Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State

Di Muzio, Tim; Dow, Matt Article — Published Version Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences Provided in Cooperation with: The Bichler & Nitzan Archives Suggested Citation: Di Muzio, Tim; Dow, Matt (2023) : Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State, London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences, ISSN 2515-5792, Great Britain Journals Press, London, Vol. 23, Iss. 22, pp. 1-19, https://journalspress.com/re-considering-the-origins-of-the-climate-emergency-war-finance-andthe-state/ , https://bnarchives.net/id/eprint/839/ This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309443 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ Scan to know paper details and author's profile 382U LJP Copyright ID: 573357 Print ISSN: 2515-5786 Online ISSN: 2515-5792 London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences Volume 23 | Issue 22 | Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State Dr. Tim Di Muzio & Dr. Matt Dow INTRODUCTION One of the most important and recurring debates in the field of International Political Economy and international affairs are the links between capitalism, fossil fuel energy and climate change (Ajl 2021; Albert 2020; Brand and Wissen 2018; Daggett 2019; Di Muzio 2015; Di Muzio and Dow 2022; Gill and Benetar 2020; Goods 2021; Kuzemko et al 2019; Malm 2016; Newell 2021; Newell and Lane 2017; Paterson 2021; Pirani 2018; Siebert 2020;). In these debates, the origins of our current climate emergency is rooted in how Britain became the first country to become reliant on mass production and consumption coal (fossil fuels) for economic growth, industriali zation, as well as social reproduction (Di Muzio 2015; Malm 2016; Moore 2015. Britain becoming a coal-fire capitalist-imperial global empire deeply influenced and structured the current world order and global political economy which is still locked-into a vicious cycle of path dependency whereby balance of power, production and social reproduction is dependent on energy, predominately fossil fuels (Di Muzio and Dow 2022). Keywords: NA Classification: LCC Code:QC981.8.C5 R45 Language: English © 2 0 23 . Dr. Tim Di Muzio & Dr. Matt Dow. Th i s i s a r e s e a r c h / r ev i ew p a pe r , d i s t r i bu t ed u n de r t h e t e r m s o f t h e C r e a t i ve C ommo n s A tt r i bu t i o n - N o n com-me r c i a l 4 . 0 U n po r t ed L i ce n s e h tt p : // c r e a t i vecommo n s . o r g / l i ce n s e s / by - n c / 4 . 0/ ) , pe r m i tt i n g a ll n o n comme r c i a l u s e , d i s t r i bu t i o n , an d r ep r oduc t i o n i n an y med i um , p r ov i ded t h e o r i g i na l wo r k i s p r ope rl y c i t ed . Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State Dr. Tim Di Muzioα& Dr. Matt Dowα _________________________________________ I. INTRODUCTION One of the most important and recurring debates in the field of International Political Economy and international affairs are the links between capitalism, fossil fuel energy and climate change (Ajl 2021; Albert 2020; Brand and Wissen 2018; Daggett 2019; Di Muzio 2015; Di Muzio and Dow 2022; Gill and Benetar 2020; Goods 2021; Kuzemko et al 2019; Malm 2016; Newell 2021; Newell and Lane 2017; Paterson 2021; Pirani 2018; Siebert 2020;).1In these debates, the origins of our current climate emergency is rooted in how Britain became the first country to become reliant on mass production and consumption coal (fossil fuels) for economic growth, industriali zation, as well as social reproduction (Di Muzio 2015; Malm 2016; Moore 2015. Britain becoming a coal-fire capitalistimperial global empire deeply influenced and structured the current world order and global political economy which is still locked-into a vicious cycle of path dependency whereby balance of power, production and social reproduction is dependent on energy, predominately fossil fuels (Di Muzio and Dow 2022). This article offers a critical political economy engagement not on the origins of climate emergency but on the explanation as to why Britain turned to fossil fuels in the first place. The scope of scholarship is plentiful but can generally be framed into two dominant perspectives. The first comes from what can be called the Malthusian or Neoclassical Economics explanation whereby Britain was forced to transition to coal from previous sources of energy (wind, peat, timber, etc.) because of resource scarcities, predominantly timber, and thereby raising commodity and labour prices (CITE). The 1We are aware that the literature is vast and that this is not a complete list of citations, but we hope it is reflective of the main debates. second explanation usually originates from Marx and has been expanded upon by what we call Ecologically Sensitive Marxism (ESM). Marx and ESM scholarship, although deeply divided, if we were to extract a primary explanation for why Britain turned to coal, it is the capitalist mode of production through the relentless need to exploit labour and nature for capitalist profit. As a result, coal becomes an input into the capitalist mode of production to help accelerate and cheapen both labour and nature exploitation. It should be noted that these are obviously heuristic devices and we by no means want to falsely characterize anyone’s work or make any blanket statements that these schools are in any way completely united in their approaches or argumentation. But with this caveat in mind, we will argue that dominant explanations given above for the rise of a ‘fossil economy’ are far too narrow and fails to consider several crucial factors that might help us explain how British capitalism – and later much of the world - became wedded to coal, and later oil and natural gas (Smil 1994; Unruh 2000; Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006; Podobnik 2006; Di Muzio 2015). To use a familiar metaphor, we will contend that both analyses allow scholars to see a few trees but not the entire forest of a coal-fired British imperial capitalism that rested on carbon energy, financial innovation, and near-constant warfare abroad. We will claim that both analyses largely sidesteps crucial geopolitical factors to focus almost exclusively on developments within Britain that contends led to the mass exploitation of coal. After exploring Britain’s geopolitical context, we will then challenge the internal transition thesis that coal was primarily pursued so that labour could be more fully and perhaps more easily exploited. We do so by considering the rise of the fiscal-military state and its London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 1 © 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 connection to capitalization, coal, and the expansion of credit within a growing international and outward looking empire. To substantiate our argument, we have divided this article into four main sections and a conclusion. In the first section, we engage with the Malthusian/Neoclassical principal thesis that the transition to coal and steam power had to do with the scarcity or price of wood. The second section addresses the silences we find troubling in both explanations particularly the lack of geopolitical context for the energy transition to coal and steam power. The third section discusses a second major silence: the rise of Britain’s fiscal-military state and its connection with coal, capitalization, and the expansion of credit. The article ends with a brief conclusion. I. THE DEARTH OF TIMBER THESIS REVISITED Like Marx (1867)[1976] and Polanyi (1957) before him, Malm’s intellectual journey sees him return to England not to find the transition to capitalist industrial production or the emergence of a market society per se, but to uncover how a ‘fossil economy’ developed. Malm is clear that his motivation is to trace why global society finds itself in a climate emergency. Not surprisingly, he argues that while there are other contributors to climate change, the combustion of fossil fuels is the leading cause of global warming (Kenner and Heede 2021; IPCC 2022). This is why we must return to Britain, because it is the birthplace of the first nation to exploit coal en masse (Nef 1932 and 1977; Wrigley 2010). For Malm, the historical and intellectual task is to uncover why Britain turned to producing and consuming coal in great quantities, when: a) coal was well known and used in antiquity for thermal energy in Britain; b) other nations did not adopt coal and steam power in any great quantities until much later and c) the energy from wood and water appeared to be cheap and abundant while the steam engine was costly and often unreliable until it was modified and improved upon to increase its efficiency. In his quest to advance a Marxist explanation for the emergence of a ‘fossil economy’, Malm’s main intellectual opponent is the demographic scholar E.A. Wrigley’s (2010) Energy and the English Industrial Revolution. Wrigley, among others, argues that the increasing reliance on coal as an energy source largely resulted from necessity (see Thomas 1986; Smil 1994; Malanima 2006; Freese 2016). The reasoning here is that over centuries, Britain denuded most of its forests (or had certain forests protected by Royal decree) causing the price of timber to increase as emphasized by Nef’s seminal research (1932 and 1977). Mounting prices for timber due to scarcity, then, was the chief reason for turning to the energy provided by coal. Malm (2015) takes serious issue with this argumentation as his hypothesis articulates that the transition to coal and steam power was mostly about the capitalist desire to exploit wage-labour more fully in pursuit of surplus value in an industrializing Britain. According to Malm and some Marxists, this is the root and continued reason for our current climate predicament (Angus 2016; Foster 2022) ). Unlike labourers who can be troublesome due to the limitations of their biology or turn to bright ideas like organizing as a collective (union), the steam engine, while requiring a feedstock of coal, did not complain, can work continuously and does not organize to contest working conditions or pay. Most importantly, steam power did not suffer from environmental limitations (the tide) as the British waterwheel did and was able to expand and intensify the working day and thereby further the exploitation of human labour-power (Malm 2013). To be sure, these reasons are more than plausible for the increasing adoption of coal and steam power. But our question is whether these were the primary reasons for the transition to greater coal production and consumption? We think not, and to demonstrate this, we must take a closer look at Malm’s critique of Nef’s ‘dearth of timber’ thesis. Malm argues that the leading reason for exploiting more coal and the development of steam power was to subordinate labour power not a country-wide dearth of timber. The evidence he provides is drawn from economic historian R. C. Allen’s (2003) thesis who argued that the British industrial elite suffered from high labour prices not high timber costs. Malm also draws on the London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 2© 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State works of Hammersley (1957), Flinn (1959), and Steinmueller (2013) who predominantly claim that there was no timber scarcity in relation to using it as a fuel source for ironworks. While Malm admits that there was indeed a popular discourse on the dearth of wood in the two centuries leading up to 1700, he claims that the timber famine was mainly restricted to London with perhaps additional regions being affected from time to time (Malm 2016: 226). In short, Malm claims there was no serious nationwide wood nor energy crisis and therefore, crucially, no dire need to turn to coal to provide more energy for industrialization. On closer inspection, we argue this is not only a simplification of Nef’s (1932) thesis but believe these arguments do not sufficiently demonstrate that the dearth of wood thesis is completely inaccurate. We find it strange that Malm attempts to refute the scarcity of timber in England by falling into neoclassical reasoning by focusing on commodity prices as the drivers of history. For example, we know both historically and presently that commodity prices are not reflective of their abundance, scarcity, nor productivity but have much to do with power relations that are embedded in their production, distribution, and consumption (Nitzan and Bichler 2018). Moreover, capitalists are not rational choice actors who only use price as a key determinant for the selection of their energy resource as neoclassical historians would have us believe (Thomas 1986; Clark and Jacks 2007; Wrigley 2010; Allen 2003). The dominant energy source within an energy system is often dictated domestic elites, geopolitics, profitability and accessibility (Di Muzio 2012; Christophers 2021; Hager 2021). Furthermore, even if there was an abundance of timber at inexpensive prices, it does not follow that industrial capitalists would not have turned to coal anyways. In this sense, Malm largely downplays both scientific and technological revolutions taking place in England and elsewhere and the superiority coal has over both timber and water (as sources of energy) in both the economy and in everyday life (Hill 1976; Cipolla 1977; Smil 1994; Goldstone 2002, 2013; Vries 2013 Freese 2016; Ashworth 2017). We find it interesting that Malm would dismiss the ‘dearth of wood’ thesis so quickly when Marx’s intellectual curiosity into studying capitalism began with investigating the ‘theft of wood’ in Germany in 1848 (Bensaïd 2021). The debates on growing timber famine in both England and some parts of Europe, especially in urban centres, started in the early 16th century which correlated with significant population increases (McNeill 2004; Malanima 2006; Warde 2006; Moore 2015). This is not to argue that Malthus’ 1798[1998] thesis is correct - whereby when a population starts to grow exponentially, so too does the consumption of resources and thereby the rise of resource depletion.2Britain’s ‘timber famine’ was even highlighted by Engels (1845) and other Marxist scholars who have argued that the timber famine in England was the result of proto-industrialization and the need for iron for the agrarian revolution and for wool and husbandry (Brenner 1976; Warde 2006; see also Watson 2021). Werner Sombart (1916)[2019] highlights that pre-industrial England and Europe could be considered the ‘Wooden Age’ due to the fact that industry, war/plunder, trade, and social reproduction were largely dependent on access to wood and clear-cut arable land. In 1650, already ‘170,000 to 200,000sq km of forest land had been cleared’ which was roughly 35 to 40 ‘percent of the continent’s whole area’ (Malanima 2006: 107). As a result, both England and Europe’s ‘dearth of wood’ is much more multifaceted than just increases in population/consumption or prices but rather, fundamentally, about social transformation, power, and inequality, especially in Britain where war and finance merged in a new and interesting way as will be discussed. Finally, Malm follows the more controversial opinions of Hammersley (1957) and Flinn’s (1959) research on the fact that iron furnaces did not deplete England’s wood reserves in any significant way. True or not, neither Hammersley, Flinn nor Malm address the larger transformations in 2As a long-standing critique of Malthus and Malthusian based scholarship is the consistent overlooking of how social hierarchies and property relations are fundamental in shaping and reshaping resource scarcities and the gross unequal distribution and consumption of resources across human histories (Angus and Butler 2011; Di Muzio 2017). London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 3 © 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State Britain’s economy that intensified its dependence on wood consumption such as the rapidly expanding wood-dependent industries (e.g., brewing, furniture, shelter/heating, iron, glass, arms, etc.) and the most important of all, shipyards and shipbuilding all required vast amounts of timber (Albion 1952; Nef 1932 and 1977; Fouquet and Pearson 1998; Melby 2012; Moore 2015 Freese 2016; Ashworth 2017; Satia 2018).3As Albion (1952) and other historians note, there was indeed a timber problem for the British Royal Navy who had an insatiable thirst for evermore hard and soft timber (McNeill 2004; Davey 2011; Ashworth 2017; Reiver 2019). This is reflected in how King James I, in May 1615, banned the use of timber, especially oak, as fuel by manufacturers that were unrelated to the Royal Navy or shipbuilding industry (Ashworth 2017: 90). This sparked the search for fuel alternatives domestically as well as timber abroad.4In 1794, the British Navy consumed almost a quarter of all wood that Britain had circulating in the economy (Davey 2011: 161). As a result, Hutchinson (2012: 581) notes that Britain was a large wood importer, reflective in 1705, when Britain’s trade imbalance with the Baltic countries for predominantly timber, iron, and grain was around £500,000 and by 1800 it rose to £2,500,000 (see also Sven-Erik Åström 1970). Lastly, Britain attempted to make their colonies, now known as Canada, the United States of America, India, and the Caribbean Islands into ‘Timber Colonies’ and ‘Naval Stores' to maintain their global navy supremacy in terms of both shipping, trade, plunder and war (Albion 1952; Davey 2011; Melby 2012; Reiver 2019; Smith 2019).5 5Hemp, iron, pitch, tar, flax, and most important of all, timber, ‘were the ingredients of British naval, commercial, and economic power. These commodities were as important as oil is in the twenty-first century. British security rested upon a functioning Royal Navy, to protect it from invasion, to 4King James I found anyone ‘defying the law was subject to the death penalty’ and were instructed to use coal (Ashworth 2017: 90). 3For example, ‘some six thousand mature oaks selected from the forests of Kent and Sussex, the equivalent of a hundred acres of forest, were needed to build Victory alone. In addition, softwoods such as fir and pine—all unavailable in sufficient quantity on the home islands—were imported for the building of the keel, decks, masts, and topmasts’ (Reiver 2019: 467). Therefore, by examining Nef’s (1932 and 1977) ‘dearth of timber’ thesis as connected to the ways Britain’s economy and social reproduction were fundamentally changing, this leads to a better explanation for the rise of coal consumption within England. As a result, one of the mistakes Malm makes is confusing the terms energy transition and energy addition. In the former, one source of energy completely substitutes for another, making the original energy source obsolete or used only parsimoniously. In the latter case, the original source continues to be used, perhaps less so to be sure, but is not wholly replaced by the new energy source – in this case of course, coal (York and Bell 2019: 1). In the end, total energy production and consumption increased due to new sources coming online – and coal was a powerful source of energy unlike any other until oil started to be produced in commercial quantities in the late nineteenth century. As Malm would likely agree, we must realize that sources of energy are born in pre-existing power relations of domination and resistance. While there was no discourse of ‘economic growth’ in early modern England or during the time of the Industrial Revolution, there was undoubtedly a growing concern with ‘improvement’ for profit by capitalists and state officials (Wood 2002; Cook 2018). Malm would doubtless agree, but it matters how we interpret this capitalist imperative as it relates to coal, the accumulation of money, and the rise of a fiscal-military state with increasing imperial tendencies. We will discuss these factors in more detail below, but for now, we turn to the concept of exploitation and the geopolitical context for the rise of a coal-fired Britain. II. EXPLOITATION AND THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE RISE OF CARBON CAPITALISM As mentioned above, what Malm presents as his evidence for the transition to coal is an internalist Marxist argument for the transition to coal in Britain. The primary motive of the capitalists, he contends, is the control and domination of protect its maritime trade, and to blockade enemy shipping’ (Davey 2011: 161). London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 4© 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State labourers as a going concern. This is because Malm, following Marx, believes that the source of surplus value (capitalist profit) is the exploitation of labour power. As a Marxist, he must then believe that the concept of ‘exploitation’ he uses means that workers are not paid the full value of their labour power/time during any given production process. So, if the drive and desire of the capitalist is to accumulate more profit, then having more workers to exploit should also be a key goal since workers are the source of all profit in Marxism (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Chapter 6 and 7). In addition, Malm believes that the transition to coal facilitated the exploitation and domination of workers. But does this contention hold water? In this section, there are at least two main points that challenge Malm’s view on the exploitation of labour and transition to coal and steam power. The first is an alternative non-Marxist understanding of the concept of ‘exploitation’ and the second is examining the geopolitical conditions in which England/Britain finds itself during the transition to capitalism. Let’s take the issue of exploitation first. The English term originates from French and generally means to take advantage of someone, a situation or something for the purpose of profiting or benefiting oneself in some way (Di Muzio 2013: 156). Notice that this is not Marx’s definition. For Marx, exploitation means workers in industrial production are not paid the full value of their labour time/power and this is the origin of the capitalist’s profits – hence the justification for revolution.6This is important because if we follow the former definition rather than Marx’s, we do not have to find capitalists waiting in the wings to garner more labour power to make ever greater profit. What this suggests is that the primary drive of transitioning to coal was not necessarily the exploitation of labour for profit. Let us be clear. Our argument is not that ‘exploitation’ was an absent factor in a hierarchical society dominated by a class of variegated capitalists. The working class was indeed exploited in ‘satanic mills’ and other places 6We sidestep the infamous transformation problem that has afflicted Marxism here (Marx had to convert labour time into prices, not the reverse) (Howard and King 1989). of work for profit (Polanyi 1957). What we dispute here is that the profit of the capitalist is solely the result of exploiting the unpaid time of industrial labourers. The fact that there are mounting fears that automation will replace some forms of labour is telling enough (Banes, Cotton, and Kumar 2022; Holzer 2022). If we are correct, then Malm’s main argument starts to break down, and we must look for other historically convincing reasons for the transition to coal in England/ Britain. While debatable we may be able to distinguish between different forms of capitalism as Marx (1867)[1976] did between commercial and industrial capital. Commercial capitalists are said to rarely produce anything and earn their profits by buying goods cheap in one place (e.g., spices) and selling these goods in another market at a higher price (Wallerstein 1974; Banaji 2020). Industrial capitalists, on the other hand, are said to be the true capitalists whose workers are directed and commanded to produce industrial goods for the market (Brenner 1977; McNally 1988; Wood 2002). But while we can make this conceptual or even analytical distinction, both operate on the principle of cost-plus accounting that originated with double-entry bookkeeping which emerged in Italy in the 15th century (Braudel 1983). In our view, this accounting method has been continuously refined and now more or less rules the world as there are no capitalists or governments without their accounting books. So, the commercial capitalists – even though they might not be exploiting labour in a factory – make their profit by adding on to the original price of the goods they purchased for sale in a foreign market. In other words, the power of commercial capitalists rested on their ability to carry out long-distance trade and administer the prices to consumers who are unable to carry out this type of trade. There was no point for a commercial capitalist buying a hundred ounces of cinnamon in Sri Lanka for £100 to return to London and sell the same hundred ounces for £100 if their end goal was the accumulation of money. The price will always be marked-up by some percentage. In a similar fashion, industrial capitalism is a cost-plus London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 5 © 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State accounting system (Douglas 1922). Chieftains of industry figure out the total cost of their products – with labour being a major cost – and add a markup to achieve a certain profit target. This may have been a bit wonky in the beginning for a variety of reasons not explored here, but it is normal capitalist practice today (Vuocolo 2022). What this suggests is that if we are correct, and profit is a result of cost-plus accounting rather than the Marxist understanding of exploitation as unpaid surplus labour. Therefore, Malm’s argument that transition to coal starts to breakdown and a stronger analysis would be to investigate how coal and later on carbon energy was/can be used to exploit (take advantage) and oppress working, gendered, racialized populations globally which happens repeatedly in capitalism (Nore and Turner 1980; Debeir Deléage, & Hémery 1991; Huber 2013; Preston 2017)In essence, the Marxist interpretation of exploitation has not ever been proven and cannot alone explain the level of prices and capitalist accumulation (Sweezy 1991; Nitzan and Bichler 2009: Chapter 6 and 7). What we do agree with is that capitalism is all about accumulating more money and this should be our starting point, not the desire to exploit more workers per se. Workers are certainly integral to the functioning of any economy from their work contributions to their purchasing power, but we contend they are not the direct or immediate source of capitalist profit. Instead, their labour is a cost to the capitalist, which is why, in the first place, there is an ongoing desire, where possible, to cut labour costs. In addition, we can verify this empirically. If Marx and his followers are correct, we would expect to find a strong correlation between the number of employees and the profitability of a firm (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 173). Table 1.0 ranks the top ten Fortune 500 companies in 2021 by profitability and shows the number of employees they ‘exploit’. As is clear to see from the data, there is no correlation between the number of employees and a company’s profitability. Table 2.0 is even more damning and ranks the top ten firms by number of employees and shows their level of profit in 2021. Again, we should expect to find that there is a strong correlation with the number of employees per firm and their profitability if the exploitation of labour time is indeed the ‘true’ source of capitalist profits. Table 1: Top 10 Fortune 500 Companies by Profit and Number of Employees7 Company # of Employees Profit (m) Apple 147,000 $57,411 Saudi Aramco 79,800 $49,286 SoftBank Group 58,786 $47,052 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 438,787 $45,783 Microsoft 163,000 $44,281 Berkshire Hathaway 360,000 $42,521 Alphabet 135,301 $40,269 China Construction Bank 373,814 $38,282 Agricultural Bank of China 462,592 $31,293 Meta Platforms 58,604 $29,146 7https://fortune.com/global500/2021/search/?fg500_profits=desc (accessed 4/8/2022). London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 6© 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 13 © 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State IV. CONCLUSION In this article we have argued that carbon capitalism was born over three centuries ago, but not specifically to subordinate and exploit waged labour as Malm’s Marxist account of a ‘fossil economy’ implies. In the end, if humanity wants to prevent the looming climate emergency Malm’s treatise provides crucial historical insight of how carbon energy accelerated industrialism. But to better understand the complexities and relationships between climate change, the capitalist world economy, and social reproduction, we need more in-depth analysis of how and why the carbonization of everyday life continues and even expands. Therefore, we need to start focusing more on capitalism and current forms of social reproduction that prevent decarbonization and reinforce most of humanity’s (although extremely unequally) carbon energy path dependencies (Newell 2021). More fundamentally both global political and economic elites continue to tether geopolitical power, finance, and economic growth to the production and consumption of fossil fuels, and this has made the world order fall to a standstill at the crossroads of possible futures (Dow 2022; Lucas 2022). This is why we have stressed that more factors were at work in the development of a coal-fired British imperial capitalism – specifically, the timber problem, the construction of an assemblage of violence using coal and coke to further capitalist accumulation, the financial revolution and the capitalization of the state’s power to tax the population and wage war abroad. In sum, we are currently witnessing a global power struggle between social forces of right, center, and left in how to solve the looming climate crisis which is rapidly deteriorating democracies across the globe. This struggle over the future of energy is rather reflective of Timothy Mitchell’s thesis especially when he stated ‘[f]ossil fuels helped create both the possibility of modern democracy and its limits (2011: 1).’ In the coming years ahead, those limits might become more pronounced. REFERENCES 1. Ajl, M. (2021). A People’s Green New Deal. London: Pluto Press. 2. Albert, M. J. (2020). Beyond continuationism: climate change, economic growth, and the future of world (dis)order. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/0955 7571.2020.1825334. 3. Albion, R. G. (1952). The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652 – 1862. The Mariner's Mirror, 38:1: 4 – 22. 4. Allen, R. C. (2003). ‘Was There a Timber Crisis in Early Modern Europe?’ in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.), Economia e Energia, Florence. 5. Alam, M. S. (2009). Bringing Energy Back into Economy. Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 41(2): pp. 170 - 185. 6. Angus, I. (2016). 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This   page   is   intentionally   left   blank London Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences 20 © 2023 Great ] Britain Journals Press | 22 | Volume 23 Issue ฀ Compilation 1.0 Re-Considering the Origins of the Climate Emergency: War, Finance, and the State