Property Rights Without Democracy: How Post-Bellum Southern Institutions Explain Contemporary Regulatory Capacity

P roject 2025 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PRO JECT © 2023 by The Heritage F oundation 214 Mass achuset ts Ave., NE W ashington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ISBN: 978-0-89195-17 4-2 F oreword b y K evin D . Roberts , PhD Edited b y P aul Dans and Stev en Gro v es F oreword b y K evin D . Roberts , PhD Edited b y P aul Dans and Stev en Grov es C ontents A CKNO WLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... ix THE PRO JECT 20 25 AD VISORY BO ARD ............................................................... xi THE 2025 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION PRO JECT : A NO TE ON “PRO JECT 2025” .................................................................................... xiii A UTHORS ................................................................................................................................... xv C ONTRIBUT ORS ................................................................................................................. xxv FOREW ORD: A PROMISE T O AMERICA ................................................................. 1 K e vin D . Roberts, PhD SECTION 1: T AKING THE REINS OF GO VERNMENT .......................... 19 1. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE .................................................................................................... 23 Rick Dearborn 2. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ST A TES ................................................................................................. 43 Russ V ought 3. CENTRAL PERSONNEL A GENCIES: MANA GING THE BUREAUCRA CY ............................................................................. 69 Donald De vine, Dennis Dean Kirk, and P aul Dans SECTION 2: THE C OMMON DEFENSE .............................................................. 87 4. DEP ARTMENT OF DEFENSE ........................................................................................ 91 Christ opher Miller 5. DEP ARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ..................................................... 133 K en Cuc cinelli 6. DEP ARTMENT OF ST A TE ............................................................................................. 171 Kiron K. Skinner 7. INTELLIGENCE C OMMUNITY ..................................................................................... 201 Dustin J . Carmack 8. MEDIA A GENCIES ............................................................................................................ 235 U.S. A GENCY FOR GL OBAL MEDIA ................................................................ 235 Mor a Namdar C ORPORA TION F OR PUBLIC BRO ADCAS TING ..................................... 246 Mik e Gonzalez 9. A GENCY FOR INTERNA TIONAL DEVEL OPMENT ....................................... 253 Max Primor ac SECTION 3: THE GENERAL WELF ARE ......................................................... 283 10. DEP ARTMENT OF A GRICUL TURE ......................................................................... 289 Daren Bak st 11. DEP ARTMENT OF EDUCA TION .............................................................................. 319 Lindse y M. Burk e 12. DEP ARTMENT OF ENERG Y AND RELA TED C OMMIS SIONS ................................................................................. 363 Bernard L. McNamee 13. ENVIRONMENT AL PRO TECTION A GENCY ...................................................... 417 Mandy M. Gunasekar a 14. DEP ARTMENT OF HEAL TH AND HUMAN SER VICES ............................................................................................... 449 Roger Se v erino 15. DEP ARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL OPMENT ................................................................................... 503 Benjamin S. Carson, Sr ., MD 16. DEP ARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR .......................................................................... 517 William P erry Pendle y 17. DEP ARTMENT OF JUSTICE ....................................................................................... 545 Gene Hamilton 18. DEP ARTMENT OF LABOR AND RELA TED A GENCIES ........................................................................................... 581 Jonathan Berry 19. DEP ARTMENT OF TRANSPORT A TION .............................................................. 619 Diana Furcht gott-Roth 20. DEP ARTMENT OF VETERANS AFF AIRS ............................................................ 641 Brook s D . T ucker SECTION 4: THE EC ONOMY ..................................................................................... 657 21. DEP ARTMENT OF C OMMERCE ............................................................................... 663 Thomas F . Gilman 22. DEP ARTMENT OF THE TREASUR Y ....................................................................... 691 William L. W alt on, Stephen Moor e, and Da vid R. Burt on 23. EXPORT –IMPORT BANK ............................................................................................... 717 THE EXPORT –IMPORT BANK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED .................... 717 V eronique de Rugy THE CA SE FOR THE EXPORT –IMPORT BANK ......................................... 724 Jennifer Haz elton 24. FEDERAL RESER VE ......................................................................................................... 731 Paul W infree 25. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINIS TRA TION ................................................................. 745 Kar en K errigan 26. TRADE ...................................................................................................................................... 765 THE CA SE FOR F AIR TRADE ............................................................................... 765 Pet er Nav arr o THE CA SE FOR FREE TRADE .............................................................................. 796 K ent Lassman SECTION 5: INDEPENDENT REGULA T OR Y A GENCIES ............... 825 27. FINANCIAL REGULA T ORY A GENCIES ............................................................... 829 SECURITIES AND EX CHANGE C OMMISSION AND RELA TED A GENCIES ..................................................................................... 829 Da vid R. Burton C ONSUMER FINANCIAL PRO TECTION BUREAU ................................... 837 Robert Bo w es 28. FEDERAL C OMMUNICA TIONS C OMMIS SION ............................................... 845 Brendan Carr 29. FEDERAL ELECTION C OMMISSION ...................................................................... 861 Hans A. v on Spak o v sky 30. FEDERAL TRADE C OMMISSION ............................................................................ 869 A dam Candeub ONW ARD! ............................................................................................................................... 883 Edwin J . Feulner — ix — Ackno wledgments T his work, Mandate f or Leader ship 2025: The C onserv ative Pr omise , is a col- lective effort of hundreds of volunteers who ha ve banded together in the spirit of advancing positive change for America. Our work is by no means the comprehensive compendium of conservative policies , nor is our group the exclusiv e cadre of conservative thinkers . The ideas expressed in this volume are not necess arily shared by all. What unites us is the drive to mak e our country bet ter . First and foremos t, we thank the chapter authors and contributors who ga ve so freely of their time in service of their country . W e were particularly grateful to have the help of dedicated members of The Heritage F oundation’ s manag ement and policy teams. Ex ecutive Vice President Derrick Morgan, Chief of Staff W esley Coopersmith, Associate Director of Project 2025 Spencer Chretien, and Thomas A. Roe Ins titute for Economic P olicy Studies Director P aul Ray devo ted a significant amount of their valuable time to reviewing and editing the lengthy manuscrip t and provided expert advice and insight. The job of transforming the work of dozens of authors and hundreds of contributors into a cohesive manuscript fell upon H eritage’ s formidable team of editors led by Director of Research Editors Therese P ennefather , Senior Editor William T . P oole, Marla Hess , J essica Lowther , Karina Rollins , and K athleen Scaturro , without whose tireless efforts you would no t be reading these words . The talented work of Data Graphics Services Manager John Fleming, Manager of W eb Development and Print Projects J ay Simon, Director of Marke ting Elizabeth F ender , Senior Graphic Designer Grace Desandro , and Senior Designer Melissa Bluey came together to bring the volume to life. W e also thank the dedicated junior staff who pro vided immeasurable assistance, especially J ordan Embree, Sarah Calvis , and Jonathan M oy . Mos t important, we are grateful to the leadership , supporters , and donors of each of the Project 2025 advisory board member organizations and those of The Heritage F oundation, without whom Project 2025 would not be possible. Thank you. P aul Dans & Steven Grov es — xvi — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise international inv estment, international information sharing, the U .S . economic relationship with China, and climate-related financial risk. Previously , Burton was General Counsel at the National Small Business Association; a partner in the Argus Group; Vice President, Finance, and General Counsel for New England Machinery; and manager of the U .S . Chamber of Commerce’ s T ax Policy Center . He holds a JD from the University of Maryland School of Law and a BA in Economics from the University of Chicago . Adam Candeub is a professor of law at Michigan State University . His scholarly research focuses on telecommunication, antitrust, and Interne t issues . He served as acting Assistant Secre tary of Commerce and Deputy Associate At torney Gen - eral at the J ustice Department during the Trump Administration. H e received his B A magna cum laude from Y ale University and his JD magna cum laude from the University of P enns ylvania Law School. Dustin J . Carmack is Research F ellow for Cybersecurity , Intelligence, and Emerg - ing T echnologies in the Border Security and Immigration Center at The Heritage F oundation. Previously , he served in the Intelligence Community as Chief of Staff to the Director of National Intelligence, John Ratcliffe. In Congress , he served as Chief of Staff to Congressman John Ratcliffe (TX -04) and Congressman Ron DeSantis (FL-06). Mr . Carmack studied at Truman State University in Missouri and T el Aviv University in Israel. Brendan Carr has nearly 20 years of private-sector and public-sector experience in communications and tech policy . He currently serves as the senior Republican on the F ederal Communications Commission. Prior to this role, Carr served as the F ederal Communication Commission’ s General Counsel. Earlier , he worked as an attorney at Wiley Rein LLP . Previously , he clerked on the U .S . Court of Appeals for the F ourth Circuit. After graduating from Georg eto wn University , he earned his JD magna cum laude from the Catholic University of America’ s Columbus School of Law where he served as an editor of the Catholic Univer - sity Law Review . Benjamin S . Carson, Sr ., MD , is F ounder and Chairman of the American Corner - stone Ins titute and previously served as the 17th Secretary of the U .S . Department of Housing and Urban Development. Born in De troit to a single mother with a third-grade education, Dr . Carson was raised to love reading and education. H e attended Y ale and earned his MD from the University of Mic higan Medical School. F or nearly 30 years, Dr . Carson served as Director of P ediatric Neurosurgery at the Johns H opkins Children’ s Center , where he performed the first separation of twins conjoined at the back of the head. — xvii — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject K en Cuccinelli served as Acting Director of U .S . Citizenship and Immigration Services in 2019 and then, from No vember 2019 through the end of the Trump Administration, as A cting Deputy Secre tary for the U .S . Department of Homeland Security . During his tenure as A cting Deputy Secretary , K en also served as the Chief Regulatory Officer for the Department of Homeland Security . He also has serv ed the Commonwealth of Virginia, firs t as a state senator and then as Virginia’ s 46th A ttorney General. Rick Dearborn served as Deputy Chief of Staff for President Donald Trump and was responsible for the day -to-day operations of five separate departments of the Executiv e Office of the President. He also serv ed as Executiv e Director of the 2016 President-elect Donald Trump transition team. Before that, Rick served in several roles , including as Chief of Staff, in the office of then-U .S . Senator J eff Sessions (R-AL) for nearly two decades . Be tween his two tours in Senator Sessions’ office, he was appointed by President George W . Bush as Assistant Secre tary of Energy for Congressional Affairs . Earlier in his career , Rick worked for the National Repub - lican Senatorial Committee, the Senate Republican Conference, and the Senate Steering Committee. H e graduated from the University of Oklahoma with a BA in Public Administration and a minor in economics. V eronique de Rugy is the Georg e Gibbs Chair in P olitical Econom y and Senior Research F ellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and a nation - ally syndicated columnis t. Her primary research interes ts include the U .S . economy , the federal budget, taxation, tax competition, and cron yism. De Rugy is the author of a weekly opinion column for the Creators Syndicate, writes regular columns for Reason magazine, and blogs about economics at National Review Online’ s The Corner . She received her MA in economics from the P aris Dauphine University and her PhD in economics from the P anthéon- Sorbonne University . Donald De vine is Senior Scholar at The F und for American Studies in W ashington, DC . He was President Ronald Reagan’ s firs t-term Office of Personnel Management Director when The W ashington P ost labeled him “Reagan’ s T errible Swift Sword of the Civil Service” for cutting bureaucracy and reducing spending by billions of dol - lars . He was a professor at the Univ ersity of Maryland and Bellevue University and is a columnist and author of 10 books , including his recent The Enduring T ension . Diana F urchtg o tt-Ro th , an Oxford-educated economist, directs the Center for Energy , Climate, and Environment at The H eritage F oundation and is adjunct professor of economics at George W ashington University . Diana served as Deputy Assistant Secre tary for Research and T echnology at the U .S . Department of Trans - portation, where she directed the Department’ s $1.2 billion research budget; the — xviii — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise Office of P ositioning, Navigation and Timing and Spectrum Management; and the University Transportation Center program. Diana worked in senior roles in the White House under Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W . Bush, and George W . Bush, where she was Chief of Staff of the Council of Economic Advisers. Thomas F . Gilman serv ed as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Administration and Chief Financial Officer of the U .S . Department of Commerce in the Trump Administration. Currently , he is a Director of ACLJ A ction and Chairman of T orn - gat Me tals . T om is the former CEO of Chrysler Financial and has had a 40-plus year career as a senior executiv e and entrepreneur in the global automotive indus try , including roles at Chrysler Corporation, Cerberus Capital Management, Asbury Automo tive Group , TD A uto Finance, and Automo tive Capital Services . He holds a BS in finance from Villanova University . Mandy M. Gunasekara of Oxford, Mississippi, is a principal at Section VII Strat- egies , a Senior P olicy Analyst at the Independent W omen’ s F orum, and Visiting F ellow in the Center for Energy , Climate, and En vironment at The H eritage F oun- dation. During the Trump Administration, Mandy served as the Chief of Staff at the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency as well as Principal D eputy Assis tant Administrator for the Office of Air and Radiation. She previous ly served in numer - ous roles at the U .S . House of Representatives and U .S. Senate, including as Majority Counsel for the Senate Environment and Public W orks Commit tee under Chair - man J im Inhofe. She received her B A from Mississippi College and her JD from the University of Mississippi School of Law . Gene Hamilton is Vice-President and General Counsel of America First Legal F oun - dation. Gene served as Counselor to the A ttorney General at the U .S . Department of J ustice; Senior Counselor to the Secre tary of Homeland Security; General Counsel on the Senate Committee on the J udiciary; Assistant Chief Counsel at U .S . Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and as an A t torney A dvisor in the Secre tary ’ s Honors Program for A ttorneys at the Department of H omeland Security . Gene graduated from the W ashington and Lee University School of Law magna cum laude and Order of the Coif and has a B A in international affairs from the University of Georgia. J ennifer Hazelton has worked as a senior strategic consultant for the Depart - ment of Defense in Industrial Base P olicy and has held senior positions at USAID , the Export–Import Bank of the United States , and the State Department. She was also a communications director in the U .S . Congress and worked as an award- win - ning journalist for CNN and F o x News Channel. Hazelton holds an MA in business administration from Emory University and earned her B A from the Univer - sity of Georgia. — xix — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Karen K errigan is President and CEO of the Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council and has helped to strengthen U .S . entrepreneurship and global business growth for 28 years . She has pro vided counsel across the globe via training missions focused on entrepreneurial development, effective advocacy , policy formation, and implementation. Karen tes tifies regularly before Congress and has served on numerous federal advisory boards representing the interests of entrepreneurs and small businesses . Dennis Dean Kirk is Associate Director for P ersonnel P olicy with the 2025 Pres- idential Transition Project at The Heritage F oundation. Born and raised in Kansas , he graduated with honors from Northern Arizona University and W ashburn Uni- versity Law School. Dennis has o ver 45 years of experience in private law and public federal governmen t counsel services . He serv ed in President George Bush’ s Administration in the U .S . Army ’ s Office of General Counsel and later as Associate General Counsel for Strategic Integration and Business Transformation, where he was recognized with the Ex ceptional Civilian and M eritorious Civilian Service Awards and o ther awards . During the Trump Administration, Dennis served in senior positions at the Office of Personnel Management and was nominated by President Trump to be Chairman of the Merit Sys tems Protection Board. K ent Lassman is President and CEO of the Competitiv e Enterprise Institute. Educated at the Catholic University of America and North Carolina State Univer - sity , he has written on telecommunications , privacy , environmental, antitrus t, and consumer protection regulation as well as trade policy and the design of regulatory sys tems . K ent’ s policy research and advocacy have taken him to 45 state capitals , more than a dozen countries , and deep into the heart of the federal regulatory s tate. Bernard L. McNamee is an energy and regulatory attorney with a major law firm and was formerly a member of the F ederal Energy Regulatory Commission. He is also the Stree t Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the Appalachian School of Law . In addition to serving as a F ederal Energy Regulatory Commissioner , McNamee has served in various senior policy and legal positions throughout his career , including at the U .S . Department of Energy , for U .S . Senator T ed Cruz, and for Virginia Governor George Allen. M cNamee also served four attorneys general in two states ( Virginia and T exas). Christopher Miller served in several positions during the Trump Administration, including as Acting U .S . Secretary of Defense, Director of the National Counter - terrorism Center , Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating T errorism, and Senior Director for Counterterrorism and Trans- national Threats at the National Security Council. Before his civilian service in the — xx — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise Department of Defense, Miller was an Arm y Green Beret in the 5th Special F orces Group with multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, achieving the rank of colonel. Miller earned a B A from George W ashington University and an MA from the Naval W ar College. He also graduated from the College of Naval Command and Staff and the Army W ar College. Stephen Moore is a conservativ e economist and author . He is currently a senior economist at F reedomW orks, a Dis tinguished F ellow at The Heritage F oundation, and a F ox News analyst. F rom 2005 to 201 4, M oore served as the senior economics writer for The W all Street Journal editorial page and as a member of the Journal ’s editorial board. He s till contributes regularly to the J ournal ’ s editorial page. He is a frequent lecturer to business inv estment and university audiences around the world on the U .S . economic and political outlook in W ashington, DC . Mora Namdar is an attorney and Senior F ellow at the American F oreign Policy Council. She speaks fluent F arsi and is an expert on U .S . national security , human rights , global communications , the Middle East, and international law . Mora serv ed as senior advisor for critical issues at the U .S . State Department and was appointed by President Donald Trump to perform the duties of the Assistant Secre tary of State for Consular Affairs . She also served as Vice President of Legal, Compliance, and Risk at the U .S . Ag ency for Global Media. P e ter Navarro holds a PhD in economics from Harvard and was one of only three senior White House officials to serve with Donald Trump from the 20 16 campaign to the end of the President’ s first term. H e was the W est Wing ’ s chief China hawk and trade czar and served as Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing P olicy and Defense Production A ct P olicy Coordinator . His books include The C oming China W ar s (2006); Death by China (2011); Cr ouching Tiger (2015); and his White House memoirs In Trump Time (2021) and T aking Back Trump’ s America (2022). His top-rated T aking Back Trump’ s America podcast appears on Apple P odcasts and Google P odcas ts. William P erry P endley was bor n in Cheyenne, Wyoming. H e earned a B A and an MA from George W ashington University , was a U .S . Marine Corps captain, and earned his JD from the University of Wyoming College of Law . He was an at torney on Capitol Hill, a senior official for President Ronald Reagan, and leader of the Bureau of Land Management for President Donald Trump . F or 30 years, he was president of Mountain States Legal F oundation where he argued and won cases before the Supreme Court of the United States . He authored five books , includ - ing Sagebrush Rebel: Reagan’ s Battle with Environmental Extr emists and Why It Matter s T oday . — xxi — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Max Primorac is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for F oreign P olicy Studies at The Heritage F oundation. He was acting Chief Operating Officer and Assistant to the Administrator , Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, at the U .S . Ag ency for International Development. Previously he was deputy director of Iraq’ s recons truction program at the U .S . Department of State and a senior adviser in the Office of the Secretary . Max was educated at F ranklin and Marshall College and the University of Chicago . Roger S e verino is Vice President of Domestic P olicy at The Heritage F ounda - tion. As director of the Office for Civil Rights at the U .S. Department of H ealth and Human Services (HHS) from 2017 to 2021, he led a team of more than 250 staff enforcing civil rights , conscience, and health information privacy laws. Roger sub - sequently founded the HHS Accountability Project at the Ethics & Public Policy Center . He holds a JD from Harvard Law School, an MA in public policy from Carnegie Mellon Univ ersity , and a B A from the University of Southern California. Kiron K. Skinner is President and CEO of the F oundation for America and the W orld, T aube Professor of International Relations and Politics at P epperdine University ’ s School of Public Policy , W . Glenn Campbell Research F ellow at the Hoo ver Institution, and a Visiting F ellow and Senior Advisor at The Heritage F oundation. Skinner served as Director of Policy Planning and Senior Advisor at the U .S . Department of State from 2018 to 2019 and w as a member of the Defense Business Board at the U .S . Department of Defense in 2020 . Skinner holds an MA and a PhD in political science from Harvard University and undergraduate degrees from Spelman College and Sacramento City Colleg e. Brooks D . T ucker served in the U .S . Department of V eterans Affairs as Assis - tant Secretary for Congressional and Legislative Affairs from 20 17 to 2021 and as Acting Chief of Staff from 2020 to 2021. He helped to craft the policy frame - work for President-elect Trump’ s transition team and served as the Senior P olicy Adviser for National Security and V eterans Affairs to Senator Richard Burr from 2010 to 20 15 . A retired Marine lieutenant colon el, Brooks served in Afghanistan , Iraq , North Africa, the Caucasus , and the W estern P acific. He is a graduate of the University of Maryland, Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College and holds a Certificate in Legislative Studies from Georgetown University . Hans A. von Spako vsk y is Senior Legal F ellow and Manager of the Election Law Reform Initiative in the Edwin Meese Center III Center for Legal and J udicial Studies at The Heritage F oundation. He is a former member of President Donald Trump’ s Advisory Commission on Election Integrity . F rom 2006 to 2007 , von — xxii — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise Spakovsky was a Commissioner on the F ederal Election Commission. He serv ed as career Counsel to the Assistant A t torney General for Civil Rights at the U .S . Department of J ustice from 2002 to 2005 . Russ V ought is F ounder and President of the Center for Renewing America. A longtime conservative leader on Capitol Hill, Russ served in President Trump’ s Cabinet as Director of the Office of Management and Budg e t, where he overs aw the implementation of the presidential budget, key policies on deregulation, and a landmark effort to eliminate critical race theory and other radical ideologies in ex ecutive agencies . Prior to his White House servic e, Russ spent nearly two decades in the broader conservative mov ement on Capitol Hill, including as P olicy Direc- tor for the House Republican Conference, Ex ecutive Director of the Republican Study Committee, and Legislativ e Assistant to former U .S . Senator Phil Gramm. Russ graduated with a B A from Wheaton College and received a JD from George W ashington University Law School. William L. W alton is Chairman of the Resolute Protector F oundation and host of The Bill W alton Show . In 20 16 and 2017 , Mr . W alton served in President-elect Donald Trump’ s transition team as Agenc y Action Leader for all the federal eco - nomic agencies. H e served as Chairman of the Board and CEO of Allied Capital Corporation, a $6 billion NYSE -traded private inves tment firm, from 1997 to 2010 . He is the immediate pas t President of the Council for National P olicy . His extensiv e board service includes The Heritage F oundation, American Conservative Union, American Enterprise Institute, U .S . Chamber of Commerce, National V enture Cap - ital Association, and Financial Services Roundtable. P aul Winfree is Dis tinguished F ellow in Economic P olicy and Public Leadership at The Heritage F oundation. Before rejoining Heritage in 2018, P aul was Deputy Assistant to the President, Deputy Director of the Domes tic P olicy Council, and Director of Budget P olicy at the White House. During the 2016 presidential transi - tion, he led the team responsible for the Office of Management and Budg e t. He also has served as a senior staff member for the U .S . Senate Committee on the Budget. P aul served in both the Biden and Trump Administrations for three terms as the Chair of the F ulbright F oreign Scholarship Board that oversees the F ulbright pro- gram and educational exchanges sponsored by the Department of State. EDIT ORS P aul Dans is Director of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project at The H eritag e F oundation, organizing polic y and personnel recommendations and training for appointees in the next presidential Administration. Before joining Heritage, he served in the Trump Administration as Chief of Staff at the U .S . Office of Personnel — xxiii — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Management, as OPM’ s White House liaison, and as a senior advisor at the U .S . Department of Housing and Urban Dev elopment. Paul has extensive experience in high-stakes commercial litigation and work ed for several large international law firms in New Y ork City from 1997 to 20 12 before founding his o wn law firm. H e is a graduate of the Univers ity of Virginia School of Law and rece ived his graduate and undergraduate degrees from the Massachuse tts Ins titute of T echnology . Stev en Gro ves is the Margaret Thatcher F ellow in the Margare t Thatcher Center for F reedom at The Heritage F oundation. Groves served in the Trump Adminis - tration, first as Ambass ador Nikki Haley ’ s Chief of Staff at the U .S . Mission to the United Nations . He later joined the White H ouse as Assistant Special Counsel, representing the White House in the Mueller in ves tigation. Groves also serv ed as White House Deputy Press Secre tary . His prior positions include Senior Counsel for the U .S . Senate Permanent Subcommit tee on Inv estigations and associate at Boies , Schiller & Flexner LLP . Groves holds an LLM from Georgetown Univ ersity Law Center , a JD from Ohio Northern University's College of Law , and a B A from Florida State University . — xxv — C ontributors T he contributors listed belo w generously volunteered their time and effort to assist the authors in the development and writing of this v olume’ s 30 chapters . The policy views and reform proposals herein are not an all-inclu - sive catalogue of conserv ative ideas for the nex t President, nor is there unanimity among the contributors or the organ izations with which they are affiliated with regard to the recommendations . Mark Albrecht Chris Anderson , Office of Senator Steve Daines J eff Anderson , The American Main Street Initiativ e Michael Anton , Hillsdale College EJ Antoni , The Heritage F oundation Andre w “ Art” Arthur , Center for Immigration Studies P aul A tkins , P atomak Global P artners J ulie Axelrod , Center for Immigration Studies J ames Bacon J ames Baehr Ste w art Baker , Steptoe and J ohnson LLP Erik Baptis t , Alliance Defending F reedom Brent Bennet t , T exas Public Policy F oundation J ohn Berlau , Competitive Enterprise Ins titute Russell Berman , Hoover Ins titution Sanjai Bhagat , University of Colorado Boulder Stephen Billy , Susan B . Anthony Pro-Life America Brad Bishop , American Cornerstone Ins titute Willis Bixby , WWBX, LLC J osh Blackman , South T exas Colleg e of Law J im Ble w , Defense of F reedom Institute for P olicy Studies Robert Bortins , Classical Convers ations Rachel Bovard , Conservative P artnership Ins titute Robert Bow es Matt Bo wman , Alliance Defending F reedom Stev en G . Bradbury , The Heritage F oundation Preston Brashers , The H eritage F oundation J onathan Bronitsk y , A THOS K yle Brosnan , The Heritage F oundation — 1 — A PROMISE T O AMERICA K e vin D . Roberts, PhD F orty -four years ago , the United States and the conservative mov ement were in dire straits . Bo th had been betrayed b y the W ashington establishment and were uncertain whom to trust. Bo th were internally splintered and stra - tegically adrift. W orse still, at that moment of acute vulnerability and division, we found ourselves besieged b y existential adv ersaries , foreign and domes tic. The late 1970s were by an y measure a historic lo w point for America and the political coa- lition dedicated to preserving its unique legacy of human flourishing and freedom. T oday , America and the conservative movement are enduring an era of division and danger akin to the late 1970s. No w , as then, our political class has been discred - ited by wholes ale dishonesty and corrup tion. Look at America under the ruling and cultural elite today: Inflation is ravaging family budgets , drug ov erdose deaths continue to escalate, and children suffer the to xic normalization of transgender - ism with drag queens and pornograph y invading their school libraries . Overseas , a totalitarian Communis t dictatorship in Beijing is engaged in a strategic, cultural, and economic Cold W ar against America’ s interests , values , and people—all while globalist elites in W ashington awak en only slowly to that growing threat. M oreov er , low -income communities are dro wning in addiction and government dependence. Contemporary elites have even repurposed the wors t ingredients of 1970s “radical chic” to build the totalitarian cult kno wn today as “The Great Awokening. ” And now , as then, the Republican P arty seems to have lit tle understanding about what to do . M ost alarming of all, the very moral foundations of our socie ty are in peril. Y et s tudents of history will no te that, notwiths tanding all those challenges, the late 1970s proved to be the moment when the political Right unified itself F ore w ord — 2 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise and the country and led the United States to historic political, economic, and global victories . The Heritage F oundation is proud to have played a small but pivo tal role in that story . It was in early 1979 —amid stagflation, gas lines , and the Red Arm y ’ s in va - sion of Afghanistan, the nadir of J imm y Carter ’ s da ys of malaise—that Heritage launched the Mandate for Leadership project. W e brought tog e ther hundreds of conservative scholars and academics across the conservative mo vement. T ogether , this team created a 20-v olume, 3, 000-page g ov erning handbook containing more than 2, 000 conservative policies to reform the federal government and rescue the American people from W ashington dysfunction. It was a promise from the conservative mov ement to the country —confident, specific, and clear . Mandate f or Leader ship was published in J anuary 1981—the s ame month Ronald Reagan was s worn into his presidency . By the end of that year , more than 60 percent of its recommendations had become policy—and Reagan was on his w ay to ending stagflation, reviving American confidence and prosperity , and winning the Cold W ar . The bad news today is that our political establishment and cultural elite hav e once again driven America tow ard decline. The g ood news is that we know the way out even though the challenges today are no t what they were in the 1970s. Conservatives should be confident that we can rescue our kids , reclaim our culture, revive our econom y , and defeat the anti-American Left—at home and abroad. W e did it before and will do it again. As Ronald Reagan put it: F reedom is a fragile thing and it’ s never more than one g eneration aw ay from extinction. It is no t ours by wa y of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly b y each generation[.] 1 This is the duty history has put before us and the s tandard by which our gen - eration of conservatives will be judged. And we should not want it an y other w ay . The legacy of Mandate f or Leader ship , and indeed of the entire Reagan Rev - olution, is that if conservatives want to s ave the country , we need a bold and courageous plan. This book is the first step in that plan. THE C ONSER V A TIVE PROMISE This volume— The C onserv ative Pr omise —is the opening s alvo of the 2025 Pres - idential Transition Project, launched by The H eritage F oundation and our many partners in April 2022. Its 30 chapters lay out hundreds of clear and concre te policy recommendations for White House offices , Cabinet departments , Congress, and agencies, commissions , and boards . J ust as important as the scope of The C onservative Pr omise’ s recommendations is the breadth of its authorship . This book is the product of more than 400 scholars — 3 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject and policy experts from across the conservative movement and around the country . Contributors include former elected officials , world-renowned economis ts, and veterans from four presidential Administrations . This is an agenda prepared by and f or conservatives who will be ready on Da y One of the next Administration to sav e our country from the brink of disas ter . The Heritage F oundation is once again facilitating this work. But as our dozens of partners and hundreds of authors will attes t, this book is the work of the entire conservative mo vement. As such, the autho rs express consensus recommendations already forged, especially along four broad fronts that will decide America’ s future: 1. Restore the family as the centerpiece of American life and pro tect our children. 2. Dismantle the administrative s tate and return self-gov ernance to the American people. 3. Defend our nation’ s sovereignty , borders , and bounty against global threats . 4. Secure our God-given individual rights to live freely — what our Cons titution calls “the Blessings of Liberty . ” What makes these four pieces of the conservative promise so valuable to the next President is that they cut through superficial dis tractions and focus on the moral and foundational challenges America faces in this moment of history . This was one of the secrets of conservativ es’ success in the Reagan Era, one our gener- ation should emulate. As in the late 1970s , Americans today experience the failures of political and cul - tural elites in countless ways: in the job marke t and in the grocery store check out lines , on the stree ts and in our schools , in the media and within our institutions . But in truth, these daily dysfunctions are not innumerable problems , but innumerable manifestations of a few core crises . In 1979 , the threats we faced were the So viet Union, the socialism of 1970s lib- erals , and the predatory deviancy of cultural elites. Reagan defeated these beas ts by ignoring their tentacles and s triking instead at their hearts . His approach to the Cold W ar? “ W e win and they lose. ” His economic agenda? The human dignity of work and its man y rewards . His platform in the culture w ars? The “community of values embodied in thes e words: family , work, neighborhood, peace and freedom. ” This book—and Project 2025 as a whole— will arm the nex t conservative Pres - ident with the same kind of s trategic clarity , but for a new ag e. — 4 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise PROMISE #1: REST ORE THE F AMIL Y AS THE CENTERPIECE OF AMERICAN LIFE AND PRO TECT OUR CHILDREN. The next conser vative President mus t get to work pursuing the true priority of politics— the well-being of the American family . In many w ays , the entire point of centralizing political po wer is to subvert the family . Its purpose is to replace people’ s natural lo ves and loyalties with unnatu - ra l ones . Y ou see this in the popular left- wing aphorism, “ Gov ernment is simply the name we give to the things we choose to do together . ” But in real life, most of the things people “do together ” hav e nothing to do with government. These are the mediating institutions that serv e as the building blocks of any health y socie ty . Marriage. F amily . W ork. Church. School. V olunteering. The name real people give to the things we do together is community , not go vernment . Our lives are full of interwoven, o verlapping communities , and our individual and collective happiness depends upon them. But the most important community in each of our lives—and the life of the nation—is the family . T oday , the American family is in crisis. F orty percent of all children are born to unmarried mothers , including more than 70 percent of black children. There is no government program that can replace the hole in a child’ s soul cut out b y the absence of a father . F atherlessness is one of the principal sources of Ameri - can poverty , crime, mental illness , teen suicide, substance abuse, rejection of the church, and high school dropouts . So many of the problems gov ernment programs are designed to solve—but can’t—are ultimately problems created b y the crisis of marriage and the family . The world has never seen a thriving, health y , free, and prosperous society where mos t children grow up without their married parents . If current trends continue, we are heading toward social implosion. F urthermore, the next conservative President must unders tand that using gov - ernment alone to respond to symp toms of the family crisis is a dead end. F ederal power mus t instead be wielded to rev er se the crisis and rescue America’ s kids from familial breakdown. The C onserv ative Promise includes dozens of specific policies to accomplish this existential task. Some are obvious and long-s tanding goals like eliminating marriage penalties in federal welfare programs and the tax code and installing work requirements for food stamps . But we mus t go further . It’ s time for policymakers to elevate family authority , formation, and cohesion as their top priority and even use government power , including through the tax code, to restore the American family . T oday the Left is threatening the tax-exemp t status of churches and charities that reject woke progressivism. They will soon turn to Chris tian schools and clubs with the same to talitarian intent. The next conservative President mus t make the ins titutions of American civil society hard targets for wok e culture warriors . This starts with dele ting the terms sexual orientation and gender identity (“S OGI”), diversity , equity , and inclusion — 5 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject (“DEI”), gender , gender equality , g ender equity , gender awareness , g ender -sensi- tive, abortion, reproductive health, reproductive rights , and any other term used to deprive Americans of their First Amendment rights out of ev ery federal rule, agenc y regulation, contract, grant, regulation, and piece of legislation that exis ts. P ornography , manifested toda y in the omnipresent propagation of transgender ideology and sexualization of children, for instance, is no t a political Gordian knot inextricably binding up disparate claims about free speech, property rights , sexual liberation, and child welfare. It has no claim to First Amendment pro tection. Its purveyors are child predators and misogynistic exploiters of women. Their product is as addictive as an y illicit drug and as psychologically des tructive as an y crime. P ornography should be outla wed. The people who produce and distribute it should be imprisoned. Educators and public librarians who purvey it should be classed as registered sex offenders . And telecommunications and technology firms that facilitate its spread should be shuttered. In our schools , the question of parental authority o ver their children’ s education is a simple one: Schools serve parents , not the o ther way around. That is , of course, the best argument for univers al school choice—a goal all conservatives and con - servative Presidents must pursue. But even before we achieve that long-term goal, parents’ rights as their children’ s primary educators should be non-negotiable in American schools . States , cities and counties , school boards, union bosses , princi- pals , and teachers who disagree should be immediately cut off from federal funds . The no xious tenets of “critical race theory ” and “gender ideology ” should be excised from curricula in ev ery public school in the country . These theories poison our children, who are being taught on the one hand to affirm that the color of their skin fundamentally determines their identity and ev en their moral status while on the other they are taught to den y the very creatureliness that inheres in being human and consists in accep ting the givenness of our nature as men or women. Allowing parents or ph ysicians to “reassign” the sex of a minor is child abuse and must end. F or public institutions to use taxpayer dollars to declare the superiority or inferiority of certain races , sexes , and religions is a violation of the Cons titu - tion and civil rights law and cannot be tolerated b y an y government an ywhere in the country . But the pro-family promises expressed in this book, and central to the next conservative President’ s agenda, must go much further than the traditional, narrow definition of “family issues . ” Every threat to family stability mus t be confronted. This resolve should color each of our policies . Consider our approach to Big T ech. The worst of these companies prey on children, like drug dealers , to get them addicted to their mobile apps . Many Silicon V alley executiv es famously don’t le t their own kids hav e smart phones . 2 They nevertheless make billions of dollars addicting other people’ s children to theirs . TikT ok, Instagram, F acebook, T witter , and other social media platforms are specifically designed to create the digital — 6 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise dependencies that fuel mental illness and anxiety , to fray children’ s bonds with their parents and siblings . F ederal polic y cannot allo w this industrial-scale child abuse to continue. Finally , conservatives should gratefully celebrate the greatest pro-family win in a generation: overturning Roe v . W ade , a decision that for five decades made a mockery of our Constitution and facilitated the deaths of tens of millions of unborn children. But the Dobbs decision is just the beginning. Conservativ es in the states and in W ashington, including in the next conservative Administration, should push as hard as possible to protect the unborn in every jurisdiction in America. In particular , the next conservative President should work with Congress to enact the most robus t protections for the unborn that Congress will support while deplo ying existing federal po wers to protect innocent life and vigorously complying with statutory bans on the federal funding of abortion. Conservatives should ardently pursue these pro-life and pro-family policies while recognizing the many women who find themselves in immensely difficult and often tragic situations and the hero - ism of every choice to become a mother . Alternative options to abortion, especially adoption, should receive federal and s tate support. In summary , the next President has a moral responsibility to lead the nation in restoring a culture of life in America again. PROMISE #2: DISMANTLE THE ADMINISTRA TIVE ST A TE AND RETURN SELF-GO VERNANCE T O THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. Of course, the surest wa y to put the federal government back to work for the American people is to reduce its size and scope back to something resembling the original constitutional intent. Conservatives desire a smaller go vernment not for its o wn sake, but for the s ake of human flourishing. But the W ashington Establishment doesn’ t want a cons titutionally limited government because it means they lose power and are held more accountable b y the people who put them in power . Like restoring popular so vereignty , the task of reattaching the federal gov - ernment’ s constitutional and democratic te thers calls to mind Ronald Reagan’ s observation that “there are no easy ans wers , but there are simple ans wers . ” In the case of making the federal government smaller , more effective, and accountable, the simple answer is the Cons titution itself. The surest proof of this is how s trenuously and creatively generations of progressives and many Repub - lican insiders have worked to cut themselv es free from the strictures of the 1789 Constitution and subsequent amendments . Consider the federal budget. Under current law , Congress is required to pass a budget— and 12 issue-specific spending bills comporting with it—every single year . The last time Congress did so was in 1996 . Congress no longer meaningfully budgets , authorizes , or categorizes spending. — 7 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Instead, party leaders negotiate one multitrillion-dollar spending bill—several thousand pages long—and then vote on it before an yone, literally , has had a chance to read it. Debate time is restricted. Amendments are prohibited. And all of this is backed up against a midnight deadline when the pr evious “omnibus” spending bill will run out and the federal government “shuts down. ” This process is not designed to empo wer 330 million American citizens and their elected representativ es , but rather to empower t he party elites secretly n ego - tiating without any public scrutin y or o versight. In the end, congressional leaders’ behavior and incentives here are no differ - ent from those of global elites insulati ng policy decisions—over the climate, trade, public health, you name it—from the sovereignty of national electorates . Public scrutiny and democratic accountability mak e life harder for policymakers—so they skirt it. It’ s not dysfunction; it’ s corrup tion. And despite its gaudy price tag, the federal budget is not ev en close to the worst example of this corruption. That dis tinction belongs to the “ A dminis trative State, ” the dismantling of which must a top priority for the nex t conservative President. The term Administrative State refers to the policymaking work done by the bureaucracies of all the federal government’ s departments , agencies, and millions of employees . Under Article I of the Cons titution, “ All legislative Power s herein gr anted shall be vested in a C ongr ess of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representativ es. ” That is , federal law is enacted only b y elected legislators in both houses of Congress . This ex clusive authority was part of the F ramers’ doctrine of “separated po wers . ” They not only split the federal government’ s legislative, executive, and judicial powers into different branches . They also gav e each branch checks over the o thers . Under our Constitution, the legislative branch—Congress—is far and a way the mos t powerful and, correspondingly , the most accountable to the people. In recent decades , members of the House and Senate disco vered that if they give away that po wer to the Article II branch of government, they can also den y responsi - bility for its actions . So toda y in W ashington, most policy is no longer set b y Congress at all, but by the Administrative State. Given the choice be tween being powerful but vulnerable or irrelevant but famous , most M embers of Congress have chosen the latter . Congress passes intentionally vague laws that delegate decisi on-making over a given issue to a federal agency . That agenc y ’ s bureaucrats—not just unelected but seemingly un-fireable—then leap at the chance to fill the vacuum created by Congress’ s preening cow ardice. The federal government is growing larger and less constitutionally accountable—even to the President—ev ery year . l A combination of elected and unelected bureaucrats at the En vironmental Protection Agency quietly strangles domes tic energy production through difficult-to-understand rulemaking processes; — 8 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise l Bureaucrats at the Department of H omeland Security , following the lead of a feckless Administration, order border and immigration enforcement agencies to help migrants criminally enter our country with impunity; l Bureaucrats at the Department of Education inject racis t, anti-American, ahistorical propaganda into America’ s classrooms; l Bureaucrats at the Department of J ustice force school districts to undermine girls’ sports and parents’ rights to satisfy trans gender extremists; l W oke bureaucrats at the P entagon force troops to attend “training ” seminars about “white privilege”; and l Bureaucrats at the State Department infuse U .S . foreign aid programs with woke extremism about “intersectionality ” and abortion. 3 Unaccountable federal spending is the secret lifeblood of the Great Awokening. Nearly every power center held b y the Left is funded or supported, one way or another , through the bureaucracy by Congress . Colleges and school dis tricts are funded by tax dollars . The Administrative State holds 100 percent of its po wer at the sufferance of Congress , and its insulation from presidential discipline is an unconstitutional fairy tale spun b y the W ashington Establishment to protect its turf. Members of Congress shield themselv es from constitutional accountability often when the White House allo ws them to g e t away with it. Cultural ins titutions like public libraries and public health agencies are only as “independent” from public accountability as elected officials and voters permit. Let’ s be clear: The mos t egregious regulations promulgated by the current Administration come from one place: the Oval Office. The President cannot hide behind the agencies; as his many ex ecutive orders make clear , his is the respon - sibility for the regulations that threaten American communities , schools , and families . A conservative President must mo ve s wiftly to do away with these vas t abuses of presidential power and remo ve the career and political bureaucrats who fuel it. Properly considered, restoring fiscal limits and cons titutional accountability to the federal government is a continuation of res toring national sovereignty to the American people. In foreign affairs , global strategy , federal budgeting and pol- icymaking, the same pattern emerges again and again. Ruling elites slash and tear at restrictions and accountability placed on them. They centralize po wer up and away from the American people: to supra-national treaties and organizations , to left- wing “experts , ” to sight-unseen all-or-nothing legislating, to the unelected career bureaucrats of the Administrative State. — 9 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject As monolithic as the Left’ s institutional po wer appears to be, it originates with appropriations from Congress and is made complete b y a feckless President. A conservative President must look to the legislativ e branch for decisive action. The Administrative State is no t going anywhere until Con gress acts to retriev e its own power from bureaucrats and the White H ouse. But in the meantime, there are many ex ecutive tools a courageous conservative President can use to handcuff the bureaucracy , push Congress to return to its cons titutional responsibility , restore power o ver W ashington to the American people, bring the A dminis trative State to heel, and in the process defang and defund the woke culture warriors who ha ve infiltrated every last ins titution in America. The C onservativ e Promise lays out how to use man y of these tools including: how to fire supposedly “un-fireable” federal bureaucrats; ho w to shutter was teful and corrupt bureaus and offices; ho w to muzzle woke propaganda at every level of government; how to res tore the American people’ s constitutional authority o ver the Administrative State; and how to s ave untold taxpayer dollars in the process . Finally , the President can restore public confidence and accountability to our most important government function of all: national defense. The American people desire a military full of highly skilled servicemen and women who can protect the homeland and our interests o verseas . The next conservativ e President must end the Left’ s social experimentation with the military , restore w ar fighting as its sole mission, and set defeating the threat of the Chinese Communis t P arty as its high- est priority . The next conservative President mus t possess the courage to relentlessly put the interests of the everyda y American over the desires of the ruling elite. Their outrage cannot be prevented; it mus t simply be ignored. And it can be. The Left derives its power from the ins titutions they control. But those institutions are only powerful to the ex tent that constitutional officers surrender their o wn legitimate authority to them. A President who refuses to do so and uses his or her office to reimpose constitutional authority o ver federal policymaking can begin to correct decades of corruption and remov e thousands of bureaucrats from the positions of public trust they hav e so long abused. PROMISE #3: DEFEND OUR NA TION’S SO VEREIGNTY , BORDERS, AND BOUNTY A GAINST GL OBAL THREA T S. The United States belongs to “ W e the people. ” All g ov ernment authority derives from the consent of the people, and our nation’ s success derives from the character of its people. The American people’ s right to rule ourselves is the ob verse of our duty: W e cannot outsource to others our obligation to ensure the conditions that allow our families , local communities , churches and s ynagogues, and neighbor - hoods to thrive. The buck stops with each of us , so each of us mus t have the freedom to pursue the good for ourselves and those entrusted to our care. — 16 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise universities , including trade schools , apprenticeship programs , and student-loan alternatives that fund students’ dreams ins tead of Marxist academics . Just as important as expanding opportunities for workers and small businesses , the next President should crack do wn on the crony capitalis t corruption that enables America’ s largest corporations to profit through political influence rather than competitive enterprise and cus tomer satisfaction. Analogous pro-growth reforms for America’ s voluntary civil socie ty are also in order . America is not an econom y; it is a country . Economic freedom is not the only important freedom. F reedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the freedom to assemble also represent key components of the American promise. T oday , in addition to the problem of Big T ech censorship , we see speakers at universities shouted down, parents in ves tigated and arrested for attemp ting to speak at school board meetings , and donors to conservative causes harassed and intimidated. The next conservative President mus t defend our First Amendment rights . BEST EFFORT Ultimately , the Left does not believe that all men are created equal—they think they are special. They certainly don’t think all people hav e an unalienable right to pursue the good life. They think only they themselves have such a right along with a moral responsibility to make decisions for everyone else. They don’t think an y citizen, state, business , church, or charity should be allo wed any freedom until they first bend the knee. This book, this agenda, the entire Project 2025 is a plan to unite the conservative movement and the American people agains t elite rule and woke culture warriors . Our mov ement has not been united in recent years , and our country has paid the price. In the past decade, though, the break down of the family , the rise of China, the Great Awokening, Big T ech’ s abuses , and the erosion of constitutional accountability in W ashington hav e rendered these divisions no t just incon venient but politically suicidal. Every hour the Left directs federal policy and elite institu- tions , our sovereignty , our Constitution, our families , and our freedom are a step closer to disappearing. Conservatives have jus t two years and one shot to get this right. With enemies at home and abroad, there is no margin for error . Time is running short. If we fail, the fight for the very idea of America may be los t. But we should take this small window of opportunity we ha ve left to act with courage and confidence, not despair . The last time our nation and movement were so near defeat, we rallied together behind a great leader and great ideas , tran - scended our differences , rescued our nation, and changed the world. It’ s time to do it again. Now , as then, we know who we are fighting and what we are fighting for: for our Republic, our freedom, and for each other . The next conservative President — 17 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject will enter office on J anuary 20 , 2025, with a simple choice: greatness or failure. It will be a daunting test, but no more so than every generation of Americans has faced and passed. The C onservativ e Promise represents the bes t effort of the conservative mo ve - ment in 2023—and the next conservative President’ s last opportunity to save our republic. ENDNO TES 1. Ronald R eagan, Inaugural A ddr ess, January 5, 196 7 , https:/ / ww w .reaganlibr ary .go v / ar chiv es/ speech /january - 5- 1967 -inaugural-addr ess -public -cer emon y (acces sed March 14, 20 23). 2. Quispe López, “6 T ech Ex ecutiv es Who Raise Their Kids T ech-Free or Seriously Limit T heir Screen T ime, ” Business Insider , Mar ch 5, 2020 , https:/ / ww w .businessinsider .com/ tech-e x ecs-scr een-time-childr en-bill-gates - ste v e-jobs- 2019-9#google-c eo-sundar-pichais-middle-school- aged-son-doesnt-o wn-a-c ell-phone-and-the- tv -can-only-be-ac cessed- with-activ ation-ener gy- 1 (acc essed Mar ch 14, 2023). 3. Simon Hankinson, “‘W ok e’ Public Diplomacy Undermines the Sta te Department’ s C ore Mis sion and W eak ens U.S. F oreign P olicy , ” Heritage Founda tion Backgr ounder No. 3 738, December 12, 20 22, https:/ / ww w .heritage. or g/ global-politics/ report/ wok e-public -diplomacy-undermines-the-s tate-departments -cor e-mission-and. 4. Michelle Nichols, “V enezuelans Facing ‘Unpr eceden ted Challenges, ’ Man y Need Aid—Internal U .N. Report, ” https:/ / ww w .reut ers.c om/ article/ us-v enezuela-politics -un/ v enezuelans-facing-unpr ec edented-challenges - many -need-aid-int ernal-u-n-report -idUSK CN1R9 2A G (acc essed Mar ch 14, 2023). — 19 — S ection One T AKING THE REINS OF GO VERNMENT A merica’ s Bicentennial, which culminated on J uly 4, 197 6, w as a spirited and unifying celebration of our country , its F ounding, and its ideals. As we approach our nation’ s 250th anniversary , which will take place during the next presidency , America is now divided between two opposing forces: woke revolu - tionaries and those who believe in the ideals of the American revolution. The former believe that America is—and always has been—“s ys temically racist” and that it is not worth celebrating and must be fundamentally transformed, largely through a cen - tralized adminis trative state. Th e latter believe in A merica’ s history and heroes , its principles and promise, and in everyday Americans and the American wa y of life. They believe in the Cons titution and republican government. Conservatives—the Ameri - canists in this bat tle—must fight for the soul of America, which is v ery much at stake. J ust two years after the death of the las t surviving Constitutional Con vention delegate, J ames Madison, A braham Lincoln warned that the greatest threat to America would come not from wit hout, but from within. This is evident today: Whether it be mask and vaccine mandates , school and business closures , efforts to keep Americans from driving gas cars or using gas sto ves , or efforts to defund the police, indoctrinate schoolchildren, alter beloved books , abridg e free speech, undermine the colorblind ideal, or den y the biological reality that there are only two sexes , the Left’ s steady stream of ins anity appears to be never-ending. The next Administration must s tand up for American ideals , American families , and American culture—all things in which, thankfully , most Americans still believ e. Highlighting this need, former director of the Office of Management and Budg e t Russ V ought writes in Chapter 2, “The modern conservative President’ s task is to — 20 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise limit, control, and direct the executiv e branch on behalf of the American people. ” A t the core of this goal is the work of the White House and the central personnel agencies. Article II of the Cons titution vests all federal ex ecutive po wer in a Pres- ident, made accountable to the citizenry through regular elections . Our F ounders wrote, “The ex ecutive P ower shall be v ested in a President of the United States of America. ” A ccordingly , V ought writes , “it is the President’ s agenda that should matter to the departments and agencies , ” not their own. Y et the federal bureaucracy has a mind of its own. F ederal employees are often ideologically aligned—not with the majority of the American people—but with one another , posing a profound problem for republican government, a government “of, by , and for ” the people. As Donald Devine, Dennis Kirk, and P aul Dans write in Chapter 3 , “ An autonomous bureaucracy has neither independent constitu - tional status nor se parate moral legitimacy . ” Byzantine personnel rules pro vide the bureaucrats with their chief means of self-protection. What’ s more, kno wledge of such rules is used to th wart the President’ s appointees and agenda. As Devine, Kirk, and Dans write, “Managing the immense bureaucracy of the federal g o vernment is impossible without an understanding of the key central personnel agencies and their governing laws and regulations . ” Many of these la ws and regulations g o verning a largely underworked, over - compensated, and unaccountable federal civilian workforce are so irrational that they would be comical in a less important context. This is true whe ther it comes to evaluating employees’ performance or hiring new emplo yees . Only in the federal government could an applicant in the hiring process be sent to the fr ont of the line because of a “ history of drug addiction” or “alcoholism, ” or due to “morbid obesity , ” “irritable bo wel syndrome, ” or a “psychiatric disorder . ” The nex t A dmin- istration should insis t that the federal government’ s hiring, evaluation, retention, and compensation practices benefit taxpayers , rather than benefiting the lo west rung of the federal workforce. In order to carry out the President’ s desires , political appointees must be given the tools , kno wledge, and support to ov ercome the federal gov ernment’ s obstructionis t Human Resources departments . More fundamentally , the new Administration must fill its ranks with political appointees . Devine, Kirk, and Dans observe that “the Trump Administration appointed fewer political appointees in its first few months in office” than an y other recent presidency . This left career employees in charge in many places . This can occur even after departments have been fully staffed with political appointees . V ought writes that the White House Office of Management and Budg et (OMB) should es tablish a “reputation as the keeper of ‘commander’ s intent, ’” ye t OMB is dominated by career employees who often try to ov errule political appointees serving in the various executiv e depart- ments . Empowering political appointees across the Administration is crucial to a President’ s success . — 21 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Abo ve all, the President and those who serve under him or her mus t be commit - ted to the Constitution and the rule of la w . This is particularly true of a conservative Administration, which knows that the President is there to uphold the Constitu - tion, not the o ther way around. If a conservative Administration does no t respect the Constitution, no Administration will. In Chap ter 1, former deputy chief of staff to the President Rick Dearborn writes that the White H ouse Counsel “must take seriously the duty to protect the po wers and privileges of the President from encroachments by C ongress , the judiciary , and the administrative compon ents of departments and agencies. ” Equally important, the President must enforce the Constitution and laws as writ ten, rather than proclaiming new “ law ” unilaterally . Presidents should no t issue mask or vaccine mandates , arbitrarily transfer s tudent loan debt, or issue monarchical mandates of an y sort. Legislatures make the laws in a republic, not ex ecutives . It is crucial that all three branches of the federal government respect what Mad - ison called the “double security ” to our liberties: the separation of powers among the three branches , and the separation of powers be tween the federal government and the states . This double security has been greatly compromised o ver the years . V ought writes that “the modern executive branch… writes federal policy , enforces that policy , and often adjudicates whether that policy was properly drafted and enforced. ” He describes this as “constitutionally dire” and “in urgent need of repair , ” adding: “Nothing less than the survival of self-governance in America is at s take. ” When it comes to ensuring that freedom can flourish, nothing is more import- ant than deconstructing the centralized adminis trative state. P olitical appointees who are answerable to the President and ha ve decision-making authority in the executiv e branch are key to this essential task. The next Administration mus t not cede such authority to non-partisan “experts , ” who pursue their own ends while engaging in groupthink, insulated from American v oters . The following chap ters detail ho w the next Administration can be responsive to the American people (not to entrenched “elites”); how it can tak e care that all the laws are “faithfully exe - cuted, ” not merely those that the President desires to see ex ecuted; and how it can achieve results and not be s tymied by an unelected bureaucracy . — 23 — 1 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE Rick Dearborn F rom popular culture to academia, the American presidency has long been a prominent fixture of the national imagination—naturally so since it is the beating heart of our nation’ s power and pres tige. It has played, for instance, a feature role in innumerable movies and television sho ws and has been prodded, analyzed, and critiqued by countless books , ess ays , and studies . But like nearly everything else in life, there is no substitute for firs thand experience, which this manual has compiled from the experience of presidential appointees and provides in accessible form for future use. With respect to the presidency , it is best to begin with our Republic’ s founda - tional document. The Constitution gives the “ex ecutive P o wer ” to the President. 1 It designates him as “ Commander in Chief ” 2 and gives him the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex ecuted. ” 3 It further prescribes that the President might seek the assistance of “the principal Officer in each of the ex ecu- tive Departments . ” 4 Beginning with George W ashington, every President has been supported by some for m of White House office consis ting of direct staff officers as well as a Cabinet comprised of department and agency heads. Since the inaugural Administration of the late 18th century , citizens have chosen to devote bo th their time and their talent to defending and strengthening our nation by serving at the pleasure of the President. Their shared patrio tic endeavor has proven to be a noble one, not least because the jobs in what is now known as the White House Office ( WHO) are among the most demanding in all of government. The President must rely on the men and women appointed to the WHO . There simply are not enough hours in the day to manage the affairs of s tate single-handedly , — 2 4 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise so delegation is not jus t advisable: It is essential. The decisions that assis tants and senior advisers make will directly impact the Administration, its legacy , and—most important—the fate of the country . Their ag enda mus t therefore be the President’ s agenda. Choosing who will carry out that agenda on a daily basis is not on ly one of the first decisions a President makes in office, but also one of the mos t critical. The tone and tempo of an administration are often de termined on J anuary 20 . CHIEF OF ST AFF As with most of the positions that will be co vered in this first chap ter , the Chief of Staff is also an Assistant to the President. H owev er , the chief is truly first among equals . Of all presidential staff members , the chief is the mos t critical to implementa - tion of the President’ s vision for the country . The chief also has a dual role as manag er of the staffs of bo th the WHO and the Executiv e Office of the President (EOP). 5 The Chief of Staff ’ s first managerial task is to establish an organizational chart for the WHO . It should be simple and contain clear lines of authority and respon- sibility to avoid conflicts . It should also identify specific points of contact for each element of the government outside of the White House. These contacts should include the White House Liaisons who are selected b y the Office of Presidential P ersonnel (PPO). Receiving guidance from the President, the chief endeavors to implement the President’ s agenda by set ting priorities for the WHO . This process begins by taking stock of the President’ s campaign promises , identifying current and prospective opportunities , and then delegating policy priorities among the departments and agencies of the Cabinet and throughout the three White House policy councils: l The National Economic Council (NEC); l The Domes tic P olicy Council (DPC); and l The National Security Council (NSC). The President is briefed on all of his policy priorities by his Cabinet and senior staff as directed b y the chief. The chief—along with senior WHO s taff—maps out the issues and themes that will be cov ered daily and weekly . The chief then works with the policy councils, the Cabine t, and the Office of Communications and Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) to sequence and ex ecute the rollout of policies and announcements . White House Counsel and senior advisers and senior counselors are also intimately inv olved. All senior staff report to the Chief of Staff, either directly o r through his two or three deputies , unless the President de termines that a particular Assistan t to the President reports directly to him. Mos t chiefs have interacted directly with — 25 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Cabinet officers and a select number of direct reports . In mos t cases , the direct reports to the chief are his two or three deputies , the Communications Director , PPO Director , White House Counsel, and senior advisers . Occasionally , the Office of Public Liaison (OPL), the Cabinet Secre tary , and Interg ov ernmental Affairs (IGA) also report directly to the chief. Usually , however , they report instead to a Deputy Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff ’ s main challenge is time management. His use of his deputies, meetings with senior s taff, and direction provided to the WHO mus t all balance with the daily needs of the President. A successful chief steers the W est Wing using his management of and influence with the various individuals and entities around him. It goes without saying that selecting the right person to be chief is vital. DEPUTY CHIEFS OF ST AFF In recent years , Presidents typically h ave appointed two Deputy Ch iefs of Staff: a Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations and a Deputy Chief of Staff for P olicy . There also have been o ther types of deputy chiefs whose roles have included, for example, overseeing s trategy , planning, and implementation. Chiefs of Staff have then occasionally appointed a principal Deputy Chief to be in charge of guiding decision-making, organizational structure, and information flo w . PRINCIP AL DEPUTY CHIEFS OF ST AFF Not all Chiefs of Staff hav e tapped a principal deputy . A major reason is that doing so adds another layer of command complexity . When principal deputies have been ins talled, their roles have varied based on the needs of particular chiefs . Mos t principal deputies have functioned as doorkeepers , sorting through action items , taking on those that can be handled at their own level, and passing up o thers that truly require the attention of the Chief of Staff or the President. Principal deputies also have assumed control of the scheduling functions , normally under the operations deputy , and have worked directly with the policy councils at the direction of the Chief of Staff. The OPL and Office of P olitical Affairs (OP A) also have reported to a principal deputy . Deput y Chief of Staff for Management and Operations. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Management and Operations oversees the President’ s schedule and all logistical aspects of his mo vement within and outside of the White H ouse (for example, both air trav el on Air F orce One and Marine One and ground transpor - tation). This deputy also interfaces directly with the Secret Service as well as the military offices tasked with keeping the President and his family s afe. In the past, this deputy has also worked with the NSC , the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Intelligence Community and on advancing all foreign trips . If their roles are separated from that of the policy deputy , this deputy should have a s trong grasp of international affairs and robust foreign policy credentials . — 32 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise F requently , man y medium-tier and top-tier jobs have been filled by policy experts tasked with accomplishing much of the work of the Administration. A t the same time, appointees in the entry -level jobs ha ve brought in valuable energy and commitment to the White House and have pro ved to be the “farm team” for the conservative mov ement. The Office of Presidential P ersonnel is responsible for: l I dentifying potential political personnel bo th actively through recruitment and passively by fielding resumes and adjudicating reques ts from political actors . l V et ting potential political personnel b y conducting political background checks and reviewing any clearance and fitness assessments b y departments and agencies. l Making recommendations to the President and to o ther appointment authorities on behalf of the President. l I dentifying programmatic political workforce needs early and developing plans (for example, Schedule F). l Maintaining a s trong relationship with the Office of P ersonnel Management (OPM) both for operational purposes and to effectuate the President’ s direct Title 5 authorities . The President is in charge of the federal workforce and exercises control principally b y working through the Director of the Office of P ersonnel Management. l Training and connecting political personnel. l Playing “ bad cop” in a way that o ther White House offices canno t (including serving as the office that takes direct responsibility for firings and hirings). l Serving as a personnel link between conservative organizations and the executiv e branch. In most Administrations , PPO will staff more than 100 positions during a transi - tion and thousands of noncareer positions during the President’ s firs t term. Direct authority and a strong relationship with the President are necess ary attributes for any PPO Director . Historically , PPO has had direct review and control of personnel files , including security clearance dossiers . — 33 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject A t the highest level, PPO is task ed with long-term, strategic workforce devel - opment. The “ billets” of political appointments are of immense importance in credentialing and training future leaders . In addition, whatever one’ s view of the constitutionality of various civil service rules (for example, the F ederal V acancies Reform Act of 1998 6 ) might be, it is necessary to ensure that departments and agencies have robust cadres of political s taff just belo w senior levels in the event of unexpected vacancies . OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFF AIRS ( OP A) The OP A is the primary office within the ex ecutive branch for managing the President’ s political interes ts . Although its specific functions vary from Admin - istration to Administration, the OP A typically serves as the liaison be tween the President and associated political entities: national committees , federal and s tate campaigns , and interest groups . Within legal guidelines , the OP A engages in out - reach, conducts casework, and—if the President is up for reelection—assists with his campaign. The OP A may also monitor congressional campaigns , arrange pres- idential visits with other political campaigns , and recommend campaign s taff to the Office of Presidential P ersonnel for service in the executiv e branch. The OP A further serves as a line of communication be tween the White House and the President’ s political party . This includes both relaying the President’ s ambitions to political interests and lis tening to the needs of political interests . This relationship allows for the ex change of information between the White House and political actors across the country . The OP A should have one director of political affairs who reports either to the Chief of Staff or to a Deputy Chief of Staff. The OP A should also include various deputy directors , each of whom is responsible for a certain geographical region of the country . Because nearly all White House activities are in some wa y inherently political, the OP A needs to be aware of all presidential actions and activities—including travel, policy decisions , speeches , nominations , and responses to matters of national security —and consider how they might affect the President’ s image. The OP A must therefore ha ve a designated staffer who communicates no t only with other White H ouse offices , but also with the Cabinet and ex ecutive branch agencies . OFFICE OF CABINET AFF AIRS ( OCA) The OCA ’ s role has changed to some degree over the course of various Adminis - trations , but its overriding function remains the s ame: to ensure the coordination of policy and communication between the White House and the Cabine t. Mos t important, the OC A coordinates all Cabinet meetings with the President. It should also organize and administer regular mee tings of the Deputy Secretaries because they also typically serve vital roles in the departments and agencies and, further , often become acting secretaries when Cabine t members resign. — 34 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise There should be one Cabinet Secre tary who reports to the Chief of Staff ’ s office, either directly or through a deputy chief, according to the chief ’ s preference and focus . The Cabinet Secre tary maintains a direct relationship with all members of the Cabinet. The OC A further consists of deputies and special assistants who work with each department’ s principal, Deputy Secretary , Under Secretaries , Assis tant Secretaries , and other senior s taff. The OCA also connects the departments to WHO offices . The OCA coordinates with the Chief of Staff ’ s office and the Office of Communi - cations to promote the President’ s agenda through the Cabinet departments and agencies. The Cabine t’ s communications staffers are ob viously another critical component of this operation. In prior Administrations, the OC A has played a vital role b y tracking the Pres- ident’ s agenda for the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs, and senior advisers . It has worked with each department and agency to advance polic y priorities . In the future, amplifying this function would truly benefit both the President and the conser - vative mov ement. F rom time to time throughout an A dministration, tra vel optics , e thics chal - lenges, and Hatch Act 7 issues inv olving Cabinet members , deputies , and senior staffers can arise. The OC A is normally tasked with keeping the WHO informed of such developments and providing support if and when necess ary . The ideal Cabinet Secre tary will have ex ceptional organizational skills and be a seasoned political operative or attorney . Because man y Cabinet officials ha ve been former presidential candidates , governors , ambassadors , and M embers of Congress , the ideal candidate should also possess the ability to interact with and persuade accomplished individuals . OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON ( OPL) The OPL is critically important in building coalitions and support for the Pres- ident’ s agenda across every aligned social, faith-based, minority , and economic interest group . It is a critical tool for shaping public opinion and keeping m yriad supporters , as well as “frenemies” and opponents alike who are within reach, bet ter informed. The OPL is a notably large office. It should have one Director who reports to the Chief of Staff ’ s office, either directly or through a deputy , according to the chief ’ s preference and focus . The Director must maintain relationships no t only with other WHO heads , but also with the senior s taff of every Cabinet department and agenc y . Since a President’ s agenda is always in motion, it is important for the OPL to facilitate listening sessions to receive the views of the various leaders and mem - bers of key interest groups . The OPL should also have a sufficient number of deputies and special assis tants to cover the vas t number of disparate interest groups that are engaged daily . The — 35 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject OPL has , by far , held more meetings in the Eisenho wer Executiv e Office Building (EEOB) and within the W est Wing itself than an y other office within the WHO . The OPL is the chief White House enforcer and gatekeeper among these var - ious interest groups . It has operated bes t whenever the Chief of Staff has given it permission to use both the pro verbial “carrot” and the pro verbial “s tick. ” T o make this work, communication with the chief ’ s office is vital. A dditionally , the OPL has had an outsized role in presidential scheduling and both official and political trav el. The OPL Director should come from the President’ s election campaign or Cap- itol Hill—but should not hav e deeply entrenched connections to a K Street entity or any o ther potential s takeholder . Some prior relationships can create real or perceived biases tow ard one group or another . The Director should be amiable, gregarious , highly organized, and willing to shoulder criticism and pushback from interest groups and o ther elements of the A dminis tration. Unlike the Director , OPL deputies and special assistants need a deep under - standing of the capital, from K Stree t to Capitol Hill. They should have ex tensive experience in private industry , the labor sector , the conservative movement, and among the specific interest groups with which they will be asked to engage on behalf of the White House. OPL staffers work with more ex ternal and internal parties than any o ther WHO staffers . In turn, they mus t be effective communicators and initiative-takers . They must also be able to influence, persuade, and—mos t important—listen to various stakeholders and ensure that they feel heard. All OPL s taffers must unders tand from the outset that their jobs might be modified or even phased out entirely as the Administration’ s priorities change. OFFICE OF INTERGO VERNMENT AL AFF AIRS (IGA) The IGA connects the White House to s tate, county , local, and tribal g o vern - ments . In other words , it is the one-stop shop for disseminating an Administration’ s agenda to all non–federal g o vernment entities . The IGA should have a Director to whom one or two Deputy Directors report. The Director must ensure that the White H ouse remains connected to all non– federal government entities . The interests and perspectives of these entities are represented in policy discussions, organized events with the W est Wing, EOP senior staff, and IGA s taff throughout the departments and agencies. The IGA can be staffed in a varie ty of ways , but two arrangements are most common: l Each deputy and that deputy ’ s staffers are responsible for a type of government. l A group of staffers is responsible for a specific geographical region of the country . — 36 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise The IGA, as suggested above, represents the interes ts and perspectives of non– federal government entities , but its primary job is to make sure that these entities understand an Administration’ s agenda and ultimately support it. The IGA must work with all o ther White House offices , especially the OP A and the OPL, and manage its staff throughout the departments and agencies. IGA s taff - ers must therefore ha ve communication skills , understand political nuance, and be willing to engage in complex polic y discussions . They should also be not jus t generally responsive, but also proactive in seeking out the interests and perspec- tives of non–federal government entities . WHITE HOUSE POLICY C OUNCILS As the federal government has ballooned in size ov er the past century , it has become increasingly difficult for the President alone to direct his agenda across the executiv e branch. Three White House policy councils have come into exis tence to help the President to control the bureaucracy and ensure continued alignment between agency leadership and White House priorities . Those councils—as pre - viewed above—are the NSC , NEC , and DPC . Each is headed by an Assistant to the President and performs three significant functions . l P olicy Coordination. The primary role of the policy councils is to coordinate the development of Administration policy . This frequently includes developing significant legislative priorities , coordinating policy decisions that impact multiple departments and agencies, and at times coordinating policy decisions within a single department or ag ency . This process must ensure that all relevant offices are included; that compe ting or conflicting opinions are thoroughly discussed and evaluated; and, when there is disagreement among White H ouse senior staff or among Cabine t members , a well-structured ques tion is presented to the President for an intermediate or final decision. l P olicy Advice. By virtue of working in the White H ouse, the heads of the three policy councils will also function as independent polic y advisers to the President. This aspect of the role will vary depending on the individual in this position and the President’ s governing philosoph y . Incumbents have ranged from “ honest brokers , ” who mostly coordinate and ensure that all opinions are fairly presented to the President, to “policy deciders, ” who largely drive a given policy topic on behalf of the President. l P olicy Implementation. The policy councils also manage and mediate the implementation of previous policy decisions. Implementation of a new statute or an ex ecutive order frequently takes years and in volv es many — 3 7 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject distinct and more granular policy decisions along the way . It is essential to have a centralized process for evaluating and coordinating these decisions , especially if they inv olve more than one Cabinet department or agenc y with differing opinions on the bes t approach for securing the President’ s goals. The abov e functions have rece ntly been managed by policy councils through a tiered interagenc y policy process . This process helps to identify differences of opinion and reach a decision without having to take every issue to the President. It can be used to address a single ques tion or monitor a recurrin g issue on an ongoing basis . T ypically , the process inv olves multiple Cabinet departments and agencies that have a pertinent role, policy interest, or dis agreement. Each policy council’ s process could inv olve the following commit tees: l P olicy Coordinating Commit tee (PCC). A PCC is led by a Special Assistant to the President from the policy council and includes political Assistant Secre tary –level experts from the relevant departments , agencies, or offices . The purpose is to de termine where consensus exists , clearly identify where there are differing opinions , and develop options for resolving the remaining questions . If no outs tanding questions or disagreements exis t, the PCC may resolve the issue and mo ve tow ard implementation at the agenc y level. l Deputies Committee (DC). A DC is a mee ting of presidentially appointed executiv es chaired by the policy council’ s Deputy Assistant to the President and relevant Deputy Secretaries . It evaluates the op tions produced by the PCC and frequently directs the PCC to add, expand, or reevaluate an option or even to reach a compromise and resolve an issue at that level. l Principals Committee (PC). When ques tions are not resolved b y a DC , the Director of the P olicy Council will chair a PC , which is attended b y the relevant Cabinet Secre taries and senior White House political s taff. This is the final opportunity for the President’ s most senior advisers to discuss the question, make sure that each principal’ s position is carefully understood, and see whether consensus or a compromise might be reached. If no t, the Chief of Staff ’ s office will schedule time for the PC to meet with the President for a final decision. Despite having seemingly clear and separate portfolios , the three policy coun- cils frequently have areas of o verlap , which can result in confusion, duplication, or conflict. F or example, there are the areas of immigration and border security — 38 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise (either NS C or DPC); health care, energy , and environment (either NEC or DPC); and trade and international economic policy (either NS C or NEC). Identifying these potentially problematic areas and assigning policy responsibilities to only one council where possible will help to speed up the policy-coordination process . While other chap ters will cover specific policy goals for each department or agenc y , incoming policy councils will need to mo ve rapidly to lead policy processes around cross-cutting agency topics, including countering China, enforcing immi- gration laws , reversing regulatory policies in order to promote energy production, combating the Left’ s aggressive at tacks on life and religious liberty , and confronting “wokeism” throughout the federal government. National Security Council. The NS C is intended to be an interdepartmen - tal body within the White House that can se t national security policy with a whole-of-government ap proach. Unlike the o ther policy councils , the NS C was established b y statute. 8 Statutory members and advisers who are currently part of the NS C include the President a nd Vice President; the Secretaries of St ate, Defense, and Energy; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of National Intelligence. 9 The NS C s taff, and particularly the National Security A dviser , should be vet ted for foreign and security policy experience and insight. The National Secu - rity Adviser and NS C staff advise the President on mat ters of foreign policy and national security , serve as an information conduit in times of crisis, and as liaisons ensuring that written communications are properly shared among NSC members. Special attention should be giv en to the use of detailees to s taff the NS C . In recent years , the NS C’ s s taff size has been rightsized from its peak of 400 in 2015 down to 100– 150 professional m embers. Th e next Administration should try to limit the number of detailees to ensure more direct presidential control. National Economic Council. The NEC was es tablished in 1993 by ex ecutive order and has four key functions: l T o “coordinate the economic polic y -making process with respect to domestic and international economic issues . ” l T o “coordinate economic polic y advice to the President. ” l T o “ensure that polic y decisions and programs are consistent with the President’ s stated goals” and “that those goals are being effectively pursued. ” l T o “monitor implementation of the President’ s economic polic y agenda. ” 10 The NEC Director coordinates and implements the President’ s economic policy objectives by working with Cabine t secretaries , their departments , and multiple — 39 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject agencies. The Director is supported b y a staff of policy experts in various fields , including infrastructure, manufacturing, research and development, agriculture, small business , financial regulation, housing, technology and innovation, and fiscal policy . The NEC considers economic policy matters , and the DPC typically considers anything related to domes tic matters with the ex cep tion of economic polic y mat- ters . It also differs from the Council of Economic A dvisers (CEA). Whereas the NEC is in charge of polic y development, the CEA acts as the White H ouse’ s internal research arm for economic analysis . It is therefore critically important to find people with the right qualifica - tions to head both the NEC and the CEA. The CEA is almos t always led b y a well-known a cademic economist, and t he NEC is regularly led by s omeone with expertise in directing the President’ s economic policy process. Those who ha ve served in the role have ranged from former CEOs of the nation’ s largest in vest - ment firms to financial-services industry managers to seasoned congressional staffers who hav e managed the economic polic y issues for top financial and tax- writing committees . Domestic P olicy Council. The Domestic P olicy Council (DPC) consists of advisers to the President on noneconomic domestic policy issues as well as inter- national issues with a significant domestic component (such as immigration). It is one of the primary policy councils serving the President along with the NS C and NEC . The Director serves as the principal DPC adviser to the President, along with members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Director chairs the commit tee respon - sible for coordinating domestic policy development at the Deputy Secre tary level. In this respect, both the Director and the Deputy Director hav e critical institu - tional functions that affect the development of domestic policy throughout the Administration. The DPC also has policy experts (for example, Special Assistants to the Presi - dent or SAP s) who are responsible for developing and coordinating, as well as for advising the President, on specific issues . It is essential that DPC policy expertise reflect the most prominent issues that are before the Administration: issues such as the environment, health care, housing, and immigration. In addition, DPC SAP s should demonstrate a working kno wledge of the rulemaking process (although they need not n ecessarily be experts on re gulation) because a working kno wledge of the rulemaking process will facilitate the DPC’ s effectiveness in coordinating Administration policy . The DPC also needs to work closely with other offices within the Ex ecutive Office of the President to promote economic opportunity and private-sector inno - vation. This includes working with the Office of Management and Budget and its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as well as the Council of Economic Advisers, Council on En vironmental Quality , and Office of Science and T echnology — 40 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise P olicy . T o this end, the Director should chair a standing meeting with the princi - pals from each of the other EOP offices to enhance coordination from within the White House. Several areas will be especially important as the DPC works to develop a well-defined domestic policy agenda. One is the promo tion of innovation as a foundation for economic growth and opportunity . The President should establish an economic opportunity working group , chaired b y the DPC Director , to coordi- nate the development of policies that promote economic opportunity . Another important area is the promotion of health care reform to bring do wn costs for the American people and the pressure that spending on health programs puts on the federal budget. Finally , DPC should coordinate with th e NS C on a policy agenda to enhance border security . OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT ( O VP) In modern U .S . history , the Vice President has acted as a significant adviser to the President. Once elected, the VP helps to promote and, in man y ins tances , put into place and execute the President’ s agenda. The President may additionally determine the inclusion of O VP staff in White H ouse meetings , including P olicy Coordinating Committee, Deputies Commit tee, and Principals Committee dis - cussions as has been done in various recent Administrations. Recent Presidents have decided to give Vice Presidents space in the W es t Wing. The VP’ s pro ximity to the President—as well as to the Chief of Staff and additional senior advisers—makes his or her role a powerful one within the W es t Wing. Presidents typically tap VP s to lead various A dminis tration efforts . These efforts have included serving on the NSC Principals Committee, heading the National Space Council, addressing immigration and border issues, leading the response to health care crises , and supervising workforce programs . VP s traditionally also spearhead projects of personal interest that ha ve been authorized by the President. The VP is also charged with breaking tie votes in the Senate and in recent years has served abroad as a brand ambassador for the White H ouse and more broadly the United States , announcing A dminis tration priorities and coordinating with heads of state and o ther top foreign government officials . The Vice President, as President of the Senate, could be a President’ s emissary to the Senate. OFFICE OF THE FIRST LAD Y /FIRS T GENTLEMAN The First Lady or Firs t Gentleman plays an interesting role in the formation, implementation, and execution of policy in concert with the President. Active and interested firs t spouses often champion a select number of signature issues , whether they be thorn y social issues or deeper policy issues. One advantage of the first spouse’ s taking on ho t-button social issues is that an y political backlash will be less severe than it would be for the President. — 4 1 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject The first spouse normally appo ints a chief of staff who has enough assis tants to support the spouse’ s activities in the East Wing of the White H ouse. This group works exclusiv ely with the first spouse and senior members of the White H ouse along with EOP personnel to implement and execute the first spouse’ s priorities , which reflect the first spouse’ s passions and interes ts and are often identified as important in discussions with the President. Executed well, they can be s trategi - cally useful in accelerating the Administration’ s agenda. Pas t East Wing initiatives have focused on such issues as combating bullying, fighting drug abuse, promo ting literacy , and encouraging physical education for young adults and children. The first spouse is afforded significant resources . His or her s taff also works with the President’ s policy team, members of the Cabinet, and other EOP s taff. A UTHOR’S NO TE: The pr epara tion of this chapter w as a collectiv e ent erprise of individuals inv olv ed in the 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject. All c ontributor s to this chapt er are lis ted at the fr ont of this v olume , but Edwin Meese III, Donald De vine, Ambassador Andr e w Br emberg, and Jona than Bronitsk y deserv e special mention. The author alone assumes r esponsibility for the c onten t of this chapter , and no vie ws e xpr essed her ein should be attribut ed to any other individual. — 48 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise l The Office of F ederal Procurement P olicy (OFPP). l The Office of Performance and P ersonnel Manag ement (OPPM). l The Office of F ederal Financial Management (OFFM). l The Office of the F ederal Chief Information Officer (OFCIO). l The Made in America Office (MIAO), which was added by the Biden Administration and is not a Senate-confirmed slot. Each of these offices has responsibilities and authorities that a President can use to help drive policy across the government. It is vital that the Director and his political staff, no t the careerists , drive these offices in pursuit of the President’ s actual priorities and not le t them set their o wn agenda based on the wishes of the sprawling “good government” management community in and outside of g o vern- ment. Many Directors do not properly prioritize the management portfolio , leaving it to the Deputy for Management, but such neglect creates purposeless bureaucrac y that impedes a President’ s agenda—an “M Train to Nowhere. ” OFPP . This office plays a critical role in leading the development of new policies and regulations concerning federal contracting and procurement. Through the F ederal A cquisition Regulatory Council, which is generally chaired by the OFPP Administrator , OFPP helps the Director to set a wide range of policies for all of those who contract with the executiv e branch. In the past, those governmentwide contracting rules have pla yed a key role in helping to implement the President’ s policy ag enda. This office should be engaged early and often in OMB ’ s effort to drive policy , including by ob taining transparency about entities that are awarded federal contracts and grants and by using government contracts to push back agains t woke policies in corporate America. OPPM . Through this office, the Director helps federal agencies to establish their performance goals and performance review processes. OPPM also works with the U .S . Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish and manage personnel policies and practices across the federal government. The Director should ins truct OPPM to establish annual performance goals and review processes for agencies that reflect the President’ s agenda. OPPM should also be part of the President’ s strategy to se t and enforce sensible policies and practices for the federal workforce. OFFM . This office helps the Director to root out w aste, fraud, and abuse in fed- eral programs—for example, through the Do Not P ay program. It should be part of efforts to sav e precious taxpayer resources . OFCIO . This office guides the federal government’ s use and adop tion of Inter- net-based technologies to impro ve government operations and s ave taxpayer — 49 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject money . As a function of its leadership role, it is critical in interagenc y discussions on a wide range of technology issues. The office thus is an important part of the President’ s efforts to modernize, strengthen, and se t technology -adoption policy for the executiv e branch. MIAO . Building on the example and work of the Trump Administration, Presi- dent Biden established this office to centralize, carry out, and further develop the federal government’ s Buy -American and o ther Made-in-America commitments . Its work ought to be continued and further strengthened. Regulatory and Information P olicy . OMB ’ s OIRA plays an enormous and vital role in reining in the regulatory state and ensuring that regulations achieve important benefits while imposing minimal burdens on Americans . The President should maintain Executiv e Order (EO) 12866 , 4 the foundation of OIRA ’ s review of regulatory actions . The A dminis tration should likewise maintain the recent extension of those s tandards to regulatory actions of the U .S . Department of the Treasury . 5 Regulatory analysis and OIRA review should also be required of the historically “independent” agencies as the Office of Legal Counsel has found is legally permissible. 6 If the current Administration proceeds with its declared intent to modify aspects of EO 12866 or review OMB Circular A-4, 7 the related document that provides the foundation for cos t-benefit analysis , the next President should imme - diately begin to undo those changes and develop a rigorous, data-driven approach that will result in the least burdensome rules possible. The nex t President should also revive the directive in Ex ecutive Order 13891 8 that significant guidance doc - uments also must pass through OIRA review . Because OIRA review often leads to fewer regulatory burdens , more regulatory benefits , and bet ter coordination of regulatory policy , funding for OIRA tends to pay large dividends. Y et over the years , funding for OIRA has diminished. This trend should be reversed. The budget should also include sufficient full-tim e equiv - alent (FTE) employees to form regulatory advance teams that would consult with agencies on cost-benefit analysis and good regulatory practices at the beginning of the rulemaking process for the most important regulations . These teams would help agencies take cost-benefit analysis into account from the beginning of their rulemaking efforts , which in turn would result in higher-quality regulations and a swifter ev entual OIRA review . T o preserve the integrity of OIRA review , the staff who consult at the beginning of a rulemaking should not handle its eventual review . The next President should also reins tate the many ex ecutive orders signed by President Trump that were designed to make the regulatory process more just, efficient, and transparent. Ex ecutive Orders 13 771, 9 13 777 , 10 13891, 11 1389 2, 12 13893 , 13 1392 4 Section 6 , 14 13979 , 15 and 13980 16 should be revived (with modifica - tions as needed). Executiv e Order 13132 17 on federalism should be strengthened so that state regulatory and fiscal operations are no t commandeered by the federal — 50 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise government through so-called cooperative federalism programs . Additionally , the President should revise and sign an updated version of President Ronald Reagan’ s Executiv e Order 12630 18 on federal takings . The next President should s trengthen implementation of the Information Qual - ity Act, 19 robustly use the authority of the P aperwork Reduction Act, 20 carefully enforce the Privacy A ct, 21 and ensure the sound execution of OIRA ’ s s tatistical and other information policy functions . Regulatory cooperation agreements can also promote the further adop tion of good regulatory practices, which impro ve market conditions for America and her allies . OIRA should also work with o ther components of OMB to revise and apply OMB ’ s uniform Guidance for Grants and Agreements 22 and ensure that federal contract and grant guidelines satisfy EO 12866 and other centralized s tandards as appropriate. But executiv e reforms and actions , while vital, are not enough: Congress also must act. The nex t President should work with Congress to pass significant reg - ulatory policy and process reforms, which could go a long way to ward reining in the administrative s tate. Ex cellent examples of such legislation include the Reg - ulatory Accountability A ct, 23 SMAR T A ct, 24 GOOD Act, 25 Early Participation in Regulations Act, 26 Unfunded Mandates Accountability and Transparenc y Act, 27 and REINS Act. 28 Finally , the next President should work with Congress to maximize the utility of the Congressional Review Act (CRA), 29 which allows Congress to undo midnight regulatory actions (including those disguised as “guidance”) on an accelerated timeline. T o leverage the CRA ’ s power to the maximum ex tent, Congress and the President should enact the Midnight Rules Relief Act, 30 which would help to ensure that multiple regulatory actions could be packaged and voted on at the same time. Immediate and robust use of the CRA would allo w the President to focus his rulemaking resources on major new regulatory reforms rather than devoting months or years to undoing the final rulemakings of the Biden Administration. Legislative Clearance and Coordination. OMB plays a critical role in ensur - ing that the executiv e branch is aligned on legislative proposals and language, agenc y tes timonies , and other communications with Congress . The Director should use these authorities to enforce policy and message consistency aggressively and promote the effective engagement of the ex ecutive branch in legislative processes . NA TIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) The National Security Council (NS C) was es tablished by s tatute to support the President in developing and implementing national security policy by coordinating across relevant departments and agencies, integrating authorities and resources toward common ends , and objectively assessing progress to ward established goals. Led b y the National Security Advisor (NSA), the NS C staff will be success - ful in implementing the President’ s national security goals only if it is made up — 51 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject of personnel with technical expertise and experience as well as an alignment to the President’ s declared national security policy priorities. The NSC must then chart a course that articulates and achieves the President’ s national security goals and objectives . The President should empower a s trong NS C that not only has the power to con vene the policy process , but also is entrusted with the full po wer of the presidency to drive the bureaucracy . In organizing ( by means of Presidential Directive 31 ) an NS C s taff that is more responsive and aligned with the President’ s goals and empowered to implement them, the NSA should immediately evaluate and eliminate directorates that are not aligned with the President’ s agenda and replace them with new directorates as appropriate that can drive implementation of the President’ s signature national security priorities . In addition to realigning the staff organization to the President’ s priorities , the NSA should assign responsibility for implementation of specific policy initiatives to senior NS C officials from across the NS C s taff structure. These officials should develop , direct, and execute tangible action plans in coordination with multiple agencies to achieve measurable, time-defined milestones . Aligning NS C s taff to the President’ s national security goals will provide clearer direction, a mandate for action, and a baseline of accountability that can be used to evaluate staff performance and the NSC’ s overall progress . Accountable senior officials , themselves either political appointees or a minimum number of career detailees , who are selected and ve tted politically and report directly to political staff should be the main day -to-day manag ers for interagency coordination and implementation of their assigned national security policy objectives. They should provide policy analysis for consideration by the broader NSC and relevant ag encies and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The accountable senior officials should be established at the direction of the NSA and draw on per - sonnel and expertise from beyond the NS C , including OMB , the National Economic Council, and relevant federal agencies. The NS C s taff and principals should work in tandem with the National Eco - nomic Council and OMB at all levels , presenting a united effort to achieve the President’ s goals and drawing on the latter’ s statutory authorities to guide the bureaucracy . T o accomplish national objectives effectively , foreign policy should fully incorporate the economic instruments of national po wer . National security policy must also include the prioritized allocation of resources . When policies are divorced from the resources required to implement them, they are stillborn—aca - demic ex ercises that undermine our national security and lea ve departments and agencies to their own devices . The accountable senior officials should be empo wered to identify , recruit, clear , and hire staff who are aligned with and willing to shepherd the President’ s national security priorities . NS C staff leads , under the direction of the NSA, should have the discretion to reduce the number of positions that need high-level clearances , — 52 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise and the NS C should be adequately resourced and authorized to adjudicate and hold security clearances internally with inv estigators who work directly for the NS C and whose sole task is to clear NSC officials. If certain s taff are determined not to need high-level clearances , the ques tion becomes whether they should be part of the NS C at all. The NS C should tak e a leading role in directing the drafting and thorough review of all formal strategies: the National Security Strategy , the National Defense Strat - egy , the Nuclear Pos ture Review , the Missile Defense Strategy , etc. In particular , the National Defense Strategy , which b y tradition has evaded significant revi ew , should be prioritized for White House review b y the NS C and OMB . Both should also conduct reviews of operational war plans and global force planning and allo- cations with the Secretary of Defense to align them with presidential priorities and review all key policy and guidance intended for implementation by the heads of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community before they are authorized for distribution. The NSC should rig orously review all general and flag officer promotions to prio ritize the core roles and responsibilities of the military over social engineering and non-defense mat ters , including climate change, critical race theory , manufactured extremism, and o ther polarizing policies that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’ s finest men and women from enlisting to serve in defense of our liberty . The NS C s taff will need to consolidate the functions of both the NSC and the Homeland Security Council (HSC), incorporate the recently established Office of the National Cyber Director , and evaluate the required regional and functional directorates . Given the aforementioned prerequisites , the NSC should be prop - erly resourced with sufficient policy professionals, and the NSA should prioritize staffing the vas t majority of NS C directorates with aligned political appointees and trusted career officials . F or instance, the NSA should return all nonessen - tial detailees to their home agencies on their first da y in office so that the new Administration can proceed efficiently without the personnel land mines left by the previous stewards and as soon as possible should replace all essential detailees with staff aligned to the new President’ s priorities . The HS C has overseen pandemic response, and its incorporation is important. In the end, change requires intervention, and the NS C staff should be appro - priately recruited, manned, and empowered to achieve the President’ s national security and foreign policy objectives and maintain robust policy analysis and discussion while minimizing resistance from those who hav e an agenda or who jealously guard their resources and autonomy at the expense of national security and sound policy development. This resistance and inertia can be inadvertently enabled by a small and unempo wered NS C . Additionally , the White House Chief of Staff and NSA must ensure that the NSC is functioning in tandem with the rest of the White H ouse staff to benefit from — 53 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject the best s trategic thinking of the President’ s top advisers . History sho ws that an unsupervised NSC staff can stra y from its statutory ro le and adversely affect a Pres - ident and his policies . Moreo ver , while the NS C should be fully incorporated into the White House, it should also be allo wed to do its job without the impediment of dually hatted s taff that report to o ther offices . F or instance, the NSC needs its own counsel to inform what legal op tions can be provided to the President. The White House Counsel should be part of that policy process as the President’ s top legal adviser . These recommendations provide a clear road map for rapidly sizing and solidifying the NS C s taff to support and achieve the President’ s objectives beginning on Inauguration Day . NA TIONAL ECONOMIC C OUNCIL (NEC) The National Economic Council is one of the policy councils serving the Pres - ident along with the NS C and the Domes tic Policy Council (DPC). The Director serves as principal adviser to the President on domes tic and international eco - nomic policy and communicates the President’ s economic message to the media. The Deputy Director is responsible for the day -to-day operation of the council, which includes chairing the committee that coordinates economic policy devel - opment at the Deputy Secretary level. In effect, the Director and Deputy Director are the officials who are primarily responsible for the development of economic policymaking for the A dministration. Once a policy is adopted, it is the appropri - ate agenc y ’ s responsibility to implement it. The NEC’ s policy process is also used to determine whe ther the President should support or oppose legislation passed by Congress . In addition to its leadership , the NEC has policy experts (for example, Special Assistants to the President or SAP s) who are responsible for developing and coor - dinating, as well as advising the President, on specific issues . It is essential that the policy expertise of the NEC reflect the current environment’ s mos t pressing issues . T oday , this would include (among other topics) taxes , energy and en vi - ronment, technology , infrastructure, health care, financial services , workforce, agriculture, antitrust and compe tition policy , and retirement programs . NEC’ s SAP s should have a working kn owledge of how the Administration can implement policy through the rulemaking process, although it is no t necessary that they be experts on regulation themselves , particularly given OMB ’ s role. This will facilitate the NEC’ s effectiveness in coordinating Administration policy . The NEC needs to work closely with other offices within the Ex ecutive Office of the President to promo te innovation b y the private sector and create an en vi - ronment that will stimulate economic activity while reducing federal spending and debt. This includes working with the DPC , NS C , OMB , Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs , Office of Cabine t Affairs, White House Counsel, Council on En vironmental Quality , Office of Legislative Affairs , — 54 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise and Office of Science and T echnology Policy . T o this end, the NEC Director should chair a standing mee ting with the principals from each of the other EOP offices to enhance coordination from within the White House. In the past, there has been tension among the DPC , NEC , and NS C ov er juris - diction. It is important to set clear jurisdictions at the s tart of an A dminis tration to prevent needless and counterproductive turf fights . In addition, the Principal Deputy for international economic policy is jointly appointed at NEC and NS C and could end up serving two different interests . T o avoid such problems , international economic policy should be entirely coordinated from NEC . It will be especially important for the NEC to work seamlessly with the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), which provides the President and the White House offices with the latest economic data and forecas ts , as well as estimates of the eco- nomic impact of proposed policies , and prepares the annual Economic Report of the President . The CEA is no t a policy council and therefore does not run policy processes , which is the responsibility of the NEC , DPC , and NS C . Ho wever , the CEA does play a key role in ensuring that an y policy considered by the councils is rigorously evaluated for its economic impacts. The NEC works closely with the White House Office of Communications and Office of Speechwriting to ensure that the White H ouse’ s messaging and media engagement communicate the President’ s economic polic y effectively . The NEC also plays a key role in advancing the President’ s economic agenda by advising the Office of Presidential P ersonnel on appointments to key economic posts , including positions in financial regulatory agencies . The NEC helps to ensure that each economic post is held b y a person who shares the President’ s policy pri- orities and works well with the rest of the Administration’ s economic team. The financial regulators are run partly by civil servants (some of whom were politi - cal appointees in prior liberal Administrations) who often resist a conservative Administration’ s policies. It is therefore critical that an Administration no t only appoints capable individuals to lead these agencies, but also has personnel who can be hired into senior staff positions within the agencies . A few areas will be especially important if the NEC is to develop a well-defined economic policy ag enda. One is the promo tion of innovation as a foundation for economic growth and opportunity . Another is the creation of an en vironment that fosters economi c growth through tax reform and the elim ination of regulatory and procedural barriers . OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENT A TIVE (USTR) The Office of the U .S . Trade Representative provides the President with the internal White House resources necess ary to formulate and ex ecute a unified, whole-of-government approach to trade policy . The President should ensure that the USTR is empowered to serve in that leadership role, much as o ther — 55 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject EOP components organize and drive a coordinated policy agenda on behalf of the President. The P eople’ s Republic of China’ s predatory trade practices have disrup ted the open-market trading s ys tem that has provided mutual benefit to all participating countries—including China—for decades . The failure of the W orld Trade Organi - zation ( WTO) to discipline China for abrogation of its trading commitments has seriously undermined its credibility and made it a largely ineffective institution. The United States , through an empowered USTR, mus t act to rebalance and refocus international trading relationships in favor of democratic nations that embrace free, fair , and open trade principles built on market-driven economies . Chapter 26 of this book outlines recommended trade policy priorities for the incoming President. Ho wever , regardless of the approach, successful implemen - tation of that trade agenda will require the President to articulate a clear polic y direction and instructions for the ex ecutive branch to operate in a coordinated fashion under the leadership of an empowered USTR. T o address these and other challenges, pro tect the American worker , and secure free and open marke ts for our communities and businesses , the next President must leverage the institutional resources and s trength of the USTR and neither allow ins titutional interes ts to drive a fragmented t rade policy that is developed from the ground up nor cater to parochial interests across gov ernment and W ash- ington’ s broader industry of influence. The USTR ’ s mission is vitally important in reorienting the global trading s ystem in a direction that is open, fair , and prosperous. In order to achiev e the President’ s policy g oals , a strong USTR must be empowered to set trade policy from the White House with the authority and resources to represent the interes ts of the Presi - dent’ s trade agenda with adequate budg e t, staff, analysis , and expertise to engage meaningfully in internal and interagenc y policy deliberations . The USTR should organize and harness existing interagency trade committees to serve the Presi - dent’ s trade agenda and drive a consensus among federal stakeholders , dispose of legacy advisory committees with members who serve special interests , direct action to implement policy priorities, measure progress to ward implementing the President’ s agenda, and hold ag encies and officials accountable for delivering the President’ s agenda. The USTR ’ s leadership should no t only coordinate and enforce the President’ s agenda across the federal community , but also set and enforce the President’ s trade agenda internally . Trade policy and priorities should be set by the President and implemented b y the U .S . Trade Representative in cooperation with the other economic and national security officials , not b y the range of g ov ernmental and nongovernmental interests that attemp t to force their policy preferences on the USTR. A strong USTR empow - ered with the necessary resources , authorities , and interagency cooperation will protect U .S . interests in the global marke tplace more effectively . — 56 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise C OUNCIL OF EC ONOMIC AD VISERS ( CEA) Congress established the Council of Economic Advisers in 1946 to advise the President on economic policy based on data, research, and evidence. The CEA is one of the oldest congressionally created offices within the White H ouse complex and plays a broad role in bringing economic expertise to Administration policy across a large rang e of policy areas . The CEA has one presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed chair , two presidentially appointed members who assis t and often have expertise that complements the chair , and appro ximately 40 staff emplo yees . Statutorily , the CEA is charg ed with being the President’ s principal source of economic advice. Ho wever , this role has diminished over time as its policy appraisal and especially formulation and recommendation functions have been taken o ver or diluted by o ther economic policy bodies within the White House. By law , the CEA is required to publish an annual Economic Report of the Pr esident within 10 da ys after submission of the budget. This report is not jus t a messaging document; it is an opportunity to provide greater rigor in support of policy areas that the White House is prioritizing and to build up the ex ternal credibility of those ideas . A future conservative Administration should utilize the CEA as the senior inter - nal White House economis ts much as the White House Counsel’ s office functions as the senior internal White House lawyers . This does not mean that there are no economists in o ther offices . There are, just as there often are lawyers in the policy councils and other White H ouse offices , but the CEA ’ s role, like the White House Counsel’ s , is to employ its unique expertise (particularly on the technical side) to ensure that sound analysis is contributing to and shaping the policy discussion. In practice, this means that CEA staff do no t “coordinate” the policy process in the way that the DPC or NEC would, but they should be integral to the EOP’ s policy development processes . CEA staff should support sound policy development and execu tion by actively contributing to running policy dialogues, proactively ra ising issues that need to be addressed, consulting on questions that arise, and guiding EOP and agenc y officials on the analytical foundations of policy . Structurally , the White House Chief of Staff should ensure that the CEA has a seat at the policymak - ing table on all relevant policy . Senior economists traditionally hav e not gone through the Office of Presidential P ersonnel process and more often than not are hired on an academic- year cycle. As a result, senior economists hired in the summer of a presidential election year tend to remain on staff until the nex t summer even if a President from the opposite party takes power and ins talls a new slate of CEA political appointees for chair , members, etc. Although these hiring practices create some continuity , the presence of senior economists who were never fully v et ted for their alignment with White House policy objectives or who were holdovers from a recently departed Administra - tion can breed skepticism and dis trust of the CEA b y other units within the White — 5 7 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject House, creating the risk that the CEA ’ s role in the policymaking process will be diminished. A future Administration should consider hiring that reflects the White House calendar (mid- J anuary) and inv olves the Office of Presidential P ersonnel. NA TIONAL SP A CE C OUNCIL (NSPC) The National Space Council is responsible for providing advice and recommen - dations to the President on the formulation and implementation of space policy and strategy . It is charged with conducting a whole-of-government app roach to the nation’ s space interests: civil, military , intelligence, commercial, or diplomatic. Historically , it has been chaired by the Vice President at the President’ s direction, and its members consist of members of the Cabinet and o ther senior executiv e branch officials as specified by the President in Ex ecutive Order 13803 . 32 The NSpC’ s purpose is to ensure that the President’ s priorities relative to space are carried out and, as necessary , to resolve policy conflicts among departments and agencies that are related to space. Space projects and programs are risky , complex, expensive, and time consum- ing—although commercial space innovations are lo wering costs and accelerating schedules . Nevertheless , while fiscal discipline should not be ignored, long-term policy stability is crucial to inv estors , inno vators, indus try , and agencies. P olicy stability is easier when policies and programs are aligned with long-term national interests as opposed to those of particular advocacy groups or political factions . The Trump Administration’ s major space policies—including the U .S . Space F orce, the Artemis program to land the next Americans on the moon, and support for a strong commercial space sector —have endured under the Biden Administration. Major challenges remain in implementation and regulatory reform to keep up with rapidly evolving space marke ts and competitors . These include the long-term sustainability of space activities in light of increasing orbital debris; creation of space situational awareness services for civil and commercial uses; management of mega-constellations; licensing of new commercial remo te sensing capabilities; keeping up with licensing demands due to high launch rates; transitioning Inter - national Space Station operations to multiple, privately owned space platforms; and (most important) accelerating the acquisition and fielding of national security space capabilities in response to an increasingly aggressive China. The Vice President should have a clear unders tanding with the National Secu- rity Advisor and the White House Counsel that they and their respective staffs will work within the White House to de termine the scope and leadership of policy reviews that can overlap multiple areas of responsibility . A similar understanding is necessary with the heads of o ther policy councils such as the NEC , DPC , and National Science and T echnology Council (NSTC). As a result of the President’ s direction and the Vice President’ s leadership , the NSpC under the Trump Administration was able to coordinate a wide range of — 64 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe - cially helpful in securing passage of the President’ s legislative agenda. T o the extent that he or she desires , a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy . A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and polic y councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. A UTHOR’S NO TE: Special thanks to those who c ontributed t o this chapter: St ephen Billy , Scott Pac e, Case y Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mik e Duffe y , V ance Ginn, Iain Murra y , Laur a Cunliffe , Mario Lo y ola, Anthony Campau, Paige A gostin, Molly Sik es, Paul Ray , Kenneth A. Kluk o wski, Michael Ant on, Robert Gr eenw a y , V alerie Huber , James Rockas, Paul Winfr ee , Aar on Hedlund, Brian McCormack, Da vid Legat es, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Ka yla T onnessen, Jeffr ey B . Clark, Jonathan W olfson, and Bob Burk ett. — 65 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject ENDNO TES 1. U.S. C onstitution, Article II, Section 1, https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ constitution/ articleii#section1 (acc essed January 30, 20 23). 2. James Madison, The Feder alist P apers No. 4 7 , January 30, 1788, h ttps:/ /f ounders.ar chiv es.go v / documents/ Madison/01- 10-02 -0266 (ac cessed January 30 , 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 134 1(a)(1)(A ) and 1341(a)(1)(B), h ttps:/ / ww w .law .cornell. edu/ uscode/ te x t/31/1341 (acc essed January 30, 20 23); § 1342, https:/ / ww w .law .cornell.edu/ uscode/t e xt/31/1342 (ac cessed January 30 , 2023); and § 1517(a), https:/ / w ww .law .cornell.edu/ uscode/t e xt/31/1517(a) (ac cessed January 30 , 2023). 4. Pr esident William J. Clint on, Ex ecutiv e Or der 12866, “Regulat ory Planning and Re vie w , ” September 30 , 1993, in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 58, No. 190 (Oc tober 4, 199 3), pp. 5173 5–517 44, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/ FR- 1993- 10-04/ pdf/FR- 1993- 10-04.pdf (acces sed March 9 , 2023). 5. Br ent J. McInt osh, Gener al Counsel, Department of the T reasury , and Neomi Rao, Administr at or , Office of Informa tion and Regulat ory Affairs, Memor andum of A gr eement, “The Department of the T r easury and the Office of Management and Budge t Re vie w of T ax Regulations Under Ex ecutive Or der 12866, ” April 11, 20 18, https:/ /home .tr easury .go v / sit es/ default/files/20 18-04/04- 11%20Signed%20T reasury%20OIRA%20MO A.pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 6. See Ste v en A. Engel, Assistant A ttorne y Gener al, Office of L egal Counsel, “Ext ending Regulat ory Re vie w Under Ex ecutiv e Order 12866 t o Independent Regula tory A gencies, ” 43 Op . O.L. C. __ ( Oct. 8, 2019), h ttps:/ / ww w .justice .go v / sit es/ def ault/files/ opinions/ attachments/20 20/12/30 /2019- 10-08-e xtend-r eg-r e view .pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Cir cular A -4, “R egulatory Analy sis, ” Sept ember 17 , 2003, https:/ / ww w . whitehouse.go v / wp-c ontent/ uploads/legacy_drupal_files/ omb/ circular s/ A4/ a-4.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 2023). 8. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Order 138 91, “Promoting the Rule of La w Thr ough Impr o v ed Agenc y Guidance Documents, ” October 9, 20 19, in Feder al Regis ter , V ol. 84, No. 199 ( Oct ober 15, 2019), pp. 55 235– 55238, h ttps:/ /home. tr easury .go v / sites/ default/ files/2018-04/ 04- 11%20Signed%20T r easury%20OIRA%20MO A. pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J . T rump , Executiv e Order 13 771, “Reducing Regulation and C ontr olling Regulat ory Costs, ” January 30, 20 17 , in Federal R egister , V ol. 82, No. 22 (F ebruary 3, 2017 0, pp. 9 339–934 1, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo . go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2017 -02-0 3/ pdf/20 17 -0 2 451.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 2023). 10. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13777 , “Enfor cing the R egulatory R eform A genda, ” F ebruary 24 , 2017 , in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 82, No. 39 (Mar ch 1, 2017), pp. 12285– 12287 , https:/ / ww w .go vinfo. go v / content/ pk g/FR-2017 -03-0 1/ pdf /2017 -0410 7 .pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supr a . 12. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13892, “Pr omoting the Rule of La w Thr ough T r anspar ency and Fairnes s in Civil Administr ativ e Enf or cement and A djudication, ” in Federal Regis ter , V ol. 84, No. 199 ( October 15, 2019), pp. 5 5239–5 52 43, https:/ / w ww .go vinf o.go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2019- 10- 15/ pdf/20 19-2262 4.pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 13. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13893, “Incr easing Go v ernment Ac countabilit y for A dministr ativ e Actions b y R einvigor ating A dministr ativ e P A Y GO , ” Oct ober 10, 2019 , in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 84, No. 200 ( October 16, 20 19), pp. 5548 7 –55488, h ttps:/ / ww w .govin fo. gov / cont ent/ pk g/FR-20 19- 10- 16/ pdf /20 19-227 49 . pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 14. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 1392 4, “R egulatory R elief to Support Ec onomic Rec ov ery , ” May 19, 2020 , in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 20 20), pp. 3135 3–313 56, esp. 31355, h ttps:/ / ww w .govinf o. go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2020-05- 22/ pdf /20 20- 11301.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 20 23). 15. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 139 79, “Ensuring Democr atic A cc ountability in A gency Rulemaking, ” January 18, 20 21, in Feder al Register , V ol. 86, No. 13 ( January 22, 20 21), pp. 6813–6815, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2021-01- 22/ pdf /20 21-01644.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 20 23). 16. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Executiv e Or der 13980 , “Pr otecting Americans fr om Ov er criminalization Thr ough Regulat ory Ref orm, ” January 18, 2021, in F ederal R egister , V ol. 86, No. 13 ( January 22, 2021), pp. 6817 –6820, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/FR- 2021-01- 22/ pdf/20 21-01645.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 2023). — 66 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 17. Pr esident William J. Clint on, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13132, “Feder alism, ” A ugust 4, 1999, in F ederal R egister , V ol. 64, No. 15 3 (Augus t 10, 1999), pp . 43255–43 259, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / content/ pkg/FR- 1999-08- 10 / pdf /99- 20 729 .pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 18. Pr esident Ronald R eagan, Exec utive Or der 126 30, “Go vernmental A ctions and Interf er ence with Constitutionally Pr ot ected Pr operty Rights, ” March 15, 1988, in Feder al Register , V ol. 53, No . 53 (Mar ch 18, 1988), pp. 8859–8862, ht tps:/ / www .regulation writers. com/ downloads/Ex ecutiv e_Or ders/E O_12630 .pdf (acc essed January 31, 2023). 19. Section 115 in H.R. 45 77 , Consolida ted Appr opriations A ct, 2001, Public La w No. 106-544, 106th Congr ess, December 21, 2000 , https:/ / ww w .congr ess.go v /106/ pla ws/ publ554/PLA W - 106publ554.pdf (acces sed January 31, 2023). 20. H.R. 6410 , Paperw ork Reduction A ct of 1980 , Public Law No . 96-511, 96th Congr ess, Dec ember 11, 1980, ht tps:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v / 96/ statute/S T A TUTE-94/S T A TUTE-94-Pg2812.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 20 23). 21. S. 3418, An A ct to Amend T itle 5, United Stat es Code , by A dding a Section 55 2a, to Safeguar d Individual Priv acy fr om the Misuse of Feder al Rec or ds, to Pr o vide that Individuals Be Gr anted A cc ess to R ecor ds Conc erning Them Which Ar e Maintained b y Feder al A gencies, to Establish a Priv acy Pr ot ection Study Commission, and f or Other Purposes (Privac y Ac t of 197 4), Public La w No. 93-5 79, 93r d C ongres s, December 31, 19 7 4, https:/ / ww w .congr ess. gov /9 3/ statute/ ST A TUTE-88/S T A TUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 2023). 22. Office of Management and Budge t, “Guidance f or Gran ts and Agr eements, ” Final Guidance, Feder al R egister , V ol. 85, No. 15 7 (A ugust 13, 2020), pp . 49506–4 9582, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo. go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2020-08- 13/ pdf /2020- 17 468.pdf (accessed January 31, 20 23), and “Guidance f or Gran ts and Agr eements, ” Corr ecting Amendments, Feder al Regist er , V ol. 86, No. 33 (February 22, 20 21), pp. 10439– 10440, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo . go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2021-0 2- 22/ pdf /2021-0 2969 .pdf (acces sed January 31, 2023). 23. H.R. 5, Regulat ory Ac countabilit y Act of 20 17 , 115th Congr ess, intr oduced January 3, 20 17 , https:/ / www . congr ess.go v /bill/115th-congr ess/house-bill/5 (ac cessed January 31, 20 /23), and S. 951, R egulatory Ac countabilit y Act of 20 17 , 115th Congr ess, intr oduced April 26, 20 17 , https:/ / www .congr ess.go v /bill/115th- congr ess/ senate-bill/ 951 (acc essed January 31, 2023). 24. S. 2314, Social Media Addic tion Reduction T echnology Act ( SMART Ac t), 116th Congr ess, intr oduced July 30 , 2019, h ttps:/ / ww w .congr ess.go v /bill/116th-congr ess/ senate-bill/2314/ te x t (accessed January 31, 20 23). 25. H.R. 1605, Guidance Out of Darkness A ct ( GOOD A ct), 117th Congr ess, intr oduc ed March 8, 20 21, https:/ / ww w . congr ess.go v /bill/117th-congr ess/house-bill/1605 (acc essed January 31, 2023). 26. S. 2804, Early Participation in R egulations Ac t of 2021, 117th Congr ess, intr oduc ed September 22, 20 21, https:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v /bill/117th-c ongress/ senate-bill/2804 (acc essed January 31, 2023). 27. S. 170 , Unfunded Mandat es Ac countabilit y and T ranspar ency A ct, 117th Congr ess, intr oduc ed February 2, 2021, https:/ / ww w .congr ess. gov /bill/117th-congr ess/ senate-bill/17 0 (acc essed January 31, 2023). 28. H.R. 277 , Regulations fr om the Ex ecutiv e in Need of Scrutiny A ct of 20 23 (REINS Act), 118th C ongres s, intr oduced January 11, 20 23, https:/ / ww w .congr ess.go v /bill/118th-congr ess/house-bill/277 / all-info ?r=217 (acc essed January 31, 2023). 29. Subtitle E, “Congr essional R e view , ” in H.R. 3136, Contr act with America A dvanc ement A ct of 1996, Public Law No. 104- 121, 104th Congr ess, Mar ch 29, 1996, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/PLA W- 104publ121/ pdf / PLA W - 104publ121.pdf (accessed January 31, 20 23). 30. H.R. 115, Midnight Rules Relief A ct of 2023, 118th Congr ess, in troduc ed January 9, 20 23, https:/ / ww w .congr ess. go v /bill/118th-c ongres s/house-bill/115/t ex t?s=1&r=18 (acc essed January 31, 2023). 31. See Feder ation of American Scientists, Int elligence R esourc e Pr ogram, “Pr esidential Dir ectiv es and Ex ecutiv e Or ders, ” ht tps:/ /irp.f as.or g/ offdocs/ direct.htm (ac cessed F ebruary 1, 2023), and Libr ary of Congr ess, Resear chers, Ne wspaper and Curr ent P eriodical Reading Room, “Pr esidential Dir ectiv es and Wher e t o Find Them, ” Mar ch 30 , 2022, https:/ / ww w .loc.go v / rr / new s/ dir ectiv es.html (ac cessed F ebruary 1, 2023). 32. President Donald J . T rump, Executiv e Or der 1380 3, “Re viving the National Space C ouncil, ” June 30 , 2017 , in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 82, No. 129 ( July 7 , 2017), pp. 31429– 31432, h ttps:/ / ww w .govinf o.go v / conten t/ pk g/FR- 2017 -07 -0 7 / pdf/2017 - 14378.pdf (ac cessed F ebruary 1, 2023). — 6 7 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 33. H.R. 10230, National Scienc e and T echnology Policy , Or ganization, and Priorities Act of 19 7 6, Public La w No. 94-282, 94th C ongres s, May 11, 19 7 6, https:/ / ww w .c ongres s.go v / 94/ statute/ ST A TUTE-90/ ST A TUTE-90-Pg459 . pdf (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 34. H.R. 4346, CHIPS [Cr eating Help ful Incentiv es to Pr oduc e Semiconduct ors] and Scienc e Ac t, Public Law No. 117 - 16 7 , 117th Congr ess, August 9 , 2022, https:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v /117 / plaws/ publ167 /PLA W- 117publ167 .pdf (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 35. S. 169, Global Change Resear ch A ct of 1990 , Public Law No. 10 1-606, 101st C ongr ess, No vember 16, 1990 , https:/ / ww w .congr ess. gov /101/ statute/ ST A TUTE- 104/ST A TUTE- 104-Pg3096.pdf (accessed F ebruary 1, 2023). 36. S. 107 5, National En vironmen tal Policy A ct of 1969 , Public Law No. 91- 190, 91s t Congr ess, January 1, 19 70 , https:/ / uscode.house .go v / statut es/ pl/ 91/190.pdf (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 37. Andrus v . Sierr a Club , 442 U.S. 34 7 , 358 (19 79), h ttps:/ / tile.loc.go v / st or age-services/ service/ll/ usrep/ usrep442/ usr ep44234 7 / usr ep44234 7 .pdf (acc essed Mar ch 7 , 2023). 38. Title XLI ( 41) in H.R. 22, Fixing America’ s Surface T ransporta tion Act (F AST A ct), Public La w No. 114-94, 114th Congr ess, Dec ember 4, 2015, https:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v /114/ statut e/S T A TUTE- 129/S T A TUTE- 129-Pg1312.pdf (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 39. President Donald J . T rump, Executiv e Or der 1380 7 , “Establishing Discipline and A ccoun tability in the Envir onmental R evie w and Permit ting Proc ess for In fras tructur e Projec ts, ” Augus t 15, 2017 , in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 82, No. 163 (A ugust 2 4, 2017), pp . 40463–40469 , https:/ / ww w .go vinfo. go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2017 -08-2 4/ pdf /2017 - 18134.pdf (ac cessed F ebruary 1, 2023). 40. H.R. 5210 , Anti-Drug Abuse of 1988, Public Law No . 100-690 , 100th Congr ess, No v ember 18, 1988, https:/ / ww w . congr ess.go v /100/ statute/ ST A TUTE- 102/S T A TUTE- 102-Pg4 181.pdf (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 41. Pr esident Joseph R. Biden Jr ., Executiv e Order 14020 , “Establishment of the Whit e House Gender Policy Council, ” March 8, 2021, in F ederal R egister , V ol. 86, No. 46 (Mar ch 11, 2021), pp . 137 97 – 13801, https:/ / ww w . go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/FR- 2021-0 3- 11/ pdf/20 21-05183.pdf (ac cessed January 31, 20 23). 42. U.S. C onstitution, Amendment XX V , https:/ / ww w .law .cornell. edu/ constitution/ amendmentxxv (ac cessed Mar ch 9, 2023). 43. 50 U.S. C. § 3021( c)(1), https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ uscode/t ex t/50/ 3021 (acc essed Mar ch 9, 20 23). 44. 20 U.S. C. § 20(a), https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ uscode/t ex t/20/ 42#:~:t e xt=The%20business%20of%20the%20 Institution%20shall%20be%20conduc ted,no%20tw o%20of%20them%20of%20the%20same%20Stat e (acc essed Mar ch 9, 2023). 45. Vice Pr esidents Ger ald F ord and L yndon Johnson assumed (For d) or initially assumed ( Johnson) the offic e of the pr esidency b y a proc ess of succ ession. — 69 — 3 CENTRAL PERSONNEL A GENCIES: MANA GING THE BUREA UCRA CY Donald De vine , Dennis Dean Kirk, and Paul Dans O VERVIEW F rom the very first Mandate f or Leader ship , the “personnel is policy ” theme has been the fundamental principle guiding the government’ s personnel management. As the U .S . Constitution makes clear , the President’ s appointment, direction, and removal author - ities are the central elements of his executiv e power . 1 In implementing that power , the people and the President deserve the most talented and responsible workforce possible. Who the President assigns to design a nd implement his political policy agenda will determine whe ther he can carry out the responsibility given to him b y the American people. The President must recognize that whoever holds a gov ernment position sets its policy . T o fulfill an electoral mandate, he must therefore giv e per- sonnel management his highest priority , including Cabinet-level precedence. The federal government’ s immense bureaucracy spreads into hundreds of agen - cies and thousands of units and is centered and o verseen at the top by k ey central personnel agencies and their g o verning laws and regulations . The major separate personnel agencies in the national g o vernment today are: l The Office of Personnel Management (OPM); l The Merit Systems Pro tection Board (MSPB); l The F ederal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA); and l The Office of Special Counsel (OS C). — 7 0 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise Title 5 of the U .S . Code charg es the OPM with ex ecuting, administering, and enforcing the rules , regulations , and laws governing the civil service. 2 It grants the OPM direct responsibility for activities like retirement, pa y , health, training, federal unionization, suitability , and classification functions not specifically granted to other agencies by statute. The agency ’ s Director is charged with aiding the President, as the President may reques t, in preparing such civil s ervice rules as the President pre - scribes and otherwise advising the President on actions that may be tak en to promote an efficient civil service and a sys tematic application of the merit s ystem principles , including recommending policies relating to the selection, promotion, transfer , per - formance, pay , conditions of service, tenure, and separation of employees . The MSPB is the lead adjudicator for hearing and resolving cases and contro - versies for 2.2 million federal employees . 3 It is required to conduct fair and neutral case adjudications , regulatory reviews, and actions and studies to impro ve the workforce. Its court-like adjudications in vestigate and hear appeals from agency actions such as furloughs , suspensions , demotions , and terminations and are appealable to the U .S . Court of Appeals. The FLRA hears appeals of agency personnel cases involving federal labor griev - ance procedures to provide judicial review with binding decisions appealable to appeals courts . 4 It interprets the rights and duties of agencies and employee labor organizations—on management rights, OPM interpre tations , recognition of labor organizations , and unfair labor practices—under the general principle of bargain- ing in good faith and compelling need. The OS C serves as the in ves tigator , mediator , publisher , and prosecutor before the MSPB with respect to agenc y and emplo yees regarding prohibited person - nel practices , Hatch A ct 5 politicization, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act 6 issues, and whis tleblower complaints . 7 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has general respon - sibility for reviewing charges of employee discrimination against all civil rights breaches . Ho wever , it also administers a government emplo yee section that inves ti - gates and adjudicates federal employee complaints concerning equal emplo yment violations as with the private sector . 8 This makes the agency an additional de facto factor in government personnel management. While not a personnel agency per se, the General Services Administration (GSA) is charged with g eneral supervision of contracting. 9 T oday , there are many more contractors in government than there are civil service employees . The GSA must therefore be a part of any personnel management discussion. ANAL Y SIS AND REC OMMEND A TIONS OPM: Managing the F ederal Bureaucracy . A t the very pinnacle of the modern progressive program to make gov ernment competent stands the ideal of professionalized, career civil service. Since the turn of the 20th century , — 71 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject progressives have sought a s ys tem that could effectively select, train, reward, and guard from partisan influence the neutral scientific experts they believe are required to staff the national government and run the adminis trative s tate. Their U .S . sys tem was initiated by the P endle ton A ct of 1883 10 and ins titutionalized by the 1930s New Deal to set principles and practices that were meant to ensure that expert merit rather than partisan fav ors or personal favoritism ruled within the federal bureaucracy . Y et, as public frus tration with the civil service has grown, generating calls to “drain the swamp , ” it has become clear that their project has had serious unintended consequences . The civil service was devised to replace the amateurism and presumed corrup- tion of the old spoils sys tem, wherein government jobs rewarded loyal partis ans who might or might not hav e professional backgrounds . Although the sys tem appeared to be sufficient for the nation’ s first century , progressive intellectuals and activists demanded a more professionalized, scientific, and politically neutral Administration. Progressives designed a merit sys tem to promote expertise and shield bureaucrats from partisan political pressure, but it soon began to insulate civil servants from accountability . The modern merit system increasingly made it almost impossible to fire all but the mos t incompetent civil servants . Complying with arcane rules regarding recruiting, rating, hiring, and firing simply replaced the goal of cultivating competence and expertise. In the 1970s , Georgia Democratic Governor J imm y Carter , then a political unknown, ran for President supporting New Deal programs and their Great Soci- ety expansion but opposing the wa y they were being administered. The policies were not actually reducing po verty , increasing prosperity , or improving the envi- ronment, he argued, and to make them work required fundamental bureaucratic reform. He correctly charged that almost all go vernment employees were rated as “successful, ” all received the same pay regardless of performance, and ev en the worst were impossible to fire—and he won the presidency . President Carter fulfilled his campaign promise by hiring Syracuse University Dean Alan Campbell, who served first as Chairman of the U .S . Civil Service Com - mission and then as Director of the OPM and helped him devise and pass the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) 11 to reset the basic s tructure of today ’ s bureau- cracy . A new performance appraisal s ystem w as devised with a five rather than three distribution of rating categories and individual goals more related to ag ency missions and more related to employee promo tion for all. P ay and benefits were based directly on improved performance apprais als (including sizable bonuses) for mid-level managers and senior executives . But time ran out on President Carter before the act could be fully ex ecuted, so it was left to President Ronald Reagan and his new OPM and agenc y leadership to implement. Overall, the new law seemed to work for a few years under Reagan, but the Carter – Reagan reforms were dissipated within a decade. T oday , employee evaluation is back — 72 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise to pre-reform levels with almost all rated successful or abo ve, frus trating any rela - tion between pa y and performance. An “outstanding ” rating should be required for Senior Executiv e Service (SES) chiefs to win big bonuses , but a few years ago , when it was disclosed that the V eterans Administration executiv es who encouraged false reporting of waiting lists for hospital admission were rated outs tanding, the Senior Executiv e Association justified it, telling Congress that only outs tanding performers would be promoted to the SES in the firs t place and that precise ratings were unnec - essary . 12 The Government A ccountability Office (GAO), ho wever , has reported that pay raises , within-grade pay increases , and locality pay for regular emplo yees and executiv es have become automatic rather than based on performance—as a result of most emplo yees being rated at similar appraisal levels . 13 OPM: Merit Hiring in a Merit Sy stem. It should no t be impossible even for a large national g o vernment to hire good people through merit selection. The government did so for years , but it has prov en difficult in recent times to select personnel based on their knowledge, skills , and abilities (KSA) as the law dictates . Y et for the pas t 34 years , the U .S . civil service has been unable to distinguish con - sistently be tween strong and unqualified applicants for emplo yment. As the Carter presidency was winding down, the U .S. Department of J ustice and top lawyers at the OPM contrived with plaintiffs to end civil service IQ exam- inations because of concern about their possible impact on minorities . The OPM had used the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (P ACE) gen - eral intelligence exam to select college graduates for top agenc y emplo yment, but Carter Administration officials—probably without the President’ s informed con - currence—abolished the P ACE through a legal consent court decree capitulating to demands by civil rights pe titioners who contended that it was discriminatory . The judicial decree was to last only fiv e years but still controls federal hiring and is applied to all KSA tests even toda y . General ability tests lik e the P ACE have been used successfully to assess the use - fulness and cost-effectiveness of broad intellectual qualities across man y separate occupations . Courts have ruled that even without evidence of overt, intentional discrimination, such results might suggest discrimination. This doctrine of dispa- rate impact could be ended legislatively or at least narro wed through the regulatory process by a future Administration. In an y event, the federal government has been denied the use of a rigorous entry examination for three decades, relying ins tead on self-evaluations that have forced managers to resort to subterfuge such as preselecting friends or associates that they believe are competent to ob tain qual- ified employees . In 2015 , President Barack Obama’ s OPM began to introduce an impro ved merit examination called USAHire, which it had been te sting quie tly since 2012 in a few agencies for a dozen job descriptions . The tes ts had multiple-choice questions with only one correct answer . Some questions even required essay replies: ques tions — 7 3 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject that would change regularly to depress cheating. President Donald Trump’ s OPM planned to implement such changes but was delayed because of legal concerns over possible disparate impact. Courts have a greed to review the consent decree if the Unifor m Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures se tting the technical requirements for sound exams are reformed. A government that is unable to select employees based on KSA-like tes t qualifications cannot work, and the OPM mus t move forw ard on this very basic personnel management obligation. The Centrality of P erformance Appraisal. In the meantime, the OPM mus t manage the workforce it has. Before they can reward or discipline federal emplo yees , managers must first identify who their top performers are and who is performing less than adequately . In fact, as Ludwig von Mises proved in his classic Bureaucr acy , 14 unlike the profit-and-loss evaluation tool used in the private sector , government performance measurement depends to tally on a functioning apprais al sys tem. If they cannot be identified in the firs t place within a functioning appraisal s ystem, it is impossible to reward good performance or correct poor performance. The problem is that the collegial atmosphere of a bureaucracy in a multifaceted apprais al sys tem that is open to appeals makes this a very challenging ideal to implement successfully . The GAO reported more recently that o verly high and widely spread perfor - mance ratings were again plaguing the government, wi th more than 99 percent of employees rated fully successful or abo ve by their managers , a mere 0 .3 percent rated as minimally successful, and 0 .1 percent actually rated unacceptable. 15 Why ? It is human nature that no one appreciates being told that he or she is less than outstanding in every w ay . Informing subordinates in a closely knit bureaucracy that they are not performing well is difficult. Rating compatrio ts is even consid - ered rude and unprofessional. Moreo ver , manag ers can be and often are accused of racial or sexual discrimination for a poor rating, and this discourages honesty . In 2018 , President Trump issued Executiv e Order 13839 16 requiring agen - cies to reduce the time for employees to impro ve performance before corrective action could be taken; to initiate disciplinary actions against poorly performing employees more expeditiously; to reiterate that agencies are obligated to make employees impro ve; to reduce the time for employees to respond to allegations of poor performance; to mandate that agencies remind supervisors of expiring employee probationary periods; to prohibit agencies from entering into set tlement agreements that modify an employee’ s personnel record; and to reevaluate proce- dures for agencies to discipline supervisors who retaliate against whis tleblowers . Unfortunately , the order was overturned b y the Biden Administration, 17 so it will need to be reintroduced in 2025 . The fact remains that meaningfully evaluating employees’ performance is a critical part of a manager ’ s job . In the Reagan appraisal process , manag ers were evaluated on ho w they themselves rated their subo rdinates . This is critical to — 80 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise independent constitutional s tatus nor separate moral legitimacy . Therefore, career civil servants by themselves should no t lead major policy chang es and reforms . The creation of the Senior Executiv e Service was the top career change intro - duced by the 1978 Carter –Campbell Civil Service Reform A ct. Its aim w as to professionalize the career service and make it more responsible to the democrat- ically elected commander in chief and his politic al appointees while respecting the rights due to career employees , very much including those in the top positions . The new SES would allow management to be more flexible in filling and reassigning executiv e positions and locations beyond narrow specialties for more efficient mission accomplishment and would provide pay and large bonuses to motivate career performance. The desire to infiltrate political appointees improperly into the high career civil service has been widespread in every Administration, whether Democrat or Republican. Democratic Administrations, ho wever , are typically more successful because they require the cooperation of careerists , who generally lean heavily to the Left. Such burrowing-in requires career job descrip tions for new positions that closely mirror the functions of a political appointee; a special hiring authority that allows the b ypassing of veterans’ preference as well as o ther preference categories; and the ability to frustrate career candidates from taking the desired position. President Reagan’ s OPM began by limiting such SES burro wing-in, arguing that the proper course was to create and fill political positions . This simultane - ously promotes the CSRA principle of political leadership of the bureaucracy and respects the professional autonomy of the career service. But this requires that career SES employees should respect political rights too . A ctions such as career staff reserving ex cessive numbers of key policy positions as “career reserved” to deny them to noncareer SES emplo yees frustrate CSRA intent. Ano ther evasion is the general domination by career staff on SES personnel evaluation boards, the opposite of noncareer executiv es dominating these critical meeting discussions as expected in the SES . Career training also often underplays the political role in leadership and inculcates career-firs t policy and value viewpoints. F rustrated with these activities by top career ex ecutives , the Trump Adminis - tration issued Executiv e Order 13957 24 to make career professionals in positions that are not normally subject to change as a result of a presidential transition but who discharge significant duties and exercise significant discretion in formulating and implementing executiv e branch policy and programs an exception to the com - petitive hiring rules and examinations for career positions under a new Schedule F . It ordered the Director of OPM and agenc y heads to se t procedures to prepare lists of such confidential, policy -determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating positions and prepare procedures to create ex ceptions from c ivil service rules when careerists hold such positions , from which they can relocate back to the regular civil service after such service. Th e order was subsequently rev ersed by President — 81 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Biden 25 at the demand of the civil service associations and unions . It should be reinstated, but SES responsibility should come firs t. Managing P ersonnel in a Union En vironment. Historically , unions were thought to be incompatible with government management. There is a natural limit to the bargaining power of private-sector unions , but the financial bo ttom line of public-sector unions is not similarly cons trained. If private-sector unions push too hard a bargain, they can so harm a company or so reduce efficiency that their employer is forced to go out of business and eliminate union jobs altogether . There is no such limit in government, which cannot go out of business , so demands can be excessiv e without negatively affecting employee and union bo ttom lines . Even Democratic President F ranklin Roosevelt considered union representa- tion in the federal gover nment to be incompatible with democracy . Striking and even threats of bargaining and delay were considered acts agains t the people and thus improper . It was not until President J ohn K ennedy that union representation in the federal government was recognized—and then merely by ex ecutive order . Labor bargaining was not se t in statute until the Carter Administration was forced by Congress to do so in order to pass the CSRA, although all bargaining was placed under OPM review . The CSRA was able to maintain strong management rights for the OPM and agencies and forbade collective bargaining on pay and benefits as well as manage- ment prerogatives . Over time, OPM, FLRA, and agencies’ personnel offices and courts , especially in Democratic A dminis trations , narrowed management rights so that labor bargaining expanded as management rights contracted. But the man - agement rights are still in statute, hav e been enforced by some Administrations , and should be enforced again by an y future OPM and agenc y managements , which should not be intimidated b y union power . Rather than being daunted, President Trump issued three executiv e orders: l Executive Order 13836 , encouraging ag encies to renegotiate all union collective bargaining agreements to ensure consistency with the law and respect for management rights; 26 l Executive Order 1383 7 , encouraging agencies to prevent union representatives from using official time preparing or pursuing grievances or from engaging in other union activity on government time; 27 and l Executive Order 13839 , encouraging agencies both to limit labor grievances on removals from service or on challenging performance apprais als and to prioritize performance ov er seniority when deciding who should be retained following reductions-in-force. 28 — 82 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise All were revoked b y the Biden A dminis tration 29 and should be reinstated b y the next Administration, to include the immediate appointment of the FLRA General Counsel and reactivation of the Impasses P anel. Congress should also consider whether public-sector unions are appropriate in the first place. The bipartis an consensus up until the middle of the 20th cen - tury held that these unions were not compatible with cons titutional government. 30 After more than half a century of experience with public-sector union frustrations of good g o vernment management, it is hard to avoid reaching the same conclusion. F ully Staffing the Ranks of P olitical Appointees . The President must rely legally on his top department and agenc y officials to run the government and on top White House s taff employees to coordinate operations through regular Cabine t and other mee tings and communications . Without this political leadership , the career civil service becomes empowered to lead the ex ecutive branch without democratic legitimacy . While many obs tacles stand in his w ay , a President is constitutionally and statutorily required to fill the top political positions in the ex ecutive branch both to assis t him and to provide o verall legitimacy . Mos t Presidents have had some difficulty ob taining congressional approval of their appointees , but this has worsened recently . After the 2016 election, President Trump faced special hostility from the opposition party and the media in g e tting his appointees confirmed or even considered by the Senate. His early Office of Presidential P ersonnel (PPO) did not generally remove political appointees from the previous A dminis tration but instead relied mostly on prior political appoin - tees and career civil servants to run the government. Such a reliance on holdov ers and bureaucrats led to a lack of agency control and the absolute refusal of the Acting Attorney General from the Obama Administration to obey a direct order from the President. Under the early PPO , the Trump A dministration appointed fewer political appointees in its first few months in office than had been appointed in an y recent presidency , partly because of historically high partis an congressional obstructions but also because several officials announced that they preferred fewer political appointees in the agencies as a way to cut federal spending. Whatever the reasoning, this had the effect of permanently hampering the rollout of the new Presiden t’ s agenda. Thus, in those critical early years , much of the government relied on senior careerists and holdo ver Obama appointees to carry out the sensitive responsibili- ties that would otherwise belong to the new President’ s appointees . F ortunately , the later PPO , OPM, and Senate leadership began to cooperate to build a strong team to implement the President’ s personnel appointment agenda. Any new Administration would be wise to learn that it will need a full cadre of sound political appointees from the beginning if it expects to direct this enormous federal bureaucracy . A close relationship between the PPO at the White House and the OPM, coordinating with agenc y assis tant secretaries of adminis tration — 83 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject and PPO’ s chosen White House Liaisons and their s taff at each agenc y , is essential to the management of this larg e, multilevel, resis tant, and bureaucratic challenge. If “personnel is policy ” is to be our general guide, it would make sense to give the President direct supervision of the bureaucracy with the OPM Director available in his Cabinet. A REFORMED BUREA UCRA CY T oday , the federal g o vernment’ s bureaucracy cannot even mee t its own civil service ideals . The merit criteria of ability , knowledge, and skills are no long er the basis for recruitment, selection, or advancement, while pay and benefits for com- parable work are substantially abo ve those in the private sector . Retention is not based primarily on performance, and for the most part, inadequate performance is not appraised, corrected, or punished. The authors have made man y suggestions here that, if implemented, could bring that bureaucracy more under control and enable it to work more efficiently and responsibly , which is especially required for the half of civilian g o vernment that administers its undeniable responsibilities for defense and foreign affairs . While a bet ter administered central bureaucracy is crucial for both those and domestic responsibilities , the problem of properly running the government goes beyond simple bureaucratic adminis tration. The specific deficiencies of the fed - eral bureaucracy—size, levels of organization, inefficiency , expense, and lack of responsiveness to political leadership—are rooted in the progressiv e ideology that unelected experts can and should be trusted to promo te the general welfare in just about every area of social life. The Constitution, ho wever , reserved a few enumerated powers to the federal government while leaving the great majority of domes tic activities to state, local, and private governance. As J ames Madison explained: “The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects , which, in the ordinary course of affairs , concern the lives , liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order , improvement and prosperity of the s tate. ” 31 Modern progressive politics has simply given the nat ional government more to do than th e complex separa - tion-of-powers Cons titution allows . That progressive s ystem has broken do wn in our time, and the only real solution is for the national government to do less: to decentralize and privatize as much as possible and then ensure that the remaining bureaucracy is manag ed effectively along the lines of the enduring principles set out in de tail here. A UTHORS’ NO TE: The authors ar e gr ateful f or the collabor ativ e w ork of the individuals list ed as contribut ors to this chapter f or the 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject. The author s alone assume r esponsibility for the c ontent of this chapter , and no views e xpr essed her ein should be attribut ed to an y other individual. — 84 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise ENDNO TES 1. U.S. C onstitution, Article II, Section 2, https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ constitution/ articleii#section1 (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 2. 5 U.S. C ode §§ 1101 et seq. and 1103(a)(5), https:/ / ww w .law .cornell. edu/ usc ode/te xt/5/ part-II/ chapter- 11 (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 3. 5 U.S. Code § 1201, h ttps:/ / www .law .cornell. edu/ usc ode/te xt/5/1201 (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 4. 5 U.S. C ode § 7101, https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ usc ode/t e xt/5/ 7101 (acc essed February 1, 2023), and § 7117 , https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ uscode/te xt/5/7117 (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 5. S. 1871, An A ct to Pr e v ent Pernicious Political A ctivities, Public La w No. 7 6-25 2, August 2, 19 39, h ttps:/ / go vtrack us.s3.amazona ws.c om/legislink/ pdf / stat/53 /ST A TUTE-5 3-Pg114 7 .pdf (accessed F ebruary 1, 2023). 6. H.R. 995, Uniformed Services Emplo yment and Reemplo yment Rights Ac t of 1994, Public Law No . 103- 35 3, 101st C ongr ess, October 13, 1994, h ttps:/ / www .congr ess.go v /103/ statute/ ST A TUTE- 108/ST A TUTE- 108-Pg3149. pdf (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 7. 5 U.S. Code § 1206, h ttps:/ / ww w .law .cornell. edu/ uscode/ te xt/ 5/1206 (acc essed February 1, 20 23). 8. 42 U.S. C ode § 2000e, https:/ / ww w .law .cornell.edu/ uscode/t e xt/ 42/2000e (ac cessed F ebruary 1, 2023). 9. 40 U.S. Code § 581, https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ uscode/t ex t/ 40/581 (ac cessed F ebruary 1, 2023). 10. U.S. National Ar chiv es, “Milest one Documents: Pendlet on Act (1883), ” last r evie w ed February 8, 20 22, https:/ / ww w .ar chives. go v / milestone-documents/ pendleton-act (ac cessed F ebruary 2, 2023). 11. S. 2640, Civil Servic e Ref orm Act of 19 7 8, Public Law No . 95-454, 95th Congr ess, Oct ober 13, 19 78, https:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v / 95/ statute/ ST A TUTE-92/ ST A TUTE-92 -Pg1111.pdf (acc essed February 2, 20 23). 12. Dono van Sack and Bill Theobald, “V eter ans A ffairs Pa ys $ 140 Million in Bonuses Amid Scandals, ” USA T oday , No v ember 11, 2015, https:/ / ww w .usatoda y .c om/ s tory / ne ws/ politics/ 2015/11/11/ v et er ans-affair s-pay s- 142- million-bonuses-amid-scandals/7 55 37 586/ (acc essed Mar ch 15, 2023). 13. U.S. Go v ernment A ccoun tability Office , “Feder al W orkforc e: Distribution of Perf ormance Ratings A cr oss the Feder al Go v ernment, 2013, ” GA O- 16-5 20R, May 9 , 2016, https:/ / ww w .gao.go v / asse ts/ gao- 16-520r .pdf (acc essed Mar ch 15, 2023); U.S. Go vernment A cc ountability Office , Results -Oriented Management: OPM Needs to Do Mor e to Ensur e Meaningful Distinctions Ar e Made in SES Ratings and Performanc e A w ards , GA O- 15- 189, January 20 15, https:/ / ww w .gao.go v / assets/ gao- 15- 189.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 15, 20 23); U.S. Go v ernment Ac countabilit y Office, “Measuring F eder al Emplo yee P erformance , ” W atchBlog, post ed October 18, 20 16, https:/ / ww w .gao.go v /blog/2016/10 /18/ measuring-feder al-emplo y ee-performanc e (acces sed March 15 , 2023); Lisa Rein, “The F eder al W orkf orc e, Wher e E v ery one’ s Perf ormance Gets Ra v e Re vie ws, ” The W ashington Post , June 13, 2016, https:/ / ww w . washingtonpos t.com/ new s/ po w erpost/ wp/2016/06/13/her es -the-new s-fr om-the- feder al-go v ernment- wher e-ev ery one-is- abo ve- av er age-w a y-abo v e/ (ac cessed Mar ch 15, 2023). 14. Ludwig v on Mises, Bureaucr acy (Ne w Ha v en, CT : Y ale Univ ersity Pr ess, 1944), ht tps:/ /ia902300 .us.ar chiv e. or g/17 /items/ mises -pdfs/1944-01-01_LudwigV onMises_Bureaucr ac y .pdf (accessed F ebruary 2, 2023). 15. Figur e 1, “Permanent, Non-Senior Ex ecutiv e Servic e Employ ee Performance Rating Out comes ( All Rating S yst ems, Calendar Y ear 2013), ” in U.S. Go v ernment A cc ountability Offic e, “Feder al W orkfor ce: Distribution of Performanc e Ratings A cross the F eder al Go v ernment, 2013, ” p . 6. 16. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13839, “Pr omoting Ac countabilit y and Str eamlining Remo v al Pr ocedur es Consist ent with Merit S y stem Principles, ” May 25, 2018, in F ederal R egister , V ol. 83, No. 106 ( June 1, 2018), pp. 25 343– 2534 7 , https:/ / ww w .go vinfo. go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2018-06-01/ pdf/ 2018- 11939.pdf (ac cessed February 2, 20 23). 17. Pr esident Joseph R. Biden Jr ., Executiv e Order 14003, “Pr ot ecting the Feder al W orkfor ce, ” January 22, 2021, in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 86, No. 16 ( January 27 , 2021), pp. 7 231– 7 233, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/FR- 2021-01- 27 / pdf/ 2021-019 2 4.pdf (acc essed February 2, 20 23). 18. Rachel Gr eszler and James Sherk, “Why It Is T ime to Ref orm Compensation f or Feder al Emplo y ees, ” The Heritage Foundation, July 2 7 , 2016, https:/ / ww w .heritage.or g/jobs-and-labor / r eport/ why-it -time-ref orm- compensation-f eder al-emplo yees. 19. Andr ew G. Biggs and Jason Rich wine, “ Comparing Feder al and Priv at e Sector C ompensation, ” American Enterprise Ins titute W orking Paper No . 2011-02, r e vised June 2011, ht tps:/ / w w w .aei.org/ wp-cont ent/ uploads/2011/10 / AEI-W orking-Paper-on-F eder al-Pay -Ma y- 2011.pdf?x91208 (acces sed February 2, 2023). — 85 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 20. See Gene L. Dodar o, Comptr oller Gener al of the United Sta tes, “Go v ernment E fficiency and Eff ectiv eness: Opportunities to R educe Fr agmentation, Ov erlap, and Duplication and Achie v e Billions in Financial Benefits, ” testimon y befor e the Subc ommittee on Emer ging Thr eats and Spending Ov ersight, C ommittee on Homeland Security and Go v ernmental Aff airs, U.S. Senat e, GA O-21-544T , May 12, 20 21, https:/ / ww w .gao.go v / assets/ gao- 21-544t.pdf (acc essed February 2, 20 23). 21. S. 20, Go v ernment Perf ormance and R esults Act of 199 3, Public Law No . 103-62, 10 3r d Congr ess, Augus t 3, 1993, https:/ / w ww .c ongres s.go v /10 3/ statute/ ST A TUTE- 10 7 / ST A TUTE- 107 -Pg285.pdf (acc essed February 2, 20 23). 22. Paul Light, “The R eal Crisis in Go v ernment, ” The C apital Times (Madison, Wisc onsin), January 22, 2010 , https:/ / captimes.c om/ ne ws/ opinion/ column/ paul-c -light-the-real-crisis -in-go v ernment/ article_9e139 318- 3d00- 5898-908d-4c7aee1e105d.html (acc essed Mar ch 15, 2023). 23. U.S. C onstitution, Article II, Section 3, https:/ / ww w .law .c ornell.edu/ constitution/ articleii#section3 (acc essed February 2, 20 23). 24. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 1395 7 , “Cr eating Schedule F in the Ex cept ed Service , ” Oct ober 21, 2020 , in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 85, No. 20 7 (Oc tober 26, 20 20), pp. 6 7 631–6 7 635, h ttps:/ / ww w .govin fo. gov / cont ent/ pkg/FR-20 20- 10-26/ pdf /20 20-23 780 .pdf (acc essed February 2, 20 23). 25. See note 17 , supr a . 26. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13836, “Dev eloping E fficient, Effec tive , and Cost -Reducing Appr oaches to Feder al Sect or Collectiv e Bar gaining, ” Ma y 25, 2018, in F ederal R egister , V ol. 83, No. 106 ( June 1, 2018), pp. 25 329–25 334, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/FR- 2018-06-01/ pdf/ 2018- 11913.pdf (accessed February 2, 20 23). 27. Pr esident Donald J. T rump, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13837 , “Ensuring T ranspar ency , Acc ountability , and Efficiency in T axpay er-Funded Union T ime Use, ” May 25, 2018, in F ederal R egister , V ol. 83, No. 106 ( June 1, 2018), pp. 2533 5–25 340, ht tps:/ / w w w .govin fo.go v / cont ent/ pk g/FR-20 18-06-01/ pdf/20 18- 11916.pdf (ac cessed February 2, 20 23). 28. See note 16, supr a . 29. See note 17 , supr a . 30. Philip K. How ar d, Not Ac coun table: Rethinking the C onstitutionalit y of Public Employ ee Unions ( Gar den City , NY : Rodin Books, 20 23). 31. James Madison, The Feder alist Papers No. 45 , January 26, 1788, https:/ /founders.ar chiv es.go v / documents/ Madison/01- 10-02 -0254 (acc essed February 1, 20 23). — 87 — S ection T w o W hile the lives of Americans are affected i n noteworth y ways , for be tter or worse, by each part of the ex ecutive branch, the inherent importance of national defense and foreign affairs makes the Departments of Defense and State first among equals . Originating in the George W ashington A dministra - tion, the W ar Department (as it was then known) was headed b y Henry Kno x, America’ s chief artillery officer in the Revolutionary W ar; Thomas Jefferson, the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, was the first Secre tary of State. Despite such long and storied his tories , neither department is currently living up to its standards , and the success of the nex t presidency will be determined in part by whe ther they can be significantly improved in short order . “Ev er since our F ounding, ” former acting secretary of defense Chri stopher Miller writes in Chapter 4, “ Americans have unders tood that the surest wa y to avoid war is to be prepared for it in peace. ” Y et the Department of Defense “is a deeply troubled institution. ” It has emphasized leftist politics o ver military readiness , “Recruiting was the worst in 2022 that it has been in two generations , ” and “the Biden A dmin- istration’ s profoundly unserious equity agenda and vaccine mandates have tak en a serious toll. ” A dditionally , Miller writes that “the atrophy of our defense indus trial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective dis armament by man y U .S . allies have exacted a high toll on America’ s military . ” Moreov er , our military has adopted a risk-av erse culture—think of masked soldiers , sailors , and airmen—rather than instilling and rewarding courage in thought and action. The good news is that most enlisted personnel, and most officers , especially below the rank of general or admiral, continue to be patriotic defenders of liberty . THE C OMMON DEFENSE — 88 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise But this is now Barack Obama’ s general officer corps . That is why Russ V ought argues in Chapter 2 that the National Security Council “should rigorously review all general and flag officer promotions to prioritize the core roles and responsi - bilities of the military over social engineering and non-defense related mat ters , including climate change, critical race theory , manufactured extremism, and other polarizing policies that weaken our armed forces and discourage our nation’ s finest men and women from enlisting. ” Ensuring that man y of America’ s best and bright - est continue to choose military service is essential. “By far the mos t significant danger ” to America from abroad, Miller writes, “is China. ” That communist regime “is undertaking a historic military buildup , ” which “could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’ s own nuclear arsenal. ” Resisting Chinese expansionist aims “requires a denial defense” whereb y we make “the subordination of T aiwan or other U .S . allies in Asia prohibitively difficult. ” However , Miller adds that “[c]ritically , the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear . ” The best gauge of such willingness is congressional approval. Accordingly , we must redisco ver and adhere to the F ounders’ wise division of war powers , whereb y Congress , the most representative and deliberativ e branch, decides whether to go to war; and the executive, the mos t energetic and decisive branch, decides ho w to carry it out once begun. As the past 75 years hav e repeatedly demonstrated in different ways—from K orea, to Vie tnam, to Iraq , to Afghanistan— we depart from our constitutional design at our peril. Miller writes that we “must treat missile defense as a top priority , ” ensure that more of our weapons are made in America, reform the budgeting process , and sustain “an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise. ” A cross all of our efforts , we must keep in mind that part of peace through s trength is knowing when to fight. As George W ashington warned nearly two centuries ago , we must con - tinue to be on guard against being drawn into conflicts that do no t justify great loss of American treasure or significant shedding of American blood. A t the same time, we must be prepared to defend our interes ts and meet challenges where and when they arise. An effective diplomatic corps is central to defending our interes ts and influ - encing world events . Whereas most military personnel ha ve had leftist priorities imposed from above, the problem at State comes largely from within. F ormer State Department director of policy planning Kiron Skinner writes in Chapter 6 , “[L]arge swaths of the State Department’ s workforce are left- wing and predis - posed to disagree with a conservative President’ s polic y agenda and vision. ” She adds that the department possesses a “ belief that it is an independent institution that knows what is best for the United States , sets its own foreign policy , and does not need direction from an elected President”—a view that does no t align with the Constitution. — 89 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject The solution to this problem is strong political leadership . Skinner writes, “The next Administration must tak e swift and decisiv e steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the President and, thereby , the American people. ” Because the Senate has been extraordinarily lax in fulfilling its constitutional obligation to confirm presidential appointees , she recommends putting appointees into acting roles until such time as the Senate confirms them. Skinner writes that State should also stop skirting the Cons titution’ s trea - ty -making requirements and stop enforcing “agreements” as treaties . It should encourage more trade with allies, particularly with Great Britain, and less with adversaries . And it should implement a “sovereign Mexico” policy , as our neighbor “ has functionally lost its so vereignty to muscular criminal cartels that effectively run the country . ” In Africa, Skinner writes , the U .S . “should focus on core security , economic, and human rights” rather than impose radical abortion and pro-LGBT initiatives . Divisive s ymbols such as the rainbow flag or the Black Lives Mat ter flag have no place nex t to the Stars and Stripes at our embassies . When it comes to China, Skinner writes that “a policy of ‘compete where we must, but cooperate where we can’…has demons trably failed. ” The People’ s Repub - lic of China’ s (PRC) “aggressive beha vior , ” she writes , “can only be curbed through external pressure. ” Efforts to protect or ex cuse China must s top . She observes , “[M]any were quick to dismiss ev en the possibility that COVID escaped from a Chinese research laboratory . ” M eanwhile, Skinner writes , “[ g ]lobal leaders includ - ing President Joe Biden…ha ve tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior . ” She adds , “In some cases , these voices , like global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney ”—or the National Basketball Association (NB A)—“directly benefit from doing business with Beijing. ” F ormer vice president of the U .S . Agency for Global Media Mora Namdar writes in Chapter 8 that we need to hav e people working for USAGM who actually believe in America, rather than allowing the agencies to function as anti-American, tax - payer-funded entities that parro t our advers aries’ propaganda and talking points . F ormer acting deputy secretary of homeland security K en Cuccinelli says in Chap - ter 5 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a creation of the George W . Bush era, should be closed, as it has added needless additional bureaucracy and expense without corresponding benefit. He recommends that it be replaced with a new “stand-alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level” and that the remaining parts of DHS be distributed among o ther departments . F ormer chief of staff for the director of National Intelligence Dustin Carmack writes in Chapter 7 that the U .S . Intelligence Community is too inclined to look in the rearview mirror , engag e in “group think, ” and employ an “overly cautious” approach aimed at personal approval rather than at offering the mos t accurate, unvarnished intelligence for the benefit of the country . And in Chapter 9 , former acting deputy administrator of the U .S . Agenc y for International Development Max — 96 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform 4 and dev elop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’ s final report is due on September 1, 2023 . 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the proto typing and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that s atisfy the most pressing national security needs . 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secre tary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use exis ting authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secre taries to brief the Secretary annually on the results . 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’ s adv ersaries to improv e our understanding of ho w they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’ s defense indus trial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U .S . stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been deple ted as a result of U .S . support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense indus try supply chain and ensure that adequate inv entory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’ s military innovate and field needed capabilities . — 97 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 3. Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engag e in multiyear procurements and block buys . This will improve private-sector rates of return, thereb y incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the government. It will also reduce government o verhead by reducing the number of procurement competitions . 4. Prioritize the U .S . and allies under the “domestic end product” and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America, Buy America Act. 5 Currently , defense companies are required to manufacture defense items for the U .S . g o vernment that are 100 percent domestically produced and at leas t 50 percent composed of domestically produced components . H owever , there are loopholes that allow companies to manufacture these items o verseas . This can create supply chain and other issues , especially in wartime. Manufacturing components and end products domestically and with allies spurs factory development, increases American jobs , and builds resilience in America’ s defense industrial base. 5. Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or “friendshoring ” of manufacturing ( kinetic capabilities , castings and forgings , critical materials , microelectronics , space, and electric vehicle batteries); evaluate them according to the s trategic landscape; and expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate. 6. Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors , which encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters compe tition. Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses so they also have commercial/private-sector cus tomers and are not solely dependent on defense orders , which can be highly specialized, expensive, and irregular . 7. Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them of DOD’ s needs and how they could work with DOD to mee t national security priorities . l Optimize the DOD acquisition communit y . 1. Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making for proto typing and program-of-record starts and terminations . Mos t bureaucrats would rather follow a checklis t and fail than go outside the procedures and win because failure means negative — 98 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise career repercussions . Senior acquisition leaders should design a sys tem that allows decision-makers to s tay within the law but b ypass unnecessary departmental regulations that are no t in the best interes t of the government and hamper the acquisition of capabilities that warfighters require. 2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries should assess their acquisition workforces; de termine what additional personnel, resources , and training they need; and develop implementation plans . The goal is to develop , proto type, acquire, and field required capabilities at the speed of relevance to meet America’ s pacing threats and maintain a warfighting advantage. 3. Decentralize Defense A cquisition University (D AU) offerings and expand the DA U mission to include accreditation of non-DOD institutions . The critical shortage of trained and certified acquisition personnel must be addressed with urgency in order to support DOD mission objectives and goals. With the rapid ev olution of training and educational technologies , including remote and virtual practices , there is no reason for DA U to maintain a monopoly on the knowledge and certification that are required to perform as acquisition professionals . F urther , the cos t to private contractors and non-DOD civilians who aspire to such a role limits the supply of trained and certified candidates . DA U has become an unnecessary barrier to entry in a career field that is vital to the DOD mission. DOD RESEARCH, DEVEL OPMENT , TEST , AND EV ALU A TION (RD T &E) The FY 2017 National Defense A uthorization A ct es tablished the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and assigned broad responsibility for “all defense research and engineering, technology develop - ment, technology transition, proto typing, experimentation, and developmental testing activities and programs , including the allocation of resources for defense research and engineering, and unifying defense research and engineering efforts across the Department, ” to the new Under Secretary , who also was tasked with “serving as the principal advisor to the Secretary on all research, engineering, and technology development activities and programs in the Department. ” 6 This led to the single largest DOD structural change since the Goldwater–Nichols act of 1986 7 and was organized effectively during President Donald Trump’ s Administration. — 99 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Needed Ref orms l Champion, engag e, and focus the American inno vation ecosy s tem. T o maintain leadership in the era of great-power competition and succeed against our advers aries , a key DOD effort mus t be the creation of mechanisms and processes to embrace America’ s most significant competitive advantage: innovation. 1. Engage and leverage all of America’ s scientific, engineering, and high- tech production communities to research, develop , prototype, and rapidly deploy advanced technology capabilities on a continuing basis to preserve our warfighting advantage. 2. Increase integration and collaboration among the DOD , government labs , and private companies to solve the department’ s mos t difficult problems. 3. Reduce the number of critical technology areas from 14 to a more manageable number to concentrate effort and resources on those that bear directly on great-power compe tition. 4. Rebuild RDT &E infrastructure that resides in Cold W ar–era facilities and is not well-suited to the current era of rapid development and testing of advanced technology and concep ts to the maturity level necessary for acquisition and operational fielding. 5. Mov e toward a much more comprehensive independent risk -reduction approach to increase understanding of the technical risks b y drawing on the expertise in DOD laboratories and agencies to help acquisition programs succeed. l Improv e the rapid deployment of technology to the bat tlefield. America’ s military advantage has derived from the professionalism of our servicemembers and our ability to manifest our technological advantage in battlefield capability . The current era of great-power compe tition will continue for the foreseeable future, and technology will be the currency of competition. Our ability to prevail will res t on our ability to develop new technologies and move them onto the bat tlefield more rapidly than our adversaries can. 1. Accelerate the prototyping cycle to meet immediate battlefield needs . 2. Require tighter integration with user communities to provide value. — 100 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 3. Establish a pipeline of near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology that is aimed at great-power compe tition (China) and can be matured, proto typed, and evaluated to support major acquisitions (the ability to produce at scale) to break the cycle of schedule delays and cost ov erruns from underdeveloped and poorly understood technologies . l Dev elop a framew ork to pro tect the RD T &E enterprise from foreign exploitation. Strategic compe tition and adaptiv e adversaries require new thinking about how to pro tect technology . China has been relentless in stealing U .S . technology , using the full rang e of measures from influence operations to outright theft. This has been a major factor in its ability to close the gap and in some cases to exceed U .S . capabilities . 1. Implement a comprehensive approach to preserving U .S . technological leadership that is based on outpacing our adversaries; clear about what we need to protect; tailored to various specific sectors (for example, academia, the defense industrial base, and laboratories); and underpinned with a full range of consequences for attempted or actual theft. DOD FOREIGN MILIT ARY S ALES The United States must regain its role as the “ Arsenal of Democracy . ” In fiscal year (FY ) 2021, U .S . g ov ernment foreign military sales (FMS) nosedived to a lo w of $34.8 billion from a record high of $55 .7 billion in FY 2018 . 8 This decrease hinders interoperability with partners and allies , decreases defense industrial base capac- ity , and increases the taxpayer burden on the U .S . military ’ s own procurements . Under previous Administrations, the United States built its reputation as a reliable partner with a strong defense indus trial base that could supply military articles and goods in a timely manner . T oday ’ s FMS process is encumbered by byzantine bureaucracy , long contracting times , high costs , and mundane technology . The United States can change this downw ard trajectory by impro ving inter - nal processes that incentivize partners and allies to procure U .S . defense sys tems , thereby expa nding our “defense ecos ystem. ” W e must reverse th e recent dip in FMS to ensure both that our partners remain interoperable with the United States and that our defense industrial base regains much-needed capacity in preparation for future challenges. Needed Ref orms l Emphasize exportabilit y with U .S. procurements . The record-low FMS sales in 2021 were driven partly b y the high costs of con verting weapon sys tems on the back end of production rather than emphasizing exportability in initial capability planning. — 101 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 1. Ensure that senior U .S . military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense s ystems that are bo th available and interoperable with our partners and allies . 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions . l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review ” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners . The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State pro vides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified. 9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process . 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from mo ving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize was te, complement strengths , and supplement our defense industrial base to create a s ystem that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allo w them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States . 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (IT AR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process . The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow . On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes appro ximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing. 10 — 102 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 1. Immediately fund more contracting capacity in all services to decrease the contracting timeline and improve the deliv ery of defense articles to our global partners . 2. Rationalize and speed arms sales decision-making to preclude our enemies from exploiting bureaucratic slothfulness and allo w us to manage the development of indigenous defense industrial bases. DOD PERSONNEL The men and women of America’ s armed forces are the most critical component of our national defense strategy , but in recent years , they have been o verextended, undervalued, and insufficiently resourced. Their families help them to carry the burden of service, but the assistance they receive is disproportionately less than the sacrifices they make. Y oung civilians who would thrive in a military environ - ment are disenfranchised when educators and influencers discourage them from learning about military service and preparing for the honor of wear ing Ameri - ca’ s uniform. The United States military is an extraordinary ins titution, staffed b y excep tional people who have defended our nation and changed the course of history , but the Biden Administration, through word and deed, has treated the armed forces as just another place to work. W e must res tore our military to a place of honor and respect and recruit and retain the individuals who will mee t the rig orous s tandards of excellence that are required for membership in the world’ s greatest fighting force. Needed Ref orms l Rescue recruiting and retention. Recruiting was the wors t in 2022 that it has been in two generations and is expected to be even worse in 2023. Some of the problems are self-inflicted and ongoing. The recruiting problem is not service-specific: It affects the entire Joint F orce. 1. Appoint a Special Assistant to the President who will maintain liaison with Congress , DOD , and all o ther interested parties on the issue of recruiting and retention. 2. Improve recruiting by suspending the use of the recently introduced MHS Genesis sys tem that uses private medical records of potential recruits at Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS), creating unnecessary delays and un warranted rejections . 11 3. Improve military recruiters’ access to secondary schools and require completion of the Armed Services V ocational Aptitude Bat tery — 103 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject (ASV AB)—the military entrance examination—by all s tudents in schools that receive federal funding. 12 4. Encourage Members of Congress to provide time to military recruiters during each townhall session in their congressional dis tricts . 5. Increase the number of J unior ROTC programs in secondary schools. l Restore s tandards of le thality and e xcellence. Entrance criteria for military service and specific occupational career fields should be based on the needs of those positions . Excep tions for individuals who are already predisposed to require medical treatment (for example, HIV positive or suffering from gender dysphoria) should be removed, and those with gender dysphoria should be expelled from military service. Physical fitness requirements should be based on the occupational field without consideration of gender , race, e thnicity , or orientation. l Eliminate politicization, reestablish trus t and accountabilit y , and restore faith to the force. In 2021, the Reagan National Defense Surv ey found that only 45 percent of Americans have “a great deal of trus t and confidence in the military ”—down from 70 percent in 2018 . 13 1. Strengthen pro tections for chaplains to carry out their ministry according to the tenets of their faith. 2. Codify language to instruct senior military officers (three and four stars) to make certain that they unders tand their primary duty to be ensuring the readiness of the armed forces , not pursuing a social engineering agenda. This direction should be reinforced during the Senate confirmation process . Orders and direction motivated b y purely partisan mo tives should be identified as threats to readiness . 3. Reinstate servicemembers to active duty who were discharged for not receiving the CO VID vaccine, restore their appropriate rank, and provide back pay . 4. Eliminate Marxist indoctrination and divisive critical race theory programs and abolish newly established diversity , equity , and inclusion offices and staff. — 104 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 5. Restrict the use of social media solely for purposes of recruitment and discipline any armed services personnel who use an official command channel to engage with civilian critics on social media. 6. Audit the course offerings at military academies to remov e Marxist indoctrination, eliminate tenure for academic professionals , and apply the same rules to ins tructors that are applied to other DOD contracting personnel. 7. Reverse policies that allow trans gender individuals to serve in the military . Gender dysphoria is incompatible with the demands of military service, and the use of public monies for transgender surgeries or to facilitate abortion for servicemembers should be ended. l V alue the military family . Military service requires extreme s acrifices by families . 1. Support legislation to increase wages and family allow ances for active- duty enlisted personnel. No uniformed personnel should ever ha ve to rely on social benefits like as food stamps or public housing assis tance. 2. Improve base housing and consider the military family holistically when considering change-of-station moves . 3. Improve spouse emplo yment opportunities and protections , including licensing reform, 14 and expand childcare. 4. Audit all curricula and health policies in DOD schools for military families , remove all inappropriate materials , and rev erse inappropriate policies . 5. Support legislation giving education savings account op tions to military families . 15 l Reduce the number of g enerals . Rank creep is pervasive. The number of 0-6 to 0-9 officers is at an all-time high across the armed services (above W orld W ar II levels), and the actual battlefield experience of this officer corps is at an all-time low . The next President should limit the continued advancement of many of the exis ting cadre, man y of whom have been advanced b y prior A dminis trations for reasons other than their warfighting prowess . — 105 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject DOD INTELLIGENCE Our national defense establishment mus t evolve to mee t the rapid, pro - found, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security portfolios—America’ s compe titive advantage against rivals and advers aries is at serious risk. H owever , for any struct ural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel - ligence Community (IC)/Defense Intellig ence Enterprise (DIE) leadership mus t be addressed. 16 The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Int elligence Community ’ s personnel and a significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’ s 17 elements , eight are within DOD , 17 two are independent, 18 and seven belong to various o ther departments and agencies. 19 Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities , both military and civilian. ” 20 The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and timely insights consis tently and with clarity , objectivity , and independence. If they continue on their current path, however , both the DIE and the Intelligence Com- munity writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence assessments that mislead policymakers. Needed Ref orms l Improv e the intellig ence process . Defense intellig ence assets ha ve been committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since Sep tember 11, 2001, at the expense of our s trategic objectives , and this has led to increased risk. 21 F urther , the DIE has evolv ed into a “customer -based” model with the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense of analytical integrity . The result has been a significant politicization of intelligence. 1. Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders . As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of DIE and IC assessments as needed. 2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interes ts (countering China and Russia). 3. Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands . Avoid the temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support a conv ergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain those threats . — 112 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise l A ccelerate the purchase of ke y munitions . It takes years to build and maintain navies but only hours to expend their ordnance in combat. The USN must be prepared to expend large quantities of air-launched and sea-launched stealth y , precision, cruise missiles against targets both at sea and ashore. Additionally , modern air defense requires the use of high- performance surface-to-air missiles . 1. Produce key munitions at the maximum rate with significant capacity . 2. W orking with the Congress , employ the wides t possible range of techniques to enhance the munitions supply chains and workforce. l Enhance warfighter de velopment. The USN requires a varie ty of documented qualifications for personnel to advance in their careers and assume leadership positions . It also requires individual professional qualifications that are focused on warfighting. 1. Mandate qualifications that demonstrate an unders tanding of core competence in collective, integrated w arfighting, especially based on current plans and technologies . 2. Elevate the Headquarters Staff focused on W arfighter Development (N7) within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNA V ) and empower it to develop such requirements . 3. Require that war games be utilized as experiential learning environments for the participants as a prerequisite for achieving career milestones (department heads , commanding officers , and major commanders). 4. Highlight in training and leader development that USN forces can and must maintain the ability to operate from and/ or defend so vereign territory to include our allies and partners . 5. Train to balance effects from kinetic to nonkinetic and from le thal to nonlethal through effective command and control. U.S. AIR FORCE The U .S . Air F orce today lacks a force s tructure with the lethality , survivabil - ity , and capacity to fight a major conflict with a great power like China, de ter nuclear threats , and meet its o ther operational requirements under the National Defense Strategy . 29 F or 30 years , the Air F orce has received less annual funding — 113 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject (if pass-through funding, defined as money in the Air F orce budg e t that does not go to the Air F orce, is removed from the equation) than the Arm y and Navy hav e received. This underfunding has forced the Air F orce to cut its forces and forg o modernizing aging weapons sys tems that were never designed to operate in current threat environments and are s tructurally and mechanically exhausted. The result is an Air F orce that is the oldest, smallest, and leas t ready in its history . The decline in Air F orce capacity and capability is occurring at the same time the security environment demands the v ery options that the Air F orce uniquely provides . Combatant commanders routinely reques t more Air F orce capabilities than the service has the capacity to provide. The Air F orce today simply cannot accomplish all of the missions it is required to perform. The Air F orce has consistently stated on the official record that it is no t sized to meet the mission demands placed on it b y the various U .S . Combatant Commands. A 2018 s tudy , “The Air F orce W e Need, ” 30 showed a 2 4 percent deficit in Air F orce capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy . Those conclusions remain valid and are more pronounced toda y because of subsequent aircraft retire - ments . The demand is also higher because of world events . T o understand these trends , one needs only to consider that the Air F orce’ s future five- year budget plan retires 1, 463 aircraft while buying just 467 . This mak es for a reduction of 996 air- craft by 2027 . The net result is a force that is smaller , older , and less ready at a time when demand is burgeoning. Needed Ref orms l Increase spending and budg e t accuracy in line with a threat-based strategy . Re turning the U .S . military to a force that can achieve deterrence or win in a fight if necessary requires re turning to a threat-based defense strategy . Real budget growth combined with a more equitable dis tribution of resources across the armed services is the only realistic wa y to create a modernized Air F orce with the capacity to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy . A dditionally , as noted abov e, pass-through funding causes numbers cited in current DOD budget documents to be higher than the dollar amounts actually received by the Air F orce. 1. Adopt a two-w ar force defense strategy with scenarios for each service that will allow the Air F orce to attain the resources it requires b y developing a force-sizing construct that reflects what is required to accomplish strategic objectives . 2. Eliminate pass-through funding, which has grown to more than $40 billion per year and has caused the Air F orce to be chronically underfunded for decades . — 114 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 3. Increase the Air F orce budg et b y 5 percent annually (after adjusting for inflation) to reverse the decline in size, age, and readiness and facilitate the transition to a more modern, lethal, and survivable force. l Reduce near-term and mid-term risk. Increasing the Air F orce’ s acquisition of next-generation capabilities that either are or soon will be in production will increase the ability of the United States to deter or defeat near-term to mid-term threats . 1. Increase F -35A procurement to 60–80 per year . 2. Build the capacity for a B -21 production rate of 15–18 aircraft per year along with applicable elements of the B -21 long-rang e strik e family of sys tems . 3. Increase Air F orce airlift and aerial refueling capacity to support agile combat employment operations that generate combat sorties from a highly dispersed posture in bo th Europe and the P acific. 4. Develop and buy larger quantities of advanced mid-rang e weapons (50 nm to 200 nm) that are sized to maximize targets per sortie for stealth aircraft flying in contested en vironments against target se ts that could exceed 100 , 000 aimpoints . 5. Accelerate the development and production of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile to reduce the risk inherent in an aging Minuteman III force in light of China’ s nuclear modernization breakout. 6. Increase the number of EC -37B electronic warfare aircraft from 10 to 20 in order to achieve a minimum capacity to engage growing threats from China across the electromagnetic spectrum. l Inves t in future Air F orce programs and efforts . Increasingly capable adversaries require new capabilities to enable victory agains t those advers aries . 1. A ttain an operationally op timized advanced battle management sys tem as the Air F orce element of the DOD Joint All Domain Command and Control enterprise. 2. Produce the next-generation air dominance sys tem of s ystems (air moving target indication, o ther sensors , communications , command and control, weapons , and uninhabited aerial vehicles). — 115 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 3. Achieve moving target engagement capability and capacity against sea, surface, and ground mobile targets at the scale necessary to mee t the needs of the National Defense Strategy . 4. Build resilient basing, sustainment, and communications for survivability in a contested en vironment. 5. Establish a vigorous and sufficiently funded electromagnetic spectrum operations recovery plan to mak e up for more than 20 years of neglect of this mission area. U.S. MARINE C ORPS The U .S . Marine Corps (USMC) is the maritime land force of the Department of Defense and Department of the Navy . It serves a critical role as an expedition - ary amphibious force that can project power from sea to shore and beyond while performing other specialized missions like securing America’ s diplomatic out - posts abroad. Between the terroris t attacks of Sep tember 11, 2001, and the conclusion of U .S . military operations in Afghanistan in A ugust 2022, the Marine Corps engaged in extended operations ashore as directed b y the Secretary of Defense, leaving it with little opportunity or ability to train for and ex ecute the naval and amphibious operations for which it is uniquely suited and directed by law . This lengthy diver - gence from its primary mission led to deep concern that the Corps had become a “second land army , ” prompting senior Marine Corps leaders to push for the service to return to the sea. In addition, the USMC spent nearly two decades fighting coun - terinsurgenc y wars in Afghanis tan and Iraq and developed capabilities that were specifically geared to those fights but have limited utility in scenarios inv olving evenly matched and advanced enemies or amphibious operations that are neces- sary for the projection of naval po wer . As a result, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed and began to implement F orce Design 2030 , 31 a plan that, if completed, would be the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since W orld W ar II. The suc- cessful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine Corps’ personnel sys tem and the Navy ’ s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness . Needed Ref orms l Dives t sy stems to implement the F orce Design 2030 transformation. 32 Divesting equipment that is less relevant to dis tributed, low -signature operations in a contested maritime en vironment will make funds available for modernization. — 116 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 1. Transform USMC force structure. a. Eliminate all USMC law enforcement battalions . b. Transform at least one Marine Infantry Regiment into a Marine Littoral Regiment. c. Reduce the size of remaining infantry battalions . 2. Divest s ys tems or equipment that are bet ter suited to heavier U .S . Army units . a. Maintain divestment of M1 A brams tanks . b. Eliminate the majority of tube artillery (M777) batteries . c. Reduce the number of A dvanced Amphibious Assault V ehicles and the number of their replacements . 3. Use funds made available by div estment of s ystems to support new sys tems that are geared to the likely needs of future conflicts . a. Increase the number of rocket artillery batteries (HIMARS). b. Increase the number of upgraded Light Armored V ehicle (LA V ) companies. c. Increase the number of Unmanned A erial Systems and anti-air sys tems (including counter-U AS s ystems). d. Develop long-range strike missiles and anti-ship missiles for the Corps . e. Modernize USMC infantry equipment. l T ransform the USMC personnel paradigm. More than other services , the USMC relies heavily on junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to staff key positions across the force but especially in combat arms . F or example, E -4s routinely hold squad leader billets when the Arm y normally has E -6s in those billets . The nature of more dis tributed operations and the increasingly complex responsibilities of a Marine Corps rifle squad and platoon under F orce Design 2030 will only put more responsibility on the backs of squad leaders and platoon sergeants, increasing the need for more senior Marines in those critical positions . A dditionally , the Corps needs to improv e its retention of junior NCOs after their firs t enlistments (the Marines hav e much lower rates of reenlis tment than other branches). 33 1. Align the USMC’ s combat arms rank s tructure with the U .S . Army ’ s (squad leader billets are for E -6s , and platoon sergeant billets are for E - 7s). — 117 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 2. Create better incentives to re tain talented junior NCOs , especially in infantry and other critical military occupational specialties . 3. Reduce unnecessary deployments to increase dwell time in order to enable more robust primary military education. l Align Navy amphibious shipbuilding with F orce Design 2030 . The U .S . Navy has struggled for decades to maintain an amphibious flee t that could support USMC war plans around large-scale amphibious operations. In addition, amphibious shipbuilding has often had to compete agains t other priorities within a constrained budget and limited shipbuilding capacity . 1. Develop and produce light amphibious warships (LA W s) to support more distributed amphibious operations , especially in the P acific. 34 2. Maintain between 28 and 31 larger amphibious warships as opposed to the 25 specified in current Navy shipbuilding plans and the 38 specified before 2020 . 35 U.S. SP A CE FORCE U .S . space forces conduct global space operations to sustain and enhance air , land, and sea effectiveness , lethality , and superiority by pro viding secure broad - band global communications (precision position, navigation, and timing ac curacy); attack warning and threat tracking and targeting capability (real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information); and their assured continuity of operations both b y defending U .S . assets and by conducting offensiv e operations that are capable of imposing unacceptable losses on advers aries that might seek to attack them. The U .S . Space F orce (USSF) was established to assure continuous global and theater combat support from space, to deter at tacks against U .S . space assets , and to prevail in space should deterrence fail. The USSF pos ture was conceived as a balance of offensive and defensive de terrent capabilities designed for maximum effectiveness . Needed Ref orms l Rev erse the Biden Administration’ s defensive posture. The Biden Administration has eliminated almost all offensive de terrence capabilities and instead will rely solely on defensive capabilities of dis aggregation, maneuver , and reconstitution—the most cos tly , the slowest, and ultimately the most fragile architecture selection. — 118 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 1. Reestablish offensive capabilities to guarantee a fa vorable balance of forces , efficiently manage the full deterrence spectrum, and seriously complicate enemy calculations of a successful firs t strik e against U .S . space assets . 2. Restore architectural balance in U .S . space forces , both offensive and defensive, to restore de terrence dominance efficiently and quickly . 3. Rapidly expand space control capability , to include cis-lunar space (the region beginning at geosynchronous altitude and encompassing the moon), to provide early warning of an enem y at tack. 4. Seek arms control and “rules of the road” understandings only when they are unambiguously in the interests of the U .S . and its allies , and prohibit their unilateral implementation. l Reduce ov erclassification. The USSF must mov e beyond the Cold W ar– era culture of secrecy and overclassification that surrounded military space to facilitate greater coordination and synchronization of efforts across the government and commercial sectors . Declassify appropriate information about terrestrial and on-orbit space capabilities that threaten the U .S . space constellation, as well as those being pursued by our compe titors , to secure the principled right to counter them offensively . l Implement policies suited to a mature USSF . No longer a “newborn, ” the USSF has entered its fourth year of existence, and the lessons learned can be incorporated across all facets of the force to increase its effectiveness . 1. Restructure from the current “unity of effort” s tructure to “unity of command. ” 2. Lead the U .S . g o vernment’ s development of a clear and unambiguous declaratory policy that the United States will operate at will in space and enforce these operations with capabilities that ensure effective deterrence and the ability to impose our will if necess ary . 3. End the current study phase of concept development and issue necessary guidance for the development and fielding of offensiv e capabilities . — 119 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 4. Alter the Space Development Agenc y ’ s current “fail-early ” approach and transition to a methodology that maintains aggressive timelines but with significantly greater engineering rigor , with special at tention to sustainment, support, and fully integrated space operations . 5. Increase the number of general officer positions to ensure the Space F orce’ s ability to compete for resources on a common basis with the other services . 6. Explore creation of a Space F orce Academy to attract top aero–as tro students , engineers , and scientis ts and develop astronauts . The academ y could be attached initially to a large existing research university lik e the California Institute of T echnology or MIT , share faculty and funding, and eventually be built separately to be on par with the other service academies . U.S. C YBER C OMMAND US CYBERCOM was established in 20 10 by the Department of Defense to unify the direction of cyberspace operations , s trengthen DOD cyberspace capabilities , and integrate and enhance U .S . c yber expertise. C yber capabilities and threats are evolving rapidly . A ccordingly , a conservative Administration should be especially sensitive to and prepared to mee t the challenges presented by bureaucratic silos , inappropriately rigid tactical doctrine, and strategic thinking ’ s historic tendency to lag behind technological capability . The preliminary evidence from the war in Ukraine suggests that existing cyber doctrine and certain capability and target assumptions may be incorrect or mis - placed. The following recommendations therefore presuppose that there will be a rigorous “ lessons learned” analysis and review of existing U .S . doctrine in light of the battlefield evidence. Needed Ref orms l Ensure that US CYBERCOM is properly focused. Mission creep is leading to wasteful o verlap with the Department of H omeland Security , National Security Ag ency , Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Ag ency . 1. Separate USCYBERCOM from the National Security Ag ency per congressional direction. 2. Conduct effective offensive cyber-effects operations at the tactical and strategic levels . — 120 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 3. Expand defensive c yber -effects operations authorized by President Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13 , “ United States C yber Operations Policy . ” 36 4. End US CYBERCOM’ s participation in federal efforts to “fortify ” U .S . elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics . l Increase US CYBERCOM’ s effectiveness . 1. Accelerate the integration of c yber and electronic warfare (EW ) doctrine and capabilities , abiding by the time-tes ted norms of combined-arms warfare. 2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers , aircrew , and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level. 3. Break the paradigm of c yber authorities held at the s trategic level. 4. Increase c yber resilience b y , for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air F orce’ s Cyber Resiliency Office for W eapons Systems (CROWS). 5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies. 6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’ s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer , Commander of US CYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint F orce Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and sys tem requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise- wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military s trategies for response. ” 37 l Rationalize strategy and doctrine. 1. Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes . 2. Apply traditional de terrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/ or EW actions agains t U .S . infrastructure and citizens . — 121 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject SPECIAL OPERA TIONS FORCES Even though America’ s conv entional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations F orces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an ex tremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has no t been another major at tack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with inter national partners is effective, and units under USS OCOM are the mos t capable and experienced warfighters in two generations. There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’ s mission in favor of o ther service priorities in great-power compe tition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power compe tition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’ s experience and repurpose its mis - sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-po wer competition, thereby pro viding a robust organization that is capable of achieving s trategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nons tate actors from negatively affecting U .S . policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships . If we maintain irregular warfare’ s traditional focus on nonstate actors , we limit ourselves to addressing only the symp toms (nonstate actors), no t the problems themselves (China, Russia, North K orea, and Iran). Needed Ref orms l Make irregular w arfare a cornerstone of securit y s trategy . The U .S . can project strength through unified action with our Interagency , 38 allies , and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities s ynchronized with elements of national power . Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nons tate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby pro viding resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the s trategic and tactical levels . 1. Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter s tate adversaries , defeat hostile nonstate actors , deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power compe tition. ” 2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U .S . by region in the National Security Strategy . — 22 4 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise l Enhanced metrics for accuracy of classification. l A general simplification of the overall sys tem for the benefit of users . On the back end, an ODNI-run declassification process that is faster , nimbler , default-to-automated, and larger-scale should be a priority . Additionally , inves tments in IT are required to deal with the growing v olumes of CNSI collected and produced in the digital age, along with many years’ worth of existing analog and digital holdings that could pro vide valuable historical insights . An incoming Administration needs to explore options to prioritize funding for innovation in declassification management: for example, by es tablishing a budget line item specifically for the modernization of declassification or designating fund - ing for program classification management as a special-interest item. The Administration will also need to transition to using technology , including tools and services for managing Big Data (which provide a robus t electronic record repository , making information within and across ag encies easier to organize and locate and facilitating more rapid review and release capabilities for records of emerging interest); artificial intelligence/machine learning (which, when incor - porated into existing business practices , enables machine interpre tation of unstructured tex t and data, applies decision support technology to enable more consistent classification decisions , and expedites reviews be tween agencies); and expansion of Commercial Cloud services (which facilitate the rapid testing and deployment of new tools and technologies). Ho wever , technology is not a panacea; human expertise in information holdings and routine validation of the technology will always be necess ary . With or with - out machine assistance, agencies will require more people and more varied skill sets to impro ve their ability to meet the electronic records era’ s classification and declassification demands and serve an incoming Administration’ s goals. Broader U .S . Government and IC Intelligence Needs . Increasingly , con - flicts among U .S . adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North K orea are conducted in the realms of technology and finance. 40 This challenge requires new tools , authorities , and technological expertise across the U .S . g o vernment, par - ticularly at the Commerce Department’ s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Committee on F oreign Inv estment in the United States (CFIUS), which is housed at the Treasury Department. An incoming conservative President should task his DNI and Secretary of Commerce with increasing coordination, the resources needed for BIS and S CIF capacity , and proper and necessary intelligence sharing to counter the activities of multifaceted advers aries such as China. This would include additional work with private-sector expertise, granting clearances to niche sector experts and United States citizen commercial and financial partners as needed. — 225 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject Cov er in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas - ingly clear that protecting the identities of underco ver intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age. 41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated sys tem for providing co ver to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign advers aries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are dev oting resources to the problem. Their back-office infras tructure, however , is such that they are still using me thods for providing co ver from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. Ho w intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even ho w and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities . 42 Legends, fake backs tories , and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a b asic Google search. 43 Officers operat - ing under nonofficial cover are offered ev en less protection and training to help them succeed. In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will hav e the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) agains t hard targets . Privacy Shield. F or many years , the European Union (EU) has tried to force U .S . companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations . Misleading claims in the 2013 Sno wden leaks destro yed the initial Safe Harbor F ramework 44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the A tlantic; its succes - sor , the Privac y Shield F ramework, 45 was struck do wn by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient pro tections for EU citizens against h ypothe t- ical U .S . g o vernment surveillance. Those same European courts ex emp ted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U .S ., suggesting that trade protectionism ma y be the real motive behind data privacy regulations . In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-A t- lantic Data Privacy F ramework, 46 intended to withstand European legal challenges . Given the fate of its predecessors , it is not certain that it will surviv e. Executiv e Order 1 4086 , “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence A ctivi - ties , ” 47 implements this new framework b y attem pting to align signals int elligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. A t mos t, the executive order ’ s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could thro w sand in the gears of important intelli - gence programs. An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’ s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally agains t, for — 226 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States . Restrictions on data exports hav e been part of the trade conflict, but now they could seriously harm our military and int elligence capabilities. Moreo ver , restrictions on U .S . intellig ence collection hurt the Europeans themselves , especially as the United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’ s invasion of Ukraine with Europeans . 48 Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight s tandards that no European country meets . A t the same time, exports of data to China are unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. That violates W orld Trade Organization agreements as an arbitrary and discriminatory data protection s tan - dard. It is a betrayal b y a nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that struck do wn prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in constitutional law but in a treaty among European nations . If the EU accepted an international agreement that data may flow to the United States under a more reasonable s tan- dard than the one adopted b y the court, that interpretation would be binding, at least as a gloss on the earlier treaty . The United States has never seriously pushed back against the EU; no w is the time. An incoming President should ask for an immediate study of the implemen- tation of Executiv e Order 1 4086 and suspend any pro visions that unduly burden intelligence collection. At the s ame time, in negotiations with the Europeans , the United States should make clear that the continued sharing of intelligence with EU member states depends on successful resolution of this issue within the firs t two years of a President’ s term. It is time for a real solution, not the 30 years of stopgaps imposed b y Brussels . President’ s Daily Brief (PDB). An incoming conservative President should make clear what the President’ s Daily Brief is and is not. The PDB should be for the President specifically , with a much narrower distribution and addressing areas of strategic concern. During the transition, the future National Security Advisor , along with the DNI, should conduct a review of current PDB recipients and deter - mine which should remain recipients when the President’ s term begins . Instead of being used as the s tatement of record for the agencies, the PDB often misses the areas of interest for Presidents and their senior advisers . The President should want the PDB to focus on providing the information needed for the often imperfect and complex decisions that a President needs to make, which should always be based on the bes t intelligence that can be gathered. Where consensus and agreement are possible, an IC -coordinated product is excellent, but insights provided b y properly channeled dissent can lead a President to ask relevant ques- tions of his DNI and IC . A future DNI determines the PDB briefer based on recommendations made b y the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (MI). His - torically , briefers have come f rom the CIA, but a future President and DNI should — 227 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject consider a primary briefer or a rotation of briefers from o ther IC elements . A ddi- tionally , the entirety of the PDB staff and production should be located at ODNI. National Intelligence Council (NIC). The National Intellig ence Council is the IC’ s premier analytic organization and includes more than a dozen National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom leads the IC’ s analysis within a regional (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) or functional (cyber , counterproliferation, economics, etc.) mission area. This includes authoring National Intelligence Estimates on major strategic issues with the entire IC , ov erseeing and deconflicting the annual analytic plans of each agenc y , and weighing in on day -to-day major analytical issues , sometimes individually (for example, b y writing the NIC’ s strategic memos or pro - viding detailed expert briefings to the President before major decisions). Historically part of the CIA, the N IC was reorganized into the ODNI as was the PDB . It retains the CIA ’ s objective analytic culture and is staffed primarily with CIA officers; howev er , as many as 25 percent of its NIOs o ver the decades have come from academia or the private sector , bringing in much-needed outside expertise to collate and understand intelligence with perspective and skills that are not necess arily nurtured within the IC . In recent years, there has been a greater emphasis on encouraging officers from other agencies—particularly the DIA, NSA, and FBI—to serve as NIOs or as their deputies . T o encourag e greater analytic independence and debate, the incoming Admin- istration should require that non-CIA officers comprise at leas t 50 percent of the NIC’ s membership and that the first-among-equals NIC Chairman is an outsider from one of the three major IC agencies with reporting responsibility to the PDDNI. Opening these senior analytic roles to the best analys ts regardless of agenc y would also encourage the continued maturation of analytic cadres and tradecraft at those agencies and give them an equal voice in interagenc y analytical disputes , which in turn would give the President access to the best thinking and a varie ty of sources and perspectives from across the entire IC rather than from the CIA alone. IC Chief Information Officer . The Intelligence Community Chief Informa - tion Officer (ICCIO) directs and oversees all aspects of the classified IT budget for all of the IC’ s 18 elements . As the DNI’ s principal adviser for technology , the ICCIO must be well- versed in technology , acquisitions, operations , and intra-agency coop - eration to advance our technical prowess and simultaneously direct a bureaucracy that, left unchecked, will serve each element’ s o wn preferences . T o ensure that procured and implemented technology and policy reflect the A dministration’ s agenda, the ICCIO must have the support of the DNI and possess the ability to command cooperation between and promo te interoperability across IC members . Because of the unique responsibilities entrusted to this position, incumbency has seesa wed between political appointees and career civilians; due to its con - gressionally capped salary , the position is often filled by an SES -level member administratively de tailed to support the DNI. A t times , the ICCIO is incorrectly — 228 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise referred to as the ODNI CIO . By law , and to secure unbiased execution across all of the IC’ s 18 elements , the same individual may no t serve as ICCIO and ODNI CIO . They are two distinct positions . Critical areas and IC IT portfolio priorities for the ICCIO include but are not limited to: l Transparent accounting and allocation of IT inves tments across the IC , including commercial cloud computing and storage (C2E); l Recognized and uniform security access for people, sys tems , and capabilities to enable interoperability across IC elements; l 5G/6G data transmission and network interoperability , which is vital to IC element operations; l Artificial intelligence and machine learning; l Quantum cryptograph y and post-quantum encryp tion (PQE); and l Cybersecurity infrastructure where Biden Administration changes have realigned and reassigned management oversight and IT architecture responsibilities to NSA and DHS/CISA, conflicting with ICCIO - delineated roles . An incoming Administration should appoint the ICCIO as a primary member of the DNI staff along with the ODNI General Counsel, IC Chief Financial Officer , and ODNI Chief Operating Officer . The President-Elect should require immediate reviews of the progress in imple - menting post-quantum encryp tion at a minimum for IC and Defense sys tems but preferably throughout the government. The President’ s National Security M emo- randum specifying “the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035” 49 needs to be revised in light of the magnitude of the threat. Accounting for the inv estment that will be needed to secure IT s ystems for national security should be a top priority . ODNI, CIA, and IC T echnology Issues . In recent years , the IC has had a mandate from multiple Administrations to advance technology needs for intelli - gence—needs that have seen massive changes as a result of such threats as China’ s advancements in technology and data infrastructure. Man y of the projects coming out of ODNI and CIA ’ s Science and T echnology Directorate (S& T) focus on expen- sive, AI-driven open-source work, but there is likely duplication of effort in areas where the private sector and entrepreneurs are already making progress . — 229 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject The Intelligence A dvanced Research Projects Activity (IARP A) and S& T should focus primarily on challenging technology problems . Avoiding duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector in such areas as practical defense cyber intellig ence and artificial intelligence research would help to focus the agen - cies on the complex shadow tasks at hand while simultaneously freeing limited resources for advancement in other areas . President’ s Intelligence Advisory B oard and PIAB Intelligence Oversight Board. The President’ s Intellig ence Advisory Board (PIAB) is charg ed with pro - viding the President with an independent source of advice on the IC’ s effectiveness while offering insights into the IC’ s future plans . The Board is meant to have access to all information needed to perform i ts functions and to have dire ct access to the President. The Intelligence Oversight Board is a standing committee within the PIAB . These entities should be tasked with giving independent, informed advice and opinion concerning major matters of national security focused on long-term, enduring issues central to advancing and protecting American interes ts . This should include taking a broader , deeper look at critical trends , developments , and their implications for U .S . national and economic security relying on unclassified and open-source information. The Importance of Space. With China developing increasingly capable space and counterspace technologies and Russia taking more aggressive action in space, space has emerged as the latest warfighting d omain. In response, the DNI cre - ated the Office of the Space Executiv e (OSX ) in 2018 as an experiment to promo te greater integration of IC space activities without incurring excessiv e overhead. The DNI mandated greater collaboration across the enterprise without adding personnel, altering authorities , and increasing budgets . The Space Executiv e’ s design reflects the original design principles of the ODNI. The ODNI was explicitly not designed to be a departmental headquarters with com - mand and control of the 18 agencies’ vast bureaucracies . Rather , it was designed to be small and lightweight with a mission to coordinate and integrate the criti - cal activities of the IC’ s 18 agencies without creating new bureaucrac y . That goal should remain in force, and calls by outside entities or Congress to add new centers and layers should be rejected. The Office of the Space Executiv e has been recognized as an effective governance model and has spawned similar efforts , including the Election Threats Ex ecutive, Economic and Threat Finance Executiv e, and Cyber Ex ecutive. With this in mind, the following initiatives should be pursued: l Expand collaboration with partners . F or too many decades , the IC and DOD have acquired and operated s atellites independently . T o improve their ability to mee t the threat posed by China and Russia, the IC and DOD should: — 230 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise 1. Explore new methods for be tter integrating our space asse ts , 2. Examine the possibility of joint programs , and 3. F ully utilize unique Title 10 and Title 50 authorities to execute space defense (and offense) strategies jointly . Additionally , the IC should support building international alliances with like-minded partners beyond the Five E yes intelligence-sharing nations. Increasingly , potential allied nations (and their commercial companies) are developing innovativ e space capabilities to augment and strengthen the U .S . space defense and intelligence posture. l Refocus space-related intellig ence collection. The IC has developed a space threats collection posture predicated on three assump tions: 1. The best information on developing space threats comes from collection against the advers aries’ military institutions on Earth, 2. There should be a clear dividing line between DOD’ s intelligence activities and the IC’ s , and 3. Only government-developed “ex quisite” capabilities can inform threat analysis and decision-making effectively . Developments by our adv ersaries and the emergence of a vibrant commercial space marketplace o ver the pas t decade have rendered all three assumptions false and even dangerous . The IC must therefore refocus and inv est in me thods that will enable it to characterize accurately the threats that already exist in space, no t just on the ground; break do wn barriers to information sharing and collaboration with the DOD; and embrace commercially derived capabilities that can be adapted to a national security mission—all while emphasizing the need to protect critical supply chains and the cybersecurity needs that result from an increasingly g o vernment– commercial low Earth orbit. Our nation’ s economic and national security depends on being able to advance America’ s leadership position in space, which is eroding in the face of increasing threats from adversaries and our o wn inaction. — 231 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject AN UNFINISHED EXPERIMENT The Intelligence Community , including specifically the role of the DNI and ODNI, is an unfinished experiment. The envisioned design principle w as a conser - vative one: a small, network -centric model for enterprise coordination as opposed to a large monolithic bureaucrac y like DHS . The ODNI, however , has reverted in some ways to a bureaucratic and hierarchical model characterized b y limited effectiveness . Historically , the CIA has undercut the DNI and maintains primacy in the IC hierarchy , especially regarding the White H ouse. An incoming conservative Pres- ident can right the ship and return the IC governance model to firs t principles by using a limited but empo wered leadership and coordination design to serve the nation’ s intelligence and national security needs while reclaiming the public trust with fiscal responsibility , political neutrality , personnel accountability , tech - nological prowess , and necess ary human capital needed to counter the immense nation-state and as ymmetrical threats facing our country . A UTHOR’S NO TE: The pr epara tion of this chapter w as a collectiv e ent erprise of individuals inv olv ed in the 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject. No particular polic y stat ement, r eform r ecommenda tion, or other view e xpres sed herein should be a ttributed t o any individual c ontributor or t o the author . — 232 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise ENDNO TES 1. “T w o independent agencies—the Office of the Dir ect or of National Int elligence ( ODNI) and the Centr al Intelligenc e A gency ( CIA); Nine Department of Def ense elements—the Def ense Intelligenc e Agenc y (DIA), the National Security A gency (NS A), the National Geospa tial-Intelligenc e Agenc y (NGA), the National Rec onnaissance Offic e (NRO ), and intelligenc e elements of the fiv e DoD services; the Arm y , Nav y , Marine Corps, Air F orc e, and Spac e For ce . Se ven elemen ts of other departments and agencies—the Department of Ener gy’ s Office of Int elligence and C ounter -Intelligenc e; the Department of Homeland Security’ s Offic e of Intelligenc e and Analysis and U .S. Coast Guar d Int elligence; the Department of Justic e’ s F ederal Bur eau of Inv estiga tion and the Drug Enfor cemen t Agenc y’ s Office of National Securit y Intelligenc e; the Department of State ’ s Bur eau of Intelligenc e and Resear ch; and the Department of the T reasury’ s Office of Intelligenc e and Analysis. ” Office of the Direc tor of National Int elligence , “What W e Do: Members of the IC, ” https:/ / ww w .dni. go v /inde x.php/ what-w e-do/ members-of-the-ic (ac cessed Mar ch 8, 20 23). 2. Office of the Dir ect or of National Intelligenc e, “Mission, ” https:/ / ww w .intelligence .go v / mission#:~:te xt=The%20 Intelligenc e%20Community's%20mis sion%20is,law%20enf or cement%2C%20and%20the%20military (acc essed February 2 4, 20 23). 3. Abraham Linc oln, Second Annual Message t o Congr ess, December 1, 1862, h ttps:/ / ww w .presidency .ucsb.edu/ documents/ second-annual-message-9 (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 2023). 4. Christopher P orter , “Se v en Questions the Ne xt Pr esident Will Need the Int elligence Communit y to Ans w er to Win the T echnology Competition with China, ” LinkedIn, Mar ch 14, 20 23, https:/ / ww w .linkedin. com/ pulse/ se ven-ques tions-ne xt -presiden t-need-int elligence-communit y-port er /?trackingId=Dl9RF5CnS wW nA O7r9gg HiQ%3D%3D (acc essed Mar ch 18, 2023). 5. H.R. 2845, Int elligence Ref orm and T errorism Pr e v ention Act of 2004 , Public Law No . 108-458, 108th Congr ess, December 17 , 2004, https:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v /108/ plaws/ publ458/PLA W - 108publ458.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 2004). 6. T estimony of Philip Z eliko w , Ex ecutive Dir ect or , National Commission on T err orist At tacks Upon the United States, in hearing, As sessing America ’ s Coun terterr orism’ s Capabilities , C ommittee on Go v ernmental A ffairs, U.S. Senat e, 108th C ongress, 2d Ses sion, August 3, 2004, p . 55, https:/ /ia802906.us.archiv e.or g/31/items/ go v . gpo.f dsy s.CHRG- 108shr g95506/ CHRG- 108shrg95 506.pdf (acc essed March 19 , 2023). 7. Michael Allen, Blinking Red: Crisis and C ompromis e in American Intelligenc e After 9 /11 (Dulles, V A: Potomac Books, 2013), p. 15 5; Intervie w with R obert Gates, April 19, 20 12. 8. Allen, Blinking Red , p. 154 ; Robert Gates e-mail t o Andy Car d, January 11, 2005; handwritten not e fr om Robert Gates, January 20 , 2005. 9. Intervie w with John Ratcliff e, December 15 , 2022. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. S. 258, National Security A ct of 194 7 , Public Law No . 80-253, 80th C ongr ess, July 26, 194 7 , https:/ / govtr ack us. s3.amazona ws.c om/legislink/ pdf / stat/6 1/S T A TUTE-61-Pg4 95.pdf (acc essed Mar ch 6, 2023). 13. Pr esident Ronald R eagan, Exec utive Or der 12333, “Unit ed States Int elligence A ctivities, ” December 4, 1981, in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 46, No. 235 (December 8, 1981), pp. 5 9941–59954, h ttps:/ / ww w .govinf o.go v / conten t/ pk g/FR- 1981- 12-08/ pdf/FR- 1981- 12-08.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 20 23). 14. President Geor ge W . Bush, Executiv e Or der 134 70 , “Further Amendments t o Ex ecutiv e Order 12333, Unit ed States In telligence A ctivities, ” July 30, 2008, in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 73, No. 150 (A ugust 4, 2008), pp. 45325–4 5342, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pkg/FR- 2008-08-04/ pdf/E8- 17940.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 2023). See also Pr esident Geor ge W . Bush, Ex ecutiv e Or der 13355, “Str engthened Management of the Intelligenc e Community , ” August 2 7 , 2004, in Federal R egister , V ol. 69 , No. 169 ( September 1, 2004), pp. 53 593–5 359 7 , https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / content/ pkg/FR- 2004-09-01/ pdf/ 04-20051.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Def ense, Defense C ounterin telligence and Securit y A gency , “T rusted W orkforc e 2.0 and Continuous V etting, ” https:/ / w w w .dcsa.mil/ mc/ p v / cv / (ac cessed Mar ch 9, 20 23). 16. 50 U.S. C ode § 3093( e), https:/ / w ww .law .cornell.edu/ uscode/t e xt/50 /3093 (ac cessed F ebruary 2 4, 2023). 17. 50 U.S. C ode § 3093(a). 18. 50 U.S. C ode § 3093(a)( 4). — 233 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject 19. Michael E. DeVine, “ Co v ert Ac tion and Clandestine Ac tivities of the Intelligenc e Community: Select ed Definitions, ” Congr essional R esear ch Service Report f or Members and C ommittees of C ongr ess No. R45 175, updated No v ember 29 , 2022, https:/ / sgp.f as.or g/ crs/intel/R4 5175 .pdf (accessed F ebruary 2 4, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, C entr al Intelligenc e Agenc y Act of 194 9, Public La w No. 81- 110, 81st C ongress, June 20 , 1949 , https:/ / go vtrack us.s3.amazona ws.c om/legislink/ pdf / stat/63 /ST A TUTE-63-P g208.pdf (acces sed March 6, 20 23). 21. Nicole Ogry sko , “Intelligenc e Community W orkfor ce Is Mor e Div erse , but Still Struggles with Ret ention and Pr omotion, ” Feder al Ne ws Net w ork, October 27 , 2021, h ttps:/ / feder alne wsnetw ork. com/ w orkf orc e/2021/10 / intelligenc e-communit y-w orkf or ce-is-mor e-div erse-but -still-struggles- with-r etention-and-pr omotion/ (acc essed Mar ch 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The In telligence P olicy Ne xus, ” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Str ategic Int elligence , V olume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Go v ernment (W estport, CT : Pr ager , 2007), and Richar d K. Betts, “ Analysis, W ar , and Decision: Why Intelligenc e Failur es Ar e Ine vitable, ” W orld Politics, V ol. 30, No . 1 (Oc tober 19 78), pp. 6 1–89 . 23. Lett er fr om Barry A. Zulauf , IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Direc tor of National Int elligence , to Senator Mar c o Rubio, A cting Chairman, and Senator Mark W arner , Vice Chairman, Select Commit tee on Intelligenc e, U .S. Senate , “RE: SSCI #20 20-30 29, ” January 6, 2021, https:/ /int.n yt.c om/ data/ documentt ools/ ic -ombudsman-election-int erfer ence- with-r esponses/ c50e548011fd6 168/full.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 14, 20 23). 24. Joshua Ro vner , Fixing the F acts: National Securit y and the Politics of Intelligenc e (Ithaca, NY : Cornell Univ ersity Pr ess, 2011), pp . 30– 31. 25. Joshua Ro vner , “Is Politicization E v er a Good Thing ?” Intelligenc e and National Securit y , V ol. 28, No . 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, F oreign In telligence Surv eillance Act of 19 78, Public La w No. 95-5 11, 95th Congr ess, Oct ober 25, 19 78, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / content/ pkg/ ST A TUTE-92/ pdf/S T A TUTE-92 -Pg1783.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief , “702 R eauthorization: Defending a K e y Intelligenc e T ool, ” remark s of Benjamin Po well, former Gener al Counsel t o the Dir ector of National In telligence , stating that FIS A 70 2 pr o vides “betw een 40 and 60 per cent” of the int elligence in the PDB, Dec ember 18, 2017 , https:/ / ww w . youtube. com/ wa tch ?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (ac cessed Mar ch 18, 20 23). 28. An intelligenc e alliance that includes A ustr alia, Canada, Ne w Z ealand, the United Kingdom, and the Unit ed States. Offic e of the Dir ector of National In telligence , National Coun terint elligence and Security C enter , “Five E yes In telligenc e Over sight and Re vie w Council (FIORC), ” https:/ / ww w .dni.go v /inde x.php/ ncsc -how -w e- w ork/217 -about/ organization/icig-pages/ 2660-icig-fiorc (ac cessed Mar ch 10 , 2023). 29. Porter , “Sev en Questions the Ne xt Pr esident W ill Need the Intelligenc e Community t o Answ er to W in the T echnology Competition with China. ” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act t o Requir e the Registr ation of C ertain Persons Emplo y ed b y A gencies to Disseminat e Pr opaganda in the United Stat es and for Other Purposes, Public La w No. 75-583, 7 5th Congr ess, June 8, 19 38, https:/ / go vtr ackus.s3.amazona ws.c om/legislink/ pdf / stat/52/ ST A TUTE-52 -Pg631.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 6, 2023). 31. Kristina W ong, “Ex clusiv e: F ormer DNI John Ratcliff e Pleased CIA Follo wing His Lead on China Thr eat, ” Br eitbart, October 13, 20 21, https:/ / ww w .breitbart. com/ politics/20 21/10/13/ ex clusiv e-john-r atcliff e-pleased- cia-follo wing-lead-china-thr eat/ (acc essed Mar ch 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence A uthorization A ct for Fiscal Y ear 2003, Public La w No. 10 7 -306, 10 7th C ongress, No v ember 27 , 2002, Title IX, ht tps:/ / www .govin fo.go v / cont ent/ pk g/S T A TUTE- 116/ pdf /S T A TUTE- 116-Pg2383.pdf (acc essed Mar ch 6, 2023). 33. President Geor ge W . Bush, Executiv e Or der 13354, “National C ountert err orism Cent er , ” August 27 , 2004, in Feder al Regist er , V ol. 69, No. 16 9 (September 1, 2004), pp . 53589–5 359 2, https:/ / ww w .go vinfo .go v / c ontent/ pk g/FR-2004-09-01/ pdf/ 04-20050 .pdf (acc essed Mar ch 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Dir ect or of National Intelligenc e, National C ounterint elligence and Securit y Cent er , “Who W e Are: Hist ory of NCSC, ” https:/ / ww w .dni.go v /index.php/ ncsc -who- we- are/ ncsc -history (ac cessed Mar ch 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F . T re v erton and C. Bry an Gabbar d, Assessing the T r adecraft of In telligence Analy sis , RAND Corpor ation, National Securit y Resear ch Division T echnical Report , 2008, p. 6, https:/ / ww w .rand. or g/ pubs/ technical_r eports/TR293.h tml (acces sed March 1, 20 23). — 2 40 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise content protected b y the “spirit of ” the Firew all Regulation—despite ample evi - dence to the contrary . Late in the Trump Administration, USAGM political leadership , following an intensive U .S. Department of J ustice review , revoked the Firewall Regulation over the protes ts of journalistic organizations—none more vociferous than V O A itself. 23 While the abuses of the Firewall Regulation are particularly disconcerting, they encompass just a fraction of similar o verreaches of the agenc y ’ s journalistic mission. Current and former USAGM/V O A leadership who w anted to maintain virtually zero accountability and oversight w aged a campaign of interference, resistance, and disinformation to stifle change at the agenc y . P erhaps not coincidentally , various media outlets with relationships to former and future USAGM leadersh ip published near-daily criticisms of Trump Administration appointees and also of grantee organi - zation leaders who were appointed by CEO P ack to implement long-o verdue reforms . 24 Agency Mission F ailure. Currently , the USAGM, by and large, is not fulfilling its mission, which remains so ill-defined and ambiguous that it enables the organi - zation to go about its business larg ely unguided with lit tle to no oversight. Rather than providing news and information in an accurate, reliable way that promo tes and supports freedom and democracy , the agenc y is mismanaged, disorganized, ineffective, and rife with was te and redundancy . These shortfalls are either oriented toward, or directly contribute to , the agen- cy ’ s media organizations joining the mainstream media’ s anti-U .S . chorus and denigrating the American story —all in the name of so-called journalis tic inde - pendence. Indeed, content during the Trump Administration was rife with typical mainstream media talking points ass ailing the President and his staff. The few bright spots within V O A and the OCB are often stifled ins tead of supported. T op- level talent often leaves the agenc y or is met with obs tacles rather than support. 25 Opportunities for modernization and effective strategy are ignored, and w asteful spending and mis allocation of resources are the norm in an en vironment in whi ch nepotism is rampant and political gamesmanship pro tects bad actors . Amanda Bennet t 26 was confirmed as USAGM CEO in 2022 after two years of being blocked by sev eral Members of Congress . Legal advocacy organization America First Legal F oundation even wrote to President J oe Biden asking him to withdraw her nomination, 27 citing several sev ere national security failures while she was director of V O A. 28 Her tenure as director during the Obama Administration (and her holdover into the beginning of the Trump Administration) w as marred with operational failures , security failures , and credibility failures . Those failures are reportedly ongoing during her current tenure as CEO . 29 NECESS AR Y REFORMS Security Issues . The Office of P ersonnel Management 30 and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence flagg ed severe security failures during four — 2 41 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject extensive in ves tigations of the USAGM, each conducted during a 10- year period between 20 10 and 2020 . 31 Security personnel and former agenc y senior leadership ignored these issues and allowed them to persis t. 32 In brief, the USAGM is vulnerable to exploitation by foreign spies . During the last six months of the Trump Administration, known foreign intelligence opera - tives were remov ed from the OCB and RFE/RL. During the 10- year period between 2010 and 2020 , both the OPM and the ODNI found that the USAGM’ s Office of Security (under the Office of Management) had grossly ignored and flouted many of the federal government’ s mos t critical and long-standing information and per - sonnel security protocols , regulations , and practices . 33 During the inv estigative period—in which the findings were largely , if not wholly , ignored by agenc y senior leadership—o ver 1,500 USAGM personnel (nearly 40 percent of its total workforce) were performing their Tier 3 and Tier 5 national-security -sensitive positions with falsified and/ or unauthorized suitabil- ity -for-emplo yment determinations and with access to sensitive federal buildings and information sys tems . In man y cases, records (including Social Security num - bers), were falsified or replaced with notional placeholders , and fingerprints (in many do zens of cases) were never submit ted to the F ederal Bureau of In vestigation for basic background in ves tigations . By the time these issues were addressed b y members of the Trump A dminis - tration, more than 500 personnel with unauthorized access and clearances had left the USAGM and rolled into other federal agencies with reciprocal clearance authorizations . Many o thers disappeared into U .S . society . As of J anuary 2021, the USAGM had not ye t determined the whereabouts of these individuals . 34 The USAGM must never again be entrus ted with delegated authority ov er its personnel security programs and suitability determinations until such time as it can prov e that these failures will not happen again. These responsibilities mus t remain with the Department of Defense and the Office of P ersonnel Management, to which they were transferred in the final weeks of the Trump Administration. J ournalists’ Securit y . Agency journalists , both on and off American soil, hav e faced danger , 35 yet their superiors hav e done little to pro tect them. Whistleblowers and Trump Administration officials found that protection of USAGM American and foreign journalists emplo yed by USAGM ne tworks and grantee organizations was severely lacking. Against often-significant resis tance, political appointees forced action to enable broadcasters (who were under verified threats) to broadcas t from remote locations while being protected b y federal law enforcement officers . Likewise, political appointees met resis tance from senior career officials when insisting that foreign-based journalists in high-risk countries make their locations kno wn to the agenc y in the event they required rescue, ex traction, or safe housing. Such safe ty measures , argued career officials , would somehow represent a violation of — 2 42 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise journalistic independence. With only rare ex ceptions , resis tance to the most basic journalist s afety m easures was the knee-jerk response from USAGM career officials . W as ting T axpayer Dollars . The USAGM’S current operations, properly man - aged, can be conducted on less than $700 million per year . Prior to the arrival of President Donald Trump’ s appointees in J une 2020 , budgeting, financial responsi - bility , and spending totaled ov er $800 million per year , with virtually no oversight or supervision. W aste, unnecessary spending, nepo tism for pet projects , redundant programs , and unnecessary hiring abounded. Consolidation and Reduction of Redundant Services . Currently , the USAGM funds numerous redundant services through its own offices , through V oice of Amer - ica and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and through its grantees . F or example, VO A has a Mandarin-language service but also funds redundant services through Radio F ree Asia. VO A also has a F arsi-language service that duplicates one funded through Radio F ree Europe/Radio Liberty . Surplus services in the same languages are often unnecessary and counterproductive. Fiscal responsibility and transparency should return to the USAGM, with consolidation being a corners tone of the strategy . As noted previously , the Open T echnology F und duplicates activities that already existed at the USAGM in the Office of Interne t F reedom. Numerous career whistleblo wers came forward to sound the alarm to President Trump’ s USAGM political team about OTF’ s abuse and o verreach. 36 Its opaque, expensive, and unnecessary usurpation of an exis ting USAGM office is an egregious example of government was te and illustrates the general disdain for U .S . taxpayers that is rife within this agenc y . F ull reinstatement of OIF would allow full agency and congres - sional oversight into ho w so-called “Internet freedom” money is being spent. 37 J-1 Vis a Program A buses . Rather than use the appropriate I vis a 38 intended for foreign journalists , the USAGM uses the J- 1 “cultural ex change” visas to allow foreign nationals to transition easily into jobs that American citizens with cul - tural and linguistic expertise could s atisfy . The J-1 vis a is intended for cultural and academic exchange programs , among others— none of which include journalism. 39 Additionally , J-1 vis as are meant for non-immigrant temporary ex changes. The USAGM’ s J- 1 visa holders often go on to apply for permanent residency , which violates the intention of this visa. Shortw ave T ransmission Upgrades and Improv ements . Non- web-based technologies that are pro ven and durable, such as shortwav e radio transmission stations , hav e been grossly deemphasized in budgeting in favor of newer web- based technologies . This move is dangerously short-sighted and puts the U .S . at a perilous strategic dis advantage in the event of a major conflict, particularly with Russia or China. There is great concern about the vulnerability of undersea cable trunks that make up the Internet cloud. The vas t majority of global Internet traffic—95 per - cent—is transmitted through these cables , including news transmissions and — 2 43 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject web-based content produced by the USAGM’ s broadcas t networks . While the robust and popular use of the Interne t is ideal during peacetime, during times of major conflict, widespread damage to the undersea cables that carry communi - cations across the globe can reasonably be expected. Long-lasting po wer outages are also likely , such as those Ukraine experienced in the aftermath of Russia’ s 2022 invasion. The USAGM’ s responsibility for t he only U .S . global shortwave rad io capability is of critical strategic importan ce if America is to carry its message to people seeking information and freedom within conflict zones . Shortwave technologies also mak e it possible to carry broadcasts in areas where Interne t traffic is severely restricted, as it is in many authoritarian s tates today . ORGANIZA TIONAL ISSUES P ersonnel. P ersonnel is one of the biggest concerns for the USAGM and its grantees . A ttractin g talented staff who will s tay and le tting go of poorly perform - ing personnel are hurdles . A dditionally , whistleblo wers have come forward with numerous credible allegations of illegal nepotism and improper hiring practic - e s. 40 P as t agenc y leaders have ignored national security procedures when hiring and have failed to adequately v et s taff. 41 Gov ernment hiring policies and federal law must be follo wed, and serious policy chang es mus t be implemented to end these practices . Rele v ant Go vernment Entities l The White House. As an ex ecutive branch agency , the USAGM ostensibly should report to the President and coordinate activities with the National Security Council (NS C)—especially given the direct and implied national security aspects of the agenc y ’ s messaging globally . Ho wever , there currently is no specific office in the White House or NSC liaison for the USAGM. The original network, V O A, functioned under the Office of Coordinator of Information as early as 1941, the W ar Department’ s Office of W ar Information from 1942 to 1945 , the State Department from 1945 to 1953 , and the U .S . Information Ag ency from 1953 until the creation of the independent Broadcasting Board of Go vernors in 1999 . Although some oversight and management functions of the agency are provided by the State Department, the USAGM otherwise has lit tle connectivity to larger departments or agencies and even less to the White House. With the dissolution of the U .S . Information Ag ency in 1999 , the USAGM has virtually been under its own supervision and guidance. The results hav e been dismal. — 2 44 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise l The State Department. VO A was mos t effective before and during the Cold W ar when it was under the direct supervision and control of the W ar and State Departments , respectively . If VO A is no t put in the direct chain of command under the NS C , serious consideration should be given to putting VO A under the direct supervision of the Office of Global Public Affairs at the Department of State. The Office of Global Public Affairs was formed during the Trump Administration by consolidation of the State Department’ s Bureau of International Information Programs and Bureau of Global Public Affairs . Ensuring that taxpayer-funded TV , radio , and messaging tells America’ s story is imperative and should be coordinated with the exis ting foreign- language social media platforms at the State Department. Currently , VO A ’ s foreign-language TV programming is unreliable in telling America’ s story , given its amorphous interpretation of its independence firew all and its waning adherence to certain provisions of the Smith–Mundt Act depending on which political party is in office. The VO A firewall is meant to protect broadcasters from government interference with content; however , USAGM staff have abused the firewall and used it as an offensive measure to block ov ersight. A dditionally , the Smith–Mundt Act stipulates that USAGM services are meant to tell the American story abroad—never to domes tic audiences—but the agenc y has used its taxpayer funding to promote partis an messaging in the U .S . One of the most egregious examples was when, in 2020 , it bought ads on its foreign- language social media sites to disseminate a Biden campaign ad and targ e ted it to a major Muslim population in Michigan. 42 Moreov er , VO A often airs foreign adversaries’ propaganda, which is antithe tical to its congressionally mandated core mission. State Department oversight or “command” ma y be one way to ensure that V O A and the rest of the USAGM re turns and adheres to its original mission. Clear lines of command and communications between the USAGM and an appropriate office of the National Security Council are also sorely lacking, as has been any reasonable accountability for USAGM senior leadership and strategy . The State Department’ s Assistant Secre tary for Global Public Affairs and Undersecretary for Diplomacy and Public Affairs should also be in the accountability loop for agenc y actions . While the U .S. Secre tary of State technically has a seat on the board of the agenc y , it is a toothless seat that is often deferred to the undersecretary and/ or assis tant secretaries noted abo ve. This position should be relevant and directive when U .S . foreign policy and strategic communications are at stake. — 2 45 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject F or example, the years-long delay in confirming the Trump-appointed CEO left disas trous holdover leadership from the previous Administration. Employing effective leadership , even in an acting capacity , while a new CEO is awaiting Senate confirmation is necess ary to prevent a repeat of this behavior . l Congress . The USAGM receives its budget and mandates directly from Congress . Often, changes in major functions at the ag ency happen because of the lobbying efforts of a few connected individuals—often grantees lobbying for more funds and less accountability . Those changes can and do handcuff leadership from any meaningful o versight. An o verhaul of the agenc y with review from Congress to modernize, s treamline, and reduce waste mus t be done with congressional support. l Ke y nongovernmental s takeholders , allies, and non-allies . These include industry groups , nonprofits , trade associations , foundations , and activist organizations , for example, America First Legal F oundation, 43 USAGM W atch, 44 BBG- USAGM W atch, 45 and Whistleblower Pro tection Project. 46 C ONCL USION The USAGM is a story of a los t opportunity both to help res tore the world’ s con - fidence in the promise and ideals of America and to set a high mark for journalis tic integrity and unbiased reporting. These two areas have suffered severely under two decades of USAGM mismanagement and lack of oversight. Finding solutions to these problems and the restoration of the agency ’ s networks mus t be the priorities of future agenc y leadership . T o accomplish this, the USAGM mus t be fully reformed top to bot tom with congressional and White House support. The possibility of consolidating no t only the agenc y ’ s subparts, but bringing the entire agency under the supervision of the NS C , the State Department, or both would dramatically aid that reform. If the de f acto aim of the agency simply remains to compete in foreign markets using anti-U .S . talking points that parro t America’ s adversaries’ propaganda, then this represents an unacceptable burden to the U .S . taxpayer and a negative re turn on inv estment. In that case, the USAGM should be defunded and dises tablished. If, howev er , the ag ency can be reformed to become an effect ive tool, it would be one of the greatest tools in America’ s arsenal to tell America’ s story and promo te freedom and democracy around the world. A UTHOR’S NO TE: The pr epar ation of this chapter w as a c ollectiv e effort inv olving many individuals to whom thanks is o w ed. These individuals include, but ar e not limited t o, Vict oria Coa tes, Michael Pack, Fr ank Wuc o, and se v er al br av e whistleblo w ers who pr efer not t o be named. Their efforts w er e int egral t o the chapter and ar e grea tly apprecia ted. — 2 46 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise C ORPORA TION FOR PUBLIC BRO ADCASTING Mik e Gonzalez E very Republican President since Richard Nix on has tried to strip the Corpora - tion for Public Broadcasting (CPB) of taxpayer funding. That is significant no t just because it means that for half a century , Republican Presidents have failed to accomplish what they set out to do , but also because Nix on was the firs t President in office when National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which the CPB funds , went on air . In other words , all Republican Presidents ha ve recognized that public funding of domestic broadcas ts is a mistake. As a 35- year -old lawyer in the Nix on White House, one Antonin Scalia warned that conservativ es were being “confronted with a long-range problem of significant social consequences—that is, the development of a government-funded broadcast s ys tem similar to the BBC . ” 47 All of which means that the next conservative P resident must finally get this done and do it despite opposition from congressional members of his own party if necess ary . T o stop public funding is good policy and good politics. The reason is simple: President Lyndon J ohnson may hav e pledged in 1967 that public broadcasting would become “a vital public resource to enrich our homes , educate our families and to provide assis tance to our classrooms , ” 48 but public broadcasting immediately became a liberal forum for public affairs and journalism. Not only is the federal gov ernment trillions of dollars in debt and unable to afford the more than half a billion dollars squandered on leftist opinion each year , but the government should not be compelling the conservativ e half of the country to pay for the suppression of its own views . As Thomas J efferson put it, “T o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagations of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors , is sinful and tyrannical. ” 49 A DEMONSTRA TED P A TTERN OF BIAS Conservatives will thus reward a President who eliminates this tyrannical sit- uation. PBS and NPR do not ev en bother to run programming that would at tract conservatives . As P ew Research demonstrated in 20 1 4, 25 percent of PBS’ s audi - ence is “mostly liberal, ” and 35 percent is “consistently liberal. ” That is 60 percent liberal compared to 15 percent conservative (11 percent “mos tly conservative” and 4 percent “consistently conservative”). 50 NPR ’ s audience is even to the Left of that, with 67 percent liberal (41 percent “consistently liberal” and 26 percent “mos tly liberal”), compared with 12 percent conservative (3 percent and 9 percent “consistently conservativ e” and “mostly con - servative, ” respectively). 51 That may be an accep table business model for MSNBC or CNN , but not for a taxpayer -subsidized broadcaster . — 2 4 7 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject DEFUNDING THROUGH THE BUDGET ARY PROCES S Cutting off the CPB is logis tically easy . The solution lies in the budgetary process . In 2022, the CPB submitted to the Labor , Health and Human Services , Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appro- priations Committees its budget jus tification for fiscal year (FY ) 2023. In it, the CPB requested that Congress give it a $565 million advance appropriation—a $40 million increase compared to its FY 2022 funding. 52 Unlike mos t other agencies , the CPB receives advance appropriations that provide them with funding two years ahead of time, which insulates the agenc y from Congress’ s po wer of the purse and oversight. This special budgetary treatment is unjus tified and should be ended. The 47th President can just tell the Congress—through the budget he proposes and through personal contact—that h e will not sign an appropria tions spending bill that contains a penny for the CPB . The President may have to use the bully pulpit, as NPR and PBS have teams of lobb yists who hav e convinced enough M embers of Congress to sav e their bacon every time their taxpayer subsidies hav e been at risk since the Nixon era. Defunding CPB would by no means cause NPR or PBS —or other public broad- casters that benefit from CPB funding, including the even-further -to-the Left P acifica Radio and American Public Media—to file for bankrup tcy . The mem - bership model that the CPB uses , along with the funding from corporations and foundations that it also receives , would allow these broadcas ters to continue to thrive. As George Will wrote, “If ‘Ses ame Street’ programming were put up for auction, the danger would be of g e tting trampled b y the stampede of potential bidders . ” 53 Indeed, “Sesame Stree t” is on HBO now , which shows its po tential as a money earner . PUBLIC INTEREST V S. PRIVILEGE Stripping public funding would, of course, mean that NPR, PBS , P acifica Radio , and the other leftis t broadcasters would be shorn of the presump tion that they act in the public interest and receive the privileges that often accompan y so acting. They should no longer , for example, be qualified as noncommercial education s ta- tions (NCE stations), which they clearly no longer are. NPR, P acifica, and the other radio ventures ha ve zero claim on an educational f unction (the original purpose for which they were created by President J ohnson), and the percentage of on-air programming that PBS devotes to educational endea vors such as “Ses ame Street” (programs that are themselves biased to the Left) is small. Being an NCE comes with benefits . The F ederal Communications Commis - sion, for example, reserves the 20 stations at the lo wer end of the radio frequency ( between 88 and 108 MHz on the FM band) for NCEs . The FCC s ays that “only noncommercial educational radio stations are licensed in the 88–9 2 MHz ‘reserved’ band, ” while both commercial and noncommercial educational stations may — 2 48 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise operate in the “non-reserved” band. 54 This confers advantages, as lo wer-frequency stations can be heard farther aw ay and are easier to find as they lie on the left end of the radio dial (figuratively as well as ideologically). The FCC also ex emp ts NCE stations from licensing fees . It sa ys that “Noncom- mercial educational (NCE) FM station licensees and full service NCE television broadcast s tation licensees are exemp t from paying regulatory fees , provided that these stations operate solely on an NCE basis . ” 55 NPR and PBS stations are in reality no longer noncommercial, as they run ads in everything but name for their sponsors . They are also noneducational. The next President should instruct the F CC to ex clude the stations affiliated with PBS and NPR from the NCE denomination and the privileges that come with it. — 2 49 — 2025 Pr esidential T ransition Pr oject ENDNO TES 1. U.S. A gency f or Global Media, https:/ / ww w .usagm.go v / (accessed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 2. Ben W eingarten, “Security F ailures USG Media A genc y Pro v e Need t o Hire Americans Fir st, ” Ne w sw eek , August 10 , 2020 , https:/ / ww w .new sw eek. com/ security-f ailures -usg-media- Agenc y-pr o v e-need-hir e- americans-firs t-opinion- 1523895 (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 3. U.S. Agenc y for Global Media, “Who W e Are , ” https:/ / ww w .usagm.go v / who-w e-ar e/hist ory / (accessed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 4. U.S. A gency f or Global Media, “V oice of America, ” https:/ / ww w .usagm.go v / netw orks/ voa/ (ac cessed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 5. Daniel Lippman, “Deleted Biden V ideo Sets Off a Crisis at V oice of America, ” Politic o July 30, 20 20, ht tps:/ / ww w .politico .com/ news/ 2020 /0 7 /30 / deleted-biden-video-se ts-off-a-crisis -at -v oice-of -america- 3885 71 (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 6. U.S. A gency for Global Media, “ Office of Cuba Br oadcasting, ” https:/ / w w w .usagm.gov / net work s/ ocb/ (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 7. Rafael Bernal, “Bipartisan Gr oup Asks Office of Cuba Br oadcasting t o Rescind La y offs, ” September 13, 20 22, The Hill , https:/ /thehill.com/la tino/3641445-bipartisan-gr oup-asks -office-of-cuba-br oadcasting-t o-r escind- lay offs/ (ac cessed Mar ch 20 , 2023). 8. U.S. A gency f or Global Media, “Middle East Br oadcasting Netw orks, ” https:/ / www .usagm.go v / netw orks/ mbn/ (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 9. U.S. Agenc y for Global Media, C onsolidation R eport , p. 13, https:/ / docs.house.go v / meetings/F A/ F A00/202109 30/114085/HMKP - 117 -F A00- 202109 30-SD002.pdf (ac cessed Mar ch 22, 2023). 10. U.S. A gency f or Global Media, “Radio Fr ee Asia, ” https:/ / ww w .usagm.go v / netw orks/ rfa/ (acces sed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 11. U.S. Department of Sta te and the Br oadcasting Boar d of Go v ernors, Office of the Inspect or Gener al, Audit of Radio Fr ee Asia Expenditur es , June 2015, https:/ / w ww .stat eoig.go v / uploads/ r eport/ r eport_pdf_file/ aud-fm- ib- 15-2 4_1.pdf (accessed Mar ch 22, 2023). 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., p. 16. 14. Susan Cr abtree , “‘Lax’ Int ernet Fr eedom Gr oup Balks at New P ack Ov ersight, ” https:/ / w w w .realclearpolitics. com/ articles/2020/ 08/2 4/la x_internet_fr eedom_gr oup_balks_at_ne w_pack_o v ersight_14404 3.html (acc essed Mar ch 22, 2023). 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Nomination of Michael Pack t o the Broadcas ting Boar d of Gov ernor s, 116th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2020), https:/ / ww w .c ongress. go v / nomination/116th-congr ess/1590 (acc essed March 20 , 2023). 18. James Robbins, “Mor e Rot a t America’ s Public Diplomacy Mouthpiec e, ” The Hill, Nov ember 7 , 2020 , https:/ / thehill.c om/ opinion / national-security /52 49 2 4-mor e-rot -at -americas-public -diplomacy-mouthpiece/ (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 19. U.S. Offic e of Personnel Management, Suitability A genc y Exec utive Pr ogr ams, Follo w Up R evie w of U.S. Agenc y for Global Media , July 20 20, https:/ /bbgwatch. com/ wp-conten t/ uploads/20 20/ 08/ OPM-SuitEA - July- 2020 .pdf (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 3). 20. If the agency w er e not an e xtension of U .S. for eign policy and national sec urity goals, then its staffing positions w ould not be classified in their entir ety as T ier 3 and Tier 5 national-security sensitiv e positions, which the y are . See U.S. A gency f or Global Media, Cons olidation Report , p. 13. 21. Feder al Regist er , V ol. 85, No. 115 ( June 15, 2020), pp. 36 150– 36 153. 22. U.S. Inf ormation and Educational Ex change A ct of 1948 (“Smith–Mundt Ac t”), Public Law 80–40 2. 23. Jessica Jerr eat, “USA GM CEO Criticized Ov er Mo v e to R escind Fire w all Regulation, ” October 28, 2020 , https:/ / ww w . voane w s.com/ a/ usa_usagm-ceo-criticiz ed-o v er-mo v e-r escind-fire w all-r egulation/6 19 7 6 71.html (acc essed Mar ch 20, 20 23). 24. Byr on Y ork, “ America’ s Lost V oice , ” W ashington E xaminer , F ebruary 4, 2021, https:/ / ww w . washingtone xaminer . com/ politics/ americas-lost -v oic e (acces sed March 20 , 2023). — 256 — Mandat e for Leadership: T he Conserv ativ e Promise l Launched its first Digital Str ategy 4 to promo te safe 5G access in emerging markets and combat Beijing ’ s efforts to equip regimes with tools to stifle democracy . l Struck bilateral development relationships with J apan, Israel, K uwait, Qatar , the United Arab Emirates , and T aiwan to support projects in sub- Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. l Established an office in Greenland to help counter China’ s claims of being “a near Arctic state” and reoriented its programming across Asia—including establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia—in line with America’ s Indo- P acific strategy . 5 l Joined with the U .S . Department of Homeland Security and National Oceanic and A tmospheric A dminis tration to help coastal countries detect and halt illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and confront criminal activities practiced by s tate-run Chinese fishing fleets that violate international norms , ravage fishing industries in developing countries , worsen food insecurity , rob vulnerable communities of their livelihoods , and deplete maritime resources . USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations . An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and USAID –U .S . International Development Finance Corporation W orking Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and propos als through a counter-China lens . A senior executiv e–level Clear Choice Coordinator , reporting to the A dminis - trator , advised the ag ency ’ s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secre tariat. The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’ s counter-China architecture to was te awa y , subordinating our national security interests to progressive climate politics in which Communis t China is viewed as a global partner . The next conservative Administration should res tore and build on the Trump Administration’ s counter -China infrastruc ture at USAID , end the c limate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of U .S . national security interests , rewarding those countries that resist China’ s debt diplomacy . It should finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to an y partner that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly . USAID’ s Bangkok -based Regional Development Mission for Asia should focus its strategic at tention on supporting cross-border initiatives designed to counter Chinese influence. 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