5%, are reported. ”≈0” range - countries with no significant TV or press bias. Sample of the countries used - WVS wave 3 (except Iran, Iraq, Hong Kong, New Zealand, where questions about mass media were not asked) www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 23 Table 5: Effects of indoctrination and ”critical citizenship” Dependent variable - diff Coef. Std. Err. P>t 95% conf. int. freedom −0.03∗∗∗ 0.007 0.000 -0.05 -0.02 cr cit 0.09∗∗∗ 0.025 0.001 0.04 0.14 F(6,157) 17.65 Prob¿F 0.00 R-squared 0.4 Adj. R-squared 0.38 No. of observations 164 Note: *** - significant at less than 1% level. Method of estimation - OLS. Sample - countries surveyed by World Values Survey during all 3 waves. itively foreseen. In the Freedom House ranking a country has the higher score the less civil and political rights it’s citizens have: 1 is the best score, 7 is the worst. Therefore, negative γin our estimation means that the intimidation effect plays a greater role in less free countries. 1 score up in the Freedom House ranking of a country makes the citizens of this country to be more cautious in answering governmentrelated questions in a survey, and consequently overestimate their governments in trust-related questions by 0.03 points. For a completely depressed country (with the score 7) the effect on our governance estimate would be -0.07 points. From the other side, residents of the countries, which are in a stage of ”critical citizenship”, do have significantly less confidence in their governments then they should have had. If not too ”critical”, residents of these countries would give their governments score 0.09 points higher, which would be reflected in the increase of citizen-centric indicator on about 0.03. Even though we find statistically significant effects of indoctrination, intimidation and ”critical citizenship” in some countries, the magnitude of these effects is not particularly immense. For example, Vietnam with our score of 0.72 is not a free country based on criteria of Freedom House (it had rank 6 in 2005), and there is a moderate (0.05) effect of indoctrination on television. Together these effects would cut citizen-centric governance indicator in Vietnam by 0.07 points. New indicator would be 0.65 - still in the highest 20th percentile of the sample. Apparently, there are other reasons for some governments to score so high in the public opinion polls. In case of East Asia the main of them is probably last decade’s stable economic growth and development in the region (as it is argued for China by Wang, 2005). At the same time, poor economic performance, political conflicts and corruption in the 90s (and for many countries up until today) in Central and Eastern European countries keep the scores the governments in this regions extremely low. www.economics-ejournal.org 30 Economics Discussion Paper Table A2: Existing sources of data and their main features Name Code Geographical coverage Years Freq., y. Data access Relevancy Num. Region Free Lag, y. World Values Survey WVS 97 worldwide 19942008 3-6 yes 2-3 average Afrobarometer AFR 20 Sub-Saharan Africa 20012008 3 yes 1-2 high Asiabarometer ASB 25 East Asia 20032006 2 yes 1-2 high Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey BEEPS 26 Central and Eastern Europe 19992005 3 yes 1-2 low Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer TI GCB 62 worldwide 20042008 1 yes <1 very low Latinobarometro LBO 18 Latin America 20042007 1 no 1 high Eurobarometer EUB 30 Europe 19732008 0.5 yes <1 very high Gallup World Poll GWP 130 worldwide 20072008 1 no n.a. n.a. GWP - datapoints from World Bank Institute (WBI) (2008) GWP WGI 119 worldwide 2007 1 yes 0 low Note: Number - the total number of countries, which participated in all waves of survey; Freq. - average time period in years, in which a country is surveyed; Lag - the time period in years between taking a survey and posting data; Relevancy - correspondence of questions in a questionnaire to the subcriteria of governance from the Table 1, given on the scale: very low-low-average-high-very high. www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 31 Table A3: Citizen-centric governance indicators: aggregate and disaggregate data by country, waves 1-3 country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 WAVE 1 Albania 1998 999 38 65 .. .. 40 42 75 .. 56 .. .. 81 46 54 21 .. 38 33 39 65 83 45 0.6 Azerbaijan 1997 2002 42 46 52 .. 40 49 66 .. 53 .. 58 86 77 64 22 .. 42 36 40 46 100 48 0.6 Argentina 1995 1079 35 32 .. .. 44 66 68 .. 32 .. .. 81 33 26 12 .. 35 41 36 32 83 42 0.8 Australia 1995 2048 43 63 .. .. 60 73 77 .. 59 .. .. 90 36 40 32 .. 43 32 38 63 83 55 0.7 Bangladesh 1996 1525 74 42 .. .. 56 60 62 .. 56 .. .. 92 70 72 60 .. 74 61 59 42 83 62 0.7 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 1200 48 68 .. .. 40 50 66 .. 77 .. .. 80 63 53 43 .. 48 50 54 68 83 53 0.8 Brazil 1997 1149 49 40 .. .. 50 68 73 .. 63 .. .. 82 43 31 25 .. 49 53 49 40 83 52 1.1 Bulgaria 1997 1072 36 49 .. .. 29 41 64 .. 72 .. .. 77 54 45 27 .. 36 46 60 49 83 43 0.8 Belarus 1996 2092 22 40 29 .. 25 37 51 .. 65 .. 34 68 50 35 17 .. 22 44 47 40 100 34 0.5 Chile 1996 1000 51 49 .. .. 55 66 67 .. 53 .. .. 81 50 40 32 .. 51 48 51 49 83 54 0.8 China 1995 1500 .. .. .. .. 57 65 74 .. .. .. .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32 63 2.7 Colombia 1997 6025 31 48 .. .. 78 81 75 .. 57 .. .. 94 39 30 21 .. 31 46 49 48 83 54 0.8 Croatia 1996 1196 44 56 .. .. 40 58 63 .. 67 .. .. 75 51 46 34 .. 44 36 36 56 83 49 0.8 Czech rep. 1998 1147 35 45 .. .. 46 60 63 .. 44 .. .. 73 37 30 18 .. 35 45 48 45 83 45 0.7 Dominican rep. 1996 417 17 28 .. .. 53 68 73 .. 41 .. .. 89 27 27 8 .. 17 43 46 28 83 40 0.8 Estonia 1996 1021 30 47 43 .. 33 44 57 .. 46 .. 43 63 48 44 15 .. 30 51 58 47 100 41 0.5 Finland 1996 987 42 69 .. .. 63 75 74 .. 68 .. .. 78 40 40 28 .. 42 40 50 69 83 57 0.6 Georgia 1996 2008 30 37 31 .. 23 41 62 .. 48 .. 32 86 45 39 6 .. 30 52 53 37 100 36 0.6 Germany 1997 2026 38 54 52 .. 58 66 66 .. 45 .. 53 53 32 35 29 .. 38 31 35 54 100 49 0.5 Hungary 1998 650 40 52 .. .. 44 54 60 .. 54 .. .. 80 44 42 18 .. 40 37 44 52 83 46 0.7 India 1995 2040 41 43 .. .. 57 61 67 .. 73 .. .. 88 52 56 29 .. 41 57 53 43 83 52 1.0 www.economics-ejournal.org 32 Economics Discussion Paper Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 Japan 1995 1054 28 63 .. .. 59 62 65 .. 56 .. .. 62 40 37 23 .. 28 59 58 63 83 50 0.5 Korea, rep. 1996 1249 42 49 .. .. 52 .. 73 .. 61 .. .. .. 47 39 17 .. 42 57 55 49 66 47 0.8 Latvia 1996 1200 30 37 32 .. 29 43 56 .. 36 .. 36 59 40 33 4 .. 30 48 52 37 100 36 0.5 Lithuania 1997 1009 29 34 38 .. 34 44 59 .. 45 .. 35 60 44 39 10 .. 29 58 60 34 100 38 0.5 Macedonia 1998 995 28 36 .. .. 41 52 71 .. 46 .. .. 86 28 25 26 .. 28 33 36 36 83 39 0.9 Mexico 1996 2364 33 35 .. .. 69 73 65 .. 54 .. .. 87 42 44 29 .. 33 49 48 35 83 51 0.8 Moldova 1996 984 27 37 26 .. 23 30 51 .. 53 .. 30 70 43 41 17 .. 27 41 47 37 100 32 0.6 New Zealand 1998 1201 31 68 .. .. 61 74 78 .. 56 .. .. 87 30 30 22 .. 31 41 44 68 83 52 0.7 Nigeria 1995 1996 29 32 .. .. 52 62 76 .. 46 .. .. 81 33 32 11 .. 29 56 58 32 83 44 1.1 Norway 1996 1127 64 67 .. .. 64 74 78 .. 60 .. .. 80 57 58 72 .. 64 42 49 67 83 65 0.5 Pakistan 1997 733 .. 33 .. .. 41 .. 69 .. 92 .. .. 94 .. .. .. .. .. 54 59 33 38 51 1.3 Peru 1996 1211 49 34 .. .. 46 60 64 .. 50 .. .. 92 46 28 57 .. 49 42 45 34 83 49 1.0 Philippines 1996 1200 47 54 .. .. 56 65 66 .. 62 .. .. 89 55 56 41 .. 47 65 64 54 83 57 0.9 Poland 1997 1153 40 51 .. .. 37 60 56 .. 67 .. .. 89 43 40 20 .. 40 48 49 51 83 47 0.8 Puerto Rico 1995 1164 48 55 .. .. 66 79 72 .. 59 .. .. 95 52 37 39 .. 48 52 45 55 83 59 0.9 Romania 1998 1239 27 43 .. .. 32 43 64 .. 72 .. .. 76 32 31 20 .. 27 41 49 43 83 38 0.8 Russian federation 1995 2040 17 36 .. .. 26 38 50 .. 63 .. .. 65 32 31 7 .. 17 43 47 36 83 31 0.7 Serbia and Montenegro 1996 1520 36 46 .. .. 34 52 63 .. 58 .. .. 71 41 39 31 .. 36 35 36 46 83 43 0.9 Slovakia 1998 1095 41 43 .. .. 40 56 62 .. 58 .. .. 77 44 37 34 .. 41 46 49 43 83 46 0.7 Slovenia 1995 1007 40 49 .. .. 48 61 59 .. 47 .. .. 84 45 35 22 .. 40 46 52 49 83 48 0.7 South Africa 1996 2935 48 65 .. .. 42 56 75 .. 52 .. .. 92 59 58 56 .. 48 52 58 65 83 55 1.1 www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 33 Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 Spain 1995 1211 29 54 .. .. 52 62 70 .. 44 .. .. 85 37 40 33 .. 29 46 44 54 83 47 0.7 Sweden 1996 1009 45 65 .. .. 58 75 78 .. 52 .. .. 78 45 47 41 .. 45 39 50 65 83 57 0.6 Switzerland 1996 1212 54 58 .. .. 70 78 79 .. 47 .. .. 67 49 45 39 .. 54 35 40 58 83 59 0.6 Taiwan 1994 780 44 54 .. .. 57 62 64 .. 62 .. .. 60 58 48 48 .. 44 46 50 54 83 54 0.6 Turkey 1996 1907 34 61 .. .. 47 58 68 .. 86 .. .. 90 43 45 20 .. 34 49 48 61 83 49 0.9 Ukraine 1996 2811 21 39 25 .. 22 33 50 .. 60 .. 27 60 43 39 12 .. 21 44 47 39 100 31 0.5 UK 1998 1093 .. .. .. .. .. 73 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 73 4.7 USA 1995 1542 45 61 .. .. 62 74 78 .. 72 .. .. 92 41 40 27 .. 45 39 39 61 83 56 0.7 Uruguay 1996 1000 35 49 .. .. 64 68 74 .. 37 .. .. 89 41 41 23 .. 35 53 51 49 83 51 0.9 Venezuela 1996 1200 19 34 .. .. 44 64 76 .. 59 .. .. 97 31 28 16 .. 19 57 53 34 83 42 1.1 WAVE 2 Albania 2002 1000 26 58 34 .. 42 46 74 .. 51 .. 41 89 54 45 35 .. 26 40 52 58 100 44 0.7 Algeria 2002 1282 32 60 41 .. 55 52 62 .. 63 .. 38 89 49 34 13 .. 32 47 45 60 100 47 0.9 Argentina 1999 1280 33 32 44 .. 50 70 71 .. 35 .. 34 85 28 23 10 .. 33 44 40 32 100 45 0.7 Austria 1999 1522 .. 64 60 .. .. 78 .. .. 45 .. 63 81 .. 46 .. .. .. 41 .. 64 60 66 0.9 Bangladesh 2002 1500 62 51 62 .. 51 53 66 .. 68 .. 61 90 76 78 44 .. 62 75 69 51 100 59 0.6 Belgium 1999 1912 .. 50 44 .. .. 71 .. .. 41 .. 56 64 .. 41 .. .. .. 41 .. 50 60 56 1.1 Bosnia and herzegovina 2001 1200 35 57 39 .. 43 53 71 .. 58 .. 39 66 39 34 19 .. 35 38 42 57 100 45 0.7 Bulgaria 1999 1000 .. 47 37 .. .. 50 .. .. 54 .. 40 67 .. 36 .. .. .. 37 .. 47 60 45 1.5 Belarus 2000 1000 .. 43 37 .. .. 42 .. .. 61 .. 41 63 .. 40 .. .. .. 44 .. 43 60 43 1.3 Canada 2000 1931 53 68 57 .. 65 76 80 .. 59 .. 68 87 44 43 47 .. 53 42 44 68 100 63 0.6 Chile 2000 1200 55 53 53 .. 52 68 71 .. 48 .. 54 87 53 39 35 .. 55 47 51 53 100 56 0.7 China 2001 1000 59 60 65 .. 52 61 70 .. 80 .. 73 68 79 76 83 .. 59 59 62 60 100 64 0.6 Croatia 1999 1003 .. 47 31 .. .. 63 .. .. 56 .. 51 74 .. 33 .. .. .. 31 .. 47 60 50 1.2 www.economics-ejournal.org 34 Economics Discussion Paper Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 Czech rep. 1999 1908 .. 43 42 .. .. 67 .. .. 39 .. 56 69 .. 28 .. .. .. 44 .. 43 60 53 1.0 Denmark 1999 1023 .. 72 59 .. .. 80 .. .. 55 .. 78 80 .. 49 .. .. .. 41 .. 72 60 70 0.8 Egypt 2000 3000 77 78 77 .. 47 48 70 .. 59 .. 63 94 55 62 31 .. 77 62 61 78 100 62 1.1 El Salvador 1999 1254 .. 51 .. .. 59 72 71 .. 49 .. .. 93 43 35 26 .. .. 48 52 51 70 58 1.3 Estonia 1999 1005 .. 41 42 .. .. 55 .. .. 42 .. 52 60 .. 37 .. .. .. 45 .. 41 60 48 1.1 Finland 2000 1038 .. 73 53 .. .. 76 .. .. 69 .. 75 83 .. 46 .. .. .. 43 .. 73 60 68 0.7 France 1999 1615 .. 57 48 .. .. 67 .. .. 55 .. 54 75 .. 40 .. .. .. 38 .. 57 60 57 1.1 Germany 1999 2036 .. 59 59 .. .. 71 .. .. 49 .. 62 63 .. 41 .. .. .. 42 .. 59 60 61 0.9 Greece 1999 1142 .. 36 51 .. .. 63 .. .. 59 .. 58 80 .. 33 .. .. .. 37 .. 36 60 53 1.1 Hungary 1999 1000 .. 44 40 .. .. 53 .. .. 45 .. 52 79 .. 38 .. .. .. 36 .. 44 60 48 1.3 Iceland 1999 968 .. 68 55 .. .. 78 .. .. 42 .. 72 88 .. 61 .. .. .. 44 .. 68 60 68 0.7 India 2001 2002 52 42 56 .. 44 46 68 .. 84 .. 65 87 53 52 34 .. 52 64 65 42 100 52 0.7 Indonesia 2001 1004 36 52 40 .. 61 66 70 .. 63 .. 59 80 52 46 30 .. 36 53 56 52 100 54 0.6 Iran 2000 2532 59 56 55 .. 53 60 75 .. .. .. 61 95 62 63 51 .. 59 44 50 56 97 58 0.8 Iraq 2004 2325 .. .. .. .. 49 47 74 .. 55 .. 39 90 40 .. 30 .. .. .. 54 .. 60 48 1.6 Ireland 1999 1012 .. 73 56 .. .. 80 .. .. 58 .. 67 91 .. 41 .. .. .. 44 .. 73 60 69 0.9 Israel 2001 1199 .. .. .. .. .. 67 .. .. .. .. .. 78 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 68 4.9 Italy 1999 2000 .. 59 42 .. .. 69 .. .. 51 .. 56 75 .. 41 .. .. .. 42 .. 59 60 58 1.0 Japan 2000 1362 28 49 45 .. 57 61 65 .. 57 .. 54 59 37 34 16 .. 28 59 58 49 100 49 0.5 Jordan 2001 1223 63 83 59 .. 44 51 76 .. 85 .. 62 89 78 62 31 .. 63 59 57 83 100 60 0.7 Korea, rep. 2001 1200 39 49 42 .. 53 58 73 .. 57 .. 47 64 40 24 12 .. 39 56 56 49 100 48 0.6 Kyrgyzstan 2003 1043 38 29 39 .. 52 61 67 .. 53 .. 38 74 38 38 17 .. 38 46 51 29 100 45 0.8 Latvia 1999 1013 .. 42 40 .. .. 47 .. .. 47 .. 50 73 .. 35 .. .. .. 46 .. 42 60 46 1.3 Lithuania 1999 1018 .. 37 35 .. .. 47 .. .. 48 .. 31 55 .. 27 .. .. .. 60 .. 37 60 41 1.4 Luxembourg 1999 1211 .. 60 64 .. .. 76 .. .. 50 .. 73 77 .. 54 .. .. .. 46 .. 60 60 67 0.9 www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 35 Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 Macedonia 2001 1055 26 48 27 .. 38 46 72 .. 51 .. 36 78 20 17 7 .. 26 33 35 48 100 37 0.9 Malta 1999 1002 .. 59 64 .. .. 80 .. .. 62 .. 62 91 .. 49 .. .. .. 40 .. 59 60 67 0.8 Mexico 2000 1535 44 34 42 .. 63 79 70 .. 53 .. 48 91 39 28 27 .. 44 45 47 34 100 53 0.8 Moldova 2002 1008 31 38 27 .. 34 40 50 .. 54 .. 31 60 39 38 9 .. 31 46 49 38 100 36 0.6 Morocco 2001 2264 46 51 44 .. 49 56 77 .. 66 .. 42 95 54 25 23 .. 46 41 36 51 100 49 0.9 Netherlands 1999 1003 .. 57 59 .. .. 76 .. .. 44 .. 70 65 .. 51 .. .. .. 53 .. 57 60 65 0.6 New Zealand 2004 954 .. 63 .. .. 63 77 72 .. 62 79 69 89 45 42 .. .. .. 37 43 48 73 63 0.7 Nigeria 2000 2022 59 39 57 .. 59 65 87 .. 49 .. 56 87 49 47 28 .. 59 62 68 39 100 57 0.8 Pakistan 2001 2000 43 35 27 .. 28 43 69 .. 79 .. 53 93 42 68 11 .. 43 55 55 35 100 43 0.5 Peru 2001 1501 45 33 45 .. 46 60 64 .. 37 .. 46 90 35 28 43 .. 45 39 40 33 100 47 0.7 Philippines 2001 1200 49 58 47 .. 53 63 67 .. 65 .. 71 94 51 57 39 .. 49 63 65 58 100 58 0.8 Poland 1999 1095 .. 55 44 .. .. 58 .. .. 62 .. 51 89 .. 40 .. .. .. 50 .. 55 60 54 1.5 Portugal 1999 1000 .. 58 62 .. .. 67 .. .. 61 .. 57 91 .. 47 .. .. .. 57 .. 58 60 62 1.0 Puerto Rico 2001 720 47 57 54 .. 72 83 75 .. 55 .. 53 98 49 39 48 .. 47 48 39 57 100 62 0.7 Romania 1999 1146 .. 47 32 .. .. 47 .. .. 72 .. 36 77 .. 28 .. .. .. 45 .. 47 60 44 1.6 Russian Federation 1999 2500 .. 34 19 .. .. 41 .. .. 61 .. 25 65 .. 27 .. .. .. 36 .. 34 60 35 1.4 Saudi Arabia 2003 1502 .. .. .. .. 69 70 84 .. .. .. 62 89 .. .. 41 .. .. 60 63 .. 58 67 1.5 Serbia and Montenegro 2001 2260 38 43 41 .. 33 51 65 .. 58 .. 48 65 36 33 29 .. 38 36 39 43 100 43 0.7 Singapore 2002 1512 71 .. .. .. 63 69 .. .. .. .. .. 82 .. .. 77 .. 71 .. .. .. 53 69 1.2 Slovakia 1999 1331 .. 45 33 .. .. 56 .. .. 62 .. 53 65 .. 42 .. .. .. 47 .. 45 60 50 1.2 Slovenia 1999 1006 .. 50 45 .. .. 69 .. .. 45 .. 45 81 .. 36 .. .. .. 57 .. 50 60 56 1.1 www.economics-ejournal.org 36 Economics Discussion Paper Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 South Africa 2001 3000 44 56 48 .. 45 59 81 .. 51 .. 51 86 51 49 32 .. 44 53 61 56 100 53 0.9 Spain 1999.52409 46 53 56 .. 58 67 72 .. 44 .. 58 81 46 48 40 .. 46 45 43 53 100 56 0.6 Sweden 1999 1015 44 62 52 .. .. 74 .. .. 47 .. 63 76 .. 50 .. .. 44 48 .. 62 74 60 0.7 Tanzania 2001 1171 53 63 63 .. 28 32 70 .. 86 .. 67 91 78 74 52 .. 53 70 72 63 100 54 1.1 Turkey 2001 4607 34 62 25 .. 37 51 68 .. 80 .. 28 82 43 39 17 .. 34 34 37 62 100 43 0.9 Uganda 2001 1002 55 56 58 .. 43 52 73 .. 71 .. 60 85 72 69 50 .. 55 63 62 56 100 57 0.8 UK 1999 1000 .. 60 50 .. .. 71 .. .. 69 .. 59 79 .. 42 .. .. .. 26 .. 60 60 60 1.0 Ukraine 1999 1195 .. 36 27 .. .. 40 .. .. 61 .. 31 57 .. 33 .. .. .. 46 .. 36 60 38 1.5 USA 1999 1200 55 62 56 .. 61 74 81 .. 71 .. 62 89 44 44 37 .. 55 38 38 62 100 60 0.6 Venezuela 2000 1200 54 41 57 .. 58 72 .. .. 59 .. 49 97 53 36 63 .. 54 59 58 41 97 58 0.9 Vietnam 2001 1000 80 82 86 .. 55 61 66 .. 88 .. 86 92 91 91 91 .. 80 72 78 82 100 75 0.5 Zimbabwe 2001 1002 36 61 37 .. 24 33 72 .. 58 .. 36 88 52 50 18 .. 36 55 57 61 100 41 0.9 WAVE 3 Andorra 2005 1003 .. 53 .. 49 59 68 72 44 .. 73 60 75 41 .. .. .. .. 43 41 41 88 58 1.4 Argentina 2006 1002 .. 31 .. 67 61 75 70 16 38 73 44 87 41 25 .. 20 .. 41 39 30 100 52 1.1 Australia 2005 1421 .. 69 .. 68 59 70 66 45 69 76 64 88 44 42 .. .. .. 30 35 51 94 60 0.8 Brazil 2006 1500 .. 43 .. 58 54 74 67 37 62 75 47 72 45 29 .. .. .. 43 41 47 94 57 0.8 Bulgaria 2006 1001 .. 51 .. 37 34 47 52 22 64 53 35 73 38 29 .. 14 .. 48 58 40 100 41 0.7 Burkina Faso 2007 1534 .. 51 .. 52 41 51 65 10 61 67 54 94 48 41 .. .. .. 52 55 47 94 51 0.7 Chile 2005 1000 .. 54 .. 66 52 68 57 39 55 69 49 84 46 32 .. .. .. 45 47 35 94 55 1.8 China 2007 2015 .. 67 .. 64 55 64 59 56 75 65 71 65 77 77 .. 22 .. 62 63 68 100 62 0.6 Colombia 2005 3025 .. 48 .. 59 .. 81 64 .. 58 78 45 96 49 31 .. 25 .. 44 47 39 82 58 0.7 Cyprus 2006 1050 .. 58 .. 64 62 71 71 28 63 74 58 80 51 49 .. .. .. 40 42 61 94 61 1.5 www.economics-ejournal.org Economics Discussion Paper 37 Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 Egypt 2008 3051 .. .. .. .. 43 53 58 3 .. 64 .. 91 .. .. .. .. .. 56 67 .. 61 51 1.7 Ethiopia 2007 1500 .. 40 .. 36 43 44 60 14 47 63 38 88 36 35 .. 28 .. 35 36 37 100 42 0.6 Finland 2005 1014 .. 75 .. 71 67 76 62 69 71 74 81 83 56 52 .. 47 .. 42 50 67 100 67 0.6 France 2006 1001 .. 59 .. 62 57 66 66 .. 57 75 .. 72 34 39 .. 21 .. 40 38 40 86 55 0.8 Germany 2006 2064 .. 61 .. 61 56 68 64 69 49 67 61 62 33 33 .. 29 .. 39 41 53 100 56 1.8 Ghana 2007 1534 .. 53 .. 83 46 57 71 29 69 75 72 97 65 60 .. 29 .. 56 65 60 100 60 0.7 Hong Kong 2005 1252 .. 65 .. .. 57 60 55 .. 52 63 64 54 53 50 .. 29 .. 55 59 .. 81 57 0.5 India 2006 2001 .. 60 .. 61 48 53 61 27 76 67 73 89 54 60 .. 27 .. 69 67 65 100 57 0.7 Indonesia 2006 2015 .. 50 .. 61 58 66 64 27 64 73 63 79 54 43 .. 22 .. 52 57 51 100 57 0.5 Iran 2007 2667 .. 57 .. 47 56 60 60 14 59 65 43 84 53 49 .. .. .. 44 51 51 94 53 0.6 Iraq 2006 2701 .. .. .. .. 41 38 57 .. 60 47 35 93 56 .. .. .. .. .. 65 .. 65 46 1.3 Italy 2005 1012 .. 63 .. 53 61 65 63 55 59 69 52 77 36 39 .. 17 .. 37 32 50 100 54 0.4 Japan 2005 1096 .. 57 .. 65 57 67 53 49 61 73 51 60 38 34 .. .. .. 60 59 66 94 59 0.4 Jordan 2007 1200 .. 85 .. 75 60 68 76 19 88 72 65 90 81 61 .. .. .. 64 65 83 94 67 2.4 Korea, rep. 2005 1200 .. 53 .. 60 51 60 64 49 51 66 58 69 46 35 .. 12 .. 56 57 48 100 53 3.2 Malaysia 2006 1201 .. 64 .. 67 61 65 72 37 71 77 64 88 67 60 .. 31 .. 58 62 68 100 63 0.4 Mali 2007 1534 .. 64 .. 67 53 57 62 16 76 73 72 96 65 55 .. .. .. 56 62 61 94 61 0.8 Mexico 2005 1560 .. 36 .. 62 68 80 61 35 59 83 53 92 45 31 .. 21 .. 48 47 40 100 59 0.7 Moldova 2006 1046 .. 32 .. 45 42 49 51 21 41 49 33 60 37 34 .. 29 .. 43 49 35 100 41 0.6 Morocco 2007 1200 .. 58 .. 44 44 47 70 13 63 68 56 83 54 47 .. .. .. 51 55 60 94 52 0.5 Netherlands 2006 1050 .. 53 .. 62 65 75 65 .. 45 78 .. 69 36 38 .. 49 .. 39 42 46 86 60 1.6 Peru 2008 1500 .. 29 .. 51 52 67 50 15 35 65 33 .. 26 22 .. 12 .. 33 34 21 98 43 0.7 Poland 2005 1000 .. 48 .. 52 46 67 54 29 60 71 55 86 31 27 .. 14 .. 45 46 40 100 50 0.7 Romania 2005 1776 .. 43 .. 53 42 53 50 44 70 52 40 73 33 28 .. .. .. 47 51 36 94 46 0.7 www.economics-ejournal.org 38 Economics Discussion Paper Table A3: (continued) country year N A B C D prec CGI var 11 21 31 37 41 51 61 74 81 91 11 21 11 19 21 24 31 11 18 21 Russian Federation 2006 2033 .. 37 .. 37 41 57 44 .. 60 58 .. 75 44 34 .. 26 .. 40 45 40 86 46 1.1 Rwanda 2007 1507 .. 76 .. .. 38 44 40 32 .. 65 .. 92 .. 69 .. .. .. 62 55 70 74 54 0.7 Serbia 2006 1220 .. 39 .. 46 42 56 54 18 49 56 33 78 34 30 .. .. .. 33 33 35 94 43 0.6 Slovenia 2005 1037 .. 43 .. 54 59 69 55 59 42 66 49 82 36 31 .. .. .. 39 43 39 94 55 0.5 South Africa 2007 2988 .. 57 .. 71 52 67 70 26 58 72 63 91 64 60 .. 27 .. 56 65 60 100 60 4.2 Spain 2007 1200 .. 55 .. 71 54 70 65 .. 50 68 56 84 46 49 .. 48 .. 45 41 52 94 59 0.5 Sweden 2006 1003 .. 63 .. 73 67 75 70 83 48 80 67 76 45 52 .. .. .. 41 51 62 94 68 1.0 Switzerland 2007 1241 .. 66 .. 74 76 78 72 59 49 79 74 74 57 51 .. 43 .. 42 41 63 100 67 1.5 Taiwan 2006 1227 .. 43 .. 66 56 62 68 57 44 68 58 54 38 25 .. 7 .. 30 28 42 100 51 1.3 Thailand 2007 1534 .. 46 .. 67 62 69 65 50 52 77 68 95 45 43 .. 26 .. 49 51 64 100 61 0.5 Trinidad and Tobago 2006 1002 .. 38 .. 57 57 70 68 56 46 79 39 96 37 31 .. .. .. 35 38 41 94 57 1.4 Turkey 2007 1346 .. 66 .. 55 55 72 59 18 82 73 41 93 59 56 .. 23 .. 36 38 68 100 56 0.9 UK 2006 1041 .. 62 .. 61 64 73 67 .. 67 81 .. 81 39 41 .. 33 .. 28 39 55 86 61 1.3 Ukraine 2006 1000 .. 38 .. 35 40 52 46 19 52 61 37 67 35 30 .. 23 .. 46 49 37 100 43 1.2 USA 2006 1249 .. 61 .. 59 54 70 69 37 71 76 59 85 44 36 .. 25 .. 37 38 53 100 56 2.3 Vietnam 2006 1495 .. 85 .. 77 59 68 54 41 93 72 79 93 93 92 .. .. .. 81 87 84 94 73 0.4 Zambia 2007 1500 .. 49 .. 63 49 56 64 37 55 59 51 83 47 44 .. .. .. 51 55 52 94 54 0.8 Note: The table presents citizen-centric governance indicators for all countries and waves of surveys as well as mean responses by each question used in estimation. The data source for all (but C24) questions is World Values Survey (WVS, 2008). Question C24 was taken from Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (TI, 2005). year - year of the survey. Nnumber of respondents. Columns 4 to 23 - mean responses to each question used in our estimation, the coding corresponds to the coding used in our dataset. prec - weights-adjusted amount of questions actually asked in a country during a survey (some questions were not asked in some countries), weights for each question are given in the Table A1. CGI - citizen-centric governance indicators, point estimates. var - estimates of variance of CGIs. All numbers are given in percentages (including variance). www.economics-ejournal.org Please note: You are most sincerely encouraged to participate in the open assessment of this discussion paper. You can do so by posting your comments. Please go to: http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2009-27 The Editor © Author(s) 2009. 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