The downfall of Assad: Syrian refugees' settlement intentions after the unexpected regime change

Hammer, Luisa et al. Working Paper The downfall of Assad: Syrian refugees' settlement intentions after the unexpected regime change IAB-Discussion Paper, No. 09/2025 Provided in Cooperation with: Institute for Employment Research (IAB) Suggested Citation: Hammer, Luisa et al. (2025) : The downfall of Assad: Syrian refugees' settlement intentions after the unexpected regime change, IAB-Discussion Paper, No. 09/2025, Institut für Arbeitsmarktund Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg, https://doi.org/10.48720/IAB.DP.2509 This Version is available at: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/324910 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. 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If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/deed.de IAB‑DISCUSSION PAPER Articles on labour market issues ISSN 2195‑2663 09|2025 The Downfall of Assad: Syrian Refugees’ Settlement Intentions after the Unexpected Regime Change Luisa Hammer, Kamal Kassam, Yuliya Kosyakova, Katia Gallegos‑Torres, Lukas Olbrich, Theresa Koch, Simon Wagner The Downfall of Assad: Syrian Refugees’ Settlement Intentions after the Unexpected Regime Change Luisa Hammer (IAB), Kamal Kassam (IAB), Yuliya Kosyakova (IAB and Otto‑Friedrich‑ Universität Bamberg), Katia Gallegos‑Torres (IAB and ZEW), Lukas Olbrich (IAB), Theresa Koch (IAB) and Simon Wagner (IAB) Mit der Reihe „IAB‑Discussion Paper“ will das Forschungsinstitut der Bundesagentur für Arbeit den Dialog mit der externen Wissenschaft intensivieren. Durch die rasche Verbreitung von Forschungsergebnissen über das Internet soll noch vor Drucklegung Kritik angeregt und Qualität gesichert werden. The “IAB‑Discussion Paper” is published by the research institute of the German Federal Employment Agency in order to intensify the dialogue with the scientific community. The prompt publication of the latest research results via the internet intends to stimulate criticism and to ensure research quality at an early stage before printing. Contents 1 Introduction............................................................................... 6 2 Method .................................................................................... 8 2.1 Data ....................................................................................... 8 2.2 Empirical Strategy ....................................................................... 9 2.2.1 Investigating the identifying assumptions.................................. 10 2.3 Descriptive statistics for Syrians and for control groups ......................... 12 3 Results .................................................................................. 12 3.1 Changes in Settlement Intentions of Syrians in Germany following Assad’s Fall ........................................................................................ 12 3.2 DiD Evidence on Refugees’ Responses to Assad’s Fall ............................ 12 3.3 Potential Mechanisms .................................................................. 16 3.4 Differential Responses Across Legal, Economic, and Social Dimensions ....... 16 3.5 Robustness analyses ................................................................... 17 4 Conclusion .............................................................................. 19 References...................................................................................... 22 Appendix .................................................................................... 24 IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 3 Abstract On December 8, 2024, the sudden collapse of Bashar al‑Assad’s regime, abruptly changed Syria’s political landscape and reshaped the return prospects for millions of Syrians living abroad. We exploit this unanticipated regime change as a natural experiment to estimate the causal impact of homeland developments on refugees’ settlement and return intentions. Drawing on novel survey data from Germany, launched just days before Assad’s fall, we find that the regime collapse significantly affected the expressed settlement intentions of Syrians in Germany. Respondents interviewed afterward were more likely to express temporary settlement intentions, more likely to report emigration considerations, and more likely to express uncertainty about their future in Germany. However, we find no effect on concrete short‑term emigration plans, suggesting that increased return aspirations reflect forward‑looking intentions rather than immediate behavioral change. Further analyses shows that legal security in Germany and weaker social or emotional integration correlate with a stronger preference for temporary stay. Zusammenfassung Am 8. Dezember 2024 veränderte der plötzliche Zusammenbruch des Regimes von Bashar al‑Assad die politische Landschaft Syriens und die Rückkehraussichten für Millionen von im Ausland lebenden Syrern abrupt. Wir nutzen diesen unerwarteten Regimewechsel als natürliches Experiment, um die kausalen Auswirkungen der Entwicklungen im Heimatland auf die Ansiedlungs‑ und Rückkehrabsichten von Flüchtlingen zu schätzen. Auf der Grundlage neuartiger Umfragedaten aus Deutschland, die nur wenige Tage vor dem Sturz Assads erhoben wurden, stellen wir fest, dass der Zusammenbruch des Regimes die Ansiedlungsabsichten der Syrer in Deutschland erheblich beeinflusste. Befragte, die danach befragt wurden, äußerten eher temporäre Niederlassungsabsichten, gaben eher an, Auswanderungsüberlegungen zu haben, und äußerten eher Unsicherheit über ihre Zukunft in Deutschland. Wir finden jedoch keine Auswirkungen auf konkrete kurzfristige Auswanderungspläne, was darauf hindeutet, dass die erhöhten Rückkehrwünsche eher zukunftsorientierte Absichten als unmittelbare Verhaltensänderungen widerspiegeln. Weitere Analysen zeigen, dass Rechtssicherheit in Deutschland und eine schwächere soziale oder emotionale Integration mit einer stärkeren Präferenz für einen vorübergehenden Aufenthalt korrelieren. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 4 JEL F22, J15, D74 Keywords Migration, Settlement Intentions, Conflict, Syria, Germany, International Mobility Panel of Migrants in Germany (IMPa) Acknowledgments We thank participants at the IAB brownbag seminar for valuable comments. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 5 1 Introduction Unexpectedly, Bashar al‑Assad’s regime collapsed on December 8, 2024, bringing an end, at least provisionally, to decades of authoritarian rule, conflict, and widespread suffering among the Syrian population. In the immediate aftermath, several European countries – including Germany, Austria, France, Greece, and the United Kingdom – postponed the processing of asylum applications from Syrian nationals (e.g., LeMonde/AFP, 2024) and began reconsidering policies which facilitate voluntary return. However, despite this political turning point, conditions in Syria remain deeply insecure. A central and unresolved question is whether the approximately 6.2 million Syrian refugees living abroad (UNHCR, 2025) are now willing to return to their country of origin. This study offers first empirical insights into this question by leveraging newly collected, large‑scale survey data, the International Mobility Panel of Migrants in Germany ( ) (Kosyakova et al., 2025) and exploiting the natural experiment distilled from the unexpected timing of Assad’s fall, which occurred five days after the start of the fieldwork. This exogenous shock enables us to estimate the causal effect of a sudden and significant change in the homeland’s political situation on the return intentions of Syrian migrants residing in Germany. IMPa This question cannot be answered without understanding the current situation in Syria. Although Assad’s departure ended an era of authoritarianism and war, it did not bring immediate peace or stability. The war left deep scars: an estimated 500,000 people were killed (Daher, 2024), more than 13 million had been displaced – more than half internally, about 5 million in neighboring countries, over 1 million in Europe, and especially in Germany which hosts the largest number of Syrians outside of the Middle East (UNHCR, 2025). By 2024, 15.3 million Syrians required humanitarian aid. Basic needs remained unmet – with 90 percent of the population living in poverty, 13.6 million lacking access to clean water and sanitation, and food prices over 100 times higher than in 2013 (OCHA, 2025). The economy shrank by 54 percent from 2010 to 2021, and public spending remained devastated across sectors including health, education, and infrastructure (World Bank, 2024), The fall of Assad has further complicated the political landscape. The rebel group Hay’at Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS) announced a transitional government and declared a general amnesty. However, HTS remains designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), United States (US), and other countries (National Counterterrorism Center, 2022). Many religious and ethnic minorities now fear renewed persecution, particularly in regions such as Homs (France24, 2025), coastal cities (Bachega/Lapham, 2025), and Kurdish‑inhabited areas in northeast Syria (Gol, 2025). The UN Special Envoy for Syria has emphasized that ”the conflict has not ended yet” (Pedersen, 2024). IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 6 In contrast, Germany has become a central destination and host country for Syrian refugees since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 (Brücker/Kosyakova/Vallizadeh, 2020). Nearly 1 million Syrians reside in Germany today, including over 80,000 with permanent residence status and 165,000 who have acquired citizenship since 2014 (Destatis, 2025a,b) . By 2023, more than 287,000 Syrian nationals were employed, with 82 percent contributing to social insurance. Economic and sociocultural integration has progressed notably with longer duration of stay (Kanas/Kosyakova, 2023; Brücker et al., 2024). Syrian doctors now represent the largest foreign medical group in Germany, with 5,758 licensed practitioners (Brücker et al., 2024). These figures reflect both the scale of Syrian displacement and the degree of integration many refugees have achieved. To understand how such populations respond to homeland developments, we draw on theoretical models of return migration that emphasize both push and pull factors (e.g., Borjas, 1987), also specifically for the case of refugees (Onder/Sayed, 2020). Push factors refer to conditions in the host country (e.g., social isolation, legal insecurity, poor job prospects), while pull factors relate to the situation in the country of origin. Alrababah et al. (2023), studying Syrian refugees in Lebanon, identify four key determinants of return: (1) individual circumstances in the host country, (2) developments in the country of origin, (3) reallocation costs, and (4) the availability of credible information about the risks and opportunities regarding potential return. Their findings suggest that homeland conditions are the strongest predictors of return intentions—and only once these are perceived as secure do host‑country push factors (e.g., economic situation) begin to matter. We extend this literature by studying how a major political shock in the country of origin – the sudden collapse of Assad’s regime – shapes return preferences. Our framework also draws on Cassarino’s conceptual distinction between the willingness and the readiness to return (Cassarino, 2013). While willingness captures subjective aspirations, readiness reflects the capacity and preparedness to act (Cassarino, 2013). In line with this distinction, we examine three dimensions of migration decision‑making: general settlement preferences in Germany, emigration considerations, and concrete short‑term migration plans. Our empirical setting offers a rare natural experiment. The first wave of the International Mobility Panel of Migrants in Germany (IMPa) began fieldwork on December 3, 2024 – just five days before Assad’s fall. This timing enables us to compare the return intentions of Syrian refugees surveyed before and after the event. We use a Difference‑in‑Differences (DiD) approach to identify the causal effect of Assad’s fall, drawing on a control group of migrants from countries experiencing ongoing conflict and low return feasibility: Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. To ensure internal validity, we restrict our analysis to respondents interviewed between December 3 and 20, 2024 – a period during which 85 percent of the interviews were completed.1 This restriction minimizes the risk of contamination by longer‑term policy changes or delayed information diffusion. We present robustness checks using the full sample period, extending until the end of the survey on April 15th, 2025. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 1 7 Our study makes several important contributions. First, we provide causal evidence on how sudden political developments in the country of origin affect refugees’ behavior in the host country. Second, we distinguish between long‑term settlement intentions and short‑term emigration plans, capturing different temporal dimensions of return‑related decision making. Third, we test the potential channels for the regime change effect on refugees’ settlement intentions such as changes in the feeling of belonging to Syria or to the host‑country, discrimination experiences, and health status. Fourth, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects in the push‑ and pull factor framework by legal status, economic situation, and social integration. These analyses help disentangle the roles of host‑ and origin‑country factors in shaping migration decisions. Together, our findings provide new insights into the behavioral responses of refugees to homeland political change, and offer implications for policy debates about return, reintegration, and host‑country obligations in the wake of regime transitions. 2 Method 2.1 Data We use the first wave of the International Mobility Panel of Migrants in Germany (IMPa) (Kosyakova et al., 2025) a large‑scale survey conducted by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). The panel targets immigrants currently residing in Germany, with a particular focus on return and onward migration dynamics. The survey is conducted online to enable future follow‑ups, even after participants have already left Germany. The questionnaire was offered in 19 different languages to facilitate the understanding for the respondents.2 Participation was incentivized by a voucher of the value of 5 €. The overall response rate amounts to 5.9 percent. In its first wave, approximately 40,000 participants completed the survey. Fieldwork began on December 2, 2024, with the first responses recorded on December 3—five days before the unexpected collapse of the Assad regime. The majority of interviews (85 percent) were completed by December 20, 2024. Our main outcomes measure respondents’ settlement and migration intentions. The primary variable captures permanent stay intentions in Germany, based on the question: “Do you want to stay in Germany forever?” with response options: “Yes,” “No,” and “Don’t 2 These languages are: German, English, Polish, Spanish, Italian, French, Portuguese, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Czech, Greek, Dari, Arabic, Russian, Ukrainian, Croatian, Romanian, Serbian, Turkish. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 8 (post × Syria = 1.221; p‑val = 0.212; 95% CI, ‑0.695 to 3.138), nor on plans to return to the country of origin (post × Syria = 0.723; p‑val = 0.239; 95% CI, ‑0.481 to 1.926) or to move to a third country (post × Syria = 0.821; p‑val = 0.254; 95% CI, ‑0.591 to 2.233). Still, point estimates suggest a weak positive trend. The averages confirm that only a small number of Syrians and of the control group reported concrete plans to leave Germany within the next 12 months. To link these results with our findings on shifts in settlement intentions and emigration considerations, it appears that while Assad’s fall prompted significant changes in long‑term and abstract migration preferences, it did not immediately lead to changes in refugees’ concrete migration plans. Table 2: Concrete emigration plans for the next 12 months Emigration plans Return plans Onward migration plans Syria vs. conflict/war countries ‑0.889 ‑0.682+ ‑0.521 (0.703) (0.399) (0.507) Post 0.236 0.172 0.069 (0.472) (0.331) (0.347) Post × Syria 1.221 0.723 0.821 (0.977) (0.614) (0.720) Constant 2.083*** 0.983*** 1.122*** (0.377) (0.262) (0.279) Observations 5,257 5,195 5,201 Pre‑treatment mean (SD) Syria 2.17 0.90 1.19 (14.57) (9.44) (10.87) Conflict / war countries 2.23 1.10 1.17 (14.57) (9.44) (10.87) Notes: The dummy variable Emigration plans equals 1 if the respondent reported having concrete plans to emigrate from Germany within the next 12 months, and 0 otherwise. Return plans indicates whether the respondent plans to return to their country of origin within the next 12 months, as opposed to having no emigration plans. Onward migration plans captures whether the respondent intends to move to a third country within the next 12 months, as opposed to having no emigration plans. The dummy variable post equals 1 from December 8, 2024 onwards (Assad’s fall), the variable Syria equals 1 if the respondent’s country of origin is Syria, or 0 if it belongs to the control group. The interaction term Post × Syria measures the effect of being Syrian and being surveyed in the Post Assad era. The regressions include observations collected between December 3‑20, 2024. The control group Conflict/war countries consists of persons originating from Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Ukraine. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The pre‑treatment means measure the average before Assad’s fall. The standard deviation is shown in parentheses below. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.01. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 15 3.3 Potential Mechanisms Since we found significant effects of the regime change in Syria on Syrians’ settlement intentions and emigration considerations, we next examine potential mechanisms behind this behavioral response. Specifically, we assess whether and how the political shift in Syria influenced other attitudes and conditions among Syrians in Germany. Estimates from Supplementary Table A.3 suggest that following Assad’s fall, Syrian respondents expressed a higher emotional attachment to their home country compared to the control group (Column 1, Panel A, Table A.3). This effect may reflect a renewed connection to Syria, likely driven by the collapse of the regime that had previously forced them to flee. In parallel, the German political debate quickly pivoted toward questions of return, with prominent media outlets reporting calls to ”send Syrians back to Syria” (e.g. Tagesschau, 2024). This raised the question of whether perceptions of Germany had also changed. However, Column 2 in Panel A of Table A.3 shows no evidence of a decline in Syrians’ emotional attachment to Germany. Moreover, we do not observe an increase in perceived experiences of unfair treatment in public (Panel B of Table A.3) – on the contrary, such perceptions slightly decreased. Finally, we find a modest decline in the share of Syrians reporting plans to reunite with family members in Germany (Column 4 in Panel A of Table A.3). Taken together with the observed increases in emigration considerations and decreases in permanent settlement intentions in Germany, this may suggest a subtle reorientation of future reunification plans away from Germany and toward the country of origin. For other outcomes, such as remittances, life or job satisfaction, social isolation, perceived welcome, time spent with Germans or co‑ethnics, and broader experiences of discrimination—we find no significant changes (see Table A.3). 3.4 Differential Responses Across Legal, Economic, and Social Dimensions To better understand which factors may “push” Syrians out of Germany, we draw on the push‑and‑pull framework and examine whether different subgroups responded differently to the political shock. Specifically, we re‑estimate our DiD models including a triple interaction for being surveyed after Assad’s fall, being of Syrian origin and subgroup characteristics. Figure 2 plots the coefficients for these triple interaction terms, capturing differential effects across groups. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 16 We classify host‑country push factors in four domains: legal security (secure residence status, i.e., possession of German or EU citizenship or a permanent residence permit), economic integration (employment, unemployment, and receipt of state welfare benefits), and social integration (no emotional attachment to Germany, no emotional attachment to local place of living, low life satisfaction and perceived social isolation). The main pull factor—Syria’s changed security outlook after Assad’s fall—is captured by the interaction term post × Syria (not included in the figure).9 Legal security appears to function as a strong positive push factor. Syrians with secure residence status in Germany — such as citizenship or a permanent residence permit — were more likely to express temporary stay intentions and report emigration considerations, but also indicate greater uncertainty about their future settlement. This may reflect lower perceived barriers to reallocation, as individuals with secure legal status typically retain the right to return to Germany if needed. In contrast, asylum seekers often face significant legal and logistical obstacles that restrict mobility, particularly in relation to return to Syria. Economic integration, as measured by employment and unemployment status10, does not significantly influence migration intentions. However, reliance on state welfare benefits is associated with a significantly lower likelihood of expressing temporary stay intentions. This may indicate that the financial costs of relocating—such as travel and reintegration expenses—are prohibitively high for individuals dependent on state support. Alternatively, it may reflect the limited reintegration opportunities available in Syria. At the same time, reliance on welfare benefits is likely closely tied to legal status, as recipients are typically required to remain in Germany and demonstrate efforts to integrate into the labor market. A low level of social integration appears to be an important push factor. Syrians who report lower emotional attachment to the host country and their local communities, and who display lower life satisfaction are significantly more likely to express temporary stay intentions. 3.5 Robustness analyses To assess the robustness of our findings, we conduct several additional analyses. Panels A and B in Supplementary Table A.1 test two alternative control groups: (1) asylum‑seeking populations with strong prospects of remaining in Germany during the 9 The overall effect on temporary settlement intentions is 4.31, on uncertain settlement intentions 7.58 and on emigration considerations 4.01 10 Employment is defined as having a paid job. Unemployment is defined as being registered as unemployed. A large fraction of people without jobs are not registered as unemployed. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 17 Figure 2: Coefficient plots for the probability of temporary and uncertain settlement intentions in Germany, and emigration considerations, by group Temporary stay intentions Secure status = 1 # post # Syria Employed = 1 # post # Syria Unemployed = 1 # post # Syria Welfare support = 1 # post # Syria Not Connected GER = 1 # post # Syria Not Connected local place = 1 # post # Syria Not satisfied with life = 1 # post # Syria Social isolation = 1 # post # Syria -32 -28 -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 Uncertain settlement intentions Secure status = 1 # post # Syria Employed = 1 # post # Syria Unemployed = 1 # post # Syria Welfare support = 1 # post # Syria Not Connected GER = 1 # post # Syria Not Connected local place = 1 # post # Syria Not satisfied with life = 1 # post # Syria Social isolation = 1 # post # Syria -32 -28 -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 Emigration considerations Secure status = 1 # post # Syria Employed = 1 # post # Syria Unemployed = 1 # post # Syria Welfare support = 1 # post # Syria Not Connected GER = 1 # post # Syria Not Connected local place = 1 # post # Syria Not satisfied with life = 1 # post # Syria Social isolation = 1 # post # Syria -32 -28 -24 -20 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 Notes: The graphs plot the coefficients for the triple interaction group*Syria*post, that is the differential treatment effect for the specific group. The outcome variables are the intention not to stay forever in Germany, the uncertainty about this choice, and emigration aspirations formed within the last 12 months. Secure status = German / EU citizen / permanent residence permit, Employed = having a paid job, Unemployed = being registered as unemployed, Welfare support indicates the reception of public welfare support. The measures for social integration indicate subjective perceptions. The plots include 95% confidence intervals, so that each coefficient for which the confidence interval does not exceed the vertical line at 0% is statistically significant from 0 at the 5% level. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 18 4 Conclusion 2015–2016 refugee peak—namely Iraqis, Iranians, Eritreans, and Somalis (Kosyakova/Brenzel, 2020), and (2) asylum seekers from countries with a good prospect of remaining in Germany in 2022–2024, such as Afghanistan, Eritrea, and Somalia (BAMF, 2022). The estimated effects on temporary stay intentions remain robust and even increase in size. However, differences in uncertainty and emigration considerations compared to these groups are no longer statistically significant. Panel C in Table A.1 shows that results are stable when including observations through April 15, 2025. The coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged. Panel D restricts the observational period to the symmetric window of 5 days before and after the regime collapse, i.e., from December 3 ‑ 12, 2024. While the point estimates go in the same direction as in our main results, due to the smaller sample, the standard errors are very large such that they are not statistically significant. In Panel E, we introduce a rich set of individual‑level confounders into the DiD models, including gender, tranche of survey invitation, family location, and possession of a university degree.11 The results remain robust, although the effect on emigration considerations becomes statistically insignificant. In Section 2method we discuss possible selection into participation in the survey in more detail. As a complementary check, we estimate a regression discontinuity (RD) design focusing on Syrian respondents only using December 8 as the cut‑off date.12 Table A.2 shows that RD estimates generally align in direction with our DiD results but lack statistical significance, likely due to the local nature of RD and limited sample size near the threshold. This study provides novel causal evidence on how sudden geopolitical developments in refugees’ countries of origin—specifically, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria—can shape immigrants’ settlement and return intentions. Leveraging the unique timing of the IMPa survey in Germany, we show that this political turning point led to a significant and immediate reduction in the share of Syrians expressing a desire to stay permanently in 11 These covariates were selected based on (marginally) significant pre‑post imbalances within the group of Syrians (see Table A.4). 12 The RD approach uses only Syrians to test for a discontinuous break at the cut‑off date of December 8, 2024. The approach uses few observations, which are determined by the optimal bandwidth using the rdrobust command. The approach can apply different trends (no trend, linear, or higher order polynomials) before and after the cut‑off which we report in the Table A.2. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 19 Germany. This reduction in permanent settlement intentions was accompanied by an increase in both uncertainty and emigration considerations. When examining potential underlying mechanisms, we find that while emotional attachment to Germany remained largely unchanged, Syrian respondents reported a significant increase in attachment to their home country following Assad’s fall. This suggests that the regime collapse reactivated a symbolic or affective connection to Syria, rather than reflecting disillusionment with life in Germany. This interpretation resonates with theoretical perspectives that emphasize the role of identity, belonging, and perceived political opportunity in shaping return aspirations (Carling/Pettersen, 2014). Our heterogeneity analysis further refines this picture and highlights key host‑country conditions that shape responses to the regime change. Legal security—such as holding permanent residency or citizenship—emerges as a strong push factor, likely because it lowers the perceived risks of return since these migrants still possess the right to return to Germany any time. In contrast, reliance on welfare benefits is associated with lower mobility intentions, possibly due to institutional obligations or limited means. Social integration factors, such as feeling welcome, emotionally connected, and satisfied with life in Germany, are linked to stronger settlement intentions, while social isolation increases openness to emigration. These results confirm that social embeddedness can serve as a powerful anchor against mobility (De Haas/Fokkema, 2011). Despite the marked shifts in settlement intentions and emigration considerations, these changes were not mirrored in respondents’ short‑term emigration plans: only about one percent of Syrians reported concrete plans to emigrate in the following year. This apparent discrepancy points to a common gap between willingness and readiness to return (Cassarino, 2013), likely shaped by logistical, legal, and emotional constraints, particularly in post‑conflict or uncertain return scenarios (Müller‑Funk/Fransen, 2023). Our findings must be interpreted in light of some limitations. First, our data capture immediate attitudinal shifts following a singular political event: longer‑term panel data would be needed to assess the persistence of these effects and their connection to actual behavior. Second, although our identification strategy offers strong internal validity, the generalizability of results may be limited to Syrian refugees in Germany. Third, the sequencing of questions and the self‑selection of interview timing13 may have influenced the way respondents reported their intentions and considerations. In conclusion, the study demonstrates that political developments in origin countries can have rapid and measurable effects on refugees’ aspirations—even among those who appear 13 We do show in the methods section that the comparison of characteristics before and after Assad’s fall doesn’t point towards major selection issues. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 20 well‑integrated in their host society. However, it also shows that policymakers should not interpret such shifts as signals of readiness to return. Return remains a complex process shaped by emotional ties, legal realities, and structural constraints. Policy responses to regime change in countries of origin must therefore avoid simplistic assumptions about voluntary return and recognize the enduring weight of integration experiences in the host country. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 21 References Alrababah, Ala; Masterson, Daniel; Casalis, Marine; Hangartner, Dominik; Weinstein, Jeremy (2023): The dynamics of refugee return: Syrian refugees and their migration intentions. In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 4, p. 1108–1131. Bachega, Hugo; Lapham, Jake (2025): Worst violence in Syria since Assad fall as dozens killed in clashes. Accessed: 2025‑03‑19. BAMF (2022): Anpassung der Herkunftsländer „mit guter Bleibeperspektive“. Accessed: 2025‑05‑05. 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World Bank (2024): The World Bank In Syrian Arab Republic. Accessed: 2025‑03‑19. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 23 Appendix Figure A.1: Pre‑trends – the wish to stay in Germany permanently Notes: Annual averages. Conflict/war countries include Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Ukraine. All observations are weighted by their survey weight. Source: IAB‑BAMF‑SOEP. IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 24 List of Figures Figure 1: Difference in stay intentions between groups before and after Assad’s fall ........................................................................................ 13 Figure 2: Coefficient plots for the probability of temporary and uncertain settle‑ ment intentions in Germany, and emigration considerations, by group .... 18 Figure A.1: Pre‑trends – the wish to stay in Germany permanently ...................... 24 List of Tables Table 1: Long‑term intentions ................................................................ 14 Table 2: Concrete emigration plans for the next 12 months ............................. 15 Table A.1: Robustness – Long‑term intentions................................................ 25 Table A.2: RD regressions – Long‑term intentions ........................................... 26 Table A.3: Potential channels ................................................................... 27 Table A.4: Characteristics of Syrian respondents before and after Assad’s downfall .. 28 Table A.5: Characteristics of respondents from conflict / war countries before and after Assad’s downfall ............................................................... 29 Table A.6: Summary statistics of treatment and control groups .......................... 30 Table A.7: Questions concerning settlement plans........................................... 30 IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 31 Imprint IAB‑Discussion Paper 09|2025 Publication Date June 26, 2025 Publisher Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Employment Agency Regensburger Straße 104 90478 Nürnberg Germany All rights reserved This publication is published under the following Creative Commons licence: Attribution – ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY‑SA 4.0) https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by‑sa/4.0/deed.de Download https://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2025/dp0925.pdf All publications in the series “IAB-Discusssion Paper” can be downloaded from https://iab.de/en/publications/iab‑publications/iab‑discussion‑paper‑en/ Website https://iab.de/en ISSN 2195‑2663 DOI 10.48720/IAB.DP.2509 Corresponding author Luisa Hammer E‑Mail [email protected] ++49 0911 1773004